INTRODUCTORY    PHILOSOPHY 


J.  F.  SOLLIER,  S.T.D., 

Provincial  S.M. 


Smprimatttt : 

^  JOHN  CARDINAL  FARLEY, 

Archbishop  of  New  York. 


February  7th,  1912. 


INTRODUCTORY 
PHILOSOPHY 


A    TEXT-BOOK 

FOR    COLLEGES   AND 

HIGH    SCHOOLS 


BY 

CHARLES  A.  DUBRAY,    S.M.,    PH.  D. 

PROFESSOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY   AT    THE 
MARIST  COLLEGE,   WASHINGTON,  D.C. 


LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO. 

FOURTH  AVENUE  &  30rn  STREET,  NEW  YORK 
LONDON,  BOMBAY  AND  CALCUTTA 

1912 


COPYRIGHT,    IQI2,    BY 
LONGMANS,    GREEN,    AND    CO, 


ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 


THB. PLIMPTON-PRESS 
[  W  •  D  •  O  ] 

NORWOOD.  MASS'U'S'A 


PREFACE 

THE  efforts  which  have  been  made  in  recent  years  to  provide 
the  beginner  in  philosophy  with  a  text-book  suited  to  his  needs 
are  justified  both  by  the  importance  of  the  subject  and  by  the 
requirements  of  educational  method.  It  is  obvious  that  an  intro- 
duction should  really  introduce,  in  other  words  that  it  should 
present  philosophy  in  such  a  way  as  to  arouse  the  student's  interest, 
give  him  a  firm  grasp  of  essentials,  and  encourage  him  to  further 
study.  But  how  these  results  are  to  be  secured  is  still  an  open 
question.  The  books  that  have  so  far  appeared  have,  each  from 
its  own  point  of  view,  distinct  advantages  either  as  outlining  the 
history  of  philosophical  problems,  or  as  setting  forth  the  claims  of 
rival  systems,  or  as  explaining  the  principles  which  serve  as  the 
foundation  of  some  special  system  and  a  basis  of  criticism  in  dis- 
cussing variant  theories.  An  introduction  that  will  combine  these 
several  utilities  seems  to  be  our  present  need. 

Dr.  Dubray's  aim  in  this  volume  is  to  lead  the  student  by  easy 
approaches  into  the  field  of  philosophy  and  to  show  him  its  divisions 
with  their  several  problems  and  the  solutions  which  these  have 
received.  In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  correct  method, 
the  knowledge  which  the  student  has  already  acquired  is  made  to 
serve  as  the  starting-point,  and  from  this  he  is  led  on  to  the  con- 
sideration of  more  abstract  philosophical  concepts  and  theories. 
These  again  are  presented  in  clear  statement  and  orderly  sequence, 
with  sufficient  indication  of  outstanding  questions,  yet  without  the 
excess  of  detail  which  sometimes  destroys  proportion  or  results  in 
narrowness  of  view.  At  the  same  time,  definite  conclusions  are 
presented  with  the  evidence  on  which  they  rest,  so  that  the  student 
may  get  from  his  use  of  the  book  not  merely  a  lot  of  vague  question- 
ings, but  a  certain  amount  of  positive  knowledge  and  critical 
direction  for  later  investigation. 


247041 


VI  PREFACE 

Students  of  Catholic  philosophy  will  appreciate  both  the  form 
and  the  content  of  this  manual.  While  adhering  to  the  principles 
of  Scholasticism,  the  author  has  kept  steadily  in  view  the  develop- 
ment of  modern  philosophy  and  the  recent  advances  of  science. 
It  is  not  possible  of  course  to  effect  a  conciliation  all  along  the  line 
where  the  aim  is  rather  to  open  up  the  whole  subject.  But  impor- 
tant service,  can  be  rendered  by  illustrating  the  method  by  which 
the  old  and  the  new  may  be  combined.  This  feature  of  the  book 
is  the  more  helpful  because  the  student,  working  simultaneously  in 
other  departments  of  knowledge,  is  sure  to  come  upon  problems 
which  lead  up  to  philosophy.  This  is  true  not  only  of  the  physical 
and  biological  sciences,  but  also  of  the  social  and  historical.  In 
each  of  these,  whatever  be  the  special  subject  of  study,  there  is 
needed  a  certain  seasoning  of  philosophical  principle  and  method 
in  order  that  the  student  may  see  scientific  facts,  not  in  their  first 
crudeness  or  isolation,  but  as  parts  of  a  larger  truth.  In  this  way 
he  will  not  only  give  to  each  item  of  knowledge  its  proportionate 
value,  but  will  also  form  the  habit  of  philosophical  thinking,  which 
in  itself  is  the  best  result  that  can  be  derived  from  an  introductory 
course. 

In  Catholic  colleges,  importance  has  always  been  attached  to 
the  study  of  philosophy  both  as  a  means  of  culture  and  as  a  source 
of  information  regarding  the  great  truths  which  are  influential  in 
supporting  Christian  belief  and  in  shaping  character.  It  is  rightly 
considered  essential  for  every  graduate  to  have  a  training  in  logic 
and  in  the  fundamentals  of  psychology,  ethics,  and  metaphysics. 
But  if  this  training  is  to  be  successful,  philosophy  must  be  presented 
not  as  a  complex  of  abstruse  speculations  on  far-off  inaccessible 
topics,  but  as  a  system  of  truths  that  enter  with  vital  consequence 
into  our  ordinary  thinking  and  our  everyday  conduct.  For  be- 
ginners especially  it  is  not  the  best  plan  to  take  up  first  the  science 
and  art  of  reasoning  where  the  formal  treatment  predominates. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  study  of  logic  itself  becomes  more  attractive 
when  it  follows  that  of  ethics  or  psychology.  There  is  yet  consider- 
able difference  of  opinion  as  to  which  of  the  philosophical  disciplines 
should  have  precedence;  but  if  the  choice  is  to  be  made  with  due 
regard  to  the  scientific  subjects  which  have  previously  been  studied, 


PREFACE  Vll 

psychology  would  seem  to  have  the  strongest  claim.  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  value  of  its  empirical  methods  is  quite  compatible  with 
the  philosophical  discussion  of  its  central  problems,  and  its  own 
conclusions  find  numerous  applications  in  other  fields  of  research. 

Teachers  of  philosophy  realize  that  the  difficulties  encountered 
in  an  introductory  course  can,  in  part  at  least,  be  overcome  by  the 
use  of  a  suitable  text-book.    As  it  is  not  desirable  that  the  student ,y 
should  memorize  a  set  of  formulae  for  the  purpose  of  recitation  orr 
examination,  it  is  also  unwise  to  expand  each  topic  in  such  lengthy' 
fulness  that  no  margin  is  left  for  individual  thinking.    The  con- 
ciseness that  marked  the  writings  of  the  great  Schoolmen  is  an 
art  that  may  yet  be  revived.     It  leaves  the  teacher  scope  to  de- 
velop the  text,  to  suggest  new  points  of  view,  and  to  select  special 
topics  for  discussion.    The  best  features  of  the  lecture  method  may 
in  this  way  be  added  to  the  ordinary  class  exercise  and  the  student 
be  gradually  led  on  to  examine  each  statement  in  the  light  of 
established  principles  and  with  a  single  eye  for  the  truth  —  which 
is  the  attitude  and  temper  of  the  really  critical  mind. 

Dr.  Dubray  has  profited  by  his  experience  as  a  teacher,  and  in 
this  volume  he  offers  the  results  with  the  hope  that  they  may  be 
useful  to  others.  He  has  certainly  contributed  his  share  toward 
encouraging  the  beginner  in  philosophy  and  has  indicated  a  line 
of  approach  which  is  neither  too  steep  nor  too  easy.  If  it  smoothes 
out  some  of  the  hard  places,  it  leaves  ample  room  for  hard  thinking. 

EDWARD  A.  PACE 
THE  CATHOLIC  UNIVERSITY  OF  AMERICA 
March  7,  1912 


CONTENTS 


GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  PHILOSOPHY 3 

1.  What  has  been  done  already 3 

2.  What  remains  to  be  done 4 

3.  Definition  of  philosophy 7.* 

4.  Division  of  philosophy 9 

5.  Method  of  philosophy n 

II.  GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  WORLD  AND  OF  MAN 13 

1.  The  self  and  the  not-self 13 

2.  The  not-self  and  its  obvious  characteristics  .      .      .     .     .     .     .  15 

3.  Relations  of  the  self  with  the  external  world 17 

4.  Obvious  characteristics  of  the  self 19 


PSYCHOLOGY,   OR   THE   EMPIRICAL  STUDY  OF 
THE   MIND 

INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 22 

1.  Definition  and  subject-matter 22 

2.  Method  of  psychology  . 26 

3.  Division  of  mental  processes 27 

II.  THE  GENERAL  LAWS  OF  THE  MIND 29 

1.  A  danger  to  be  avoided 29 

2.  General  processes  and  attitudes  of  the  mind 31 

3.  General  laws  of  the  mind 35 

CHAPTER  I 

KNOWLEDGE 

PRELIMINARY  REMARKS 40 

ARTICLE  I.    SENSE  PRESENTATION 

I.  SENSATION 44 

1.  Sensation  in  general 44 

2.  Internal  or  general  sensations 46 

iz 


X  CONTENTS 

3.  External  sensations 46 

(a)   Smell  and  taste 47 

(6)   Touch 49 

(c)  Hearing 51 

(d)  Vision •  52 

4.  Number  and  comparison  of  the  senses 53 

5.  Psychophysics  and  psychophysiology 56 

II.  PERCEPTION 62 

1.  Analysis  and  genesis  of  sense-perception 62 

2.  Perceptions  of  smell  and  taste 64 

3.  Auditory  perceptions 65 

4.  Tactual  perceptions 66 

5.  Visual  perceptions 67 

ARTICLE  II.    SENSE  REPRESENTATION 

I.  THE  MENTAL  IMAGE 71 

1.  Nature  of  the  image 71 

2.  Properties  of  the  image 73 

3.  Association  and  its  laws 76 

II.  IMAGINATION 78 

1.  Nature  of  imagination        78 

2.  Importance  of  imagination 79 

3.  Training  of  the  imagination 81 

III.  MEMORY 83 

1.  Nature  of  memory 83 

2.  Qualities  and  conditions  of  a  good  memory  .......  85 

3.  Culture  of  memory 86 

4.  Time-perception 88 

IV.  ILLUSIONS  or  THE  SENSES 89 

1.  Nature  of  illusions  and  hallucinations 89 

2.  Main  causes  of  illusions  and  hallucinations 90 

ARTICLE  III.    CONCEPTION 

I.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  CONCEPT 92 

1.  Various  terms  explained 92 

2.  The  essential  characteristics  of  the  concept 94 

II.   GENESIS  OF  THE  CONCEPT 98 

1.  Various  proposed  systems        08 

2.  Discussion  of  the  systems ,    .     ,  102 

ARTICLE  IV.    JUDGMENT 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT I07 

1.  The  psychological  process I0y 

2.  Various  kinds  of  judgments IO8 


CONTENTS  xi 

II.  GENESIS  OF  THE  JUDGMENT no 

1.  General no 

2.  Genesis  of  necessary  judgments .112 

3.  Genesis  of  mediate  judgments.    Inference.    Reasoning     .      .      .  115 

4.  The  processes  of  judging  and  reasoning  in  ordinary  life     .     .      .  117 

ARTICLE  V.    LANGUAGE 

I.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  LANGUAGE 122 

1.  Signs  in  general.     Signs  of  mental  processes 122 

2.  Special  signs  of  intellectual  ideas.    Language 124 

II.  LANGUAGE  AND  THOUGHT 126 

1.  In  the  speaker  or  writer 126 

2.  In  the  hearer  or  reader 128 

REMARKS  ON  THIS  CHAPTER .129 

1.  General  conspectus  of  cognitive  faculties 129 

2.  Genesis  of  some  ideas  and  principles 131 

3.  Development  of  intellectual  cognition 133 


CHAPTER  II 
FEELING 

INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 137 

ARTICLE  I.    FEELINGS  OF  PLEASURE  AND  PAIN 

I.  NATURE  AND  LAWS  OF  THESE  FEELINGS 139 

1.  Nature  of  the  feelings 139 

2.  Laws  of  feelings 140 

II.  IMPORTANCE  OF  FEELINGS .142 

ARTICLE  II.    EMOTIONS 

I.  SELF-REGARDING  EMOTIONS 145 

II.  ALTRUISTIC  EMOTIONS        148 

ARTICLE  III.    SENTIMENTS 

I.    INTELLECTUAL  SENTIMENTS 153 

II.  ^ESTHETIC  SENTIMENTS 155 

III.  MORAL  SENTIMENTS    . 157 

IV.  RELIGIOUS  SENTIMENTS 158 

CONCLUSION.    IMPORTANCE  AND  CULTURE  OF  AFFECTIVE  LIFE  .     .     .  160 

1.  Importance  of  affective  life 160 

2.  Cultivation  of  affective  life 163 


xil  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III 
ACTING  AND  WILLING 
ARTICLE  I.    ACTION  AND  MODES  OF  ACTION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 166 

1.  Meaning  of  action 166 

2.  General  modes  of  action 167 

II.  NON- VOLITIONAL  ACTION 169 

1.  Random,  automatic,  and  reflex  movements  .      .     .    . .     .     .     .     169 

2.  Impulsive  and  instinctive  movements 171 

III.  VOLITIONAL  ACTION 173 

IV.  HABIT 175 

ARTICLE  II.    DETERMINANTS  AND  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 

1.  Determinants  and  motors  of  the  will 177 

2.  Freedom  of  the  will 178 

CONCLUSION.    CULTIVATION  OF  THE  WILL 185 

1.  The  qualities  and  defects  of  the  will 185 

2.  Some  principles  to  be  used  in  will-culture 187 

CHAPTER  IV 

SUPPLEMENTARY  — SOME    SPECIAL   RELATIONS    AND 
MODES  OF  MENTAL  PROCESSES 

I.  MIND  AND  ORGANISM JQO 

1.  Mutual  relations  of  dependence  and  influence 190 

2.  Cerebral  localization I92 

II.  SOME  SPECIAL  MENTAL  CONDITIONS 194 

CONCLUSION  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  —  CHARACTER  AND  PERSONALITY     ...  203 

LOGIC,  OR  THE  NORMATIVE  SCIENCE  OF 

THE  INTELLECT 
INTRODUCTION 205 

CHAPTER  I 
REASONING 

ARTICLE  I.    THE  IDEA 

I.  NATURE  OF  IDEAS 2o8 

i.  The  idea  in  logic 20g 


CONTENTS  xiii 

2.  Intension  and  extension  of  ideas  and  terms  .     .     .     .     .     .     .  211 

3.  Division  of  ideas  and  terms 212 

II.  DEFINITION  AND  DIVISION 215 

1.  Definition 215 

2.  Division         217 

ARTICLE  II.    THE  JUDGMENT 

1.  Nature  of  the  judgment  and  proposition 219 

2.  Division  of  judgments  and  propositions 219 

3.  Related  propositions 222 

ARTICLE  III.    REASONING 

I.  THE  PERFECT  SYLLOGISM 226 

1.  Nature  of  the  syllogism 226 

2.  Figures  and  moods  of  the  syllogism 227 

3.  Rules  of  the  syllogism 228 

II.  VARIOUS  KINDS  OF  ARGUMENTS 230 

III.  PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 233 


CHAPTER  II 

METHOD 

OBJECT  OF  THIS  CHAPTER 237 

ARTICLE  I.    THE  TERMINI 

I.  THE  END  TO  BE  REACHED 238 

1.  The  nature  of  science 238 

2.  Classification  of  sciences 240 

II.  THE  STARTING-POINT .  243 

ARTICLE  II.    THE  PROGRESS 

I.  THE  VALUE  OF  THE  ARGUMENTS 244 

1.  Demonstration 244 

2.  Probable  arguments 246 

II.  THE  Two  GENERAL  METHODS 250 

.   Induction 251 

2.  Deduction 254 

III.  OBSTACLES 256 

1.  Fallacies 256 

2.  Error 260 

CONCLUSION  OF  LOGIC  .  262 


xiv  CONTENTS 

AESTHETICS,  OR  THE  NORMATIVE  SCIENCE  OF 
THE  FEELINGS  OF  THE  BEAUTIFUL 

INTRODUCTION 265 

1.  What  is  aesthetics? 265 

2.  The  place  of  aesthetics 266 

CHAPTER  I 
BEAUTY 

1.  Subjective  aspect 270 

2.  Objective  conditions 271 

CHAPTER  II 
THE  FINE  ARTS 

1.  Nature  of  the  fine  arts 275 

2.  Art  and  nature 276 

3.  The  production  of  works  of  art 277 

4.  Classification  of  the  fine  arts 279 


ETHICS,  OR  THE  NORMATIVE  SCIENCE  OF 
THE  WILL 

INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  MEANING  OF  ETHICAL  SCIENCE 2gr 

1.  Facts        2gj. 

2.  The  science  of  ethics 2gx 

II.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CONDITIONS  OF  MORALITY I  287 

y 


Knowledge *  2g7 

,    -   Feelings 288 

\  3-  Will 28o 

CHAPTER  I 

FUNDAMENTAL  ETHICS 
ARTICLE  I.    THE  MORAL  NORMS  OR  LAWS 


i.  Definition  and  divisions 


CONTENTS  XV 

2.  Characteristics  of  the  moral  law 294 

3.  Existence  of  the  moral  law 295 

II.   CONSCIENCE        299 

1.  Nature  of  conscience 299 

2.  Value  of  conscience  as  the  rule  of  actions 300 

ARTICLE  II.    THE  MORAL  STANDARD 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 303 

1.  The  object  of  the  present  article 303 

2.  Different  views  classified 304 

II.  THE  QUESTION  DISCUSSED 306 

1.  Positive  determination  of  the  moral  good 306 

2.  Morality  based  on  a  special  sentiment 309 

3.  Morality  relative  to  pleasure  and  utility 313 

4.  Morality  dependent  on  reason 319 

5.  The  ultimate  foundation  of  the  moral  law 323 

6.  Conclusion 326 

CHAPTER  II 

APPLIED   ETHICS 

RIGHT  AND  DUTY 328 

ARTICLE  I.    PERSONAL  ETHICS  OR  DUTIES  TOWARD  ONESELF 

EXISTENCE  OF  DUTIES  TOWARD  ONESELF 331 

I.  DUTIES  REFERRING  CHIEFLY  TO  THE  MIND 332 

1.  Personal  dignity 332 

2.  Intelligence 333 

3-   Will 334 

4.    Conclusion 336 

II.  DUTIES  REFERRING  CHIEFLY  TO  THE  BODY 337 

1.  Negative  duties 337 

2.  Positive  duties 341 

ARTICLE  II.    SOCIAL  ETHICS  OR  DUTIES  OF  MAN  TOWARD 
OTHER  MEN 

EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THESE  DUTIES 341 

I.  DUTIES  TOWARD  INDIVIDUAL  MEN 344 

1.  Duties  toward  the  person  of  Others 344 

2.  Duties  toward  the  property  of  others 347 

II.  SOCIAL  DUTIES 352 

1.  The  family 353 

2.  The  state 354 

CONCLUSION  OF  ETHICS 360 


XVI  CONTENTS 

EPISTEMOLOGY,   OR  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  EPISTEMOLOGY 362 

II.  FACTS  AND  PROBLEMS 364 

1.  Facts 364 

2.  Problems 368 

III.  METHOD 369 

CHAPTER  I 

IS  CERTITUDE  JUSTIFIED? 

1.  Scepticism 373 

2.  Agnosticism 376 

3.  Dogmatism 377 

CHAPTER  II 

CERTITUDES 

1.  Facts 380 

2.  Empiricism 382 

3.  Rationalism 383 

CHAPTER  III 

WHAT  IS  KNOWLEDGE? 

I.  FACT  OF  KNOWLEDGE 385 

II.   VALUE  OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  ASPECT  OF  KNOWLEDGE   .     .     .  386 

1.  In  general 386 

2.  The  external  world 389 

3.  Ideal  truths 395 

4-~  Summary  and  corollaries 399 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  CRITERIA  OF  VALID  KNOWLEDGE 

I.  THE  ULTIMATE  CRITERION 403 

i.   Theories  of  a  criterion  extrinsic  to  both  the  knowing  mind  and 

the  object  known  by  this  mind 403 


CONTENTS  Xvii 

2.  Theories  of  a  subjective  criterion,  intrinsic  to  the  knower,  but 

extrinsic  to  the  object 405 

3.  Theory  of  a  criterion  intrinsic  to  the  object  and,  in  a  certain 

sense,  also  to  the  knower 411 

II.  DERIVATIVE  CRITERIA 414 

1.  Personal  faculties  coming  in  direct  contact  with  the  known  object    414 

2.  Indirect  relation  of  the  mind  with  the  known  object 417 

CONCLUSION  OF  EPISTEMOLOGY 421 


COSMOLOGY,  OR  THE  METAPHYSICAL  STUDY  OF 
THE  PHYSICAL  WORLD 

INTRODUCTION 422 


CHAPTER  I 

INORGANIC  SUBSTANCES 

I.  PROPERTIES 425 

II.  CONSTITUTION 426 

1.  The  question  stated . 426 

2.  Discussion  of  the  systems 428 

CHAPTER  II 

LIVING  BEINGS 

I.  THE  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  LIFE 432 

1.  In  general 432 

2.  Manifestations  of  life 434 

II.  NATURE  OF  THE  LIVING  BEING 436 

1.  Theories 436 

2.  Discussion 436 

CHAPTER  III 
ORIGIN  AND  EVOLUTION 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 439 

II.  THE  INORGANIC  WORLD 441 

III.  THE  ORGANIC  WORLD 441 

1.  The  origin  of  life 442 

2.  The  origin  of  the  various  forms  of  life 443 


xviii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 
THE  COSMOS 

INTRODUCTORY 448 

I.  SPACE  AND  TIME 449 

1.  Space 449 

2.  Time 451 

II.  THE  LAWS  OF  NATURE 452 

1.   Meaning  and  properties 452 

B.   Efficiency  and  teleology 454 

CONCLUSION  OF  COSMOLOGY 457 

RATIONAL   PSYCHOLOGY,    OR    PHILOSOPHY   OF 
THE   HUMAN  MIND 

INTRODUCTION 458 

CHAPTER  I 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

1.  Meaning  of  substantiality 460 

2.  Proofs  of  the  substantiality 461 

3.  Phenomenalism 463 

4.  Multiple  personality 465 

CHAPTER  II 

SPIRITUALITY 

1.  The  question  stated 469 

2.  The  simplicity  of  the  soul        470 

SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 471 

1.  Specific  human  activities 471 

2.  Spirituality  of  the  human  soul 474 

3.  Psychological  materialism 476 

CHAPTER  III 
THE  UNION  OF  THE  SOUL  WITH  THE  BODY 

I.  THE  UNION  ITSELF 480 

1.  The  question  stated .     .  480 

2.  Man,  one  composite  substance 483 

II.  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  UNION 487 


CONTENTS  XIX 

CHAPTER  IV 

ORIGIN  OF  THE  SOUL  AND  OF  MAN 

I.  THE  HUMAN  ORGANISM 490 

1.  The  evidence 490 

2.  Conclusions 491 

II.  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 492 

1.  The  first  human  soul 492 

2.  Subsequent  human  souls 493 

III.  MANKIND 495 

1.  Specific  unity  of  mankind 495 

2.  Antiquity  of  man 496 

CHAPTER  V 

IMMORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 498 

1.  Death 498 

2.  The  question  of  immortality 500 

II.  POSSIBILITY  AND  FACT  OF  IMMORTALITY 501 

1.  Possibility 501 

2.  Proofs  of  immortality 503 

CONCLUSION  or  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MIND.    HUMAN  PERSONALITY       .  509 


THEODICY,  OR  THE  STUDY  OF  GOD 

INTRODUCTION 511 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  GOD 

I.  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 514 

1.  The  question  stated 514 

2.  The  argument 516 

II.  THE  NATURE  OF  GOD 521 

1.  Distinction  of  God  from  the  world 521 

2.  Fundamental  or  primary  attributes 525 

3.  Derived  or  secondary  attributes 528 

4.  Value  of  these  conclusions 529 


XX  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   II 

GOD  AND  THE  WORLD 

I.  GOD  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  WORLD 534 

II.  THE  WORLD  IN  ITS  RELATION  TO  GOD 538 

1.  The  universe 538 

2.  Man 538 

CONCLUSION  or  THEODICY 541 

OUTLINES  OF  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

INTRODUCTION 542 

CHAPTER  I 
ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

I.  ORIENTAL  PHILOSOPHY 544 

•  II.   GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 548 

1.  Pre-Socratic  schools 548 

2.  Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle 551 

3.  Post- Aristotelian  philosophy 555 

III.  GRECO-ORIENTAL  PHILOSOPHY .     .     .557 

CHAPTER  II 

MEDIEVAL  PHILOSOPHY 

TRANSITION.    PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY 559 

I.  FIRST  PERIOD 561 

1.  Beginnings 561 

2.  The  problem  of  universals 562 

3.  Mysticism  and  pantheism 565 

4.  Oriental  philosophy 565 

II.  SECOND  PERIOD 567 

1.  General 567 

2.  Philosophy  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  thirteenth  century     .     .     .  568 

3.  Thomistic  philosophy 568 

4.  Scotistic  philosophy 570 

5.  Other  schools  and  philosophers 570 

III.  THIRD  PERIOD 571 


CONTE  NTS  XXI 

CHAPTER  III 
MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 

TRANSITION.    RENAISSANCE 574 

I.  FIRST  PERIOD 577 

1.  Bacon  and  Descartes 577 

2.  Development  of  British  empiricism 579 

3.  Development  of  Cartesian  rationalism 582 

II.  SECOND  PERIOD 584 

1.  German  philosophy 584 

2.  Scottish  philosophy 588 

3.  French  philosophy 589 

4.  Italian  and  Spanish  philosophy 590 

5.  English  and  American  philosophy 591 

CONCLUSION  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY 593 

GENERAL  CONCLUSION 

1.  The  universe 595 

2.  Man         597 

3-   God 597 

APPENDIX 601 

INDEX  613 


INTRODUCTORY   PHILOSOPHY 


GENERAL    INTRODUCTION 


I.    THE    NATURE  OF    PHILOSOPHY 

AS  the  study  of  philosophy  takes  place  at  the  end  of  the 
college  course,  it  will  be  useful  to  outline  the  relations  of 
philosophy  to  the  knowledge  already  acquired  by  the  student. 

I.    WHAT  HAS  BEEN  DONE  ALREADY 

i.  Special  Results. — During  the  college  years  numerous  studies 
have  been  pursued,  and  little  by  little  the  physical  universe  has 
unfolded  its  secrets. 

(a)  Chemistry  has  reduced  material  substances  to  their  finest 
elements  and  revealed  the  laws  by  which  their  various  combina- 
tions are  governed.     Biology  has  manifested  the  special  properties 
of  living  beings,  and  the  human  organism  has  been  the  special 
subject-matter  of  anatomy  and  physiology.     The  whole  earth  has 
been  described  in  the  sciences  of  geography   and  geology,   while 
astronomy  pointed  to  millions  of  other  worlds  which,  in  their  con- 
stitution and  evolution,  bear  a  striking  resemblance  to  the  world 
which  we  inhabit.    From  physics  we  also  know  that,  however 
near  or  distant    they  may  be,   all   the  beings  of   the  universe 
are  ruled  by  natural  laws  which  all  obey  and  which  produce 
order  and  harmony  in  the  world. 

(b)  Mathematical  and  geometrical  sciences  deal  with  the  prop- 
erties and  laws  of  quantity;  namely  of  numbers,  surfaces,  and 
volumes.     Wherever  applied,  these  relations,  once  ascertained, 
will  always  be  verified. 

(c)  Events  of  the  past  recorded  in  history  have  also  been  memo- 
rized, and  from  the  comparison  of  the  present  with  the  past  the 
mind  is  now  able  to  draw  useful  lessons.    We  know  the  deeds  of 
great  men  in  war  and  peace,  and  we  are  able  to  follow  the  succes- 

3 


4  GENERAL     INTRODUCTION 

sive  steps  by  which  nations  have  reached  their  actual  standing  in 
the  world. 

(d)  Not  only  knowledge  has  been  acquired,  but  also  the  apti- 
tude to  express  it  by  speech  and  writing.    The  study  of  grammar 
and  of  the  various  languages  and  literatures  enables  man  not  only 
to  manifest  his  own  thoughts  to  others,  but  also  to  profit  by  the 
thoughts  of  other  men  and  to  admire  the  beauties  found  in  the 
various  forms  of  literature. 

(e)  Religious  science  has  taught  us  how  to  revere  and  serve 
God.     The  principles  of  morality  are  the  guides  of  human  actions 
and  behavior. 

2.  More  General  Results.  —  In  addition  to  the  mastering  of 
the  various  sciences,  another  result  has  been  attained.  Gymnastic 
exercises  do  not  merely  develop  one  muscle  or  another;  their 
purpose  is  not  only  to  make  man  go  through  a  certain  series  of 
motions,  but  chiefly  to  strengthen  and  develop  the  whole  organism. 
So  also  the  mental  efforts  made  in  the  different  studies  have  con- 
tributed to  the  general  and  harmonious  growth  of  the  mind.  Mem- 
ory is  stronger;  the  power  of  attention  has  been  increased;  habits 
of  study  and  reflection  have  been  developed.  The  faculties  of 
judgment  and  reasoning  have  been  strengthened.  The  discipline 
of  college  life,  the  obligation  to  follow  a  rule,  the  constant  relations 
with  other  students,  have  been  important  factors  hi  the  formation 
of  character  and  the  acquisition  of  social  virtues. 

Hence  if  we  had  to  summarize  in  a  few  words  the  mental  results 
of  college  years,  we  might  say  that  the  mind  has  been  furnished 
with  a  numerous  array  of  facts  grouped  and  classified,  and  that 
it  has  grown  or  increased  in  power  and  energy. 

II.  WHAT  REMAINS  TO  BE  DONE 

Great  and  important  as  it  is,  the  knowledge  acquired  so  far  is 
insufficient.  Certain  things  have  been  neglected  altogether  and 
the  knowledge  of  the  others  needs  a  complement. 

i.  New  Knowledge  to  be  Acquired.  —  (a)  There  is  a  whole 
world,  as  varied  and  as  complex  as  the  physical  world,  which  has 
been  left  aside  almost  completely,  or,  at  least,  has  not  been  the 


NATURE     OF     PHILOSOPHY  5 

object  of  any  systematic  study.  It  is  the  inner  world  of  the  self, 
of  our  own  mind,  with  its  constant  changes,  its  successive  states, 
its  growth  and  development,  and  its  conditions  of  activity.  You 
have  learned  your  lessons,  but  what  is  it  to  learn?  What  is  the 
power  of  acquiring  knowledge  with  which  the  mind  is  endowed, 
and  how  is  such  a  power  exercised?  How  should  it  be  exercised? 
What  is  knowledge  itself?  And  when  judgments  and  conclusions 
are  called  true  or  false,  questions  are  suggested  immediately  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  truth,  the  possibility  of  reaching  it  and  of 
distinguishing  it  from  error,  and  the  method  of  doing  this  most 
effectively. 

(b)  In  your  studies  you  made  use  of  your  memory,  judgment, 
reasoning,  reflection,  etc.,  so  many  words  which  now  call  for  further 
explanation,  and  which  suggest  numerous  problems  concerning 
the  functions  of  the  senses,  the  memory,  and  the  intellect.    Fre- 
quently you  have  relied  on  the  testimony  of  others;  you  have 
learned  a  text-book  and  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  author  was 
right.    How  could  you  do  otherwise,  for  instance,  for  historical 
or  geographical  statements?    But  this  method,  which  was  the  only 
possible  one,  must  not  now  lead  to  an  exaggerated  reverence  for 
all  that  is  found  in  books  or  newspapers.    For,  how  many  errors 
are  published  and  how  many  fallacies  are  taken  for  truths  simply 
because  they  appear  in  print,  or  even  because  they  are  spoken  in 
brilliant  language  accompanied  by  fine  gestures.    It  is  necessary  to 
learn  how  to  use  one's  own  reason  and  to  practise  the  difficult  art  of 
criticism  so  as  to  distinguish  truth  from  falsity,  and  thus  to  become 
able  to  steer  one's  own  mental  life,  to  think  for  oneself,  and  no 
longer  depend  too  exclusively  on  the  thinking  of  others. 

(c)  Other  questions  may  be  raised  which  so  far  have  received 
no  answer.    You  have  made  efforts  and  acted  for  the  best:  herein 
are  included  such  notions  as  those  of  end,  purpose,  motive,  choice, 
activity,  habit,  etc.,  which  have  to  be  elucidated. 

(d)  When  the  working  of  man's  organic  and  mental  life  is 
understood,  when  we  know  its  conditions  and  laws,  there  still 
remain  the  problems  of  our  own  constitution.    We  speak  of  body 
and  mind.    What  are  they  and  what  are  their  mutual  relations? 
What  is  the  origin  and  what  will  be  the  destiny  of  the  human 


6  GENERAL     INTRODUCTION 

soul?  What  is  the  end  of  man?  Even  if  our  Christian  faith  has 
given  us  answers  to  these  questions,  what  is  the  attitude  of  reason 
toward  our  belief? 

These  are  a  few  of   the  many  problems  which   so  far  have 
received  no  solution. 

2.   The  Knowledge  already  Acquired  must  be  Completed.— 
Even  in  sciences  that  have  been  mastered,  there  remain  many 
incomplete  conclusions.     They  are  good  as  far  as  they  go,  but 
they  do  not  go  far  enough. 

(a)  At  the  very  outset,  when  we  learn  to  read  and  write,  and 
when  later  we  learn  to  express  our  thoughts  correctly,  accurately, 
and  clearly,  how  many  problems  present  themselves:  the  nature 
of  thought,  of  correct  and  consistent  thought;  the  possibility  of 
expressing  it  by  means  of  symbols  and  of  understanding  others; 
the  general  relations  of  body  and  mind,  since,  in  speaking,  writing, 
or  making  signs,  bodily  movements  are  supposed  to  be  controlled 
by  the  mind  and  to  represent  mental  processes  or  ideas. 

(b)  Historical  and  social  sciences  lead  to  such  problems  as  the  con- 
ditions, motives,  and  value  of  human  activity.    We  pass  judgments 
on  the  actions  of  others,  approve  them  as  right  or  condemn  them 
as  wrong;  what,  then,  is  right  and  wrong?    We  rely  on  human  testi- 
mony and  historical  records;  what  is  their  value  as  signs  of  truth? 

(c)  Sciences  that  deal  with  the  material  world  leave  also  many 
notions  unexplained.     The  very  word  "matter"  is  an  enigma, 
and  "force"  is  hardly  clearer.     We  are   told  of  a  being  acting 
on  another  in  a  certain  way  and  under  certain  conditions,  and  pro- 
ducing such  or  such  results.     Because  these  are  everyday  occur- 
rences which  have  become  familiar,  they  seem  clear,  and  we  do 
not  even  think  that  they  may  need  an  explanation.     And  yet 
if  we  are  asked  to  define  what  is  meant  by  activity,  action,  and 
cause  in  general,  and  how  action  and  causality  are  possible,  we 
find  that  the  task  is  not  an  easy  one,  and  that,  at  every  step, 
many  obscurities  and  difficulties  are  met  with.     If  all  this  were 
understood,  there  would  still  remain  questions  which  are  altogether 
beyond   the  reach  of  natural  science;   namely,  those  concerning 
the  first  origin  and  cause  of  the  world,  the  nature  and  necessity 
of  the  laws  that  govern  it. 


NATURE     OF     PHILOSOPHY  7 

(d)  Religion  requires  a  basis.  It  does  not  consist  in  blindly 
believing  certain  things  as  true  or  following  certain  arbitrary 
practices.  To  reason  belongs  the  task  of  proving  the  existence 
of  God  and  of  explaining  his  attributes  as  far  as  possible. 

To  sum  up:  The  task  of  philosophy  is  to  complete  and  unify 
knowledge  by  showing  how  all  the  things  which  we  know  are  related 
together,  and  by  examining  certain  notions  which  have  a  wide 
range  of  application  and  cover  numerous  cases,  such  as  those  of 
substance,  cause,  activity,  matter,  mind,  etc. 

III.    DEFINITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

If  we  consider  the  name  itself,  we  find  that  philosophy  means  the 
love  of  wisdom  (<£&os  friend,  o-o</u'a  wisdom).  The  first  Greek 
philosophers  did  not  call  themselves  "friends  of  wisdom,"  but 
"wise"  (o-o^ot).  Cicero  says  that  Pythagoras  was  the  first  to 
take  the  name  of  philosopher  because,  according  to  him,  the  gods 
alone  should  be  called  wise. 

1.  For  the  ancients  philosophy  included  both  science,  i.e.  the 
knowledge  and  explanation  of  things,  and  wisdom,  i.e.  prudence, 
the  practice  of  virtue,  and  the  right  conduct  of  life.    As  a  science 
it  was  not  limited  to  any  special  object,  but  included  the  sum  total 
of  all  knowledge.     Thus  Cicero:  "Nee  quidquam  aliud  est  philo- 
sophia,  si  interpretari  velis,  quam  studium  sapientiae.     Sapientia 
autem  est  (ut  a  veteribus  philosophis  definitum  est)  rerum  divi- 
narum  et  humanarum  causarumque  quibus  hae  res  continentur 
scientia"  (De  Offic.  II.  ii). 

2.  To-day,  owing  to  the  increase  of  human  knowledge  and  the 
multiplication  of  sciences,  philosophy  can  no  longer  be  a  universal 
science  in  the  same  sense  as  formerly,     (i)  Sometimes  the  word  is 
still  applied  to  any  reasoned  doctrine  or  science,  the  main  sur- 
viving use  being  the  name  "natural  philosophy,"  which  is  some- 
times given  to  the  science  of  physics.     (2)  More  frequently  to 
say  of  a  man  that  he  is  a  philosopher,  or  that  he  takes  things 
philosophically,   indicates   a   habit   or   disposition,   especially   in 
practical  matters,  to  refer  things  to  higher  principles  and  to  govern 


8  GENERAL     INTRODUCTION 

the  senses  and  the  feelings  by  reason.  (3)  Strictly  speaking, 
however,  the  name  philosophy  applies  to  the  science  of  the  higher 
principles  of  things,  to  the  elucidation  of  those  concepts  and  laws 
which  are  common  to  several  sciences  and  which  are  used  by  them 
without  being  subjected  to  any  special  investigation. 

It  is  not  a  mere  classification  of  the  sciences,  it  has  special 
questions  to  answer  and  special  problems  to  solve.  Sciences  reduce 
phenomena  to  general  laws;  philosophy  tries  to  further  unify  the 
various  sciences  by  taking  a  higher  point  of  view  and  going  to  the 
principles  common  to  many  or  to  all  sciences. 

3.  Relation  of  Philosophy  to  the  Other  Sciences.  —  Hence  it  is 
easy  to  understand  the  relations  of  philosophy  to  the  other  sciences. 
It  considers  the  same  objects,  but  from  a  different  and  higher  stand- 
point. It  uses  the  same  methods,  at  least  essentially,  although  the 
processes  of  observation  and  experiment  have  a  considerably  smaller 
importance,  whereas  reasoning  is  given  greater  prominence. 

(a)  Philosophy  completes  the  other  sciences,     (i)  It  considers 
higher  principles  and  causes  which  are  neglected  by  them.     (2)  It 
examines  critically  the  value  of  the  principles  which  they  pre- 
suppose, e.g.  the  principle  of  causality  which  is  used  by  all  natural 
sciences,  but  tested  by  none.     (3)  It  links  and  connects  the  different 
sciences,  because  it  considers  the  common  principles  that  pervade 
them  all  and  on  which  they  rest. 

(b)  On  the  other  hand  philosophy  depends  on  the  other  sciences, 
for  it  must  constantly  keep  in  touch  with  the  facts  and  laws  which 
they  manifest.    Otherwise  it  would  be  a  mere  random  play  of  the 
mind,  in  which  any  vagary  could  find  a  place. 

(c)  The  relation  of  philosophy  to  the  sciences  may  be  conceived 
diagrammatically  as  follows.    If  we  have  a  large  circle  the  cir- 
cumference of  which  represents  the  facts  of  experience,  its  surface 
will  represent  the  sciences  dealing  with  different  groups  of  facts, 
and  more  or  less  closely  related.    These  sciences  may  be  repre- 
sented by  sectors  the  number  and  dimensions  of  which  vary  with 
the  progress  of  sciences  and   their  differentiations.    The   circle 
itself  is  constantly  being  enlarged  as  new  facts  are  discovered. 
Within  this  circle  let  us  draw  another  concentric  with  it  which  will 
represent  philosophy.     It  may  also  vary  in  size;  originally  it  was 


NATURE     OF     PHILOSOPHY  9 

co-extensive  with  the  circle  of  sciences,  but  is  now  considerably 
smaller.  Beginning  at  the  outer  circumference,  sciences  may  go 
higher  and  higher,  be  more  or  less 
general,  give  a  more  immediate 
or  a  more  remote  explanation  of 
the  facts,  stop  at  one  or  the  other 
of  the  dotted  circles;  all  converge 
toward  philosophy.  Can  we 
reach  a  centre  O  which  would 
give  us  one  general  principle,  or 
one  key  applying  to  all  sciences? 
This  is  a  question  which  we  can- 
not attempt  to  answer  at  present. 
The  human  mind  craves  unity; 
sciences  are  subordinate  to  one  another  and  lead  to  a  higher  sci- 
ence. All  finally  lead  to  philosophy,  which  always,  whatever  be 
the  extension  of  the  questions  assigned  to  it,  occupies  a  central 
position  and  from  this  vantage-ground  surveys  in  its  own  general 
way  the  whole  field  of  human  knowledge. 

IV.    DIVISION  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

i.  The  Various  Branches  of  Philosophy.  —  (a)  Since  the  ex- 
tension of  the  field  of  philosophy  has  varied  so  much  in  history, 
and  since  even  to-day  not  all  philosophers  are  agreed  on  this  point, 
it  is  impossible  to  give  a  division  of  philosophy  into  its  various 
branches  that  will  be  acceptable  to  all  and  that  may  claim  to  be 
finally  and  forever  settled.  Not  long  ago  logic,  psychology,  and 
ethics  had  still  an  undisputed  place  in  philosophy.  To-day  many 
look  upon  them  as  independent  sciences,  and  only  some  of  their 
higher  problems  are  turned  over  to  philosophy. 

For  our  purpose  in  the  present  course  it  matters  little  how  much 
ground  philosophy  strictly  so-called  should  cover.  Our  point  of 
view  is  a  practical  one,  and  hence  we  shall  treat  of  those  ques- 
tions which  have  been  neglected  heretofore  and  yet  are  necessary 
to  complete  the  knowledge  acquired  so  far  and  prepare  the  student 
for  further  studies. 


10 


GENERAL     INTRODUCTION 


(b)  Philosophy  comes  after  the  study  of  physical  sciences; 
hence  the  name  "metaphysics"  (//.era  TO,  c^vo-wca,  after-physics), 
which  is  frequently  given  to  philosophy  or  to  a  branch  of  it. 

(i)  The  philosophical  study  of  realities,  i.e.  of  existing  objects, 
includes  cosmology,  or  the  general  study  of  the  world; 
biology,  or  the  more  special  study  of  living  organisms;  psychology, 
or  the  still  more  special  study  of  the  human  mind;  theodicy,  or  the 
study  of  God  as  the  first  cause  of  the  world.  (2)  Besides  the  real 
we  have  to  consider  the  ideal,  i.e.  the  rules  to  which  thought  must 
conform  in  order  to  be  consistent  (logic);  the  expression  of  ideals 
to  realize  something  beautiful  ((esthetics);  the  guidance  of 
our  actions  in  conformity  with  the  rules  of  morality  (ethics). 
(3)  Epistemology  holds  an  intermediate  place  between  the  science 
of  the  real  and  that  of  the  ideal.  It  examines  whether  and  how 
far  our  ideas  correspond  to  external  reality.  Hence  the  following 
synopsis : 


Philosophical  study  of  the 


real 


world  =  cosmology. 

man  =  psychology  and  philosophy 

of  the  mind. 
God  =  theodicy, 
relations  of  knowledge  with  reality 
=  epistemology. 


ideal 


of  thought  =  logic. 

of  expression  =  aesthetics. 

of  action  =  ethics. 


2.  Division  of  this  Course.  —  In  itself  the  order  just  mentioned 
would  seem  to  be  the  best.  But  it  is  not  the  most  practical  nor 
the  most  useful  because  it  requires  too  many  a  priori  postulates 
and  obliges  one  to  admit  too  many  presuppositions  which  are  to 
be  justified  only  later.  Moreover  it  is  true  that  the  mind  is  first 
objective,  that  it  knows  other  things  before  knowing  itself.  But, 
in  order  precisely  to  develop  habits  of  reflection,  it  seems  preferable 
to  begin  with  psychology.  Hence  the  following  order  is  better 
adapted  to  our  present  purpose,  because  it  enables  the  mind  to 
proceed  step  by  step  without  supposing  and  taking  too  much 
for  granted  at  the  outset.  We  shall  begin  with  the  psychological 
processes  of  knowledge,  feeling,  and. action;  then  proceed  to  examine 


NATURE     OF     PHILOSOPHY  II 

the  rules  of  these  three  groups  of  processes.  After  examining  the 
value  of  knowledge  we  shall  pass  to  the  study  of  the  world,  of  man, 
and  of  God.  The  synopsis  of  the  present  course  is  therefore  as 
follows: 

I.  The  empirical  study  of  the  self  =  psychology. 

1.  Cognitive  consciousness  =  knowledge. 

2.  Affective  consciousness  =  feeling. 

3.  Conative  or  active  consciousness  =  activity  and  will. 
II.   The  normative  sciences 

1.  of  the  intellect  =  logic. 

2.  of  expression  of  ideals  to  arouse  certain  feelings 

=  aesthetics. 

3.  of  will  and  action  =  ethics. 

III.  Epistemology,  or  the  study  of  the  relations  of  cognitive  processes 

to  real  world;  a  transition  to  the  following. 

IV.  Philosophical  study  =  metaphysics. 

1.  of  the  world  =  cosmology. 

2.  of  man  =  philosophy  of  mind. 

3.  of  God  =  theodicy. 


V.    THE  METHOD  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  central  rule  to  be  observed  for  the  profitable  study  of 
philosophy  is:  Use  your  own  judgment  and  reason  under  the  guid- 
ance of  your  professor  and  text-book. 

1.  Eagerness  to  Know.  —  (a)   The  main  cause  that  prompts 
men  to  philosophize,  as  Plato  and  Aristotle  already  pointed  out, 
is  wonder  or  admiration.     The  mind  wonders  as  long  as  a  given 
fact  has  not  been  given  an  explanation  and  assigned  adequate 
causes.     It  endeavors  to  discover  causes  and  principles  so  as  to 
account  for  experience.     Out  of  this  desire  philosophy  was  born; 
in  this  desire  it  finds  its  incentive. 

(b)  Hence  an  essential  quality  of  the  mind  is  to  be  inquisitive, 
to  question  and  investigate,  and  never  to  feel  at  rest  so  long  as  a 
satisfactory  explanation  has  not  been  found.  It  must  compare 
facts,  gather  solutions,  discuss,  criticise,  and  harmonize  them. 

2.  Personal  Reflection.  —  (a)   This  work  must  be  a  personal 
work  of  understanding,  not  the  mere  memorizing  of  the  words  of 
the  professor  or  of  books.    It  is  true  that  without  books  or  pro- 


12  GENERAL     INTRODUCTION 

fessor  the  student  could  do  very  little;  he  would  grope  in  the  dark, 
uncertain  of  the  direction  to  be  taken  and  of  the  value  of  the 
progress  already  made.  But  nevertheless  these  are  only  aids  for 
the  student's  thinking,  and  their  teaching  would  be  of  little  value 
if  the  mind  did  not  verify  it  and  appropriate  it.  If  exaggerated 
self-confidence  is  a  serious  defect,  if  man  must  listen  to  the  opinions 
of  others,  be  somewhat  diffident  of  his  own  intellect,  and  proceed 
cautiously,  it  is  also  a  serious  defect  for  the  mind  to  remain 
inactive  and  to  take  for  granted  everything  that  is  said  without 
understanding  the  truth  of  it. 

A  lesson  in  philosophy  is  not  like  a  lesson  in  geography  or  history. 
When  I  am  told  that  Peking  is  in  China  and  London  in  England, 
I  believe  it  at  once;  my  activity  consists  only  in  memorizing  a 
fact  which  I  cannot  verify  and  on  which  all  agree.  But  in  philoso- 
phy it  is  always  necessary  first  to  understand  and  verify  the 
truth  of  a  statement;  the  work  of  memorizing  comes  last.  Never 
try  to  memorize  anything  which  is  not  understood  thoroughly.  A 
nurse  is  a  help  to  the  child  who  begins  to  walk;  she  guides  his 
first  steps,  but  cannot  take  the  place  of  the  child's  own  activity; 
the  walking  process  must  be  that  of  the  child.  So  also  the  beginner 
in  philosophy  needs  guidance,  but  this  can  never  dispense  with  his 
own  activity.  To  be  genuine  and  to  deserve  its  name,  philosophy 
must  be  the  mind's  own  philosophy;  not  in  the  sense  that  the  mind 
has  discovered  all  the  truths  which  it  possesses,  but  in  the  sense 
that  it  has  appropriated  and  digested  them  and  thought  them  for 
itself. 

(b)  Habits  of  reflection  must  be  acquired.    Man  is  not,  or  should 
not  be,  a  machine  to    be  moved  at  will  by  an  engineer;    he 
must  act  for  himself.    This  is  not  a  book  of  ready  made  formulas, 
but  rather  a  book  of  suggestions  for  the  student's  thought. 

(c)  The  study  of  philosophy  should  make  man  cautious  in 
affirming  and  denying,  in  approving  and  condemning  the  opinions 
of  others.    If  those  men  are  not  to  be  admired  and  imitated  who 
are  never  able  to  take  a  resolution,  to  side  for  or  against  a  proposi- 
tion, and  to  give  a  straight  answer,  still  less  are  those  to  be  com- 
mended who  have  ready  made  ideas  on  all  questions,  unchangeable 
and  categorical  solutions  for  all  problems,  and  whom  no  amount 


THEWORLDANDMAN  13 

of  proofs,  however  cogent,  can  ever  induce  to  modify  their  views. 
The  most  affirmative  are  also  frequently  the  most  ignorant. 

In  one  word,  at  the  time  when  the  body  is  acquiring  its  full 
development,  let  the  mind  also  grow,  and,  by  its  own  efforts  under 
the  guidance  of  those  who  are  more  skilful  and  experienced,  proceed 
in  the  acquisition,  or  rather  in  the  building  up  for  itself,  of  a  sound 
philosophy. 

II.  GENERAL  VIEW  OF  THE  WORLD  AND  OF  MAN 

I.    THE  SELF  AND  THE  NOT-SELF 

Sciences  group  and  classify  the  various  beings  of  the  world  accord- 
ing to  their  resemblances  and  differences.  But  there  is  one  division 
which  they  overlook;  a  division  which,  though  it  is  most  important 
and  should  be  most  striking,  is  frequently  neglected  or  receives 
little  attention;  a  division  the  members  of  which  are  most  unequal 
in  number  and  extension,  for  it  opposes  one  individual  to  the  rest 
of  the  world.  On  one  side  I  place  myself;  on  the  other,  all  the 
other  beings  of  the  world.  The  division  of  the  universe  into  self 
and  not-self  is  a  primary  one,  as  it  brings  into  opposition  beings 
that  are  endowed  with  irreducible  characters. 

i.  Their  Opposition.  —  (a)  What  I  call  myself  is  that  centre 
around  which  the  whole  world  seems  to  be  grouped.  I  am  con- 
stantly acting,  perceiving,  imagining,  thinking,  feeling,  etc.;  yet 
this  conscious  activity,  this  inner  life,  is  directly  perceivable  only 
for  myself.  It  is  my  inalienable  property  which  no  amount  of 
effort  will  enable  me  to  transfer  to  another.  I  may,  by  certain 
gestures,  speech,  or  writing,  manifest  my  thoughts  to  others, 
but  they  remain  mine,  and  are  experienced  by  me  alone.  Nothing 
but  a  sign  or  a  symbol  of  them  can  reach  another  mind. 

(b)  Far  different  are  the  objects  of  the  world;  any  number  of  ob- 
servers may  study  and  examine  them;  they  are  not  "private," 
but  "  public"  property.  If  I  know  the  existence  of  other  minds 
like  mine,  of  other  selves,  it  is  only  because  I  see  elsewhere  the 
same  manifestations  by  which  I  make  mine  known,  but  I  am  not 
aware  of  them  directly.  In  themselves  they  have  the  same  strict 
privacy  which  I  enjoy. 


14  GENERAL    INTRODUCTION 

(c)  My  self  is  a  sanctum  into  which  I  alone  can  penetrate,  a 
within  which  I  constantly  oppose  to  a  without,  i.e.  to  the  world 
which  reflects  itself  in  my  mind. 

2.  The  Self  is  Primary.  —  (a)  Although  it  is  so  small  when 
compared  to  the  universe,  yet  my  self  is  for  me  the  primary  and 
most  important  reality  in  the  whole  world,  and,  in  a  certain  sense, 
coextensive  with  it,  since  all  the  knowledge  which  I  have  of  the 
world  is  in  my  mind.     All  other  things  and  selves  act  on  my  self 
and  are  acted  on  by  my  self.     I  thus  become  a  centre  toward  which, 
from  my  point  of  view,  all  converge.     I  know,  it  is  true,  of  the 
interaction  between  them,  but  the  chief  point  of  interest  is  how 
they  behave,  not  toward  one  another,  but  toward  me.     In  this 
sense,  we  are  all,  and  we  cannot  help  being,  egoists.     I  move  and 
act  amid  other  material  beings  and  amid  other  persons,  but  my 
own  motion  and  action  is  what  concerns  me  most.     The  world 
is  my  world  as  I  know  it  and  as  it  affects  me. 

(b)  Nor  does  it  take  long  for  me  to  notice  that  my  world,  i.e. 
the  world  as  known  by  me,  is  not  perfectly  identical  with  the  world 
of  my  neighbor.  My  views  differ  from  his;  the  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings aroused  by  one  and  the  same  object  are  not  the  same  for  my 
mind  and  for  his.  In  the  same  circumstances  we  are  not  affected 
in  the  same  manner,  and  the  ensuing  actions  are  different.  In 
all  such  cases  I  cannot  but  place  myself  first;  for  what  I  am  pri- 
marily interested  in  is  my  own,  and  not  anybody  else's,  knowledge 
and  activity. 

3.  The  Objective  World  is  Known  First.  —  Self  and  not-self 
form  an  antithesis  which  is  not  known  clearly  to  the  individual 
at  the  beginning  of  his  mental  life.     The  child  lives  almost  exclu- 
sively in  an  objective  world.     His  power  of  reflection  is  not  strong 
enough  to  be  concentrated  on  the  subject  or  self.     The  distinc- 
tion is  for  him  vague  and  indistinct,  but  becomes  clearer  as  the 
mind  develops. 

A  similar  remark  applies  to  the  beginnings  of  philosophy.  The 
first  philosophers  of  Greece  deal  with  the  objective,  not  the  sub- 
jective, world.  Their  theories  are  cosmologic,  cosmogonic,  theo- 
gonic;  the  self  is  neglected.  They  are  concerned  primarily  with 
the  origin  of  things,  the  constitution  and  the  elements  of  the  uni- 


THEWORLDANDMAN  15 

verse,  not  with  the  nature  and  functions  of  the  self.  We  must 
wait  till  the  time  of  Socrates  to  find  the  attention  directed  toward 
the  subject,  toward  the  internal  world  of  ideas,  feelings,  and  activ- 
ities, together  with  the  rules  these  ought  to  obey:  "  Socrates  autem 
primus  philosophiam  evocavit  e  coelo,  et  in  urbibus  collocavit,  et 
in  domos  etiam  introduxit,  et  coegit  de  vita  et  moribus,  rebusque 
bonis  et  malis  quaerere."  (Cicero,  Tusc.,  V.  iv.) 

II.    THE  NOT-SELF  AND  ITS  OBVIOUS  CHARACTERISTICS 

1.  Diversity.  —  If  we  consider  the  not-self,  i.e.  the   material 
world  around  us,  we  are  amazed  at  the  number,  variety,  and  com- 
plexity of  the  beings  that  compose  it.    Their  multitude  is  beyond 
our  power  of  understanding.    Moreover,  all  have  different  natures, 
sizes,  qualities,  etc.     Whether  we  can  find  in  the  whole  world  two 
beings  exactly  and  in  all  details  alike  is  a  question  which  cannot 
be  answered.     Try  to  find  in  nature  two  things  perfectly  similar, 
even    if  they  are  the  most   common,  like  two  leaves,  or  two 
blades  of  grass,  or  even  two  particles  of  dust,  and  you  will  at  once 
find  it  very  difficult.    Even  when  you  think  you  have  succeeded, 
a  more  minute  examination,  a  dissection,  the  use  of  the  microscope, 
or  certain  modes  of  analysis  will  reveal  numerous  differences. 

2.  Likeness.  —  At  the  same  time  we  observe  many  common 
features,  many  points  of  similarity  which  enable  us  to  classify 
things. 

(a)  In  the  first  place,  there  are  other  men  to  whom  I  attrib- 
ute a  nature  essentially  similar  to  mine.  I  believe  that  they  also 
are  selves.  Not  that  it  is  possible  for  me  to  be  directly  aware 
of  the  fact,  for,  although  I  see  their  organisms,  their  minds  are, 
as  stated  already,  their  own  private  property;  but,  in  their  whole 
behavior,  these  organisms  are  so  similar  to  mine  that,  by  analogy, 
I  cannot  fail  to  infer  that  they  are  also  related  to  minds  like  my 
own.  I  hold  myself  responsible  for  my  actions,  and  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame;  I  experience  a  number  of  feelings  and  impulses, 
and  I  attribute  the  same  to  my  fellow-men.  I  cannot  believe 
that  they  are  governed  by  the  same  laws  as  physical  things.  I  do 
not  blame  the  stone  that  hurts  me  by  its  fall,  but  I  condemn  the 


16  GENERAL    INTRODUCTION 

man  who  throws  it  at  me;  I  judge  his  motives  and  intentions,  and 
treat  him  differently  from  any  other  being.  The  physical  laws 
that  govern  matter  are  fatal  and  inevitable,  but  man  is  capable  of 
education;  he  subjugates  nature  and  uses  it  for  his  own  purposes. 

(b)  Below  man  in  nature  I  find  animals  with  their  infinite  vari- 
eties.   To  them  also  I  attribute  a  mind  with  sensations,  memory, 
feelings  of  pain  and  pleasure,  etc.     But  their  mind  is  of  an  infe- 
rior order;  they  manifest  no  ideas  by  speech  or  writing,  and  are 
capable  of  but  little  progress. 

(c)  Men,  animals,  and  plants,  however  different,  may  never- 
theless be  classed    together  as  living  organisms.     They    possess 
certain  common  properties  of  nutrition,  growth,  and  reproduction, 
and  by  these  differ  from    inorganic    substances.    An  organism 
originates  from  a  similar  organism ;  it  assimilates  foreign  substances 
and  transforms  them  into  its  own  substance. 

(d)  In  opposition  to  organisms  we  find  the  manifold  beings 
which  belong  to  the  inorganic  world.    They  exist  in  three  differ- 
ent states,  liquid,  solid,  and  gaseous,  and  present  many  different 
properties  and  activities. 

(e)  Obvious  as  are  these  main  classifications  theoretically,  since 
they  are  based  on  marked  differences  between  the  classes,  and  on 
marked  similarities  among  members  of  the  same  class,  their  con- 
crete applications  sometimes  offer  great  difficulties.    If  I  compare 
a  higher  animal  with  a  tree  or  a  mineral,  the  points  of  difference 
are  clear.    But  when  we  come  to  the  confines  of  two  kingdoms, 
it  may  be  impossible  to  determine  whether  a  given  specimen  is 
an  animal  or  a  plant,  a  plant  or  a  mineral.    The  principle  of  the 
continuity  of  nature  finds  an  application  everywhere.      In  many 
respects  nature  is  like  the  spectrum,  the  colors  of  which  pass  insen- 
sibly from  one  to  the  other.    I  see  the  different  colors,  and  yet 
cannot  point  out  the  exact  limit  where  one  begins  and  the  other 
ends.     Between   two  extremes  clearly  differentiated   are  to  be 
found  numerous  transitional  forms. 

3.  Change.  —  All  beings,  organic  and  inorganic,  undergo  mani- 
fold changes. 

(a)  They  pass  from  place  to  place,  sometimes  with  slow  and 
hardly  perceptible  motion,  and  sometimes  with  great  rapidity. 


THE    WORLD    AND    MAN  17 

There  are  motions  of  the  smallest  particles  of  matter  and  of  the 
tiniest  microscopical  organisms,  and  there  are  motions  of  the  earth, 
of  the  stars,  and  of  the  whole  universe,  carrying  with  them  all 
things,  even  those  that  seem  to  be  at  rest. 

(b)  Changes  in  size  and  quantity,  in  quality,  color,  tempera- 
ture, activity,  etc.,  also  take  place  constantly.  And  besides  the 
changes  which  we  may  observe  ourselves,  many  others  are  recorded 
in  history  or  inferred  from  science.  At  all  times  and  in  all  things 
change  is  a  law  of  the  world. 

(c)  Nevertheless  the  order,  harmony,  and  unity  of  the  world 
are  preserved.  It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  this  unity  of 
nature.  We  are  obliged  to  study  things  separately,  to  analyze, 
divide,  and  dissect,  but  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  unity  which 
results  from  the  various  relations  between  all  these  elements  of 
the  universe. 

Changes  are  not  produced  at  random,  but  form  a  continuous 
and  uninterrupted  chain  of  events,  each  link  of  which  depends  on 
the  preceding  and  contributes  to  the  production  of  the  following; 
or  rather  it  is  a  continuous  network  ramifying  in  all  directions. 
This  is  another  aspect  of  the  unity  of  nature,  a  unity  resulting 
from  harmonious  succession,  and  which  must  be  added  to  that 
which  was  mentioned  above  resulting  from  the  harmonious  co- 
existence of  manifold  realities.  Not  only  do  the  beings  of  the  world 
form  a  series  the  members  of  which  are  close  to  one  another,  they 
also  form  one  continuous  network  of  activity  and  causality.  Every 
event  is  determined  by  antecedent  events.  Sometimes  the  thread 
which  links  them  is  plainly  visible;  sometimes  also  we  become 
lost  in  the  investigation  and  are  unable  to  trace  the  manifold  ram- 
ifications of  causes  and  effects.  Yet  we  never  doubt  that  such 
connections  exist,  even  if  they  are  unknown  to  us.  The  task  of 
science  is  to  discover  them. 

III.    RELATIONS  OF  THE  SELF  WITH  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD 

i.  Knowledge  and  Action.  —  All  the  relations  which  the  self 
has  with  the  various  objects  of  the  world  may  be  reduced  to  two 
groups:  knowledge  of,  and  action  on,  them.    These  two  terms  are 
3 


l8  GENERAL    INTRODUCTION 

not  mutually  exclusive,  for  I  am  conscious  that,  in  knowing,  I  am 
not  merely  passive  and  receptive,  but  that  I  also  exercise  some 
activity,  and  that  I  contribute  my  share  to  the  final  result.  But 
such  an  activity  is  essentially  immanent,  that  is,  it  remains  within 
myself  and  in  no  way  modifies  the  known  object. 

(a)  The  object  is  perceived  through  its  substitute,  the  idea, 
but   my   invincible   inclination   is   to   suppose   that,   known   or 
unknown,  it  remains  permanent  and  identical.     I  alone,  not  the 
object,  undergo  a  change  when  I  acquire  a  new  idea.     In  cog- 
nition the  primary  direction  of  activity  is  from  the  known  object  to 
the  knowing  mind,  since  the  object  is  appropriated  in  the  form  of 
an  idea  within  the  mind  under  the  action  or  stimulation  coming 
from  the  object.     We  naturally  and  spontaneously  believe  that 
we  know  things  as  they  are;  yet,  a  little  reflection  suffices  to  con- 
vince us  that  exaggeration  is  very  easy  on  this  point,  and  that, 
since  frequently  men  have  different  views  of  the  world  or  of  parts 
of  it,  all  views  cannot  correspond  exactly  to  the  supposedly  iden- 
tical reality.    This  problem  will  be  examined  in  epistemology. 

(b)  Besides  immanent  activity  such  as  that  of  the  mind  in  know- 
ing, there  is  another  form,  namely,  transitive  activity,  when  the 
modification  is  received  in  a  being  different  from  the  agent.    This 
is  what  is  meant  by  action  as  opposed  to  knowledge.     In  action 
the  primary  direction  is  from  the  self  to  other   things  or  persons. 
That  we  have  many  such  relations  is  evident,  for  every  use  which 
we  make  of  things  implies  for  them  changes  of  place,  shape,  qual- 
ities, relations,  etc.     We  adapt  them    to  our  purposes,  and  in 
many  ways,  voluntarily  or  involuntarily,  modify  them. 

2.  Further  Determination  of  Knowledge  and  Action. — The 
self's  twofold  relation  with  the  world  is  obvious.  We  know  some 
realities  of  the  world,  and  are  known  by  some,  namely,  by  other 
minds.  We  act  on  them  and  are  acted  upon  by  them.  There 
are  many  forms  of  knowledge,  from  sense-perception  to  the  high- 
est form  of  reasoning,  from  the  weakest  opinion  or  belief  to  the 
strongest  certitude.  There  are  also  many  forms  of  action,  from 
those  which  we  accomplish  without,  or  even  against,  our  will  to 
the  highly  deliberative  and  intentional  actions.  But  the  essen- 
tial characteristics  of  knowledge  and  action  remain  the  same. 


THEWOELDANDMAN  ig 

One  is  an  acquisition,  an  incoming,  the  other,  a  giving  out  or  out- 
going. The  two,  however,  are  closely  related.  As  stated  already, 
some  kind  of  action  is  implied  in  knowledge;  one  transitive,  from 
the  object  to  the  mind;  the  other  immanent  in  the  mind.  More- 
over, knowledge  is  frequently  a  principle  or  motive  of  human  actions. 
Thus  in  knowledge,  the  object  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  centre 
acting  in  different  directions,  and  its  activity,  when  received  in  a 
responsive  mind,  produces  knowledge.  The  sun  sends  its  light 
all  around;  it  is  perceived  by  a  number  of  minds  which  might  be 
increased  or  decreased  without  changing  the  nature  or  amount  of 
the  light  itself,  and  without  modifying  the  perception  of  any  indi- 
vidual mind.  In  action,  on  the  contrary,  the  self  is  considered  as 
a  centre  radiating  its  energy  in  various  directions,  sometimes  at 
random,  sometimes  also  for  a  purpose  and  in  a  chosen  direction 
in  order  to  obtain  a  certain  response  and  produce  a  determined 
result. 

IV.    OBVIOUS  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  SELF 

The  obvious  characteristics  of  the  self  may  be  reduced  to  the 
following:  (i)  Its  states  are  manifold,  complex,  ever  flowing,  and 
ever  changing.  (2)  Something  one,  permanent,  and  identical 
is  the  common  centre  of  all  mental  states. 

i.  Diversity.  —  (a)  The  variety  which  is  observed  in  the  mate- 
rial world  is  little  when  compared  to  that  of  the  spiritual  world 
of  the  mind.  Since  knowledge  is  but  the  mental  representation 
of  things,  it  is  clear  that  every  difference  between  objects  perceived 
in  the  external  world  is  accompanied  by  a  correlative  difference  in 
the  ideas  that  represent  them.  It  is  true  that  there  is  in  the  world 
more  variety  than  can  be  known  by  the  mind,  since  our  knowl- 
edge is  necessarily  limited.  But  of  unnoticed  variety  nothing 
can  be  said,  and  all  the  variety  which  is  noticed  has  its  correla- 
tive in  the  mind.  In  other  words,  if  we  assume  —  as  common- 
sense  obliges  us  to  assume  —  that  ideas  are  representations  of 
things,  it  must  be  admitted  that,  on  this  ground,  there  is  at  least 
as  much  diversity  in  the  representing  mind  as  in  the  represented 
objects. 

But  the  mind  offers  another  kind  of  diversity  which  is  not 


20  GENERAL    INTRODUCTION 

shared  by  things  and  is  the  mind's  exclusive  feature.  Conscious- 
ness is  not  limited  to  representative  states;  it  extends  to  imaginary 
ideas,  to  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  emotions  of  fear  and  anger, 
pride  and  sympathy,  hope  and  despair,  etc.,  to  moral,  aesthetic, 
and  religious  sentiments,  to  attention,  effort,  mental  struggle, 
will,  etc.  A  little  reflection  suffices  to  show  in  all  these  an  endless 
variety.  At  times,  the  field  of  consciousness  is  large  and  varied, 
but,  at  other  times,  it  is  more  restricted  and  uniform.  Conscious- 
ness itself  may  become  more  and  more  feeble  till  apparently  it  dis- 
appears altogether  in  a  dreamless  sleep,  or  in  certain  abnormal 
states  such  as  epilepsy  or  swoons. 

(6)  Moreover,  mental  processes  are  always  very  complex  and 
depend  on  many  factors,  as  will  be  made  clearer  when  we  study 
them  in  detail.  Their  elements  cannot  be  taken  apart  in  the  same 
way  that  an  organism  is  dissected,  but  reflection  reveals  their 
presence  by  showing  that  a  mental  state,  even  after  it  has  disap- 
peared, nevertheless  influences  those  that  follow.  This  is  clear 
for  memory,  imagination,  and  habit.  It  is  hardly  less  evident 
that  mental  processes  are  conditioned  by  past  experience,  surround- 
ings, and  education.  Here  the  complexity  of  the  mind  baffles 
all  attempts  at  analysis.  Common  language  seems  to  recognize 
this  normal  complexity  and  diversity  of  the  mind,  since  the  name 
"simple-minded  "  is  applied  to  those  whose  minds  are  weak  and 
defective. 

(c)  To  be  constantly  flowing  and  changing  is  also  a  law  of  the 
human  mind,  and  this  feature  is  even  more  striking  in  the  mind 
than  in  the  outer  world.  Things  change,  it  is  true,  sometimes 
rapidly  and  sometimes  imperceptibly.  Yet  many  things  seem  to 
have  great  permanence;  they  may  be  observed  year  after  year 
without  noticing  the  slightest  change  in  place,  color,  shape,  size, 
or  any  other  respect.  As  to  mental  processes,  all  are  short-lived. 
Ideas  are  in  constant  flux;  they  succeed  one  another  rapidly,  and 
no  sooner  has  one  appeared  than  it  is  pushed  out  of  conscious- 
ness by  another.  A  persistent  idea  is  not  normal.  Try  to  keep 
the  same  idea  for  some  time  in  the  field  of  consciousness,  and  you 
will  see  how  short  an  interval  elapses  before  a  distracting  thought 
enters  the  mind. 


THE    WORLD    AND    MAN  21 

2.  Unity.  —  Under  the  complexity,  variety,  and  flux  of  mental 
states  are  found  unity,  identity,  and  permanence.  There  is  unity, 
for  all  these  states  belong  to  the  same  self;  however  diverse  they 
may  be,  all  are  referred  to  the  same  centre,  and  attributed  to  the 
same  ego  from  whose  activity  they  proceed.  There  is  identity 
and  endurance,  for,  under  the  constant  flux  of  its  conscious  states, 
the  self  remains,  and,  under  the  undulating  surface,  a  deeper  real- 
ity is  found.  Such  facts  as  memory  and  recognition  of  the  past, 
responsibility  for  past  deeds,  remorse  and  self-approval,  just 
reward  and  punishment,  show  that  after  the  passing  away  of  one 
state  something  remains,  more  stable  and  more  enduring;  some- 
thing related  to,  yet  distinct  from,  the  ever-changing  surface  of 
consciousness. 


PSYCHOLOGY    OR    THE    EMPIRICAL 
STUDY   OF   THE    MIND 


INTRODUCTION 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

I.  DEFINITION  AND  SUBJECT-MATTER 
i.    The  Meaning  of  Psychology.  —  Psychology  (faxy  and  Ao'yos) 


means  etymologically  the  science  of  the  psyche  or  soul.  Formerly 
it  embraced  all  the  knowledge  concerning  the  soul,  its  manifesta- 
tions or  processes,  its  nature,  origin,  and  destiny.  Nor  was  it 
restricted  to  the  soul  as  the  principle  of  conscious  life;  it  ex- 
tended to  all  vital  activities,  and  dealt  with  life  in  all  its  forms. 

But  the  meaning  of  psychology,  like  that  of  a  number  of  sciences, 
has  been  more  and  more  restricted.  Psychology  is  the  study  of 
mental  processes.  The  higher  questions  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  mind  or  soul  are  referred  to  what  is  known  as  rational  psy- 
chology or  the  philosophy  of  mind.  Psychology  is  an  empirical 
science,  that  is,  its  statements  and  laws  may  be  tested  and  veri- 
fied by  an  appeal  to  some  form  of  experience.  Like  physics  and 
chemistry,  which  deal  with  material  facts  and  laws  without  con- 
sidering the  essence  and  origin  of  matter,  it  considers  only  mental 
processes,  but  not  the  first  principle  from  which  they  originate. 

When  the  term  "psychology"  is  used  without  qualification, 
(i)  it  applies  only  to  the  study  of  the  human  mind.  When  applied 
to  the  study  of  lower  minds,  such  terms  as  "  animal  psychology  " 
or  "comparative  psychology  "  are  used.  (2)  It  applies  only  to  the 
study  of  mental  life,  and  does  not  extend  to  the  functions  of  organic 
life.  Organic  processes,  however,  may  be  considered  as  influencing 
and  determining  conscious  processes,  and  this  gives  rise  to  the 
various  problems  of  physiological  psychology.  (3)  It  deals  chiefly 

22 


NATURE    OF    PSYCHOLOGY  23 

with  the  normal  manifestations  of  the  human  mind,  the  others 
being  considered  in  abnormal  psychology  or  mental  pathology. 

2.  The  Subject-Matter  of  Psychology  is  what  is  called  con- 
sciousness, mind,  mental  processes,  or  mental  states.  These  terms 
cannot  be  denned;  they  denote  facts  which  must  be  experienced. 
All  that  can  be  done  is  to  call  attention  to  these  facts,  classify 
them  and  explain  them. 

(a)  Consciousness    is    internal    or    subjective    experience.    It 
includes  all  those  states  which  a  man  calls  his  own,  and  which 
are  experienced  by  him  alone.    It  is  the  fact  of  being  aware  of 
something.     It  includes  the  complex  and  manifold  experiences 
by  which  the  state  of  wakefulness  is  different  from  that  of  a  dream- 
less sleep.     Seeing,  hearing,  thinking,  feeling,  wishing,  desiring, 
willing,  etc.,  are  states  of  consciousness.     However  different  they 
may  be,  all  share  the  common  characteristic  of  being  internal 
experiences.    Even  in  what  is  called  external  experience  two  ele- 
ments must  be  distinguished,  one,  objective  or  common,  the  other, 
subjective  or  private.    A  multitude  of  persons  may  see  the  same 
picture  or  listen  to  the  same  concert.     All  perceive  the  same  object, 
but  each  has  his  own  perception  of  it  in  his  own  consciousness, 
distinct  from  the  perception  in  every  other  consciousness.     This 
perception  of  the  same  thing  arouses  in  one  mind  ideas,  judgments, 
feelings,  and  appreciations  different  from  those  aroused  in  other 
minds.    How  different  the  world  would  appear  to  a  man  if  it  were 
possible  to  substitute  for  his  own  consciousness  the  consciousness 
of  another  man. 

(b)  The  terms  conscious  process  and  conscious  state  are  often 
used  synonymously;  their  meaning,  however,  is  not  quite  iden- 
tical.    Conscious  or  mental  state  applies  to  the  contents  of  the 
mind  at  any  given  time  and  apart  from  their  essential  flux  (static 
point  of  view).     Conscious  or  mental  process  represents  better 
the  ever-moving  and  ever-changing  character  of  consciousness 
(dynamic  point  of  view). 

(c)  Variations  are  observed  in  the  extension  of  the  field  of  con- 
sciousness, the  intensity  of  mental  processes,  and  the  rapidity  of 
their  succession. 

(i)  The  field  of  consciousness,  i.e.  the  number  of  ideas  actually 


24  PSYCHOLOGY 

present,  varies  greatly.  One  idea  only  may  be  present,  or  perhaps 
a  multitude  of  ideas  try  to  crowd  themselves  together  in  the 
mind.  Sometimes  consciousness  is  concentrated  on  a  very  nar- 
row field,  whereas  at  other  times  it  is,  as  it  were,  diffused  over  a 
number  of  objects. 

(2)  The  intensity  of  consciousness,  both  as  a  whole  and  in  its 
several   processes,   undergoes   marked   changes.    We   may   pass 
almost  insensibly  from  vivid  consciousness  to  unconsciousness, 
and  vice  versa.    It  is  like  the  bright  light  of  the  evening  sun  which 
decreases  little  by  little  till  finally  it  leaves  us  in  the  complete 
darkness  of  night.    As  to  individual  conscious  processes,  they 
may  at  first  occupy  the  very  focus  or  centre  of  the  field  of 
consciousness,  and  gradually  move   toward  the  border  till  they 
finally  disappear  altogether  out  of  consciousness;  or,  on  the  con- 
trary, they  may  move  from  the  dim  borders  of  the  field  toward 
its  bright  centre.    Thus  at  any  time  the  field  of  consciousness 
is  composed  of  a  central  bright  part  or  focus,  and  of  a  multitude 
of  other  more  obscure  elements  which  have  been  termed  the  fringe 
of  consciousness.    It  is  a  fact  of  frequent  experience  that  an  idea, 
and  especially  a  feeling,  even  when  not  actually  thought  of,  con- 
tinues nevertheless  to  influence,  tinge,  or  shade  subsequent  mental 
processes. 

(3)  The  rapidity  with  which  mental  processes  succeed  one  an- 
other is  also  variable.     Sometimes  the  stream  seems  to  pass  through 
a  level  region;  the  current  is  slow  and  weak,  and  constant  efforts, 
frequently  unsuccessful,  are  necessary  to  stimulate  the  mind  and 
bring  up  ideas.    In  other  cases,  on  the  contrary,  one  has  to  deal 
with  a  mighty  torrent  which  no  effort  can  stay.    Ideas  succeed 
one  another  with  amazing  rapidity,  and  it  is  almost  impossible  to 
stop  any  of  them.    Not  only  may  every  one  notice  these  varia- 
tions in  his  own  consciousness,  but   certain  minds   are   habit- 
ually and  naturally  slow  and  sluggish,  whereas  others  are  quick, 
impetuous,  and  precipitate. 

(d)  The  term  mind  (and  the  corresponding  adjective  mental) 
has  several  meanings.  In  general  it  is  opposed  to  matter,  which 
is  external  and  located  in  space,  while  mind  is  internal,  subjective, 
and  without  spatial  relations.  A  body  is  always  located  some- 


NATURE    OF    PSYCHOLOGY  25 

,  Here,  and  has  definite  relations  with  other  material  substances. 
An  idea,  on  the  contrary,  has  no  size,  and,  for  instance,  cannot  be 
said  to  be  on  the  right  or  the  left  of  another.  "  Mind  "  has  a 
greater  extension  than  "consciousness,"  for  it  includes  not  only 
actual  conscious  processes,  but  also  whatever  has  been  or  may 
become  conscious,  and,  in  general,  it  is  the  capacity  for  experien- 
cing conscious  processes.  A  narrower  signification  is  given  to 
the  term  "  mind  "  when  we  say  of  a  man  that  he  is  strong  or  weak 
minded,  or  that  he  has  a  great  mind. 

3.  Relations  of  Psychology  to  Other  Sciences.  —  Psychology 
endeavors  to  determine  the  laws,  conditions,  relations,  etc.,  of 
conscious  processes.  From  this  are  derived  its  differences  from 
other  sciences. 

(a)  It  is  needless  to  mention  how  psychology  differs  from  sci- 
ences which  consider  the  world  external  to  man;  what  was  said 
above  concerning  its  subject-matter  is  sufficient.  The  distinc- 
tion from  the  sciences  which  consider  the  human  organism,  such 
as  anatomy,  physiology,  morphology,  histology,  hygiene,  is  also 
obvious.  The  organism  is  an  object  external  to  the  mind,  al- 
though intimately  connected  with  it.  Hence  psychology  is  not 
directly  interested  in  it,  but  only  indirectly:  in  general,  because 
the  organism  influences  the  mind  and  is  in  some  manner  united 
with  it,  and,  in  particular,  because  some  of  its  processes  are  accom- 
panied by,  and  are  indispensable  conditions  of,  consciousness. 

As  to  other  sciences  which  also  deal  with  internal  and  conscious 
facts,  they  differ  from  psychology  primarily  in  the  points  of  view 
from  which  they  regard  these  facts.  Psychology  alone  considers 
conscious  processes  in  themselves,  as  events,  to  find  out  their  nature 
and  the  conditions  of  their  appearance.  The  other  mental  sci- 
ences compare  them  with  something  else  to  which  they  have  to 
conform.  They  do  not  examine  what  these  processes  are  in  them- 
selves and  how  they  happen,  but  how  they  should  happen  in  order  to 
reach  intended  results.  Thus  logic  teaches  us  how  to  use  rational 
faculties,  deals  with  intellectual  processes  only,  and  lays  down  the 
rules  that  must  be  observed  in  order  to  have  consistent  thinking. 
Epistemology  examines  the  relations  between  knowledge  and  ex- 
ternal reality,  and  endeavors  to  indicate  whether  and  how  far  the 


26  PSYCHOLOGY 

former  is  the  representation  of  the  latter.  Ethics  considers 
voluntary  processes  with  the  purpose  of  determining  their  con- 
formity with  certain  laws  and  rules,  i.e.  of  ascertaining  whether 
they  are  right  or  wrong.  Thus  the  same  mental  process,  as  stud- 
ied by  psychology,  may  be,  for  logic,  good  or  fallacious  reasoning; 
for  epistemology,  true  knowledge  or  error;  for  ethics,  worthy  of 
praise  or  blame.  For  psychology,  it  is  simply  a  mental  event. 

(b)  Psychology,  however,  needs  the  other  sciences  in  so  far  as 
they  may  throw  some  light  on  mental  processes.  The  sciences 
that  study  the  human  organism  are  especially  very  useful,  as  they 
explain  some  of  the  essential  conditions  of  consciousness.  Hence 
it  will  be  necessary  to  study,  or  at  least  to  recall  to  mind,  the  essen- 
tials of  physiology,  especially  concerning  the  brain,  the  nervous 
system,  and  the  sense-organs. 

4.  The  Utility  and  Importance  of  psychology  need  not  be  in- 
sisted upon.  The  maxim,  "Know  thyself,"  which  was  inscribed 
in  the  temple  of  Apollo  at  Delphi,  is  a  fundamental  one.  Self- 
knowledge  is  indispensable  both  for  one's  private  conduct  and  for 
one's  dealings  with  other  men.  M any  sciences  and  arts,  such  as 
logic,  ethics,  pedagogy,  rhetoric,  medicine,  politics,  history,  etc., 
are  based  on,  or  largely  indebted  to,  psychology.  All  need  a  thor- 
ough acquaintance  with  the  working  of  the  human  mind.  Success 
in  social  or  business  relations,  even  those  of  the  most  ordinary 
nature,  will  always  be  found  to  depend  greatly  on  the  practical 
and  applied  knowledge  of  psychological  laws. 

II.    METHOD  OF  PSYCHOLOGY 

Psychology  uses  a  twofold  method,  one  subjective  or  introspec- 
tive, based  on  the  observation  of  one's  own  mental  states,  the 
other  objective,  based  on  the  observation  of  the  mental  states  of 
other  men. 

(a)  The  introspective  method  is  primary  and  fundamental,  because 
the  experience  of  a  mental  process  is  the  only  way  we  have  of  know- 
ing its  nature.  Thus  no  amount  of  explanation  and  description 
will  ever  give  the  faintest  idea  of  a  sensation  of  color  to  the  man 
born  blind,  or  of  hearing  to  the  man  born  deaf.  If,  from  the  ac- 
tions, words,  and  signs  of  other  men  we  are  enabled  to  know  — 


NATURE    OF    PSYCHOLOGY  27 

always  imperfectly  —  what  mental  states  they  experience,  it  is 
only  in  an  indirect  manner,  from  the  analogy  with  those  we  have 
experienced  ourselves.  Hence  an  important  remark  for  the  stu- 
dent. Nowhere  is  reflection  more  essential  than  in  the  study  of 
psychology.  To  try  to  understand  psychology  by  merely  reading 
a  description  of  mental  states,  without  verifying  this  descrip- 
tion by  introspection,  as  far  as  possible,  is  prejposterous.  The 
text-book  and  the  professor  are  useful  guides  in  directing  intro- 
spection, but  they  cannot  take  its  place.  The  first  and  most 
indispensable  text-book  of  psychology  is  one's  own  mind» 

(b)  Introspection  must  be  supplemented   and  controlled   by  the 
objective  method,  i.e.  by  the  study  of  other  minds.     In  psychology, 
as  in  every  other  science,  the  observation  of  one  instance  —  and 
we  can  observe  directly  one  mind  only  —  is  not  always  a  sufficient 
basis  for  a  valid  generalization.    The  mental  processes  of  others 
are  inferred  from  the  oral  or  written  account  which  is  given  of 
them,  or  from  more  or  less  decisive  physiological  manifestations. 
Physiology,  pathology,  and  medicine  may  give  valuable  assist- 
ance in  gathering  data. 

(c)  These  two  sources  of  information  must  be  used  together. 
Psychology  starts  from  observed  facts  and  endeavors  to  formu- 
late the  laws  that  govern  them.    It  uses,  therefore,  what  will  be 
called  in  logic  the  inductive  method. 

III.    DIVISION  OF  MENTAL  PROCESSES 

The  classification  of  mental  processes,  and  the  division  of  psy- 
chology which  depends  on  it,  may  be  made  from  a  philosophical 
or  from  a  psychological  point  of  view. 

i.  Philosophical  Point  of  View.  —  (a)  If  the  distinction  and 
opposition  of  mind  and  body  were  taken  for  granted,  and  if  it 
were  presupposed  that  some  processes  are  at  once  and  essentially 
both  organic  and  mental,  whereas  others  are  essentially  and  exclu- 
sively mental  and  spiritual,  we  might  be  justified  in  distinguishing 
and  opposing  also  these  two  groups  of  processes.  But  this  dis- 
tinction, even  if  true  and  legitimate  in  itself,  is  not  legitimate  as 
a  starting-point  because  it  is  far  from  self-evident.  Later  on  we 
shall  see  whether  it  is  a  valid  conclusion  based  on  observed  facts. 


28  PSYCHOLOGY 

Here  we  are  not  justified  in  presupposing  a  dividing  line  be- 
tween sense  (organic)  and  intellect  (spiritual),  or  between  lower 
tendencies  (organic)  and  will  (spiritual). 

(b)  If  the  distinction  of  faculties  as  specific  energies  of  the  mind 
were  admitted,  we  might  again  be  led  to  a  bipartite  division  into 
what  the  scholastics  called  knowledge  and  tendency  (appetitus), 
or  what  others  term  intellectual  and  active  powers.  According 
to  this,  feelings,  emotions,  and  sentiments  do  not  form  a  separate 
group,  but  share  in  the  nature  of  both  knowledge  and  appetitus 
without  being  adequately  distinct  from  appetitus.  The  pleasant- 
ness or  unpleasantness  of  a  known  object  is  nothing  but  its  con- 
formity or  disagreement  with  tendencies,  i.e.  a  special  aspect  of 
appetitus.  The  whole  affective  life  is  a  resultant  of  the  two  specific 
energies,  knowledge  and  appetitus.  But  here  again  it  must  be 
noted  that  the  doctrine  of  faculties,  when  assumed  to  mean  any- 
thing beyond  the  mere  classification  and  grouping  of  mental  proc- 
esses, is  not  empirical,  and  hence  cannot  be  used  at  the  outset  of 
psychology. 

2.  Psychological  Point  of  View.  —  Modern  psychology  does  not 
attempt  to  explain  philosophically,  but  simply  to  classify,  mental 
processes.  The  classification  which  it  offers  may  be  more  or  less 
superficial  and  arbitrary,  and  nevertheless  be  more  useful  for, 
and  better  adapted  to,  a  mere  description  of  facts  without  any 
underlying  philosophical  assumption. 

Although  exceptions  are  to  be  found,  psychologists  generally 
reduce  mental  processes  to  three  groups:  processes  of  cognition,  of 
feeling,  and  of  conation.  The  prominence  given  to  feelings  by  mak- 
ing them  a  separate  class  is  due  to  the  recognition  of  their  special 
characteristics  and  of  their  importance  in  the  whole  psychological 
life.  Feeling  is  the  outcome  of  the  exercise  of  all  forms  of  activity, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  exercises  a  very  great  influence  on  action. 

(a)  Knowledge  is  the  presence  in  the  mind  of  the  idea  of  an  ex- 
ternal object;  it  has  both  an  active  and  a  passive  phase;  the  mind 
must  be  first  acted  upon,  and  then  exercise  its  own  activity.  Feel- 
ing is  subjective;  it  manifests  no  external  reality,  and  is  chiefly 
passive.  Yet  it  is  a  powerful  incentive  to  action.  If  it  is  too  in- 
tense, it  tends  to  exclude  knowledge  and  intellectual  application. 


GENERAL     LAWS     OF     MIND  29 

Moreover,  feeling  is  of  itself  concerned  chiefly  with  the  present, 
and  is  largely  spontaneous  and  necessary.  Conation  is  essentially 
active  and  directed  toward  the  future  in  order  to  produce,  pre- 
serve, or  remove  a  mental  state  according  as  it  is  found  desirable 
or  undesirable. 

(b)  These  feelings  may  undergo  different  variations.    The  same 
sound  or  song  (knowledge),  at  first  agreeable  (feeling),  may,  if 
prolonged   (same  knowledge),    become   tedious    and  thoroughly 
annoying  and  painful  (different  feeling).     As  a  consequence,  and 
according  to  the  complex  motives  and  circumstances  influencing 
human  actions,  the  will  may  assume  diverse  attitudes,  e.g.  it  may 
determine  the  listener  to  stay  or  to  leave,  to  encourage  or  stop 
the  singer,  to  make  this  or  that  remark,  etc. 

(c)  Knowledge  of  the  same  thing,  because  it  is  more  objective, 
and  especially  sense-perception,  will  be  more  similar  in  the  same 
and   in   different   minds.    Affections   are   more   subjective   and 
changing.    Volition  is  also  less  permanent  and  more  variable 
because  it  may  struggle  with  different  feelings. 

Such  are  the  main  reasons  for  distinguishing,  in  psychology, 
three  groups  of  mental  processes;  but  this  is  merely  a  working  psy- 
chological classification,  useful  for  purposes  of  study;  and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  there  is  a  constant  overlapping  of  one  group 
upon  the  others. 


II.  THE  GENERAL  LAWS  OF  THE  MIND 
I.    A  DANGER  TO  BE  AVOIDED 

i.  Necessity  of  Analysis.  —  (a)  The  human  intellect  cannot 
reach  at  once  the  complete  knowledge  of  anything.  Every  real- 
ity is  so  complex,  its  aspects  and  relations  are  so  numerous,  that 
the  mind  is  always  obliged  to  decompose  it,  to  proceed  by  analysis, 
and  to  take  successively  different  points  of  view.  The  physicist, 
the  chemist,  the  geologist,  have  to  examine  separately  the  vari- 
ous properties  and  energies  of  material  substances.  The  histo- 
rian and  the  sociologist  must  consider  one  after  another  the  differ- 
ent phases  of  human  events.  In  proportion  as  an  object  is  more 


30  PSYCHOLOGY 

complex,  the  necessity  of  analysis  becomes  greater.  See,  for 
instance,  how  the  human  organism  has  to  be  analyzed,  and  how  its 
parts  and  organs  must  be  studied  successively,  in  order  to  reach 
even  a  superficial  knowledge  of  its  functions.  We  cannot  acquire 
a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  human  organism  as  a  whole  without 
studying  first  separately  the  different  organs  that  compose  it. 

(b)  Nowhere  is  this  necessity  of  analysis  greater  than  in  psychol- 
ogy, (i)  The  mind  is  more  varied  and  more  complex  than  any 
material  reality.  Yet  recourse  to  dissection  or  actual  separation  is 
impossible.  Nor  can  we  take  apart  for  single  consideration  one 
mental  process  and  hold  it  in  the  mind  for  special  examination. 
A  mental  process,  as  it  occurs  actually,  is  said  to  be  complex  and 
composed  of  elementary  processes.  But  these  cannot  be  really 
separated  in  the  same  manner  that  it  is  possible  to  dissect  an  organ- 
ism. (2)  Material  substances  are  permanent,  whereas  mental 
processes  are  essentially  fleeting  and  disappear  rapidly.  Mental 
analysis  can  only  be  an  abstraction  and  a  process  of  inference. 
Unlike  chemical  elements,  which  are  really  set  apart  when  the 
compound  is  analyzed,  elementary  mental  processes,  though  influ- 
encing actual  complex  processes,  are  not  experienced  by  themselves 
in  consciousness. 

2.  Danger  of  Analysis.  —  Such  a  necessity  for  the  human  intel- 
lect to  proceed  analytically  is  not  without  danger.  The  danger 
consists  in  resting  satisfied  with  partial  views,  without  reconstruct- 
ing again  by  synthesis  the  complete  reality,  and  in  studying  the 
parts  chosen  more  or  less  arbitrarily  as  units,  without  perceiving 
their  relations  to  the  whole.  This  danger  again  is  greater  in  the 
study  of  the  mind  than  in  any  other  study  because  solidarity  and 
continuity  are  most  striking  in  the  mental  world.  One  might  be 
led  to  consider  a  mental  process  such  as  sensation,  memory,  pleas- 
ure, love,  anger,  desire,  choice,  action,  as  isolated,  as  taking  place 
apart  from  the  others,  and  even  sometimes  independently  of  them, 
and  thus  to  view,  so  to  say,  a  dead  and  unreal  mind,  not  the  liv- 
ing, complex,  and  ever-changing  mind.  The  mind  is  one.  Even 
if  it  is  endowed  with  distinct  energies  or  faculties,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  these  are  energies  of  one  and  the  same  mind, 
that  they  do  not  act  independently  of  one  another,  but  that  the 


GENERAL     LAWS     OF     MIND  31 

activity  of  one  is  always  mixed  with,  and  influenced  by,  that  of 
the  others. 

It  is  in  order  to  obviate  these  difficulties,  and  guard  the  student 
against  these  dangers,  that  a  short  outline  is  given  here  of  some 
general  laws  of  the  mind  which  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  while 
studying  separately  the  different  mental  processes.  On  this 
condition  only  is  the  knowledge  of  the  real  living  mind  possible. 

II.    GENERAL  PROCESSES  AND  ATTITUDES  OF  THE  MIND 

Several  mental  attitudes  and  processes,  which  will  receive  a 
more  extensive  treatment  elsewhere,  run  through  the  three  groups 
of  mental  processes  and  influence  all.  Hence  a  few  words  will 
be  said  of  them  here.  They  are  attention  and  association,  which 
are  of  a  most  general  nature;  memory  and  imagination,  which  refer 
especially  to  the  cognitive  aspect  of  consciousness;  habit,  which 
refers  chiefly  to  activity  in  all  its  forms. 

i.  Attention.  —  (a)  By  attention  is  meant  the  focussing  of  the 
mind  on  a  special  object  or  conscious  process.  It  includes  pri- 
marily a  mental  and  sometimes  also  secondarily  an  organic  atti- 
tude, like  " stretching  the  ears,"  "fixing  the  gaze,"  "holding  the 
breath  "  in  expectation.  In  attention  the  energy  of  the  mind  is 
more  concentrated,  less  diffused,  and  hence  intensified  with  regard 
to  the  object  to  which  it  is  applied.  This  attitude  may  be  com- 
pared to  the  focussing  of  the  sun-rays  with  a  lens.  Distraction, 
therefore,  is  not  the  contrary  of  attention,  but  rather  a  form  of  it, 
for  it  is  attention  to  an  object  against  the  will,  the  inclination  or 
intention.  Distraction,  however,  may  bear  on  many  ideas  and 
thus  be  equivalent  to  diffusion  or  dispersion  of  mental  energy, 
which  is  the  mental  attitude  opposed  to  attention.  In  attention 
the  mind  looks  at  one  thing  intensely;  in  dispersion  it  looks  at 
many  things,  but  less  intensely  at  each  one. 

Attention  is  not  restricted  to  knowledge,  but  extends  to  feelings 
and  actions.  Thus  a  man  may  concentrate  his  mind  on  his  sor- 
rows, sufferings,  or  joys;  he  may  act  with  or  without  care,  and  care- 
fulness is  but  a  form  of  attention.  The  power  of  attention  is  an 
indispensable  condition  of  success  in  any  pursuit.  The  man  who 


32  PSYCHOLOGY 

cannot  pay  attention  to  his  own  thoughts,  actions,  or  feelings,  and 
to  surrounding  objects  or  persons,  is  doomed  to  failure. 

(b)  The  capacity  for  arousing  attention  is  called  interest.    Inter- 
est depends  both  on  certain  conditions  of  the  object  and  on  the 
dispositions  of  the  subject.    Thus  I  may  study  a  lesson  because  I 
like  it  and  find  it  interesting;  or  because,  although  I  dislike  it, 
I  am  prompted  by  a  sense  of  duty,  or  I  feel  that  this  study, 
uninteresting  though  it  may  be  in  itself,  is  useful  or  necessary. 

Hence,  if  we  consider  the  cause  that  produces  it,  attention  is  of 
two  kinds:  (i)  One  is  the  result  of  objective  interest  alone.  The 
will  has  no  part  in  it,  or  may  even  oppose  it.  A  concert  may  be 
found  very  interesting,  and  attention  is  naturally  given  to  it;  or 
an  idea  may  be  present  in  the  focus  of  consciousness  in  spite  of 
the  efforts  of  the  will  to  banish  it.  (2)  The  other  is  voluntary; 
the  interest  may  be  partly  in  the  object,  but  it  is  chiefly  subjec- 
tive. The  will  itself  influences  the  mental  activity,  and  applies 
it  to  the  consideration  of  an  idea  or  to  a  certain  action.  Thus 
even  things  which  are  found  uninteresting  in  themselves  are 
paid  attention  to  for  subjective  reasons  of  utility,  necessity, 
duty,  etc. 

(c)  The  most  important  laws  of  attention  are  the  following: 
(i)  Attention  is  proportional  to  interest,  objective  and  subjective. 
Sometimes  one,  and  sometimes  the  other,  is  predominant.    The 
presence  of  the  subjective  factor  accounts  for  the  fact  that  one  and 
the  same  thing  will  be  of  interest  to  one  man  and  not  to  another, 
nor  even  to  the  same  man  at  different  times.    The  object  remains 
identical,  but  the  mental  dispositions  are  different.     (2)  In  the 
object  interest  results  from  several  qualities  or  properties,  among 
which  may  be  mentioned  newness,  unusualness  in  size,  color, 
intensity,  change,  etc.     In  the  subject  it  depends  on  education, 
habits,   character,   actual   dispositions  of  the  mind,  ideals,  as- 
pirations, etc.     When  a  man  wants  to  call  the  attention  of  others 
to  anything,  he  has  to  take  all  these  into  account.    A  good  illus- 
tration  may   be  found  in  the  art   of  advertising.      (How?  .  .  . 
Where?  .  .  .    When?  ...    By   what   means?  ...  is  advertising 
done?)      A    more    particular    instance   is   that    of    the   orator 
who    varies   the   intensity   and    pitch    of   his    voice    and    the 


GENERAL     LAWS     OF     MIND  33 

nature  of  his  gestures.  Sometimes  a  thundering  voice  and 
sometimes  a  low  whisper  will  be  effective  in  making  the 
listener  attentive.  (Why?)  (3)  Attention  does  not  remain  con- 
stant in  the  same  direction  for  a  long  period  of  time.  Little 
by  little  it  decreases  and  disappears  unless  its  object  changes  or 
some  new  aspect  is  discovered  in  it  (e.g.  ...?).  (4)  The  intensity 
of  attention  varies  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  number  of  objects  attended  to: 
"Pluribus  intentus  minor  est  ad  singula  sensus."  Jugglers  know 
how  to  divert  the  spectator's  attention  so  that  the  way  in  which 
they  perform  their  tricks  of  legerdemain  will  not  be  detected. 
Pickpockets  choose  the  psychological  moment  at  which  their  pro- 
spective victim's  attention  is  absorbed.  .  .  .  (Why?  .  .  .  Find 
other  instances.) 

(d)  From  these  principles  it  is  clear  that,  besides  physical  and 
physiological  obstacles  to  attention,  such  as  surroundings,  tempera- 
ment, health,  etc.,  which  it  is  not  always  possible  to  remove, 
there  are  psychological  obstacles,  such  as  mental  restlessness  or  the 
incapacity  for  the  mind  of  applying  itself  to  one  object,  mental 
sluggishness  or  the  incapacity  of  making  an  effort  in  order  to  bring 
the  energy  of  the  mind  into  play.  It  is  important  to  correct  these 
defects  and  to  cultivate  the  power  of  attention.  For  children 
the  only  source  of  attention  is  objective  interest,  and  the  teacher 
must  always  remember  it  in  his  lessons  and  explanations.  As 
the  mind  develops  it  becomes  capable  also  of  voluntary  attention, 
which  is  the  more  important  since  by  it  we  attend  for  a  purpose 
and  in  order  to  reach  an  end.  The  power  of  attention  must  be 
increased  by  daily  practice.  How  many  fail  hi  life  because  they 
"notice"  nothing,  and  are  unable  to  concentrate  their  mental 
energy  on  the  objects  which  should  be  of  interest  to  them! 

2.  Memory  and  Imagination.  —  After  it  has  been  experienced, 
a  mental  state  can  be  recalled  into  the  mind.  Not  that  the  same 
identical  process  which  took  place  in  the  past  can  again  take  place 
at  present;  in  this  sense  that  which  is  passed  never  comes  back. 
But  I  may  be  aware  that  the  process  which  I  now  experience  is 
similar  to  the  one  which  I  experienced  yesterday;  that  I  now  see, 
hear,  consider,  or  feel  the  same  thing  as  formerly.  This  power  of 
reproduction  is  exercised  in  memory  (when  the  mind  is  aware  of 
4 


34  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  fact  of  reproduction),  and  in  imagination  (when  in  fact  there 
is  reproduction,  but  without  the  consciousness  of  the  fact  that  it 
is  a  reproduction).  Not  only  knowledge,  but  also  feelings  and 
conscious  activities,  may  be  reproduced  in  the  mind. 

3.  Association  of  Ideas.  —  Memory  and  imagination  depend  on 
association.     We  know  from  personal  experience  that  an  idea  is 
not  recalled  at  random,  but  is  suggested  by  others  which  call  it 
back  to  consciousness.     Ideas  seem  to  be  linked  together  so  that, 
if  one  is  reproduced,  it  has  a  tendency  to  reproduce  another.     Like 
memory  and  imagination,  association  refers  chiefly  to  knowledge, 
yet  an  idea  will  recall  not  only  another  idea  with  which  it  is 
connected,  but  also  the  feeling  or  action  by  which  it  was  accom- 
panied.    The  sight  of  an  enemy  yesterday  was  accompanied  by 
a  feeling  of  anger.    To-day  the  thought  of  the  event  tends  to 
call  forth  not  merely  the  idea  that  I  was  angry,  but  also  this 
feeling  itself. 

4.  Habit.  —  What   association   does  for  ideas  habit  does  for 
actions.    In  fact,  habit  and  association  present  the  same  essen- 
tial features,  and  association  is  but  one  form  of  habit.     The  action 
which  has  become  habitual  is  performed  automatically,  without 
effort,   frequently   even  without   distinct   consciousness.     Before 
acquiring  the  habit  of  piano-playing,  for  instance,  every  single 
action  (vision,  hearing,  appropriate  motions)  of  which  the  com- 
plete series  is  composed,  required  a  distinct  effort.     When  the 
action  has  become  habitual,  the  result  is  more  perfect  and  obtained 
more   easily.     Once  the    series   is   started,  all  the  other  com- 
plex elements  follow  in  their  order.     Habit  has  also  a  close  resem- 
blance with  that  form  of  memory  which  consists  in  learning  by  rote. 
The  schoolboy  who  repeats  his  lesson  several  times  in  order  to 
memorize  it  establishes  a  number  of  associations  between  words 
as  written  or  spoken,  and  between  the  physiological  processes 
necessary  to  utter  them,  so  that  words  uttered  by  him  follow  one 
another  in  order  and  automatically.     Both  mental  and  organic 
activities  are  subject  to  the  law  of  fixation  or  habit.     We  not  only 
have  habits  of  movement,  but  also  habitual  views,  associations, 
and  mental  attitudes. 


GENERAL     LAWS     OF     MIND  35 

III.    GENERAL  LAWS  OF  THE  MIND 

Besides  the  general  processes  and  attitudes  just  mentioned, 
there  are  general  laws  that  govern  processes  belonging  to  different 
groups.  They  are  the  laws  of  solidarity,  continuity,  and  unity 
amid  multiplicity.  These  laws  should  be  constantly  kept  in  mind, 
as  applications  of  them  will  be  found  at  every  step. 

i.  Solidarity.  —  By  solidarity  is  meant  the  mutual  dependence 
of  all  mental  processes. 

(a)  The  use  of  the  analytical  process  in  psychology  may  be  the 
source  of  great  errors,  if  one  fails  to  notice  that  it  isolates  arti- 
ficially that  which  is  in  reality  always  connected  and  associated. 
The  mind  is  like  an  organism  or  a  well-ruled  society  in  which  all 
organs  or  all  classes  depend  on  the  others  for  their  functions  or 
their  subsistence.     Mental  life,  in  its  various  manifestations,  is 
one,  and  none  of  its  manifestations  is  independent  of  the  others. 

(b)  All  psychical  phenomena  are  dependent  on,  and  influenced 
by,  the  general  processes  and  attitudes  mentioned  above:  atten- 
tion, memory,  association,  and  habit.     The  whole  progress  and 
development  of  the  mind  is  conditioned  by  them. 

(c)  All  mental  processes  influence  one  another,     (i)  Cognition 
is  the  basis  of  most  feelings.     We  are  pleased  or  displeased,  and 
experience  various  emotions  according  to  the  ideas  that  are  pres- 
ent in  the  mind.     Moreover,  to  know,  or  to  study  in  order  to 
know,  is  in  itself  an  important  source  of  feelings.    The  will  is 
essentially  guided  by  motives,  i.e.  by  the  results  of  reflection  and 
reasoning.     The  actions  which  are  not  voluntary  are  frequently 
the  consequences  of  impulses  resulting  from  inferior  forms  of 
knowledge.     (2)  Feelings,  being  a  source  of  interest,  are  also  a 
source  of  attention  and  application,  and  hence  very  important 
in1  acquiring  knowledge.     They  also  often  influence  opinions  and 
beliefs.    What  a  man  likes  is  readily  accepted  by  him  as  true;  he 
is  willing  to  believe  the  calumnies  which  he  hears  about  an  enemy, 
but  admits  his  good  qualities  more  reluctantly.     It  is  no  less  clear 
that  feelings  influence  activity,  since  we  act  in  order  to  obtain  some 
good  and  for  the  satisfaction  of  some  desire.     How  much  greater 
and  more  effective  is  our  activity  for  a  task  which  we  like  than  for 


36  PSYCHOLOGY 

one  which  we  are  compelled  to  do  against  our  inclination.  (3) 
The  will  is  the  power  that  rules  —  more  or  less  perfectly  —  the 
other  mental  energies.  It  controls  attention,  commands  a  patient 
and  impartial  research,  or,  by  its  precipitation,  causes  the  mind 
to  assent  without  sufficient  grounds,  and  is  thus  partly  responsible 
for  resulting  errors.  On  the  other  hand,  man  endeavors  to  con- 
form his  actions  to  his  thoughts.  Although  the  will  has  not 
perfect  control  over  the  feelings,  it  nevertheless  exercises  a  great 
power  in  checking,  suppressing,  or  fostering  them. 

(d)  Finally,  there  is  a  solidarity  between  the  mind  and  the  organism. 

(1)  The  conditions  of  the  organism,  age,  sex,  temperament,  food 
and  drink,  health  or  disease,  present  physiological  condition  and 
disposition,  have  their  counterpart  in  the  activities  of  the  mind. 

(2)  The  mind  influences  the  organism  in  many  ways,  e.g.  emotions 
are  accompanied  by  various  physiological  phenomena;  mental 
application  may  cause  a  headache;  the  will  controls  many  move- 
ments of  the  body,  etc. 

2.  Continuity.  —  (a)  In  the  perpetual  flux  of  mental  life  we 
distinguish  certain  waves  as  more  prominent,  and  consider  them 
separately.  This  conception  of  mental  states  may  be  misleading, 
and  it  must  be  remembered  that  consciousness  is  not  made  up  of 
parts,  but  is  always  flowing  like  a  stream.  In  the  state  of  wake- 
fulness  at  least,  mental  processes  are  always  going  on  without  inter- 
mission, even  if,  for  purposes  of  study,  only  the  most  prominent 
and  those  that  are  better  characterized  are  attended  to.  The 
break  which  seems  to  occur  in  a  dreamless  sleep,  epilepsy,  fainting, 
and  similar  states,  is  bridged  over  by  memory  which  connects 
the  part  preceding  with  the  part  following  the  interruption. 

(b)  At  any  one  time  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  complex, 
including  a  focus  and  a  fringe.  Thus  while  I  am  writing,  my 
mind  is  concentrated  upon  the  ideas  to  be  expressed — the  school- 
boy's mind  might  be  concentrated  on  the  manner  in  which  he  has 
to  hold  the  pen  and  form  every  letter;  at  the  same  time  I  have 
an  indistinct  consciousness  of  papers  and  books  around  me,  of 
the  little  noise  of  the  pen  as  it  runs  over  the  paper,  the  ticking  of 
the  clock,  the  singing  of  the  birds  outside;  of  sensations  of  touch 
in  the  fingers  holding  the  pen,  the  arm  resting  on  the  table,  the 


GENERAL     LAWS     OF     MIND  37 

parts  of  the  body  that  are  in  contact  with  other  objects;  of  tempera- 
ture; of  my  whole  organic  disposition;  of  images  fleeting  through 
my  mind;  of  an  emotion  experienced  a  short  time  ago,  etc. 

(c)  Generally  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  not  renewed  all 
at  once;  its  elements  pass  from  the  focus  to  the  fringe,  and  vice 
versa;  some  disappear  altogether,  while  others  persist  and  enter 
the  succeeding  complex  mental  state.    As  an  instance  of  such 
persistence  may  be  mentioned  a  violent  emotion,  e.g.  of  anger, 
which  may  remain  in  the  background  of  consciousness  for  a  long 
time  and  continue  to  influence  more  or  less  apparently  many  suc- 
cessive processes.     In  this  respect,  the  mind  is  somewhat  like  the 
organism,  the  whole  of  which  is  renewed  after  a  certain  length  of 
time,  but  through  changes  that  take  place  gradually,  more  rapidly 
in  some  parts,  more  slowly  in  others. 

(d)  As  a  consequence  of  this  fact,  it  follows  that  the  nature  of 
the  contents  of  consciousness  depends  on  previous  contents.    This 
is  true  even  where  the  direction  of  the  stream  seems  to  be  modi- 
fied suddenly.    The  new  state  is  different  according  as  it  follows 
different  thoughts,  emotions,  or  mental  efforts.     For  instance, 
the  impression  produced  by  a  sudden  clap  of  thunder  varies  accord- 
ing to  the  circumstances  in  which  I  find  myself  when  I  hear  it. 
Differences  in  the  contents  of  my  mind  will  cause  me  to  experi- 
ence different  feelings  when  a  friend  calls  on  me  unexpectedly. 

Not  only  is  there  continuity  between  immediately  succeeding 
states,  but  habit,  memory,  and  generally  subconsciousness,  are 
like  so  many  permanent  links  of  continuity,  making  mental  life 
one  uninterrupted  whole,  or  like  so  many  reservoirs  into  which 
all  mental  activities  bring  some  modifying  element,  and  owing  to 
which,  accordingly,  every  new  mental  activity  is  modified.  Thus 
the  mind  may  be  compared  to  a  water  reservoir  into  which  all 
ingoing  streams  would  bring  their  own  special  and  constantly 
changing  qualities,  and  from  which  outgoing  streams  would  in 
consequence  derive  these  new  qualities.  We  cannot  experience 
two  mental  states  perfectly  identical,  since,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
actual  mental  background  is  always  different  in  some  respects, 
and,  on  the  other,  the  new  state  is  modified  by  past  influences. 

(e)  When  in  a  series  of  objects  arranged  according  to  gradually 


38  PSYCHOLOGY 

increasing  diversity  two  extremes  are  compared,  the  differences 
are  striking;  but  if  two  objects  placed  in  immediate  succession  are 
compared,  the  differences  are  hardly  noticeable.  Between  any 
two  colors,  intermediate  tinges  may  be  inserted  passing  insensibly 
from  one  to  the  other;  between  a  giant  and  a  dwarf  a  series  of  men 
with  slowly  decreasing  sizes  make  an  easy  transition,  etc.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  mind:  between  extremes  a  number  of  transi- 
tional forms  are  found.  The  abstract  definitions  of  mental  atten- 
tion and  mental  dispersion  are  easily  understood,  and  their 
concrete  applications  also  are  easily  verified  when  two  attitudes  far 
apart  in  this  respect  are  compared.  But  if  the  diffusion  be  re- 
stricted gradually,  it  is  impossible  to  point  out  the  beginning  of 
the  attentive  attitude.  Sensations  of  vision,  sound,  taste,  smell, 
temperature,  etc.,  may  be  arranged  in  series  varying  imperceptibly 
according  to  quality  or  intensity.  Perfect  memory  and  complete 
forgetfulness  are  extremes  between  which  may  be  inserted  an 
infinite  number  of  partial,  more  or  less  vague  and  obscure,  remem- 
brances. In  a  more  complex  sphere,  the  insane  man  in  an  asy- 
lum has  mental  defects  by  which  he  clearly  differs  from  what  he 
was  when  normal;  yet  if  his  condition  has  developed  gradually, 
we  cannot  indicate  the  precise  moment  where  insanity  began. 
And  in  a  series  of  minds  passing  from  a  normal  to  an  abnormal 
condition,  extremes  alone  are  recognizable;  the  limit  separating 
the  normal  from  the  abnormal  cannot  be  indicated.  Examples 
could  be  multiplied  for  all  transitions  from  one  process  or  series  of 
processes  to  another. 

3.  Unity  amid  Multiplicity,  (a)  From  what  is  manifold  in 
nature  one  conscious  state  may  result,  e.g.  a  large  number  of  vibra- 
tions of  ether,  air,  or  molecules,  produces  in  consciousness  one 
sensation  of  light,  sound,  or  temperature.  Moreover,  the  mind 
strives  to  unify  external  experiences  by  constantly  reducing  them 
to  more  general  laws  and  principles. 

(b)  The  mind  tends  to  homogeneity  and  consistency.  Self-contra- 
diction, i.e.  the  presence  in  the  mind  of  irreconcilable  judgments, 
is  painful.  Attempts  are  made  to  find  the  means  of  reconciling 
them  or  to  see  which  should  be  eliminated.  Moreover,  the  mind 
strives  after  harmony  between  itself  and  the  external  world  of 


GENERAL    LAWS    OF    MIND  39 

things  and  persons,  either  by  trying  to  conform  its  ideas  to  the 
reality  of  things  and  to  adapt  itself  to  surroundings,  or  by  trying 
to  conform  the  environment  to  its  own  desires  and  purposes. 
Consistency,  harmony,  uniformity,  are  sources  of  pleasure;  dis- 
sension is  a  source  of  unhappiness. 

(c)  Attention  has  been  called  to  the  complexity,  variety,  changes, 
and  succession  of  mental  states.     It  is  a  fact  of  experience,  how- 
ever, that  these  always  form  a  part  of  a  group  which  is  personal. 
There  is  no  mental  process  which  is  not  somebody's,  and  which  is 
not  claimed  by  some  person  as  his  own.     Isolated  as  they  are  from 
mental  processes  which  belong  to  other  minds,  my  own  mental 
processes  are  all  within  the  unity  of  my  own  self. 

(d)  Hence  the  thinking  subject  is  one.     Consciousness  is  not 
simply  the  existence  of  thought,  but  also  of  my  thinking,  and  I 
am  the  centre  to  which  all  thoughts  are  referred  and  attributed 
as  their  source  and  as  the  subject  toward  which  all  converge. 
This  holds  for  past  as  well  as  for  present  states.    The  self  appears 
not  only  as  one,  but  also  as  identical  under  many  changes.     To 
say  "  /  think  "  is  true,  but  it  is  also  true  to  say  "  I  thought."    Obvi- 
ously there  is  something  underlying  the  stream  of  consciousness. 
A  man  remembers  his  past,  feels  responsible  for  his  actions,  pre- 
pares  his   future.     Memory,   responsibility,   foresight,   are   signs 
that,  even  if  the  states  of  mind  disappear,  the  mind  itself  is  a  more 
permanent  and  a  deeper  reality. 


CHAPTER  I 
KNOWLEDGE 

PRELIMINARY  REMARKS 

i.  What  is  Knowledge?  —  (a)  The  mental  state  called  know- 
ing cannot  be  denned  strictly.  It  is  obvious  to  all  men,  and  a 
definition  would  be  useful  only  ina3much  as  it  would  be  known, 
i.e.  inasmuch  as  it  would  imply  the  experience  of  the  very  state 
to  be  defined.  The  following  explanations  are  given  only  to  make 
this  experience  clearer.  To  know  is  to  be  aware  of  something  which 
is  called  the  object  of  knowledge.  In  every  cognitive  process  is 
implied  essentially  an  antithesis  of  something  (object)  which  faces 
or  lies  opposite  to  (ob-iacere)  the  mind  and  of  the  knowing  mind 
or  subject  (sub-iacere)  which  is  modified  by  the  knowing  process, 
that  is,  which  acquires  a  new  idea  or  the  perception  of  a  new 
relation. 

(b)  The  object  of  knowledge  may  be  internal  or  external;  it  in- 
cludes not  only  external  things,  but  also  mental  states.    Thus  a 
feeling  or  an  emotion  may  not  only  be  experienced  as  such,  i.e. 
felt,  but  it  may  be  analyzed,  studied,  recognized,  and  known;  and 
the  same  is  true  of  actions.    It  may  be  impossible  in  many  cases 
to  draw  a  well-defined  line  separating  knowledge  from  other  men- 
tal processes  which  are  objects  of  knowledge,  but  nevertheless  we 
understand  the  distinction  between  feeling  and  knowing  that  we 
feel,  acting  and  knowing  that  we  act.    And  even  in  cases  of  intense 
feeling  or  activity,  the  awareness  or  knowledge  of  them  may  almost 
disappear;  a  man  feels  and  acts,  and  his  whole  consciousness 
seems  to  be  absorbed  in  these  processes  so  that  he  does  not  even 
reflect  that  he  is  experiencing  them. 

(c)  In  knowledge,  subject  and  object  are  opposed,  yet  closely 
related.    In  fact,  the  known  object  must,  hi  some  manner,  be 

40 


KNOWLEDGE  41 

present  within  the  knowing  subject,  not  according  to  its  natural 
reality,  but  in  a  special  mental  or  ideal  form.  To  know  a  thing 
is  to  have  in  the  mind  an  idea  or  representation  of  it.  The  fact  of 
its  being  known  changes  in  no  way  the  reality  of  the  object;  the 
mind  alone  is  modified  by  the  acquisition  of  an  idea  which  it  did 
not  possess  previously. 

2.  There  are  Several  Kinds  of  Knowledge.  —  (a)  Knowledge  is 
actual  when  the  idea  is  present  in  consciousness;  habitual  when  the 
idea  which  has  disappeared  from  consciousness  can  be  recalled. 
In  the  former  case  a  man  actually  thinks  of  what  he  knows;  in  the 
latter,  he  does  not  actually  think  of  it,  but  can  do  so.  Immedi- 
ately upon  completing  the  demonstration  of  a  geometrical  theorem 
I  have  the  actual  knowledge  of  its  truth.  The  following  day, 
when  my  mind  is  occupied  with  other  matters,  I  still  know  it 
although  actually  thinking  of  something  else. 

(b)  (i)  To  know  may  mean  simply  to  be  acquainted  with,  to 
be  able  to  recognize.    Thus  I  know  a  man  by  sight  after  meeting 
him  more  or  less  frequently;  I  know  his  character  after  a  more 
or  less  prolonged  intercourse  with  him.    This  form  of  knowledge 
reaches  the  object  directly;  it  implies  perception  and  recognition. 
(2)  To  know  means  also  to  understand.    In  this  sense  knowledge 
reaches  the  object  indirectly;  it  supposes  the  work  of  intellectual 
comparison,  judgment,  and  reasoning.    Thus  I  may  know  many 
things  about  a  man  whom  I  have  never  seen.    A  blind  man  who 
never  perceived  light  may  nevertheless  know  several  things  about 
it,  like  its  laws  of  reflection  or  refraction. 

(c)  The  term  "  knowledge  "  is  applied  sometimes  to  the  process 
of  knowing  (subjective  sense),  and  sometimes  to  the  known  object 
(objective  sense).     I  may  speak  of  my  knowledge  of  chemistry, 
and  of  the  science  of  chemistry  as  a  body  of  knowledge. 

(d)  Knowledge  is  frequently  opposed  to  opinion  and  belief. 
The  former  is  more  certain  and  has  a  stronger  and  firmer  ob- 
jective basis;  the  latter  is  more  subjective  and  depends  also  on 
personal  mental  dispositions. 

(e)  The  cognitive  faculties  are  (i)  presentation  (sensation  and 
perception),   (2)  representation   (memory  and  imagination),   (3) 
conception    or   abstract  representation,    (4)  judgment,  which  is 


42  PSYCHOLOGY 

obtained  either  immediately  (intuitive)  or  mediately  by  reason- 
ing. Hence  the  division  of  the  present  chapter  into  four  articles, 
to  which  a  fifth  will  be  added  on  language,  which  is  the  expression 
of  knowledge. 

A  simple  representation  as  such  is  neither  true  nor  false,  but 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  truly  or  falsely  affirmed  or  denied  to  be 
the  accurate  representation  of  such  or  such  an  object.  Hence 
knowledge  proper  is  found  only  in  judgment. 

3.  Complexity  of  Knowledge.  —  It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that 
the  cognitive  processes  just  mentioned  are  not  isolated,  but  work 
together.  A  simple  and  commonplace  instance  may  be  given  to 
illustrate  the  complexity  of  knowledge  and  of  the  many  processes 
which  it  implies.  "I  see  my  friend  speaking  to  a  policeman." 
This  is  about  as  simple  an  experience  as  can  be  imagined.  It  takes 
place  all  at  once.  Without  reflection  or  hesitation,  in  what  seems 
to  be  one  single  act  of  perception,  I  affirm  that  "I  see  my  friend 
talking  to  a  policeman."  What  is  so  simple  now  is  in  reality  very 
complex  in  its  analysis  and  genesis.  If  the  many  elementary 
processes  are  not  now  present  in  consciousness,  it  is  owing  to  habit 
and  to  what  will  be  called  later  the  education  of  the  senses.  As 
we  shall  see  more  clearly  in  the  following  articles,  it  has  not  always 
been  so.  Let  us  now  briefly  analyze  our  statement;  the  analysis 
will  be  justified  later. 

"/  see"  Directly  and  primitively  vision  gives  to  the  mind 
only  sensations  of  light  and  color.  In  the  present  case,  if  by  "I 
see  "  I  mean  a  sensation,  i.e.  a  primitive  and  elementary  process, 
what  I  see  is  a  certain  surface  colored  in  this  or  that  way.  But 
the  educated  eye  reports  much  more  than  this.  There  are  addi- 
tions to  the  primitive  fact,  that  make  the  present  mental  state 
much  more  complex. 

"  My  friend."  A  certain  familiarity  and  habit  make  me  recog- 
nize the  form  of  a  man,  and,  although  I  see  only  about  one  half, 
my  imagination  readily  supplies  the  part  which  I  do  not  see. 
Moreover,  certain  signs,  e.g.  the  fact  of  his  being  in  the  street,  of 
moving  the  limbs  or  lips,  of  facing  another  person,  etc.  (facts 
which  are  also  perceived  owing  to  a  number  of  past  associations 
and  to  the  education  of  the  senses),  make  me  infer  that  I  have  before 


KNOWLEDGE  43 

my  eyes  a  real  man,  and  not  a  mere  image  or  statue  of  a  man. 
My  imagination  again  supplies  implicitly  a  whole  group  of  sensa- 
tions of  sound,  touch,  etc.,  of  which  this  man,  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, would  be  the  cause  for  me.  All  this  supposes  that 
I  have  seen,  heard,  etc.,  other  men  before. 

When  I  refer  to  this  man  as  "my  friend,"  I  suppose  an  act  of 
recognition.  This  is  not  simply  a  man,  but  it  is  this  man  with 
whom  I  had  such  or  such  relations,  with  whom  I  am  in  sympathy, 
who  did  this  or  that,  etc.  Many  signs  may  help  me  to  recognize 
him,  but,  strictly  speaking,  I  do  not  see  my  friend;  I  see  only  cer- 
tain colors  and  shape,  I  perceive  a  man,  and  I  recognize  or  infer 
that  it  is  my  friend.  It  is  evident  that  the  relation  of  friend- 
ship cannot  be  perceived  by  any  sense:  it  is  an  implicit  judgment 
supposing  many  mental  elements  past  and  present. 

"Speaking"  I  may  hear  a  sound,  I  cannot  see  it.  Here  I 
perceive  certain  attitudes,  gestures,  and  motions  which,  in  my 
experience,  are  associated  with  sensations  of  hearing.  We  have 
here  again  an  inference,  an  induction,  an  implicit  reasoning,  which, 
stated  explicitly,  would  run  thus:  "  Such  or  such  visual  sensa- 
tions in  the  past  have  always  been  accompanied  by  corresponding 
auditory  sensations  when  I  was  within  hearing  distance.  Now  I 
experience  the  same  visual  sensations.  Therefore  the  man  is 
speaking,  although,  on  account  of  the  distance,  I  do  not  hear 
him." 

"  To  a  policeman"  Here  again  we  have  a  very  complex  per- 
ception, as  may  be  gathered  from  the  preceding  remarks. 

This  is  a  very  short  and  summary  analysis  of  a  simple  state- 
ment, and  every  statement  which  we  make  is  of  the  same  com- 
plex nature.  Let  us  now  proceed  to  examine  the  various  stages 
of  cognition,  and  thereby  see  how  the  mind  passes  from  simple  to 
complex  processes  of  knowledge. 


44  PSYCHOLOGY 

ARTICLE  I.   SENSE  PRESENTATION 

I.  SENSATION 

I.    SENSATION  IN  GENERAL 

1.  The  Nature  of  Sensation.  —  Sensation  is  the  first  or  element- 
ary mental  process;  first,  because  mental  life  begins  with  sensa- 
tion; elementary,  because  other  mental  states  are  based  on  and 
suppose  sensation.     Sensations  are  therefore  real  constituents  of 
complex  states,  but  they  are  only  abstractions  when  considered 
in  themselves  as  simple,  and  apart  from  the  complex  states.    The 
normal  adult  does  not  experience  simple  sensations;  his  so-called 
sensations  are  always  complex  processes,  and  are  influenced  by 
other  past  or  present  sensations  of  the  same  or  of  different  kind. 

Perception  is  the  reference  of  sensations  to  an  external  object.  It 
supposes  several  presentative  and  representative  elements,  and 
includes  not  only  primitive  data  of  the  senses,  but  also  results 
from  the  education  of  the  senses.  The  knowledge  which  we  have 
of  sensations  is  not  obtained  directly  from  introspection,  but  rather 
from  inferences  based  on  introspection.  Frequently,  however, 
the  distinction  between  sensation  and  perception  is  not  observed 
in  ordinary  language,  and  both  terms  are  used  indifferently. 

2.  Definition  of  Related  Terms.  —  (i)  Sense  denotes  the  ability 
to  experience  a  certain  class  of  sensations.    Thus  we  speak  of  the 
sense  of  vision  or  of  the  sense  of  touch.     (2)  The  being  which  is 
capable  of  experiencing  sensations  is  called  sentient  or  sensitive, 
and  this  is  opposed  to  inanimate  or  vegetal.    There  are  evidently 
many  degrees  of  perfection  in  sensitive  life.    In  a  more  general 
way,  sentient  and  sensitive  are  synonymous  with  conscious,  and 
refer  to  any  form  of  consciousness.     (3)  Sensitive  frequently  refers 
also  to  one  who  is  excitable,  impressionable,  or  who  is  easily  affected 
by  external  influences.    When  applied  to  a  special  sense,  it  denotes 
a  special  keenness.     (4)  The  adjective  sensible  is  more  ambigu- 
ous on  account  of  its  several  meanings.    It  may  be  synonymous 
with  sentient;  or  it  denotes  a  sound  judgment  and  a  prudent  esti- 
mate of  things,  persons,  and  events.    Again,  a  man  is  sensible 


SENSATION  45 

of  a  thing  when  he  is  aware  or  persuaded  of  it.  Finally,  the 
term  "sensible  "  may  be  used  objectively  of  a  thing  that  can  be 
perceived  by  the  senses.  (5)  Sensuous  means  that  which  pertains 
to  the  senses.  Thus  we  speak  of  sense-perception  or  of  sensuous 
perception.  (6)  Sensual  applies  especially  to  one  who  indulges 
in  the  lower  tendencies  and  pleasures  of  the  senses.  (7)  Sensi- 
bility, sentiency,  sensitivity  and  sensitiveness  may  be  used  to  denote 
the  capacity  of  experiencing  sensations,  but  sensibility  signifies 
more  particularly  a  special  susceptibility  to  pleasure,  pain,  and 
emotion,  while  sensitiveness  denotes  a  special  mental  or  nervous 
excitability  or  keenness  of  the  senses. 

3.  Internal  and  External  Sensations.  —  Sensations  are  com- 
monly classified  into  internal  and  external,  but  the  meaning  given 
to  internal  sensations  to-day  is  not  the  same  as  formerly.  Exter- 
nal sensations  are  those  by  which  the  mind  enters  into  direct  rela- 
tion with  external  things,  e.g.  seeing,  hearing,  etc.  They  are 
exercised  through  sense-organs  located  at  the  periphery  of  the 
organism. 

Formerly,  internal  sensations  meant  the  mental  processes  by  which 
the  mind  enters  into  relation  directly  with  something  mental, 
and  indirectly  with  external  concrete  realities.  Their  organ  is 
internal,  namely,  the  brain.  Thus  memory  and  imagination 
were  called  internal  senses  because  they  deal  immediately  with 
mental  images,  and  only  mediately  with  the  things  of  which  they 
are  images.  To  these  two  internal  senses  two  others  were  added, 
the  sensus  communis  or  central  sense  which  gathers  together  the 
various  impressions  received  from  the  external  senses,  and  the 
aestimativa  which  enables  the  mind  to  discern  the  good  or  bad, 
useful  or  harmful  qualities  of  objects  (akin  to  instinct  in  animals). 

To-day,  by  internal  sensations  are  meant  those  sensations  which 
do  not  refer  to  the  external  world,  but  to  some  internal  states, 
especially  of  the  organism,  like  hunger,  thirst,  fatigue,  etc.  They 
are  vague,  hard  to  localize,  and  generally  indicative  of  physical 
conditions  and  needs.  Hence  they  are  also  more  subjective  than 
external  sensations.  The  division  of  sensations  into  internal  and 
external  almost  coincides  with  the  division  into  special  and  gen- 
eral or  organic  sensations.  Internal  sensations  are  closely  related 


46  PSYCHOLOGY 

to  the  affective  life,  and  in  many  cases  they  are  feelings  rather 
than  cognitions. 

II.   INTERNAL  OR  GENERAL  SENSATIONS 

1.  Characteristics. — These  sensations  are  called  internal  and 
organic  because  the  information  which  they  give  refers  to  states 
and  changes  within  the  body;  general  or  common  because  they  have 
no  special  end-organs  and  are  hard  to  localize.     Ccenesthesis  is  a 
more  technical  term  to  express  the  same  idea.     Internal  sensa- 
tions are  numerous,  complex,  vague,  difficult  to  analyze,  localize, 
and  discriminate.     As  cognitions  they  are  in  themselves  of  but 
little  value;  yet  habit  and  experience  enable  us  to  assign  to  them 
external  or  internal  causes,  e.g.  we  may  know  what  food  has  caused 
a  painful  digestion,  where  nervousness  or  fatigue  comes  from, 
etc. 

2.  The  Main  Groups  of  internal  sensations  are:  (i)  The  vital 
sense,  or  general  sensations  of  life,  of  the  whole  living  organism, 
of  its  position  and  changes  of  position,  its  general  condition  of 
strength  or  weakness,  activity  or  sleepiness,  etc.     (2)  Sensations 
connected  with  the  nervous  system,  its  excitability  and  tension, 
or,  on  the  contrary,  inactivity  and  laziness,  nervousness  and  neuras- 
thenia.    (3)  Sensations   connected    with    the    muscular    system. 
Some  are  more  general,  like  the  tension  or  relaxation  of  the  muscles, 
and  general  fitness  or  fatigue.     Others  are  more  special,  like  local 
fatigue,  or  the  sensations  experienced  in  executing  various  move- 
ments.    (4)  Sensations    connected    with    the    digestive    system; 
hunger,  thirst,  repletion,  nausea,  easy  or  difficult  digestion.     (5) 
Sensations  connected  with  the  respiratory  system,  such  as  facility 
or  difficulty  in  breathing,  abundance  or  scarcity  of  air,  its  qual- 
ities, like  purity  or  foulness,  choking,  stifling,  etc.     (6)  Sensations 
connected  with  the  circulatory  system,  like  those  of  blushing  or 
growing  pale,  of  active  circulation  in  the  whole  organism  or  in 
some  of  its  parts. 

III.    EXTERNAL  SENSATIONS 

(a)  External   sensations   are   experienced   through   the   sense- 
organs.    A  sense-organ  includes  three  essential  elements:     (i)  a 


SENSATION  47 

peripheral  apparatus,  like  the  eye,  ear,  nerve-endings  in  the  skin, 
etc.;  (2)  a  sensory  or  afferent  nerve  connecting  the  peripheral 
structure  with  (3)  the  centre,  which  is  some  determined  portion  of 
the  brain.  The  study  of  the  anatomy  and  functions  of  these 
belongs  to  physiology,  and,  while  studying  sensations,  it  will  be 
useful  to  review  the  physiology  of  the  senses  as  well  as  the  physics 
of  sound,  light,  etc. 

(b)  The  factors  of  sensation  are:  (i)  Physical,  i.e.  something 
external  (e.g.  vibrations  of  ether  or  air)  which  acts  on  the  organ- 
ism. It  is  called  the  stimulus  of  sensation,  and  its  action  on  the 
appropriate  organ  is  the  stimulation.  (2)  Physiological.  The 
organ  at  the  periphery  is  especially  adapted  to  receive  the  stimu- 
lation proper  to  each  sense,  and  the  impression  thus  received  is 
transmitted  to  the  brain  by  the  afferent  nerve.  (3)  Psychological. 
Consciousness  is  intimately  connected  with,  and  depends  on,  the 
physiological  processes.  Yet  it  cannot  be  identified  with  them, 
for  consciousness  is  something  altogether  different  from  a  move- 
ment, a  vibration,  or  a  chemical  change,  such  as  take  place  in  the 
organism. 

External  senses  are  reduced  to  five  classes:  smell,  taste,  touch, 
hearing,  and  vision. 

A.  SMELL  AND  TASTE 

i.  Common  Features.  —  (i)  These  two  senses  are  closely 
connected  and  generally  work  together.  Smell,  however,  is  more 
independent  of  taste  than  taste  of  smell.  It  has  been  ascertained 
that  when  the  sense  of  smell  is  impaired  taste  is  also  less  perfect, 
and  in  some  cases  it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  a  sensation  is  due 
primarily  to  smell  or  to  taste,  e.g.  spices  are  "tasted"  chiefly 
through  the  sense  of  smell.  (2)  In  both  cases  the  sensations 
are  vague  and  lack  definiteness.  Feeling,  i.e.  their  pleasantness 
or  unpleasantness,  is  the  predominant  feature.  (3)  These  sensa- 
tions are  not  easily  classified,  and  the  reason  why  a  substance 
smells  or  tastes  differently  from  another  is  not  known.  (4)  As 
verbs,  the  terms  "smell  "  and  "taste  "  are  transitive  or  intransi- 
tive; as  substantives,  they  apply  to  both  the  sensation  or  mental 
state  and  to  the  physical  stimulus.  I  speak  not  only  of  my  sensa- 


48  PSYCHOLOGY 

tions  of  smell  and  taste,  but  also  of  the  smell  of  a  rose  or  the  taste 
of  an  orange.  (5)  Smell  and  taste  are  not  so  useful  for  intellec- 
tual life  as  the  other  sensations,  but  are  very  useful  for  organic 
life,  especially  in  animals.  Their  very  position  at  the  entrance 
of  the  respiratory  and  digestive  systems  is  suggestive  of  these 
functions.  Thus  the  sense  of  smell  may  give  warning  of  the  pres- 
ence of  impure  or  poisonous  air;  that  of  taste,  of  the  presence  of 
some  injurious  element  in  food. 

2.  Smell.  —  Its  organ  is  the   mucous    membrane    lining  the 
upper  part  of  the  nasal  cavity  where  the  olfactory  nerves  are 
distributed. 

(a)  Odors  are  the  object  of  the  sense  of  smell.     It  is  impossible 
to  classify  them  and  to  give  definitions  of  the  several  odors.     When 
we  speak  of  them,  we  refer  them  to  the  substances  to  which  they 
generally  belong.    Thus  we  say  of  a  substance  that  it  smells  like 
the  rose  or  the  violet,  or  we  use  general  terms  like  "fragrant," 
"nauseous,"  etc. 

(b)  In  order  to  have  sensations  of  smell,  emanations  from  odor- 
ous substances  must  be  carried  to  the  olfactory  organs  through  the 
air.    Liquids  as  such,  if  they  come  in  contact  with  the  organs  of 
smell  without  air,  produce  no  olfactory  sensation.     Breathing 
draws  these  emanations  through  the  nasal  fossae,  and  this  is  done 
more  effectively  by  sniffing.    A  very  small  amount  of  an  odorous 
substance  is  sufficient  to  produce  a  sensation  of  smell.    Thus  the 
smallest  particle  of  musk  will  give  its  characteristic  smell  to 
clothes  for  years.    The  action  of  the  odorous  substance  on  the 
olfactory  organs  is  probably  of  a  chemical  nature. 

(c)  One  of  the  important  features  of  the  sense  of  smell  is  that 
it  easily  becomes  fatigued.    The   same  continuous  stimulation 
makes  it  dull  with  regard  to  this  special  odor.    When  entering  a 
kitchen  or  a  room  filled  with  foul  air,  we  are  conscious  at  first  of 
certain  sensations  which  we  cease  to  experience  after  some  time 
spent  there. 

3.  Taste. — Organ:    The  papillae  of  the    mucous   membrane 
covering  the  superior  surface  of  the  tongue.    The  circumvallate 
papillae  at  the  base  of  the  tongue  seem  to  be  the  most  important. 

(a)  Savors  or  flavors  are  the  object  of  the  sense  of  taste.     For 


SENSATION  49 

want  of  a  better  division  they  are  commonly  reduced  to  four  types: 
sweet,  bitter,  acid,  and  salt.  Their  action  on  the  organ  of  taste 
is  also  probably  of  a  chemical  nature. 

(b)  In  order  to  have  sensations  of  taste,  the  sapid  substance 
must  be  soluble.    Only  fluids,  i.e.  dissolved  substances,  are  per- 
ceived.   The  saliva,  and  the  act  of  pressing  the  substance  against 
the  palate  or  the  gums  with  the  tongue,  help  the  process  of 
solution. 

(c)  Like  the  sense  of  smell,  the  sense  of  taste  is  subject  to  fatigue. 
It  is  also  greatly  affected  by  contrast.    Every  one  may  notice,  for 
instance,  that  the  same  cup  of  tea  which  has  a  very  sweet  taste 
while  eating  meat,  bread,  or  pickles,  seems  almost  bitter  while 
eating  candy  or  sweets. 

B.  TOUCH 

The  sense  of  touch  includes  three  main  groups  of  sensations: 
sensations  of  contact  and  pressure,  sensations  of  temperature, 
and  kinesthetic  sensations.  For  contact  and  pressure,  and  for 
temperature,  its  organ  consists  of  the  papillae  of  the  derma  or  true 
skin.  For  kinesthetic  sensations,  it  consists  of  the  numerous 
nervous  fibrillae  found  in  the  muscular  system.  The  distinction 
of  the  organs  of  contact  and  pressure  from  those  of  temperature 
is  not  clear  physiologically,  that  is,  organs  special  to  each  group 
cannot  be  pointed  out.  Yet  they  seem  to  be  distinct,  for,  in 
certain  diseases,  the  sense  of  touch  proper  may  disappear  while 
the  sense  of  temperature  persists,  and  vice  versa. 

i.  Contact  and  Pressure.  —These  two  sensations  go  together. 
Evidently  there  can  be  no  pressure  without  contact,  and  most 
sensations  of  contact  are  also  accompanied  by  some  pressure. 

(a)  The  qualities  perceived  by  contact  are  hardness  and  soft- 
ness, roughness  and  smoothness.    All  these  may  be  reduced  to 
resistance;  hardness  and  softness  are  degrees  of  resistance;  rough- 
ness and  smoothness  are  its  qualities  and  its  localization  on  the 
same  surface. 

(b)  The  different  parts  of  the  body  are  not  equally  sensitive. 
The  points  of  a  pair  of  dividers  kept  at  the  same  distance  from 
each  other  will  be  felt  as  two  or  as  one  according  to  the  place  to 

5 


50  PSYCHOLOGY 

which  they  are  applied.  This  has  been  called  discriminative  sen- 
sibility, or  the  skin's  sense  of  locality.  It  varies  from  about  i  mm. 
(0.039  inch)  for  the  tip  of  the  tongue  to  about  68  mm.  for  the  skin 
of  the  middle  of  the  back,  the  upper  arm  and  leg.  Discriminative 
sensibility  may  be  greatly  improved  by  exercise. 

2.  Temperature.  —  (a)  "Hot "  and  "  cold  "  are  terms  used  in  re- 
lation to  our  own  temperature.     Sensations  of  temperature  depend 
on  the  physiological  zero,  i.e.   the  temperature  of   the  skin  on 
the  part  of  the  body  where  the  sensation  is  experienced.    An 
object  having  this  temperature  is  felt  as  neither  hot  nor  cold. 
The  physiological  zero  is  not  identical  with  blood  temperature, 
but  may  be  higher  or  lower. 

(b)  Contrast  is  an  important  factor  in  the  appreciation  of  tem- 
perature.   The  temperature  of  a  room  which  one  enters  seems 
colder  or  warmer  according  as  one  comes  from  a  warmer  or  a  colder 
place.    The  same  water  may  be  almost  burning  for  a  cold  hand, 
and  only  warm  for  the  hand  which  has  just  experienced  a  higher 
temperature. 

(c)  Within  certain  limits,  the  sense  of  temperature  is  subject 
to  adaptation.    The  water  which  at  first  seemed  very  hot  to  the 
hand  becomes  more  tolerable  if  the  contact  be  prolonged.     Some 
heat  being  imparted  to  the  organism,  the  contrast  disappears, 
and  thus  it  is  seen  that  this  phenomenon  is  connected  with  the  one 
just  mentioned. 

(d)  Temperatures  most  readily  appreciated  are  those  between 
10  and  45  degrees  Centigrade  (50-111  Fahrenheit).    Extreme  heat 
and  cold  produce  painful  sensations  in  many  respects  similar. 
The  finger  dipped  in  boiling  water  or  in  liquid  air  experiences  a 
sensation  which  might  be  called  "burning  "  in  both  cases. 

(e)  The  organs  for  heat  seem  to  be  different  from  those  for  cold. 
There  are  "cold  spots  "  and  "heat  spots,"  as  may  be  ascertained 
easily  by  pressing  gently  on  the  skin  with  the  point  of  a  lead  pencil. 
In  some  spots  no  distinct  sensation  of  temperature  is  experienced ; 
in  other  spots  there  is  a  sensation  of  cold.    Or  if  the  point  be  previ- 
ously warmed,  sensations  of  heat  are  experienced  only  in  some  spots. 

3.  Kinesthetic  or  Muscular  Sensations  may  be  reduced  in  part 
to  internal  sensations   (e.g.  muscular  tension),  and  in  part  to 


SENSATION  51 

external  sensations  (when  they  give  information  concerning  the 
external  world,  e.g.  weight).  They  include  two  main  groups: 
sensations  of  movement,  including  the  sensations  of  skin,  joints, 
muscles,  and  tendons;  sensations  of  strain  or  resistance,  e.g. 
muscular  effort  in  lifting  a  weight. 

C.   HEARING 

1.  The  Organs  of  Hearing  consist  of  the  ear;  external  ear 
(pinna  or  auricle,  and  auditory  canal  or  meatus)-,  middle  ear  or 
tympanum,  separated  from  the  external  ear  by  the  membrana 
tympani  and  including  the  three  auditory  bones;  internal  ear  or 
labyrinth  (vestibule,  semicircular  canals,  and  cochlea)  communi- 
cating with  the  middle  ear  by  the  two  foramina. 

The  external  ear  gathers  air  vibrations  and  transmits  them  to 
the  middle  ear  by  vibrating  the  membrana  tympani.  The  middle 
ear  serves  for  the  transmission  of  vibrations,  the  ossicles  dimin- 
ishing their  amplitude  but  increasing  their  intensity.  The  organ 
proper  of  hearing  is  the  internal  ear  where  the  acoustic  nerve  is 
distributed,  partly  in  the  semicircular  canals,  and  partly  in  the 
cochlea  in  which  the  complex  and  interesting  organ  of  Corti  is 
found. 

2.  Sound  is  the  stimulus  of  the  sense  of  hearing.    Physically 
it  consists  of  air  vibrations.    According  as  these  follow  one  an- 
other in  regular  or  irregular  succession,  we  have  musical  sounds 
or  noises. 

(a)  Sound  possesses:  (i)  Intensity  or  loudness,  which  depends 
on  the  force  or  amplitude  of  the  vibrations.     (2)   Pitch,  which 
depends  on  the  number  of  vibrations  in  a  given  unit  of  time.    The 
number  of  perceivable  vibrations,  i.e.  the  range  of  hearing,  is  from 
about  16  to  38,000  a  second   for  an  ordinary  ear.   (3)  Quality, 
timbre,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  the  color  of  the  tone,  which 
depends  on  the  combination  of  secondary  vibrations  or  overtones 
with  the  fundamental  tone. 

(b)  The  discrimination  of  sounds  of  different  pitch  is  susceptible 
of  great  improvement  by  exercise.    For  simultaneous  sounds  the 
sensitiveness  is  not  so  great  as  for  successive  sounds.    With  a 
little  exercise  the  average  ear  may  perceive  the  difference  in  pitch 


52    I  PSYCHOLOGY 


etween  two  successive  sounds  whose  number  of  vibrations  are  in 
the  ratio  200:  201.  A  very  keen  ear  may  perceive  the  difference 
when  the  number  of  vibrations  is  in  the  ratio  1000: 1001. 

D.   VISION 

1.  The  Organ  of  Vision  is  the  Eye. — (i)  The  enclosing  mem- 
branes, protective  and  nutritive,  are  the  sclerotic  (in  front,  cornea) 
and  the  choroid  (in  front,  iris).     (2)  The  refracting  media  are  the 
aqueous  humor,  the   crystalline  lens,   and   the  vitreous  humor. 
(3)  Accessory  structures  are  the  various  muscles  both  of  the  eye- 
ball and  the  interior  eye  (especially  those  which  regulate  the  con- 
vexity of  the  lens  and  the  aperture  of  the  pupil),  the  eyelids,  and 
the  lachrymal  glands.    (4)  The  organ  proper  of  vision  is  the  retina, 
and  among  the  eight  or  nine  layers  which  are  distinguished  in  the 
retina  that  of  rods  and  cones  is  the  most  important.    The  retina 
is  the  expansion  of  the  optic  nerve  spreading  within  the  eyeball 
close  to  the  choroid.    The  macula  lutea  or  yellow  spot,  and  chiefly 
the  pit  in  its  centre  or  fovea  centralis,  is  the  place  where  the  rays 
of  light  fall  in  clear  vision.    The  blind  spot  is  the  entrance  itself 
of  the  optic  nerve  in  the  eyeball.    Rays  of  light  falling  there  are  not 
perceived. 

2.  The  Stimulus  of  Vision  is  light,  which  physically  consists 
of  ether  vibrations. 

By  refraction  the  white  light  of  the  sun  is  decomposed  into  the 
seven  colors  of  the  spectrum.  The  differences  in  color  depend  on 
the  rapidity  and  length  of  the  waves,  these  two  being  in  inverse 
ratio.  Substances  are  white  or  black  according  as  they  reflect 
all  or  none  of  the  rays  of  light.  They  are  variously  colored  accord- 
ing as  they  absorb  some  rays  of  the  spectrum  and  reflect  others. 

The  union  of  the  seven  spectral  colors  is  not  necessary  to  pro- 
duce white.  Two  colors,  called  complementary,  give  the  same 
result:  red  and  bluish-green,  orange  and  greenish-blue,  yellow 
and  ultramarine  blue,  greenish-yellow  and  violet. 

3.  Special  Features.  —  (a)  The  sensation  of  vision  does  not 
disappear  immediately  after  the  stimulus  is  withdrawn,  but  con- 
tinues for  a  short  time;  e.g.  the  fiery  trail  of  a  shooting-star;  a 
luminous  point  rotating  rapidly,  as  the  end  of  a  kindled  stick, 


SENSATION  53 

produces  the  impression  of  a  luminous  disk.  If  you  look  intensely 
at  a  bright  lamp  for  a  few  seconds,  and  put  out  the  light,  you 
will  continue  to  see  the  flame  in  the  dark. 

(b)  Color  blindness,  or  the  incapacity  of  the  eye  to  discern  one 
or  several  colors,  is  more  frequent  than  is  commonly  supposed. 
Red  is  the  color  for  which  blindness  is  more  generally  found.    Hence 
the  necessity  of  careful  tests  for  locomotive  engineers  and  others 
who  have  to  distinguish  colored  signals. 

(c)  An  after-image  is  a  phenomenon  of  vision  produced  after 
the  stimulus  has  disappeared.    The  after-image  may  be  posi- 
tive, as  in  the  cases  mentioned  above  (under  a),  or  negative,  due 
to  the  fatigue  of  the  retina.    The  negative  after-images  of  dark 
objects  are  relatively  bright,  and  vice  versa;  those  of  colored  objects 
present  the  complementary  color.    After  gazing  fixedly  at  the 
bright  window  about  a  half  minute,  turn  your  eyes  toward  the 
white  wall  or  ceiling,  and  you  will  see  the  window  again,  but 
the  pane  will  be  darker  than  the  frame.    After  looking  intensely 
at  a  bright  and  glossy  red  cardboard  triangle,  look  again  at  the 
white  ceiling;  a  green  triangle  will  be  seen,  the  dimensions  of 
which  will  vary  according  to  the  distance  of  the  wall  which  is  used 
as  a  screen.    If  the  wall  or  ceiling  is  not  white,  the  color  of 
the  after-image  will  be  different. 

(d)  Contrast  in  brightness  and  colors  is  very  important,  and  the 
harmonious  arrangement  of  colors  is  to  be  observed  in  painting, 
decorating,  dressing,  etc. 

IV.   NUMBER  AND  COMPARISON  OF  THE  SENSES 

i.  Number. — The  question  of  the  number  of  the  senses  is 
limited  to  external  senses.  On  account  of  their  complexity  and 
vagueness,  no  attempt  is  made  to  number  internal  senses,  and 
psychologists  follow  different  classifications.  For  the  external 
senses,  on  the  contrary,  we  have  the  traditional  division  into  five 
senses  as  mentioned  above.  Some  psychologists,  however,  pay 
little  or  no  attention  to  this  classification  which  they  find  inade- 
quate. The  present  question  is  secondary  and  of  minor  impor- 
tance, yet  it  may  be  of  interest  to  see  how  solutions  have  been 
attempted. 


54  PSYCHOLOGY 

(a)  If  we  take  a  psychological  basis  of  division,  namely,  the  dif- 
ferent qualities  of  sensations  as  mental  states,  we  are  at  once  con- 
fronted with  the  difficulty  of  determining  the  meaning  of  quality 
when  applied  to  sensations.     A  sensation  of  red  is  qualitatively 
different  from  a  sensation  of  blue;  the  sound  of  the  flute  from  that 
of  thunder,  etc.     It  is  asserted  even  that  every  change  in  intensity 
is  also  a  change  in  quality.     Hence  on  this  basis  alone  a  classifica- 
tion is  impossible.     Perhaps  quality  may  be  used  in  a  generic 
sense,  all  colors  forming  one  kind  of  quality;  all  sounds,  another, 
and  so  on.     But  this  is  not  purely  psychological;  sensations  here 
are  said  to  have  the  same  generic  quality  because  they  are  experi- 
enced through  the  same  sense  organ  (physiology),  or  because  their 
stimuli  are  of  the  same  nature  (physics). 

(b)  If  we  take  a  physiological  basis  of  division,  namely,  the 
number  of  the  different  sense  organs,  we  have  first  to  define  what 
is  meant  by  a  special  organ.     Double  organs  like  eyes  and  ears 
are  counted  as  one.     Why?    Partly  because  they  have  the  same 
structure  and  functions,  partly  also  because  they  are  affected  by 
the  same  stimuli  (this  is  not  physiological,  but  physical).     More- 
over, what  is  one  special  organ?     Physiologists  commonly  hold 
that  there  are  within  the  eye  special  organs  for  the  perception 
of  each  of  the  fundamental  colors,  that  the  organs  of  touch  are 
distinct  from  those  of  temperature,  that  different  qualities  of  taste 
are  perceived  through  different  papillae,  etc.      Hence  the  number 
of  sense  organs  can  hardly  be  determined.    We  may,  however, 
admit  five  generic  kinds  of  organs,  counting  as  one  those  that  are 
close  together  and  have  the  same  outer  and  accessory  structures. 
For  instance,  even  if  every  fundamental  color  is  perceived  through 
different  retinal  endings,  the  eye  is  one  organ  with  only  one  set 
of  enclosing  membranes,  refracting  media,  etc. 

(c)  To  argue  from  the  number  of  distinct  physical  stimuli  is  to 
beg  the  question,  since  we  are  aware  of  the  stimulus  only  through 
the  sensation.    To  say  that  there  are  five  groups  of  irreducible 
stimuli  simply  means  that  we  experience  five  kinds  of  sensations, 
and  this  is  the  very  question  at  issue.     Physical  sciences,  however, 
lend  us  assistance  by  reducing  all  colors  to  ether  vibrations,  heat 
to  molecular  vibrations,  etc. 


SENSATION  55 

(d)  Let  us  conclude  that  the  commonly  received  division  of 
the  external  senses  may  be  retained  on  condition  that  it  be  under- 
stood as  a  generic  division  under  which  are  found  distinct  sub- 
classes.    As  such  it  corresponds  to  the  generic  division  of  physical 
stimuli  and  of  organs.     All  colors  are  referred  to  the  sense  of  vision 
because,  although  blue  differs  from  red,  both  are  ether  vibrations, 
and,  although  each  may  have  special  organs  in  the  retina,  these 
organs  belong  to  the  same  structure  and  are  parts  of  the  whole 
complete  organ,  which  is  the  eye.    The  same  remarks  apply  to 
the  other  sensations. 

(e)  As  to  the  possibility  of  some  other  sense  altogether  different 
from  those  we  have  now,  it  has  been  asserted  by  some;   but  it 
can  be  neither  proved  nor  disproved.    The  question  is  an  idle  one. 
(i)  To  have  a  new  sense,  there  should  be  another  stimulus  differ- 
ent from  those  that  are  known  at  present.     Its  existence  can  only 
be  asserted  gratuitously.     (2)  In  certain  abnormal  states,  like 
somnambulism  or  hypnotism,  a  man  may  perceive  things  which 
he  does  not  perceive  normally,  or  in  a  manner  different  from  that 
of  the  normal  mind.     But  no  new  quality  of  things  is  manifested; 
there  is  only  a  special  keenness  of  the  senses,  or  a  new  mode  of 
perceiving  the  same  qualities.     (3)  Granting   this  supposition  of 
another  sense,  it  could  not  be  inferred  that  things  would  seem  dif- 
ferent from  what  they  are  now.    The  new  information  would  not 
contradict,  but  complete,  the  information  which  we  have  at  pres- 
ent.   In  the  same  way,  if  the  power  of  vision  is  given  to  the  man 
born  blind,  he  becomes  aware  of  qualities  hitherto  unknown  to  him, 
but  this  knowledge  does  not  contradict  or  invalidate  that  which 
he  has  acquired  through  the  other  senses. 

2.  The  Comparison  of  the  Senses  may  be  made  from  different 
points  of  view. 

(a)  In  reference  to  usefulness,  (i)  Taste  and  smell  are  more 
closely  related  to  organic  sensations  and  less  definite.  They  give 
less  information  concerning  the  external  world.  Hence,  whereas 
they  may  be  very  useful  for  organic  life,  especially  in  some  kinds  of 
animals,  they  are  of  little  use  for  intellectual  life.  (2)  Touch, 
hearing,  and  sight  are  the  "intellectual"  senses;  from  them  are 
derived  the  data  necessary  for  the  higher  mental  functions. 


56  PSYCHOLOGY 

Through  hearing  we  receive  oral  information,  which  is  essential 
both  in  early  education  and  in  the  whole  course  of  life.  Touch  is 
the  sense  on  which,  in  many  cases,  the  other  senses  depend  for 
the  confirmation  of  the  reality  of  their  perceptions;  it  is  of  great 
value  in  educating  them,  as  will  be  seen  hereafter.  In  adult  life, 
however,  sight  seems  to  be  the  chief  sense,  because  it  enables  the 
mind  to  receive  written  information,  and,  as  will  be  shown  when  we 
speak  of  perception,  it  embodies  the  results  of  touch  and  the  other 
senses. 

(b)  With  regard  to  the  mode  of  stimulation,  it  may  be  said  that 
some  kind  of  actual  contact  is  required  of  the  appropriate  stimu- 
lus with  the  sense  organ.    Ether  waves,  air  vibrations,  emana- 
tions, etc.,  must  act  on  the  organ.    Yet  a  distinction  is  to  be  made, 
if  not  for  the  simple  sensation,  at  least  for  perception.    An  object 
cannot  be    tasted  or  touched  without  actual  contact  with  it. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  possible  to  smell,  hear,  or  see  distant  odorous, 
sounding,  or  luminous  bodies,  the  reach  of  sight  being  far  greater 
than  that  of  any  other  sense. 

(c)  As  to  the  evolution  of  the  senses,  touch  comes  first,     (i)  It 
is  the  foundation  of  the  other  senses,  since  all  require  some  contact. 
(2)  It  is  the  most  universal.    Lower  animals  which  do  not  have 
all  the  other  senses  have  at  least  the  sense  of  touch.    There  is  no 
known  instance  of  the  presence  of  other  senses  where  this  one  is 
absent.     (3)  In  the  same  individual  man,  touch  is  the  first  sense 
to  be  exercised. 

V.     PSYCHOPHYSICS  AND  PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 

i.  Facts  of  Common  Experience.  —  (a)  Sensations  are  called 
weak,  strong,  moderate,  etc.,  i.e.  their  intensity  varies.  A  sound 
may  be  loud  or  hardly  perceptible;  temperature  may  be  increased 
or  decreased;  and  thus  for  all  the  senses,  (i)  Generally  to  an 
increase  in  the  stimulus  corresponds  an  increase  in  the  intensity 
of  the  sensation.  Fifty  candles  give  more  light  than  one;  lifting  a 
hundredweight  gives  a  more  intense  sensation  of  muscular  tension 
than  lifting  twenty  pounds,  etc.  (2)  Yet  ordinary  experience 
shows  also  that  the  sensation  does  not  increase  in  the  same  abso- 
lute proportion  as  the  stimulus.  One  singer's  voice  added  to  a 


SENSATION  57 

numerous  chorus  does  not  produce  the  same  increment  of  sensa- 
tion as  if  it  were  added  to  one  or  two  singers  only.  In  a  very  bright 
room,  the  addition  of  one  candle  is  not  so  striking  as  it  would  be 
in  a  dimly  lighted  room,  etc.  Therefore,  in  order  to  produce  a 
noticeable  difference  in  the  sensation,  the  necessary  increment  of 
stimulus,  must  be  proportioned  to  the  already  existing  stimulus, 
i.e.  it  must  be  greater  or  smaller  according  as  the  original  stimu- 
lus is  itself  greater  or  smaller. 

(b)  A  certain  amount  of  physical  stimulus  is  required  to  produce 
a  sensation.  A  violin  string  may  be  vibrating  without  my  hear- 
ing any  sound,  either  because  the  vibrations  are  too  feeble,  or 
because,  owing  to  the  distance,  they  do  not  reach  my  ear.  At  a 
certain  distance,  the  ticking  of  a  clock  may  be  heard  whereas 
that  of  a  watch  is  not.  A  small  amount  of  a  given  substance 
diluted  in  a  glass  of  water  may  not  give  it  a  noticeable  taste;  if  it 
be  increased  a  little  the  taste  will  be  perceived.  The  initial  point 
of  sensation  is  called  its  threshold  or  its  lower  limit.  There  is  also 
an  upper  limit  or  acme  of  sensation,  but  it  cannot  be  determined, 
because  some  perceptible  stimuli  (e.g.  some  odors  and  savors) 
cannot  be  increased  beyond  certain  limits,  and  chiefly  because  the 
sensations  become  too  painful  and  dangerous;  e.g.  too  high  a  tem- 
perature, too  bright  a  light,  too  intense  a  sound,  too  great  a  con- 
tact and  pressure  are  productive  of  pain  rather  than  of  external 
sensation,  and  injure  the  organism. 

2.  Experimental  Science  tries  to  determine  more  accurately 
these  facts  of  common  experience. 

(a)  Sensations  cannot  be  measured  directly  and  in  themselves. 
Evidently  no  physical  unit  can  be  applied  to  mental  states.    Nor 
can  any  mental  process  be  taken  as  a  unit,  because  mental  states 
are  of  widely  different  nature  (a  sensation  of  color  or  smell  can- 
not be  estimated  in  sound-units) ;  and  also  because,  even  within  the 
same  class  of  processes,  no  unit  can  be  applied.    I  may  know 
that  a  sound  is  louder  than  another,  but  it  is  impossible  for  con- 
sciousness to  determine  whether  it  is  exactly  three  or  four  times 
louder.    The  relative  intensity  of  sensations  cannot  be  measured 
by  introspection. 

(b)  Only  an  indirect  measurement  is  possible.    A  sensation  can 


58  PSYCHOLOGY 

be  measured,  not  in  itself,  but  in  its  relation  to  something  else 
which  is  under  control  and  which  can  be  measured  accurately, 
(i)  I  cannot,  it  is  true,  say  whether  a  sensation  of  sound  is  three 
or  four  tunes  more  intense  than  another,  but  I  can  know  that  the 
number  of  vibrations  producing  it  is  three  or  four  times  larger 
than  another.  This  relation  of  the  sensation  to  the  physical 
stimulus  is  the  problem  which  psychophysics  undertakes  to  solve. 
Its  two  main  questions  are  those  of  the  threshold  of  sensations, 
i.e.  the  minimum  quantity  of  stimulus  that  can  be  perceived,  and 
of  the  smallest  differences  of  sensations,  i.e.  the  minimum  incre- 
ment of  stimulus  necessary  to  produce  a  difference  in  conscious- 
ness. (2)  All  mental  states  are  accompanied  by  organic  processes. 
Physiological  psychology  endeavors  to  measure  these  organic 
changes  in  blood-circulation,  secretion,  muscular  activity,  tem- 
perature, etc.,  in  order  to  see  how  they  are  correlated  to  various 
mental  states.  (3)  Mental  processes  require  time.  Between 
the  application  of  a  given  stimulus  and  a  corresponding  reaction 
an  interval  of  time  elapses  which  psychometry  tries  to  analyze  and 
measure. 

N.B.  Of  these  various  problems,  the  first  applies  only  to  sen- 
sation and  perception,  for  the  stimulus  must  be  external  and 
under  control,  and  such  is  not  the  case  in  other  mental  states  like 
memory,  emotion,  volition.  The  second  applies  to  all  mental 
states,  for  all  have  correlates  in  the  organism;  but  it  is  impossible 
to  measure  all  organic  processes.  Some,  like  nervous  processes, 
are  central  and  cannot  be  reached.  All  are  variable;  what  affects 
the  circulation  in  one  may  affect  the  secretions  in  another;  one 
grows  pale  where  another  would  blush  or  tremble,  etc.  The  third 
applies  also  to  all  mental  states,  but  it  is  difficult  to  analyze 
and  measure  exactly  every  one  of  the  elementary  processes  of  a 
reaction. 

3.  Methods.  —  (a)  To  determine  the  threshold  of  sensation 
two  methods  are  followed,  (i)  Begin  with  too  weak  or  too  dis- 
tant a  stimulus,  and  gradually  increase  it  or  bring  it  nearer  until 
it  is  perceived.  (2)  Begin  with  a  certainly  perceivable  stimulus, 
and  gradually  decrease  it  or  move  it  farther  until  it  ceases  to  be 
perceived.  N.B.  The  latter  method  will  generally  give  a  lower 


SENSATION  59 

threshold  than  the  former,  i.e.  weaker  or  more  distant  stimuli 
will  be  perceived;  hence  averages  must  be  taken. 

(b)  To  determine  the  smallest  perceptible  difference,  three  meth- 
ods are  used,     (i)  The  method  of  least  observable  difference,  which 
is  applied  in  four  ways.     Begin  with  two  equal  stimuli,  and  grad- 
ually (a)  increase  or  (b)  decrease  one  till  the  precise  moment  when 
the  difference  is  noticed.     Begin  with  stimuli  perceived  as  unequal, 
and  gradually  (c)  increase  the  weaker  or  (d)  decrease  the  stronger 
till  no  difference  is  felt.     (2)  The  method  of  correct  and  mistaken 
cases.    Slightly  different  stimuli  are  used,  and  after  comparing 
them  the  subject  pronounces  on  their  relative  differences.     (3) 
The  method  of  average  error.    One  fixed  stimulus  is  taken,  and 
others  more  or  less  different  are  tried  until  one  is  found  which 
appears  to  be  equal  to  the  first. 

N.B.  In  all  these  methods,  which  it  is  advisable  to  use  together 
whenever  possible  in  order  to  correct  one  by  another,  several 
experiments  are  made  and  averages  taken.  Without  compli- 
cated apparatus  they  can  be  easily  applied  to  certain  sensations, 
e.g.  weight,  temperature,  taste. 

(c)  The  methods  of  physiological  psychology  are  very  complex 
and  require  an  elaborate  apparatus  to  record  and  measure  organic 
changes. 

(d)  The  same  must  be  said  of  experiments  in  reaction-time. 
The  general  procedure,  however,  is  as  follows :    In  simple  reaction- 
time  or  physiological  time,  the  subject  reacts   by  an  easy  and 
familiar  movement  —  generally  cutting  off  an  electric  current  by 
pressing  on  a  key  —  to  a  simple  sensation  which  he  expects.    In 
complex  reaction-time,  which  is  longer,  there  is  a  choice  in  the  mode 
of  reaction  according  to  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  or  there  is 
uncertainty  as  to  the  nature  or  quality  of  the  sensation  which  will 
be  experienced.     The  duration  of  the  complex  mental  process  is 
calculated  by  subtracting  the  physiological  time  from  the  total 
duration  of  the  whole  process. 

4.  Results.  —  (a)  Special  results  and  numerical  formulae  which 
have  been  arrived  at  in  these  various  experiments  cannot  be  given 
here.  Only  some  of  the  most  general  points  will  be  mentioned. 

(b)  Experiments  on  the  threshold  of   sensation  give   different 


60  PSYCHOLOGY 

results  according  to  the  nature  and  distance  of  the  stimuli  used. 
Experiments  on  the  minimum  of  perceptible  increase  have  led  to 
the  formulation  of  the  law  known  as  "  Weber's  law,"  which  is  but  a 
formula  for  both  common  and  scientific  experience:  "The  intensity 
of  a  sensation  increases  by  absolute  magnitudes  when  the  stimulus 
increases  by  relatively  constant  magnitudes."  Or:  "Equal  in- 
crements of  sensation  result  from  relatively  equal  increments  of 
stimulus."  Absolute  increment  means  the  addition  of  the  same 
quantity;  relative  increment  means  the  addition  of  a  quantity 
compared  to  the  already  existing  amount  to  which  it  is  added. 
This  law  was  given  a  more  mathematical  formulation  by  Fechner: 
"If  the  sensation  must  increase  in  arithmetical  progression,  the 
stimulus  must  increase  in  geometrical  progression."  Or:  "The 
sensation  increases  as  the  logarithm  of  the  stimulus." 

Thus,  for  instance,  to  say  that  the  smallest  perceptible  incre- 
ment is,  for  sound  J,  for  weight  iV,  and  for  light  T&TT,  means  that, 
in  order  to  perceive  the  increment  of  stimulus,  we  must  add  ^, 
tV,  Totf,  of  the  preceding  stimulus.  The  difference  between  100 
and  101  candles  will  be  the  minimum  perceptible.  If  the  first 
stimulus  be  200  or  300,  then  we  must  have,  in  order  to  perceive  a 
difference,  not  201  or  301  candles,  but  200  -f-  f  $J,  or  202,  and 
300  -f  f  U,  or  303. 

(c)  Experiments  in  physiological  psychology  show  the  influence 
of  various  mental  states  on  organic  processes,  the  effects  of  fatigue, 
emotions,  dispositions,  etc. 

(d)  Reaction-time  has  led  to  determine  the  rate  of  transmission 
of  the  nervous  current,  and  hence  the  duration  of  more  complex 
cerebral  processes.     Even  so-called  simple  reaction-time  is  in  real- 
ity complex,  for  it  includes  the  action  of  the  stimulus  on  the  end- 
organs,  the  transmission  to  the  nervous  centre,  either  to  the  brain 
directly  or  to  the  brain  through  the  cord,  the  passage  from  a  sen- 
sory to  a  motor  process  in  the  brain  centre,  the  transmission  of 
the  motor  excitation  through  the  brain,  cord,  and  motor  nerves, 
and  the  production  of  muscular  contraction. 

5.  Value  of  the  Results  of  Experiments.  —  We  shall  limit  our- 
selves to  a  general  appreciation. 

(a)  Weber's  law  has  been  discussed  and   criticised,   and  the 


SENSATION  61 

conclusion  seems  to  be  that  it  holds  good  provided  it  be  accepted 
only  as  an  approximation  and  applied  only  to  sensations  of  mod- 
erate intensity.  Hence  Fechner's  formula  is  too  strict  and  too 
mathematical. 

(b)  Experiments  give  different  results  according  to  the  methods 
used,  the  aptitudes  of  the  subject,  his  training,  power  of  attention, 
habits  and  disposition.     Hence  the  results  obtained  by  different 
psychologists  do  not  always  agree,  and  they  must    always  be 
understood  as  averages,  not  as  invariable  formulae. 

(c)  Experimental  psychology  is  a  young  science.    The  first 
psychological  laboratory  was  founded  by  Wundt  at  Leipzig  (1878), 
but  Weber's  and  Fechner's  investigations  had  taken  place  before 
that  time.    It  has  developed  rapidly,  and  to-day  psychological 
laboratories  are  found  in  all  leading  universities.     By  some,  experi- 
mental psychology  has  been  hailed  as  the  only  true  psycholog- 
ical science  in  which  alone  progress  is  possible.     By  others,  it  has 
been  condemned  unreservedly  as  a  vain  and  fruitless  attempt  from 
which  no  results  useful  to  psychology  have  been  obtained,  and 
from  which  none  are  to  be  expected.    It  is  not  psychology  at  all, 
but  physiology.      It  has  even  been  identified  with  materialistic 
psychology. 

(d)  The  truth  is  to  be  found  between  these  two  extreme  views. 
Experimental  psychology  in  itself  is  not  materialistic.    It  has 
nothing  or  little  to  do  with  the  metaphysical  problem  of  the  nature 
of  the  mind.     It  is  only  one  branch  or  one  method  of  psychology. 
It  does  not  reach  all  mental  processes,  and  considers  only  some  as- 
pects of  those  which  it  does  reach.     Its  limitations  are  in  its  range 
of  application,  in  the  restricted  value  of  the  results,  and  in  the  need 
which  it  has  of  other  psychological  methods  to  coordinate  its 
results. 

Its  value  is  both  theoretical  and  practical.  It  makes  of  psy- 
chology a  more  exact  science,  helps  us  to  understand  better  the 
nature  and  effects  of  certain  mental  attitudes  and  processes,  like 
attention,  emotions,  expectation,  and  shows  more  clearly  the  rela- 
tions of  mind  and  organism.  The  influence  of  sex,  fatigue,  heredity, 
drugs,  etc.,  is  ascertained  more  accurately  and  verified.  The  laws 
of  habit,  education,  training,  distraction,  etc.,  are  also  determined 


62  PSYCHOLOGY 

more  strictly.  Hence  experimental  psychology  is  useful  to  medi- 
cine, physiology,  and  may  become  very  valuable  for  pedagogy 
by  finding  better  methods  of  teaching,  in  stricter  accordance  with 
the  laws  of  the  mind  and  the  organism.  The  results  so  far  obtained 
are  imperfect,  but  they  are  sufficient  to  give  hopes  of  greater, 
better,  and  more  useful  results  in  the  future. 

II.    PERCEPTION 
I.  ANALYSIS  AND  GENESIS  OF  SENSE  PERCEPTION 

i.  Analysis.  —  (a)  Perception  is  the  consciousness  of  things, 
whereas  sensation  is  merely  the  consciousness  of  qualities.  Per- 
ception refers  these  qualities  to  objects.  Thus  in  adult  life  I  do 
not  merely  hear  a  sound,  but  I  hear  the  church  bell  or  the  whistle 
of  the  engine,  I  see  a  man,  I  smell  a  rose,  I  touch  the  table,  etc. 

(b)  Perceptions  have  not  always  the  same  degree  of  clearness. 
I  may  hear  a  sound  without  being  able  to  ascertain  its  source; 
perceive  an  unknown  tree,  or  a  machine  which  I  never  saw  before 
and  the  use  of  which  I  do  not  know,  or  an  animal  different  from 
all  those  with  which  I  am  familiar.    In  such  cases  there  is  per- 
ception, although  indistinct,  for  I   am  conscious  not  only  of  a 
quality,  but  also  in  some  manner  of  a  distance,  direction,  etc., 
and  chiefly  of  an  object  to  which  I  refer  such  qualities.    Percep- 
tions become  more   and  more  perfect  with  age,  education,  and 
mental  development,  because  they  embody  a  more  accurate  and 
more  complete  knowledge  of  the  perceived  objects. 

(c)  Consequently  it  is  in  perception  that  sensations  acquire  a 
meaning.    If  I  hear  somebody  speaking  in  a  language  unknown 
to  me,  his  words  have  no  meaning  for  me;  they  are  simply  sounds, 
since  I  cannot  grasp  the  underlying  thought  which  they  are  in- 
tended to  manifest.     In  the  same  manner  sensations  by  themselves 
are  meaningless,   and  perception  unites  them  into  a  coherent 
whole. 

(d)  Perception  is  synthetic  and  coordinates  several  sensations. 
In  the  statement  "I  see  the  dog  asleep  over  there,"  are  implied 
many  sensations  past  and  present.    I  see  simply  a  certain  color, 
and  I  supply  the  rest  from  past  associations.    Many  sensory,  and 


PERCEPTION  63 

perhaps  intellectual,  elements  enter  into  my  complete  perception 
of  the  dog,  and  only  a  few  of  these  are  actually  given  in  my  act 
of  vision.  All  are  now  synthetized  in  the  one  perception  of  the 
sleeping  dog. 

(e)  Hence  perception  implies:  (i)  A  synthesis  of  several  simul- 
taneous sensations,  although  sometimes  only  one  sense  is  used. 
Thus  I  refer  to  the  same  bell  the  sensations  of  vision,  sound,  hard- 
ness, etc.  (2)  A  synthesis  of  present  sensations  with  past  sensa- 
tions of  the  same  or  of  other  senses,  i.e.  memory  and  recognition. 
Thus,  although  I  have  no  actual  experience  of  it,  I  know  how  the 
boiling  water  which  I  see  would  affect  my  sense  of  touch  if  I  dipped 
my  finger  in  it,  and  the  knowledge  that  it  is  boiling  is  itself  the 
result  of  past  experiences.  Imagination  and  habit  may  even  pre- 
vent us  from  perceiving  things  as  they  are  really,  for  instance, 
when  a  word  in  which  a  letter  is  missing  is  read  without  the  mis- 
print being  noticed.  Or  they  complete  the  perception,  as  when  I 
see  a  ball  and  perceive  that  it  is  spherical,  although  I  really  see 
only  half  of  it.  (3)  The  substitution  of  one  sense  for  another,  or  of 
one  sense  for  a  more  complex  act  of  judgment  and  inference. 
For  instance,  I  see  that  the  table  is  hard  and  the  pillow  soft  (touch), 
or  I  see  that  the  dog  is  living  (inference  from  its  behavior). 

(/)  We  may  recall  an  old  distinction  which  applies  here. 
Sensile     per  se     proprium. 
commune, 
per  accidens. 

By  sensile  or  obiectum  sensibile  is  meant  the  object  about  which 
the  senses  give  information.  The  sensile  per  se  is  perceived 
directly.  The  sensile  per  accidens  is  not  perceived  in  itself,  but 
only  because  of  some  connection  with  the  sense  to  whose  percep- 
tion it  is  attributed.  Color,  sound,  odor,  taste,  tactile  qualities, 
are  sensilia  per  se  and  propria,  i.e.  special  to  each  sense.  Size, 
number,  shape,  movement,  rest,  are  sensilia  per  se  but  communia, 
as  they  may  be  perceived  by  more  than  one  sense.  Thus  distance 
may  be  perceived  by  touch,  vision,  hearing,  and  even  smell. 
To  see  the  hardness  of  an  object;  to  see  a  friend;  to  see  that  a  dog 
is  alive  or  dead,  that  a  man  is  sad  or  joyful,  healthy  or  sick;  to 


64  PSYCHOLOGY 

hear  that  the  bell  is  broken;  to  know  by  taste  that  a  fruit  is  of  such 
or  such  a  kind;  to  enter  a  room  and  learn  by  smell  that  the  win- 
dows have  not  been  opened  for  a  long  time,  etc.,  are  examples  of 
sensilia  per  accidens.  These  qualities  or  objects  are  not  perceived 
directly  by  the  sense  to  which  they  are  attributed,  but  inferred  by 
habitual  association. 

2.  Genesis.  —  The  first  sensations  are  very  vague,  but,  little 
by  little,  images  left  by  them  in  the  mind  associate  with  sensations 
and  images  of  the  same  or  of  different  kind  so  as  to  enable  the 
mind  to  identify  and  discern  objects.    The  senses  become  educated. 
Applied  to  the  senses,  education  means:  (i)  Their  development  and 
perfection  for  their  immediate  and  original  sensations.    By  exercise 
they  acquire  a  greater  keenness  and  accuracy.     (2)  The  acquisi- 
tion by  a  given  sense  of  perceptions  which  are  not  original  (sensilia 
communia  and  sensilia  per  accidens).     (3)  The  correction  of  errors 
and  illusions.     The  main  psychological  factors  in  the  education  of 
the  senses  are  attention,  association,  imagination  and  memory, 
intellect  and  will.     Physiological  factors  are  the  habituation  of 
the  nervous  system  and  the  whole  organism,  the  development, 
growth,  and  adaptation  of  sense  organs,  the  development  of  the 
brain,  hygiene,  and  the  proper  care  and  use  of  the  sense  organs. 

3.  The  Most  Important  Perceptions  are  those  of  sight,  for,  in  the 
adult,  sight  is  in  many  cases  a  substitute  for  the  other  senses,  and 
reaches  objects  at  a  greater  distance.    It  enables  the  mind  to  com- 
municate with  others  by  gestures  and  writing.     Touch,  as  we  shall 
see,  contributes  greatly  to  the  education  of  the  other  senses, 
especially  of  sight.     Hearing  has  a  great  importance  because  it 
makes  it  possible  to  exchange  ideas  by  means  of  speech.     Smell 
and  taste  occupy  the  lowest  place. 

II.     PERCEPTIONS  OF  SMELL  AND  TASTE 

Both  senses  can  be  developed  so  as  to  reach  a  wonderful  degree 
of  keenness,  e.g.  in  professional  tasters.  But  even  when  educated, 
they  give  but  little  information  concerning  the  external  world. 
By  experience,  however,  we  learn  to  associate  many  odors  and 
savors  with  the  objects  from  which  they  proceed,  and  thus  can 
recognize  certain  substances  by  these  senses  alone.  Smell  may  also 


PERCEPTION  65 

indirectly,  and  more  or  less  accurately,  give  information  concerning 
the  distance,  direction,  and  even  size  of  the  odorous  object. 

III.     AUDITORY  PERCEPTIONS 

1.  Nature  of  Objects.  —  By  association,  sensations  of  hearing 
are  ascribed  to  their  causes  and  referred  to  such  or  such  objects. 
A  certain  sound  becomes  the  sound  of  a  bell,  and  even  of  the 
church  bell,  the  engine  bell,  the  school  bell  .  .  .  ,  because  this  sen- 
sation of  hearing  has  been  associated  with  other  visual  or  tactual 
sensations,  and  because  it  has  been  noticed  in  what  respects  the 
sound  of  a  bell  in  general  differs  from  every  other  sound,  and  the 
sound  of  a  particular  bell  from  that  of  other  bells.     In  the  same 
way  I  come  to  know  that  a  certain  tune  is  played  on  the  violin, 
the  cornet,  or  the  trombone,  even  when  I  do  not  see  these  instru- 
ments.    (Let  the  student  endeavor  to  indicate  more  in  detail  and 
more  concretely  the  genesis  of  such  perceptions.)     Mention  must 
also  be  made  of  the  auditory  perceptions  of  tempo,  rhythm,  and 
cadence  in  music,  speech,  poetry,  etc.,  which  are  the  sources  of  so 
much  enjoyment. 

2.  The  Localization  of  Sounds  in  space  includes  the  perceptions 
of  direction  and  distance. 

(a)  Perception  of  Direction,     (i)  The  use  of  the  senses  of  sight 
and  touch  is  fundamental  in  acquiring  and  developing  this  percep- 
tion, and,  even  for  the  educated  ear,  these  senses  are  frequently 
necessary  to  ascertain  the  direction  accurately  and  to  confirm  the 
auditory  perception.     (2)  Binaural  perception  is  an  index  of  direc- 
tion, because  the  intensity  of  sounds  coming  from  the  right  or  the 
left  is  different  for  the  right  and  the  left  ear.    Hence  it  is  that  in 
order  to  perceive  the  direction  of  a  sound  we  generally  turn  the 
head  around.     Experience  shows  that  the  direction  of  sounds 
coming  from  the  right  or  the  left  is  more  readily  ascertained  than 
that  of  sounds  coming  from  objects  in  front  or  back  of  the  hearer. 
(3)  It  is  probable  that  the  sensitiveness  of  the  skin  of  the  external 
ear  and  meatus,  and  the  position  of  the  semicircular  canals,  have 
something  to  do  with  the  perception  of  direction. 

(b)  Perception  of  Distance.    The  distance  of  a  sonorous  object 

is  known  by  comparing  the  intensity  of  the  present  sound  with  the 
6 


66  PSYCHOLOGY 

intensity  of  the  same  sound  at  greater  or  shorter  known  distances. 
To  this  end,  the  nature  of  the  sonorous  object  and  the  intensity 
of  its  sound  at  a  given  distance  must  be  already  known.  Atmos- 
pheric conditions,  like  the  direction  of  the  wind,  the  presence  of 
fog,  etc.,  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  The  distance  of  un- 
usual or  unfamiliar  sounds  is  much  more  difficult  to  determine. 

IV.     TACTUAL  PERCEPTIONS 

The  information  received  from  the  sense  of  touch  concerns  the 
primary  qualities  of  matter  which  are  most  fundamental,  namely, 
quantity,  extension,  number,  shape,  etc.  Moreover,  touch  is  the 
sense  to  which  appeal  is  generally  made  when  other  senses  do  not 
seem  to  agree,  e.g.  by  grasping  the  object,  walking  toward  or  around 
it.  Through  cultivation  it  is  capable  of  acquiring  a  wonderful 
and  almost  incredible  degree  of  perfection,  as,  for  instance,  in  per- 
sons born  blind.  In  all  cases  active  touch,  e.g.  "  feeling  "  with  the 
hands,  is  much  more  useful  than  mere  passive  touch,  because 
to  the  simple  contact  of  the  latter  it  adds  sensations  of  muscular 
activity  and  movement,  and  it  gives  several  simultaneous  and 
successive  sensations.  The  knowledge  of  the  shape,  dimensions, 
and  qualities  of  a  knife  will  be  more  accurate  after  handling  it 
than  after  merely  touching  it.  Tactual  perceptions  may  be  reduced 
to  those  of  our  own  body  and  those  of  other  material  substances. 

i.  Perception  of  One's  Own  Organism. —  (a)  There  seems  to 
be  some  native  but  very  vague  consciousness  of  the  organism. 
In  the  beginning,  tactual  sensations  —  including  contact  and 
pressure,  temperature,  sensations  of  muscles  and  joints  —  are 
vaguely  localized  in  the  organism,  and  discriminative  sensibility 
is  very  imperfect.  The  numerous  and  complex  vital  sensations, 
the  various  contacts  of  the  organism  with  surrounding  objects,  the 
experience  of  pain,  etc.,  contribute  to  make  the  perception  more 
definite.  So  also  the  fact  that  objects  produce  different  impres- 
sions according  to  their  size  and  qualities,  and  according  to  the 
parts  of  the  body  with  which  they  come  in  contact. 

(b)  More  effective  are  the  sensations  of  double  contact.  When 
a  part  of  the  organism,  e.g.  the  hand,  touches  another,  a  double 
sensation  of  touch  is  experienced,  and  thus  by  passive  and  chiefly 


PERCEPTION  67 

by  active  touch  the  limits  and  parts  of  the  organism  are  soon 
ascertained. 

(c)  The  sense  of  sight  is  a  help  in  localizing  more  accurately 
the  sensations  of  touch. 

2.  Perception  of  Other  Material  Substances.  —  (a)  Sensations 
of  single  contact,  as  opposed  to  those  of  double  contact,  contribute 
to  the  consciousness  of  the  distinction  between  one's  organism  and 
other  bodies.  The  same  is  true  of  the  pain  felt  in  one  part  of  the 
organism  or  in  two  according  as  the  child  strikes  some  external 
substance  or  his  own  body. 

(b)  Size,  figure,  and  distance  are  perceived  chiefly  by  active  touch, 
and  by  the  muscular  sensations  experienced  in  passing  the  hands 
on  or  around  the  object,  and  in  walking  toward  or  around  it. 
Measurements  of  size  and  distance  are  effected  by  a  comparison 
with  a  known  unit,  with  parts  of  our  own  body,  or  with  our  bodily 
movements.    It  is  noteworthy  that  the  interpretation  of  visual 
sensations  of  size  and  distance  is  frequently  done  in  terms  of  touch. 
A  thing  is  so  many  "  steps  "  away,  so  many  "  feet  "  or  "  cubits  " 
long;  it  is  at  the  distance  of  "  a  stone's  throw,"  of  "  a  two-hour 
walk,"  etc.    In  such  expressions  the  standard  unit  is  taken  from 
the  human  body  and  its  movements. 

(c)  Weight  depends  largely  on  the  strength,  exercise,  and  educa- 
tion of  the  muscular  sense.    In  consequence  it  is  greatly  relative, 
unless  the  habit  has  been  acquired  of  referring  it  to  a  fixed  unit, 
such  as  ounce,  pound,  etc.    Active  touch  especially  is  important 
in  the  determination  of  the  number  and  the  movements  of  objects. 

(d)  Combined  sensations  and  perceptions  of  touch  may  in  some 
cases  give  the  knowledge  of  the  very  nature  of  an  object.    Thus  a 
certain  group  of  sensations  will  indicate  a  metal,  and  even  this  or 
that  metal;  another  group  will  indicate  marble  or  wood,  oil  or 
water,  etc. 

V.     VISUAL  PERCEPTIONS 

i.  Erect  and  Single  Vision.  —  The  phenomena  of  erect  vision 
although  the  image  formed  on  the  retina  is  inverted,  and  of  single 
vision  although  we  have  two  eyes,  belong  chiefly  to  the  domain  of 
physiology. 


68  PSYCHOLOGY 

(a)  With  regard  to  erect  vision,  habit  may  be  an  important  fac- 
tor, for,  even  if  originally  we  had  a  tendency  to  see  things  inverted, 
habit  acquired  by  touch  would  correct  this  tendency.    It  is  possible 
also  that,  in  the  transmission  from  the  retina  to  the  brain,  spatial 
relations  are  not  preserved.    But  the  more  probable  explanation 
is  that  the  image  on  the  retina  is  not  perceived  at  all,  and  in  fact 
we  are  not  directly  aware  of  it.    The  rays  of  light  are  perceived  in 
the  direction  from  which  they  come  because  in  vision  there  seems 
to  be  a  double  movement,  one  of  the  object  toward  the  eye  through 
the  refracting  media,  producing  the  inverted  image  on  the  retina, 
the  other  from  the  eye,  projecting  the  image  in  its  erected  position. 
This  activity  from  the  eye  is  manifest  in  projected  after-images. 
In  photography,  on  the  contrary,  the  object  is  simply  received  on 
the  film,  which  is  passive,  and  hence  is  found  inverted. 

(b)  As  to  single  perception:  (i)  The  greater  part  of  the  field  of 
vision  is  common  to  both  eyes,  as  can  be  easily  verified  by  using 
each  separately.    The  same  is  not  true  of  fishes,  birds,  or  other 
animals  whose  eyes  are  found  on  the  sides  of  the  head.     (2)  If 
we  look  simultaneously  at  two  objects  unequally  distant  from  the 
eye,  for  instance,  at  two  pencils  held  vertically  before  the  eyes,  one 
at  a  distance  of  seven  or  eight  inches,  the  other  seven  or  eight  inches 
farther,  the  nearer  pencil  will  appear  double  if  the  eyes  are  accom- 
modated for  and  fixed  upon  the  more  distant,  and  vice  versa.    Or 
hold  a  finger  before  your  eyes,  and  look  at  the  ceiling  or  sky :  two 
fingers  will  be  seen,  although  vaguely.     (3)  Some  animals  cer- 
tainly have  single  perceptions  from  the  beginning,  e.g.  the  chick, 
which  immediately  pecks  the  grain  of  corn.    But  they  are  precisely 
those  whose  eyes  are  divergent,  and  for  which  therefore  the  majority 
of  objects  perceived  simultaneously  are  perceived  by  one  eye  only. 
(4)  Physiologists  commonly  hold  that  single  perception  is  based 
on  the  corresponding  points  of  the  retina,  i.e.  points  situated  in 
the  same  relative  position  with  regard  to  the  fovea  centralis,  both 
being  on  the  right  of  it,  or  on  the  left,  or  up,  or  down.     Hence,  for 
instance,  the  nasal  half  of  one  retina  has  no  corresponding  point  in 
the  nasal  half  of  the  other  retina,  but  in  its  temporal  half.     Rays 
of  light  falling  on  corresponding  points  are  perceived  as  single, 
otherwise  as  double.  —  From  what  precedes  it  would  seem  that 


PERCEPTION  69 

both  a  native  disposition  and  also  education  and  exercise  are  factors 
in  the  phenomenon  of  single  vision. 

2.  Perception  of  Surface.  —  Against  pure  empiricists  who  claim 
that  the  perception  of  surface  is  not  original  and  primitive,  but 
acquired  by  experience,  it  seems  certain  that  original  perceptions 
of  vision  include  in  a  vague  manner  that  of  surface  and  extension, 
(i)  It  seems  impossible  to  perceive  a  color  without  perceiving  at 
once  some  colored  extension.     (2)  In  fact,  in  the  few  instances  of 
persons  born  blind  and  made  to  see  in  adult  age,  these  persons 
perceive  at  once  some  colored  surface,  but  no  distance  or  solidity. 
(3)  Some  animals,  e.g.  the  chick  which  does  not  miss  its  aim,  as 
already  mentioned,  have  originally  not  only  the  perception  of 
extension,  but  also  that  of  distance. 

The  superficial  shape,  if  small,  is  perceived  at  one  glance;  if 
large,  by  the  movements  of  the  eye  around  the  object. 

3.  Perception  of  Distance.  —  (a)  The  perception  of  distance  is 
not  original,  but  acquired.    A  nativistic  view  cannot  be  accepted 
here,  as  it  was  for  the  perception  of  surface,     (i)  A  man  born 
blind  and  operated  upon  for  cataract  reports  objects  as  being  in 
contact  with  the  eye,  or  at  most  perhaps  at  a  vague  distance  which 
cannot  be  estimated.     (2)  A  child  shows  that  it  cannot  appre- 
ciate   distances,  e.g.  when  it    tries  to    grasp  objects,  like  the 
moon,  which  are  far  beyond  its  reach.  —  These  reasons  show  at 
least  that  distances  cannot  be  estimated  at  first,  even  should 
the  object  be  perceived  as  vaguely  distant  and  distinct  from  the 
eye. 

(b)  The  mam  factors  in  the  perception  of  distance  are:  (i)  The 
sensations  of  accommodation,  as  various  structures  of  the  eye  adapt 
themselves  differently  according  as  the  object  is  far  or  near.  (2) 
The  visual  angle,  that  is,  the  apparent  size  of  an  object  when  its 
real  size  is  known.  A  man  appears  smaller  at  the  distance  of  one 
mile  than  at  the  distance  of  ten  feet,  i.e.  the  visual  angle  —  the 
angle  formed  from  the  eye  as  vertex  between  lines  directed  toward 
the  extremities  of  the  perceived  object  —  is  smaller.  Hence 
illusions  of  distance  will  produce  illusions  of  size,  e.g.  in  panoramas. 
(3)  The  fact  that  an  object  covers  another  totally  or  in  part,  and 
the  number  of  intervening  objects,  are  signs  of  their  relative  distances. 


70  PSYCHOLOGY 

(4)  The  apparent  brightness  of  the  object,  the  distinctness  of  its 
parts  and  outlines.  (5)  The  changes  in  the  relative  positions  of 
different  objects,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  these  changes  take 
place  when  one  moves  the  head  or  the  whole  body.  On  a  train, 
nearer  objects  seem  to  "  move  "  much  faster  than  the  more  distant 
ones.  (6)  The  degree  of  convergence  of  the  axes  of  both  eyes, 
which  is  greater  for  near  objects.  This  applies  only  to  distances 
under  one  fourth  of,  or  perhaps  half,  a  mile.  For  greater  distances 
the  convergence  is  the  same.  (7)  The  similarity  and  dissimilarity  of 
the  separate  vision  of  each  eye,  which  vary  according  to  the  distance 
of  the  object.  (8)  Touch  and  locomotion,  which  make  it  possible 
to  estimate  distances  accurately  and  are  necessary  to  train  the  eye. 

With  the  use  of  one  eye  only,  vertically  hold  a  pin  or  a  pencil 
in  each  hand,  one  higher,  the  other  lower,  and  without  the  help 
of  the  sense  of  touch  try  to  bring  the  point  of  the  higher  pencil 
or  pin  exactly  on  top  of  the  point  of  the  lower,  and  see  how  you 
will  succeed.  Try  again.  Try  with  the  use  of  both  eyes.  Do 
you  succeed  better?  Why? 

4.  The  Perception  of  Solidity,  Relief,  and  Depth  is  but  an 
application  of  the  perception  of  distance.  It  depends  chiefly  on 
binocular  vision  helped  by  touch.  Monocular  perception  of 
solidity  is  always  imperfect.  Unless  an  object,  e.g.  a  book,  is  at 
too  great  a  distance  (of  over  twenty  or  thirty  feet),  one  eye  does 
not  perceive  it  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the  other.  The  right 
eye  perceives  more  on  the  right  side  of  the  object,  and  the  left 
eye  more  on  the  left  side.  Hold  a  pencil  or  rod  about  one  foot 
long  horizontally  before  the  eyes,  the  nearer  end  being  about  six 
inches  from  the  face,  and  at  the  height  of  the  mouth;  look  at  it 
with  the  right  eye,  it  is  seen  as  / ;  look  with  the  left  eye,  it  is  seen 
as  \  ;  look  with  both  eyes  fixed  on  the  nearer  end,  it  is  seen  as  V ; 
fixed  on  the  farther  end,  it  is  seen  as  \ ;  fixed  on  the  middle,  it  is 
seen  as  X .  The  factors  in  the  perception  of  relief  are  the  same  as 
for  distance.  In  paintings  and  drawings  many  illusions  of  distance, 
solidity,  and  relief  are  produced  by  the  proper  arrangement  of  light, 
colors,  shades,  perspective,  sizes,  etc.  Two  pictures  may  be 
taken  of  the  same  object,  but  slightly  different,  one  as  it  appears 
to  the  right,  the  other  as  it  appears  to  the  left  eye.  In  the  stereo- 


THE    MENTAL    IMAGE  71 

scope,  by  means  of  lenses,  both  are  made  to  be  seen  in  the  same  place 
as  one  picture,  and  thus  produce  the  illusion  of  solidity  and  relief. 
5.  The  Perception  of  the  Size  or  Magnitude  of  surfaces  and 
solids  is  acquired  in  different  ways. 

(a)  Near  objects  may  be  compared  to  the  human  body  or  to 
parts  of  it,  and  this  comparison  is  facilitated  by  touch  and  locomo- 
tion.   Or  they  may  be  compared  to  other  bodies  the  size  of  which 
is  already  known.     Hence  in  drawing  the  sketch  of  a  building, 
an  architect  will  place  near  it  drawings  of  men,  trees,  carriages,  or 
other  familiar  objects,  so  as  to  make  it  easier  to  estimate  the 
height  of  the  building. 

(b)  By  means  of  the  visual  angle,  the  distance,  if  known,  makes 
it  possible  to  form  an  idea  of  the  real  size  of  objects.    Thus  I  may 
know  that  the  man  twenty  feet  away  is  taller  than  another  at  a 
distance  of  ten  feet,  although  the  latter,  judged  only  by  the  visual 
angle,  seems  taller. 

(c)  Important  also  are  the  muscular  sensations  experienced  in 
moving  the  eyeball  or  head  in  order  to  follow  the  outlines  of  the 
object. 

ARTICLE  II.    SENSE  REPRESENTATION 

I.    THE  MENTAL  IMAGE 

I.    NATURE  OF  THE  IMAGE 

i.  Psychological.  —  (a)  Representation  does  not  mean  that 
the  same  object  or  quality  which  has  been  perceived  is  again  pre- 
sented and  perceived  in  the  same  way,  but  only  as  a  likeness,  a 
copy,  or,  better,  an  image  (imago,  from  the  root  im  in  imitor).  It 
is  a  fact  of  daily  experience  that  we  can  "  imagine  "  absent  things, 
that  is,  recall  to  mind  the  images  of  things  perceived  in  the  past. 
Image,  which  in  common  usage  refers  to  the  sense  of  vision,  applies 
here  to  all  senses.  Not  only  are  there  visual  images,  but  auditory, 
tactual,  etc.,  images  as  well.  Mental  imagery  is  the  collection  of 
images  in  the  mind. 

(b)  An  image  necessarily  implies  that  something  has  been  left 
over  by  the  preceding  perception  which  it  represents.  Where 


72  PSYCHOLOGY 

there  has  been  no  sensation,  there  is  no  image;  a  blind  man  may 
form  images  of  sounds,  but  not  of  colors.  This  residue  of  the 
preceding  perception  is  not  the  image  itself,  for  image  applies  only 
to  the  representation  actually  present  in  consciousness,  not  to 
the  unconscious  retention  of  something  intermediary  between  the 
perception  and  the  image.  This  residue  is  therefore  more  com- 
monly called  a  disposition,  i.e.  a  capacity  or  aptitude  resulting 
from  a  permanent  modification,  which  enables  the  mind  to  revive 
images  of  things  perceived  formerly.  Three  stages  are  included 
in  representation:  (i)  perception;  (2)  retention  of  an  unconscious 
disposition,  sometimes  called  latent  image;  (3)  actual  revival  and 
presence  of  the  image  in  the  mind. 

(c)  The  following  characteristics  differentiate  the  image  from 
the  percept,  i.e.  from  the  result  of  the  act  of  perception.  —  We 
shall  speak  later  of  abnormal  cases  in  which  images  are  taken  for 
percepts  (hallucination)  —  (i)  The  percept  is  antecedent  in  time, 
and  independent  of  the  resulting  image;  the  image  is  posterior  to, 
and  dependent  on,  perception.     (2)  The  percept  is  vivid  and  at- 
tributed to  the  presence  of  a  real  object;  the  image  is  fainter,  and 
is  not  referred  to  an  object  actually  present.     (3)  Perception  is 
dependent  on  the  presence  of  external  objects  for  its  possibility, 
nature,  appearance,  or  disappearance.   The  image  is  possible  in  the 
absence  of  the  external  object;  it  appears  or  disappears  of  itself,  or 
under  the  influence  of  the  will;  its  nature  even  maybe  modified  so  as 
to  be  either  a  true  or  a  more  or  less  fanciful  representation.    If  my 
eyes  are  normal  and  open,  I  cannot  help  seeing  objects  within  my 
field  of  vision,  and  I  can  see  no  other.  But  even  in  the  dark  or  with 
my  eyes  closed,  some  visual  images  may  come  spontaneously  or  be 
called  to  the  mind;  others  may  be  excluded  or  modified  purposely. 

(d)  A  few  remarks  will  be  useful  on  the  meaning  of  certain 
terms  used  in  connection  with  the  present  question.     "  Idea  " 
applies  to  both  images  and  concepts,  i.e.  to  all  mental  representa- 
tions,  whether   concrete   or  abstract.    By   the   scholastics   any 
image  or  mental  picture  was  called  phantasma,  and  the  faculty  of 
retaining  images  was  the  phantasia  (<£aiVw,  to  appear).     To-day 
the  terms  "phantasm"  and   "phantasy"  are  seldom,  if  ever, 
used  in  this  sense.     Phantasy  or  fancy  indicates  something  illusory, 


THE     MENTAL    IMAGE  73 

odd  or  whimsical,  "  fanciful  "  or  "  fantastic."  Phantasm  is  applied 
especially  to  forms  or  spectres  of  an  hallucinatory  nature  which 
appear  in  various  forms  of  mental  excitation  and  exaltation,  or 
under  the  influence  of  certain  drugs.  Sometimes,  chiefly  in  spirit- 
istic literature,  it  is  restricted  to  the  true  or  supposed  apparitions 
of  disembodied  spirits. 

2.  Physiological.  —  (a)  Certain  facts  make  it  clear  that  the 
mental  image  has  a  physiological  basis,  (i)  Experimental  re- 
searches and  pathological  observations  have  shown  that  injury 
to,  and  disease  of,  certain  parts  of  the  brain  destroy  or  impair  the 
power  of  reviving  certain  groups  of  mental  images.  (2)  The 
restoration  or  cure  of  these  parts  has  been  followed  by  the  restitu- 
tion of  the  missing  images.  (3)  The  easier  acquisition  of  images 
in  early  age  is  generally  explained,  in  part  at  least,  by  the  fact 
that  the  nervous  centres  are  more  plastic  than  in  old  age.  (4)  On 
the  other  hand,  physiological  experiments  show  that  a  nerve, 
once  it  has  been  excited,  acquires  some  facility  for  receiving  again 
the  same  excitation,  that  is,  every  excitation  leaves  some  trace 
or  residue  in  the  nervous  system.  Whether  this  is  a  persisting 
movement  and  vibration,  or  a  permanent  impression  and  modifica- 
tion, or  a  latent  disposition,  is  secondary.  These  three  hypotheses 
are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Persisting  vibrations  and  persisting 
imprints  may  coexist,  and  both  account  for  the  resulting  aptitude 
or  disposition.  Sensations  produce  some  modification  in  the 
nervous  substance,  and  hence  leave  special  dispositions. 

(b)  Physiological  dispositions  cannot  dispense  with  mental 
dispositions.  A  movement,  vibration,  or  chemical  change  in  the 
organism  can  no  more  account  for  the  image  than  for  the  perception 
itself.  Consciousness  cannot  be  reduced  to  material  properties. 
To  speak  of  organic  memory,  or  of  the  memory  of  a  violin,  because 
it  improves  by  usage,  is  objectionable  because  memory  is  a 
psychological  term  implying  consciousness. 

II.    PROPERTIES  OF  THE  IMAGE 

The  image  is  representative  (psychological),  and  motor  (physio- 
logical). 

i.   The  Image  is  Representative.  —  (a)  According  as  it  repre- 


74  PSYCHOLOGY 

sents  an  object  as  it  was  really  perceived,  or  is  combined  with 
other  images,  the  image  is  called  simple  or  complex.  In  a  certain 
sense,  it  is  true  that  all  images  are  complex,  since  perception  itself 
is  complex.  But  simplicity  and  complexity  here  refer  to  the 
image  considered  either  as  reproducing  only  one  perception,  or  as 
reproducing  together  several,  or  parts  of  several,  perceptions. 
The  complexity  of  images  results  from  the  combination  of  several 
images  into  one,  or  from  the  dissociation  of  the  elements  of  one 
image,  and  their  grouping  with  parts  of  other  images.  I  may 
imagine,  for  instance,  a  dog  with  feathers,  or  a  bird  with  hair  and 
four  feet.  In  the  simple  image  no  new  elements  are  introduced, 
but  it  may  be  a  more  or  less  complete  representation  of  the  object. 

(b)  Images  become  fused,  that  is,  images  partly  similar  and 
partly  dissimilar  may  be,  as  it  were,  superposed  in  the  mind  so  as 
to  strengthen    common   features,  and   blur  individual  features. 
By  taking  successively  on  the  same  plate  photographs  of,  let  us 
say,  six  members  of  a  family,  each  one  receiving  only  one  sixth  of 
the  total  necessary  exposure,  a  composite  photograph  is  obtained 
in  which  common   features  are  reinforced,   whereas  individual 
characteristics  are  weak.    The  fusion  of  images  has  a  similar  result. 
For  instance,  the  features  common  to  all  dogs,  like  the  facts  of 
having  two  ears  and  eyes,  four  legs,  a  certain  general  appearance, 
etc.,  remain  prominent;  but  individual  features,  like  size,  definite 
color,  etc., are  in  the  background.    These  are  included  in  the  image 
of  an  individual  dog,  but  are  generally  replaced  by  averages,  or 
are  hardly  noticed,  when  we  simply  think  of  a  dog  without  referring 
the  image  to  this  or  that  individual. 

(c)  Complexity  and  fusion  give  one  simultaneous  result,  namely, 
one  composite  or  vague  image.     Association  gives  a  successive 
result.     It  means  a  linking  together  of  two  or  more  images  in  a 
series  as  antecedents  and  consequents,  so  that  the  revival  of  an 
image  is  likely  to  produce  the  revival  of  another  image  with  which 
it  is  associated.    Of  association  we  shall  soon  speak  more  in  detail. 

(d)  An  image  has  intensity.     Not  in  the  same  sense  as  sensation, 
for  the  images  of  thunder  or  of  a  dazzling  light  may  be  fainter  than 
those  of  a  whisper  or  a  candle;  but  in  the  sense  that  it  is  more  or 
less  vivid,  clear,  distinct,  and  similar  to  the  original. 


THE     MENTAL    IMAGE  75 

(e)  Complexity,  fusion,  association,  and  vividness  of  images 
sometimes  require  no  effort  of  the  will,  sometimes  also  are  under 
the  control  of  the  will  and  are  intended  for  special  purposes. 

2.  The  Image  is  Motor.  —  This  important  aspect  of  ideas  has 
a  more  direct  reference  to  the  chapter  on  conative  faculties  than 
to  the  present  chapter  on  cognitive  faculties. 

(a)  All  perceptions  are  accompanied  by  various  organic  pro- 
cesses which  are  more  or  less  conscious.    Hence  by  association 
mental  images  are  accompanied  by  the  images  of  these  processes. 
In  playing  the  piano,  or  the  trombone,  or  any  other  instrument, 
the  sensations  of  sound  are  accompanied  by  the  movements  of 
the  arms,  hands,  and  fingers,  necessary  to  produce  these  sounds. 
In  listening  to  music  played  by  others,  the  performer's  motions 
may  also  be  perceived  and  associated  with  the  auditory  sensations. 
Or  the  listener  may  be  aware  of  certain  definite  or  indefinite  motions 
in  his  own  organism,  e.g.  of  the  tendency  to  dance,  beat  time,  mark 
the  rhythm  by  certain  gestures,  etc.    In  reproduction  all  these 
images  tend  to  come  back  together. 

(b)  A  perception  or  image  of  a  movement  is  accompanied  by 
an  inchoative  execution  of  such  a  movement,  which  in  many  cases 
is  conscious.     When  I  follow  the  pianist's  motions  with  the  eyes, 
my  hands  themselves  have  a  tendency  to  move  with  those  of  the 
player.    I  feel  a  beginning  of  the  necessary  innervation  and 
muscular  adaptation,  the  strength  of  which  varies  with  the  nature 
of  the  stimulus,  and  with  subjective  dispositions  and  habits. 
When  I  recall  a  tune  which  I  have  played,  there  is  some  inchoation 
of  those  movements  which  were  required  to  play  it.    If  it  is  a 
march  or  a  dance,  there  is  a  tendency  to  take  a  certain  bodily 
attitude  and  to  execute  appropriate  movements.    The  image  of  a 
circle  includes  certain  eye  changes  in  order  to  follow  its  outline. 
The  image  of  a  word  produces  inchoative  movements  in  the  organs 
of  speech  to  utter  it,  or  in  the  hands  and  fingers  to  write  it,  etc. 
Hence,  in  general,  an  image  always  implies  a  motor  tendency  to 
realization. 

(c)  This  tendency  may  be  so  strong,  for  instance  in  the  case  of 
habits,  that  an  idea  is  immediately  and  almost  automatically 
accompanied  by  complete  motor  processes.    Or  it  may  be  reduced 


76  PSYCHOLO  G  Y 

to  a  feeble  and  imperceptible  change  in  the  nerve  centres,  without 
any  external  manifestation.  If  there  is  only  one  idea  in  the  mind, 
as  happens  in  a  hypnotized  subject,  the  tendency  to  realization  is 
irresistible,  because  the  mind  is  deprived  of  other  ideas  which 
normally  would  hold  this  one  in  check.  If,  for  instance,  while  the 
subject  is  in  reality  eating  something  sweet  and  agreeable,  the  idea 
is  suggested  to  him  that  he  is  eating  something  loathsome,  his 
face  will  show  an  expression  of  disgust,  and  his  stomach  may  be  so 
upset  as  to  cause  vomiting.  When,  on  the  contrary,  several  ideas 
are  present  in  the  mind,  either  they  will  evoke  a  series  of  coordi- 
nated movements,  if  they  are  in  harmony,  or,  if  they  are  opposed, 
they  will  remain  in  equilibrium,  or  form  antagonistic  groups,  one  of 
which  will  finally  prevail.  Higher  mental  faculties  also  contribute 
to  foster  or  check  the  motor  tendencies  of  ideas. 

(d)  Not  only  does  the  idea  suggest  the  movement,  but  the  move- 
ment or  attitude  suggests  the  idea.    Thus  the  attitude  of  prayer 
suggests  the  idea  of  praying,  clenching  the  fist  is  suggestive  of 
revenge,  etc. 

(e)  This  motor  property  of  ideas  accounts  for  many  facts  attri- 
buted to  imitation.    The  perception  of  actions  performed  by 
another  suggests  the  idea  of  this  action,  which  is  in  turn  followed 
by  the  appropriate  movements.    It  also  accounts  for  many  facts 
attributed   to   mind-reading.     Slight   movements   and   muscular 
contractions  are  real,  although  unconscious,  and  they  can  be 
detected  by  a  skilled  and  sensitive  person.    Thus,  for  instance, 
an  object  is  concealed,  and  only  one  person  knows  where.    This 
person  is  taken  by  the  hand  and  led  almost  immediately  to  the 
hiding-place.     Such  mind-reading   amounts  simply  to  perceiving 
and  interpreting  some  slight  muscular  contractions  performed 
unconsciously  and  involuntarily  by  the  subject,  as  he  is  led  toward 
or  away  from  the  place  where  the  object  is  to  be  found.    The 
whole  expression  of  the  face,  especially  of  the  eyes,  is  also  of  great 
help  in  such  experiments. 

III.    ASSOCIATION  AND  ITS  LAWS 

i.   Meaning.  —  (a)  As  already  remarked,  association  does  not 
mean  a  process  of  combination  by  which  several  images  would 


THE     MENTAL    IMAGE  77 

unite  so  as  to  become  one.  It  refers  to  the  succession  of  ideas  in 
the  mind,  and  means  that  images  are  not  revived  independently 
and  at  random,  but  that  their  revival  depends  on  actual  perceptions 
or  on  the  presence  of  other  ideas  in  the  mind.  Images  are  grouped 
or  linked  together  so  that  the  revival  of  one  tends  to  bring  about 
the  revival  of  another  or  of  several  others. 

(b)  Sometimes  we  are  clearly  aware  of  this  connection;  we  can 
follow  the  "  train  "  of  ideas  and  perceive  their  nexus.    In  other 
cases  we  are  unable  to  see  why  one  idea  is  revived;  it  seems  to 
flash  into  the  mind  without  being  called  for  and  of  its  own  accord. 
But  frequently  in  such  cases  further  reflection  reveals  the  hidden 
thread  which  bound  ideas  together.    After  a  conversation,  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  which  deal  with  totally  different  subjects 
that  seem  to  have  nothing  in  common,  it  is  very  interesting  to  trace 
back  the  trend  of  the  conversation  in  order  to  see  the  connection 
between  the  various  topics,  and  examine  how  one  led  to  another. 

(c)  Association  has  no  laws  properly  so-called.    Every  individual 
mind  has  its  own  associations,  and  the  same  idea  or  perception 
will  revive  different  ideas  in  different  minds;  it  "  reminds  "  one  of 
one  thing,  and  another  of  another  thing.     Moreover,  even  in  the 
same  mind,  manifold  associations  exist,  and  it  is  impossible  before- 
hand to  say  which  idea  will  be  revived.    Hence  it  occurs  fre- 
quently that  we  fail  when  trying  to  "  give  the  clue  "  to  another, 
and  that  a  "  hint "  is  not  always  taken.    The  so-called  laws  of 
association  simply  indicate  how  groups  of  ideas  are  formed,  and 
how  one  idea  suggests  another. 

2.  The  Laws  of  Association  have  been  enumerated  in  various 
ways.  Some  psychologists  mention  three,  others  two,  and  others 
one,  reducing  all  to  the  law  of  contiguity  in  consciousness.  Here 
the  various  modes  of  association  are  indicated  without  any  attempt 
to  examine  whether  they  are  reducible  to  one  or  two  laws. 

(a)  An  idea  may  be  revived  owing  to  the  likeness  which  it  has 
with  another  already  present  in  consciousness.  The  similarity 
may  be  total  or  partial,  and  the  common  features  are  more  or 
less  numerous.  Examples:  likeness  of  two  tunes,  of  two  words  in 
spelling  or  pronunciation,  of  a  copy  and  its  original,  of  two  houses, 
of  two  smells  or  tastes,  etc. 


78  PSYCHOLOGY 

(b)  Contrast  contributes  to  the  revival  of  images,  e.g.  a  hot 
summer  day  and  a  cold  winter  day,  a  giant  and  a  dwarf,  a  good 
and  a  bad  action.     It  is  clear  that  contrast  in  some  respects  and 
similarity  in  other  respects  frequently  exist  together  between  the 
same  objects. 

(c)  Association  also  takes  place  on  account  of  the  contiguity  in 
space  or  time.    Thus  my  thought  of  a  building  in  a  city  may  recall 
that  of  another  building  in  the  same  city;  a  state  may  suggest  a 
neighboring  state.     The  thought  of  a  historical  event  may  recall 
other  contemporary  or  immediately  preceding  and  following  events 
or  personages. 

Similarity,  contrast,  and  contiguity  are  the  three  main  laws  of 
association. 

(d)  Among  other  important  factors  of  association  must   be 
mentioned:  (i)  The  vividness  of  the  impression  or  impressions,  and 
hence  their  interest,  the  attention  voluntarily  or  involuntarily 
given    to    them,    their    emotional    aspect,    etc.     (2)  Recentness; 
generally  images  fade  away  with  time  unless  they  are  recalled. 
(3)  General  and  special  dispositions,  organic  and  mental,  perma- 
nent and  transitory,  acquired  and  natural. 

(e)  An  idea  may  be  linked  with  others  in  more  than  one  way, 
and  in  this  case  the  chances  of  its  being  recalled  are  greater. 

(/)  Associations  and  groupings  of  ideas  may  be  cooperative  or 
conflicting.  In  the  struggle  for  persistence  and  revival,  the  law 
which,  for  organisms,  has  been  called  the  law  of  "  the  survival  of  the 
fittest,"  applies  to  ideas.  An  idea  may  have  several  advantages 
over  its  competitors,  both  in  itself  and  on  account  of  the  group  to 
which  it  belongs.  In  this  case  it  stands  a  better  chance  of  survival. 
Others,  on  the  contrary,  being  weak,  soon  become  weaker  still; 
they  fall  into  subconsciousness,  never  perhaps  to  be  revived. 

II.    IMAGINATION 

I.    NATURE  OF  IMAGINATION 

i.  Meaning  of  the  Term.  —  Imagination  sometimes  means  the 
power,  sometimes  the  process  itself,  of  forming  mental  images, 
and  sometimes  the  result  of  this  activity,  namely,  the  mental  image. 


IMAGINATION  79 

The  term  "  imagination  "  is  also  used  in  a  more  restricted  sense 
for  the  constructive  imagination,  i.e.  the  forming  of  images  that 
are  not  in  conformity  with  reality,  as  when,  after  listening  to  a 
yarn,  we  say;  "  That's  all  imagination."  This  last  meaning  is 
more  properly  that  of  fancy,  which  is  more  superficial,  playful, 
false,  and  artificial. 

2.  Kinds  of  Imagination.  —  (a)  Imagination  is  called  passive 
or  active  according  as  images  recur  spontaneously,  or  as  an  effort 
is  made  to  recall  them. 

(b)  Imagination  is  simply  reproductive,  or  constructive,  according 
as  it  merely  represents  (more  or  less  completely)  the  object  as 
perceived,  or  combines  images  into  one  composite  image.     The 
"  construction  "  may  be  merely  mechanical  and  spontaneous,  or 
it  may  be  purposive,  for  instance,  in  inventions  and  works  of  art. 
To  the  constructive  imagination  may  be  reduced  the  power  of 
magnifying  and  minimizing  things. 

(c)  Constructive    imagination    includes    two    main    processes, 
isolating  and  combining.     By  the  former  ideas  are  dissociated  into 
several  parts;  by  the  latter  the  parts  thus  obtained  are  united  in 
different  ways  to  form  composite  images. 

(d)  Imagination  deals  with  reproduction,  but  not  necessarily, 
nor  even  primarily,  with  faithful  reproduction.     Nevertheless  all 
the  elements  of  a  composite  image  are  found  scattered  in  preceding 
sense-perceptions. 

II.    IMPORTANCE  OF  IMAGINATION 

The  importance  of  imagination,  both  for  good  and  for  bad,  can 
hardly  be  overestimated;  it  is  a  useful,  yet  dangerous  power. 

i.  For  Organic  Life.  —  Imagination  exercises  a  great  influence 
on  the  health  of  the  organism  because  ideas  are  not  only  representa- 
tive but  also  motor.  Many  illustrations  of  this  could  be  given. 
Do  we  not  see  frequently  imaginary  ills  leading  to  real  sickness? 
To  imagine  that  you  are  sick  is  one  of  the  best  ways  to  become 
truly  sick,  and  to  avoid  thinking  of  your  real  sickness  frequently 
proves  to  be  a  powerful  help  in  the  cure.  The  use  of  an  appropriate 
remedy  is  in  itself  very  beneficial,  but  the  conviction  that  it  is 
beneficial  and  that  it  will  produce  a  certain  result  makes  it  twice 


8o  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  effective.  Imagination  without  the  remedy  may  even  produce 
the  desired  result.  Cases  might  be  cited  of  persons  who  felt  sure 
they  had  taken  a  certain  medicine,  and  indeed  experienced  the 
results  of  it,  and  who  later  found  the  pill  which,  in  fact,  they  had 
forgotten  to  take.  There  is  a  better  chance  for  the  man  who  has 
made  up  his  mind  to  get  well  than  for  the  one  who  imagines  that 
he  will  die  and  despairs. 

2.  Intellectual  Life.  —  (a)  General.  Perception  supposes  imag- 
ination; it  is  from  images  left  by  past  experiences  that  we  supply 
the  elements  of  the  object  which  are  not  actually  perceived  by  the 
senses.  The  higher  forms  of  mental  life,  conception,  judgment, 
and  reasoning,  are  dependent  on  imagination,  as  will  be  shown 
later.  To  a  certain  extent  the  imagination  helps  to  concentrate 
the  mind  on  an  object;  but  it  may  also  be  the  source  of  fickleness 
and  of  a  constant  wandering  of  the  mind. 

(b)  Special.    Imagination  helps  the  understanding  of  abstract 
truths  because  it  furnishes  concrete  examples  and  illustrations. 
It  may  also  become  a  danger,  because  thought  cannot  always  take 
the  form  of  images,  and  some  are  inclined  to  identify  understanding 
with  imagining.    Under  the  guidance  of  reason,  imagination  is  the 
principle  of  inventions,  for  it  furnishes  the  mind  with  the  complex 
images  of  certain  effects  to  be  expected  and  realized.    It  helps  to 
frame  and  test  hypotheses,  and  here  it  is  very  important  to  imagine 
all  possible  cases,  e.g.  for  a  general  to  think  of  all  the  possible  move- 
ments of  the  enemy,  since  to  omit  one  may  cause  defeat;  or  for  a 
scientist  to  think  of  all  the  possible  causes  of  a  phenomenon, 
otherwise  he  is  in  danger  of  being  mistaken. 

The  danger  of  attaching  too  much  importance  to  imaginary 
conceptions,  and  of  mistaking  them  for  realities,  is  to  be  avoided. 
One  must  beware  especially  of  "  complementary  "  imagination 
by  which  things  are  perceived,  not  as  they  really  are,  but  as  they 
should  be  in  order  to  meet  one's  expectations  and  views.  See,  for 
instance,  in  how  many  different  ways  the  same  fact  is  interpreted 
and  reported  by  different  observers,  every  one  coloring  it  according 
to  his  own  fancy. 

(c)  In  arts,  imagination  creates  ideals,  types,  fictions,  etc.,  which 
the  artist  endeavors  to  realize  and  express. 


IMAGINATION  8l 

3.  In  Daily  Practical  Life,  imagination  has  a  very  complex  role. 
Success  depends  largely  on  imagination  and  forethought,  since  it 
requires  the  idea  of  the  end  to  be  reached  and  of  the  means  to  reach 
it,  the  prevision  of  the  possible  good  and  bad  results  of  an  enter- 
prise, etc.     Failure  is  frequently  due  to  an  excess  or  a  lack  of 
imagination.     Imagination  exercises  a  great  influence  in  making 
human  life  happy  or  miserable,  for  it  causes  us  to  magnify  or 
minimize  its  goods  and  evils,  and  to  compare  our  lot  with  the 
worse  or  the  better  lot  of  others.     It  thus  gives  an  optimistic  or  a 
pessimistic  view  of  the  world  and  of  life,  and  changes  the  aspect  of 
things.    In  the  relations  with  others,  it  may  so  blind  one  to  reality 
that  nothing  but  good  will  be  seen  in  certain  persons,  and  nothing 
but  evil  in  others.     Motives  will  be  supplied  rightly  or  wrongly, 
and  "  complementary  "  imagination  will  make  it  almost  impossible 
to  pass  a  sound  judgment  on  the  actions  of  others. 

4.  In  Moral  Life,  imagination  may  usurp  the  place  of  reason 
as  the  guide  of  human  actions,  but  it  may  also  be  used  to  construe 
the  means  of  doing  good,  and  to  form  ideals  and  examples. 

5.  In  Religious  Life,  imagination  helps  to  grasp  the  highest 
spiritual  truths  and  to  express  them  by  appropriate  symbols. 
But  it  is  also  the  source  of  errors,  prejudices,  and  superstitions. 

III.    TRAINING  OF  THE  IMAGINATION 

i.  General  Principles.  —  (a)  As  imagination  may  be  both  very 
useful  and  very  harmful  according  to  the  use  which  is  made  of  it, 
it  is  important  to  pay  attention  to  its  development.  Imagination 
must  be  cultivated  on  account  of  its  utility,  and  controlled  on  account 
of  its  dangers.  Certain  features  must  be  strengthened,  others 
must  be  checked. 

(b)  The  main  principle  is  that  imagination  should  be  a  useful 
servant.  Hence  it  should  never  be  allowed  to  reign  over  other 
faculties  and  activities,  or  to  guide  human  actions  and  behavior; 
it  must  remain  under  the  guidance  and  control  of  reason.  To 
do  this  is  a  serious  task  which  requires  constant  effort  and  vigilance, 
and,  notwithstanding  these,  imagination  from  time  to  time  will  still 
work  mischief  in  the  mind;  it  will  still  deceive  and  mislead  man. 
With  persevering  attention  it  is  possible  to  train  and  control  the 
7 


82  PSYCHOLOGY 

imagination,  to  increase  its  usefulness  by  developing  it  along  certain 
lines  and  checking  its  excessive  activity.  Imagination  must  not 
be  allowed  free  scope  to  wander  at  random.  Images  which  should 
not  occupy  the  mind  —  remember  that  they  are  motor  —  must  be 
banished  and  held  in  check  by  calling  forth  other  images  and 
ideas. 

2.  The  General  Factors  in  the  development  of  the  imagination 
are  psychological  and  physiological,  (i)  Acquired  or  innate 
dispositions,  temperament,  sex,  character,  age,  etc.  (2)  The 
relative  development  and  keenness  of  the  senses.  (3)  Surround- 
ings, mode  of  life,  occupations,  business,  etc.  (4)  Habits.  (5) 
The  use  of  narcotics  and  stimulants. 

(a)  From  these  result  the  various  types  of  imagination:  visual, 
auditory,  tactual,  and  motor.     A  type  of  imagination  consists  in 
a  special  tendency  to  revive  images  of  one  sense  in  preference  to 
those  of  other  senses.     Thus  in  reciting  a  lesson  which  they  have 
memorized,  some  pupils  will  see  it  on  their  books,  follow  it  line 
after  line,  remember  the  first  words  of  each  page  and  paragraph, 
etc.    Others  are  led  rather  by  the  sequence  of  sounds;  others,  by 
the  motions  necessary  to  utter  the  words.    In  consequence,  some 
will  learn  their  lesson  by  simply  reading  it  with  the  eyes;  others, 
by  reading  it  aloud;  others,  by  going  through  the  motions  of  the 
organs  of  speech,  especially  of  the  lips  and  tongue,  without  uttering 
any  sound.     The  revival  of  the  image  of  a  band  concert  may  consist 
primarily  of  the  visual  images  of  the  players,  their  respective 
positions,  their  uniforms,  motions,  etc.;  or  of  the  various  sounds 
and  tunes;  or  of  certain  motor  phenomena,  marching  or  dancing, 
which  lead  to  remember  the  tunes. 

(b)  More  special  features  may  be  developed  for  certain  purposes 
according  to  various  conditions  of  life,  for  business,  arts,  and 
sciences.    This  is  effected  by  attention  and  concentration  of  mind. 
Thus  the  chauffeur  has  to  remember  roads;  the  car  conductor, 
persons;  the  business  man,  merchandise,  etc.    The  musician  im- 
agines sounds  in  preference  to  colors;  the  painter,  colors  and  visual 
features  in  preference  to  sounds,  etc. 

To  conclude:  Keep  the  faculty  of  imagination  alive,  but  apply 


MEMORY  83 

it  according  to  reason.    Develop  it,  but  control  and  direct  it,  and 
do  not  be  led  by  it  in  your  judgments  and  actions. 

in.    MEMORY 

I.    NATURE  OF  MEMORY 

i.  Distinction  of  Memory  and  Imagination.  —  It  is  difficult  to 
draw  a  strict  dividing  line  between  memory  and  imagination. 
The  main  differences,  however,  are  the  following: 

(a)  Imagination   is    more  fanciful    and    constructive,    whereas 
memory  reproduces  the  image  of  an  experience  as  it  really  occurred. 
Whatever  is  added  or  changed,  whether  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously, belongs  to  imagination.    It  must  be  noted,  however,  that, 
in  order  to  belong  to  memory,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  image  to 
represent  all  details.    This  is  generally  impossible,  and  the  memory 
of  some  features  co-exists  with  the  oblivion  of  some  others.    The 
image  may  be  true  without  being  complete.    Yet  it  cannot  be 
called  a  faithful  reproduction  if  essential  features  are  left  out; 
but,  according  to  different  points  of  view,  different  features  may 
be  looked  upon  as  essential, 

(b)  Memory  implies  a  reference  to  the  past,  and  includes  recogni- 
tion; imagination  refers  chiefly  to  the  present  or  future,  and  includes 
no  recognition.     An  image  may  be  present  in  the  mind  without 
the  awareness  that  it  is  an  image  and  therefore  a  reproduction. 
Or  I  may  perceive  a  thing  for  the  second  or  third  time  without 
remembering  former  perceptions;  it  is  altogether  "  new  "  to  me. 
This  is  true  not  only  of  images  that  are  built  up  by  the  constructive 
imagination,  and  the  elements  of  which  are  found  scattered  in 
past  perceptions,  but  even  of  simple  images.    The  mind  may  be 
incapable  of  referring  them  to  the  original,  and  is  not  conscious 
that  they  are  copies.    Or  it  may  stop  at  the  consideration  of  the 
present  image,  without  thinking  at  all  of  the  past  perception. 
Or  finally  it  may  apply  itself  chiefly  to  the  future  realization  of  such 
an  image  or  ideal.    This  is  not  enough  for  memory,  which  requires 
that  the  image  be  referred  to  its  original,  and  that  the  mind 
recognize  it  as  a  representation  of  some  past  perception. 

(c)  Hence  memory  supposes  at  least  the  implicit  knowledge 


84  PSYCHOLOGY 

that  the  ego  or  subject  who  now  recognizes  the  image  is  the  same 
who  experienced  the  original  corresponding  perception.  It  leads 
one  to  acknowledge  the  fact  of  the  persistence  of  the  self  and  of 
self-identity,  since  the  same  mind  is  at  once  forming  the  present 
image  and  referring  it  to  its  own  past  experience. 

2.  Two  Kinds  of  Memory.  —  According  to  the  mode  of  this 
reference  two  kinds  of  memory  must  be  distinguished,     (i)  One 
is  the  recall  of  an  individual  event  which  has  occurred  only  once  or  a 
few  times,  at  such  or  such  a  date,  in  these  or  those  circumstances. 
Thus  I  may  clearly  remember  an  event  which  I  witnessed,  an 
action  which  I  performed,  a  conversation  which  I  held,  a  speech 
which  I  heard,  etc.     (2)  The  other  is  acquired  by  a  series  of 
repetitions  made  for  the  purpose  of  learning.    The  child  who 
memorizes  his  lesson  for  the  next  day  reads  it  and  repeats  it  to 
himself  one,  two,  .  .  .  ten  times,  in  succession,  or  at  several  intervals 
of  time,  and  on  the  next  day,  when  he  recites  it,  the  individual  read- 
ings are  of  no  importance  for  him;  he  is  attentive  only  to  the 
present  conformity  of  his  words  with  those  of  the  book.    This 
memory  is  very  close  to  habit  and  consists  of  many  habitual  associa- 
tions. 

3.  The  Three  Stages  of  Memory  are  retention,  reproduction, 
and  recognition.    The  former  two  are  common  to  memory  and 
imagination,  the  latter  is  special  to  memory. 

(a)  Images  are  retained  in  the  mind  as  unconscious  dispositions. 
Images  must  not  be  conceived  as  "  stored  up  "  in  the  mind  or  the 
brain,  as  though  the  mind  or  brain  were  like  a  storehouse,  box,  or 
receptacle  in  which  they  can  be  gathered  and  preserved.     Since 
image  means  a  conscious  representation,  the  retention  of  images 
is  but  a  metaphorical  expression.     What  is  retained  is  the  latent 
disposition  or  aptitude  to  call  forth  an  image. 

(b)  Reproduction,  or  the  actual  revival  in  consciousness,  depends 
on  (i)  association  with,  or  suggestion  from,  present  perceptions 
or  images;  (2)  recollection,  that  is,  the  voluntary  effort  to  recall 
an  idea  that  has  been  partially  forgotten,  and  some  elements  of 
which   are   now   present   in    consciousness.    In    recollection    we 
endeavor  to  reach  back  in  the  past  and  to  recall  the  whole  idea 
or  group  of  ideas  by  the  use  of  the  laws  of  association. 


MEMORY  85 

(c)  Recognition,  or  the  reference  of  the  present  to  the  past,  is 
of  two  kinds,  as  already  indicated.  The  child  who  recites  a  lesson 
learned  by  successive  repetitions  endeavors  to  reproduce  the 
ideas  or  words  of  the  book.  This  implies  some  recognition,  namely, 
the  recognition  of  the  similarity  of  the  present  recitation  with  the 
original.  Yet  this  recognition  is  rather  secondary,  for  now  the 
child  is  hardly  aware  of  the  past,  he  is  all  intent  on  the  present 
recitation,  and  recognition  is,  in  this  case,  little  more  than  a  general 
and  vague  sense  of  familiarity.  Perfect  and  properly  so-called 
recognition  will  occur  only  if  there  is  a  special  reason  directing  the 
attention  to  the  past.  Thus,  if  a  child  be  asked  why  he  does  not 
know  the  lesson,  whether  he  has  studied  it,  or  how  many  times  he 
has  read  it,  his  mind  will  begin  to  think  of  the  past.  Each  attempt 
at  learning,  with  its  circumstances  of  time,  space,  succession, 
success  or  difficulty,  etc.,  will  be  brought  back  to  the  mind.  This 
is  recognition  proper,  i.e.  the  identification  of  a  present  image  with 
its  corresponding  original,  and  it  may  be  more  or  less  perfect,  more 
or  less  accurate  and  complete.  Thus,  for  the  time,  I  may  recall 
the  day,  or  the  week,  or  the  month,  or  the  year  in  which  an  event 
took  place;  for  the  place  and  circumstances,  details  may  be 
remembered  with  varying  degrees  of  perfection. 

II.    QUALITIES  AND  CONDITIONS  OF  A  GOOD  MEMORY 

i.  The  Main  Qualities  of  Memory  are:  (a)  Ease  and  facility  in 
acquiring  knowledge,  i.e.  in  receiving  in  the  mind  ideas  capable 
of  future  recall. 

(b)  Tenacity  in  retaining.    The  forgetful  mind  easily  loses  the 
traces  of  past  experiences,  of  promises  made,  and  of  advice  received. 
Once  an  experience  has  disappeared  from  consciousness,  its  recall 
is  difficult.     Some  learn  rapidly,  but  forget  almost  immediately. 
Others  need  a  longer  time  to  learn,  but  the  knowledge  once  acquired 
is  not  so  easily  forgotten. 

(c)  Readiness  of  revival.    It  is  not  enough  to  have  many  ideas 
in  the  mind.    In  order  to  be  serviceable,  these  ideas  must  be  at 
the  mind's  disposal,  ready  to  come  back  when  called  for. 

(d)  Faithfulness  of  revival,  that  is,  the  absence  of  purely  im- 
aginary elements,  and  the  completeness  of  the  mental  representa- 


86  PSYCHOLOGY 

tion.  Many  memories  are  defective  in  this  respect.  Sometimes, 
even  in  perfect  good  faith,  events,  chiefly  when  complex,  are 
distorted  and  misrepresented  owing  to  subjective  additions  and 
changes. 

2.  Conditions  of  Memory.  —  Memory  depends  chiefly  on:  (i) 
The  plasticity  of  the  brain;  hence  in  old  age  it  is  more  difficult  to 
learn,  or  to  change  ideas  acquired  formerly.  (2)  Natural  endow- 
ments and  mental  education,  including  the  various  types  of 
imagination  and  memory.  (3)  The  laws  of  association,  and  conse- 
quently the  interest  of  the  event,  the  intensity,  vividness,  recentness, 
and  repetition  of  mental  processes.  (4)  The  influence  of  intellect 
and  will. 

III.    CULTURE  OF  MEMORY 

i.  General  Principles.  —  (a)  Important  as  it  may  be  to  have 
a  good  memory,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  develop  it  at  the  expense 
of  judgment;  the  two  must  go  together,  and  be  developed  and 
exercised  together.  This  is  true  especially  of  rational  sciences, 
in  which  the  work  of  the  understanding,  not  that  of  memory, 
is  of  primary  importance.  Nothing  must  be  committed  to 
memory  before  seeing  whether  it  is  worth  retaining  and  before 
understanding  it. 

(b)  The  development  of  memory  coincides  in  a  great  measure 
with  the  development  of  the  thinking  powers,  the  growth  of  atten- 
tion, the  faculty  of  properly  correlating  events,  etc.     Hence,  to 
improve  memory,   special   attention   should  be  given  to   these 
faculties. 

(c)  In  general  we  must  remember  the  law  of  "  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  "  ideas.    The  training  of  memory  must  have  for  its 
object  to  make  ideas  which  we  want  to  survive  "  fitter  "  than  the 
others.     Do  what  we  may,  it  is  certain  that  we  shall  forget  a  great 
many  things;  we  must  know  what  may  be  allowed  to  fall  into 
oblivion  and  what  should  be  preserved.    The  art  of  forgetting 
goes  along  with  the  art  of  remembering.    The  fitness  of  an  idea 
consists  in  its  strength,  vividness,  interest,  and  in  its  association 
with  strong  groups  of  ideas  by  strong  ties,  for  then  it  has  the  strength 
of  the  whole  group  to  which  it  belongs. 


MEMORY  87 

2.  Special  Rules.  —  (a)  Attention  and  concentration  of  mind 
contribute  to  make  a  deeper  impression,  a  more  vivid  and  better 
defined  perception  and  image. 

(b)  Do  not  begin  with  something  too  complex,  because  the  mind  is 
puzzled  by  too  great  an  abundance  of  details.    This  is  why  to  a 
child  who,  for  instance,  has  to  learn  the  whole  course  in  grammar, 
history,  or  geography,  a  primer  is  given  first,  containing  only  the 
essentials  without  the  encumbering  minor  details,  rules,  and  ex- 
ceptions which  cannot  yet  be  mastered.    In  the  same  way,  for 
private  study,  try  to  analyze  a  complex  lesson  into  simpler  elements. 
The  degree  of  simplification  and  analysis  which  is  required  depends 
on  the  stage  of  mental  development  and  on  personal  aptitudes. 
What  is  simple  enough  for  one  mind  may  be  far  too  complex  for 
another. 

(c)  Associate,  i.e.  organize  ideas.    An  idea  by  itself  is  weak,  but 
associated  with  others  it  acquires  strength  and  vitality.     The 
motto  might  apply  here:  "United  we  stand,  divided  we  fall."    In 
reading,  study  the  objective  sequence  of  ideas,  and  subjectively 
associate  them  in  your  mind. 

(d)  Repetition  strengthens  ideas.    A  certain  number  of  repetitions 
is  required  to  learn  a  lesson,  but  it  will  be  found  preferable,  after 
going  over  the  lesson  attentively  several  times,  to  allow  some 
interval  to  elapse  between  following  repetitions.    To  revive  ideas 
at  intervals  of  time,  the  duration  of  which  varies  with  the  nature  of 
these  ideas  and  the  special  dispositions  of  mind,  is  better  than  to 
revive  them  the  same  number  of  times  in  immediate  succession. 

(e)  Use  as  many  faculties  as  possible  so  as  to  form  several  images 
of  the  same  object.    An  idea  which,  at  the  same  time,  belongs  to 
an  auditory,  a  visual,  and  a  logical  group  is  more  firmly  seated  in 
the  mind  and  has  more  numerous  associations.     Real,  not  merely 
verbal,  knowledge  should  be  insisted  on;  learn  ideas  primarily, 
not  words.    Simple  and  obvious  as  this  is,  it  is  too  often  forgotten 
in  practice.    Of  the  several  senses  sight  seems  to  be  the  most 
important,  as  it  is  a  substitute  for  the  other  senses,  especially  for 
the  sense  of  touch. 

(/)  Use  simultaneously  reason  and  the  senses.  Know  what  to 
retain  and  what  to  forget.  Group  ideas  logically  around  a  central 


88  PSYCHOLOGY 

idea  which  is  the  most  important,  and  which,  when  recalled,  will 
tend  to  recall  the  whole  group.  In  a  speech,  article,  or  lesson,  see 
the  logical  connections,  the  main  ideas,  their  organization  and 
sequence.  One  attentive  and  intelligent  reading  will  do  much 
more  than  many  mechanical  repetitions. 

N.B.  All  so-called  mnemonic  systems  and  methods  of  never 
forgetting  are  but  applications  of  the  above  rules. 

IV.    TIME-PERCEPTION 

Since  memory  refers  the  present  to  the  past  and  implies  suc- 
cession, a  few  words  will  be  said  here  of  time-perception.  Evidently 
we  are  not  concerned  at  present  with  the  abstract  idea  of  time  and 
its  definition;  nor  even  with  the  concrete,  but  objective  and  artifi- 
cial, division  of  time  into  years,  months,  days,  hours,  minutes,  and 
seconds.  We  deal  only  with  the  concrete  subjective  experience  of 
time  or  duration;  with  time  as  recorded  in  the  mind,  not  as  recorded 
in  nature  by  the  course  of  the  sun  or  the  revolutions  of  the  hands  of 
a  watch. 

(a)  In  the  very  beginning  of  mental  life  there  is  a  succession  of 
processes  which,  however,  is  hardly  conscious.    It  takes  some  time 
to  notice  by  reflection  the  facts  of  change,  endurance,  and  recurrence, 
and  thus  to  acquire  the  conscious  distinction  of  a  now,  or  present, 
and  a  then,  or  past.     The  memory  of  rhythmic  changes  like  respira- 
tion, pulse,  need  of  food  or  sleep,  is  probably  of  great  importance 
in  the  development  of  time-perception.    Little  by  little  the  vague 
notion  of  time  or  succession  becomes  clearer  and  develops  into  a 
time-appreciation. 

(b)  The  appreciation  of  time  is  to  a  great  extent  relative.    It  is  a 
fact  of  daily  experience  that  certain  lapses  of   time  objectively 
equal  pass  more  or  less  rapidly.     We  are  surprised  that  an  hour 
has  already  passed  in  a  conversation  with  a  friend,  the  reading  of 
an  interesting  book,  or  some  amusement;   and  we  are  equally 
surprised  that  it  is  only  ten  minutes  since  we  began  studying  an 
uninteresting  lesson  or  listening  to  a  tedious  speech. 

These  variations  depend  on:  (i)  The  number  of  intervening 
experiences.  When  these  are  many  and  varied,  time  passes  away 
more  rapidly  than  when  they  are  few.  In  retrospect,  on  the  con- 


ILLUSIONS     AND     HALLUCINATIONS      89 

trary,  intervals  almost  empty  of  experiences,  as  a  week  spent  in 
bed,  seem  shorter  because  we  have  no  memory  of  any  events  with 
which  to  fill  up  the  interval.  This  is  the  source  of  a  frequent 
historical  fallacy  which  consists  in  jumping  from  century  to  century 
without  distinction,  because  we  have  only  a  few  events  to  record; 
hence  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  a  century  seem  nearer  than 
they  are  in  reality,  and  men  who  lived  at  great  intervals  of  time 
are  looked  upon  as  contemporary.  (2)  The  interest  of  intervals; 
if  they  are  pleasant,  time  passes  more  rapidly.  (3)  Suspense, 
expectation,  and  anticipation;  a  future  event  which  is  desired  anx- 
iously and  has  to  be  waited  for  does  not  come  quickly  enough; 
but  once  it  has  come,  it  passes  off  very  rapidly.  The  youth  sees 
a  long,  long  life  before  him;  behind  him  the  old  man  sees  only  a 
short  duration.  Any  one  may  compare  the  day  or  year  that  pre- 
cedes an  expected  and  desired  event  with  the  day  or  year  that 
follows  it,  and  see  how  much  shorter  the  latter  seems. 

(c)  Localization  in  time  may  be  vague  or  accurate,  definite  or 
indefinite.  It  seems  to  depend  chiefly  on  the  importance  of  events 
and  on  associations  between  ideas. 

IV.    ILLUSIONS  OF  THE  SENSES 
I.  NATURE  OF  ILLUSIONS  AND  HALLUCINATIONS 

Illusions  and  hallucinations  are  generally  dependent  on  repro- 
ductive activity.  They  may  be  partly  presentative  and  partly 
representative  phenomena. 

i.  Definitions.  —  (a)  Frequently  common-sense  draws  a  sharp 
distinction  between  illusion  and  normal  perception,  as  if  illusion 
were  always  something  abnormal  and  indicative  of  a  special  defect 
in  the  mind.  This  meaning  is  inaccurate;  there  are  illusions  that 
are  natural,  ordinary,  and  common  to  all  men. 

(b)  Illusion  may  be  defined  in  general  as  the  acceptance  as  real 
by  the  mind  of  anything  which  is  unreal.  In  this  broad  sense  it 
includes  delusion,  error,  and  hallucination.  More  strictly,  illusion 
is  the  acceptance  as  real  by  the  mind  of  something  unreal,  but 
on  the  basis  of  some  real  data.  Sense  illusion  is  commonly  re- 
stricted to  errors  of  sense  perception  that  are  normal,  regular, 


QO  PSYCHOLOGY 

persistent,  and  common  to  all.  Delusion  applies  rather  to  a  false 
belief  which  implies  reasoning  processes,  is  persistent,  and  can 
be  removed  only  with  great  difficulty. 

(c)  Hallucination  cannot  always  be  distinguished  from  illusion. 
In  general  it  differs  from  illusion  because  it  lacks  the  basis  of  real 
data  which  is  present  in  illusion,  or  at  least  because  real  data 
contribute  but  little  and  remotely  to  the  present  mental  state  which 
is  mistaken  for  a  perception.  To  see  a  stick  where  there  is  no  stick 
at  all  is  a  hallucination;  to  see  a  stick  as  broken  in  the  water,  when 
in  reality  it  is  straight,  is  an  optical  illusion.  To  see  the  moon  when 
there  is  none  would  be  a  hallucination;  to  see  the  moon  as  gliding 
behind  the  clouds  is  an  illusion. 

2.  Classification.  —  Sense  illusions  can  hardly  be  classified  except 
by  referring  them  to  the  different  senses.  The  most  frequent  are 
optical  illusions  of  color,  shape,  distance,  size,  and  movement. 
Hallucination  is  (i)  positive  or  negative,  according  as  it  makes  one 
perceive  the  unreal,  or  prevents  one  from  perceiving  the  real  which 
under  normal  conditions  should  be  perceived;  (2)  simple  or  complex, 
according  as  it  affects  only  one  sense  or  several  senses.  The  senses 
most  subject  to  hallucinations  are  sight  and  hearing  and  also 
ccenesthesis. 

II.    MAIN  CAUSES  OF  ILLUSIONS  AND  HALLUCINATIONS 

We  speak  of  the  causes  of  these  two  phenomena  together  because 
many  are  common  to  both.  By  indicating  their  causes,  the  means 
of  correcting  illusions  and  hallucinations  will  also  be  indicated. 
In  general  an  illusion  or  hallucination  is  corrected  by  removing 
its  causes  when  possible,  and  by  testing  the  report  of  one  sense  by 
the  use  of  other  senses. 

i .  The  Constitution,  Keenness,  and  Fatigue  of  the  Sense  Organs ; 
their  defects,  either  special  to  some  or  common  to  all  individuals, 
are  sources  of  illusions.  After-images,  lack  of  discriminative 
sensibility  of  the  skin,  color  blindness,  double  vision,  etc.,  come 
from  such  causes.  Thus  if  a  man  with  his  eyes  closed  is  touched 
gently  on  the  hand  with  the  point  of  a  pencil,  and  is  asked,  always 
without  looking,  to  indicate  the  exact  spot  with  the  point  of  another 
pencil,  he  will  generally  fail,  and,  if  he  succeeds,  the  success  will 


ILLUSIONS     AND     HALLUCINATIONS      91 


B 


be  purely  accidental.  The  reason  is  that,  on  the  back  of  the  hand, 
the  discriminative  sensibility  is  about  i£  inches;  hence  within  that 
distance  the  two  impressions  are  felt  as  one. 

2.  Nature  of  the  Surroundings.  —  (a)  The  newness  of  an  object 
and  the  lack  of  familiarity  with  it  c 

tend  to  make  imagination  complete 
and  interpret  it. 

(b)  Various  circumstances,  such  as 
incompleteness,  e.g.  equivocal  figures 
which  are  capable  of  being  in- 
terpreted in  different  ways,  thus 
the  planes  ABCD  or  EFGH  may 
be  seen  in  the  front  or  in  the  back 
of  the  figure;  amount  of  light,  e.g. 
with  a  clear  atmosphere  a  mountain  i 
seems  nearer  than  with  a  misty 

atmosphere;  in  the  fog,  a  lamp  post  may  be  mistaken  for  some- 
thing else;  darkness  is  the  source  of  many  illusions;  intervening 
objects;  presence  or  absence 

of   materials  for  comparison.     HlllllllllllllllHllllllllllllH 

Compare     a     straight     line 

crossed  by   perpendiculars    with  its  continuation   of    the    same 

length  but  without  such  cross  lines.      Which  part  seems  longer? 


H 


D 


Or  again  compare     .x 


and 


The  moon  seems  larger  at  the  horizon  than  at  the  zenith  because 

the  number  of  intervening  objects  makes  it  look  more  distant, 

and  consequently  the  same 

visual  angle  is  interpreted 

as    corresponding     to     a 

larger  object;  the  angles 

are  equal,  but  their  sides 

seem  to  extend  farther.,    In  a  picture,  the  eyes  always  seem  to 

follow  the  spectator  because  the  pupil  is  always  in  view  as  if 

directed  toward  him  (absence  of  relief). 

(c)  Contrast  in  sizes,  colors,  shapes,  etc.,  is  likely  to  influence 
the  judgment.     (Instances.  .  .  .  ) 


92  PSYCHOLOGY 

(d)  The  use  of  instruments  like  colored  glasses,  lenses,  mirrors, 
etc. 

3.  Mental   Influences.  —  (i)  Memory,  inference,    association, 
suggestion,  and  habit.     It  is  well  known  how  sensations  can  be 
affected  by  these  influences.    (2)   Lack  of   attention.    (3)  Ex- 
pectation, desire,  and  fear. 

4.  Diseases,  strong  emotions,  weakness,  exhaustion,  delirium, 
epilepsy,  insanity,  the  use  of  certain  drugs,  hypnosis,  etc.,  produce 
illusions  and  hallucinations. 

ARTICLE  III.    CONCEPTION 
I.     CHARACTERISTICS   OF   THE   CONCEPT 

I.    VARIOUS  TERMS  EXPLAINED 

Before  describing  the  distinctive  features  of  the  concept,  it  will 
be  useful  to  compare  this  term  with  some  other  closely  related 
terms. 

1.  Thought.  —  (i)  Frequently  the  term  "  thought  "  is  applied 
to  all  conscious  activities  and  representations.    To  think  of  the 
events  of  yesterday  is  to  bring  them  back  to  memory.     When 
asked   for   information  which   I   do  not   actually   remember,  I 
am  likely  to  say:  "  Let  me  think  a  little."    To  think  is  also  used 
to  express  mere  opinion  as  distinct  from  certitude;  for  instance, 
when  I  say:  "  I  think  so."     (2)  Yet  other  current  expressions  point 
to  another  more  restricted  meaning.     When  we  say  of  a  man: 
"He  never  thinks,"  or   of   another:    "He   is    or    was   a  great 
thinker,"  we  refer  to  something  different  from  the  mere  power 
of  memory  and   imagination.     To   think   is   to   examine,  com- 
pare, judge,  classify,  elaborate  the  data  of  the  senses  so  as  to 
see  their  logical  relations.    It  is  from  present  and  past  experiences 
to  foresee  and  prepare  the  future;  to  find  out  the  laws  that  govern 
events  and  the  conditions  of  phenomena;  to  rise  from  the  con- 
crete instance  which  is  experienced  to  the  abstract  law  or  principle 
common  to  this  and  to  similar  instances. 

2.  Intellect.  —  In   this  narrower  sense,   thinking   is  generally 
attributed  to  man  alone,  and  referred  to  the  faculty  known  as 


CHARACTERISTICS     OF    CONCEPT  93 

intellect.  Animals  are  frequently  called  more  or  less  intelligent, 
and  by  this  we  refer  to  their  greater  or  smaller  aptitude  to  adapt 
means  to  an  end,  or  to  be  trained.  But  it  will  be  seen  in  another 
place  that  this  requires  no  thought  in  the  stricter  meaning;  it  is 
explainable  by  the  senses  and  the  retentive  powers.  In  fact  we 
do  not  speak  of  the  intellect  of  animals,  and  thus  we  make  a  differ- 
ence between  intelligence,  or  the  taking  of  means  appropriate  to 
an  end,  and  the  intellect,  or  the  superior  mode  of  knowledge  by 
abstraction,  generalization,  and  logical  sequence.  Thought  proper, 
or  intellectual  knowledge,  includes  three  steps:  the  formation  of 
abstract  and  general  ideas,  judgment,  and  reasoning.  From  these 
spring  other  manifestations,  especially  language,  written  or 
spoken. 

3.  Concept.  —  Abstract  and  general  ideas  are  properly  called 
concepts.  "  Idea  "  is  thus  a  more  general  term  applying  to  all 
forms  of  mental  representations,  images,  and  judgments.  I  say, 
for  instance:  "  I  have  no  idea  how  that  building  looks;  I  never  saw 
it;  "  or  "  I  have  no  clear  idea  on  this  matter,"  that  is,  "  I  cannot 
form  a  satisfactory  judgment,  or  reach  certitude."  As  percept 
corresponds  to  perception,  so  the  concept  is  the  result  of  the  process 
of  conception. 

We  have  seen  that  sensations  are  gradually  elaborated  into  per- 
ceptions. The  perception,  for  instance,  of  a  horse,  resulting  from 
many  presentations  and  representations,  is  always  concrete.  I  see 
this  horse,  with  this  color,  size,  etc.,  in  this  direction  and  at  this 
distance.  When  I  say:  "  It  is  a  horse,"  I  apply  to  this  concrete 
object  an  abstract  and  general  idea,  or  a  concept.  For  not  only  of 
this,  but  of  any  other  animal  of  the  same  kind,  wherever  it  may  be, 
and  whatever  its  color  and  size,  I  may  also  say:  "  It  is  a  horse." 
I  therefore  am  led  to  distinguish  something  which  is  common  to 
all  horses  and  which  I  consider  by  itself  apart  from  individual 
determinations.  As  a  percept,  horse  is  always  an  individual  con- 
crete reality ;  as  a  concept  it  is  an  idea  common  and  applicable  to 
all  horses,  and  it  can  be  so  only  because  it  is  abstract,  namely,  be- 
cause it  does  not  include  all  the  distinctive  features  of  this  or  that 
individual.  Hence  abstraction  is  the  fundamental  process  in  the 
formation  of  the  concept. 


94  PSYCHOLOGY 

II.    THE  ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  CONCEPT 

i.  Abstraction.  —  The  first  characteristic  of  the  concept  is  to 
be  abstract.  The  concept  does  not  represent  the  object  as  it  exists 
in  nature,  with  all  its  individual  qualities  and  determinations,  but 
it  considers  certain  features  and  leaves  out  the  others  (abs-trahere) . 
Here  evidently  the  question  is  not  that  of  a  physical,  but  only  of  a 
mental  or  ideal  separation. 

Mental  abstraction  is  of  several  kinds,  (a)  In  the  same  object 
there  are  many  qualities,  each  of  which  may  be  perceived  by  a 
special  sense,  the  color  by  the  eye,  the  sound  by  the  ear,  the  resist- 
ance by  touch,  etc.  Hence  by  its  very  nature  every  sense  is  ab- 
stractive; it  perceives  only  one  out  of  many  qualities  belonging  to 
the  same  object.  Or  sense-abstraction  may  be  due  to  voluntary 
attention,  when,  in  an  object,  a  quality  or  group  of  qualities  is  of 
special  interest,  e.g.  the  taste  of  an  apple,  the  sound  of  a  musical 
instrument. 

(b)  There  is  also  a  process  of  abstraction  in  imagination  and  its 
various  types,  in  the  association  and  fusion  of  images,  and  in  mem- 
ory.   Some  features  of  the  images  are  considered  while  others  are 
left  out. 

(c)  In  language,  spoken  or  written,  one  may  consider  the  ideas 
represented,  i.e.  the  meaning  of  words  and  sentences,  or  one's 
attention  may  be  directed  to  the  words  themselves  from  the  differ- 
ent points  of  view  of  etymology,  declension,  spelling,  pronunciation, 
etc. 

(d)  The  concept  is  called  abstract  in  a  stricter  sense.    That 
which  it  represents  is,  or  should  be,  only  the  features  that  are 
absolutely  essential  to  the  object  and  therefore  common  to  all 
objects  of  the  same  kind,  leaving  out  all  unessential  and  particular 
features.    The   concept,  for  instance,  will   represent  something 
essential  and  common  to  all  movements  (change  of  place),  to  all 
causes  (production),  to  all  squares  (the  fact  of  having  four  equal 
sides  and  four  right  angles).    The  individual  determinations,  con- 
ditions, circumstances,  ...  of  this  or  that  movement,  cause,  and 
square  are  left  out  of  consideration.     In  the  same  concrete  object, 
however,  we  may  consider  different  aspects  and  find  different 


CHARACTERISTICS    OF     CONCEPT          95 

concepts.    Thus  in   my  free  action  I  may  find  the  concepts  of 
freedom,  cause,  motion,  action,  responsibility,  and  change. 

2.  Derived  Characteristics.  —  Because  the  concept  is  abstract, 
it  also  possesses  three  other  main  characteristics. 

(a)  It  is  not  restricted  to  one  individual,  but  may  be  applied 
to  several;  it  is  universal  because  it  does  not  include  individual- 
izing determinations.     My  perception  of  a  man,  because  it  is  con- 
crete, applies  only  to  the  one  man  whom  I  perceive;  my  concept  of 
man  applies  to  all  men ;  —  the  same  is  true  of  the  concepts  of  color, 
weather,  circle,  etc.,  as  compared  to  perceptions. 

(b)  The  concept  is  not  restricted  to  individuals  actually  exist- 
ing.   If  it  represents  only  that  which  is  really  essential  —  in  many 
cases,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  not  so  —  it  is  necessary,  and  indepen- 
dent of  actual  existence  which  is  contingent.    The  acquisition  of 
it  depends  on  the  perception  of  concrete  existing  things,  but,  in 
some  cases,  no  concrete  object  may  be  found  in  which  the  concept 
thus  formed  is  actually  realized.    Thus  my  concepts  of  a  circle, 
of  a  triangle,  of  two  parallels,  represent  in  my  mind  that  which  is 
the  essential  and  necessary  constituents  of  these,  although  per- 
haps such  elements  are  neither  represented  nor  perfectly  repre- 
sentable  physically  on  the  blackboard  or  on  paper.    I  have  the 
concept  of  a  man  perfect  physically  and  mentally,  although  such 
a  man  may  never  be  found.    The  formation  of  the  concept  of  life 
supposes  the  perception  of  living  beings,  but  this  concept,  once 
acquired,  is  indifferent  to  the  various  forms  according  to  which 
life  is  actually  realized,  and  even  to  any  realization  of  life  in  the 
world. 

(c)  Hence  it  follows  that  the  concept  is  not  dependent  on  the 
conditions  of  space  and  time,  which  are  always  determinations  of 
concrete  things. 

3.  Various  Degrees  of  these  Characteristics.  —  These  charac- 
teristics of  the  concept,  and  primarily  its  abstraction,  are  not 
always  found  in  the  same  degree  nor  in  the  same  manner. 

(a)  By  intension  or  connotation  of  a  concept  are  meant  its  con- 
stituent notes.  By  its  extension  or  denotation  is  meant  the  number 
of  individuals  to  which  it  applies.  Thus  I  may  have  the  concept 
of  a  plane  geometrical  figure  limited  by  four  equal  straight  lines 


g6  PSYCHOLOGY 

parallel  two  by  two  and  intersecting  at  right  angles.  This  is  the 
intension  of  my  concept  of  a  square,  and  this  concept  denotes  all 
squares.  If  in  the  definition  I  leave  out  the  idea  "equal,"  I  de- 
crease the  intension,  but  the  concept  will  apply  to  a  greater  num- 
ber of  figures,  namely,  to  all  rectangles.  The  connotation  may  be 
further  decreased  by  leaving  out  the  condition  of  intersection  at 
right  angles;  the  denotation  will  be  increased,  since  the  concept 
will  apply  to  all  parallelograms.  Further  still  the  condition  of 
parallelism  may  be  omitted,  and  the  concept  applies  to  all  quad- 
rilaterals, and  so  on.  Thus  it  is  seen  that  intension  and  extension 
vary  in  opposite  directions.  To  increase  one  is  to  decrease  the  other, 
and  vice  versa. 

(b)  This  also  shows  that  the  concept  may  be  more  or  less  com- 
plete, accurate,  and  comprehensive.    It  is  true  but  incomplete 
to  say  that  the  essence  of  the  square  is  to  be  a  rectangle  or  a  par- 
allelogram.   In  these  latter  concepts  we  reach  a  higher  degree  of 
abstraction,  a  lessening  of  the  connotation,  and  an  addition  to 
the  extension.    Again,  I  may  conceive  the  cow  as  a  large  herbiv- 
orous animal;    this  is  true   but   insufficient.     By  the  complete 
essence  of  a  thing  is  meant  that  which  includes  all  the  constituent 
elements  of   the  species  to   which  it  belongs,  and  that  which 
distinguishes  it  from  anything  belonging  to  any  other  class. 

(c)  In  many,  if  not  in  most  cases,  we  know  the  essences  of  things 
very  imperfectly.     For  the  child,  a  cat  may  be  essentially  black 
or  white,  and  it  is  only  later,  after  seeing  cats  of  different  colors, 
that  this  notion  is  corrected.    The   same   frequently  occurs  in 
sciences;  tentative  and  provisional  definitions  are  used  which  must 
be  revised  by  future  progress  along  the  same  line  of  investigation. 

4.  The  Concept  and  the  Image  Compared.  —  From  what  pre- 
cedes, and  from  what  has  been  said  on  imagination,  the  differ- 
ences between  the  concept  and  the  image  may  be  inferred.  Since 
the  concept  is  general,  it  is  clear  that  it  differs  essentially  from  the 
simple  image,  which  represents  a  single  perception.  Some  claim 
that  the  concept  is  but  a  generic  image  in  which  the  essential  fea- 
tures, because  they  are  common  to  many  images,  are  prominent, 
whereas  individual  features  are  blurred.  This  account,  however, 
is  insufficient. 


CHARACTERISTICS     OF     CONCEPT^        97 

(a)  Like  the  composite  photograph,  the  generic  image  is  concrete. 
It  is  true  that  it  does  not  represent  exclusively  this  or  that  indi- 
vidual which  has  been  perceived  before.    To  some  extent  it  is 
vague  and  indetermined,  but  yet  it  is  an  individual  picture,  rep- 
resenting perfectly  one  individual  only,  which,  it  is  true,  has  not 
been  perceived  and  probably  does  not  exist,  but  which  is  one  and 
concrete.     Because  it  is  vague,  it  may  be  applied  to  several  indi- 
viduals, but  to  all  imperfectly  and  only  in  part;  to  none  perfectly. 
The  concept,  on  the  contrary,  is  applicable  perfectly  to  all  the  indi- 
viduals.    As  a  concept,  movement  means  simply  a  change  of  place; 
as  an  image,  it  is  always  this  movement  with  this  special  direction 
and  velocity.     The  concept  of  a  circle  includes  no  definite  dimen- 
sions; the  image  of  a  circle  cannot  be  without  them.    In  other 
words,  the  composite  image  is  an  average  picture,  and  an  average 
here,  as  in  mathematics,  is  always  something  concrete.     In  fact, 
every  image,  however  complex,  represents  an  object  with  certain 
dimensions,  shape,  size,  color,  etc. 

(b)  Hence  an  image  can  always  be  outlined,  or  painted,  or 
described  in  some  manner;  the  concept  cannot.    The  concepts  of 
triangle,  man,  or  color  apply  to  all  triangles,  men,  and  colors.    An 
image  always  represents  one  triangle,  one  man,  one  color.    It  is 
true  that  the  concept  is  generally  accompanied  by  some  shadowy, 
vague,  and  indistinct  mental  image.     But  as  soon  as  we  turn  the 
attention  to  it,  the  image  becomes  clearer  and  assumes  definite 
determinations.    It  was  vague  because  attention  was  not  concen- 
trated upon  it. 

(c)  A  concept  may  be  clear  and  distinct  while  the  correspond- 
ing image  is  obscure  or  even  impossible.    I  understand  perfectly 
what  is  meant  by  a  chiliagon  or  a  geometrical  figure  of  a  thousand 
sides,  and  how  it  differs  from  another  figure  with  a  thousand  and 
one  sides.    Yet  my  imagination  is  powerless  to  give  me  a  mental 
picture  of  these.    The  same  may  be  said  in  general  of  very  large 
and  of  very  small  things,  like  the  distance  between  the  sun  and 
the  earth,  and  the  size  of  a  cell  -5^-3  of  an  inch  in  diameter.    I 
understand  what  the  mathematician  tells  me  when  he  says  that 
a  quantity  may  be  multiplied  and  divided  ad  infinitum,  but  I  can 
imagine  it  in  no  concrete  case.    A  familiar  instance  may  be  taken 


98  PSYCHOLOGY 

from  those  animals  which  are  called  myriapods  (etymologically 
10,000  feet),  among  which  are  centipeds  (etymologically  100  feet). 
To  understand  is  not  to  imagine;  intellect  is  not  imagination. 

(d)  We  have  concepts  of  things  immaterial  which  can  in  no  way 
be  represented  by  imagination,  like  virtue,  justice,  duty,  truth, 
etc.  There  are  virtuous  and  just  actions,  but  I  do  not  perceive  at 
all  with  the  senses  the  goodness  or  justice  of  a  concrete  action. 
This  concept,  therefore,  though  derived  from,  and  realized  only 
in,  individual  actions,  has  a  source  distinct  from  the  senses  and  the 
imagination.  Or  again,  I  see  one  thing  succeeding  another,  but 
I  do  not  see  the  causality  or  production,  and  yet  I  have  not  only 
the  concept  of  succession,  but  also  that  of  cause. 

II.   GENESIS   OF  THE   CONCEPT 

I.   VARIOUS  PROPOSED  SYSTEMS 

The  systems  proposed  to  explain  the  origin  of  concepts  may  be 
reduced  to  three,  two  extreme  and  one  intermediate,  (i)  At  one 
extreme  are  found  those  who  claim  that  the  formation  of  the  con- 
cept can  be  accounted  for  completely  by  the  senses  —  presentation 
and  representation  —  and  their  various  complex  functions;  no 
special  activity  is  required.  (2)  At  the  other  extreme  are  found 
those  who  claim  that  the  senses  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
formation  of  the  concept.  It  must  be  attributed  to  a  special  inde- 
pendent mental  power.  (3)  Between  these  two  are  found  those 
who  claim  that  the  senses  are  both  necessary  and  insufficient  to 
account  for  the  concept.  Intellectual  knowledge  begins  with  the 
senses,  but  rises  higher  and  cannot  be  completed  by  them. 

i.  First  Extreme  or  Generally  Sensism.  —  (a)  It  is  clear  that 
if  no  other  existence  than  that  of  matter  is  admitted,  every  form 
of  knowledge  must  be  reduced  to  the  properties  of  matter.  This 
was  the  conclusion  of  the  older  and  cruder  materialists,  Emped- 
ocles,  Leucippus,  Democritus,  Epicurus,  who  explained  knowledge 
by  the  entering  into  the  sense  organs,  of  small  material  particles 
coming  from  the  objects  themselves.  It  is  also  the  conclusion  of 
the  new  and  more  elaborate  materialism  of  the  latter  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century  in  France  and  of  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 


GENESIS     OF     CONCEPT  99 

century  in  Germany.    Thought  in  all  its  forms  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  some  material  energy. 

(b)  The  name  of  Sensationalism  is  given  especially  to  the  systems 
of  Locke  and  Condillac.    According  to  Locke,  all  ideas  come  from 
experience,  and  experience  is  twofold:  sensation  by  which  external 
objects  are  perceived,  and  reflection  by  which  we  are  aware  of 
concrete  mental  processes.    Ideas  thus  acquired  are  complex  or 
simple  according  as  they  are  repeated  and  combined  with  others 
or  not.     Condillac  rejects  reflection  as  a  distinct  source  of  knowl- 
edge.     For  him  there  is  only  one  source,  sensation  together  with 
its  various  transformations,  which  are  attention  or  application  to 
sensations,  reflection  or  attention  to  successive  sensations,  memory 
or  the  power  of  recall,  comparison  or  attention  to  simultaneous 
sensations  and  memories,  judgment  or  perception  of  their  rela- 
tions of  likeness  and  difference,  imagination  or  the  combination 
of  ideas,  reasoning  or  the  inference  of  a  judgment  from  other 
judgments. 

(c)  More  recently  the  theory  reducing  all  ideas  to  images  has 
been  and  is  still  advocated,  but  as  a  more  complete  and  more 
elaborate  system,     (i)  The  main  point  which  is  insisted  on  is 
the  fusion  of  images  by  which,  as  in  composite  photographs,  com- 
mon features  are  made  to  stand  prominent,   while  individual 
features  are  not  apparent.    There  is  thus  a  double  process,  disso- 
ciation and  combination,  the  causes  of  which  are  either  external 
and  involuntary,  especially  the  identity  and  dissimilarity  of  cer- 
tain features,  or  internal,  like  elective  attention,  mental  types, 
and  special  purpose.    This  process  of  addition  and  subtraction, 
or,  perhaps  better,  of  multiplication  and  division,  gives  the  ab- 
stract and  general  idea  which  represents  only  common  features. 
This  is  Associationism  (Stuart  Mill,  Bain).     (2)  Others  say  that 
the  idea  remains  really  concrete,  but  we  look  upon  it  as  abstract 
and  general  when  it  is  expressed  by  a  universal  term,  or  common 
name,  applying  to  a  group  of  similar  images.    The  label  only, 
not  the  real  content  of  the  mind,  is  abstract  and  universal.    This  is 
Nominalism  (Taine).     (3)  Finally,  the  process  may  be  completed 
by  accumulating  the  experiences  and  associations  not  only  of  the 
individual,  but  of  his  ancestors.    Thus  the  individual  is  born,  if 


100  PSYCHOLOGY 

not  with  ready-made  ideas,  at  least  with  the  capacity  and  apti- 
tude for  forming  them  immediately,  because  he  profits  by  the  work 
of  mental  combination  of  images  which  has  taken  place  before  and 
the  results  of  which  he  inherits.  This  is  Evolutionism  added  to 
Associationism  (Spencer).  And  here,  as  in  so  many  other  instances, 
extremes  meet,  and  this  view  comes  close  to  innatism,  which 
belongs  to  the  aprioristic  group  of  theories. 

2.  Second  Extreme  or  Generally  Apriorism.  —  It  has  four  chief 
forms:  Innatism,  Transcendentalism,  Ontologism,  Traditionalism. 

(a)  According  to  innatism  concepts  are  not  acquired.  All, 
or  at  least  some,  are  inborn  in  the  mind,  (i)  For  Plato,  this 
world  is  essentially  changing  and  contingent;  consequently  our 
necessary  ideas  cannot  be  derived  from  sense-perception.  There 
exists  another  world  of  which  this  visible  world  is  only  a  partic- 
ipation, an  appearance  and  a  shadow,  namely  the  world  of  ideas, 
in  which  are  found,  for  instance,  justice-in-itself,  beauty-in-itself, 
virtue-in-itself,  etc.,  whereas  in  our  world  are  found  only  things 
that  partake  of  these  in  various  degrees,  i.e.  just  things,  beautiful 
things,  virtuous  actions,  etc.  Before  being  united  with  a  body  in 
this  world,  the  soul  preexisted  as  a  pure  spirit  in  the  world  of  ideas, 
and  had  the  intuition  of  them.  Its  union  with  the  organism  — 
which  is  a  punishment  —  deprives  the  soul  of  this  intuition. 
The  perception  of  things  by  the  senses  revives  in  the  mind 
ideas  acquired  previously,  but  forgotten.  Pure  ideas  are  really 
remembrances. 

(2)  Descartes  recognizes  three  kinds  of  ideas:  adventitious, 
(from  sense-perceptions),  fictitious  (built  up  by  the  imagination), 
and  innate  (universal  and  purely  intellectual  ideas).     What  Des- 
cartes means  by  innate  ideas  is  not  clear.     Sometimes  he  speaks 
of  them  as  actual  and  ready-made  ideas  or  representations;  some- 
times, when  pressed  by  the  objections  of   his   adversaries,    he 
speaks  of  them  as  faculties  or  virtualities  or  even  unconscious 
ideas. 

(3)  According  to  Leibniz,  the  soul  having  "neither  doors  nor 
windows,"  i.e.  being  incapable  of  communicating  in  any  way  with 
the  external  world,  all  ideas  must  be  innate.    But,  of  themselves, 
innate  ideas  are  not  yet  conscious,  not  yet  "apperceptions."    They 


GENESIS    OF    CONCEPT  IOI 

are   rather  inclinations,   dispositions,   habits,   or,   better,   germs 
which  will  evolve  into  conscious  perceptions. 

(4)  Rosmini  claimed  that  one  idea  at  least,  namely,  the  idea 
of  being  which  is  implied  in  every  concept,  must  be  innate. 

(b)  According  to  Kant,  the  mind  must  find  in  itself  the  "forms  " 
according  to  which  it  knows  things.    The  characters  of  universal- 
ity and  necessity  which  are  found  in  some  ideas  cannot  be  derived 
from  individual  contingent  objects;  hence  they  come  from  the 
mind  alone.    Things-in-themselves  exist,  but,  as  such,  are  unknow- 
able.   They  are  necessarily  known  according  to  the  mind's  natural 
and  inborn  "a  priori  forms."    We  know  things-as-they-appear 
to  the  mind  (phenomena)-,    to  reach  the  thing-in-itself  (noume- 
non)  is  impossible.    This  system  is  known  as  transcendentalism, 

(c)  For  ontologism  —  Malebranche  and  a  few  Catholic  philos- 
ophers of  the  nineteenth  century  —  we  know  all  things  in  God, 
the  source  not  only  of  all  being,  but  also  of  all  knowledge.     God 
alone  is  intelligible,  and  things  are  intelligible  only  through  the 
divine  intelligence. 

(d)  Traditionalism  —  another   system   of   some   Catholic   phi- 
losophers: De  Bonald,  Lamennais,  etc.,  in  the  nineteenth  century 
—  supposes  that  general  ideas  cannot  be  formed  by  the  mind; 
they    must    be    taught     and     transmitted     by    tradition,     and 
therefore  traditionalists    have    recourse    to    a    primitive    divine 
revelation. 

3.  Intermediate  System.  —  The  formation  of  concepts  depends 
on,  and  begins  with,  the  senses,  but  is  completed  by  a  special  fac- 
ulty, the  intellect,  distinct  from  them,  (i)  We  have  no  innate 
ideas,  and,  in  forming  concepts,  the  intellect  depends  on  sense- 
perception  and  images.  The  senses  are  thus  the  necessary  point 
of  departure  of  intellectual  knowledge.  (2)  All  sense-perceptions 
and  images  are  representations  of  concrete  and  individual  objects. 
To  be  elaborated  into  concepts  they  require  a  special  operation, 
namely,  abstraction,  by  which  the  material,  individual,  and  con- 
crete features  of  the  image  are,  so  to  say,  removed  so  as  to  leave 
only  the  essential  and  consequently  common  features.  (3)  Hence 
the  formation  of  abstract  and  general  ideas  requires  in  the  intel- 
lect a  double  function,  one  of  activity,  the  other  of  receptivity. 


102  PSYCHOLOGY 

By  the  former  the  sense-products  are  elaborated;   by  the  latter 
the  act  itself  of  intellectual  knowledge  is  performed. 

II.     DISCUSSION    OF    THE    SYSTEMS 

It  will  be  easier  to  begin  with  the  last-mentioned  system.  Its 
very  position  between  two  extremes  seems  already  to  be  in  its 
favor.  If  it  is  true  that  "In  medio  stat  virtus"  it  is  frequently 
true  also  that  "In  medio  stat  veritas."  A  system  is  not  advo- 
cated by  serious  thinkers  without  good  reasons,  and  when  serious 
thinkers  advocate  systems  that  are  diametrically  opposed,  it  is 
generally  safe  to  infer  that  there  is  some  misunderstanding  and 
some  one-sidedness  in  their  respective  points  of  view.  If  another 
system  can  avail  itself  of  the  reasons  in  favor  of  both  extremes, 
and  avoid  their  shortcomings,  it  has  a  chance  to  stand  nearer  to 
the  truth. 

i.  Intellectual  Knowledge  Begins  with,  but  is  npt  Completed 
by,  the  Senses.  —  Let  us  briefly  give  reasons  for  this  proposition. 

(a)  Intellectual  knowledge  depends  on  the  senses.  In  this  we  agree 
with  the  first  extreme  system  and  differ  from  most  of  the  advocates 
of  the  second.  By  senses  here  we  mean  chiefly  images  with  their 
various  associations  and  fusions.  The  formation  itself  of  the  con- 
cept seems  to  depend  ultimately  on  some  corresponding  image. 
For  instance,  to  form  the  concept  of  a  dog,  I  must  have  had  the 
perception  of  a  dog,  or  of  animals  closely  akin  to  it,  or  I  must 
have  its  appearance  and  nature  explained  to  me.  But  once  the 
concept  has  been  acquired,  any  sign  or  image  may  recall  it  by  asso- 
ciation. Thus  the  word  itself,  "dog,"  which  is  a  purely  arbitrary 
and  conventional  term,  is  sufficient  to  recall  my  concept.  Again, 
although  the  concept  of  a  circle  may  be  acquired  without  having 
ever  seen  a  perfect  geometrical  circle,  yet  the  elements  which  com- 
pose this  complex  concept  depend  ultimately  on  sense-perception 
from  which  the  ideas  of  point,  line,  curve,  etc.,  are  formed. 

The  main  reasons  for  asserting  this  dependence  are  based  on 
the  following  facts:  (i)  The  condition  of  the  organism,  especially 
of  the  brain,  influences  the  highest  mental  functions,  and,  in  many 
cases,  mental  disorders  are  traced  back  to  organic,  and  especially 
cerebral,  lesions  and  diseases.  The  influence  of  certain  drugs 


GENESIS     OF     CONCEPT  103 

and  intoxicants  is  also  too  well  known.  (2)  When  some  sense  is 
lacking,  no  concept  of  things  referring  to  this  sense  is  possible. 
The  man  born  blind  may  have  ideas  of  mechanical  vibrations,  but 
not  of  colors  as  such.  (3)  Experience  shows  that  the  highest  con- 
ceptions are  greatly  facilitated  by  the  use  of  images,  symbols, 
diagrams,  etc. 

(b)  If  the  materials  for  forming  concepts  are  found  in  percep- 
tions and  images,  these  materials  must  be  elaborated.    This  is  but 
the  conclusion  of  what  was  said  above  (p.  96)  on  the  impossi- 
bility of  reducing  the  concept  to  the  image.    The  senses  always 
give  representations  that  have  individual,  contingent,  and  con- 
crete characters.    A  special  power  of  abstraction  must  be  used 
to  elaborate  these  into  a  necessary  and  universal  concept.    The 
universal  is  radically  in  things,  since  they  have  an  essence  which 
may  be  looked  upon  as  common  when  considered  apart  from  the 
individual  nqtes  with  which  it  is  really  found  in  nature;  but,  as 
a  universal,  it  exists  only  in  the  mind.    The  image  gives  the 
necessary  basis  on  which  the  concept  can  be  formed. 

(c)  Knowing  the  starting-point,  i.e.  the  senses,  and  the  result, 
i.e.  the  concept,  the  question  remains:  How  can  the  bridging  over 
be  effected?    Here  we  need  a  special  activity,  or  "intellectus 
agens,"  whose  function  is  abstraction  and  the  elaboration  of  the 
data  of  the  senses  into  some  higher  idea  whose  nature  is  purely 
intellectual.    This  process  of  abstraction  is  also  called  illumina- 
tion, as  it  throws  light  on  certain  features  and  leaves  others  in 
darkness.    Thus  is  formed  the  abstract  concept,  which  is  a  special 
mental  representation  deprived  of  the  material  and  individual 
features  found  in   the  mental    image,  and  which  consequently 
may    be   applied  to   all  individuals  that  belong    to  the    same 
class. 

2.  Sensism.  —  (a)  In  general  sensism  rightly  recognizes  the 
necessity  of  the  senses  for  intellectual  knowledge;  but  it 'does  not 
go  far  enough  in  its  account,  for  it  denies  the  radical  distinction 
which  exists  between  the  concept  and  the  image.  A  defect  in  the 
method  used  may  be  pointed  out:  Sensists  generally  try  to  ex- 
plain the  origin  of  concepts  without  examining  first  their  specific 
characteristics.  They  seem  to  take  it  for  granted  a  priori  that  the 


104  PSYCHOLOGY 

concept  must  be  reduced  to  some  activity  of  the  senses.  It  is 
true  that  the  general  law  of  continuity  applies  here,  and  that  the 
passage  from  the  image  to  the  concept  is  gradual,  but  this  does  not 
prevent  the  two  from  being  different  and  irreducible.  Sometimes 
even  metaphysical  preoccupations  —  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
soul  and  its  spirituality  —  seem  to  be  found  at  the  start  of  this 
investigation.  It  may  also  be  noted  that  sensists  often  implicitly 
assume  the  existence  of  a  special  faculty  of  elaboration,  even  when 
they  deny  it. 

To  all  forms  of  sensism  the  following  objections  apply:  (i) 
They  fail  to  recognize  the  distinction  between  concept  and  image. 

(2)  Either,  if  they  are  consistent,  they  cannot  account  for  the 
special  characteristics  of  the  concept;  or,  if  they  do,  it  is  by  intro- 
ducing tacitly  the  special  activity  which  they  deny.    In  fact, 
when  carefully  considered,  sensistic  theories  are  seen  to  introduce 
special  activities,  reflection,  the  power  of  transforming  the  sensa- 
tions, the  power  of  elective  attention  or  elaboration,  and  the  like. 

(3)  Frequently  sensism  is  only  a  consequence  or  application  of  a 
wider  philosophical  view,  materialism,  positivism,  etc. 

(b)  The  features  special  to  some  systems  do  not  obviate  these 
difficulties,  (i)  Reflection  is  only  the  consciousness  of  the  mind's 
own  individual  and  concrete  activities.  (2)  The  transformation 
of  the  sensation  either  does  not  account  for  the  formation  of  the 
concept,  or,  if  it  accounts  for  it,  requires  a  special  elaborative 
faculty.  (3)  The  association,  or,  better,  fusion,  of  images  may  give 
a  composite  image;  but  this  cannot  be  identified  with  the  concept, 
even  if  we  give  it  the  accumulated  associations  of  centuries.  (4) 
The  name,  it  is  true,  may  be  common  and  applicable  to  all  individ- 
uals of  the  same  class.  Yet  the  name  as  written  or  uttered  is 
always  concrete;  it  is  abstract  and  common  only  because  it  ex- 
presses an  abstract  and  general  idea.  Suppress  the  abstract  idea 
which  it  manifests,  and  the  word  is  then  a  mere  concrete  utter- 
ance, at  such  a  time,  with  such  a  sound,  and  in  such  circumstances. 
Far  from  giving  to  the  image  its  abstract  character,  the  name 
must  itself  receive  it  from  the  idea  for  which  it  stands.  When  I 
apply  the  name  "  triangle  "  to  all  triangles,  it  is  because  I  have 
already  recognized  that  which  is  essential  to  a  triangle,  and  con- 


GENESIS     OF     CONCEPT  105 

sidered  this  apart  from  the  determinations  with  which  it  is  always 
accompanied  in  the  perceived  or  imagined  triangle,  of  such  an  area, 
right-angled  or  otherwise,  scalene  or  otherwise,  with  sides  of  a 
definite  length,  angles  of  definite  dimensions,  etc. 

3.  Apriorism.  —  As  aprioristic  systems  are  widely  different, 
they  must  be  considered  separately.  In  general,  all  rightly  rec- 
ognize the  impossibility  of  deriving  the  concept  from  mere  sense- 
experience,  but  wrongly  fail  to  recognize  the  dependence  of  the 
concept  on  the  senses. 

(a)  Ontologism  and  traditionalism  were  systems  designed  by 
Catholic  philosophers  to  counteract  extreme   materialistic,  sen- 
sistic,  and  rationalistic  tendencies  in  the  past  century.    Both  were 
condemned  by  the  Church  and  soon  disappeared.    Hence  a  few 
remarks  will  suffice  here.    Ontologism  is  gratuitous  and  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  testimony  of  consciousness.    Ontologists  took  a  great 
deal  of  trouble  to  explain  the  intuition  of  God,  which,  according 
to  them,  we  must  necessarily  possess;  but  their  explanation  is 
satisfactory  neither  to  the  philosopher  nor  to  the  theologian. 

Traditionalism  contains  much  that  must  be  accepted.  Un- 
doubtedly tradition  transmitted  by  language  is  a  great  help  in 
acquiring  ideas.  For  the  most  part,  our  ideas  are  received  from 
others,  and,  if  our  individual  minds  were  left  to  their  own  activ- 
ity, all  ideas  would  remain  very  imperfect.  But  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  no  idea  can  be  acquired  otherwise.  In  fact,  in  order  to 
convey  ideas  to  the  hearer  or  reader,  language  must  be  understood, 
and  understanding  supposes  in  the  hearer  or  reader  the  ideas 
which  the  words  represent.  If  words  presuppose  ideas,  it  is  clear 
that  they  cannot  be  the  exclusive  source  of  ideas. 

(b)  The  theory  of  innate  ideas  is  a  purely  gratuitous  and  lazy 
theory,  since  there  is  no  consciousness  of  them,  and  their  innateness 
is  not  the  only  way  of  accounting  for  their  presence  in  the  mind. 
On  the  contrary,  we  are  conscious  of  the  mental  activity  by  which 
we  elaborate  concepts  from  the  data  of  the  senses,  and  of  a  con- 
tinuity, not  of  a  break,  between  the  senses  and  the  intellect.    To 
say  that  ideas  are  ready-made  and  conscious  is  obviously  false. 
To  say  t-hat  they  are  ready-made,  yet  unconscious,  is  to  say 
nothing  intelligible.    To  say   that  they  are  mere  faculties  and 


106  PSYCHOLOGY 

virtualities  is  to  deny  that  they  are  innate  and  to  fall  back  into 
another  system  admitting  only  the  power  of  forming  concepts. 

(c)  Kant's  special  views  on  the  present  problem  are  but  parts 
of  his  whole  philosophy,  and  cannot  be  discussed  fully  here.  His 
solution  cannot  be  proved  to  have  any  real  value,  as  it  may  be 
nothing  but  a  result  of  a  priori  forms  of  the  mind.  It  is  difficult 
to  understand  the  meaning  of  these  a  priori  forms  which  are  empty 
until  they  receive  experiences  from  the  external  world,  and,  after 
receiving  them,  form  with  them  the  complete  knowledge.  Nor 
does  it  seem  possible  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  their  exist- 
ence. The  principle:  " Whatever  is  necessary  and  universal  in 
knowledge  must  come  from  the  mind,  and  not  from  the  object," 
is  gratuitous  until  it  has  been  shown  that  these  characteristics 
are  not  radically  in  objects  themselves,  and  therefore  can  in  no 
way  be  found  in  them.  Thus  we  are  told  that,  since  all  things 
are  perceived  in  space,  and  all  mental  processes  in  time,  space 
and  time  are  presupposed  to  any  perception;  they  must  preexist 
in  the  mind  as  a  priori  forms  of  external  and  of  internal  sensibil- 
ity. It  would  be  equally  reasonable  to  say  that  they  do  not  pre- 
exist, but  simply  coexist,  and,  in  this  case,  the  ideas  of  space  and 
time  may  be  derived  from  things  and  processes  themselves.  From 
the  fact  that  all  things  are  perceived  in  space,  I  may  simply  con- 
clude that  all  things  are  in  space,  and  are  perceived  as  they  are. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  all  a  priori  forms;  their  existence  is  not 
to  be  admitted  if  facts  can  be  accounted  for  otherwise. 

4.  Conclusion.  —  From  what  has  been  said  we  conclude  that, 
of  the  two  extreme  systems  proposed  to  explain  the  origin  of  con- 
cepts, one  starts  rightly  but  stops  too  low,  the  other  ends  rightly 
but  starts  too  high.  The  intermediate  system  has  the  advantage 
of  being  in  better  conformity  with  experience,  and  of  giving  a 
sufficient  explanation  with  a  minimum  of  a  priori  elements. 


NATURE     OF     JUDGMENT  107 

ARTICLE  IV.    JUDGMENT 
I.   NATURE   OF   THE   JUDGMENT 

I.    THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROCESS 

1.  What    is    Judgment?  —  (a)    Human    thinking    essentially 
takes  the  form  of  judgments;  judgment  alone  has  a  meaning  and 
is  true  or  false.     I  may  have  the  idea  of  four  miles,  and  the  idea 
of  the  distance  from  a  place  A  to  another  place  B.    There  is  no 
meaning,  no  truth  or  falsity,  in  these  ideas  taken  separately,  but 
only  when  I  compare  them  and  think  or  say  that  the  distance  from 
A  to  B  is,  or  is  not,  four  miles.    This  is  a  judgment,  and  the  new 
essential   element  which  has  been  introduced  is  the  connecting 
link  between  two  ideas,  by  which  I  pronounce  on  their  agreement 
or  disagreement.     A  mere  list  of  words  gives  no  meaning,  unless 
these   words   are   so   connected    as   to   form    judgments.    Con- 
versations, writings,  scientific  formulae,  speeches,  etc.,  all  express 
judgments,  and   not  merely  ideas,  although    idea  is  sometimes 
used  in  the  sense  of  judgment  (cf.  p.  93).     Strictly,  an  idea  is  a 
mere  representation  of  an  object.    When  we  speak  of  a  true  or  of 
a  false  idea  according  as  it  does  or  does  not  correspond  to  reality, 
we  really  speak  of  an  implicit  judgment  pronouncing  on  this  con- 
formity.   Judging   is   essentially   affirming    the   relations   between 
things  or  ideas,  relations  which  may  be  of  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment, of  affirmation  or  negation. 

(b)  Hence  the  distinction  between  positive  and  negative  judg- 
ments, however  true  it  may  be  from  a  certain  point  of  view,  and 
useful  for  certain  purposes,  is  not  strictly  applicable  to  the  psycho- 
logical act  of  judging,  which  is  always  essentially  positive.  The 
judgment:  "Peter  is  not  attentive,"  is  negative  from  the  point  of 
view  of  grammar  and  logic;  yet,  if  I  consider  only  the  nature  of 
the  mental  process,  it  consists  essentially  of  the  positive  act  by 
which  I  pronounce  or  judge  that  there  is  a  lack  of  attention  in 
Peter's  mind.  The  mental  attitude  opposed  to  this  would  be 
rather  ignorance  or  doubt. 

2.  Elements  and   Conditions  of  a   Judgment.  —  A  judgment 


108  PSYCHOLOGY 

always  implies:  (i)  The  presence  of  two  ideas  in  the  mind, 
namely,  the  subject,  of  which  something  is  affirmed  or  denied, 
and  the  attribute  or  predicate,  which  is  affirmed  or  denied  of 
the  subject.  (2)  A  comparison  of  these  two  ideas.  (3)  The 
affirmation  of  their  agreement  or  disagreement,  which  is  the 
judgment  itself. 

The  judgment  may  be  reached  very  rapidly  as  soon  as  the  two 
ideas  are  brought  in  presence  of  each  other.  The  comparison  is 
only  implicit  and  needs  no  special  attention,  as,  for  instance,  when 
I  say  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts.  Or  it  may 
necessitate  a  more  or  less  complex  process  of  comparison  of  the 
ideas  with  other  ideas  and  judgments,  as,  for  instance,  when  I  say 
that  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  This  cannot  be  affirmed  immediately,  but  only  after 
demonstrating  it. 

3.  Judgment  and  Concept  Compared.  —  We  may  now  under- 
stand the  relations  between  judgment  and  conception.  A  concept 
is  one  notion  standing  apart  from  other  notions.  A  judgment 
necessarily  implies  at  least  two  notions  or  groups  of  notions,  and 
the  perception  of  their  relation.  But  a  notion  which  is  the  neces- 
sary element  of  a  judgment  depends  itself  on  previous  judgments. 
Our  first  concepts  are  vague  and  most  general ;  they  become  clearer 
and  clearer,  more  and  more  connotative,  in  proportion  as  they 
embody  the  results  of  more  judgments.  Thus  my  primitive 
idea  of  "water  "  as  a  flowing  something,  or  a  transparent  liquid, 
may  be  perfected  by  the  judgment  that  it  is  composed  of  oxygen 
and  hydrogen,  or  that  it  has  certain  definite  physical  properties. 
These  new  elements  in  my  idea  of  water  are  the  results  of  a  great 
many  comparisons  and  judgments.  The  botanist's  notion  of  a 
plant  is  more  complex  and  more  accurate  than  that  of  the 
ordinary  man  because  it  embodies  many  elements  acquired  by 
study,  i.e.  by  a  series  of  judgments. 

II.    VARIOUS  KINDS  OF  JUDGMENTS 

N.B.  We  mention  only  the  most  important  divisions  of  judg- 
ments from  the  psychological  point  of  view.  Other  divisions 
belong  to  logic. 


NATURE    OF    JUDGMENT  IOQ 

1.  Singular  and  General.  —  According  as  the  subject  is  an  indi- 
vidual or  a  class,  a  concrete  or  an  abstract  idea,  the  judgment  is 
singular  or  general,  concrete  or  abstract.    Thus,  "This  man  is 
tall,"  or  "This  rose  is  red,"  are  individual  and  concrete  judgments. 
"Man  is  made  to  live  in  society,"  or  "Roses  are  fragrant,"  are 
judgments  referring  to  a  class,  and  their  predicates  are  attributed, 
not  to  any  special  individual,  but  to  all.     General  judgments  are 
also  abstract,  since  the  class  as  such  does  not  exist,  but  is  realized 
only  in  the  concrete  individuals.    Universal  judgments  refer  to 
all  concrete  individuals  of  a  class,  e.g.  "All  men  are  made  to  live  in 
society,"  "All  roses  are  fragrant."    Partial  judgments  pronounce 
only  on  a  part  of  the  whole  class.    Thus,  "Some  men  are  white." 

2.  Analytic  and  Synthetic.  —  When  the  predicate  is  already 
contained  in  the  nature  or  essential  relations  and  properties  of 
the  subject,  the  judgment  is  called  analytical;  the  predicate  may 
be  inferred  from  the  consideration  of  the  subject.    When  the  pred- 
icate adds  something  new  to  the  subject,  that  is,  something  which 
no  amount  of  analysis  of  the  subject  would  reveal,  the  judgment 
is  synthetical.    The  analytic  judgment  unfolds  the  subject,  and 
states  explicitly  that  which  was  already  implied  in  it  and  in  its 
essential  relations.    The  synthetic  judgment  gives  a  knowledge 
which  could  not  be  derived  from  the  essence  of  the  subject. 

We  must  distinguish  between  the  subject  itself  of  the  judgment 
and  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  it.  A  judgment  may  be 
analytic  in  itself,  and  yet  synthetic  for  a  given  individual;  and  a 
judgment  which  is  synthetic  for  one  may  be  analytic  for  another 
who  possesses  a  more  complete  knowledge  of  the  subject.  Thus 
the  judgments  "Two  and  two  are  four,"  or  "The  whole  is  greater 
than  any  of  its  parts,"  are  obvious  for  all  those  who  understand 
the  meaning  of  the  terms  used.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  these 
judgments:  "n  multiplied  by  12  is  132,"  or  "The  sum  of  the 
angles  of  a  triangle  equals  two  right  angles."  In  themselves 
these  judgments  are  analytic,  yet  all  men  do  not  see  why  the  pred- 
icate belongs  essentially  to  the  subject.  On  the  contrary,  such 
judgments  as  "This  man  is  six  feet  tall,"  or  "This  iron  is  hot," 
are  synthetic,  because  the  predicate  is  not  essentially  contained 
in  the  analysis  of  the  subject. 


110  PSYCHOLOGY 

Hence  analytical  judgments  are  also  called  necessary,  because 
they  suffer  no  exception;  absolute,  because  they  do  not  depend  on 
any  condition;  a  priori,  because  they  need  not  be  known  by  ex- 
perience before  their  truth  is  accepted.  Thus,  after  demonstration, 
the  theorem  "The  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal  to 
two  right  angles,"  is  seen  to  express  an  essential  property  of  all 
kinds  of  triangles,  true  of  all  triangles  without  exception  and  under 
all  circumstances.  It  is  not  necessary  to  measure  the  angles  of  any 
given  triangle  to  see  that  the  theorem  applies  to  it.  Synthetical 
judgments  are  called  contingent,  hypothetical,  and  a  posteriori, 
because  they  are  based  directly  on  experience,  and  are  true  only 
of  the  cases  observed,  or  within  the  limits  of  a  valid  generaliza- 
tion. Experience  alone  can  justify  the  statements:  "This  book 
has  five  hundred  pages;  "  "This  man  is  learned;  "  "This  triangle 
is  isosceles." 

3.  Intuitive  and  Deliberative.  —  Considering  the  manner  in 
which  they  are  arrived  at,  judgments  are  intuitive  or  delibera- 
tive. An  intuitive  or  immediate  judgment  is  a  judgment  which 
is  reached  immediately  as  soon  as  both  terms  are  compared.  The 
intuition  may  be  a  sense  intuition,  as  in  the  judgment  "This  iron 
is  hot," or  a  direct  perception  of  consciousness,  as  "I  am  suffering," 
or  a  rational  intuition,  as  "The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part." 
A  deliberative  or  mediate  judgment  is  a  judgment  which  cannot 
be  passed  at  once,  but  requires  a  more  or  less  prolonged  considera- 
tion, study,  and  reasoning,  e.g.  the  formulation  of  physical  and 
chemical  laws  and  properties. 

II.   GENESIS   OF   THE   JUDGMENT 

I.    GENERAL 

N.B.  We  do  not  speak  here  of  extra-intellectual  factors  in 
the  formation  of  judgments,  such  as  feelings,  prejudices,  personal 
dispositions,  etc.  They  will  be  mentioned  later. 

i.  Analysis  and  Synthesis  in  the  Judgment.  —  (a)  Judgment 
supposes  the  power  of  abstraction.  Frequently  the  subject  is 
abstract  and  stands,  not  for  something  individual  and  concrete, 
but  for  an  abstract  quality  or  a  class,  as  "Virtue  is  to  be  prac- 


GENESIS     OF     JUDGMENT  III 

tised,"  "Iron  is  a  metal."  Generally  the  predicate  is  abstract, 
the  only  exception  being  for  judgments  in  which  there  is  a  per- 
fect identity  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  as  when  I 
say,  "This  man  is  Peter  Smith."  In  other  cases  the  predicate  is 
the  concept  of  a  class  to  which  the  subject  belongs  or  not,  of  a 
quality  which  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  it. 

(b)  The  same  judgment  may  often  be  considered  both  as  an 
analysis  and  a  synthesis  of  the  subject.  I  say,  for  instance,  "This 
paper  is  white."  As  explained  above,  this  is  a  synthetic  judg- 
ment; the  mere  analysis  of  the  notion  "paper  "  will  not  give  me 
the  predicate  "white,"  but  I  have  to  verify  it  by  experience. 
This  judgment  is  therefore  the  synthesis  of  two  terms,  "paper" 
and  "white."  Yet,  in  another  sense,  this  same  judgment  is  really 
the  result  of  my  one  perception  of  white  paper,  which  I  have  first 
to  disjoin  or  analyze  into  two  elements  in  order  to  form  the  above 
judgment,  i.e.  in  order  to  synthetize  them  again.  However,  a 
judgment  based  immediately  on  sense-perception  differs  from  this 
perception,  because  the  perception  is  concrete,  "  this-white-paper," 
whereas  in  the  judgment  "This  paper  is  white  "  the  predicate  is 
abstract  and  general. 

2.  Experience  and  Reason  in  the  Judgment.  —  In  all  syn- 
thetic judgments  some  perception  or  experience  is  required  to 
ascertain  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate. 
Not  that  the  experience  need  be  repeated  in  every  individual 
case;  it  is  not  necessary  to  decompose  all  drops  of  water  to  pro- 
nounce with  certitude  that  they  are  composed  of  the  same  defi- 
nite proportions  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  Natural  laws  like  those 
of  physics  and  chemistry  are  universal,  although  they  have  not 
been  verified  experimentally  for  all  individual  cases.  But  all 
rest  on  some  experience  interpreted  with  the  help  of  reason.  They 
never  reach  the  same  degree  of  certitude  which  we  attribute  to 
certain  other  principles,  for  we  conceive  that  the  laws  that  govern 
the  world  might  be  different,  whereas  we  cannot  conceive  of  a 
whole  not  being  equal  to  the  sum  of  its  parts.  This  leads  us  to 
examine  the  genesis  of  a  priori  and  necessary  principles. 


112  PSYCHOLOGY 

II.    GENESIS  OF  NECESSARY  JUDGMENTS 

i.  Meaning.  —  Necessary  judgments  as  understood  here  are 
those  that  are  simple,  clear,  primitive,  and  immediate,  needing 
no  demonstration,  and  self-evident  as  soon  as  their  terms  are 
understood.  They  are  a  priori  and  analytical  —  admitted  inde- 
pendently of  their  verification  by  experience;  necessary  —  the  nega- 
tion of  them  is  absurdity;  universal  both  in  regard  to  the  knowing 
mind,  which  cannot  fail  to  perceive  their  truth,  and  in  regard  to 
their  range  of  application,  for  they  admit  of  no  possible  exception 
at  any  time  or  in  any  place.  Hence  we  do  not  speak  here  of  all 
analytic  judgments,  but  only  of  those  that  are  obvious  and  require 
no  demonstration.  That  is,  we  speak  of  principles,  or  judgments 
that  stand  in  the  very  beginning  of  intellectual  life,  and  that  are 
admitted  even  before  or  without  verification  by  experience.  Thus 
the  principles  of  identity:  "A  is  A,"  or  "A  thing  is  what  it  is  "; 
of  excluded  middle:  "A  is  or  is  not";  of  contradiction:  "The 
same  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time  ";  of  sufficient 
reason:  "Whatever  exists  has  a  sufficient  reason  accounting  for  its 
existence  or  happening."  Thus  also  in  geometry  such  principles 
as:  "The  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts,  and  equal  to  the 
sum  of  its  parts  ";  "Two  things  which  are  equal  to  the  same  third 
are  equal  to  each  other;"  "A  straight  line  cannot  enclose  a  space." 

These  principles  are  not  formulated  explicitly  by  all  minds, 
but  they  are  implicitly  recognized  by  all.  The  child  may  know 
nothing  of  the  explicit  statement  called  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, yet  he  does  not  fail  to  recognize  that  one  of  two  assertions 
which  he  knows  to  be  contradictory  is  a  falsehood.  A  man  may 
not  be  aware  that  he  is  applying  the  principle  of  causality  and  of 
sufficient  reason  when  he  concludes  that  the  house  has  not  built 
itself,  but  requires  an  architect;  yet  he  will  consider  it  absurd  to 
require  proofs  for  his  assertion.  Ask  a  child  to  give  you  half  his 
apple,  and  try  to  convince  him  that  he  will  lose  nothing  by  it  and 
that  what  will  be  left  is  as  big  as  the  whole  apple. 

Now  the  question  is:  Wherefrom  do  such  principles  derive  their 
characters  of  necessity  and  universality  so  as  to  admit  of  no 
exception? 


GENESIS    OF    JUDGMENT  113 

2.  Theories.  —  We  need  not  discuss  theories  of  apriorism  and 
innatism.    If  there  is  no  reason  for  asserting  the  existence  of  innate 
ideas,  still  less  is  there  any  for  asserting  the  innateness  of  principles. 
Two  main  systems  remain,  intuitionalism  and   empiricism,     (i) 
According  to  the  former,  the  senses  furnish  the  mind  with  the 
concrete  materials  out  of  which  are  elaborated  abstract  ideas,  or 
concepts,  representing  the  essences  of  things.    The  mind  is  thus 
enabled  to  perceive  and  affirm  their  essential  and  necessary  rela- 
tions.   Thus  the  concepts  of  whole  and  of  part  are  not  given  in 
pure  experience;  they  are  abstractions  and  elaborations  from  experi- 
ence.   The  relation  between  them  is  at  once  clear  to  the  mind 
independently  of  the  actual  concrete  perception  of  a  whole  and  its 
parts.     (2)  According  to  the  empirical  theory,  or  associationism, 
principles  are  simply  the  results  of  many  associated  experiences 
in  which   they  have  been  constantly  verified.    The  individual's 
experience  is  strengthened  by  the  experiences  of  his  ancestors, 
which  were  accumulated  in  the  course  of  ages  and  transmitted 
by  heredity.     Such  judgments  may  perhaps  seem  intuitive  to  us 
now,  but  their  formation  has  required  many  concrete  experiences 
of  instances  in  which  they  were  applied. 

3.  Criticism  of  Associationism.     (a)  A  mere  empirical  theory  is 
inadequate  to  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  necessary  judgments 
and  axioms.    Experience  manifests  only  that  which  exists,  but 
does  not  reveal  whether  things  are  necessarily  or  not.     We  are 
not  concerned  at  present  simply  with  what  happens  or  is  true, 
nor  even  with  what  always  happens  or  is  always  true,  but  with 
what  happens  and  is  true  necessarily  so  that  it  could  never  be 
otherwise.     This  character  of  necessity  cannot  be  found  in  experi- 
ence.   A  man  may  not  have  seen  many  or  even  any  straight  lines, 
yet  he  knows  a  priori  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a 
space.    He  may  never  have  seen  parallels,  yet  he  will  not  hesi- 
tate to  pronounce  that  parallels  can  never  meet,  because  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction  is  implied  here:  Lines  always  at  the  same 
distance   cannot  at    the    same    time    change    their    respective 
distances. 

(b)  In  order  to  have  any  reliable,  orderly,  and  organized  experi- 
ence, certain  principles,  like  those  of  identity  and  contradiction, 
9 


114  PSYCHOLOGY 

are  already  required;  they  cannot  therefore  result  exclusively 
from  experience.  How  is  any  experience  possible  if  the  same  thing 
can  at  the  same  time  be  and  not  be,  be  perceived  and  not 
perceived,  true  and  not  true,  white  and  not  white,  etc.? 

(c)  Finally,  it  may  be  noted  that,  for  such  principles,  no  trace 
whatever  of  any  increase  of  evidence  or  firmness  is  found  either 
in  the  individual  or  the  race.  At  all  times  they  are  accepted  as 
clear  and  self-evident,  and  repeated  experience  does  not  strengthen 
them.  Ever  since  men  have  been,  their  thinking  has  implied  cer- 
tain principles  admitted  as  necessary  and  universal;  their  experi- 
ence has  constantly  testified  to  the  regular  succession  of  day  and 
night  resulting  from  the  apparent  revolution,  of  the  sun  around 
the  earth.  Yet  such  constant  experience  does  not  show  this  regu- 
lar succession  every  twenty-four  hours  as  necessary  and  universal. 
The  empiricist  may  say  that  this  is  due  to  the  known  possibility 
of  different  experiences  on  the  earth  or  on  other  planets,  as  re- 
vealed by  science.  But  his  explanation  implies  the  very  dis- 
tinction of  the  necessary  and  the  contingent  which  is  not 
given  in  experience,  but  derived  from  some  other  source.  In 
experience  we  never  find  necessity,  but  at  most  universal  con- 
tingency. 

4.  Conclusion.  —  Hence  we  say  that  principles  are  neither 
a  priori,  if  by  this  we  mean  innate  and  without  any  empirical 
factor,  nor  yet  a  posteriori,  if  by  this  we  exclude  the  rational  fac- 
tor. They  are  both.  Experience  is  necessary  to  form  the  abstract 
ideas  the  relations  of  which  are  affirmed  by  these  principles;  and 
it  is  useful  for  their  reflex  knowledge,  formulation,  and  applica- 
tion to  concrete  instances.  But  this  experience  is  not  necessarily 
so  frequent  and  repeated  as  to  produce  invincible  associations, 
as  empiricists  claim.  The  terms  being  known,  the  mind  has  at 
once  the  intuition  of  their  necessary  relation  of  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement. Knowing  things,  not  only  in  their  individual  and 
concrete  existence,  but  in  their  abstract,  general,  and  essential 
aspects,  the  mind  is  also  capable  of  perceiving  the  essential 
relations  which  exist  between  them. 


GENESIS     OF     JUDGMENT  115 

III.    GENESIS  OF  MEDIATE  JUDGMENTS.     INFERENCE. 
REASONING 

i.  Nature  of  the  Reasoning  Process.  —  (a)  Thinking  consists 
essentially  in  judging,  and  is  complete  only  when  we  can  affirm 
or  deny.  We  frequently  say:  "I  think  so,"  by  which  we  implicitly 
formulate  a  judgment.  We  also  say:  "Let  me  think  a  minute,"  by 
which  we  mean  that  a  little  reflection  and  consideration  is  needed 
before  we  can  express  an  opinion,  make  an  assertion,  and  see  the 
relation  between  ideas,  i.e.  pass  a  judgment.  In  this  latter 
sense  thought  is  equivalent  to  inference  or  reasoning.  The  imme- 
diate or  intuitive  judgments  of  sense  or  reason  are  few  when  com- 
pared to  the  number  of  judgments  obtained  by  explicit  or  implicit 
reasoning.  In  an  intuitive  and  immediate  judgment,  no  reason  can 
be  given  except  that  the  truth  is  seen  at  once,  and  that  the  judgment 
is  self-evident.  In  the  mediate  judgment,  obtained  by  reasoning 
—  reasoning  is  only  a  means  toward  judging  —  a  reason  can  be 
given  on  which  it  rests  and  on  which  its  truth  depends;  the  link 
between  two  or  several  judgments  is  perceived. 

(b)  Hence  we  see  the  difference  between  reasoning  and  associa- 
tion.   In  association  also  one  idea  or  judgment  is  linked  with  an- 
other, but  without  dependence  as  far  as  the  truth  of  the  second 
judgment  is  concerned.    One  idea  gives  rise  to  another,  but  it  is 
a  mere  succession.    Thus,  if  I  see  John  sick  with  a  cold,  a  number 
of  ideas  may  be  recalled  to  my  mind  by  association;  of  boys  run- 
ning, drinking  cold  water,  being  careless  .  .  .  ;  of  remedies  and  drug 
stores  .  .  .  ;  of  coughing,  staying  in  bed  .  .  .  ;  of  other  diseases, 
other  persons  .  .  .  etc.    This  is  not  reasoning.    But,  if  I  say: 
"  John  is  sick  because  he  remained  in  a  draught  of  cold  air,"  or: 
"This  remedy  will  cure  him  because  it  has   cured  Peter   and 
Henry  in   the   same  circumstances,"  then  I  perceive  a  relation 
of  dependence  between  two  judgments;  I  conceive  one  as  being  the 
foundation  of  another.    This  is  reasoning. 

(c)  It  is  clear  that  the  great  majority  of  our  judgments  are 
based  on  some  inference,  sometimes  explicit,  sometimes  also  exist- 
ing implicitly  in  the  mind,  and  ready  to  express  itself  in  the  form 
of  a  "because."    When  a  judgment  is  not  immediate,  it  is  always 


Il6  PSYCHOLOGY 

accepted  because  of  something  else.  Whether  the  psychological 
process  be  valid  or  not  from  the  point  of  view  of  logic  and  epis- 
temology,  the  psychological  process  is  the  same. 

2.  Elements  of  the  Reasoning  Process.  —  (a)  From  what  has 
just  been  said,  it  is  easy  to  understand  that  the  elements  of  reason- 
ing are  not  only  several  ideas,  but  several  judgments,  which  must 
be  present  explicitly  or  implicitly  in  the  mind,  and  one  of  which 
is  considered  as  a  consequence  of  the  others.    This  consequence 
may  be  expressed  last:  "He  who  wilfully  injures  his  neighbor  is 
worthy  of  blame;  Peter  has  stolen,  and  to  steal  is  wilfully  to  injure 
one's  neighbor;  consequently  Peter  is  blameworthy."    Or  it  may 
be  expressed  first:  "Peter  is  blameworthy  because  he  has  stolen, 
thereby  injuring  his  neighbor."    Or  it  may  find  an  intermediate 
place:  "Peter  has  stolen;  he  is  therefore  blameworthy,  since  who- 
ever wilfully  injures  his  neighbor  is  blameworthy."      In  Logic  we 
shall  see  how  these  may  be  reduced  to  perfect  syllogisms.     For 
the  present  we  are  concerned  with  the  process  of  syllogism  as  we 
generally  use  it. 

(b)  The  foregoing  examples  show  that  reasoning  always  includes 
a  universal  element  or  law,  and  a  more  special  instance  or  applica- 
tion. Even  in  cases  in  which  we  seem  to  pass  from  one  particular 
or  individual  instance  to  another  a  general  statement  is  implied. 
Thus:  "This  remedy  is  likely  to  do  good  to  John  because  it 
did  good  to  Peter,"  implies  that  in  both  cases  the  diseases  are  of 
the  same  nature,  and  that  in  the  same  circumstances  the  same 
remedy  will  produce  the  same  effect.  Again,  when  I  say :  "  We  shall 
have  rain  because  such  clouds  are  forming  and  the  wind  comes 
from  such  a  direction,"  I  seem  to  derive  my  conclusion  from 
concrete  facts  of  past  experience.  Yet  I  suppose  the  general 
principle  that  such  a  direction  of  the  wind  and  such  clouds 
are  generally  followed  by  rain. 

3.  Inductive  and  Deductive  Reasoning.  —  (a)  When  the  gen- 
eral principle  or  law  is  the  goal  reached  or  the  conclusion,  the  rea- 
soning is  inductive.    When  it  is  the  starting-point  or  the  reason, 
the  reasoning  process  is  called  deductive.    If  I  have  been  deceived 
by  one,  then  by  another,  and  by  a  third  man  with  whom  I  dealt, 
I  say  —  rightly  or  wrongly,  it  matters  not  for  our  present  purpose 


GENESIS     OF     JUDGMENT  117 

—  "All  men,  or  at  least  all  men  of  this  class,  are  liars  "  (induction). 
Now  when  I  say:  "Beware  of  A,  he  will  tell  you  all  sorts  of  stories, 
for,  you  know,  he  is  engaged  in  such  or  such  a  profession,"  I  pro- 
ceed deductively.  Again,  it  is  by  induction  or  generalization  that 
the  chemist  pronounces  that  all  water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and 
hydrogen.  It  is  by  deduction  that  he  applies  this  to  a  glass  of 
water  which  he  has  never  analyzed.  These  two  processes  com- 
plete each  other.  We  proceed  from  the  observed  facts  to  the  law, 
and  from  the  law  to  the  unobserved  facts. 

(b)  Induction  is  primarily  analytic;  deduction,  primarily  syn- 
thetic. By  analysis  is  meant  the  resolution  of  the  complex  into 
that  which  is  more  simple;  by  synthesis,  the  combination  of  simple 
elements  into  something  more  complex.  A  general  proposition 
is  simpler  than  the  individual  fact,  because  it  does  not  include 
the  concrete  determinations  special  to  each  instance.  "All  bod- 
ies attract  one  another  in  direct  ratio  to  their  masses  and  in  inverse 
ratio  to  the  square  of  the  distances  "  is  a  simpler  statement  than 
that  which  determines  all  the  particulars  in  the  case  of  this  body 
whose  mass  is  A,  and  this  other  body  whose  mass  is  B,  the 
distance  between  the  two  being  C. 

IV.   THE  PROCESSES  OF  JUDGING  AND  REASONING  IN 
ORDINARY  LIFE 

i.   There  are  Three  Ways  of  Forming  Judgments.  —  (i)  As 

stated  already,  some  judgments  are  intuitive,  i.e.  accepted  in  view 
of  their  self-evidence.  I  say  that  snow  is  white  because  I  see  that 
it  is  so;  that  two  and  two  are  four  because  I  understand  that  it 
cannot  be  otherwise.  (2)  Other  judgments  are  accepted  on  the 
authority  of  other  men.  I  know  that  Napoleon  was  emperor  of 
the  French,  that  Columbus  discovered  America,  and  that  Peking 
is  a  city  in  China.  For  these  and  a  multitude  of  other  judgments 
I  depend  on  the  testimony,  and  therefore  on  the  knowledge  and 
truthfulness  of  other  men  who  either  exist  now  or  have  existed 
in  the  past.  The  same  is  true  of  many  scientific  statements. 
Empirical  science  need  not  always  be  a  science  based  on  one's 
own  experience.  Little  progress  would  be  made  if,  before  accept- 
ing the  report  of  an  experiment,  one  always  had  to  perform  the  same 


Il8  PSYCHOLOGY 

experiment.  There  are  facts  that  occur  only  once  or  a  few  times, 
and  cannot  be  observed  by  all.  (3)  A  third  way  of  forming  a 
judgment  is  to  reason  it  out.  For  instance,  I  find  two  contradic- 
tory statements,  say,  on  a  political  or  religious  question.  I  en- 
deavor to  get  the  data  on  both  sides,  weigh  the  arguments,  use  my 
own  intelligence,  and  form  my  own  judgment.  In  all  sciences  and 
in  daily  life  many  statements  are  based  on  personal  inference. 
And  even  when  a  truth  is  based  on  authority,  its  acceptance  sup- 
poses inferences  concerning  the  value  of  the  testimony  of  others. 

It  is  evident  that  judgments  reached  by  these  methods  are 
not  considered  as  having  always  the  same  value;  and,  within 
the  same  method,  judgments  are  more  or  less  certain,  probable, 
or  doubtful.  The  process  by  which  they  are  reached  may  be 
short  and  simple,  or  require  long  and  difficult  demonstrations. 

2.  Prejudices.  —  (a)  Reflection  shows  that  frequently  assent 
is  given  to  judgments  that  do  not  deserve  it.  Things  considered 
as  certainly  true,  and  never  before  suspected  of  being  even  doubt- 
ful, may  be  rejected  later  as  certainly  false.  As  a  result  of  more 
careful  study  and  greater  mental  development,  it  is  found  that  a 
number  of  judgments  must  be  revised.  Statements  that  were 
not  self-evident  were  accepted  without  reason,  or  for  insufficient 
reasons.  Early  education  gives  the  child  a  number  of  ideas  and 
beliefs  which  are  accepted  on  authority  or  insufficient  inference, 
and  even  are  the  results  of  misunderstanding  and  misinterpreta- 
tion. One  may  find  many  misrepresentations  in  former  beliefs 
now  outgrown,  arising  from  various  causes  and  circumstances. 
See  how  many  popular  maxims,  proverbs,  and  sayings  concerning 
health,  happiness,  social  life,  and  even  the  weather,  are  accepted 
without  reflection.  Even  when  disproved  by  science  and  per- 
sonal experience,  they  still  hold  their  ground;  favorable  occur- 
rences strengthen  them;  contrary  occurrences  are  looked  upon  as 
exceptions.  Surroundings,  daily  intercourse  with  other  men, 
bodily  and  mental  dispositions,  contribute  to  form  a  nucleus  of 
knowledge  which,  little  by  little,  is  developed  and  increased,  and 
which  is  the  centre  toward  which  all  knowledge  converges. 

(b)  We  become  accustomed  to  these  judgments.  Like  all  habits 
they  become  stronger,  and  take  a  deeper  root  by  daily  acceptance 


GENESIS     OF     JUDGMENT  119 

and  by  the  uses  or  applications  —  at  least  implicit  —  which  are 
made  of  them.  They  form  a  bulk  of  supposedly  known  and 
ascertained  truths,  and  become  the  standard  to  which  we  refer 
and  by  which  we  judge  new  propositions  offered  for  our  accept- 
ance. If  we  reach  a  pleasant  conclusion,  little  or  no  trouble  is 
taken  to  verify  it.  Mere  hearsay  becomes  the  highest  source  of 
certitude.  But  sometimes  the  most  cogent  arguments  do  not 
succeed  in  leading  to  the  acceptance  of  an  unpleasant  conclusion. 
See,  for  instance,  how  ready  a  man  is  to  accept  as  true  the 
slanders  he  hears  about  his  enemy,  and  how  reluctantly  he 
admits  the  good  qualities  that  are  attributed  to  him.  An  obvious 
fact  or  argument  against  one's  fixed  ideas  may  convince  for  the 
time  being.  If  it  does  not  frequently  reenter  the  mind  so  as  to 
strengthen  its  impression,  it  soon  loses  its  hold  on  the  mind.  A 
few  days  or  months  later  it  may  have  been  forgotten,  and  the 
conviction  may  have  vanished.  The  new  and  unexpected  takes 
root  with  difficulty;  it  rather  tends  to  remain  at  the  surface 
and  wither,  because  the  mental  soil  is  already  occupied  by  deep- 
rooted  judgments  which  are  not  easily  torn  away. 

(c)  In  all  cases  the  value  of  new  judgments  is  tested  by  compar- 
ing them  with  other  judgments  accepted  as  certain  and  used  as 
norms.     And  as  man  is  loath  to  break  with  inveterate  habits  and 
to  discard  long-standing  opinions,  so  is  he  likely  to  reject,  or  at 
least  to  suspect  a  priori,  whatever  conflicts  with  his  previous  views. 

(d)  Because  these  judgments  are  habitual  and  familiar  they 
attract  no  attention  or  reflection.     It  hardly  occurs  to  the  mind 
to  question  or  test  them  until  some  strong  evidence  is  offered 
against  their  validity.     Even  in  this  case  they  cling  to  the  mind 
until   obliged   to  retreat  —  a  step  which,  like  the  breaking  of 
an  old  habit,  is  always  more  or  less  painful.     Because  they  are 
unnoticed  they  are  the  more  dangerous. 

(e)  A  large  number  of  habitual  views  and  opinions  are  true, 
but  many  also  are  narrow  and  belong  to  an  individual  man  or  a 
special  group  of  men  as  a  result  of  their  education.    They  arouse 
the  curiosity,  sometimes  the  suspicion  and  hatred,  of  other  indi- 
viduals or  groups  of  men.    They  are  sources  of  misunderstanding, 
frequently  without  any  ill-will  on  either  side,  but  too  often  with 


120  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  imputation  of  ill-will  on  the  part  of  those  whose  opinions  are 
different.  A  man  cannot  be  educated  by,  or  associate  with,  other 
men  without  reflecting  in  some  degree  their  views  and  opinions. 
This  is  true  especially  of  children  and  young  people,  because  their 
minds  are  more  receptive  and  more  easily  influenced.  Hence  the 
importance  of  a  good  early  intellectual  education  cannot  be  over- 
estimated; its  influence  extends  to  the  whole  life.  All  judgments 
acquired  without  sufficient  justification,  whether  they  be  true  or 
false,  influence  following  judgments.  For  good  or  for  bad,  they  are 
prejudices. 

3.  Knowledge  and  Belief.  —  (a)  This  leads  us  to  recognize 
an  important  distinction  between  what  may  be  called  impersonal 
and  personal  truths.  Impersonal  truth  is  that  which  is  so  evident 
that  it  imposes  itself  on  all.  The  reasons  for  accepting  it  are 
cogent,  and  appeal  to  all  minds  to  whom  they  are  presented. 
Personal  truths  have  not  the  same  evidence;  they  are  accepted 
owing  to  both  objective  and  subjective  influences.  Generally 
they  are  truths  which  carry  with  them  practical  consequences 
and  are  the  sources  of  certain  rules  of  conduct.  To  this  class 
belong  many  judgments  in  the  religious,  moral,  political,  and 
social  orders. 

(b)  This  distinction  corresponds  to  a  distinction  which  is  fre- 
quently made  between  knowledge  and  belief.     Knowledge  is  based 
on  immediate  or  mediate  evidence  and  is  essentially  rational. 
Belief  refers  to  that  which  is  not  evident,  or  at  least  not  clearly 
so;  thus  it  is  partly  rational,  partly  emotional,  and  partly  voli- 
tional in  its  causes.    In  the  acceptance  of  a  statement,  the  propor- 
tion of  objective  and  subjective  influences  may  vary;  a  truth  is 
more  or  less  impersonal  and  more  or  less  personal. 

(c)  With  truths  of  the  first  class,  e.g.  a  theorem  of  geometry, 
only  the  intellect  is  concerned.    In  truths  of  the  second  class  the 
whole  man  is  interested,  and  all  the  faculties  contribute  to  influ- 
ence the  judgment.      "Thy  wish  was    father,  Harry,   to  that 
thought  "  (Henry  IV,  P.  II,  act  iv,  sc.  iv)  is  applicable  to  many 
thoughts,  and,  at  times,  all  of  us  are  so  many  Harries.    As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact  —  we  are  not  concerned  at  present  with  what  should 
be,  but  with  what  is  —  judgments  are  influenced  by  motives  which 


GENESIS     OF     JUDGMENT  121 

do  not  come  simply  from  reason,  but  from  prejudices,  feelings, 
desires,  and  will.  These  blind  man,  and  either  prevent  him  from 
accepting  reasons  at  all,  or  act  as  convex  or  concave  lenses  through 
which  reasons  are  seen  in  such  a  way  that  their  real  value  is  exag- 
gerated or  minimized.  Even  in  truths  that  are  of  themselves 
impersonal  it  may  happen  that,  because  a  man  has  a  theory  which 
he  cherishes,  he  will  rather  close  his  eyes  than  examine  facts 
which,  if  admitted,  would  be  irreconcilable  with  the  theory  accepted 
so  far. 

To  sum  up:  In  the  majority  of  our  assents  we  are  not  simply  drawn 
by  objective  light  and  evidence,  but  also  impelled  and  prompted  by 
subjective  and  internal  motives  which  may  or  may  not  be  explicitly 
recognized  in  consciousness. 

4.  Three  Uses  of  Reasoning.  —  Man,  being  reasonable,  is  not 
satisfied  until  he  can  give  to  himself  and  to  others  a  reason  for  his 
judgments.  Reasoning  and  proving  may  be  used  for  three  pur- 
poses, to  form  judgments,  to  test  those  that  are  already  accepted, 
and  to  convince  others. 

(a)  When  the  truth  is  not  known,  we  endeavor  to  find  it  by  in- 
vestigating, comparing,  and  weighing  the  evidence  for  and  against 
it.    This  is  chiefly  the  work  of  reason;  but,  as  mentioned  already, 
reason  is  sometimes  guided  —  or  rather  misguided  and  blinded  — 
by  preconceived  ideas  and  prejudices. 

(b)  When  a  judgment  is  already  accepted,  and  we  want  to 
examine  whether  it  is  sufficiently  justified,  reasoning  is  again  used 
as  a  test  to  revise  the  motives  and  arguments  and  estimate  their 
value.    Too  frequently  again,  especially  in  matters  of  practical 
interest,  reasoning  is  used  to  justify  rather  than  to  test.    An  opin- 
ion is  already  accepted,  and  only  motives  that  can  make  it  appear 
reasonable  are  considered,  or  their  value  is  magnified,  while  the 
value  of  antagonistic  motives  is  lessened.     In  such  cases,  judg- 
ments are  not  based  on  reasons,  but  rather  reasons  are  adapted  to 
suit  our  judgments.    They  are  like  the  pretexts  which  are  some- 
times found  to  justify  in  one's  own  eyes,  and,  if  possible,  in  the 
eyes  of  others,  a  course  of  action  which  one  has  already  determined 
to  follow. 

(c)  When  reasoning  is  used  to  convince  other  men,  two  things 


122  PSYCHOLOGY 

must  be  kept  in  mind:  the  nature  of  the  truth  itself,  and  the  men- 
tal dispositions  of  the  man  or  of  the  audience  addressed. 
According  as  the  statement  which  is  presented  has  an  impersonal 
or  a  personal  character  in  the  sense  explained  above,  the  process 
of  argumentation  will  assume  a  more  rigid  and  more  formal  aspect, 
or  a  warmer  and  more  highly  colored  tone.  In  one  case,  reason 
alone,  in  the  other  case,  all  human  activities  and  feelings,  will  be 
appealed  to.  A  political  principle  is  not  demonstrated  in  the 
same  way  as  a  theorem  of  geometry.  According  as  the  audience 
is  well  disposed  or  hostile,  fair  or  prejudiced,  the  speaker  will 
again  assume  different  attitudes.  In  every  case,  since  the  truth 
must  enter  the  mind,  it  is  necessary  first  to  remove  obstacles, 
then  to  prepare  the  mind  for  its  reception  and  assimilation,  and 
finally  to  present  the  truth  in  the  best  adapted  manner.  The 
same  truth  presented  differently,  by  different  persons,  to  different 
hearers,  in  different  ways,  and  different  circumstances,  will 
produce  an  innumerable  variety  of  results.  Hear,  for  instance, 
the  simple  statement:  "Miss  So-and-So  was  in  church  yesterday," 
and  listen  to  the  comment  started  by  the  mention  of  such  a  fact. 

ARTICLE  V.  LANGUAGE 

I.  THE  FUNCTION  OF  LANGUAGE 

I.    SIGNS  IN  GENERAL.    SIGNS  OF  MENTAL  PROCESSES 

Mental  processes  are  essentially  private  and  personal.  They 
are  not  manifested  directly  by  the  action  of  one  mind  upon 
another,  but  indirectly  by  means  of  signs.  I  know  the  opinion  of 
another  man  because  he  told  me  or  because  I  read  it.  I  know 
his  grief  or  joy  because  I  see  him  weeping  or  laughing.  Words, 
spoken  or  written,  tears,  laughter,  are  so  many  signs  of  mental 
processes. 

i.  Meaning  of  Sign.  —  A  sign  is  whatever  manifests  something 
else  because  of  some  relation  between  the  two,  like  similarity, 
causality,  association,  or  convention  among  men.  A  certain 
position  of  the  semaphore  is  a  sign  of  danger  for  the  engineer. 
A  certain  form  of  clouds,  direction  of  the  wind,  peculiarity  of  the 


THE     FUNCTION     OF     LANGUAGE  123 

atmosphere,  are  signs  of  an  impending  storm.  The  sign  is  per- 
ceived directly,  and  the  thing  signified,  indirectly.  The  same  thing 
may  be  a  sign  for  one  man  and  not  for  another,  according  as  the 
relation  between  it  and  something  else  is  known  or  not.  The 
interpretation  of  signs  is  the  work  of  mental  association  and 
judgment. 

2.  Division  of  Signs.  —  (a)  A  sign  is  natural  when  its  relation 
with  the  thing  it  signifies  comes  from  nature  itself.    When  this 
relation  is  one  of  similarity  the  sign  is  called  formal.    Thus  cer- 
tain clouds  are  the  natural  signs  of  coming  rain;  smoke  is  the  nat- 
ural sign  of  fire;  a  picture  is  the  natural  and  formal  sign  of  the 
individual  whom  it  represents.     On  the  contrary,  the  sign  is  con- 
ventional when  its  signification  is  based  merely  on  an  agreement 
between  men.     Such  are  the  signals  for  trains  or  vessels,  the  tele- 
graphic codes,  the  flags  of  the  different  nations,  the  red,  white,  and 
blue  striped  pole  to  indicate  a  barber  shop,  etc.    A  sign  may  be 
neither  strictly  natural  nor  strictly  conventional  but  share  in  the 
nature  of  both.    Thus  a  sword  is  the  emblem  of  war;  a  crown, 
the  emblem  of  royalty,  etc. 

(b)  Signs  are  more  or  less  certain,  or  equivocal,  according  as  they 
are  clear  and  refer  to  one  thing  only,  or  are  vague  and  may  refer 
to  several  things.     Thus  a  symptom  may  be  the  certain  sign  of  a 
special  disease;  smoke  the  certain  sign  of  fire;  a  sentence  the  cer- 
tain sign  of  a  meaning.     But  a  tower  is  not  certainly  the  sign  of 
a  church;  perspiration  not  necessarily  a  sign   of  hot  weather; 
constant  reading  not  always  a  sign  of  science  or  of  studiousness. 
Different  signs  may  signify  the  same  thing,  or  the  same  sign 
different  things. 

(c)  Signs  may  be  perceived  by  any  of  the  five  senses.    I  see  a 
certain  badge  and  I  know  that  the  man  wearing  it  is  a  policeman; 
I  hear  a  bell  and  become  aware  that  the  church  service  is  about 
to  begin;  I  touch  a  patient  and  his  temperature  is  a  sign  of  fever; 
I  smell  tobacco  smoke  and  am  sure  it  is  coming  from  a  good  cigar; 
I  taste  an  apple  and  am  sure  that  it  may  do  me  harm  because  it 
is  not  ripe. 

3.  The  Signs  of  Mental  Processes  may  be:  (a)    Natural  or 
conventional,  or  partly  natural  and   partly  conventional.     Thus 


124  PSYCHOLOGY 

crying  is  the  natural  sign  of  pain;  laughing  the  natural  sign  of 
mirth;  clenching  the  fist  the  natural  sign  of  anger.  Some  words 
—  in  onomatopoeia  —  may  also  be  considered  as  natural  signs, 
but  they  are  exceptions,  for  words  generally  have  a  purely  conven- 
tional meaning.  The  form  of  letters,  the  spelling  and  pronuncia- 
tion of  words  are  also  conventional.  Some  gestures  are  natural, 
e.g.  pointing  toward  a  certain  direction  to  call  attention  to  an 
object;  others  are  artificial,  e.g.  the  language-signs  of  the  deaf  and 
dumb;  others  seem  to  depend  both  on  nature  and  convention, 
e.g.  many  of  the  gestures  of  an  orator. 

(b)  Certain  or  doubtful.    Some  words  and  sentences  have  a 
clear  meaning;  others  are  equivocal.    The  expression  on  the  face 
is  not  always  easy  to  interpret,  and  the  corresponding  feelings 
cannot  always  be  inferred.    The  modes  of  salutation  vary  with 
different  countries;  the  same  gesture  or  action  may  be  a  sign  of 
respect  in  one  place,  and  an  insult  in  another.    Signs  are  frequently 
misunderstood  owing  either  to  the  nature  of  the  sign  itself,  and 
the   circumstances   in   which   it  is  used,  or  to  the  ignorance, 
distraction,  and  mental  preoccupation  of  the  man  to  whom  it  is 
given.  . 

(c)  Visual,  auditory,  and  tactual.    Touch  is  not  a   frequent 
sign  of  mental  processes  except  for  the  blind.    Hence  normally 
there  remain  two  classes  of  signs:    auditory,  like  cries,  speech, 
singing;  visual,  like  certain  physiognomical  expressions,  gestures, 
writing. 

II.  SPECIAL  SIGNS  OF  INTELLECTUAL  IDEAS.    LANGUAGE 

i.  Nature  of  Language. — The  term  "language"  applies  to  a 
system  of  rational  and  conventional  signs  which  express  abstract 
and  general  ideas  and  the  various  relations  between  these  ideas.  It 
manifests  thought  in  the  strict  sense,  and  thus  does  not  refer  to  the 
manifestations  of  emotions  and  feelings,  such  as  crying,  laughing, 
or  blushing.  Animals  may  give  signs  of  their  mental  states,  but 
language  proper  belongs  to  man  alone.  The  same  words  may  be 
uttered  by  a  man  and  a  parrot,  but  in  the  former  case  only  do  they 
manifest  ideas;  in  the  latter  they  are  the  results  of  sensory  asso- 
ciations and  have  no  conscious  meaning.  Man  alone  has  devised 


THE     FUNCTION     OF     LANGUAGE  125 

rational  means  of  communication  with  other  men.  Bugle  calls, 
cannon  and  gun  reports,  ringing  of  bells,  blowing  of  whistles,  etc., 
are,  or  may  be,  so  many  auditory  signs  of  orders  and  ideas.  Sema- 
phores, flag  signals,  lights  of  certain  colors,  bodily  gestures,  etc., 
are  so  many  visual  signs  which  manifest  thoughts  or  inferences; 
for  instance,  that  a  train  has  passed  the  station  recently  and 
consequently  is  still  within  a  short  distance,  thus  making  it 
dangerous  for  the  present  train  to  proceed. 

However  important  these  signs  may  be,  there  are  two  means  of 
communication  which  are  more  common,  more  usual,  and  of  greater 
value:  one  auditory,  spoken  language;  the  other  visual,  written 
language.  In  fact,  all  the  others  may  be  reduced  to  these.  The 
signs  of  the  deaf  and  dumb  stand  for  alphabetical  letters,  the 
bugle  call  for  a  definite  sentence  or  order,  the  red  lantern  for  a 
warning  of  danger,  etc. 

2.  Speech   and   Writing   Compared.  —  (a)  Speech  has  several 
advantages  over  writing,     (i)  The  visual  field  extends  only  in  a 
certain  direction  and  is  intercepted  by  opaque  bodies.    Sounds 
can  be  heard  from  any  direction,  and  are  not  so  easily  intercepted. 
Hence  sound  attracts  the  attention  more  easily.     (2)  Visual  signs 
depend  on  light;  sounds  are  heard  even  in  obscurity.     (3)  Speech, 
especially  when  combined  with  facial  expression  and  gestures,  is 
more  living  than  writing,  and  expresses  better  the  feelings  that 
accompany  the  ideas. 

(b)  On  the  other  hand,  writing  has  several  advantages  over  speech. 
(i)  It  is   more  permanent.     (2)    It   can   be    transmitted  more 
easily,  and  with  less  danger  of  alteration.     (3)  Hence  it  can  reach 
a  greater  number  of  persons,  especially  by  printing. 

(c)  In  certain  modes  of  writing,  such  as  hieroglyphics,  the  sign 
is  directly  the  sign  of  the  thing  or  rather  of  the  idea  of  the  thing. 
But  in  modern  writing,  the  sign  represents  directly  the  sound. 
Thus  a  certain  group  of  signs  stands  for  the  sound  "cat,"  which 
in  turn  stands  for  the  idea. 

3.  Acquisition  of  Language.  —  In  the  acquisition  of  language 
the  child  is  helped  greatly  by  the  fact  that  there  are  other  speak- 
ing men  to  teach  him.    At  first  the  exercise  of  the  limbs  and  of  the 
vocal  organs  is  spontaneous;  movements  and  cries  manifest  only 


126  PSYCHOLOGY 

sensations  and  feelings.  These  signs  become  rational  little  by 
little  as  reason  itself  develops.  The  main  factors  in  this  acquisi- 
tion of  language  are: 

(a)  Natural  signs.    The  attention  of  the  child  is  called  to  cer- 
tain objects  by  appropriate  gestures,  and  their  names  are  pro- 
nounced until  the  association  between  the  sound  and  the  thing 
is  established.    Easy  names  are  learned  first,  like  "papa,"  "bow- 
wow," etc. 

(b)  On  the  part  of  the  child  there  are  also  certain  natural  mani- 
festations of  painful  or  agreeable  states,  and  to  these  correspond 
certain  actions  on  the  part  of  the  mother  or  the  nurse.    Another 
association  is  formed,  and  the  desire  to  have  his  mother  come  may 
induce  the  child  to  cry  or  utter  certain  sounds. 

(c)  The  child  tends  to  imitate  both  rational  beings  and  the 
phenomena  of  inanimate  nature. 

(d)  Little  by  little,  from  purely  emotional,  and,  we  might  say, 
concrete  expressions,  the  child  passes  to  rational  language.     Signs 
are  used  to  manifest  concepts  and  their  relations.     Definitions, 
reading,  intercourse  with  other  men,  constantly  perfect  the  knowl- 
edge and  use  of  language. 

(e)  Even  without  the  help  of  others,  man,  endowed  with  reason 
and  reflection,  would  soon  find  the  means  to  communicate  his 
thoughts,  however  imperfect  these  might  be  at  first. 

H.    LANGUAGE  AND   THOUGHT 

I.  IN  THE  SPEAKER  OR  WRITER 

i.  Language  Presupposes  Thought.  —  (a)  Since  the  function 
of  language  is  to  express  and  communicate  thought,  it  follows 
that  language  is  not  the  source  of  ideas,  but  presupposes  them. 
The  child  has  ideas  before  being  able  to  express  them,  and  even 
the  adult  frequently  has  thoughts  for  which  he  can  hardly  find  any 
expression.  The  child  at  first  uses  natural  signs  to  express  his 
desires  and  feelings,  and  later  is  gradually  initiated  to  conventional 
language  which  he  learns  from  others.  This  process  of  learning 
evidently  supposes  ideas  in  the  child's  mind,  for  otherwise  language 
would  be  absolutely  unintelligible,  and  words  would  have  no  mean- 


LANGUAGE    AND     THOUGHT  127 

ing.  Nature  gives  only,  so  to  speak,  the  instruments  of  speech; 
it  is  reason  that  gives  to  words  their  soulfand  their  real  intellectual 
value. 

(b)  It  is  true,  however,  that  thought  and  speech  develop  together 
and  in  close  dependence,  and  that  we  hardly  ever  think  without 
speaking  to  ourselves  within  our  own  mind.    In  Greek,  the  word 
Xoyos  means  both  reason  and  speech,  and  in  scholastic  philosophy, 
the  mental  word  or  verbum  mentale  means  the  idea  itself  or  concept. 
To  think  is  really  to  speak  to  oneself;  to  speak  is  to  think 
aloud  and  for  others. 

(c)  Hence  the  importance  of  clear  and  methodical  thought. 
Without  clear  thought  it  is  impossible  to  express  oneself  clearly, 
and  what  is  clear  in  the  mind  is  usually  clear  in  the  expression. 

2.  Language  Perfects  Thought.  —  If  language  is  the  instrument 
of  reason  and  reflection,  it  must  be  admitted  also  that  it  greatly 
contributes  to  improve  thought  and  reason. 

(a)  By  transmitting  thought,  it  is  the  basis  of  all  social  relations. 
It  is  also  the  means  of  preserving  the  knowledge  accumulated  by 
the  individual  and  by  generations. 

(b)  It  facilitates  attention  by  giving  stability  and  permanence 
to  the  thought,  which  is  naturally  transient  and  unstable.     Hence 
it  also  facilitates  memory  by  embodying  the  idea  in  a  sensible  sym- 
bol, which  is  the  condition  of  thought,  since,  as  we  have  seen, 
we  never  think  without  some  image  or  some  sense-perception. 
The  best  way  to  master  ideas  is  to  endeavor  to  express  them,  and 
this  attempt  frequently  shows  that  ideas  which  seemed  clear  are 
really  far  from  being  so.    A  compendium  of  philosophy  made  by 
the  student  himself  is  not  only  a  memorandum;  it  also  contrib- 
utes to  the  understanding  of  the  subject.     Reading  is  much  more 
profitable  when  it  is  done  with  a  pencil  or  pen  in  hand  to  take  notes. 

(c)  Language  is  an  instrument  of  analysis,  for  it  serves  to  decom- 
pose the  complex  thought  into  its  various  elements,  and  to  fixate 
every  one  of  these  elements.     By  the  very  fact  that  we  can  speak 
only  successively  we  are  obliged  to  express  separately  ideas  which 
are  together  in  the  mind.    When  I  say:  "Peter  is  coming,"  I 
decompose  the  one  act  of  perception,  by  which  I  see  at  once 
"Peter-and-his-coming,"  into  two  elements. 


128  PSYCHOLOGY 

(d)  At  the  same  time  it  is  an  instrument  of  synthesis,  combina- 
tion, and  classification.  A  word,  because  it  is  general,  applies 
to  a  multitude  of  individuals.  It  includes  in  one  single  expres- 
sion all  their  common  features  which  are  found  scattered  in  many 
individuals  amid  a  multitude  of  other  features. 

II.  IN  THE  HEARER  OR  READER 

We  shall  simply  call  attention  to  a  few  general  principles,  easily 
understood,  yet  too  frequently  forgotten  in  practice. 

1.  Speech  Signifies  the  Ideas  of  the  Speaker,  not  those  of  the 
hearer.    The  word  or  sentence,  in  the  mind  and  intention  of  the 
man  who  uses  it,  may  not  always  stand  for  exactly  the  same  idea 
which  it  stands  for  in  the  mind  of  the  man  who  hears  or  reads  it. 
Hence  arise  frequent  misrepresentations.    Hence  also  frequent 
complaints  on  the  part  of  writers  and  speakers  that  they  have 
been  misunderstood  and  misquoted. 

2.  Changes  in  the  Meaning  of  Words.  —  Language  is  sometimes 
equivocal,  that  is,  the  meaning  may  be  uncertain.    Meaning  may 
also  vary  with  the  various  countries,  regions,  and  times.    Like  a 
living  organism,  a  language  is  constantly  changing.    Many  influ- 
ences are   always   at  work   to    modify  it   with   regard    to   the 
signification  of  words,  their  pronunciation  and  spelling,  the  rules 
of  grammar,  etc.    The  language  that  does  not  change  and  is 
crystallized  is  rightly  called  a  dead  language. 

3.  Consequences.  —  It  is  important  to  keep  these  principles 
in  mind.    The  word  is  only  a  symbol  of  the  speaker's  mind;  it 
must  not  therefore  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  hearer's  or 
reader's  ideas.    How  many  discussions,  oral  or  written,  would 
be  avoided  if,  on  one  side,  the  speaker  were  careful  to  make  his 
meaning  clear,  and,  on  the  other,  the  hearer  were  careful  to  get 
the  right  meaning.    How  many  long  and  bitter  controversies 
end  or  should  end  by:  "If  this  is  what  you  mean,  I  agree  with 
you."    Perhaps  there  is  mental  agreement  all  the  time,  and  the 
disagreement  is  only  a  verbal  one.    Be  sure  then  of  the  meaning 
of    those    to   whom   you    listen    or   whose   writings   you   read. 
Interpret   expressions   according   to  their  obvious  meaning,  but 
always  taking  into  account  by  whom  and  in  what  circumstances 


DEVELOPMENT    OF    KNOWLEDGE         129 

they  were  used.  Ask  for  further  explanation,  when  possible, 
especially  in  cases  of  different  opinions,  and  you  will  frequently 
avoid  many  difficulties  and  discussions. 


CLOSING  REMARKS   ON  THIS   CHAPTER 

I.  GENERAL  CONSPECTUS  OF  COGNITIVE  FACULTIES 

i.  Summary.  —  (a)  The  present  chapter  has  led  us  through 
the  various  successive  steps  of  cognition.  Beginning  with  the 
simplest  elements  we  have  risen  to  more  and  more  complex  acts. 
The  elaboration  of  knowledge  requires  a  multitude  of  processes  of 
ever-increasing  complexity,  each  process  depending  on  those  that 
have  preceded.  Analysis  and  synthesis,  separation  and  combina- 
tion, resolution  and  construction,  go  together  and  give  each  other 
mutual  help.  The  highest  mental  processes  of  the  intellect 
pervade,  complete,  and  perfect  the  data  of  the  senses,  and  the 
senses  are  necessary  to  the  highest  mental  processes. 

(b)  Continuity  and  solidarity  are  found  at  every  stage.    Sensa- 
tion, perception,  retention  and  reproduction,  conception,  judg- 
ment and  reasoning,  are  all  interwoven  in  cognitive  processes. 
What  is  now  a  direct  perception  may  have  been  in  the  beginning  a 
judgment  and  an  act  of  reasoning  now  embodied  in  one  and  the 
same  act.    When  I  say  that  I  see  my  friend  Peter,  think  how  many 
acts  of  sensation,  perception,  comparison,  and  judgment,  perhaps 
even  scientific  conclusions  reached  by  a  long  process  of  reasoning, 
are  summed  up  in  that  one  word  "friend.'* 

(c)  Yet  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  continuity  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  that  all  cognitive  acts  come  from  and  must  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  same  principle.    If  we  admit,  as  common-sense  leads 
us  to  admit,  a  radical  distinction  between  inorganic  and  organic 
substances,  and  between  plants  and  animals,  we  must  also  admit 
that  there  is  in  the  plant  a  special  mode  of  activity  which  is  not 
found  in  inorganic  matter,  and  in  the  animal  some  special  property 
which  is  not  found  in  the  plant.    Nevertheless  it  may  be  impos- 
sible to  determine,  in  concrete  cases,  where  one  kingdom  begins 
and  where  the  other  ends.    From  what  has  been  said  especially 

10 


130  PSYCHOLOGY 

on  the  origin  and  the  formation  of  concepts,  one  may  already 
suspect  that  sense  and  intellect  are  two  distinct  and  irreducible 
faculties.  This  point  must  now  be  made  clearer. 

2.  Senses  and  Intellect.  —  Man  is  endowed  with  two  kinds  of 
faculties  or  powers,  irreducible  to  each  other,  the  senses  and  the 
intellect.  At  present  we  shall  simply  indicate  the  main  reasons 
for  this  assertion,  as  we  intend  to  come  back  to  the  same  subject 
and  determine  the  nature  of  intellectual  processes  when  we  study 
the  philosophy  of  the  human  mind. 

(a)  We  acquire  concepts  that  are  abstract  and  universal,  not 
determined  therefore  by  the  concrete  circumstances  of  space  and 
time.    The  concept  has  been  shown   already  to  be  irreducible 
to  the  image.    Through  an  organic  or  material  process  we  can 
know  only  the  material,  concrete,  and  actual  reality.    The  senses, 
therefore,  however  complex  or  composite  the  image  may  be,  can 
give  only  the  knowledge  of  concrete  objects  determined  in  space 
and  time. 

(b)  The  judgment  supposes  the  concept.    It  does  not  simply 
consist  in  a  juxtaposition,  in  a  resemblance  or  a  difference  between 
two  ideas,  but  it  consists  essentially  in  the  perception  and  affirma- 
tion of  such  relations.    In  the  case  of  necessary  judgments,  that 
is,  of  judgments  which  not  only  are  true  as  matters  of  fact,  but 
must  be  true  at  all  times,  everywhere,  and  for  all  minds,  no  sense 
can  ever  give  to  any  judgment,  or  perceive  in  any  reality,  this 
character  of  necessity.    It  comes  from  a  higher  source. 

(c)  Probably  the  most  marvellous  power  of  the  human  mind 
is  the  power  of  reflection  or  self -consciousness.    The  mind  not 
only  thinks  objects  external  to  itself,  but  thinks  its  own  thought, 
observes  its  own  sensations,  emotions,  volitions,  and  desires,  com- 
pares them  with  one  another,  and  notices  their  differences  or  re- 
semblances.   Under  all  these  we  are  aware  of  the  identity  of  the 
agent  from  whose  activity  they  proceed  and  to  whom  all  are  attrib- 
uted.   An  organic  or  material  action  cannot  thus  perceive  itself. 
Vision  does  not  see  itself,  hearing  does  not  hear  itself,  etc.    An 
organ  cannot  be  reflected,  or  folded  back  on  itself.    If  this  fea- 
ture belongs  to  higher  mental  manifestations,  it  points  to  a  power 
superior  to  the  senses.    It  is  only  a  supra-sensuous  power  of  thought 


DEVELOPMENT     OF    KNOWLEDGE         131 

that  can  bind  together  the  passing  states  of  mind,  and  recognize 
the  identity  and  permanence  of  the  self  under  its  passing  proc- 
esses. 

II.  GENESIS  OF  SOME  IDEAS  AND  PRINCIPLES 

We  give  here  a  short  outline  of  the  way  in  which  we  acquire 
some  fundamental  concepts  and  judgments  which  others  imply, 
or  which  are  of  most  frequent  use.  The  present  point  of  view  is 
exclusively  psychological.  Some  of  these  ideas  and  principles 
will  have  to  be  examined  elsewhere  from  other  points  of  view,  in 
Logic,  Epistemology,  Cosmology,  etc. 

i.  Ideas.  —  The  most  important  ideas  to  be  mentioned  are 
those  of  being,  self,  substance  and  accident,  cause  and  effect, 
finite  and  infinite,  relative  and  absolute. 

(a)  The  notion  of  being  is  the  first  which  the  human  mind  ac- 
quires.   It  is  the    most    general    since  it  applies  to  everything, 
hence  also  the  most  indetermined  and  the  most  imperfect.    It  is 
at  the  basis  of  all  other  notions,  for,  whatever  is  known  is  known 
as  something,  i.e.  as  some  form  of  being. 

(b)  The  knowledge  of  self  is  acquired  by  reflection.    The  facts 
of  memory  and  recognition  lead  to  the  idea  of  self-identity.     Com- 
parison and  the  perception   of  difference  and  similarity  between 
mental  processes  indicate  a  judging  unity  under  the  multiplicity 
of  mental  states.    Moreover,  the  consciousness  of  power  manifests 
the  self  as  an  active  principle.     It  is  not  merely  a  centre  or 
support  for  its  passing  states,  but  an  agent   from   which  they 
spring. 

(c)  Consciousness  gives  me  the  testimony  that  I  am  a  substance, 
namely,  that  I  exist  in  myself    as  an  individual.     On  the  con- 
trary, it  gives  the  testimony   that  the  ideas,  feelings,  emotions, 
desires,  etc.,awhich  I  experience  are  mine.    They  do  not  stand  by 
themselves,  and  I  cannot  think  of  a  thought  which  is  not  some 
mind's  thought.    Another  contrast  is  apparent,  namely,  the  con- 
trast of  the  permanent  ego  with  the  transitory  states  of  the  ego, 
which   again   leads  to  the  recognition  of  a   distinction   between 
the   ego  as  a  substance,  and   its  states  as  accidents.     This  is 
also  verified  in   external  objects.     The  same  thing  changes   in 


132  PSYCHOLOGY 

various  respects.  These  two  ideas  of  sameness  and  yet  of 
successive  variety  are  indications  that,  in  external  things,  a  dis- 
tinction must  also  be  made  between  substance  and  accidents  or 
properties. 

(d)  Internal  experience  reveals  the  self  as  an  agent.    There 
are  changes  and  successions  of  mental  states,  or  even  bodily  move- 
ments, whose  happening  is  the  result  of  volition.    We  feel  that, 
sometimes  at  least,  we  are  not  merely  spectators,  but  agents  and 
causes  of  the  sequence  of  our  mental  processes;  that  we  dispose 
of  and  use  a  certain  energy  which  is  in  ourselves,  and  that  we 
are  capable  of  effort.    Through  external  experience  we  observe 
similar  facts  of  change  and  succession  in  the  outside  world.    These 
changes  take  place  according  to  laws  which  science  endeavors 
to  discover.    In  the  same  circumstances,  the  same  antecedent  is 
always  followed  by  the  same  consequent.    Reason  is  naturally  led 
to  inquire  why  these  changes  are  produced,  and  to  attribute  them 
to  the  activity  of  causes  from  which  they  proceed.    A  cause  is 
not  merely  an  antecedent;  it  not  only  precedes  in  time,  but  it 
exercises  an  influence  in  the  production  of  the  consequent. 

(e)  The  senses  of  vision  and  touch  give  perceptions  of  surface 
and  solidity,  that  is,  of  concrete  extension  and  dimension.    By 
abstraction,  the  concepts  of  extension,  matter,  and  body  in  general 
are  formed.    Moreover,  we  perceive  the  various  relations  of  dis- 
tance, the  respective  positions  of  bodies  and  their  changes  of  place, 
and  we  look  upon  space  as  one  immense  receptacle  in  which  all 
things  are  and  move. 

(/)  The  perception  of  succession,  i.e.  of  the  fact  that  events, 
internal  and  external,  do  not  all  take  place  at  once,  but  one  after 
the  other,  leads  to  the  idea  of  time,  or  of  a  present  instant  preceded 
by  a  past  and  to  be  followed  by  a  future. 

(g)  Everywhere  in  the  world  we  find  limitations  in  extension, 
power,  activity,  and  perfection.  From  these  we  form  the  idea  of 
limitation;  and  by  removing  all  limitations  we  form  the  idea  — 
always  imperfect  —  of  the  unlimited,  of  the  perfect  and  the  infinite. 
I  can  do  only  certain  things,  the  Omnipotent  or  Infinite  Power  can 
do  all  things.  My  knowledge  is  imperfect  and  limited,  the  Infi- 
nite Knower  reaches  perfectly  every  truth,  etc.  In  the  same  man- 


DEVELOPMENT    OF     KNOWLEDGE         133 

ner,  knowing  that  we  are  dependent  on  many  other  persons  and 
things,  both  for  our  very  existence  and  for  our  activity;  knowing 
that  all  beings  are  thus  dependent  on  one  another  and  that  they 
have  manifold  relations,  we  conceive  the  idea  of  the  perfectly 
independent  or  Absolute. 

2.  Principles.  —  From  primitive  concepts  are  formed  primary 
judgments  or  principles  which  are  necessary,  universal,  and  funda- 
mental in  experimental  and  rational  sciences.  The  most  important 
are:  The  principle  of  identity:  "What  is  is,"  or  "A  is  A."  The 
principle  of  contradiction:  "The  same  thing  cannot  be  and  not  be 
at  the  same  time;  "  or,  applied  to  cognition:  "The  same  thing  can- 
not be  affirmed  and  denied  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same 
sense."  The  principle  of  substantiality:  "There  is  no  mode  or  phe- 
nomenon without  a  substance."  The  principle  of  causality  and 
sufficient  reason:  "Nothing  begins  to  exist  without  an  adequate 
cause."  The  principles  of  space  and  time:  "All  bodies  are  in  space," 
and  "All  events  take  place  in  time."  The  principle  of  the  abso- 
lute: "The  relative  supposes  an  absolute;  the  imperfect  supposes 
the  perfect;  the  finite  supposes  the  infinite."  The  principle  of 
morality:  "Right  and  wrong  differ  essentially,"  "Moral  obligation 
must  be  fulfilled,  and  moral  evil  must  be  avoided." 


III.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  INTELLECTUAL  COGNITION 

i.  Intellectual  Development. — Let  us  first  ask  the  question: 
In  what  does  intellectual  development  consist?  As  has  been 
indicated  already,  the  first  notions  acquired  by  the  intellect  are 
very  vague,  indistinct,  and  general.  The  intellect  is  developed 
and  perfected  little  by  little,  and  its  perfection  consists  mainly  in 
the  three  following  qualities: 

(a)  The  extension  of  knowledge,  that  is,  the  number  of  things 
that  are  known,  of  sciences  that  are  mastered,  and  of  facts,  laws, 
and  details  with  which  the  mind  is  acquainted. 

(b)  Far  more  important  than  the  quantity  of  knowledge  is  its 
quality,  its  distinctness,  clearness,  accuracy,   and  thoroughness. 
To  know  much  is  good;  to  know  well  is  better.     Persons  are  found 
who  have  acquired  varied  and  extensive  information  on  a  number 


134  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  subjects;  they  have  a  smattering  of  everything.  But  it  is  all 
vague  and  hazy,  all  a-peu-pres,  without  any  clearness  or  definite- 
ness.  They  may  astonish  the  ignorant,  but  to  the  really  learned 
their  display  of  knowledge  appears  as  an  addition  of  conceit  to 
ignorance. 

(c)  More  important  still  and  more  fruitful  is  what  may  be  called 
the  synthesis  of  knowledge,  that  is,  the  perception,  not  merely  of 
individual  objects,  but  of  their  relations,  both  ontological  and  log- 
ical. Things  and  events  are  related  by  similarity,  difference, 
analogy,  causality,  etc.,  and,  both  in  speculative  and  in  practical 
thinking,  success  depends  on  the  power  of  the  mind  to  grasp  these 
relations.  What  are  scientific  and  popular  classifications  but 
groupings  of  things  according  to  likeness  and  difference?  On  what 
does  the  success  of  an  enterprise  depend,  if  not  on  the  power  of 
grasping  beforehand  the  possible  sources  of  success  and  failure, 
and  the  relations  of  one  event  to  another?  In  business,  in  sci- 
ence, in  war,  in  politics,  in  commerce,  everywhere,  the  powerful 
mind  is  the  mind  that  does  not  see  or  foresee  merely  one  side  of 
reality,  but  that  embraces  at  once  all  its  complex  aspects.  Look 
not  only  at  the  individual;  look  at  the  whole  to  which  it  belongs 
and  with  which  it  has  manifold  relations.  It  is  necessary  for 
the  mind  to  analyze,  but  it  must  later  replace  every  object  of 
knowledge  in  its  true  relations. 

2.  Main  Factors  in  Intellectual  Development.  —  (a)  Much 
assistance  is  received  from  others,  but  it  is  necessary  to  control 
human  testimony  and  authority.  I  make  no  difficulty  in  believ- 
ing my  friend,  whom  I  know  to  be  truthful,  when  he  tells  me  of 
things  he  has  seen  and  of  events  he  has  witnessed.  If,  however, 
he  speaks  to  me  on  other  matters,  before  I  assent  I  must  weigh 
his  reasons  and  test  their  value.  To  act  differently  would  be  to 
renounce  the  highest  and  noblest  human  prerogative. 

(b)  Besides  this  external  assistance,  several  internal  helps  must 
be  mentioned,  (i)  The  intellect  depends  on  the  senses;  therefore 
it  is  necessary  to  give  to  the  senses  the  greatest  possible  perfection, 
and,  within  proper  limits,  to  cultivate  memory  and  imagina- 
tion. Hence  also  the  importance  of  explaining  and  illustrating 
abstract  notions  by  concrete  examples.  (2)  Attention  must  be 


DEVELOPMENT     OF     KNOWLEDGE         135 

given  to  the  various  aspects  of  sense-experience.  Judgment  and 
reasoning  are  to  be  used  with  caution  and  prudence.  Care  must 
be  taken  not  to  be  misled  by  prejudices  and  habits  of  thought. 
The  principle  or  law  must  be  based  on  facts,  and  the  facts  must 
not  be  denied  or  distorted  in  order  to  fit  in  with  a  preconceived 
theory.  (3)  The  habits  of  introspection  and  reflection  are  neces- 
sary, as  self-knowledge  is  essential  in  all  aspects  of  life.  (4)  The 
connections  and  relations  between  objects  of  knowledge  are  to  be 
examined.  The  endeavor  should  not  be  so  much  to  acquire  mani- 
fold and  varied  information  as  to  group  it  and  arrange  it  in  the 
mind.  On  this  condition  only  will  knowledge  be  available.  A 
business  man  who  has  many  things  in  his  store  but  without  any 
order,  and  who  does  not  keep  his  accounts  carefully,  is  not  likely 
to  succeed.  The  same  is  true  of  a  mind  in  which  many  ideas  are 
scattered  at  random  without  order  and  method. 

3.  Main  Dangers  to  be  Guarded  Against.  —  (a)  The  illusion 
of  clearness  is  frequent.  A  word  or  sentence  is  heard  or  read  fre- 
quently, and,  because  it  becomes  familiar,  the  mind  never  stops 
to  consider  its  accurate  meaning.  A  word  altogether  new  will 
strike  the  mind  and  lead  us  to  consult  the  dictionary.  Yet  many 
familiar  words  are  not  thoroughly  understood;  we  have  only  a 
vague  and  hazy  idea  of  their  signification.  Try  to  read  a  page  of 
a  novel  or  of  any  easy  book.  Stop  carefully  to  ponder  every  word 
and  try  to  give  a  definition  of  it,  and  you  will  see  how  many  do 
not  convey  a  clear  and  distinct  idea  to  your  mind. 

(b)  Imagination,  prejudices,  a  priori  theories,  blind  the  intellect, 
prevent  it  from  seeing  things  in  their  true  light,  and  even  make  it 
incapable  of  observing  facts  without  bias.    They  are  like  colored 
glasses  which  change  the  visual  appearance  of  everything,  or  like 
lenses  which,  according  as  they  are  convex  or  concave,  magnify 
or  reduce  the  apparent  size  of  objects. 

(c)  Some  have  an  exaggerated  credulity  with  regard  to  the  state- 
ments of  a  favorite  author,  orator,  friend,  etc.,  without  even 
examining   their   value;   or,  on   the   contrary,  a   disposition   to 
disbelieve  anything  which  another  man  may  state.    A  priori  the 
former  are  always  right;  the  latter  always  wrong. 

(d)  In  general,  mental  passivity  and  laziness  make  the  mind 


136  PSYCHOLOGY 

merely  receptive  instead  of  active.  An  easy-going  intellectual 
life,  satisfied  with  any  kind  of  reason,  frightened  at  the  very  idea 
of  research,  scrutiny,  questioning,  and  reflection,  incapable  of 
advancing  one  step  unless  it  is  pushed,  is  the  surest  sign  of 
mental  weakness  and  atrophy. 


CHAPTER   II 

FEELING 

INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS 

1.  Meanings  of   the  Term  "Feeling." —  The  term  "feeling" 
has  several  meanings,     (i)  Sometimes  it  is  used  to  denote  general 
or  internal  sensations:  a  man  feels  hungry,  tired,  nervous,  unwell, 
etc.     (2)  It  is  also  applied  to  specific  external  sensations,  especially 
those  of  touch:  a  man  feels  the  contact  and  qualities  of  an  exter- 
nal object,  or  he  feels  cold.     (3)  It  expresses  a  form  of  cognition 
or  belief  which  it  is  difficult  to  account  for  and  justify  by  reason: 
a  man  feels  that  a  certain  action  is  right  or  wrong,  that  a  certain 
man  is  not  reliable  or  friendly,  although  the  reasons  therefor  may 
not  be  clear  and  defined.     (4)  As  opposed  to  knowing  and  willing, 
it  denotes  in  general  what  is  called  the  affective  life,  i.e.  certain 
states  of  consciousness,  or  mental  attitudes,  known  as  pleasure 
and    displeasure,    satisfaction    and    dissatisfaction,    etc.,    which 
result  from  the  manner  in  which  objects  affect  us.     (5)  It  has  a 
more  restricted  meaning  applying  only  to  pleasure  and  pain,  that 
is,  to  the  elementary  processes  of  affective  life. 

Here  we  speak  of  feelings  in  meanings  (4)  and  (5).  In  meaning 
(4)  it  includes,  and  in  meaning  (5)  it  is  opposed  to,  the  other  mani- 
festations of  affective  life,  namely,  emotions  and  sentiments. 

2.  Meaning  of  Other  Terms.  —  An  emotion  is  a  mental  state 
of  an  affective  nature,  more  complex  than  the  mere  feeling  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain.    It  is  the  way  in  which  the  mind  is  affected  by  a 
complex  situation  which  it  apprehends.    By  passion  is  generally 
meant  a  strong   emotion   or  emotional  tendency,  uncontrolled 
and  violent.    A  sentiment  is  of  a  higher  and  still  more  complex 
nature.     It  has  its  source  in  the  higher  mental  processes  of  knowl- 
edge.   Appetite  implies  a  tendency,  craving,  or  desire,  and  applies 

i37 


138  PSYCHOLOGY 

especially  to  organic  and  periodical  needs,  chiefly  the  need  of 
food,  which  refer  to  the  preservation  of  the  individual  and  the 
species.  Thus  the  modern  use  of  this  term  is  far  more  restricted 
than  that  of  the  term  appetitus  in  mediaeval  philosophy,  where 
appetitus  included  the  whole  affective  and  active  life.  Love, 
anger,  enjoyment,  desire,  satisfaction,  will,  etc.,  were  all  reduced 
to  appetitus. 

These  definitions,  or  rather  descriptions,  may  be  made  clearer 
by  an  example.  A  wound  on  my  body  produces  a  feeling  of  pain. 
If  I  am  aware  that  it  has  been  inflicted  intentionally  by  an  enemy, 
I  may  feel  an  emotion  of  anger  which  will  prompt  me  to  take 
revenge.  But  just  then  I  may  experience  a  moral  or  religious 
sentiment  which  will  make  me  forgive.  Pain  is  felt  by  the  infant, 
but  he  does  not  experience  any  emotion  when  slandered  or  insulted, 
since  this  requires  understanding.  Some  emotions,  however,  are 
experienced  in  very -early  childhood;  the  sentiments  develop 
later. 

3.  Classification.  —  No  classification  of  the  processes  of  the 
affective  life  is  perfectly  satisfactory.  It  is  difficult  to  analyze 
these  processes.  They  are  very  complex,  and  frequently  it  would 
be  impossible  to  say  whether  a  concrete  affective  process  belongs 
to  feelings,  or  emotions,  or  sentiments.  Each  group  generally 
includes  elements  which  belong  to  another  group.  However, 
for  purposes  of  study  a  classification  is  needed,  and  the  following 
will  be  used  with  the  understanding  that  it  is  not  adequate: 
I.  Feelings  proper,  in  the  strict  sense. 

II.  Emotions:   (i)  self-regarding,  personal,  or  individual;     (2) 
altruistic,  sympathetic,  or  social. 

III.  Sentiments:     (i)  of    truth,   intellectual;     (2)  of    beauty, 
aesthetic;     (3)  of  right  and  wrong,  moral;   (4)  of  relations  with 
God,  religious. 


PLEASURE     AND    PAIN  139 

ARTICLE  I.    FEELINGS  OF  PLEASURE  AND  PAIN 

I.    NATURE  AND   LAWS   OF   THESE   FEELINGS 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  FEELINGS 

1.  Definitions.  —  The  term  "pain"  and  the  term  "pleasure" 
cannot  be  denned;  their  meaning  can  only  be  experienced.    As 
no  idea  of  color  can  be  imparted  to  the  man  born  blind,  so  no  idea 
of  pleasure  and  pain  could  ever  be  imparted  to  a  man  who  had 
never  felt  them.    But  no  definition  is  necessary  since,  in  a  gen- 
eral way  at  least,  everybody  knows  the  general  character  of  each 
feeling  and  the  difference  between  them.    With  regard  to  the  use 
of  these  two  terms  it  may  be  noted  that  "pain  "  applies  chiefly 
to  feelings  resulting  from  certain  organic  conditions,  for  instance, 
a  wound,  a  soreness,  an  ache.     Yet  some  other  mental  states 
due  to  other  causes  are  also  called  painful.     "Unpleasantness" 
is  a  more  general  term  and  applies  to  all  phases  of  mental  life.    It 
indicates  less  than  pain,  and  many  states  of  consciousness  to  which 
we  could  hardly  apply  the  term  "painful  "  may  be  called  "unpleas- 
ant."   The  same  distinction  is  also  applied,  but  less  generally, 
to  the  terms  "pleasure  "  and  "pleasantness."     "Agreeable  "  and 
"disagreeable"  have  a  meaning  which  is  very  close  to  that  of 
pleasant  and  unpleasant. 

2.  Psychological  Nature.  —  (a)  Whatever  be  said  concerning 
their  cause  and  their  ontological  nature,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  psychology  both  pleasure  and  pain  are  positive  feelings.    Even 
if  pain  be  considered  as  negative  in  itself,  i.e.  as  resulting  from  the 
lack  of  a  due  perfection,  from  a  defect  or  a  privation;   if,  for 
instance,  a  stomach  ache  results  from  the  absence  of  certain  normal 
conditions  necessary  for  the  proper  functioning  of  this  organ; 
or  if  the  unpleasantness  of  a  sensation  is  caused  by  the  lack  of 
adaptation  of  the  sense  organ  to  a  certain  stimulation,  it  is  true, 
nevertheless,  that,  in  consciousness,  the  feeling  of  pain  or  unpleas- 
antness is  a  feeling  no  less  positive  than  pleasure  and  pleasantness. 

(b)  Pleasure  results  from  the  healthy,  vigorous,  normal,  and  har- 
monious exercise  of  the  various  activities.    Inactivity  and  rest, 


140  PSYCHOLOGY 

as  such,  are  not  pleasurable.  The  most  agreeable  rest  is  a  change 
in  the  nature  and  intensity  of  activity.  Pain  and  unpleasantness 
result  from  excessive  exercise  or  excessive  restraint.  The  com- 
plete inactivity  of  a  faculty  —  like  the  eye,  the  ear,  the  muscles, 
imagination,  etc.  —  especially  if  prolonged,  becomes  very  painful. 
Think  of  being  always  in  complete  darkness  or  remaining  with 
closed  eyes,  of  making  no  motion,  of  not  thinking  of  anything;  it 
would  be  unbearable.  On  the  other  hand,  excessive  exercise  is 
also  painful.  Too  bright  a  light,  too  loud  a  sound,  too  great  a 
muscular  effort  are  sources  of  pain.  Moderate  and  appropriate 
efforts  are  rather  pleasurable,  and  to  assert,  with  pessimists  like 
Schopenhauer,  that  activity  and  effort  are  essentially  painful  is 
to  go  directly  against  the  clear  testimony  of  consciousness. 

3.  Variations.  —  Feelings  vary  in  intensity,  and  their  varia- 
tions depend  both  on  subjective  conditions  and  on  objective  factors. 
(i)  According  as  the  mind  is  disposed,  the  same  perception  or 
image  may  be  pleasant  or  unpleasant.  The  present  occupation, 
the  mental  contents,  the  preceding  sensations,  etc.,  exercise  an 
influence  on  the  way  in  which  the  mind  is  affected.  We  also  know 
that  the  same  stimulus  may  produce  an  agreeable  feeling  in  one 
individual  and  a  disagreeable  feeling  in  another.  (2)  On  the 
other  hand,  certain  objects  naturally  produce  an  agreeable,  others 
a  painful  feeling.  Some  sensations  of  taste,  sound,  etc.,  are 
pleasant,  while  others  are  unpleasant,  for  practically  all  individ- 
uals. The  following  laws  will  specify  this  general  principle. 

II.  LAWS  OF  FEELINGS 

1.  Law  of  Stimulation. —  The  stimulus  may  be  suitable  for  the 
sense,  or  unsuitable;  proportioned,  or  too  great,  or  too  small.    Too 
weak  a  stimulus  —  for  instance,  too  feeble  a  light,  a  scarcely  au- 
dible whisper  —  requires  too  much  effort  and  tension.    Too  great 
a   stimulus  —  for  instance,  a  dazzling  light,  a  shrill  sound,  a 
suffocating  odor,  extremes  of  heat  and  cold  —  is  also  painful.    A 
sensation  is  agreeable  only  when  the  stimulation  remains  within 
certain  limits  of  intensity. 

2.  Law  of  Duration,  Change,  and  Contrast.  —  When  pleasure 
is  prolonged  unduly  it  ceases  to  be  felt,  and  even  may  be  succeeded 


PLEASURE    AND     PAIN  141 

by  unpleasantness.  The  same  activity  which  was  agreeable  in 
the  beginning  becomes  tedious.  The  same  piece  of  music  which 
was  pleasing  when  heard  for  the  first  time  becomes  tiresome  if  it 
is  repeated  too  frequently.  See  how  rapidly  the  popularity  of  a 
song,  even  of  a  "hit,"  decreases  and  dies.  The  same  dainty  food 
becomes  unbearable.  We  have  "too  much  of  a  good  thing." 
Hence  the  necessity  of  variety  and  of  change:  (i)  In  the  kind  of 
stimulus,  even  if  we  remain  within  the  same  group  of  sensations, 
e.g.  change  of  visual  surroundings.  (2)  In  the  degree  of  stimula- 
tion; in  many  cases  the  pleasure  will  continue  up  to  a  certain  level 
if  the  stimulus  be  increased.  The  persistent  admiration  of  real 
masterpieces  is  due  to  some  kind  of  change.  The  more  we  see  or 
hear  them,  the  more  also  do  we  appreciate  them,  because  we  under- 
stand them  better  and  find  new  beauties  in  them.  (3)  In  the 
kind  of  activity.  The  monotony  due  to  repeating  certain  actions 
is  painful;  hence  the  importance  of  varying  exercises, and  of  passing 
from  one  mode  of  occupation  to  another. 

Contrast  affects  the  nature  and  intensity  of  the  feelings.  Pleas- 
ure following  pain  is  more  keenly  felt,  and  vice  versa. 

3.  Law  of  Accommodation.  —  This  law  works  in  two  ways, 
either  toward  pleasure  or  toward  pain,  as  will  be  verified  easily 
from  personal  experience,  (i)  Things  which  at  first  were  very 
disagreeable  may  become  indifferent  and  even  pleasurable;  smok- 
ing, eating  certain  foods  or  condiments,  studying  according  to 
certain  methods,  may  serve  as  illustrations.  Taste  for  what  is 
disagreeable  may  be  acquired.  We  first  "get  used  to  "  them,  and 
later  derive  real  pleasure  from  them.  This  is  due  largely  to 
the  influence  of  habit.  (2)  But  accommodation  may  also  lessen 
the  pleasure.  After  a  certain  time  of  constant  use,  more  condi- 
ment, more  cigars,  more  amusements,  etc.,  may  be  required  to 
cause  the  same  amount  of  pleasure.  An  activity  which  at  first 
was  accompanied  by  a  pleasurable  feeling,  by  repetition  may 
become  indifferent  and  tedious.  (3)  When  an  action  or  a  stimu- 
lation has  become  habitual,  even  if  it  is  the  source  of  no  special 
pleasure,  the  interruption  of  it,  or  interference  with  it,  is  painful. 
If  I  am  used  to  the  ticking  of  the. clock  in  my  room,  I  "miss  "  it 
when  it  stops.  The  interference  with  habitual  activities,  move- 


142  PSYCHOLOGY 

ments,  religious  or  moral    opinions  and   accustomed  modes  of 
thought,  is  disagreeable. 

4.  Laws  of  Mutual  Furtherance  or  Hindrance  of  Activities, 
and  of  Harmony  or  Antagonism  between  Mental  States.  —  As 
was  said  above,  pleasure  and  pain  depend  largely  on  subjective 
dispositions.  The  same  behavior  toward  me  may  be  agreeable 
or  disagreeable  according  as  I  am  dealing  with  a  man  whom  I 
like  or  with  one  whom  I  dislike.  In  the  same  manner,  when  work- 
ing in  behalf  of  a  friend,  I  find  pleasure  in  actions  which  would 
cause  me  annoyance  if  I  had  to  perform  them  under  other  condi- 
tions. When  a  man  is  occupied  with  an  important  or  interesting 
task,  interruption,  even  in  the  form  of  an  otherwise  agreeable 
conversation  or  recreation,  will  be  unwelcome.  What  furthers 
the  present  purpose  and  is  in  harmony  with  the  present  state  of 
mind  and  disposition  will,  as  the  case  may  be,  cause  more  pleas- 
ure or  less  displeasure  than  what  is  antagonistic  to  them  and 
hinders  them. 

II.    IMPORTANCE  OF  FEELINGS 

All  men  naturally  and  without  exception  crave  for  happiness. 
They  may  differ  as  to  the  means  of  obtaining  it;  they  may  look 
merely  for  present  enjoyment,  or  work  for  future  pleasure;  they 
may  seek  the  pleasures  of  the  senses  or  those  of  the  mind  and  the 
moral  aspirations;  they  may  work  for  happiness  in  this  life  or  in 
the  next;  but  the  innate  desire  to  be  happy  is  universal.  Hence 
the  importance  of  feelings  as  springs  of  action. 

1.  For  Happiness.  —  Pleasure  and  pain  are  the  main  factors 
in  human  happiness  and  misery.    The  amount  of  happiness  in 
life  is  measured  by  the  amount  of  pleasure  found  in  it.     But  such 
pleasure  must  not  be  estimated  in  reference  to  the  present  alone. 
An  action  which  would  be  otherwise  painful  may  become  agree- 
able on  account  of  the  pleasure  to  which  it  is  expected  to  lead. 
Frequently  the  same  complex  process  will  have  pleasant  and  un- 
pleasant aspects,  for  instance,  the  satisfaction  of  the  senses,  and 
remorse  of  conscience;  present  pleasure,  and  anticipation  of  future 
pain.  , 

2.  For  Mental  Life.  —  Pleasure  and  pain  are  very  important 


IMPORTANCE     OF     FEELINGS  143 

in  intellectual  life  and  affect  the  whole  mental  attitude  and  be- 
havior. Pleasure  or  the  anticipation  of  pleasure  is  a  powerful 
incentive  to  study.  What  the  mind  likes  is  much  more  easily 
attended  to  and  assimilated.  From  this  fact  important  peda- 
gogical conclusions  may  be  inferred.  The  child's  reason  is  not 
yet  sufficiently  developed  to  control  his  feelings  and  direct  his 
conduct.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  give  him  lessons  and  exer- 
cises that  will  interest  him,  and  from  which  he  will  derive  some 
pleasure.  He  must  be  made  to  like  his  work  and  studies;  and 
means,  such  as  change,  variety,  concrete  applications,  etc.,  must 
be  adapted  to  this  end.  Even  for  the  adult,  agreeable  work  is 
much  easier.  A  great  amount  of  will  power  is  required  to  over- 
come repugnances  and  become  proficient  in  a  science  for  which  one 
feels  nothing  but  dislike.  Pleasantness  facilitates  and  quickens 
attention,  and  increases  mental  energy. 

3.  For  Ordinary  Behavior.  —  Feelings  play  an  important  part 
in  daily  life,     (i)  Pleasure  is  often  a  guide,  but  not  an  infallible 
one,  to  the  real  good.     Certain  agreeable  sensations  of  smell  and 
taste  may  be  signs  of  the  healthfulness  of  aliments,  and  repug- 
nance is  frequently  a  sign  of  danger.    This  is  true  especially  of 
animals;  man  depends  more  on  artificial  conventions,  and  less  on 
nature.     Even  for  higher  activities,  pleasures  to  be  obtained  or 
pains  to  be  avoided  are  ordinary  motives  of  action.     (2)  Bodily 
pain  is  a  warning  and  calls  attention  to  a  diseased  organism.    Were 
it  not  for  pain,  how  many  would  die  before  knowing  that  they 
were  sick  at  all.    It  also  tells  us  when  to  stop  the  exercise  of  cer- 
tain activities;  a  soreness  of  the  eyes  or  a  headache  may  be  a  warn- 
ing that  continuing  to  read  will  be  injurious.      (3)  Pleasure  and 
pain  influence  man's  whole  behavior  and  character.     Suffering  and 
enjoyment,  whether  transitory  or  permanent,  affect  the  ordinary 
mental   attitude.     Reflection   will    show   that    the   influence   of 
feelings  on  the  whole  human  conduct  is  much  greater  than  is 
commonly  supposed. 

4.  For  Development  and  Progress.  —  Pleasure  and  pain  are 
prominent  factors  in  the  progress  and  development  both  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  race,     (i)  What  is  the  best  educator  for  the 
child?    His  own  experience.     According  as  it  is  pleasurable  or 


144  PSYCHOLOGY 

unpleasant  there  will  be  a  tendency  to  repeat  or  to  avoid  it.  Burn- 
ing his  fingers  will  make  him  very  careful  when  he  sees  fire  again. 
Receiving  a  reward  or  a  punishment  will  tend  to  make  him  per- 
form or  refrain  from  certain  actions.  In  adult  age,  reason  becomes 
more  important,  yet  reflection  will  show  that  the  motives  derived 
from  reason  are  generally  reducible  to  the  obtaining  of  what  is 
pleasurable  and  the  avoiding  of  what  is  painful.  (2)  Civilization, 
that  is,  the  progress  realized  by  mankind  in  useful  sciences  and 
arts,  is  due  to  a  constant  effort  toward  decreasing  pain,  fatigue, 
and  whatever  else  is  disagreeable,  and  toward  increasing  pleasure 
and  comfort.  Inventions  tend  to  make  life  easier  and  more 
agreeable. 

5.  For  Morality.  —  In  the  higher  sphere  of  moral  life  we  shall 
mention   only   the   following:    (i)  Pleasure  and  pain,   whether 
immediate  or  future,  supply  motives  of  conduct,  good  or  bad. 
Theft  and  almsgiving,  murder  and  'disinterested  love,  etc.,   have 
reference  to  present  or  future  pleasure  and  pain  of  the  agent  or 
of  his  fellowmen.     (2)  They  contribute  to  the  practice  of  indi- 
vidual virtues,  the  development  of  the  will,  courage,  self-respect, 
etc.,  and  (3)  of  social  virtues,  charity,  sympathy,  self-sacrifice, 
almsgiving,  etc. 

6.  For    Religion.  —  Religion    and   religious    practices    depend 
greatly  on  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.     Reward  or  punish- 
ment is  always  presented  as  the  outcome  of  a  good  or  a  bad  life. 
During  life,  suffering  shows  man  his  nothingness  and  the  vanity 
of  pleasures,  and  it  makes  him  look  forward  to  a  future  and  bet- 
ter life.     Evil  and  the  fear  of  evil  are  incentives  to  prayer  and 
divine  worship  so  as  to  obtain  the  divine  assistance.     Christian 
religion  is  full  of  references  to  happiness,  riches,  and  pleasures, 
to  misery,  poverty,  and  sufferings.     It  supplies  higher  motives 
and  views  both  in  the   examples  and  in  the  teachings  of  its 
Founder. 

ARTICLE  II.    EMOTIONS 

As  already  indicated,  the  emotions  are  more  complex  than  the 
feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain.  They  always  include  pleasurable 
or  painful  elements,  and  sometimes  a  mixture  of  both;  these  vary 


SELF-REGARDING     EMOTIONS  145 

with  different  individuals,  and  even  with  different  manifestations 
of  the  same  emotion  in  the  same  individual.  Hence  it  is  difficult 
to  analyze  an  emotion,  because  its  elements  are  closely  interwoven 
and  form  a  very  complex  and  intricate  state  of  mind.  To  this 
may  be  added  that,  at  least  when  an  emotion  is  strong  and  vio- 
lent, the  power  of  reflection  is  lessened  or  suppressed.  After  the 
emotion  has  abated  or  ceased,  what  remains  is  the  memory  of  it, 
not  the  emotion  itself  as  it  appeared  in  consciousness.  And 
in  the  memory  of  an  emotion  it  is  almost  impossible  to  dis- 
tinguish from  the  purely  emotional  elements  the  ideational  and 
volitional  processes  which  preceded,  accompanied,  or  followed 
them. 

We  shall  consider  successively  the  egoistic  or  self-regarding 
emotions  —  referring  to  and  centring  around  the  self;  and  the  al- 
truistic emotions  —  referring  to,  caused  by,  or  tending  to  others. 

I.     SELF-REGARDING    EMOTIONS 

i.  Their  Nature. — These  emotions  refer  to  the  personal  good 
of  the  individual.  When  they  are  called  egoistic,  this  term  is 
not  given  the  odious  meaning  which  it  frequently  has,  namely, 
that  of  an  excessive  self-love  which  makes  one  forget  other 
men;  it  only  indicates  that  these  emotions  refer  primarily  to  the 
self.  All  are  based  on  the  innate  tendency  to  self-preservation, 
self-assertion,  and  development.  Man  wants  to  preserve  himself, 
that  is,  he  wants  to  protect  his  life,  not  only  the  life  of  the  body, 
but  also  his  mental  faculties,  reputation,  and  character.  Man 
wants  to  assert  and  develop  his  life  and  his  faculties,  to  manifest 
his  various  energies,  to  increase  and  perfect  them.  Hence  two 
general  features  of  these  emotions.  Some  refer  to  things  that 
are  conducive  to  the  fundamental  ends  of  man,  and  therefore 
objects  of  love;  others  refer  to  things  that  are  antagonistic  to  them, 
and  therefore  objects  of  aversion.  We  shafl  mention  the  most 
important. 

Bodily  appetites  need  not  detain  us;  they  are  physiological 
needs  which  manifest  themselves  in  consciousness  by  a  painful 

craving,  like  hunger,  thirst,  need  of  air  or  of  exercise,  etc.,  and 
ii 


146  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  satisfaction  of  which  causes  a  special  pleasure.    They  refer 
primarily  to  the  conservation  of  individual  organic  life. 

2.  Self-importance  is  a  fundamental  emotion  which  takes  an 
explicit  form  with  the  power  of  reflection,  clear  germs  of  which, 
however,  manifest  themselves  in  very  early  childhood.     It  assumes 
several  forms,     (i)  Self-esteem  and  self-love;  man  knows  his  own 
qualities,  true  or  apparent,  and  is  aware  of  the  good  there  is,  or 
he  thinks  there  is,  in  himself.     This  leads  to  (2)  self-complacency, 
that  is,  pleasure  at  the  thought  of  his  excellence,  and  (3)  self- 
respect,  which  influences  conduct  in  an  honorable  direction  so  as 
to  preserve  his  dignity.     (4)  Self-reliance  results  from  the  con- 
sciousness of  power,  intellectual,  moral,  social,  political,  muscular, 
etc.    It  is  based  on  self-esteem,  that  is,  on  the  good  opinion  which 
a  man  has  of  himself.     (5)  Pride,  in  its  ordinary  meaning,  is  an 
excessive  self-esteem,  and  a  desire  for  superiority,  which  are  not 
justified  by  real  merits  and  excellence. 

These  emotions  are  mostly  pleasurable,  but  they  may  be  closely 
associated  with  displeasure,  if  others  do  not  concur  in  the  opinion 
which  we  have  of  ourselves.  Self-pity  is  a  feeling  of  weakness  and 
inferiority  experienced  when  the  lack  of  a  desirable  attainment 
is  recognized.  It  may  assume  many  forms  and  is  chiefly  painful. 

3.  The  Love  of  Approbation  is  the  natural  consequence  of  self- 
assertion  and  self-importance.      It  refers  to  the  self,  and  includes 
also  a  social  element.     We  want  others  to  recognize  our  excel- 
lence or  our  superiority;  we  want  their  esteem  and  respect;  we  feel 
pleasure  when  we  succeed  and  pain  when  we  fail.     Frequently 
pleasure  and  pain  will  be  experienced  together,  because  the  ap- 
proval of  all  men,  and  even  the  approval  of  the  same  person  for 
all  actions,  cannot  be  obtained.     According  as  one  is  held  in  greater 
esteem,  his  approval  gives  greater  satisfaction,  and  his  disapproval 
greater  pain.     The  esteem  and  love  for  a  person  may  be  so  great 
that  his  approval  alone  seems  sufficient,  and  what  others  may 
think  is  indifferent. 

This  emotion  easily  leads  to  vanity  or  vainglory,  which  seeks 
undue  praise  or  esteem,  and  deems  very  important  that  which 
is  really  worth  little  or  nothing,  like  birth,  dress,  ornaments, 
wealth,  etc. 


SELF-REGARDING    EMOTIONS  147 

4.  Love  of  Activity.  —  (a)  The  love  of  activity  and  power  fol- 
lows from  the  natural  desire  to  exercise  our  faculties,  that  is, 
from  the  emotions  of  self-importance  and  self-esteem.    The  con- 
sciousness of  power  manifests  itself  especially  in  successful  efforts 
to  overcome  obstacles  which  are  met  when  endeavoring  to  reach 
an  end  (ambition).    A  social  influence  frequently  manifests  it- 
self, namely,  the  love  of  superiority  over  others.    The  feelings  of 
restraint  of  activity,  or  of  incapacity  to  overcome  a  difficulty,  are 
painful. 

(b)  The  love  of  activity  and  superiority  produces  emulation 
and  rivalry,  which  are  so  important  in  all  concerns  of  life,  in  intel- 
lectual development,  in  business,  in  politics,  etc.  Individuals 
and  nations  in  all  their  various  pursuits,  serious  or  sportive,  seek 
to  display  their  activity  and  power,  and  to  outshine  one  another. 
There  is  pleasure  in  the  hope  and  anticipation  of  victory  and 
approval,  and  in  the  conflict  itself  that  is  expected  to  lead  to  them. 
Pain  may  result  from  failure  and  from  the  consciousness  of 
inferiority.  This  emotion,  in  itself,  is  legitimate  and  noble.  It 
stimulates  the  ardor  and  multiplies  the  activity.  But  it  may 
also  be  the  source  of  envy,  hatred,  anger,  antipathy,  and  injustice 
in  the  use  of  the  means. 

5.  Fear  is  primarily  egoistic,  yet  it  may  also  refer  to  others. 
It  is  produced  by  the  painful  anticipation  of  some  evil.    This  emo- 
tion depends  on  some  previous  painful  experience  which  has  been 
stored  up  in  memory,  or  on  a  complexity  of  experiences  which  have 
been  associated  or  constructed  by  imagination.    I  am  afraid  of 
fire  because  I  have  experienced  sensations  of  burning.    I  am 
afraid  of  a  strange  animal,  of  darkness,  of  an  unknown  object, 
of  a  sudden  and  unexpected  noise  or  sight,  because  they  suggest 
danger. 

The  physical  effects  of  fear  vary  with  individuals.  In  general, 
they  are  depressive  and  consist  of  a  lowering  of  vitality  and  con- 
trol—  paleness,  trembling,  perspiration,  chattering  of  the  teeth, 
etc.  Fear  may  have  very  serious,  and  even  fatal,  results.  Men- 
tal functions  are  also  impaired.  Judgment,  reasoning,  reflection, 
and  attention  are  suspended  or  disordered.  In  some  cases  the 
will,  or  rather  the  impulse  to  act,  will  be  quickened,  and  strength 


148  PSYCHOLOGY 

increased  in  order  to  escape  the  object  of  fear.  In  other  cases 
fear  will  paralyze  every  effort.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
fear  of  punishment  simply  deters  from  evil,  and  that,  while  it 
is  a  useful  means  of  education,  other  means  must  be  taken  to 
promote  good  aspirations. 

Fear  is  legitimate  and  unavoidable,  but  must  not  be  allowed 
to  turn  into  cowardice,  that  is,  groundless  or  exaggerated  fear, 
out  of  proportion  with  the  impending  evil.  The  objective  causes 
of  it  are  generally  beyond  control,  but  its  subjective  causes  —  fre- 
quently ignorance,  ill-health,  nervousness,  laziness,  imagination 
—  may  be  removed  little  by  little. 

6.  Anger,  like  fear,  is  primarily  egoistic,  but  may  also  refer  to 
others.    It  results  from  a  sense  of  injury,  either  bodily  or  mental. 
Hence  it  includes  a  painful  element,  namely,  the  consciousness 
of  a  wrong  which  is  suffered,  and  of  a  failure  on  the  part  of  others 
to  respect  our  own  persons  or  possessions.    Anger  is  a  stimulant 
for  activity,  and  creates  a  desire  to  retaliate.    It  multiplies  the 
energy,  accelerates  the  circulation  and  respiration,  quickens  the 
heart,  etc.,  but  prevents  the  exercise  of  attention,  judgment,  and 
reason.    It  may  include  a  pleasurable  element  in  the  exercise  of 
activity,  and  the  success  in  retaliating.    Anger  takes  several  forms. 
It  may  be  a  sudden  involuntary  outburst,  or  premeditated  anger. 
It  may  lead  to  revenge,  or  take  the  form  of  a  natural,  persistent 
antipathy,  and  even  hatred.    Malevolence  takes  pleasure  in  inflict- 
ing pain  on  others. 

7.  Remorse,  Shame,  and  Self-Condemnation  are  painful  feelings 
resulting  from  the  consciousness  of  having  done  something  wrong 
which  lowers  us  in  our  own  eyes  or  in  the  eyes  of  others.    They 
are  therefore  opposed  to  the  pleasurable  feelings  of  self-importance 
and  love  of  approbation.     Remorse  comes  especially  from  self- 
disapproval,  while  shame  is  rather  the  result  of  feeling  oneself 
disapproved  by  other  men. 

II.     ALTRUISTIC    EMOTIONS 

i.  Their  Existence.  —  (a)  Man  does  not  suffice  to  himself, 
he  needs  others  and  is  made  to  live  in  society.  He  is  also  endowed 
by  nature  with  certain  feelings  that  refer  to  his  fellowmen.  The 


ALTRUISTIC    EMOTIONS  149 

distinct  existence  of  these  feelings  has  been  denied  or  doubted  by 
some  psychologists.  For  them  every  feeling  is  essentially  selfish. 
When  we  do  good  to  others,  it  is  because  we  expect  a  return  and 
thus  have  in  view  our  own  good.  When  we  feel  sympathy  for 
others,  we  imagine  how  we  should  suffer  if  their  afflictions  were 
thrown  upon  ourselves.  When  we  revere  and  respect  others,  it 
is  self-regard  and  the  desire  of  esteem  and  approval  that  prompt 
us.  Whatever  feeling  is  experienced  toward  other  men  is  always 
reducible  to  a  self -regarding  emotion. 

(b)  This  view  cannot  be  accepted.    A  man,  it  is  true,  may 
perform  charitable  actions,  give  alms  or  encouragement,  for  selfish 
motives  and  in  the  hope  of  deriving  therefrom  certain  personal 
advantages,     (i)  But  the  inner  feelings  of  compassion,  respect, 
and  sympathy  are  frequently  experienced  without  being  mani- 
fested at  all,  and  therefore  without  being  able  to  bring  any  return. 
(2)  It  is  a  fact  of  consciousness  that  sometimes  disinterested  feel- 
ings are  experienced,  and  that  actions  springing  from  motives 
of  compassion  or  of  the  love  of  others  are  performed  without  any 
expectation  or  prospect  of  reward  or  personal  satisfaction.     (3) 
Such  feelings  are  universal,  found  in  all  men,  beginning  at  an 
early  age,  extending  not  only  to  our  fellowmen,  but  even  to  the 
imaginary  characters  described  in  novels  or  plays. 

(c)  It  must  be  admitted  that  in  many  cases  personal  satisfac- 
tion accompanies  these  feelings,  but  what  is  claimed  here  is  that 
this  satisfaction  is  not  always  what  the  agent  has  in  view,  and  that 
there  are  sympathetic  emotions  which  are  completely  orientated 
toward  others,  not  toward  self.     Altruistic  emotions  may  pre- 
suppose personal  experience  without  being  selfish  in  their  nature. 
The  love  of  others  does  not  exclude  self-love,  but  self-love  does 
not  account  for  all  emotions  and  is  not  always  primary.    The  as- 
sertion that  there  are  altruistic  emotions  does  not  exclude  their 
close  contact  with  egoistic  emotions.    Emotions  referring  to  others 
are  more  or  less  developed,  but  one  of  the  worst  insults  that  can 
be  addressed  to  a  man  is  to  say  that  he  has  no  feeling,  no  regard, 
and  no  sympathy  for  others. 

We  shall  not  speak  here  of  the  blameworthy  feelings  toward 
others,  such  as  hard-heartedness,  hatred,  cruelty,  scorn,  etc.    These 


150  PSYCHOLOGY 

come  rather  from  a  lack  of  feeling  for  others,  from  exaggerated 
and  overbearing  self-love  and  self-conceit,  and  from  egoism,  in 
the  bad  sense  in  which  this  word  is  generally  used. 

2.  Sympathy.  —  The  fundamental  altruistic  emotion  is  sym- 
pathy.    Etymologically  this  word  means  a  "feeling  with  ";  it 
indicates,  therefore,  an  understanding  and  a  sharing  of  the  feelings 
of  others,  of  their  pleasures  and  pains,  of  their  joys  and  afflictions. 
Its  chief  factors  are:  (i)   A  natural  and  instinctive  tendency  from 
the  earliest  age.     (2)  Association  and  imagination.     We  associate 
certain  modes  of  expression  with  certain  feelings,  recall  similar 
feelings  experienced  by  ourselves,  and  imagine  feelings  which  we 
have  not  experienced.    Thus  a  man  who  never  had  his  meal  delayed 
more  than  a  few  hours  will  nevertheless  imagine  the  feelings  of  a 
man  whom  he  sees  starving.    Imagination  is  frequently  misleading, 
because  it  interprets  the  feelings  of  others  according  to  the  dis- 
positions of  the  sympathizer  himself,  and  hence  may  magnify  or 
minimize  them.    (3)  The  intellect  also  is  an  important  factor  in  the 
observation  and  interpretation  of  the  manifestation  of  feelings. 

3.  The   Main  Determinants  of   Sympathy  are  the  following: 
(i)  Its  intensity  varies  with  both  the  subjective  dispositions  — 
temperament,  friendship,  love,  etc.  —  and  the  objective  condi- 
tions, that  is,  the  greatness,  real  or  imagined,  of  the  feeling  experi- 
enced by  others.     (2)  It  always  supposes  some  similarity  and 
community  between  the  sympathizer  and  the  object  of  his  sym- 
pathy.   This  community  may  be  merely  one  of  nature,  between 
all  human  beings;  or  of  interests,  between  members  of  the  same 
civil,  industrial,  commercial,  society;  or  of  purposes;  or  of  family 
relations.     In  proportion  as  it  is  closer,  the  feelings  of  sympathy 
are  more  easily  aroused  and  more  intense.    Differences  and  con- 
trasts in  education,  religion,  social  position,  and  character  are 
frequently  obstacles  to  sympathy.     (3)  Sympathy  has  a  tendency 
to  increase  in  proportion  to  the  activity  used  in  expressing  it. 
Works  generate  love.     Thus  —  all  things  being  otherwise  the  same 
—  a  mother  will  frequently  love  the  more  a  sickly  child  who  has 
required   more   care.     (4)  Sympathy  is   communicative  and,   as 
it  were,  contagious.     The  best  means  to  win  the  sympathy  of  a 
person  is  to  manifest  sympathy  toward  him. 


ALTRUISTIC    EMOTIONS  151 

4.  The  Main  Effects  of  Sympathy  are  the  following:     (i)  It  not 
only  makes  man  share  the  joys  and  sorrows  of  his  fellowmen,  but 
tends  to  make  him  increase  the  former  and  lessen  the  latter.    Hence 
arise  benevolence,  which  is  the  desire  of  the  good  of  others,  and  benef- 
icence, charity,  commiseration,  etc.,  which  are  practical  endeavors 
to  procure  it.     (2)  There  is  a  tendency,  sometimes  unconscious, 
to  imitate  those  for  whom  sympathy  is  felt,  to  love  what  they  love, 
and  to  share  their  interests.     Members  of  the  same  family  and  the 
same  community  generally  have  many  common  features.     (3) 
Respect  and  reverence  are  manifestations   of   sympathy   toward 
persons  who  have  some  special  merit  and  perfection.    Respect  is 
due  to  all  in  various  degrees.    Reverence  is  due  to  those  who  have 
some  superiority  in  virtue,  position,  character,  etc.    Both  imply 
some  affection,  otherwise  they  pass  into  mere  formality,  wonder, 
awe,  and  even  fear. 

5.  Forms  of  Sympathy.  —  Sympathetic  feelings  take  several 
forms  according  to  their  range  and  nature.    They  are  less  intense 
in  proportion  as  they  refer  to  a  greater  number  of  individuals 
at  the  same  time. 

(a)  Love  and  friendship  are  selective;  a  special  choice  is  made 
of  the  person  who  is  their  object.    The  former  is  generally  more 
intense,  less  durable,  more  sensitive,  more  blind;  the  latter  more 
reflective,  more  intellectual,  more  lasting.    Friendship  is  always 
reciprocal  and  requires  mutual  esteem;  love  may  be  one-sided. 
Besides  this  meaning  as  an  emotion,  love  has  also  a  more  general 
meaning  applicable  to  feelings  which  we  should  have  toward  all 
men:  "Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

(b)  Family    affections    bind    together    by    mutual    sympathy 
husband  and  wife,  parents  and  children,  and  children  among 
themselves.    There  is  a  natural  sympathy  for  members  of  the  same 
family,  which,  unhappily,  certain  uncongenialities  of  temperament, 
or  other  causes,  may  sometimes  prevent. 

(c)  Local  interests,  business,  and  neighborhood  bring  men  into 
special  contact  with  some  other  men,  and  unite  them  for  certain 
purposes,  especially  those  referring  to  the  good  of  the  community. 
Thus  in  the  cases  of  members  of  the  same  church,  of  the  same 
political  party,  of  the  same  commercial  enterprise,  etc. 


152  PSYCHOLOGY 

(d)  Patriotism,  or  love  of  one's  country,  is  still  more  extensive. 
It  is  based  on  a  common  consent  to  promote  the  interests  of  the 
nation.    The   community   of   tongue,   religion,   authority,   laws, 
customs,  history,  etc.,  cements  the  wills  of  the  citizens  and  unites 
their  efforts.  ^* 

(e)  Philanthropy  is   sympathy   for   mankind  in   general.    On 
the  mere  ground  of  their  community  of  nature,  all  men  are  entitled 
to  the  sympathy  and  respect  of  their  fellowmen. 

ARTICLE  III.    SENTIMENTS 

Their  Nature.  —  Sentiments  are  superior,  more  rational,  more 
complex,  and  also  more  disinterested  feelings. 

(a)  They  are  based  on  higher  needs,  and  hence  can  hardly  ever 
be   satiated.    They   manifest   aspirations    toward   ideals   which 
are  never  fully  realized.    The  ideals  of  truth,  beauty,  goodness, 
and  religion  seem  always  to  recede  from  us  in  our  search  for  them. 
For  instance,  for  the  satisfaction  and  pleasure  of  discovering  one 
truth,  there  is  the  pain  and  anxiety  of  finding  several  new  unsolved 
problems  and  unanswered  difficulties.    As  we  proceed,  new  horizons 
are  opened  before  us.     Based  on  the  higher  mental  processes,  they 
are  also  the  best  incentives  to  the  perfection  of  these  processes. 

(b)  Because  they  are  of  a  more  refined  nature,  they  are  also 
less  Common,  at  least  in  their  nobler  manifestations.    They  depend 
more  on  education  and  general  culture  than  the  feelings  proper 
and  the  emotions.    The  same  wound  will  produce  about  the  same 
pain  in  several  individuals.    An  insulting  remark  is  likely  to  pro- 
duce emotions  of  anger  in  all  men,  although,  for  emotions,  the 
variations  are  already  of  great  importance,  and  the  laws  much 
less  strict.    In  the  sentiments  still  greater  variations  will  be  ob- 
served.   Some  men  will  experience  no  aesthetic  sentiment  when 
looking  at  a  perfect  painting,  or  reading  a  beautiful  poem.     Some 
may  even  prefer  the  ragtimes  of  the  street-organ  to  a  classical 
piece  played  by  a  first-class  orchestra,  and  the  funny  pictures  of 
the  Sunday  paper  to  a  masterpiece  of  a  great  artist.     Sentiments 
are  so  complex  that  the  whole  mental  structure  of  every  individual 
must  be  taken  into  account. 


INTELLECTUAL  SENTIMENTS     153 

I.    INTELLECTUAL   SENTIMENTS 

1.  Love  of  Truth. — The  basis  of  the  intellectual  sentiments 
is  the  love  of  truth.     Man  is  naturally  eager  to  know,  and  although 
this  tendency  is  not  explicit  at  first,  it  manifests  itself  in  many 
ways,  such  as  questions,  investigations,  attempts  at  generaliza- 
tion  and   explanation.     Men   do  not  always  require   the  same 
accurate  and  scientific  explanation,  but  all  want  to  link  facts  and 
events  together  under  the  same  general  laws.    In  its  highest 
form,  the  love  of  truth  is  disinterested,  pursuing  knowledge  for 
its  own  sake,  and  apart  from  practical  and  utilitarian  motives 
like  the  love  of  fame,  the  hope  of  remuneration,  the  satisfaction 
of  ambition,  and  the  like.     In  its  earlier  stages,  especially,  this 
sentiment  is  associated  with,  and  results  from,  other  feelings. 
The  child  learns  his  lesson  in  order  to  please  his  teacher  and  parents, 
or  in  order  to  avoid  punishment  and  obtain  reward.    Later  he  may 
come  to  see  the  necessity  of  learning  in  order  to  attain  success  in 
life,  and,  later  still,  he  will  learn  because  of  the  pleasure  which  he 
finds  in  knowing. 

2.  Ignorance.  —  (a)  Since  man  likes  to  know,  it  follows  that 
the  awareness  of  ignorance  and  perplexity  is  painful.    To  see  some- 
thing which  cannot  be  understood  creates  a  certain  feeling  of  want 
and  a  sense  of  uneasiness,  especially  if  that  thing  is  of  interest. 
This  general  feeling  of  ignorance  and  confusion,  however,  may 
sometimes  be  accompanied  by  pleasurable  elements,  like  novelty, 
surprise,  and  wonder. 

(b)  Novelty  implies  either  an  objective  change,  or  the  discovery 
by  the  mind  of  a  new  aspect  in  the  object.    It  is  likely  to  produce 
a  certain  amount  of  pleasure.    Surprise  indicates  not  only  a  change, 
but  a  sudden  and  unexpected  change.     Wonder  refers  to  something 
which  is  unexpected  because  it  is  out  of  the  ordinary,  or  which 
seems  strange  on  account  of  its  unusually  large  or  small  size,  its 
peculiar  unwonted  characteristics,  its  excellence  or  depravity,  etc. 
Hence  it  is  a  very  complex  state,  in  which  pleasurable  and  unpleas- 
urable  elements  may  be  combined. 

(c)  Ignorance,  perplexity,  wonder,  naturally  arouse  the  curios- 
ity and  the  desire  to  know.     Curiosity  is  one  of  the  mainsprings  of 


.  154  PSYCHOLOGY 

mental  activity.  It  prompts  to  inquire,  investigate,  and  question. 
At  a  more  developed  stage  it  can  be  sustained  longer,  because 
the  love  of  truth  is  deeper.  In  the  child  the  feeling  of  curiosity 
would  soon  be  forgotten,  were  not  the  interest  kept  up  and  revived. 
Curiosity  is  very  useful;  it  must  be  encouraged,  and,  as  much  as 
possible,  satisfied.  It  is  the  sign  of  an  inquisitive  mind  and  of 
eagerness  to  know.  Hence,  in  repressing  the  excessive  and  objec- 
tionable forms  of  this  feeling,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  discour- 
age or  rebuke  the  child,  or  in  any  way  to  repress  the  natural  and 
useful  tendency  of  the  mind  to  know  what  it  has  the  duty  or  right 
to  know. 

3.  Curiosity  Leads  to  Investigation.  —  At  this  stage  are  expe- 
rienced various  feelings  of  pursuit,  discovery,  assimilation,  and 
possession;  or  of  incapacity,  disappointment,  and  failure. 

(a)  Pursuit,  as  an  exercise  of  activity,  is  a  source  of  pleasure. 
This  character,  however,  may  be  modified  at  every  step  by  the 
hope  of  success  or  the  fear  of  failure,  the  sense  of  power  or  of 
incapacity. 

(b)  Discovery  is  a  source  of  great  pleasure,  and,  when  confusion 
and  perplexity  have  preceded,  when  the  pursuit  has  been  arduous 
and  strenuous,  the  pleasure  of  final  success  is  enhanced  by  con- 
trast.    How  much  greater  is  the  joy  of  finding  a  solution  for  one- 
self than  that  of  being  told  without  having  made  any  effort.    A 
success  which  has  cost  more  labor  is  more  pleasurable.    The 
failure  to  find  a  solution  is  always  unpleasant. 

(c)  The  knowledge  thus  acquired  is  assimilated  with  the  knowl- 
edge already  at  hand.     It  is  compared  to  and  incorporated  with 
the  other  mental  possessions.    The  feeling  of  logical  consistency, 
that  is,  of  agreement  with  previous  experience  and  knowledge, 
is  very  pleasant.     On  the  contrary,  the  awareness  of  contradiction 
and  inconsistency  is  distressing  and  produces  a  new  state  of  per- 
plexity; either  the  new  knowledge  is  invalid  and  the  mind  has 
gone  astray,  or  previously  acquired  knowledge  has  to  be  rejected. 

Besides  the  feelings  of  which  we  have  spoken  may  be  mentioned 
some  others  that  have  both  an  intellectual  and  an  ethical  aspect, 
like  fairness,  impartiality,  disinterestedness,  or,  on  the  contrary, 
intellectual  bias,  prejudice,  and  prepossession.  When  these  are 


AESTHETIC     SENTIMENTS  155 

experienced  in  ourselves  or  perceived  in  others,  they  naturally 
produce  complex  agreeable  or  disagreeable  sentiments. 


II.    /ESTHETIC  SENTIMENTS 

Certain  persons,  things,  and  actions  which  we  call  beautiful, 
pretty,  graceful,  sublime,  harmonious,  melodious,  witty,  ludi- 
crous, etc.,  produce  in  the  mind  a  pleasurable  impression,  whereas 
others  recognized  as  ugly,  inharmonious,  improportionate,  etc., 
produce  a  disagreeable  feeling.  This  is  called  the  aesthetic  sen- 
timent, and  the  special  faculty  for  experiencing  it,  or  the  suscepti- 
bility to  it,  is  called  the  aesthetic  taste.  The  beautiful  is  always 
agreeable,  but  the  agreeable  is  not  always  beautiful. 

i.  Elements  of  the  ^Esthetic  Sentiment. — The  objective  ele- 
ments of  beauty  will  be  examined  in  ^Esthetics.  On  the  subjec- 
tive side,  the  one  of  interest  to  psychology,  the  elements  of  the 
aesthetic  sentiments  are: 

(a)  Sensory.    Objects    that    produce  aesthetic  sentiments  are 
perceived  by  two  senses:  (i)  sight  —  natural  objects,  such  as  land- 
scapes,  sceneries,  rivers,  seas,  mountains,  etc.;   artificial   objects, 
such  as  paintings,   monuments,   sculptures,   etc.;   (2)  hearing  — 
singing  of  birds,  music,  rhythm,  poetry,  etc.     Some  sensations  of 
color,  light,  sound,  etc.,  in  themselves  are  agreeable  and  pleasant 
for  all  men.    This  purely  sensuous  feeling  which  results  from  a 
suitable  stimulation  of  the  sense-organ  disposes  and  contributes 
to  the  aesthetic  pleasure,  but  stops  at  its  lowest  degree. 

(b)  Perceptive  and  intellectual.     Details  must  be  perceived  in 
their  mutual  relations,  so  as  to  give  rise  to  the  perception  of  the 
object  as  a  whole.    The    aesthetic  sentiment  is   due   chiefly  to 
this    perception   of    details    or    units    forming    one    harmonious 
whole. 

(c)  Associative  and  ideal.    Things  which  of  themselves  might 
not  arouse  any  special  aesthetic  sentiment  do  so  on  account  of 
the  memories  which  they  recall  or  the  ideas  which  they  suggest. 
Historical  places  where  important  events  have  occurred,  or  places 
associated  with  legends,  will,  on  account  of  these  associations, 
arouse  sentiments  more  readily.     Or  again,  a  certain  scenery  will 


156  PSYCHOLOGY 

suggest  ideas  of  danger,  power,  or  strength,  which  contribute 
to  the  production  and  special  aspects  of  sentiments.  It  is  not  so 
much  on  account  of  their  melodies  as  on  account  of  the  associa- 
tions which  they  suggest  that  the  national  hymn  or  patriotic  songs 
are  able  to  arouse  enthusiastic  feelings. 

2.  Special  Features.  —  Among  the  special  features  of  the  aes- 
thetic sentiments  two  must  be  mentioned. 

(a)  ^Esthetic  taste  is  capricious,  and  the  old  proverb  "De  gus- 
tibus  non  disputandum  "  does  not  only  apply  to  the  sense  of 
taste,  but  indicates  also  that  diverse  feelings  may  be  aroused  in 
several  individuals  by  the  perception  of  the  same  object.    These 
differences    come    partly    from    native    dispositions,    emotional 
tendencies  and   character,  and   partly  from   the  cultivation   of 
taste  in  a  certain  direction. 

(b)  However,  there  is  a  standard  of  taste  which  varies  within 
broader  or  narrower  limits  according  as  it  is  applied  to  a  more  or 
less  numerous  class  of  men.    Thus  there  are  things  which  cannot 
be  considered  as  aesthetic  in  any  place  or  at  any  time,  but  they 
are  few.     The  standard  is  more  uniform  for  the  same  epoch,  still 
more  so  when  applied  only  to  a  nation,  a  class  having  the  same 
education,  a  school  within  the  class,  a  closely  related  group  within 
the  school. 

These  questions  will  be  developed  more  at  length  in  ^Esthetics. 
Some  points  concerning  the  subjective  or  psychological  aspect 
of  the  aesthetic  feelings  will  find  there  a  more  suitable  place,  as 
they  will  help  to  determine  the  nature  of  objective  beauty. 

3.  Forms  of  the  Esthetic  Sentiment.  —  The  sentiments  thus 
far  analyzed  in  their  generality  take  several  forms  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  object  by  which  they  are  aroused,     (i)  Sublim- 
ity implies  greatness,  superiority,  and  power.      Hence  the  corre- 
sponding feeling  is  mingled  with  awe,  fear,  admiration,  and  a  sense 
of  inferiority  and  weakness.    Thus  something  immense  and  impos- 
ing in  space  or  time,  the  power  of  the  sea  in  a  tempest,  an  heroic 
deed,  etc.     (2)  Prettiness,  on  the  contrary,  refers  to  something 
small,  tiny,  or  weak.     (3)  The  feeling  of  the  ludicrous,  wit,  humor, 
is  produced  by  something  unexpected,  surprising,  incongruous,  or 
undignified.     It  is  expressed  by  laughter  and  mirth. 


MORAL     SENTIMENTS  157 

III.    MORAL   SENTIMENTS 

1.  Their  Nature.  —  The  moral  sentiments  refer  to  voluntary 
human  actions  in  so  far  as  they  are  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong. 

(1)  Voluntary  actions  are  the  only  ones  which  we  call  moral. 
Merely  physical  happenings  have  no  moral  aspect,  and  the  same 
must  be  said  of  accidental  results  produced  unintentionally,  and 
of  spontaneous  actions  in  man,  like  the  organic  vital  functions. 
The  will  has  no  control  over  these.     We  condemn  as  wrong  the 
mere  intention  and  desire  to  do  wrong,  even  if  it  be  not  carried  out. 

(2)  In  so  far  as  they  are  right  or  wrong.     Other  feelings  may  refer 
to  the  same  actions  in  other  respects;  other  sciences  may  try  to 
give  them  another  special  direction.    The  point  of  view  here  is 
that  of  the  moral  value,  i.e.  of  the  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  the 
actions,  their  comparison  with  a  rule,  a  standard,  and  an  ideal  to 
which  they  ought  to  conform. 

2.  The  Fundamental  Form  of  the  Moral  Sentiment  is  the  feeling 
of  right  and  wrong  in  conscience,  that  is,  a  feeling  of  obligation  to 
do  or  avoid  certain  actions.    It  imposes  a  reference  to  some  law, 
authority,  and  command  which  tell  us  absolutely:   "Thou  shalt," 
or  "Thou  shalt  not."    Whatever  source  be  assigned  to  this  cate- 
gorical imperative,  and  however  great  be  the  differences  in  the 
standards  of  morality  among  different  nations  and  at  different 
times,  all  men  recognize  that  some  actions  must,  and  others  must 
not,  be  performed.    Hence  this  sentiment  is  a  powerful  spring  of 
action. 

The  sentiment  of  right  and  wrong  must  be  distinguished  from 
that  of  mere  utility  or  from  the  conditional  imperative.  If  I  fail 
to  profit  by  a  good  business  opportunity,  I  may  blame  myself, 
but  not  as  having  done  wrong  morally.  According  to  the  moral 
character  of  the  action  a  man  feels  satisfaction,  pleasure,  and 
self-approval,  or  remorse,  shame,  guilt,  and  self-condemnation. 
All  this  supposes  the  sentiment  of  responsibility  and  free-will. 
We  experience  satisfaction  and  remorse  only  for  those  actions 
which  we  feel  we  could  perform  or  avoid.  If  I  kill  a  man 
accidentally  and  unavoidably,  I  may,  of  course,  be  very  sorry, 
but  I  do  not  feel  responsible  for  it. 


158  PSYCHOLOGY 

3.  Factors  in  the  Concrete  Sentiment  of  Morality.  —  This  is 
not  the  place  to  speak  of  the  value  of  the  moral  law,  which  will 
be  explained  in  Ethics.  But  one  cannot  fail  to  notice  a  great 
diversity  of  standards  according  to  individuals,  places,  and  times. 
What  one  would  be  thoroughly  ashamed  of  will  be  indifferent  for 
another.  What  is  considered  wrong  in  one  locality,  or  at  one 
time,  may  be  considered  right  elsewhere  and  at  another  time. 
Few,  if  any,  are  the  actions  which  have  been  regarded  as  wrong 
at  all  times  and  by  all  men.  Without  speaking  of  the  objective 
value  of  actions,  and  of  the  true  rule  to  which  they  ought  to  con- 
form, we  merely  enumerate  the  main  psychological  factors  that 
influence  concrete  moral  feelings,  (i)  The  importance  of  intel- 
lectual faculties  in  supplying  motives  and  intentions,  and  in  deter- 
mining the  moral  value  of  actions,  is  self-evident.  (2)  Custom, 
association,  imagination,  and  habit  exercise  a  very  great  influence. 
What  a  man  has  been  accustomed  to  do,  even  if  known  intellec- 
tually to  be  wrong,  will  hardly  excite  any  feeling  of  shame  or 
remorse.  The  inveterate  drunkard  or  criminal  are  good  illustra- 
tions of  this.  Again,  what  is  customary  in  a  locality  arouses 
no  surprise  and  no  moral  feeling  for  those  who  live  there,  though 
it  may  shock  outsiders.  (3)  Human  passions  may  blind  man's 
understanding  and  pervert  his  will.  Thus  avarice  and  greed  will 
easily  lead  to  theft,  hatred  to  murder,  and  so  on.  The  feeling  ex- 
perienced may  vary  in  nature  and  intensity  according  to  the 
prompting  passions  and  the  derived  advantages. 

IV.    RELIGIOUS   SENTIMENTS 

i.  Their  Nature.  —  Religious  sentiments,  manifestations,  and 
practices  are  found  in  all  places  and  at  all  times,  but  take  many 
different  forms.  The  conceptions  regarding  the  attributes  of  the 
object  or  objects  of  religious  worship,  and  the  nature  of  religious 
practices,  have  been  and  are  still  varied  almost  beyond  imagina- 
tion. One  has  but  to  recall  the  practices  of  polytheism  and 
fetichism  to  understand  the  truth  of  this  statement.  In  some  reli- 
gions, the  dominant  feeling  is  that  of  fear,  and,  in  order  to  placate 
the  terrible  divinities,  practices  of  an  inconceivable  cruelty  are 


RELIGIOUS     SENTIMENTS  159 

frequently  adopted.  In  others  the  dominant  feeling  is  love,  and 
all  good  gifts  are  lavished  by  the  Creator  on  His  creatures.  These 
feelings  may  assume  numberless  forms  and  give  rise  to  many  others. 
It  would  be  an  endless  task  to  go  through  their  analysis,  and  to 
enter  into  the  enumeration  of  the  actions  performed  for  religious 
motives.  Some  elements,  however,  are  common  to  all  forms  of 
the  religious  sentiment. 

Independently  of  particular  creeds,  there  is  in  all  religions  a 
sentiment  of  dependence,  a  recognition  of  God's  greatness  and  power, 
and  of  man's  littleness  and  weakness  when  compared  to  God. 
According  to  the  nature  which  is  ascribed  to  God,  this  feeling  will 
take  the  forms  of  love,  confidence,  fear,  resignation,  prayer,  etc., 
and  express  itself  in  the  offering  of  various  sacrifices.  In  its  high- 
est stage  of  development,  the  feeling  of  the  greatness  sof  God 
becomes  that  of  the  divine  Infinity  which  brings  man  face  to  face 
with  an  unfathomable  mystery. 

2.  Main  Forms  of  Religious  Sentiments.  —  The  religious  sen- 
timent will  tend  to  make  man  view  things  in  their  relations  to 
God,  as  coming  from  Him,  directed  by  Him,  returning  to  Him, 
and,  in  the  case  of  man,  accountable  to  Him.     It  ennobles  our 
views  of  things  and  events  by  referring  them  to  their  source  and 
ultimate  goal.    It  even  creates  the  desire  of  a  union  with  God  by 
knowledge  and  possession.    Hence  come  many  of  the  ideas  of  re- 
ward and  punishment  in  the  next  life.     Hence  also  the  ideas  of 
being  in  peace  with  God  when  we  have  not  offended  Him,  and 
of  enmity  when  we  have  not  complied  with  His  law.    It  is  easy  to 
see  how  complex  these  feelings  are,  how  numerous  their  elements, 
and  how  difficult  their  analysis.    They  vary  in  nature,  eleva- 
tion, and  refinement  according  to  the  nature  and  elevation  of  the 
ideas  concerning  God,  the  divine  attributes,  and  the  divine  laws 
and  sanctions. 

3.  Psychological  Factors.  —  These  feelings  manifest  themselves 
by  religious  worship,  that  is,  by  a  multitude  of  religious  practices 
which  in  turn  are  the  sources  of  many  other  feelings.     The  main 
factors  in  the  determination  of  these  practices  are:  (i)  Reason, 
which  examines  the  foundation  of  beliefs  and  the  value  of  religious 
practices.     (2)   Habit;  what  we  are  used  to  seems  right,  whereas 


160  PSYCHOLOGY 

novelty  arouses  suspicion.  A  new  belief  that  contradicts  accus- 
tomed ways  of  thinking,  or  which  is  merely  added  to  them,  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  accept.  Unwonted  practices  are  generally 
unwelcome  until  the  sense  of  novelty  has  passed.  On  the  contrary, 
an  unfounded  or  superstitious  belief  and  practice,  if  habitual, 
stands  firm.  It  is  easy  to  notice  how  great  a  difficulty  is  found  in 
changing  the  habitual  religious  ideas  and  customs  of  thoroughly 
religious  people.  (3)  The  senses,  association,  and  imagination; 
certain  surroundings,  times,  and  places  are  more  favorable  to 
religious  practices  and  to  religious  manifestations.  Looking  at  reli- 
gious pictures,  statues,  symbols,  etc.,  hearing  or  singing  religious 
hymns,  are  incentives  to  the  religious  feelings.  (4)  Other  emotions 
and  sentiments;  thus  suffering  and  need  are  motives  for  having 
recourse  to  God  by  prayer.  How  much  more  fervent  is  prayer  in 
time  of  danger!  The  beauty  of  religious  temples,  and  the  solem- 
nity of  rites  and  ceremonies,  also  contribute  to  the  experience 
of  religious  sentiments. 


CONCLUSION 

IMPORTANCE  AND   CULTURE  OF   AFFECTIVE  LIFE 

I.  IMPORTANCE  OF  AFFECTIVE  LIFE 

Affective  life  is  very  important  both  for  the  individual  himself 
and  in  his  relations  with  other  men.  In  general  it  may  be  said 
that  feelings  give  to  human  life  its  distinctive  character,  its  tone, 
its  happiness  or  unhappiness,  its  enjoyment  or  irksomeness.  Hence 
judgments  passed  on  other  men  refer  in  a  large  measure  to  their 
character  and  their  various  modes  of  feeling.  The  esteem  in 
which  some  men  are  held,  and  the  reprobation  which  is  given 
others,  are  due  to  their  conduct  in  so  far  as  this  conduct  manifests 
their  sentiments. 

i.  In  the  Development  of  Intellectual  Life,  as  already  pointed 
out,  feelings  are  important  factors,  (i)  They  incite  to  the  search 
of  truth,  the  enjoyment  of  the  pursuit  and  of  the  success.  They 
may  also  be  the  sources  of  error  and  bias,  when  interest  is  found 


CULTURE     OF     AFFECTIVE     LIFE  l6l 

in  one  solution  rather  than  in  its  opposite.  They  magnify  or  min- 
imize reasons  that  tend  to  prove  a  conclusion  which  a  priori  is  found 
to  be  favorable  or  unfavorable,  and  which  accordingly  one  desires 
to  have  demonstrated  or  disproved.  (2)  Feelings  are  frequently 
made  use  of  in  convincing  others.  In  many  cases  an  appeal  to  pure 
reason,  though  it  be  cogent,  will  fail,  whereas  an  appeal  to  the 
feelings  will  be  successful.  If  a  speaker  wants  to  bring  his  audi- 
ence to  practical  conclusions,  he  has  not  only  to  convince  but  to 
move  and  touch  them;  hence  he  must  appeal  to  their  ambitions, 
desires,  interests,  egoistic  or  altruistic  emotions,  and  higher 
sentiments.  (Cf.  p.  117  ff.) 

2.  In  Regard  to  Moral  Life.  —  (i)  Feelings  themselves  may  have 
a  moral  value  according  as  they  are  or  are  not  regulated  and  con- 
trolled.   One  may  be  blameworthy  for  failing  to  repress  certain 
emotions  or  passions.     (2)  Feelings  are  powerful  springs  of  action. 
As  a  motive  of  action,  a  mere  intellectual  idea  is  weak;  its  strength 
is  greatly  increased  by  feelings.    The  notion  that  an  action  is  good 
or  bad  will  not  go  far  toward  making  one  perform  or  avoid  it, 
unless  there  is  at  the  same  time  in  consciousness  the  love  of  the 
good  and  the  hatred  of  the  bad,  the  sense  of  duty,  and  the  pleas- 
ure in  complying  with  the  rules  of  morality.     (3)  Feelings  exer- 
cise a  great  influence  on  responsibility.    A  murder  committed  coolly 
and  deliberately  is  judged  more  severely  than  a  murder  com- 
mitted in  a  passion.     Certain  feelings  blind  the   understanding 
and  prevent  it  from  throwing  its  searching  light  on  the  value  of 
an  action. 

3.  Religious  Life  is  largely  dependent  on  the  affective  life.    A 
revealed  creed,  especially  one  that  includes  mysteries  to  be  believed, 
will  be  accepted  with  difficulty  by  a  proud  intellect.    Under  the 
influence  of  feelings,  how  frequently  is  the  accidental  in  religion 
preferred  to  the  essential,  the  optional  to  the  obligatory!    The 
choice  of  religious  practices  which  are  not  regarded  as  obligatory 
will  be  largely  a  matter  of  feelings  prompting  to  one  mode  of  prayer, 
devotion,  offering,  sacrifice,  rather  than  to  another.     Some  saints 
are  austere  and  unsympathetic;  others  are  mild,  and  excite  not 
only  our  admiration,  but  also  our  sympathy  and  love.    The  former 
are  directed  chiefly  by  fear  of  the  judgments  of  God,  the  latter  by 


162  PSYCHOLOGY 

confidence  in  His  mercy.    According  to  our  own  feelings,  we  are 
inclined  to  imitate  the  former  or  the  latter. 

4.  For  Success  and  Happiness.  —  The  importance  of  affective 
life  in  daily  affairs  and  for  general  happiness  is  very  great. 

(a)  Feelings  are  not  all  of  the  same  importance,  nor  are  they 
necessary  to  all  men  in  the  same  degree  —  this  depends  on  the 
special  conditions  of  life  and  culture,  —  yet  some  are  fundamental, 
especially  those  of  joy,  hope,  cheerfulness,  fear,  grief,  gloominess, 
etc.,  since  they  are  the  main  factors  of  happiness  or  misery  in  life, 
and  contribute  so  much  to  man's  character,  and  to  his  view  of 
things.     Emotions,  and  especially  passions,  are  the  source  of  the 
greatest   good,   and   of   the   greatest   evil.     A   good   conscience 
makes  a  man  happy,  remorse  leaves  him  no  rest. 

(b)  Personal  moods  and  dispositions,  inclinations,  or  aversions 
are  due  to  feelings,  and  experience  teaches  how  much  influence 
they  exercise  for  success  and  failure. 

(c)  Other  men  are  to  be  dealt  with  according  to  their  temper 
and  character,  that  is,  chiefly  according  to  their  affective  peculiar- 
ities.    Success  in  dealing  with  others  depends  principally  on  a  cer- 
tain insight  into  the  propensities  of  those  with  whom  we  come  in 
contact.    The  successful  man  knows  that  each  individual  must 
be  treated  differently  from  all  others,  that  each  has  a  special 
"touchy  "  or  "sensitive  "  spot,  etc. 

(d)  General  happiness  is  partly  objective,  and  due  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  external  goods;  but  it  is  chiefly  subjective.    Frequently 
we  see  the  poor  happier  than  the  rich,  the  man  who  has  only  the 
necessaries  of  life  more  cheerful  than  the  one  who  has  all  possible 
luxuries.     Happiness  is  the  satisfaction  of  desires.     Desire  little, 
and  little  will  suffice  to  make  you  happy.    Be  resigned  to  the  in- 
evitable, and  accept  cheerfully  that  which,  however  painful,  can- 
not be  averted.    Let  your  mind  be  hopeful,  and  always  strive  for 
better  things,  but  let  it  not  lose  courage  and  equanimity  if  failure 
follows  your  efforts.     All  things,  even  the  worst,  have  some  brighter 
aspect;  look  at  them  from  this  point  of  view,  and  this  bright- 
ness will  be  a  source  of  light  for   your  reason  and  of  agree- 
able warmth    for  your   heart.     In  all    circumstances,   cultivate 
"happy "    feelings    and    dispositions,    throw    away    melancholy 


CULTURE     OF     AFFECTIVE     LIFE  163 

and  gloomy  views;  life  will  bring  you  greater  comfort,  pleasure, 
and  success. 

II.  CULTIVATION  OF  AFFECTIVE  LIFE 

1.  Its  Necessity.  —  The  importance  of  feelings  in  general  suffi- 
ciently shows  the  necessity  of  cultivating  them. 

(a)  This  culture  is  general — of  the  affective  life  in  its  most  general 
manifestations,  —  or  special  —  of  particular  feelings  and  emotions, 
for  instance,  of  the  religious  sentiment,  aesthetic  taste,  sympathy, 
etc.    All  feelings  are  not  equally  necessary  in  all  conditions  of  life. 

(b)  Nor  are  all  feelings  capable  of  the  same  degree  of  culture 
and  control.    This  varies  with  subjective  dispositions,  natural 
endowments,    character,    and    temperament,    which    cannot    be 
changed  altogether.    The  more  refined  feelings  are  not  accessible 
to  all  classes  in  their  perfection.    Yet  for  all,  within  variable  lim- 
its, progress  is  possible.    Even  physical  suffering  which  seems 
inevitable  can  be  alleviated  by  physical  and  mental  means. 

(c)  The  culture  of  affective  life  is  negative  when  it  has  for  its 
object  the  repression  or  suppression  of  feelings;  positive  when  it 
tends  to  increase  or  acquire  them. 

(d)  It  may  also  be  personal,  for  the  individual  himself  who 
applies  himself  to  it;  or  it  may  be  the  culture  of  feelings  in  others, 
especially  in  children,  by  education.    The  child's  affective  life 
must  be  cultivated  very  early.     Even  when  objectionable,  feelings 
may  be  utilized,  transformed,  and  elevated  by  making  them  serve 
nobler  purposes  and  giving  them  worthy  objects. 

2.  General  Principles.  —  (a)  Difficult  though  it  is,  cultivation 
is  possible  and  necessary.     Feelings  can  and  must  be  regulated, 
acquired  or  suppressed,  increased  or  decreased,  according  to  the 
dictates  of  reason,  and  within  just  limits.     Some  are  praiseworthy, 
others  shameful.     Even  feelings  that  are  good  may  be  excessive, 
e.g.  self-love,  sympathy,  etc.     Hence  all  must  be  controlled. 

(b)  No  fixed  standard  can  be  assigned,  for  it  varies  within  exten- 
sive limits  according  to  conditions  in  life.  In  the  case  of  more 
fundamental  and  more  necessary  feelings,  like  sympathy,  love, 
fairness,  etc.,  the  limits,  though  wide,  are  narrower  than  for  the 
others.  Moreover,  it  is  impossible  for  all  men  to  be  moulded 


164  PSYCHOLOGY 

according  to  the  same  pattern.  Every  individual's  personality 
must  be  preserved.  This  world  would  be  a  dull  world  if  it  were 
otherwise. 

(c)  Generally  speaking,  the  egoistic  feelings  tend  to  excess  and 
should  rather  be  repressed;  altruistic  feelings  tend  to  defect  and  should 
rather  be  developed.    Higher  sentiments  are  to  be  cultivated  ac- 
cording to  education  and  special  dispositions. 

(d)  Feelings  are  connected.    Hence  cultivating  one  group  will 
also  affect  the  others;  cultivating  the  more  general  will  affect  the 
more  special.    Thus  developing  sympathy  will  develop  compas- 
sion, esteem,  and  respect. 

(e)  Feelings  arise  from  ideas,  hence  controlling  the  ideas  will 
naturally  modify  the  resulting  feelings.     Feelings  are  also  closely 
associated  with  their  physical  expression;  control  of  the  physical 
expression  will  be  a  help  in  controlling  the  feeling  itself.     The 
law  of  adaptation  and  habit  and  the  law  of  change  have  been 
mentioned  already. 

(/)  Feelings  are  contagious.  For  instance,  to  be  with  a  congre- 
gation praying  fervently  helps  the  attitude  of  prayer;  panic  is  a 
fear  which  spreads  rapidly;  the  indignation  and  cruelty  of  a  mob 
are  communicated  sometimes  without  any  reason. 

(g)  A  special  illusion  must  be  guarded  against,  that  of  mistak- 
ing the  strong  expression  of  a  feeling  for  strenuous  action.  The 
man  who  vents  his  displeasure  and  inveighs  vehemently  against 
this  or  that  evil,  may  come  to  the  belief  that  he  is  doing  much  to 
relieve  the  situation,  whereas  he  merely  expresses  his  dissatisfac- 
tion without  trying  to  find  the  causes  of  the  evil  or  the  suitable 
remedies. 

3.  A  Few  Special  Applications  of  these  general  principles  will 
be  mentioned  here. 

(a)  To  repress  a  feeling:  (i)  Avoid  occasions  in  which  you  know 
from  experience  that  it  would  be  aroused.  (2)  If  it  is  aroused, 
combat  it  by  positive  efforts  of  reason  and  will.  (3)  Give  rise 
to  contrary  feelings  by  calling  to  mind  contrary  ideas.  In  most 
cases  this  is  the  most  effective  means.  (4)  Procure  yourself  diver- 
sion and  distraction  by  thinking  of  other  things  which  have  enough 
interest  to  keep  the  mind's  attention.  (5)  Control  the  emotional 


CULTURE     OF     AFFECTIVE     LIFE  165 

expression,  or  create  an  antagonistic  one.  To  check  all  manifes- 
tations of  anger  helps  to  decrease  the  feeling  itself.  To  whistle 
at  night  will  help  to  remove  fear.  A  noble  and  proud  behavior 
will  tend  to  do  away  with  excessive  timidity.  Expressions  of 
sympathy  will  reduce  excessive  selfishness,  and  so  on. 

(b)  To  create  or  stimulates,  feeling:  (i)  Call  forth  suitable  ideas, 
objects,  circumstances,  or  situations.  (2)  Cultivate  certain  modes 
of  attention,  reflection,  and  imagination.  (3)  Produce  the  suit- 
able expression.  Clenching  the  fist  is  likely  to  stimulate  anger; 
trembling,  fear;  kneeling,  prayer;  an  humble  deportment,  humil- 
ity. Actors  have  been  seen  to  feel  really  and  with  great  inten- 
sity the  sentiments  and  emotions  which  they  merely  sought  to 
express. 

In  all  this  the  purpose  is  to  make  the  affective  life  an  auxil- 
iary in  striving  for  the  noblest  aims. 


CHAPTER   III 
ACTING  AND  WILLING 

ARTICLE  I.    ACTION  AND  MODES   OF  ACTION 
I.    INTRODUCTION 

I.  MEANING  OF  ACTION 

1.  Definition  of  Terms.  —  It  would  be  as  impossible  to  explain 
action  to  one  who  had  never  exercised  any  activity  —  were  such 
a  case  possible  —  as  it  is  to  explain  color  to  the  man  born  blind, 
or  sound  to  the  man  born  deaf.    No  definition  of  action  can  be 
given.     Nor  is  a  definition  necessary,  for  all  men    understand 
what  it  is  to  "do"  and  to  "be  active"  and  to  "exercise  one's 
energy."    The  term  conation  denotes  all  the  active  aspects  of  con- 
sciousness, or  rather  that  which  is  common  to  them  all,  namely, 
a  tendency  to  induce,  preserve,  or  change  a  state  of  mind  or  body. 
Thus  conation  applies  to  those  processes  which  we  call  desiring, 
craving,   longing,   endeavoring,   trying,   making   effort,   striving, 
wishing,  willing,  and  the  like. 

2.  Meaning  of  Action.  —  (a)  In  a  broad  sense  —  first  extreme 
—  activity  is  a  general  condition  of  all  our  faculties,  and  all  men- 
tal states  have  an  active  aspect.    To  think,  to  judge,  to  perceive, 
to  reason,  to  feel  .  .  .  are  actions,  or,  perhaps  better,  reactions. 
The  mind  is  not  exclusively  passive;  it  is  first  acted  on,  but  must 
also,  in  response,  exercise  its  own  activity.    Thus  knowledge  has  a 
twofold  aspect,  one  representative,  and  the  other  active.    So  far 
we  have  considered  only  its  representative  aspect.    Even  feelings 
and  passions,  though  primarily  passive,  are  also  in  this  sense  active. 

(b)  In  a  very  strict  sense  —  second  extreme  —  action  refers 
only  to  external  actions,  i.e.  to  movements  of  the  organism.  Thus 
we  oppose  action  to  thought  and  feeling,  both  of  which  are  inter- 

166 


ACTION  167 

nal  and  subjective.  Thus  also  we  oppose  the  man  of  science, 
thought,  contemplation,  meditation,  ...  to  the  man  of  action,  who 
uses  his  energy  in  some  external  and  visible  manner,  and  for  tan- 
gible results.  The  man  who  spends  his  days  in  study  and  reflec- 
tion, although  he  is  at  work,  and  hence  really  active  all  the  time, 
is  not  called  a  man  of  action. 

(c)  Between  these  two  extremes,  terms  denoting  exercise  and 
activity  are  applied  to  a  multitude  of  processes.  My  stomach 
acts  on  the  food  to  digest  it.  My  brain  and  my  mind  are  active 
during  study,  reflection,  reasoning,  deliberation,  and  choice.  I 
am  active  in  interpreting  or  paying  attention  to  my  sensations 
and  perceptions,  but  I  should  rather  be  inclined  to  call  myself 
inactive  when  simply  receiving  sensations  and  perceptions  with- 
out making  any  effort  to  interpret  and  understand  them.  Thus 
we  say  of  a  boy  in  class  that  he  is  merely  passive  and  does  nothing, 
when  he  is  present  without  making  any  personal  effort. 

II.  GENERAL  MODES  OF  ACTION 

N.B.  What  we  say  here  of  positive  action  must  be  applied  also 
to  inhibition,  i.e.  the  checking  of  an  activity  which  would  natu- 
rally manifest  itself.  Inhibition  is  but  another  form  of  effort  and 
activity. 

1.  Personal  and  Impersonal.  —  There  are  actions  which  I  am 
conscious  of  as^coming  from,  and  attributable  to,  myself.    They 
may  be  called  personal.    Others,  on  the  contrary,   take  place 
within  myself,  but  do  not  spring  from  my  own  ego.    They  may  be 
called  impersonal.    Thus  my  digestion,  my  winking  of  the  eye 
when  some  object  suddenly  approaches  too  near,  my  wounding 
or  killing  a  man  accidentally  and  unavoidably,  the  thoughts  that 
come  to  my  mind  of  themselves  and  inadvertently,  etc.,  are  not 
my  own  doings.    Applying  my  mind  purposely  to  a  certain  object 
or  study,  my  killing  a  man  premeditately  and  intentionally,  my 
voluntarily  going  to  a  certain  place,  etc.,  spring  from  my  own 
personal  activity. 

2.  Actions  are  Conscious  or  Unconscious.  —  (a)  While  I  am 
now  conscious  of  reading  and  writing,  I  am  not  conscious  of  a  mul- 
titude of  processes  that  take  place  within  the  organism,  and  that 


l68  PSYCHOLOGY 

might  be  conscious,  like  breathing;  nor  of  the  pain  which  I  felt  a 
moment  ago,  and  which  I  know  I  should  feel  if  I  were  not  absorbed 
in  something  else;  nor  of  the  ticking  of  my  clock,  although  I  must 
hear  it  in  some  way,  since,  if  it  stops,  I  become  immediately  aware 
of  the  fact. 

(b)  Conscious  actions  are  not  always  personal.  For  instance, 
I  may  be  conscious  of  the  beating  of  my  heart,  of  my  respiration, 
of  the  winking  of  my  eyes,  the  stretching  forward  of  my  arms 
when  I  feel  I  am  going  to  fall,  or  of  thoughts  suddenly  occurring 
to  my  mind.  Yet  I  know  that  I  am  not  the  cause,  but  only  the 
witness,  of  such  actions.  They  take  place  within  me,  but  I  am 
not  accountable  for  them.  Conscious  actions  therefore  may  be 
impersonal. 

On  the  other  hand,  hi  order  to  be  personal,  must  an  action  be 
conscious?  Or  can  there  be  personal,  yet  unconscious,  actions? 
An  action  cannot  actually  spring  from  myself  and  be  personal  with- 
out my  being  aware  of  it.  The  man  who  is  so  thoroughly  intoxi- 
cated, or  in  such  a  passion  that  he  no  longer  knows  what  he  is 
doing,  does  not  perform  any  personal  actions.  Not  himself,  but  his 
state  and  condition,  are  the  true  agents  if,  for  instance,  he  kills 
another  man.  Such  an  action  is  not  actually  and  immediately 
personal.  Yet  it  may  be  called  indirectly,  remotely,  and  causally 
personal,  if  the  man  consciously  and  voluntarily  induced  the 
state  of  intoxication  or  the  passion,  and  at  the  same  time  had 
some  consciousness  or  prevision  of  what  was  likely  to  happen  when 
he  would  no  longer  be  himself  and  no  longer  capable  of  acting  as 
a  person.  Hence  all  personal  actions  suppose  consciousness,  if 
not  actual,  at  least  antecedent. 

3.  Voluntary,  Non- Voluntary,  and  Involuntary.  —  From  what 
precedes  we  see  that  there  are  three  degrees  in  our  mode  of  acting. 
Some  actions  are  unconscious;  others  are  simply  conscious  but 
without  personal  will;  others  finally  are  volitional. 

With  regard  to  the  attitude  of  the  person  toward  the  action, 
we  may  have  (i)  voluntary,  (2)  non-voluntary,  (3)  involuntary 
action,  according  as  it  (i)  is  intended,  and  proceeds  from  a  posi- 
tive act  of  the  will;  or  (2)  is  independent  of  the  will,  the  will  neither 
producing  nor  opposing  it;  thus  I  may  let  my  mind  wander  at  lei- 


NON-VOLITIONAL    ACTION  169 

sure  without  doing  anything  to  induce  or  check  the  train  of  thought; 
or  (3)  finally  takes  place  against  the  will.  My  arm  may  be  moved 
by  force  notwithstanding  my  efforts  to  the  contrary;  I  may  be 
obliged  to  stay  in  some  place  because  of  paralysis;  or  I  may 
be  unable  to  banish  a  certain  thought  or  feeling  from  my  mind. 


II.     NON-VOLITIONAL  ACTION 

We  shall  speak  here  only  of  organic  activity  and  movement. 
There  are  also  many  non-voluntary  mental  actions  such  as 
perception,  reproduction  of  images,  association,  feeling,  etc.,  but 
these  have  been  examined  elsewhere.  They  are  the  spontaneous 
or  automatic  working  of  the  mind.  Non-volitional  movements 
may  be  divided  into  two  general  classes  according  as  (i)  they  are 
performed  not  only  without  a  command  and  direction  of  the  will, 
but,  even,  as  sometimes  happens,  without  preceding  or  accompany- 
ing consciousness  of  purpose  (random,  automatic,  and  reflex  move- 
ments) ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  (2)  are  performed  for  an  end  and  with 
some  consciousness  of  a  purpose  (impulsive  and  instinctive  move- 
ments). There  is  no  strict  line  of  demarcation  between  the  two 
classes;  actions  pass  gradually  from  the  former  to  the  latter.  It 
may  be  noted  also  that  authors  do  not  always  agree  in  defining 
the  terms  mentioned  here. 

I.   RANDOM,  AUTOMATIC,  AND  REFLEX  MOVEMENTS 

1.  Spontaneous  or  Random  Movements  include  a  great  number 
of  movements  of  the  limbs  in  the  child,  and  few  in  the  adult.    As 
far  as  can  be  known,  they  are  not  provoked  by  external  impres- 
sions or  internal  states  of  mind,  but  are  purposeless,  and  seem  to 
be  merely  spontaneous  overflows  of  energy. 

2.  Automatic  Movements  are  purposive  and  necessary  for  life, 
although  the  purpose  may  be  unconscious.    They  require  no  stimu- 
lation from  without,  but  are  spontaneous  discharges  of  energy 
from  the  nerve-centres.  The  most  common  examples  are  those  of  the 
regular  beating  of  the  heart,  respiratory  movements,  the  processes 
of  digestion  and  assimilation.    These  are  automatic  from  the  be- 
ginning.    Some  are  or  may  be  conscious;  others  are  unconscious. 


170  PSYCHOLOGY 

To  these  may  be  added  others  that  become  automatic  by  habit. 
In  the  beginning  they  require  consciousness,  attention,  and  effort; 
but,  later  on,  these  factors  are  no  longer  necessary,  and,  as  soon 
as  the  series  is  initiated,  all  the  movements  follow  of  themselves, 
being  perfectly  automatic  in  some  cases,  and  in  others,  nearly  so. 
As  examples  may  be  mentioned  walking,  dancing,  speaking,  etc. 
These  have  also  been  called  acquired  reflexes.  More  will  be  said 
about  them  when  we  speak  of  habit. 

3.  Reflex  Action  differs  from  automatic  action  chiefly  in  this, 
that,  whereas  the  latter  has  its  origin  within  the  organism  itself, 
the  reflex  action  is  due  to  a  stimulation  from  without.  It  is  a  motor 
process  due  directly  to  a  sensory  process,  but  without  will,  desire, 
conscious  effort,  or  conscious  purpose.  The  action  itself,  however, 
may  be  performed  consciously  or  unconsciously.  Thus  if  the  sole 
of  the  foot  be  tickled,  the  foot  is  immediately  withdrawn  from  its 
place,  whether  the  person  be  asleep  or  awake.  In  both  cases  the 
action  is  reflex;  in  the  former  it  is  unconscious,  in  the  latter  con- 
scious. Reflexes  are  due  to  motor  centres  which  are  excited  by 
an  external  sensory  stimulation,  the  afferent  nerve  and  the  effer- 
ent nerve  being  connected  in  the  nerve-centres  of  the  brain  or  of 
the  spinal  cord. 

Some  reflexes  are  original  and  natural;  they  tend  chiefly  to  the 
preservation  of  life,  like  sneezing,  swallowing,  winking.  Others 
are  acquired  and  depend  on  association  and  education.  These 
suppose  generally  some  conscious  state  to  start  the  whole  series. 
Thus  the  sight  of  the  notes  by  the  pianist  determines  immedi- 
ately the  appropriate  movements  for  striking  the  keys. 

Animals,  the  spinal  cord  of  which  has  been  severed,  or  the  brain 
removed,  perform  reflex  actions.  A  decapitated  frog  will  jerk 
away  its  leg  or  scratch  it  if  some  acid  be  put  on  it.  These  actions 
depend  on  the  nerve-centres  in  the  cord,  and,  although  they  are 
not  conscious,  they  are  nevertheless  seemingly  purposive.  They 
correspond  directly  and  immediately  to  the  stimulation,  just  as 
if  there  had  been  a  conscious  sensation. 

In  normal  life,  such  actions  as  sneezing,  winking,  vomiting, 
secreting  saliva,  withdrawing  the  hand  from  a  burning  object, 
extending  the  arms  forward  when  in  danger  of  falling,  etc.,  are 


NON-VOLITIONAL    ACTION  171 

reflex  actions.  Although  they  are  generally  accompanied  and 
even  preceded  by  consciousness,  they  are  not  determined  by  any 
effort,  nor  produced  under  the  guidance  of  the  will. 

II.  IMPULSIVE  AND  INSTINCTIVE  MOVEMENTS 

1.  Impulsive  Actions  are  those  which  proceed  immediately  from 
the  presence  of  an  idea  in  the  mind,  and  from  the  consciousness  of 
an  end  to  be  reached.    There  is  no  deliberation,  no  reflection,  no 
multiplicity  of  tendencies,  and  no  choice.     The  primary  impulses 
are  toward  pleasure  and  freedom  from  pain.     But,  as  the  work  of 
education  proceeds  and  habits  are  contracted,  impulses  are  diver- 
sified, and  become  as  numerous  as  the  things  themselves  from  which 
pleasure  and  pain  are  derived  in  the  physical,  the  intellectual, 
the  moral,  and  the  religious  spheres.     Hence  the  impulses  of  sev- 
eral men  in  the  same  circumstances  will  be  widely  different.    For 
instance,  a  murder  may  be  committed  impulsively  when  the  mind 
is  so  obsessed  by  one  idea  that  the  action  follows  immediately 
without  any  deliberation.    Again,  upon  hearing  a  noise  in  my  room 
at  night,  my  impulse  may  be  to  run  away,  or  to  speak  and  ask 
questions,  or  to  grasp  my  revolver  and  fire,  etc. 

To  impulsive  movements  may  be  reduced  imitative  movements 
which  originate  from  an  impulse  excited  by  the  perception  of  these 
movements  as  performed  by  others.  Children  especially  have  a 
tendency  to  imitate  the  actions  of  others,  like  smiling,  pouting, 
talking,  etc. 

2.  Instinctive  Actions  are  found  chiefly  in  animals;  their  num- 
ber is  small  in  man.    They  are  more  complex  than  impulsive 
actions,  do  not  always  suppose  the  clear  idea  of  the  end  to  be 
reached,  have  a  more  remote  purpose,  and  do  not  vary  so  much 
with  the  individuals,  but  are  common  to  the  species,  and  are  trans- 
mitted by  heredity.    Thus  the  migratory  habits  of  birds,  their 
building  of  nests,  the  constructing  of  wax  cells  by  bees,  the  swim- 
ming of  the  young  duck,  etc.     These  actions  are  prompted  by 
sensations   or   images   of  some  kind,  and   tend    to   a   purpose, 
but  sometimes  —  for  instance,  when  the  bird  builds  a  nest  for  the 
first  time  —  the  representation  of  this  purpose  can  only  be  a 
vague  one. 


172  PSYCHOLOGY 

SUMMARY 

We  may  sum  up  briefly  the  main  characteristics  of  the  various 
forms  of  action  mentioned  so  far.  All  agree  in  being  fatal  and 
necessary,  that  is,  there  is  no  conflict  of  motives  and  no  delibera- 
tion. The  tendency  to  act  is  all  in  one  direction.  The  will  may 
sometimes  interfere  with  them,  foster  or  inhibit  them,  but,  in  this 
case,  the  action  becomes  more  or  less  voluntary. 

(a)  Random  movements  are  purposeless,  and  centrally  initiated. 
Automatic  movements  are  purposive,  and  adapted  to  an  end  which, 
however,  is  not  a  determinant  of  the  movement;  they  also  are 
centrally  initiated.     Reflex  movements  are  purposive,  but  periph- 
erally initiated.    Their  purpose  is  an  immediate  one,  and  hence 
reflex  differ  from  instinctive  actions. 

(b)  Impulsive  movement  supposes  only  one  idea  in  the  mind, 
and  generally  follows  this  idea  immediately;  it  varies  with  the  indi- 
viduals.    Instinctive  action  is  not  always  accompanied  by  the  dis- 
tinct consciousness  of  the  end;  it  implies  a  greater  complexity  of 
ideas  and  elements,  and  is  the  same  for  all  individuals  of  the  same 
species^'.  Both  impulsive  and  instinctive  actions  are  ordinarily 
more  complex  than  random,  automatic,  and  reflex  actions,  and  in- 
volve a  series  of  movements  coordinated  in  order  to  reach  an  end. 
They  always  suppose  some  consciousness,   whereas   the  others 
may  be  conscious  or  unconscious.    They  are  not  so  mechanical, 
but  require  some  intelligent  adaptation  and  coordination. 

(c)  In  the  young  child  we  find  only  the  forms  of  movement  men- 
tioned so  far.     Voluntary  or  controlled  movements,  that  is,  move- 
ments consciously  directed  and  adapted  to  a  known  end,  are  evolved 
little  by  little  as  the  mental  and  the  organic  faculties  become  more 
developed.    The  main  factor  in  this  development  seems  to  be  the 
mental  association  of  certain  uncontrolled  actions  with  the  sensa- 
tions of  pleasure  or  pain  resulting  from  them.     Some  random, 
impulsive,  automatic,  and  instinctive  actions  yield  a  pleasant 
result;  others  are  unpleasant.    Hence  the  tendency  to  repeat  the 
former,  and  to  abstain  from  the  latter.    Hence  also  arise  tentative 
efforts  to  do  so;  and  little  by  little  the  control  of  more  and  more 
complex  movements  is  secured. 


VOLITIONAL    ACTION  173 

in.    VOLITIONAL  ACTION 

i.  Elements  of  Volitional  Actions.  —  Volitional  action  is  directed 
to  an  end  known  and  intended.  Hence  it  implies  the  following  steps 
which,  however,  have  not  the  same  importance  in  all  actions,  and 
may  require  more  or  less  time  according  to  the  different  cases.  Some 
even  may  not  be  explicit  at  all,  but  merely  implied  in  others  or  pre- 
supposed, because  they  have  already  taken  place  at  other  times. 

(a)  The  mind  must  have  the  idea  of  an  end  to  be  reached,  i.e. 
of  a  good  to  be  obtained  or  of  an  evil  to  be  avoided.    To  become 
rich,  successful,  learned,  or  influential;  to  enjoy  oneself,  to  be  up- 
right and  virtuous,  etc.,  may  be  so  many  ends.    They  appear  as 
good,  and  create  in  the  mind  the  desire  of  reaching  them.    There 
may  be  in  the  mind  several  alternatives  of  ends  to  be  reached  or 
of  means  to  reach  them,  of  actions  to  be  performed  or  omitted, 
of  means  to  be  taken  or  rejected,  of  conduct  to  be  followed  or 
avoided. 

(b)  The  reasons  for  choosing  one  end  rather  than  another,  for 
instance,  duty  rather  than  pleasure;  and,  when  the  end  has  been 
chosen,  the  reasons  for  taking  some  means  in  preference  to  others, 
are  examined,  compared  with  one  another,  and  weighed.     In  some 
cases,  this  takes  a  long  time;  in  other  cases,  it  is  a  short  process, 
because  either  the  merits  of  the  various  alternatives  are  clear 
enough,  or  it  is  urgent  to  act  at  once,  or  the  decision  is  imprudent 
and  hasty.    This  process  is  called  deliberation. 

(c)  Choice  follows  the  examination  of  motives.    A  course  of 
action  is  selected,  and  an  alternative  accepted.    This  is  decision  or 
volition. 

(d)  Finally  comes  the  execution.    At  the  command  of  the  will, 
the  mental  or  organic  faculties  are  applied  to  perform  the  action 
that  has  been  chosen. 

From  this  analysis  it  is  easy  to  see  how  voluntary  actions 
differ  from  those  mentioned  above.  Example:  A  young  man  has 
to  choose  a  profession  .  .  .  must  learn  .  .  .  goes  to  college  .  .  . 
applies  himself  to  study,  etc.  See  how  many  alternatives  pre- 
sent themselves  at  every  step,  and  how  every  step  is  taken  in 
accordance  with  the  analysis  just  made. 


174  PSYCHOLOGY 

2.  Desire.  —  (a)  We  have  mentioned  the  term  "  desire."    Desire 
must  be  distinguished  from  volition;  it  is  the  transitional  step 
from  knowledge  to  volition.    Desire  is  a  tendency  to,  or  craving 
for,  something  which  appears  good.     It  includes  cognitive  ele- 
ments, presentative  and  chiefly  representative,  by  which  the  idea 
of  the  object  arouses  the  idea  of  some  pleasurable  feeling  con- 
nected with  it.    Hence  it  contains  also  elements  of  feelings,  and 
the  intensity  of  the  desire  is  in  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the 
pleasure  which  is  anticipated. 

(b)  (i)  Desire  is  blind  and  fatal.    We  cannot  help  finding  cer- 
tain things  good  and  agreeable.     (2)  Desire  may  refer  to  things 
that  are  independent  of  the  will  —  e.g.  good  weather  —  and  even 
to  unattainable  things   which  one  would  like  to  possess  —  e.g. 
good  health.     (3)  With  regard  to  the  same  thing,  we  may  have 
contradictory  desires,  desire  in  one  respect,  and  aversion  in  an- 
other.    I  may  at  the  same  time  desire  to  enjoy  a  certain  pleasure 
because  it  is  agreeable,  and  to  turn  away  from  it  because  it  is  for- 
bidden.    Two  things  may  be  desired  at  the  same  time  —  e.g.  a 
walk  outside  and  an  entertainment  indoors  —  although  one  only 
is  possible. 

(c)  In  opposition  to  these  characteristics  of  desire,  (i)  the  will 
is   reasonable   and   controllable.     (2)  It   applies   only   to   things 
that  seem  attainable  and  that  are  in  our  power.     (3)  Of  several 
incompatible  alternatives  one  only  can  be  willed.     (4)  It  may  be 
added  that  the  will  is  not  always  proportioned  to  the  desire. 
Some  men  seem  to  be  almost  incapable  of  carrying  out  their  plans. 
Their  desires  may  be  strong,  but  their  will  is  weak.     They  "  would 
like  "  to  do  certain  things,  but  have  not  enough  determination  to 
say:  "I  will  do  it." 

3.  Decision  concerning  a  certain  action  may  be  positive  or  neg- 
ative, a  volition  or  a  nolition;  it  may  produce  or  inhibit  a  move- 
ment.    As  psychological  processes,  however,  both  are  positive, 
and  nolition  is  called  negative  only  with  regard  to  the  result. 
Inhibition  is  as  frequent  and  as  necessary  as  the  initiation  of  action. 
It  may  check  the  desire  and  impulse  to  action,  as  when  we  desire 
to  perform  certain  actions  which,  for  better  reasons,  we  decide 
not  to  perform.     It  is  implied  in  any  decision  where  a  choice  is 


HABIT  175 

made  between  conflicting  desires.  It  may  also  interrupt  an  action 
already  begun,  and  prevent  it  from  being  completed.  Like  action, 
arrest  of  action  is  more  or  less  volitional,  sometimes  being  entirely 
or  almost  automatic,  and  sometimes  resulting  from  deliberation. 

IV.    HABIT 

Recall  to  mind  your  first  lessons  in  writing,  and  compare  them 
with  the  facility  which  you  have  at  present.  Writing  has  now 
become  habitual.  In  examining  the  nature,  genesis,  and  impor- 
tance of  habits,  constantly  keep  before  your  mind  the  instance 
just  given,  or  any  other  habit  which  you  have  acquired. 

1.  Nature  of  Habit.  —  (a)  Experience  shows  that,  after  being 
performed  several  times,  organic  and  mental  actions  become  eas- 
ier, and  require  less  attention  and  effort.     Hence  habit  is  a  disposi- 
tion to  reproduce  certain  actions  and  to  act  in  the  same  way  under 
the   same   circumstances.    The   perfectly   habitual   action   is   not 
actually  voluntary  in  the  strict  sense,  because  it  is  performed 
without  reflection  and  deliberation,  and  even  with  little  or   no 
consciousness.     This,  however,  is  true  only  of  actions  that  proceed 
exclusively  from  habit.     In  many  cases  habit  and  will   together 
play  a  more  or  less   important   part.     Habitual  actions    differ 
also  from  instinctive  actions  because  they  are  not  results  of  innate 
dispositions,  but  acquired  by  repetition.     They  are  more  diverse, 
and  are  not  perfect  from  the  beginning,  but  become  more   and 
more  so  by  repetition. 

(b)  A  habit  may  be  contracted  voluntarily  or  involuntarily. 
In  the  former  case,  the  resulting  action,  although  presently  non- 
voluntary,  is  nevertheless  voluntary  in  its  cause.  In  the  latter 
case,  the  action  cannot  be  voluntary  since  the  habit  itself  is  not. 

2.  Genesis  of  Habits.  —  (a)   Habit  begins  with  the  first   act, 
and  grows  with  every  repetition.     If  no  disposition  were  left  by 
the  first  act,  there  would  be  no  reason  why  habit  should  begin 
with  the  second  or  any  subsequent  act.     Every  action  leaves  a 
trace  or  disposition,  which,  however,  may  disappear  if  it  is  not 
again  excited  within  a  certain  time.     The  trace  left  is  more  im- 
portant in  proportion  to  the  interest,  attention,  application,  etc. 

(b)  The  strength  of  the  habit  increases  in  proportion  to  the 


176  PSYCHOLOGY 

frequency  of  the  actions,  their  duration,  their  intensity,  the  inter- 
val between  them,  and  chiefly  the  accompanying  attention  and 
feelings.  How  frequent,  how  long,  and  how  intense  the  actions 
and  repetitions  should  be  cannot  be  determined  except  by  ex- 
perience. This  varies  with  the  nature  of  the  actions,  and  the 
subjective  dispositions. 

(c)  Habits  decrease  in  strength,  or  even  disappear,  through  lack 
of  exercise,  and  chiefly,  when  possible,  through  opposite  actions. 
Will  and  effort  to  resist  the  habit  are  more  or  less  effective  accord- 
ing to  the  strength  of  the  habit  and  the  amount  of  effort. 

3.  Importance.  —  (a)  Habit  is  important  because  of  the  range 
of  its  application  and  influence  which  include  every  aspect  of 
human  life.  The  organism  becomes  habituated  to  certain  modes  of 
activity,  to  foods,  stimulants,  narcotics,  climate,  diet,  etc.  Its 
various  movements  are  perfected,  or  vitiated,  by  habit.  On  the 
mental  side,  we  find  habits  of  perception,  memory,  imagination, 
association,  judgment,  conduct,  feelings,  will,  etc.,  all  this  framing 
man's  character  and  personality. 

(b)  The  effects  of  habit  are  chiefly  the  following:     (i)  Habitual 
actions,  good  and  bad,  are  more  perfect  and  easier  than  others. 
(2)  They  require  less  attention,  and  are  performed,  so  to  say, 
automatically.     (3)  Habit  is  a  great  economy  of  energy  and  time; 
instead  of  having  to  make  an  effort  for  every  detail  of  the  action, 
the  series  of  details  follows  of  itself,  and  meanwhile  attention 
may  be  directed  to  something  else.     (4)  Habits  enable  one  to  do 
things  which  would  be  otherwise  impossible. 

(c)  If  you  examine  your  daily  actions,  you  will  see  how  many 
are  performed  by  force  of  habit  and  routine,  without  conscious- 
ness or  attention,  whereas  in  the  beginning  they  required  many 
distinct  efforts.    Dressing,  eating,  walking,  speaking,  writing,  in 
fact,  every  ordinary  action  has  been  made  as  easy  as  it  is  by  habit. 
Hence  habit  has  rightly  been  called  a  second  nature,  and  man  has 
been  termed  a  bundle  of  habits.    Hence  also  the  importance  of 
learning  to  do  all  things  well  from  the  beginning,  for  a  bad  habit 
is  hard  to  overcome,  and  every  false  step  means  a  great  waste  of 
energy. 


DETERMINISM    AND     FREEDOM  177 


ARTICLE   II.     DETERMINANTS    AND   FREEDOM  OF 
THE  WILL 

I.  DETERMINANTS  AND  MOTORS  OF  THE  WILL 

i.  Motives.  —  (a)  A  motive  is  that  for  which  we  act.  It  is 
always  the  idea  of  something  good,  i.e.  of  something  useful,  pleasur- 
able, noble,  honest,  etc.,  which  we  want  to  obtain.  Motives  may 
be  subordinated  to  one  another.  Thus  I  take  my  umbrella  to 
avoid  getting  wet.  I  want  to  avoid  getting  wet  in  order  not  to 
fall  sick,  or  not  to  spoil  my  new  straw  hat,  or  not  to  feel  uncom- 
fortable, etc.  I  want  to  preserve  my  health  in  order  to  do  my  work, 
and  so  on.  Whatever  is  done  voluntarily  is  done  on  account  of 
some  good  to  be  derived  from  the  action.  It  is  impossible  for 
man  to  act  otherwise;  he  cannot  choose  to  do  something  which 
appears  altogether,  and  from  all  points  of  view,  evil  and  unpleas- 
urable.  He  may  be  mistaken  in  his  estimate,  and  pursue  an  appar- 
ent for  a  real  good,  but  there  is  at  least  the  appearance,  that  is, 
the  idea,  of  something  good. 

(b)  The  first  motor  of  the  will,  therefore,  is  the  tendency  to  happi- 
ness, which  is  implied  in  every  action.    Happiness  is  the  ultimate 
goal  which  all  men  want  to  reach.    They  do  not  agree  in  their  con- 
ception of  the  concrete  realization  of  happiness.     Some  may  place 
it  in  riches,  others  in  glory,  others  in  pleasure,  others  in  the  ful- 
filment of  duty,  etc.    Some  may  expect  it  in  this  life,  others  hi  a 
future  life.    But  the  desire  of  happiness  in  general  is  always  the 
mainspring   of   every  form  of  activity.    Hence   the  most    gen- 
eral and  the  most  uniform  tendencies  of  man  are  toward  those 
things  that  are  conceived  as  necessary  to  happiness:  life,  health, 
reputation,  the  normal  exercise  of  faculties,  etc. 

(c)  If  all  men  had  the  same  conception  of  concrete  happiness, 
and  if  there  were  only  one  possible  means  of  reaching  it,  all  would 
be  determined  to  act  in  the  same  way.    Thus,  whenever  a  man  has 
chosen  to  reach  a  certain  end,  and  he  has  only  one  possible  way  of 
doing  so,  he  necessarily  takes  this  one  means.    If  I  have  deter- 
mined to  go  to  Europe,  there  is  as  yet  no  other  means  but  to  take 
a  vessel.    Hence  to  do  this  is  necessary,  although  there  are  several 

13 


178  PSYCHOLOGY 

vessels  to  be  chosen  from.  If  I  really  want  to  learn,  and  see  that 
the  only  means  is  to  study,  I  certainly  will  study.  To  neglect 
study  is  a  sure  sign  that  one  has  at  most  a  desire,  not  the  will,  of 
acquiring  science.  As  concrete  ends  vary,  and  as  even  the  same  end 
may  be  reached  by  different  means  —  e.g.  I  may  earn  a  living  in 
different  ways;  I  may,  as  a  Christian,  sanctify  myself  by  the  prac- 
tice of  different  virtues  —  a  great  variety  of  actions  will  result, 
but  all  with  the  same  underlying  motive  of  reaching  some  form  of 
happiness. 

(d)  Ends  may  be  conflicting,  like  acquiring  wealth  by  what- 
ever means,  and  observing  the  rules  of  justice.  In  such  a  case  the 
will  abandons  one  in  so  far  as  it  is  incompatible  with  the  other. 
Some  will  abandon  honesty  and  become  rich  by  whatever  means; 
others  will  remain  poor  rather  than  go  against  the  dictates  of 
their  conscience. 

2.  Relative  Force  of  Motives.  —  Thus  we  see  that  we  follow  a 
certain  line  of  action  because  the  motives  for  it  appear  prepon- 
derant, and  because  it  seems  to  be  a  greater  good  than  another. 
What  makes  a  motive  preponderant?  To  a  great  extent  it  is  its 
objective  worth.  But  it  is  also,  and  perhaps  to  a  greater  extent, 
the  subjective  dispositions  of  the  agent.  Both  internal  experience 
and  the  observation  of  other  men  make  it  clear  that  we  act  as  we 
are,  and  that  we  are  what  we  are  on  account  of  heredity,  tempera- 
ment, habit,  surroundings,  education,  etc.  When  we  know  a  man, 
we  generally  can  guess  pretty  accurately  how  he  will  behave  under 
certain  circumstances.  The  views  entertained  of  things  during 
deliberation,  and  the  attention  given  to  one  motive  —  for  instance, 
the  religious  or  moral  aspect  of  an  action  —  rather  than  to  another 
—  for  instance,  personal  interest  or  gratification  of  the  senses  — • 
are  due  largely  to  circumstances,  to  personal  character,  and  to 
the  manner  in  which  a  man  has  been  educated.  We  may  not  be 
aware  of  it  at  all  times,  but  to  a  great  extent  we  are  what  all  these 
circumstances  have  made  us,  and  our  actions  follow  our  nature. 

II.  FREEDOM  OF  THE  WILL 

i.  Meaning  of  the  Question.  —  When  we  ask  whether  the  will 
is  free,  we  ask  whether  the  motors  mentioned  above  so  completely 


DETERMINISM    AND     FREEDOM  179 

determine  the  will  that  the  choice  which  it  makes  is  always  made 
necessarily;  or  whether  the  will,  notwithstanding  these,  can  deter- 
mine itself,  choose  freely,  and  subtract  itself  from  the  necessity  of 
acting  in  one  way  only,  (i)  Hence  we  do  not  speak  here  of 
physical  liberty,  or  liberty  of  execution,  for  it  is  certain  that  I  may 
choose  to  do  a  thing  and  be  prevented  by  force.  I  may  want  to 
go  out  and  may  be  locked  in,  or  refuse  to  go  out  and  be  carried  out 
by  force.  Here  we  speak  of  the  volition  itself.  (2)  Nor  do  we 
speak  of  various  liberties,  political  or  economic,  as  when  we  speak 
of  a  free  citizen,  a  free  nation,  a  free  country,  free  thought,  free 
trade,  free  port,  free  goods,  free  of  cost,  etc.  These  liberties 
imply  the  absence  of  some  external  obligation,  restraint  or  duty. 
(3)  By  freedom  of  the  will  we  mean  the  power  of  the  will  to  be  its 
own  determinant  and  to  originate  action.  The  question^  there- 
fore, is  this:  Are  objective  motives  and  subjective  influences  the 
only  adequate  causes  of  all  actions,  or  is  the  will  itself  a  power, 
capable  of  self-determination? 

2.  Limits  of  Freedom.  —  (a)  (i)  From  what  has  been  said  above 
it  is  clear  that  freedom  does  not  mean  caprice,  or  the  power  of  act- 
ing without  motives.  On  the  contrary,  only  those  actions  can 
be  free  that  are  voluntary,  and  imply  some  implicit  or  explicit 
deliberation  and  weighing  of  the  motives.  Hence  habitual  ac- 
tions, and  actions  proceeding  from  a  violent  passion  or  from  igno- 
rance, are  not  free  unless  there  is  nevertheless  enough  attention 
and  reflection  given  to  them.  (2)  Many  organic  actions  are  not 
and  can  never  be  free  because  they  are  not  under  the  influence 
of  the  will.  (3)  We  can  be  free  only  with  respect  to  what  seems 
possible  and  attainable.  Thus  the  strong  or  the  learned  may  at- 
tempt what  is  not  possible  for  the  weak  or  th£  ignorant.  Hence 
freedom  is  limited  both  in  regard  to  the  nature  itself  of  freedom 
which  is  present  or  absent,  greater  or  less  in  different  individuals, 
and  in  the  same  individual  with  regard  to  different  actions. 

(b)  From  habits,  education,  temperament,  etc.,  life  has  a  gen- 
eral direction  which,  however,  may  have  been  taken  freely  to  some 
extent,  and  perhaps  even  now  may  be  changed.  Because  a  man 
is  engaged  in  a  certain  business  in  which  he  wants  to  succeed,  he 
will  not  act  in  the  same  manner  as  the  man  who  is  in  another  line 


l8o  PSYCHOLOGY 

of  business.  Certain  actions  are  determined  by  the  end  one  wants 
to  reach.  But  the  end  itself  may  have  been  chosen  freely  in  the 
past.  The  will  is  like  a  vessel  sailing  on  a  river  and  kept  between 
the  two  banks  so  that  she  can  move  only  within  them;  or  like  a 
man  walking  on  the  deck  of  a  steamer,  having  his  own  limited 
movement,  and,  at  the  same  time,  carried  on  by  the  general  move- 
ment of  the  vessel.  Every  individual  has  to  steer  his  own  vessel, 
but  the  general  direction  toward  happiness  cannot  be  changed, 
although  all  do  not  expect  to  find  happiness  in  the  same  port. 

3.  The  Consciousness  of  Freedom.  —  (a)  When  we  deliberate, 
we  are  conscious  that  we  can  choose  one  of  two  or  more  alterna- 
tives that  are  offered  to  the  mind.  The  power  of  choice  supposes 
the  absence  of  determinism.  The  stone  thrown  up  in  the  air  has 
no  choice  between  staying  up  or  falling  down;  it  falls  necessarily. 
Moreover,  we  are  conscious  that  we  are  not  mere  spectators, 
but  actors,  in  the  deliberation;  that,  by  voluntary  attention, 
we  may  strengthen  one  motive  or  underrate  its  value,  and  that 
we  may  even  suspend  the  deliberation,  shorten  it,  or  exclude  certain 
reasons  and  considerations.  Thus  all  the  time  we  are  conscious 
that  the  final  decision  is  in  our  power.  The  motives  are  weighed 
in  the  balance,  but  their  weight  depends  partly  on  the  mind. 

(b)  The  decision  itself  comes  from  the  individual,  and  the  result- 
ing action  seems  to  be  free.    Not  only  are  we  conscious  of  no  de- 
termination, but  we  are  conscious  of  indetermination.     We  make 
a  clear  distinction  between  a  necessary  and  a  free  volition,  between 
the  cases  where  we  can  choose  freely  and  those  where  we  cannot, 
between  an  action    performed  in  a  passion  and  one  performed 
calmly  and  deliberately.    We  do  not  deliberate  and  decide  whether 
we  shall  try  to  be  happy,  but  we  do  deliberate  and  decide  by 
what  means  we  shall  endeavor  to  reach  happiness. 

(c)  Sometimes  deliberation  manifests  an  action  as  obligatory; 
there  is  a  sense  of  duty  and  obligation.    Duty  is  an  imperative  inde- 
pendent of  pleasure  and  usefulness,  and  duty  supposes  freedom. 
I  cannot  feel  obliged  to  respect  my  fellowmen,  or  to  abstain  from 
theft  and  murder,  unless  it  is  in  my  power  to  do  so.    To  act  neces- 
sarily against  what  I  feel  to  be  now  my  duty  is  an  impossibility. 
If  I  must,  I  can;  if  I  can,  I  have  the  power  and  am  free. 


DETERMINISM    AND     FREEDOM  l8l 

(d)  After  acting  we  feel  that  we  have  been  prudent  or  impru- 
dent, and  that  we  might  have  done  otherwise.    If  the  action  has  a 
moral  character,  we  feel  worthy  of  praise  or  blame.    This  again 
is  inexplicable  if  the  action  was  not  free.    I  deserve  neither  esteem 
nor  blame  for  what  I  could  not  have  done  otherwise.    I  clearly 
distinguish  between  a  just  and  an  unjust  punishment  according  as 
I  failed  voluntarily  and  freely,  or,  on  the  contrary,  "could  not 
help  it."    We  deplore  and  regret  actions  that  are  evil  and  neces- 
sary as  we  deplore  and  regret  accidents  or  bodily  deformities. 
These  do  not  cause  any  feeling  of  shame  nor  any  desert  of  blame. 

(e)  That  all  men  have  the  same  consciousness  of  freedom  is  evi- 
denced by  their  behavior,  especially  in  their  deliberations,  and  in 
the  blame  or  praise  which  they  give  to  others.    A  man  cannot  be 
blamed  unless  it  is  supposed  that  he  acted  freely.    I  do  not  blame 
the  stone  that  hits  me,  but  I  blame  the  man  who  threw  it,  inasmuch 
as  such  an  action  was  free  and  could  have  been  avoided.    All 
men  have  the  idea  of  a  just  punishment,  and  a  just  punishment 
supposes   freedom.    Indeed,   even   if   committed   necessarily,   a 
crime  might  be  punished  to  deter  others  from  committing  it,  or 
to  train  the  wrongdoer  as  we  tram  an  animal.     Such  a  pun- 
ishment is  only  useful,  not  just.    It  is  intended  to  have  good  re- 
sults in  the  future,  but  cannot  be  merited  by  the  past  deed.    In 
fact,  the  law  makes  a  difference  between  free  and  necessary  actions; 
it  punishes  the  criminal,  but  not  the  insane. 

In  a  word,  the  testimony  of  consciousness  is  summed  up  in  the 
awareness  that  certain  actions  are  personal,  that  they  come  from 
me,  that  I  am  their  cause,  that  the  ego  is,  in  part  at  least,  respon- 
sible for  the  occurrence,  that  the  action  is  really  mine,  not  only 
because  it  takes  place  in  me,  but  because  it  originates  from  me. 

(/)  The  reason  why  the  will  is  free  is  found  in  the  relations  of 
concrete  goods  to  perfect  happiness.  All  concrete  goods  are  lim- 
ited and  imperfect;  they  even  have  some  evil  aspects,  such  as  the 
difficulty  of  obtaining  them,  the  uncertainty  of  the  success,  the 
necessity  of  parting  with  them  perhaps  in  life,  and  certainly  at 
death,  and  the  fact  that  we  cannot  have  all  at  once.  Hence  none 
satisfies  the  will  fully,  for  the  will  craves  for  perfect  happiness. 

4.  Value  of  this  Testimony  of  Consciousness.  —  This  testimony 


182  PSYCHOLOGY 

seems  clear,  and,  if  we  are  really  free,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the 
fact  could  be  perceived  with  greater  evidence.  We  must  say  imme- 
diately that  a  clear  testimony  of  direct  consciousness  cannot  eas- 
ily be  invalidated,  and  should  not  be  rejected  except  for  cogent 
reasons.  Yet,  in  the  present  instance,  it  has  been  rejected  by  some 
psychologists. 

(a)  Stuart  Mill  asserts  that  the  consciousness  of  freedom  is 
impossible.    We  have  the  consciousness  only  of  what  occurs,  not 
of  what  perhaps  could,  but  in  fact  does  not,  take  place.     The  con- 
sciousness of  actual  processes  alone  is  possible,  and  the  conscious- 
ness of  freedom  would  be  the  consciousness  of  processes  which 
could  be,  but  are  not  actually,  performed. 

Answer:  Consciousness  does  not  perceive  what  is  not,  but  it 
perceives  the  actual  power  which  the  individual  possesses  of  deter- 
mining himself,  namely,  it  perceives  the  act  as  it  is,  as  indeter- 
mined  and  as  coming  from  an  agent  who  acts  as  he  chooses. 

(b)  The  consciousness  of  freedom  is  illusory;  it  is  simply  the 
ignorance  of  determinant  motives.    Not  being  conscious  of  the 
motives  that  determine  us  necessarily,  we  believe  falsely  that  we 
determine  ourselves. 

Answer:  We  are  not  only  unconscious  of  determining  motives, 
but  positively  conscious  of  our  own  active  power  in  the  decision. 
Moreover,  if  the  objection  were  true,  the  sense  of  freedom  would 
be  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  knowledge  we  have  of  the  motives.  But, 
on  the  contrary,  it  is  when  there  has  been  no  deliberation  and 
when  we  do  not  know  why  we  have  acted  that  the  action  seems 
necessary  and  that  we  feel  no  responsibility  for  it. 

(c)  In  fact,  we  know  that  a  hypnotized  subject  acts  necessa- 
rily and  cannot  refuse  to  execute  the  command  of  the  hypnotizer. 
Yet  he  feels  and  asserts  that  he  is  free.     Consciousness  of  freedom 
is  again  illusory. 

Answer.  The  following  remarks  will  answer  this  difficulty, 
(i)  The  subject  may  assert  his  freedom,  but  he  shows  no  sign  of 
the  consciousness  of  freedom;  there  is  no  deliberation  before  the 
action,  and  no  joy  or  shame  after  it.  Moreover,  he  will  not  always 
assert  his  freedom;  in  some  cases  he  will  say  that  he  acted  neces- 
sarily, although  he  may  be  unable  to  account  for  this  necessity. 


DETERMINISM    AND     FREEDOM  183 

When  he  falsely  asserts  it,  he  may  do  so  by  force  of  habit,  because 
he  generally  has  the  real  sense  of  freedom,  or  because  the  answer 
has  been  suggested  to  him,  or  finally  because  he  knows  what 
answer  is  wanted.  Many  excuses  of  irresistible  hypnotic  influ- 
ences have  been  brought  before  the  courts.  (2)  From  abnormal 
and  exceptional  cases  one  cannot  validly  base  an  inference  apply- 
ing to  all,  even  normal,  cases.  Because  a  man  is  sick  or  insane, 
it  cannot  be  inferred  that  all  men  are  in  the  same  condition.  The 
objection,  therefore,  consists  in  depriving  a  man  of  his  freedom 
and  concluding  that  no  men  are  free.  The  illusion  of  the  subject 
who  is  made  to  believe  that  he  is  an  emperor  does  not  prove  that 
there  are  no  real  emperors,  although  he  is  not  one.  And  the  fact 
that  some  men  have  not  the  use  of  their  legs  does  not  prove  that 
no  men  can  walk.  The  reason  why  the  hypnotized  subject  is 
deprived  of  his  freedom  is  easy  to  find.  For  him  there  can  be  no 
choice  of  motives,  since  only  such  ideas  enter  his  mind  as  are  al- 
lowed by  the  hypnotizer.  (3)  The  question  of  the  existence  of 
freedom  in  a  hypnotized  person,  and  his  power  to  resist  the  orders 
that  are  given  to  him,  is  one  on  which  there  is  no  complete 
agreement. 

(d)  Character,  habits,  temperament,  education,  and  in  general 
subconscious  factors  determine  the  will.  The  actions  of  other 
men  can  be  foreseen  with  enough  accuracy,  and,  were  our  knowl- 
edge of  other  minds  more  perfect  all  actions  could  be  fore- 
seen with  certainty.  In  a  word,  as  was  admitted  above,  we  act 
as  we  are. 

Answer.  To  the  first  statement  we  say  that:  (i)  All  these  may 
sometimes  be  necessitating,  but  not  always.  We  feel  that  we  can 
resist  them  and  we  do  resist.  A  man  struggles  against  himself 
and  changes  his  natural  dispositions.  (2)  They  give  a  general 
impulse  which  does  not  determine  all  concrete  actions,  but  leaves 
some  room  for  freedom.  (3)  Subconscious  factors  exercise  an 
influence  only  when  they  appear  at  the  surface  in  consciousness, 
and  their  action  results  in  a  conscious  impulse. 

To  the  second  statement  we  say  that:  (i)  We  may  foresee  a 
free  action  of  other  men,  because  men  act  for  reasonable  motives^ 
have  the  same  essential  nature,  and  are  influenced  by  their  char- 


184  PSYCHOLOGY 

acter.  (2)  This  foresight  is  in  most  cases  only  a  conjecture,  and 
we  are  frequently  mistaken.  (3)  Our  foreknowledge  generally 
bears  on  external,  spontaneous,  indeliberate,  and  hence  necessary 
actions.  (4)  Our  behavior  toward  other  men  in  bestowing  praise 
or  blame  shows  that  we  recognize  some  of  their  actions  as  free. 
(5)  "We  act  as  we  are."  Even  if  this  were  true,  we  must  say  that 
we  are  not  only  what  circumstances  make  us,  but  also  what  we  make 
ourselves.  Emotional  tendencies,  dispositions,  character,  strength 
or  weakness  of  will,  etc.,  depend  greatly  on  ourselves,  on  the  will, 
and  on  the  good  or  bad  use  which  is  made  of  it. 

(e)  It  is  affirmed  that  the  strongest  motive  determines  the  will. 
It  would  be  unreasonable  to  act  without  a  motive,  or  to  choose  a 
less  good  when  a  greater  good  is  offered. 

Answer.  As  was  said  above,  it  must  be  admitted  that  a  free 
action  is  always  performed  for  a  motive,  but  it  does  not  necessa- 
rily follow  that  the  greatest  objective  good  is  always  and  neces- 
sarily chosen,  (i)  We  may  also  admit  that  the  strongest  motive 
determines  the  will,  for  we  have  no  other  means  of  determining 
which  motive  is  the  strongest  except  that  it  finally  prevails.  There 
is  no  common  measure  to  estimate  objectively  the  weight  of  dif- 
ferent motives  such  as  duty  and  pleasure.  Evidently  the  prepon- 
derant motive  is  the  one  according  to  which  we  act.  But  do  we 
act  necessarily  or  freely?  This  is  the  question.  (2)  The  will 
contributes  to  make  a  motive  preponderant,  and  gives  it  its  final 
victory  over  the  others.  As  already  stated,  the  will  is  not  like  the 
indicator  of  a  balance,  inert  and  passive,  but  living  and  active. 
It  makes  a  given  motive  stronger  and  prevalent.  But,  it  may  be 
asked,  why  does  it  do  so?  Sometimes,  because  we  have  already 
"made  up  our  minds,"  either  deliberately  and  freely,  or  indelib- 
erately  and  necessarily.  Sometimes,  owing  to  the  influence  of 
subjective  dispositions  and  habits  which  may,  more  or  less,  be 
dependent  on  the  past  or  present  exercise  of  the  free  will.  Some- 
times, with  the  full  consciousness  that  it  is  doing  right  or  wrong, 
yielding  to  the  call  of  duty  or  to  that  of  pleasure,  and  doing  it 
freely. 

(/)  The  objection  taken  from  the  constancy  of  human  statistics 
—  births,  marriages,  crimes,  etc.  —  need  not  detain  us.  Statistics 


CULTIVATION     OF     THE     WILL  185 

apply  to  communities,  not  to  individuals;  nor  are  they  abso- 
lutely constant.  They  simply  point  to  a  uniformity  of  motives 
by  which  men  in  general  are  prompted  to  act;  whether  freely  or. 
necessarily,  statistics  cannot  indicate. 

Hence,  although  it  is  true  that  the  large  majority  of  human 
actions  are  not  actually  free,  in  a  number  of  cases  the  conscious- 
ness of  freedom  remains  a  valid  testimony. 


CONCLUSION 

CULTIVATION  OF  THE  WILL 
I.  THE  QUALITIES  AND  DEFECTS  OF  THE  WILL 

i.  Importance  of  the  Will.  —  (i)  A  man  is  himself  in  proper-  , 
tion  as  he  is  his  own  master,  has  control  of  his  actions,  and  with- 
draws himself  from  external  determining  influences  to  command 
his  own  actions.  (2)  A  man  who  has  self-control,  who  possesses 
a  strong,  persevering,  and  well-directed  will,  is  not  only  his 
own  master,  he  will  also  subdue  inanimate  nature,  succeed  in  his 
undertakings,  and  be  the  leader  of  his  fellowmen.  To  be  the  mas- 
ter of  others,  a  man  must  first  be  master  of  himself.  Nothing 
resists  a  strong  will.  The  man  who  has  taken  a  firm  resolution, 
and  takes  the  proper  means  to  carry  it  out,  will  seldom  fail,  or, 
after  a  first  failure,  he  will  try  again  until  his  efforts  are  rewarded 
with  success.  (3)  Even  intellectual  value  depends  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  will.  Application,  attention,  perseverance,  are  so 
many  conditions  of  success,  and  the  will  is  the  power  that  com- 
mands them.  (4)  Moral  character,  habits,  even  feelings,  and  hence 
personality,  are  largely  dependent  on  the  will.  The  will  is  the 
supreme  power,  the  mainspring  of  human  activities,  and  the  gov- 
erning authority.  To  it  must  be  attributed  to  a  great  extent  man's 
success  or  failure  in  his  various  undertakings,  and  in  general, 
man's  worth. 

No  man,  it  is  true,  can  ever  be  independent  of  external  sur- 
roundings and  of  internal  dispositions,  innate  or  acquired,  per- 
manent or  temporary,  which  influence  his  thought  and  action. 


PSYCHOLOGY 

Nor  is  such  an  independence  what  we  mean  by  freedom  and 
mastery  over  oneself.  But,  whereas  the  weak  will  is  the  tool 
.of  these  influences  and  is  unable  to  resist  them,  the  strong  will 
utilizes  some,  resists  others,  directs  and  controls  all.  Influences 
known  to  be  good  are  accepted  knowingly  and  willingly;  those 
that  are  misleading  are  excluded.  Thus  the  man  who  is  his  own 
master  does  not  blindly  follow  the  example  of  others  or  his  own 
impulses,  but  he  examines  first  whether  they  are  worth  following. 
He  is  able  to  check  the  natural  impulse  to  act  until  he  has 
reached  a  prudent  decision  based  on  calm  judgment,  and,  when 
the  occasion  requires  it,  he  is  also  able  to  muster  all  his  energies 
and  make  them  subservient  to  the  realization  of  his  ideals. 
^V'2.  The  Main  Qualities  of  the  Will  are  the  following:  (i)  There 
should  be  no  hastiness  in  the  deliberation  or  decision,  but  the  whole 
process  should  be  calm  and  without  passion.  Be  slow,  take  as 
much  time  as  is  required  and  as  circumstances  will  allow  accord- 
ing to  the  importance  of  the  step  which  you  want  to  take  and 
the  difficulty  which  you  experience.  Precipitation  in  speaking  or 
acting  is  often  the  source  of  subsequent  regrets.  (2)  Yet  the  neces- 
sity of  reflection  must  not  cause  one  to  postpone  the  decision  and 
action  indefinitely.  Do  not  remain  all  the  time  hesitating,  fluc- 
tuating, and  deferring.  When  all  the  evidence  is  at  hand,  take 
your  decision  accordingly,  and  carry  it  out.  (3)  Execute  your 
decision  promptly.  Be  not  satisfied  with  desires  that  are  never 
realized.  When  you  have  seen  what  you  ought  to  do,  do  it  with- 
out useless  delay.  Remember  that  "desires  kill  the  slothful, 
for  his  hands  have  refused  to  work  at  all.  He  longeth  and  desir- 
eth  all  the  day."  (Prov.  xxi,  25.)  He  will  keep  his  resolution 
"to-morrow,"  or  the  next  time,"  and  the  more  he  procrastinates, 
the  weaker  he  becomes.  (4)  Do  not  "change  your  mind  "  on  the 
slightest  pretext,  but  be  constant  and  persevering.  To  abandon 
one's  prudent  plans  without  sufficient  reason  is  a  sign  of  fickleness 
and  a  presage  of  failure. 

3.  The  Defects  of  the  Will  come  from  two  causes,  and  are  in 
two  opposite  directions,  excess  and  defect,  (i)  The  will  may  be 
too  strong,  when  it  shows,  not  prudent,  but  imprudent  firmness, 
constancy,  and  perseverance.  This  is  obstinacy  and  stubborn- 


CULTIVATION     OF     THE     WILL  187 

ness.  A  man  who  is  stubborn  will  abide  by  his  former  decision 
in  spite  of  new  contrary  and  convincing  evidence.  (2)  The  will 
may  be  too  hasty,  impulsive,  rash,  and  impatient.  Instead  of  re- 
flecting attentively,  a  man  will  at  once  rush  into  action  on  the 
impulse  of  the  moment.  The  power  of  inhibition  seems  insuffici- 
ent to  apply  the  brakes  in  time  and  to  prevent  impulses  from 
passing  at  once  into  action.  (3)  Some,  on  the  contrary,  have 
not  enough  will  power.  Without  speaking  of  extreme  cases  of 
aboulia  which  are  pathological,  some  persons  are  unable  to  take 
a  decision.  They  are  always  hesitating  and  cannot  resolve  to 
adopt  a  plan.  Others  "want  to  do,"  but  always  find  an  excuse. 
"I  know,"  they  will  say,  "that  I  ought  to  do  it,  but  I  can't."  In 
every  pursuit  man  needs  light  and  intelligence,  but  he  needs  also 
a  good,  strong,  and  persevering  will.  Truly  and  sincerely  to 
say  "I  will"  implies  generally  "I  can,"  whereas  to  say  "I 
cannot  "  is  to  make  an  action  almost  impossible. 

II.  SOME  PRINCIPLES  TO  BE  USED  IN  WILL  CULTURE 

In  general,  try  to  acquire  the  qualities  and  to  avoid  the  defects 
mentioned  above.  Here  we  must  limit  ourselves  to  a  few  of  the 
most  general  principles  regarding  the  intellect,  the  feelings,  and 
the  will  itself. 

1.  Intellect.  — The  common  principles  "Nil  volitum  nisi  prae- 
cognitum,"  and  "Ignoti  nulla  cupido,"  express  the  evident  truth 
that  the  will  does  not  tend  to  any  unknown  good,  but  must  neces- 
sarily have  something  apprehended  as  good  presented  to  it.    But 
the  intellect  by  itself  is  a  weak  motor,  and  mere  ideas  have  but 
little  influence  on  the  determination.    How  many  know  what  is 
good,  noble,  and  right,  and  yet  seem  to  have  no  inclination  for  it, 
or,  if  they  have  an  inclination,  seem  incapable  of  making  it  pass 
into  action.    They  know  their  duty,  but  do  not  love  it.    They  may 
even  desire  to  fulfil  it,  but  do  not  will  it. 

2.  Feelings.  —  Therefore  ideas  must  be  associated  with  feelings. 
What  we  ardently  love  and  want  sets  the  energy  into  action.    The 
meditation  on  the  motives  must  not  be  cold  and  purely  rational; 
it  must  be  warm,  and  tend  to  excite  not  only  the  knowledge,  but 
also  the  love  of  the  good.     Consider  not  only  the  truth,  but  also 


l88  PSYCHOLOGY 

the  utility,  pleasure,  peace,  etc.,  that  will  result.  See  the  examples 
of  heroes  and  saints,  and  let  them  instil  in  you  courage,  confidence, 
and  enthusiasm.  At  every  step,  keep  in  mind  the  necessity  and 
advantages  of  your  action.  Attention  to  the  end,  attention  to 
the  means,  attention  to  the  results,  will  lead  to  strength  and  per- 
severance. It  has  been  said  that  ideas  lead  the  world.  This  is 
not  exact;  what  leads  the  world  is  not  so  much  the  ideas  as  the 
love  for  certain  ideas.  Hence  the  necessity  of  feelings  and  of 
enthusiasm. 

If  you  find  it  impossible  to  perform  an  action  or  conquer  a  habit 
immediately,  proceed  gradually  and  step  by  step,  but  always 
take  clear-cut  resolutions  bearing  on  a  well-determined  point. 
The  resolution  to  do  good  in  general  is  too  abstract,  and  does  not 
excite  a  concrete  love.  But  take  the  resolution  to  do  this  speci- 
fied kind  of  good,  in  this  special  circumstance,  under  these  special 
conditions. 

3.  Will.  —  (a)  As  to  the  will  itself,  see  what  should  be  devel- 
oped and  what  should  be  repressed,  where  there  is  excess  and 
where  there  is  defect.  It  is  very  important  to  acquire  good  habits, 
for  a  habit  is  a  ready  mechanism  which  needs  only  a  first  impulse 
to  unfold  immediately  a  whole  series  of  actions.  Habit  prevents 
the  diffusion  of  energy  in  various  useless  directions,  and  the  dis- 
persion of  strength.  The  whole  energy  goes  straight  to  performing 
the  action.  How  much  conscious  and  organic  energy  is  dispersed, 
for  instance,  in  the  first  piano  lesson.  Later  on,  it  is  concentrated 
unconsciously  and  tends  to  the  perfect  result.  Hence  the  impor- 
tance of  acquiring  immediately  the  habit  of  performing  a  series  of 
movements  in  the  manner  which  is  the  shortest  and  the  best 
adapted  to  the  intended  result.  Watch  constantly  lest  you  should 
acquire  bad  habits,  for  it  is  very  difficult  to  uproot  them.  Apply 
yourself  chiefly  to  the  acquisition  of  those  habits  which  you  need 
most,  and  especially  of  the  four  moral  habits  that  have  such 
an  importance  in  the  whole  course  of  life:  prudence,  justice, 
temperance,  and  courage. 

(b)  Always  keep  your  will  on  edge;  exercise  it  constantly;  find 
something  to  do  that  requires  effort.  If  you  simply  let  yourself 
go  down  the  stream,  carried  along  by  the  current  of  your  habits 


CULTIVATION     OF     THE     WILL  189 

and  character,  even  if  they  do  not  lead  you  astray,  you  will 
find  that  you  will  not  have  strength  enough  to  overcome 
obstacles  and  change  your  course  if  it  becomes  necessary  to 
do  so.  Like  our  muscles,  our  will  weakens  if  it  is  not  exercised. 
Hence  every  day  impose  on  yourself  some  task  and  effort.  A 
great  fault  to  be  avoided  is  to  fail  to  carry  out  a  good  resolution 
once  it  has  been  taken,  for  every  voluntary  failure  is  a  weakening 
defeat.  It  is  better  to  take  no  resolutions  than  to  take  them  reluc- 
tantly and  without  trying  to  keep  them  by  all  possible  means. 
Yet  let  not  your  failures  discourage  you,  but  rise  again,  strengthen 
your  resolution,  and  try  to  do  better.  Let  not  a  single  day  pass 
without  making  some  useful  effort,  without  using  your  will,  and 
using  it  well. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SUPPLEMENTARY.— SOME   SPECIAL   RELATIONS 
AND   MODES   OF   MENTAL   PROCESSES 

I.    MIND   AND   ORGANISM 
I.  MUTUAL  RELATIONS  or  DEPENDENCE  AND  INFLUENCE 

Although  the  mind  is  distinct  from  the  organism,  and  conscious- 
ness cannot  be  reduced  to  any  form  of  movement,  it  is  certain 
that  the  two  are  very  closely  united  and  influence  each  other. 

i.  Influence  of  the  Organism  on  the  Mind.  —  (a)  In  general, 
mental  processes  depend  on  the  conditions  of  the  organism,  (i) 
Sensations  depend  on  the  transmission  through  an  afferent  nerve 
to  the  brain,  of  an  impression  received  by  the  peripheral  appa- 
ratus. Cut  the  transmitting  nerve,  or  let  the  nerve  or  the  brain 
centre  be  diseased,  and  no  sensation  is  experienced.  (2)  Imagina- 
tion, memory,  intelligence,  depend  on  brain  centres;  if  these  are 
destroyed  or  impaired,  there  follows  a  loss  or  a  disturbance  of  these 
faculties.  Moreover,  intellectual  faculties  cannot  be  exercised 
until  the  brain  reaches  a  certain  minimum  of  development.  (3) 
Feelings  depend  largely  on  organic  dispositions,  especially  of  the 
nervous  system.  (4)  The  exercise  of  activity  commanded  by  the 
will  can  be  carried  out  only  if  the  organism  is  in  the  normal 
condition.  Thus  the  paralytic  is  unable  to  execute  a  volition  of 
movement. 

(b)  In  a  more  special  manner,  we  mention  the  concomitant 
variations  of  mental  processes  with  the  dispositions  of  the  organ- 
ism: (i)  health  and  illness;  (2)  food  and  drink;   (3)  special  or- 
ganic modifications   caused  by  mental  processes  like  memory, 
imagination,  emotions,  etc. 

(c)  Finally  we  note  the  following  influences:  (i)  Age;  the  child, 
the  adult,  and  the  old  man  have  not  the  same  views,  the  same 

190 


MIND    AND    ORGANISM  191 

sensibility,  and  the  same  constancy.  The  youth  is  more  impetu- 
ous and  more  changing,  the  mature  man  more  circumspect  and 
prudent,  the  old  man  generally  weaker.  These  differences  are 
due  largely  to  differences  in  the  irritability  of  the  nerves,  the 
strength  of  the  muscles,  the  plasticity  of  the  whole  system,  the 
quality  of  the  blood,  and  the  vital  functions.  (2)  Sex;  women  have 
generally  more  sensitiveness,  more  delicacy,  more  changeableness; 
men,  more  strength,  constancy,  and  intelligence.  (3)  Tempera- 
ment; strong  or  weak  according  as  the  mental  energy  is  greater 
or  smaller,  and  in  consequence  the  mental  states  are  more  or  less 
intense;  quick  or  slow  according  as  the  mental  states  succeed  one 
another  rapidly  or  slowly.  The  strong  temperaments  are  the 
choleric  and  melancholic;  the  weak  temperaments,  the  sanguine 
and  phlegmatic;  the  quick  temperaments,  the  choleric  and  san- 
guine; the  slow  temperaments,  the  melancholic  and  phlegmatic. 
Strong  temperaments  are  inclined  to  great  emotions,  and  yield 
more  easily  to  painful  impressions.  Weak  temperaments  have 
little  emotion,  and  are  rather  disposed  to  enjoyment.  Quick  tem- 
peraments have  rapid  changes,  are  intent  on  the  present,  and  re- 
quire additional  strength  to  do  more  work.  Slow  temperaments 
change  slowly,  are  rather  inclined  to  look  toward  the  future,  and 
require  additional  time  to  do  more  work.  We  may  also  note 
that  the  choleric  and  phlegmatic  temperaments  chiefly  refer  to 
action;  the  sanguine  and  melancholic,  chiefly  to  feelings.  Tem- 
peraments are  seldom  found  with  these  exclusive  features;  they 
include  elements  belonging  to  several  groups,  and  are  determined 
by  their  predominant  features.  (4)  Climate;  mental  dispositions 
vary  with  different  atmospheric  conditions,  and  there  is  a  notice- 
able difference  between  the  inhabitants  of  cold  and  those  of  hot 
countries.  (5)  Heredity  of  certain  organic  traits. 

2.  Influence  of  Mental  Processes  on  the  Organism  —  (a) 
Ideas  and  images  of  movements  tend  to  produce  those  movements. 
In  general,  as  explained  above,  the  image  is  both  representative 
and  motor.  The  thought  of  something  terrible  may  cause  trem- 
bling; the  thought  of  something  disgusting  may  cause  vomit- 
ing, etc.  Imagination  may  contribute  to  induce  and  increase 
sickness,  and  many  an  apparent  remedy  has  acted  with  as 


IQ2  PSYCHOLOGY 

much  efficacy  as  a  real  one.    In  such  cases,  there  is  generally  a 
combination  of  images  and  feelings. 

(b)  Feelings,  and  chiefly  strong  emotions,  are  naturally  expressed 
in  the  organism  by  certain  modifications;  circulatory  —  blushing, 
turning  pale,  acceleration  or  decrease  of  pulsations,  etc.;    res- 
piratory—  cries,    meanings,    acceleration    of    respiration,    etc.; 
movements  of  eyes;  secretions,  e.g.  tears;  facial  nerves,  physiog- 
nomy; and  other  nerves  —  trembling,  spasms,  etc.    Moreover, 
emotions  may  affect  all  vital  functions,  secretion,  digestion,  etc. 
If  too  violent,  they  may  cause  serious  troubles,  swoonings,  and 
even  death. 

(c)  The  will  causes  motions  in  the  organism;  some  are  directly 
under  its  control,  but  it  can  reach  indirectly  all  organs  and  func- 
tions, for  instance,  digestion  by  allowing  only  a  certain  quantity 
or  quality  of  food. 

Hence,  in  a  general  way,  organic  habits,  health,  features,  etc., 
are  to  a  certain  extent  signs  of  habits  of  mind.  Physiognomy  is 
frequently  an  unsafe  and  misleading  guide,  yet  its  value,  especially 
in  certain  cases,  cannot  be  denied.  Although  unsafe  when  used 
alone,  and  when  relied  on  too  securely,  judging  a  person  "by 
his  looks  "  may  sometimes  be  of  great  utility. 

II.  CEREBRAL  LOCALIZATION 

Besides  the  general  relations  of  mind  and  body,  there  are  others 
of  a  more  special  nature.  Certain  mental  functions  have  their 
seat,  or  are  localized,  in  certain  parts  of  the  organism. 

i.  Phrenology  generally  applies  to  the  systems  of  Gall  and 
Spurzheim,  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century.  They  sup- 
pose the  innateness  of  all  mental  faculties  or  qualities,  and  their 
adequate  manifestation  through  the  brain,  which,  according  to 
them,  has  as  many  special  organs  as  there  are  distinct  faculties. 
Hence,  according  as  a  certain  area  of  the  brain  is  more  developed 
— this  is  manifested  externally  by  the  shape  of  the  skull  —  a  men- 
tal aptitude  will  be  predominant.  The  number  of  distinct  facul- 
ties varies  from  twenty-six,  according  to  Gall,  to  thirty-five, 
according  to  Spurzheim,  and  even  more  according  to  others. 

Phrenology  is   completely  discredited   to-day.    The   methods 


MIND     AND     ORGANISM  193 

used  are  unscientific,  and  some  of  the  fundamental  principles  are 
false,  for  instance,  that  the  development  of  a  mental  power  always 
depends  on  the  size  of  the  corresponding  organ  —  it  depends  rather 
on  qualitative  properties;  that  mental  tendencies  are  innate 
and  unmodifiable;  that  the  shape  of  the  skull  always  manifests 
the  relative  development  of  the  corresponding  parts  of  the  brain, 
—  the  convolutions  of  the  brain,  which  are  very  important,  can- 
not be  manifested  by  the  shape  of  the  skull.  The  division  of  fac- 
ulties is  arbitrary  and  fanciful;  and  to  assign  a  special  part  of  the 
brain  to  every  faculty  is  impossible.  The  main  objection  against 
phrenology,  however,  is  the  progress  of  modern  psychological  and 
physiological  sciences  which  have  disproved  the  tenets  of  phre- 
nologists concerning  the  functions  of  the  brain,  and,  in  some  cases, 
have  established  cerebral  localizations  different  from  those  which 
phrenology  mapped  out. 

2.  Scientific  Localization.  —  (a)  The  methods  used  to  deter- 
mine the  localization  of  functions  in  the  brain  are:  (i)  Experi- 
mentation. Either  stimulate  —  chiefly  by  an  electric  current  — 
certain  areas  of  the  brain  cortex,  and  see  what  movements  take 
place  or  what  results  are  obtained.  Or  extirpate  certain  por- 
tions of  the  brain,  and  see  what  loss  or  disturbance  in  motion  or 
in  sensory  processes  follows.  Such  experiments  are  performed 
on  animals,  and,  by  analogy,  the  results  are  applied  to  man.  (2) 
Pathology.  Man  does  not  experiment  on  the  human  brain.  But 
it  happens  that  lesions  or  pathological  affections  occur  which  are 
observed  in  post-mortem  examinations,  and  thus  the  cause  of  the 
motor  or  sensory  troubles  which  had  been  manifested  is  ascer- 
tained. In  some  cases  the  skull  has  been  trepanned,  and  a  tumor, 
piece  of  bone,  or  lesion  has  been  found  where  it  was  supposed  to 
be.  (3)  Comparative  anatomy  and  histology.  The  higher  the 
organization  of  animals,  the  greater  the  number  of  localized  func- 
tions. Hence  localizations  verified  in  the  highest  vertebrates 
are  applied  to  man  with  great  probability.  Histology  is  making 
progress  toward  following  the  nerve-tracts  through  the  brain  to 
the  cortex.  (4)  These  methods  are  generally  used  cumulatively, 
and  the  evidence  is  compared. 

(b)  The  student  is  referred  to  text-books  of  physiology  for  the 
14 


194  PSYCHOLOGY 

details  of  cerebral  localization.  The  most  general  and  best  estab- 
lished are  the  following:  (i)  The  motor  centres  are  found  on  both 
sides  of  the  fissure  of  Rolando.  It  is  noteworthy  that  motor 
centres  of  one  hemisphere  are  related  to  the  other  side  of  the  body 
—  the  right  hemisphere  controls  the  left  limbs,  and  the  left  hemi- 
sphere, the  right  limbs.  (2)  The  sensory  centres  are  not  all  ascer- 
tained. The  visual  centre  is  in  the  occipital  lobes;  the  auditory, 
in  the  temporal  lobes,  as  also  probably  the  olfactory  and  the 
gustatory.  The  tactile  centres  are  probably  in  the  parietal 
lobes. 

(c)  These  localizations  are  not  restricted  to  a  well-defined  spot, 
mathematically  circumscribed.  Neighboring  centres,  so  to  speak, 
interpenetrate.  Moreover,  if  one  part  becomes  incapable  of  per- 
forming its  functions,  other  parts  —  either  corresponding  parts 
of  the  other  hemisphere,  or  neighboring  parts  in  the  same  hemi- 
sphere—  sometimes  may  take  its  place. 

II.    SOME   SPECIAL  MENTAL  CONDITIONS 

The  following  mental  conditions  are  related  to  special  organic 
conditions,  many  of  which  are  but  very  imperfectly  known. 

i.  Insanity.  — The  mind  as  well  as  the  body  has  its  diseases. 
They  form  the  object  of  the  sciences  known  as  abnormal  psychol- 
ogy; mental  pathology,  i.e.  the  science  of  the  diseases  of  the  mind; 
psychiatry  (etymologically,  the  healing  of  the  soul).  Some  of 
these  diseases,  like  hallucination  and  aboulia,  are  partial  and 
affect  a  special  faculty.  Others  are  of  a  more  general  nature  and 
seem  to  affect  the  whole  or  almost  the  whole  mental  life.  Again, 
some  are  of  small  importance  and  little  apparent.  Others  are  more 
manifest  and  deeper.  The  term  "insanity" — although  etymolog- 
ically meaning  any  disease  (in-sanitas)  —  is  restricted  to  the  most 
general  and  best  characterized  forms  of  mental  disease.  Hardly 
any  definition  or  classification  of  its  various  forms  can  be  given. 
In  general,  insanity  is  not  applied  to  temporary  mental  derange- 
ment, like  that  due  to  a  strong  emotion;  yet  this  usage  seems  to 
become  current  in  criminal  courts  where  temporary  insanity  is 
made  the  plea  for  the  defence.  Nor  is  it  applied  to  a  slight  dis- 


SPECIAL    MENTAL    CONDITIONS          195 

turbance  or  irregularity  of  functions,  but  to  a  serious  defect  of 
thought,  emotion,  or  rational  activity. 

Dementia  is  a  weakened  condition  of  the  mental  powers.  It 
denotes  feebleness,  inactivity,  and  incapacity,  rather  than  ab- 
normal functioning.  It  supposes  that  the  faculties  have  been 
stronger  before,  whereas  idiocy  and  imbecility  or  feeble-minded- 
ness  are  congenital. 

The  causes  of  insanity  may  be  general  dispositions  or  accidental 
events.  The  most  important  are  heredity,  worry,  a  melancholic 
temperament,  various  hereditary  and  acquired  dispositions  and 
defects  of  the  organism,  and  especially  of  the  nervous  system. 
Many  accidents,  bodily  injury,  strong  emotions,  intemperance, 
drug-habits,  etc.,  may  bring  about  insanity. 

2.  Sleep  and  Dream.  —  Sleep  is  a  temporary  dementia,  and  in- 
sanity has  been  termed  the  dream  of  the  waking  man.  In  fact, 
there  is  more  than  one  point  of  resemblance  between  these  two 
states.  In  dream  and  in  insanity  we  observe  the  same  incoher- 
ence, irrational  sequence  of  ideas  and  images,  and  the  same 
absence  of  control  of  the  inferior  mental  powers  by  the  higher 
faculties. 

(a)  Psychologically,  sleep  is  the  suspension  ort  at  least,  the  lowering 
of  consciousness.     If  we  rely  on  the  testimony  of  memory,  we  may 
think  that  consciousness  is  totally  suspended  at  least  during  some 
periods  of  sleep,  for  we  are  not  aware  of  dreaming  all  the  time. 
However,  this  testimony  is  not  necessarily  reliable,  for  we  have 
dreams  which  we  do  not  remember,  or  which  are  recalled  later 
owing  to  some  accidental  association.    It  seems  also  that  whenr 
ever  we  wake  up,  if  we  can  take  immediate  cognizance  of  our 
state  we  are  conscious  of  waking  from  a  dream  which  may  be 
weak,  and  the  memory  of  which,  after  a  few  instants,  disappears 
beyond  recall. 

(b)  The  physiological  causes  of  sleep  are  not  certain.    To  a  great 
extent  they  seem  to  be  changes  in  the  blood  circulation  in  the 
brain.    The  work  of  the  day  fatigues  the  brain  and  accumulates 
waste-matter.     Hence  the  need  of  rest,  during  which  this  is  elim- 
inated.   The  main  conditions  contributing  to  induce  sleep  are 
fatigue,  monotonous  impressions,  the  influence  of  cold  and  heat, 


196  PSYCHOLOGY 

certain  organic  functions  like  digestion,  or  organic  morbid  dis- 
positions, and  chiefly  the  absence  of  ordinary  sensory  stimuli,  that 
is,  darkness,  silence,  and  tranquillity.  Waking  may  result  from 
the  sufficiency  of  rest,  from  a  stimulus,  either  internal,  like  pain, 
or  external,  like  sound,  light,  or  touch,  especially  if  the  stimulus 
is  strong,  or  if,  though  weak,  it  corresponds  to  a  special  attention 
of  the  subject.  Thus  a  mother  perceives  the  slightest  cry  of  a 
sick  child,  the  fireman  hears  the  sound  of  the  alarm  bell,  etc. 
The  stopping  of  accustomed  regular  movements  or  noises  may 
also  cause  one  to  arouse  from  sleep. 

(c)  Conscious  processes  during  sleep  are  called  dreams.    Be- 
tween the  state  of  wakefulness  and  the  dreaming  state  we  may  men- 
tion "  reverie,"  in  which  little  or  no  attention  is  paid  to  external 
things,  and  free  play  is  allowed  to  the  imagination.    As  all  mental 
faculties  maybe,  or  at  least  may  seem  to  be,  suspended  during  sleep, 
so  also  all  may  be  exercised.    There  is  imagination  and  memory; 
feeling  —  e.g.   fear  in   a  nightmare;    judgment   and  reasoning, 
no  matter  how  uncouth  and  unreasonable  these  may  be;  will,  or 
at  any  rate  something  akin  to  it,  for  instance,  when  one  wants  to 
run  away,  speak,  etc.    There  is  even  some  kind  of  sensation,  as 
we  shall  see  when  we  speak  of  the  causes  of  dreams.    However, 
a  dream  is  a  continuous  hallucination.    Images,  no  matter  how 
ridiculous  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  waking  state,  are  taken 
for  realities.    This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  such  images  are  not  cor- 
rected by  perceptions  or  by  reason.    They  are  not  under  the  con- 
trol of  attention  and  will,  and  follow  their  own  capricious  course. 
No  account  is  taken  of  time.    Observations  have  shown  that,  in 
a  few  seconds,  one  may  dream  of  a  succession  of  events  that  would 
occupy  a  very  long  time. 

(d)  The  main  causes  of  dreams  are:  (i)  Sensations.    Thus  a  little 
touch  or  smart  may  be  magnified  and  represented  in  consciousness 
by  huge  weights  or  wounds.     (2)  Organic  conditions  like  indiges- 
tion, difficult  breathing,  etc.     (3)  Mental  states  going  on  before 
sleep  and  continued  during  it.     (4)  General  tendencies  and  pre- 
occupations which  contribute  to  modify  the  dreaming  tendencies. 

3.   Somnambulism — etymologically,  walking  asleep — is  a  state 
of  mental  activity  during  sleep,  or  perhaps  quasi-sleep,  accompa- 


SPECIAL    MENTAL    CONDITIONS  197 

nied  by  perceptions,  movements,  and  purposive  actions.  It  has 
been  called  the  acting  of  one's  dream.  In  somnambulism  there  is 
activity  and  coordinated  movement,  e.g.  walking,  speaking,  writ- 
ing. Frequently  there  is  also  sequence  and  coherence  in  the  ideas. 
The  somnambulist  may  speak  or  write  very  sensibly,  and  even  do 
intellectual  work,  solve  problems,  write  essays,  and  find  solutions 
which  had  been  sought  in  vain  during  the  state  of  wakefulness. 
The  senses  are  awake,  and  the  somnambulist  walks  and  avoids 
obstacles  on  his  way,  or  carries  on  a  conversation.  The  senses 
are  even  generally  keener  than  in  the  waking  state,  especially 
the  muscular  sense.  The  somnambulist  performs  dangerous 
actions  which  he  would  never  be  able  to  perform  when  awake. 
At  the  same  time,  the  senses  are  selective,  and  their  field  is  narrower. 
Frequently  certain  objects  only  are  perceived,  namely,  those  that 
are  connected  with  the  train  of  ideas,  while  the  others  are  over- 
looked. There  is  thus  an  exaggerated  form  of  what,  in  the  wak- 
ing state,  would  be  called  distraction.  Whereas  we  may  have  a 
very  vivid  recollection  of  dreams,  actions  performed  in  the  somnam- 
bulistic state  are  not  remembered  in  the  state  of  wakefulness,  but 
may  be  recalled  in  a  new  somnambulism. 

4.  Duality  or  Multiplicity  of  "Selves  "  or  "Personalities  "  is  a 
term  frequently  used,  although  what  it  expresses  is  in  reality  a 
dissociation  of  the  centres,  chiefly  of  the  memory  centres. 

(a)  In  some  cases,  a  person  has  had,  so  to  speak,  two  or  three 
different  successive  or  alternating  personalities  which,  though  suc- 
ceeding one  another,  form  in  consciousness  two  continuous  series 
and  are  generally  more  or  less  independent: 


In  the  series  A,  the  events  of  the  series  B  are  not  remembered, 
nor  are  those  of  the  series  A  in  the  series  B.  Sometimes,  however, 
one  series  is  privileged,  and  includes  the  other,  but  not  vice  versa. 
Something,  e.g.  language,  knowledge  of  persons,  etc.,  may  be, 
but  is  not  always,  common  to  both  series.  If  one  "personality  " 
has  any  knowledge  of  the  other,  it  will  generally  refer  to  it 
in  the  third  person.  It  also  may  happen  that  in  one  series  the 


198  PSYCHOLOGY 

character  and  aptitudes  are  greatly  different  from  those  in  the 
other  series. 

(b)  Two  simultaneous  "personalities "  may  also  be  found. 
For  instance,  while  the  subject  is  engaged  in  conversation  with 
another  person,  a  third  person  may  ask  questions  which  will  be 
answered  rationally  by  automatic  writing.  In  more  general 
terms,  two  simultaneous  series  of  rational  actions  will  go  on  inde- 
pendently. It  is  remarkable  that,  when  the  subject  writes  auto- 
matically while  carrying  on  a  conversation,  the  "writer"  will 
refer  to  the  "  speaker  "  in  the  third  person,  and  even  may  refer 
to  him  as  a  stranger  or  an  enemy. 

Such  facts  —  which  of  course  are  rare  —  occur  chiefly  in  cases 
of  hysteria.  Hysteria  is  a  very  complex  organic  and  mental  dis- 
ease, having  several  points  in  common  with  somnambulism,  chiefly 
the  hyperaesthesia  of  certain  senses. 

5.  Suggestion  is  very  closely  allied  to  imagination. 

(a)  In  a  broad  sense,  to  suggest  is  to  impart  an  idea,  especially 
with  a  view  to  determine  some  action.     It  is  of  daily  occurrence 
and  use.     A  striking  instance  will  be  found  in  advertising.    The 
purpose  of  advertising  is  to  arouse  in  the  mind  the  idea  of  certain 
wants,  and  hence  the  desire  to  satisfy  them  by  buying  the  recom- 
mended article.    The  symptoms  of   a  disease  will  be  described 
so  as  to  suggest  that  you  have  that  disease.     Conclusion:  buy  the 
patent  medicine.    The  more  completely  an  idea  takes  possession 
of  the  mind  and  is  prominent,  the  greater  is  its  motor  power, 
and  the  greater  the  chances  of  its  being  effective.     Hence  if 
it  is  the  only  idea  present  in  the  mind,  or  if  other  ideas  are 
made   to   strengthen   it,  or   if,  finally,  other    antagonistic   ideas 
have  no  time  to  counteract  it,  the  suggested  action  is  certain  to 
follow. 

(b)  This  necessary  determination  of  an  action  by  an  idea  is 
suggestion  in  the  strict  sense.    The   determined   process  may  be 
sensory  —  hallucination,  illusion,   etc.,  —  motor,  inhibitory,  emo- 
tional, or  ideal.     Suggestibility  in  the  broad  sense  is  common  to 
all  men.     In  the  strict  sense  it  is  found  chiefly  in  certain  abnormal 
states,   especially   in   hypnotism.     Hetero-suggestion,   or   simply 
suggestion,  is  given  by  the  words,  gestures,  or  signs  of  some  one 


SPECIAL    MENTAL    CONDITIONS  199 

else.  Auto-suggestion  comes  consciously  or  unconsciously  from 
the  agent  himself. 

6.  Hypnotism  (VTTVOS,  sleep)  is  the  art,  theory,  or  practice  of 
hypnosis.    Hypnosis  is  a  mental  state  in  many  respects  similar 
to  somnambulism. 

(a)  Hypnosis  is  produced  in  many  different  ways:  gazing  at  a 
bright  object,  listening  to  a  monotonous  sound,  passes  before  the 
eyes  and  on  the  body,  suggestion  or  command  to  go  to  sleep. 

(b)  The  main  psychological  features  of  the  deep  and  complete 
hypnosis  are:  (i)  Suggestibility.    All  kinds  of  illusions  and  hallu- 
cinations occur  at  the  will  of  the  hypnotizer.    Present  things  or 
persons  are  not  perceived,  or  absent  things  and  persons  are  imag- 
ined to  be  present.    The  subject  changes  his  attitude  and  behav- 
ior accordingly.    Actions  are  performed  when  and  as  commanded 

—  whether  always  irresistibly  seems  uncertain.  Post-hypnotic 
suggestions  are  suggestions  made  during  the  hypnotic  state,  but 
to  be  carried  out  only  at  an  appointed  time,  after  the  subject  has 
been  aroused.  (2)  Alterations  of  memory.  Actions  performed 
during  hypnosis  generally  are  not  recalled  in  the  normal  state, 
but  may  be  recalled  in  a  subsequent  hypnosis.  (3)  The  "  rapport  " 
of  the  subject  with  the  hypnotizer  is  a  special  relation  of  the  two, 
to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  person  unless  the  hypnotizer  allows 
the  subject  to  communicate  also  with  others. 

(c)  The  causes  and  mechanism  of  hypnotism  are  very  uncer- 
tain.   Some  analogies  and  hints  are  found  in  other  mental  condi- 
tions already   mentioned;    but  an  adequate   explanation  is  not 
possible  with  our  actual  knowledge. 

(d)  All  serious  psychologists  and  hypnotists  agree  that  the  prac- 
tice of  hypnotism  is  dangerous.     It  weakens  the  intellect  and  will, 
and  generally  has  a  harmful  influence  on  the  nervous  system,  not 
to  mention  the  immoral  or  criminal  influences  that  may  be  exer- 
cised  by   unscrupulous   hypnotizers.    In   some   cases,   however, 
hypnotism  may  be  useful  to  correct  mental  or  organic  defects. 
Only  competent  and  upright  physicians  should  be  allowed  to 
practice  hypnotism,  and  under  restrictions  and  conditions  which 
obviate  its  dangers. 

7.  Clairvoyance,   Mental   Suggestion,   Telepathy.  —  (a)  Clair- 


200  PSYCHOLOGY 

voyance  is  the  alleged  power  to  see  things  through  opaque  bodies, 
or  at  great  distances.  If  the  facts  alleged  are  true,  perhaps  other 
facts,  such  as  radio-activity,  wireless  telegraphy,  and  wireless 
telephony,  may  throw  some  light  on  these  abnormal  phenomena. 
Certain  rays  penetrate  opaque  bodies,  and  can  affect  special 
photographic  plates.  Is  it  impossible  that  the  eye  should  be 
adapted  to  receive  and  perceive  them?  All  that  is  required 
is  that  the  eye  should  allow  such  rays  to  pass  through  its 
various  refracting  media  —  which  it  does  not  ordinarily — and 
that  the  retina  be  sensitive  to  them.  As  to  the  vision  of  past 
and  future  events,  if  true,  it  can  be  explained  to  some  extent  by 
memory  —  even  though  the  event  was  not  consciously  known,  — 
or  by  guesses  and  inferences  from  known  causes. 

(b)  Mental  suggestion  is  a  suggestion  made  immediately  from 
mind  to  mind  without  any  sensible  sign,  word,  or  gesture.     Sev- 
eral hypotheses  have  been  proposed  to  explain  such  facts,  suppos- 
ing them  to  be  authentic.    None  seems  satisfactory,  or,  at  least, 
sufficiently  based  on  known  mental  or  physical  properties.    Is  it 
possible  for  an  idea  to  correspond  to  certain  brain  processes  which 
would  be  transmitted  to  and  interpreted  by  another  brain?    Here 
again 'recent  discoveries  in  physical  sciences  must  make  us  hesi- 
tate in  denying  this  possibility.    As  we  do  not  know  all  the  prop- 
erties of  matter,  so  we  do  not  know  all  the  properties  of  organized 
matter,  nor  of  mind.    Investigations  seem  to  point  out  that  men- 
tal work  produces  something  like  emanations  or  radiations.    At 
certain  tunes  two  brains  may  be  in  special  relations  of  sympathy, 
so  that  one  of  them  is  apt  to  receive  and  interpret  the  other's 
messages. 

(c)  Telepathy  is  the  communication  between  two  minds  without 
the  help  of  the  senses,  and  generally  at  a  great  distance.    The 
alleged  facts  consist  chiefly  of  apparitions  of  persons  dying  far 
away,  of  a  sense  of  uneasiness  when  some  absent  relative  or  friend 
meets  with  an  accident,  and  of  certain  premonitions  of  danger. 
Whether  and  how  such  facts  can  be  explained,  it  is  not  possible 
at  present  to  say.    The  indications  given  for  mental  suggestion 
or   thought-transference   apply    also    to    some    of    the    facts  of 
telepathy. 


SPECIAL    MENTAL    CONDITIONS          2OI 

8.  Spiritism,  sometimes  called  spiritualism,  which  is  to-day 
so  much  in  evidence, includes  many  marvellous  facts:  table- turning 
in  order  to  receive  answers  to  questions  asked,  motions  of  furni- 
ture, light  or  sounds  coming  from  unknown  and  unseen  causes, 
apparitions,  etc.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  presence  of  a 
medium  is  required,  that  is,  of  a  specially  sensitive  person 
through  whom  the  "spirits"  manifest  themselves.  Frequently 
the  medium  gives  answers  by  speech  or  automatic  writing. 

(a)  Many  of  the  so-called  spiritistic  phenomena  are  frauds 
which  have  been  exposed  more  than  once.    However,  there  seems 
to  remain  a  certain  number  of  well-ascertained  facts,  and,  even 
if  there  is  much  more  fraud  than  truth,  this  is  not  a  sufficient  rea- 
son for  denying  everything,  especially  when  we  have  honest, 
serious,  and  competent  witnesses.    These  facts  are  not  at  present 
explicable.    We  simply  note  that  the  facts  of  objectivated  dreams, 
hallucinations,  hypnotism,  double   personality,  and   somnambu- 
lism can  probably  account  for  some  of  the  medium's  powers,  and 
perhaps  for  all  those  which  he  really  possesses.    Thought-trans- 
ference, if  possible,  would  also  be  a  clue  toward  an  explanation. 
It  is  significant  that  the  same  "spirit"  does  not  speak  in  the  same 
manner,  nor  are  his  opinions  the  same,  when  given  through  differ- 
ent mediums,  and  that  the  medium  impersonates  the  "spirits" 
and  transmits  messages  purporting  to  come  from  them  according 
to   the  knowledge  he  has  of  such  "spirits."     Significant  also 
is  the  fact  of  the  "trance"  of  the  medium  during  his  supposed 
communication   with   the   spirit,  as  we   know  that   hypnotism 
predisposes  one  to  play  a  r61e  or  a  second  personality. 

(b)  What  has  been  said  of  the  dangers  of  hypnotism  applies  to 
spiritism,  and  here  even  the  dangers  are  much  greater,  as  experi- 
ence teaches.    Moreover,  there  may  be  moral  and  religious  rea- 
sons for  avoiding  all  spiritistic  practices.    As  a  religious  system 
based  on  supposed  revelations  of  the  "spirits,"  spiritism  is  in  open 
contradiction  with  the  Christian  religion. 

N.B.  It  is  impossible  to  enter  here  into  a  more  detailed  account 
of  these  extraordinary  facts.  We  caution  the  student  against 
too  great  a  credulity  with  regard  to  the  multitude  of  stories  cir- 
culated on  these  topics,  and  against  hasty  inferences  and  theories. 


202  PSYCHOLOGY 

It  may  also  be  noticed  that  these  facts  form  a  continuous  series. 
The  passage  from  one  to  the  other  is  gradual;  there  is  no  sudden 
jump  and  no  gap.  But  psychology  is  unable  at  present  to  explain 
them  all.  Finally,  it  must  be  recalled  that  continuity  does  not 
necessarily  mean  identity  in  nature  or  in  the  causes  of  the  ex- 
tremes that  are  linked  by  many  intermediaries. 


CONCLUSION 

CHARACTER  AND  PERSONALITY 

i.  Character.  —  (a)  Etymologically,  character  signifies  a  dis- 
tinctive mark,  and  accordingly  means  the  most  salient  features 
in  every  individual's  mental  structure  and  functions,  that  which 
makes  him  to  be  so  or  so.  In  this  broad  sense  it  denotes  something 
very  complex,  namely,  the  general  relations  between  mental  ten- 
dencies, their  relative  importance,  the  inferiority  or  predominance 
of  some.  The  most  obvious  distinctive  feature  in  man  is  his  con- 
duct, his  mode  of  acting,  especially  in  such  actions  as  are  volun- 
tarily purposive.  Hence  character  refers  chiefly  to  the  active 
aspect  of  life,  that  is,  to  the  tendencies  and  feelings,  inasmuch  as 
they  prompt  to  certain  lines  of  action. 

(b)  In  a  narrower  signification,  as  when  we  speak  of  a  man  of 
character,  or  say  that  a  man  has  no  character,  we  refer  especially 
to  the  unity  and  consistency  of  his  mental  processes,  together 
with  some  independence  and  strength  of  will.    A  character  is 
thus  dependent  on  the  qualities  of  intelligence,  especially  reflec- 
tion, and  on  the  emotional  nature,  especially  the  control  of  the 
emotions  by  the  will.    Although  character  depends  largely  on 
heredity,    environment,    early    education,    and   surroundings,    it 
refers  chiefly  to  the  acquired  habits  of  will.    We*act  according  to 
our  habits.    The  early  formation  of  character  is  very  important. 
Parents  and  teachers  can  never  give  too  much  attention  and  care 
to  it.    They  must  use  innate  tendencies  to  help  the  formation  of 
right  habits  and  the  uprooting  of  wrong  ones,  and  to  suggest  noble 
motives  and  ideals. 

(c)  Temperament   and   disposition  are  closely   related  to  char- 
acter.   Temperament  is  chiefly  dependent  on  inherited  organic 
conditions,  and  can  be  reformed  less  easily  than  character.    Dis- 
position is  also  mostly  innate  and  hereditary.    It  refers  to  emo- 

203 


204  PSYCHOLOGY 

tional  and  active  tendencies.  Thus  a  man  is  said  to  have  a  happy 
disposition,  an  excitable  disposition,  a  sluggish  disposition,  etc. 
We  have  spoken  above  (p.  191)  of  the  four  temperaments;  char- 
acters cannot  be  classified  satisfactorily;  according  to  their  domi- 
nant features  they  are  referred  to  as  weak,  obstinate,  inconstant, 
selfish,  etc. 

2.  Personality.  —  In  its  psychological  —  not  philosophical  — 
sense,  personality  is  almost  the  same  as  character;  it  denotes  a 
strong  and  marked  individuality.  Man  alone  is  a  person,  and 
he  is  personal  when  he  performs  certain  actions  that  spring  from 
himself.  To  be  a  person  is  to  emerge  above  the  universal  deter- 
minism of  matter,  to  conquer  and  not  be  conquered,  to  possess 
oneself.  The  self  is  the  centre  of  attribution  of  voluntary  activ- 
ities, the  responsible  agent,  that  which  in  us  is  worthy  of  respect 
and  which,  therefore,  is  the  foundation  of  social  ethics.  The 
psychological  self  changes  and  is  modified  by  circumstances  and 
chiefly  by  effort.  We  say  of  a  man:  "He  is  not  what  he  used  to 
be; "  and  of  the  man  who  acts  according  to  his  character,  and  accord- 
ing to  our  expectation,  we  say:  "That  is  just  like  him."  Of  a  man 
whom  we  suppose  to  have  acted  under  such  a  strong  or  sudden 
impulse  that  his  will  was  prevented  from  inhibiting  the  action,  we 
say:  "He  was  not  himself."  To  be  oneself  is  to  be  one's  own  mas- 
ter. Hence  let  your  primary  and  chief  endeavor  be  to  develop 
in  you  good  habits,  good  dispositions,  and  a  good  character. 
Always  strive  after  what  is  worth  your  best  effort.  Ascertain 
the  direction  to  be  taken,  and,  when  you  know  that  your  efforts 
are  directed  toward  right  and  noble  ideals,  be  strong,  constant, 
and  invincible.  In  all  things  and  actions,  be  a  personality;  be 
yourself. 


LOGIC   OR   THE    NORMATIVE 
SCIENCE    OF   THE    INTELLECT 


INTRODUCTION 

i.  Main  Conclusions  from  Psychology,  which  it  is  necessary  to 
recall  here,  (i)  Truth  is  found  in  the  judgment,  that  is,  in  the 
affirmation  or  negation  of  the  agreement  of  two  notions.  A  simple 
idea  in  itself  has  no  truth,  but  only  when  its  relation  to  another  is 
asserted  (p.  107).  (2)  Judgments  are  immediate  and  self-evident, 
or  mediate  and  reached  through  a  process  of  reasoning  (p.  112, 
115  fL).  (3)  Judgments  are  true  or  false  according  as  they 
affirm  that  which  is  or  is  not  in  conformity  with  reality.  Men 
reform  some  of  their  judgments,  considering  as  false  what  they 
previously  considered  as  true,  and  vice  versa.  Again,  they  look 
upon  the  judgments  of  other  men  as  true  or  false,  and  as  more  or 
less  certain  or  uncertain  (p.  117  ff.).  (4)  The  mind  may  be  in  a 
state  of  ignorance,  when  it  has  no  knowledge  whatever  of  an  object, 
and  hence  can  form  no  judgment;  of  error,  when  a  false  judgment 
is  accepted;  of  doubt,  when  the  mind,  although  knowing  something 
about  an  object,  finds  no  sufficient  reason  for  affirming  or  denying; 
of  opinion,  when  the  mind  assents  to  a  judgment,  but  does  not 
give  a  firm  assent  because  there  are  reasons  to  fear  lest  such  a 
judgment  be  false;  of  certitude,  when  the  truth  appears  with  evi- 
dence, and  a  judgment  is  assented  to  unreservedly.  It  may  be 
noticed  that  in  common  usage  ignorance  is  often  used  for  doubt 
and  error,  and  doubt  for  opinion,  or  rather  for  the  fear  of  error. 
(5)  We  have  also  called  attention  to  the  distinction  between  assent 
and  consent,  convincing  and  persuading,  knowing  intellectually 
and  practically  accepting  the  truth  with  all  its  consequences. 
The  former  regards  the  intellect  alone,  the  latter  concerns  the 
whole  man  (p.  120  ff.). 

205 


206  LOGIC 

2.  Meaning    of   Logic.  —  (a)    The   names   of   many   sciences 
end  in  -logy  —  psychology,  cosmology,  geology,  etc.    The  term 
Aoyos  signifies  primarily  word,  and  secondarily  thought,  and  also 
science.     "Logic"  comes  from  the  same  Greek  term.     In  ordinary 
language  it  refers  to  the  power  of  reasoning,  and  to  the  consistency 
either  between  the    thoughts  of    an  individual,  or  between  his 
thoughts  and  his  mode  of  action.     To  be  logical  is  to  be  reasonable. 

(b)  As  used  here,  the  term  "logic"  means  the  normative  science 
of  the  intellectual  faculties.  Certain  modes  of  thought  are  invalid. 
There  are  judgments  that  are  incompatible  and  exclude  one  an- 
other. Others  are  compatible,  but  independent  of  one  another, 
and  have  no  logical  relation.  Others  are  compatible  and  log- 
ically related  as  principles  and  conclusions,  one  being  inferred  from 
others.  The  purpose  of  logic  is  to  indicate  the  rules  of  valid  infer- 
ence so  as  to  facilitate  the  progress  of  the  mind  in  the  pursuit  of 
truth  and  the  freedom  from  error.  In  other  words,  logic  tries  to 
dispose  the  materials  found  in  the  mind  into  harmonious  struc- 
tures, and  to  indicate  the  way  toward  the  acquisition  of  new 
knowledge. 

3.  Definition  of  Logic.  —  The  truth  which  is  considered  here 
is  logical  truth.    The  intrinsic  value  of  the  materials  used  is  not 
examined,  but  only  their  valid  sequence  in  the  mind.    For  instance, 
"All  men  are  white;  Peter  is  a  man;  therefore  Peter  is  white," 
is  a  true  and  valid  syllogism  from  the  point  of  view  of  logic, 
although  the  first  proposition  is  not  in  conformity  with  reality. 
The  logical  value  of  a  syllogism  is  independent  of  the  truth  of  its 
propositions,  as  will  be  explained  more  in  detail  later  on.     Hence 
logic  has  frequently  been  defined  as  the  science  of  the  formal  laws 
of  thought. 

By  "thought"  is  meant  chiefly  discursive  thought  or  reasoning. 
The  "laws  of  thought"  are  the  norms  of  valid  reasoning,  and  of 
inference  in  general.  By  "formal"  laws  is  meant  that  logic  deals 
with  the  process  of  reasoning  apart  from  its  contents  or  materials, 
considering  only  the  validity  of  the  process,  no  matter  what  the 
contents  may  be. 

Hence  logic  differs  from  psychology,  which  studies  also  the  proc- 
esses of  thought,  but  in  their  nature  and  genesis  apart  from  their 


NATURE    OF    LOGIC  207 

validity;  from  epistemology,  which  examines  the  value  of  the  con- 
tents of  judgments;  from  oratory,  which  tries  not  only  to  convince 
but  chiefly  to  persuade;  from  grammar,  which  deals  with  the 
correct  expression  of  thought. 

4.  Utility  of  Logic.  —  Logic  is  a  very  useful  science,  since  it 
teaches  the  proper  use  of  intellectual  faculties  in  finding  and  teach- 
ing the  truth  and  in  guarding  against  error.    It  has  been  called 
rightly  the  science  of  sciences,  or  the  instrument  of  sciences.    All 
men  have  a  natural  logic;  all  know  what  it  is  to  contradict  one- 
self;   all   use    arguments   and   detect   fallacies.    Scientific   logic 
develops  this  natural   aptitude.    It  strengthens  the  intellectual 
faculties  by  exercising  them  methodically  and  contributing  to  the 
acquisition  of  good  habits  of  thought.    It  assists  the  mind  in  find- 
ing the  truth  and  testing  the  value  of  judgments.    It  makes  it 
easier  to  detect  the  numerous  fallacies  which,  consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously, creep  into  books,  conversations,  speeches,  and  articles. 
The  logical  mind  is  not  drawn  so  irresistibly  by  an  appeal  to 
prejudices,  passions,  and  emotions.    It  looks  for  the  reasons  and 
the  inner  value  of  the  arguments  used. 

5.  Division  of  Logic.  —  This  treatise  will  be  divided  into  two 
chapters.    The  first  will  consider  the  instruments  which  the  mind 
uses  to  reach  truth,  the  most  important  of  which  is  reasoning. 
The  second  will  deal  with  the  proper  use  of  these  instruments, 
their  value,  and  orderly  arrangement. 


CHAPTER  I 

REASONING 

Knowledge  is  generally  discursive.  Except  in  the  case  of  self- 
evidence,  truth  is  acquired  by  proceeding  from  some  known  judg- 
ment to  another.  This  is  called  reasoning,  by  means  of  which  a 
judgment,  unknown  or  less  known  before,  is  reached.  Hence  rea- 
soning is  the  main  instrument  by  which  knowledge  is  acquired, 
and  consequently  the  primary  object  of  this  chapter.  However, 
as  reasoning  supposes  judgments,  and  judgments  suppose  ideas, 
it  is  also  necessary  to  consider  these  elements  of  reasoning.  Begin- 
ning with  the  simplest,  we  have  the  three  following  articles:  (i) 
Idea.  (2)  Judgment.  (3)  Reasoning. 


ARTICLE  I.    THE  IDEA 
I.    NATURE   OF   IDEAS 

I.  THE  IDEA  IN  LOGIC 

i.  How  Logic  Considers  Ideas.  —  From  what  has  been  said  in 
psychology  we  know  that  an  idea  is  a  simple  mental  representa- 
tion, i.e.  something  in  the  mind,  holding  the  place  of  or  represent- 
ing some  object.  This  representation  is  called  simple  because  it 
includes  no  affirmation  or  negation,  and  in  this  differs  from  the 
judgment.  Logic  does  not  consider  the  idea  in  all  its  aspects;  it 
leaves  its  genesis  to  psychology,  and  its  conformity  with  the  object 
to  epistemology.  It  considers  the  idea  only  as  the  element  —  sub- 
ject or  predicate  —  of  the  judgment.  An  idea  may  be  attributed 
to  another  according  to  various  modes,  and  their  connection  may 
be  more  or  less  necessary.  On  the  other  hand,  all  possible  ideas 
are  reducible  to  certain  higher  classes  in  which  they  are  contained. 

208 


IDEAS    AND    TERMS 


209 


Hence  the  necessity  of  speaking  of  predicables  and  of  predicaments 
or  categories.  To  predicate  (praedicare)  means  to  affirm  the 
relation  of  an  attribute  to  a  subject. 

2.  Predicables.  —  (a)  An  idea  may  be  conceived:  (i)  As  con- 
stituting the  complete  essence,  and  only  the  essence  of  a  class  of 
individuals,  e.g.  the  idea  of  man  as  applied  to  Peter,  Paul,  John, 
etc.,  or  the  idea  of  a  plane  figure  bounded  by  four  straight  lines  as 
applied  to  all  quadrilaterals.  (Species.)  (2)  As  common  to  sev- 
eral classes  of  individuals  and  constituting  their  essence  incompletely. 
Thus  I  say  that  a  man,  a  horse,  a  robin,  a  fly,  etc.,  are  animals. 
(Genus.)  (3)  As  something  differentiating  this  common  idea  or 
genus.  Thus  every  class  of  animals  just  mentioned  has  essential 
characteristics  by  which  it  differs  from  the  others.  (Specific 
dijfference.)  (4)  As  necessarily  connected  with,  and  flowing  from, 
the  essence,  although  not  constituting  it.  Thus  in  man  the  power 
of  expressing  ideas  by  speech  or  writing.  (Property.)  (5)  As 
present  in  fact,  but  with  no  necessary  connection,  so  that  it  might  be 
absent.  Thus  for  man  to  be  white,  learned,  tall,  strong,  etc. 
(Accident.) 

(b)  Hence  we  have  Jive  predicables,  that  is,  five  modes  according 
to  which  ideas  may  be  predicated  of  others:  species,  genus,  spe- 
cific difference,  property,  and  accident.  The  predicates  of  all 
judgments  are  attributed  to  the  subject  in  one  of  these  five  ways. 
Hence  the  following  synopsis. 


Predication 


(i)  necessary 


(a)  constituting  the  essence 

(1)  completely  =  Species 

(2)  incompletely, 


(a)  as   the   more    com- 
mon element = Genus 
(6)    as    the    restricting 
element  =  Difference 
(b)  resulting  from  the  essence  =  Property 
(2)  unnecessary  =  Accident 


(c)  Hence  several  individuals  may  agree  or  differ  specifically. 
Individuals  within  the  same  species  necessarily  agree  in  species, 
genus,  specific  difference,  and  properties.  Individuals  within 
the  same  genus  always  have  some  common  essential  note. 


2IO 


LOGIC 


N.B.  We  speak  here  of  property  in  the  strict  sense,  as  that 
which  belongs  to  all  individuals  of  the  same  class,  and  to  these 
individuals  alone.  In  common  language  other  meanings  are  fre- 
quently used. 

(d)  The  same  idea  may  often  be  considered  both  as  genus  and 
as  species  from  different  points  of  view.  Thus  animal  is  a  species 
of  living  substances  —  specifically  different  from  plants  which  are 
also  living,  —  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  the  genus  of  man  and  of 
irrational  animals.  The  genus  supremum  is  the  first  division  of 
the  most  general  notion,  that  of  being.  The  species  infima  is  the 
last  species  under  which  individuals  only  are  found.  The  follow- 
ing list  is  known  as  the  tree  of  Porphyry  (a  philosopher,  A.D. 


Substance 

1 

==  Highest  genus 
=  Specific  difference 
=  Subaltern  genus,  also  species 
=  Specific  difference 
=  Subaltern  genus,  also  species 
=  Specific  difference 
=  Subaltern  genus,  also  species 
=  Specific  difference 

=  Lowest  species.     (Irrational  animals  or 
brutes  have  other  species) 

=  Individuals 

Corporeal 

~1 
Incorporeal 

Body 

Organic 

Inorganic 

1 
Living 

Sentient 

1 

Non-sentient 

1 
Animal 
1 

Rational 
1 

Irrational 

Man 

1 

Peter 

1                I                1 
Paul         John          Etc. 

N.B.  We  suppose  that  there  is  no  genus  above  substance.  The 
idea  of  being  alone  is  above  it,  and  this  is  not  a  genus,  since,  what- 
ever difference  that  might  be  added  to  it  is  something  or  some 
being,  and  therefore  already  contained  in  the  notion  of  being. 


IDEAS     AND     TERMS  211 

Ideas  may  be  within  the  same  proximate,  or  only  within  the  same 
remote  genus.  Thus  man  and  stone  are  within  the  same  genus 
of  material  substances  or  bodies,  but  not  within  the  same  prox- 
imate genus. 

3.  Predicaments  or  Categories  are  the  genera  suprema,  or  high- 
est genera  to  which  all  possible  ideas  are  reducible.    Aristotle 
numbered  ten  categories:  substance,  quantity,  quality,  relation, 
action,  passion,  place,  time,  situation  or  posture,  habit  or  bear- 
ing.   All  ideas  certainly  can  be  reduced  to  one  of  these  groups. 
The  nine  last  together  form  the  group  known  as  accident.    Acci- 
dents are  conceived,  not  as  existing  in  themselves,  but  as  being 
received  in  and  modifying  the  substance.    Probably  a  further  re- 
duction of  the  categories  is  possible  into:  substance,  quantity, 
quality,  and  relation,  all  other  accidents  being  reduced  to  rela- 
tions; or  into:  substance  —  existing  in  itself,  —  as  man,  gold,  etc.; 
accident  —  existing  in   the   substance  —  as   science,   color,   size, 
etc.;  and  relation  —  referring  a  thing  to  another  —  as  cause  and 
effect,  similarity,  right  or  left,  etc.    N.B.    Notice  the  difference 
in  the  meaning  of  accident  as  a  predicament  and  as  a  predicable. 

4.  Terms.  —  A  term  is  a  word,  spoken  or  written,  used  to  express 
an  idea.    The  function  of  language  has  been  explained  in  psychol- 
ogy (p.  122  ff.).     Since  it  is  a  sign,  the  term  stands  for  something 
else.    This  is  called  its  supposition.    The  term  may  stand  for 
itself  as  written  or  spoken,  for  instance,  "man  is  spelt  m-a-n,"  or 
"man  is  a  monosyllable."    This  is  called  material  supposition. 
Or  the  term  may  stand  for  an  idea  that  exists  only  in  the  mind, 
e.g.  a  genus  or  species,  for  instance,  "Man  is  a  species  of  animal." 
This  is  called  logical  supposition.    Or,  finally,  it  may  stand  for  a 
reality  existing  outside  of  the  mind,  e.g.  "This  man  is  wise." 
This  is  called  real  supposition. 

II.  INTENSION  AND  EXTENSION  OF  IDEAS  AND  TERMS 

i.  Meaning.  —  In  the  Porphyry  tree  above,  higher  notions 
are  not  so  complex  as  lower  ones.  Thus  animal  includes  the 
ideas  of  substance,  material,  organic,  and  sentient;  living  in- 
cludes only  the  ideas  of  substance,  material,  and  organic;  body 
includes  only  the  ideas  of  substance  and  material.  On  the 


212  LOGIC 

contrary,  as  we  go  higher,  the  number  of  individuals  contained 
under  the  notion  grows  larger.  There  are  more  living  substances 
than  animals,  and  more  bodies  than  living  substances.  The  total- 
ity of  the  necessary  elements  of  an  idea,  that  is,  of  the  simpler  ideas 
that  are  implied  in  it,  is  called  its  connotation,  comprehension,  inten- 
sion, or  contents.  The  totality  of  the  individuals  to  which  such  an 
idea  applies  is  called  its  denotation,  extension,  or  sphere  of  applica- 
tion. 

2.  Law.  —  From  what  precedes  it  is  apparent  that  extension 
and  intension  vary  in  opposite  directions,  that  is,  the  greater  the 
extension,  the  smaller  the  intension,  and  vice  versa.  Since  increas- 
ing the  intension  means  adding  a  new  difference,  it  means  forming 
two  or  several  sub-classes,  each  of  which  cannot  include  the  same 
number  of  individuals  as  all  taken  together.  And  since  widening 
the  extension  means  enlarging  the  number  of  individuals,  it  means 
removing  some  barrier,  i.e.  some  difference  by  which  the  former 
class  was  separated  from  neighboring  classes.  Thus,  there  are 
more  men  than  white  men,  more  books  than  bound  books,  etc. 
"White"  and  "bound"  are  new  differences  or  new  ideas  intro- 
duced in  the  connotation,  and  restricting  men  and  books  to  fewer 
applications.  The  addition  of  "tallness"  to  white  men  or  of 
"leather  binding"  to  bound  books  would  still  further  reduce 
their  extension,  and  so  on.  We  suppose,  however,  that  such 
connotative  additions  are  not  already  contained  essentially  in 
the  former  idea  so  as  to  apply  to  all  individuals;  e.g.  "trilateral 
triangle"  has  the  same  extension  as  triangle.  (Cf.  p.  95.) 

III.  DIVISION  or  IDEAS  AND  TERMS 

i.  Division  of  Ideas.  —  An  idea  is:  (i)  Clear,  if  the  object  which 
it  represents  can  be  discerned  from  every  other;  obscure,  if  this  is 
not  possible.  For  instance,  I  know  clearly  a  bird  in  general,  but 
I  may  not  be  able  to  distinguish  certain  kinds  of  birds  from  cer- 
tain others.  My  generic  knowledge  is  clear,  but  my  specific  knowl- 
edge is  obscure.  (2)  Distinct,  if  the  distinctive  essential  notes 
are  known;  vague,  if  they  are  not  known.  Thus  I  may  know  the 
scientific  characteristics  of  a  bird,  or  simply  know  it  as  an  animal 
that  flies  in  the  air.  N.B.  A  distinct  notion  is  always  clear, 


IDEAS    AND    TERMS  213 

but  a  clear  notion  may  be  vague,  because  accidental  features 
may  be  sufficient  to  distinguish  clearly  one  thing  from  another. 
Closely  connected  with  this  division  is  the  division  of  ideas  into 
generic,  specific,  and  individual,  the  nature  of  which  results  from 
what  has  been  said  on  the  genus,  species,  and  individual.  (3)  Ade- 
quate, if  it  represents  all  the  object's  features;  inadequate,  if  it  does 
not.  In  the  strict  sense  no  human  idea  is  adequate,  i.e.  none  rep- 
resents all  that  can  be  known  about  an  object.  In  a  relative 
sense  an  adequate  idea  is  one  that  represents  as  much  about  an 
object  as  the  present  state  of  science  allows. 

2.  Division  of  Terms.  —  The  main  division  special  to  terms  is 
into  univocal,  equivocal,  and  analogous. 

(a)  A  term  is  univocal  when  it  applies  to  several  things  in  ex- 
actly the  same  sense,  i.e.  without  any  change  in  its  connotation. 
Thus  "man"  is  applied  univocally  to  all  individual  men. 

(6)  It  is  equivocal  when  it  stands  for  two  or  several  different 
ideas,  i.e.  when  the  connotation  is  not  at  all  the  same.  Terms  may 
be  equivocal  (i)  in  sound  only  —  equivocation  in  speech  —  e.g. 
"right,"  "rite,"  "wright";  (2)  in  spelling  only  —  equivocation 
in  writing  — e.g.  "lead"  and  "lead,"  "tear"  and  "tear";  (3)  in 
both  sound  and  spelling,  e.g.  "pen"  (writing  instrument,  and 
cattle  enclosure),  "mean  "  (average,  and  vulgar). 

(c)  It  is  analogous  when  the  sense  is  neither  totally  different  nor 
totally  identical,  i.e.  when  there  is  some  connection  between  the 
several  meanings  of  a  term,  and  hence  its  connotation  is  partly 
the  same  and  partly  different.  Such  a  relation  may  be  one  of 
causality;  thus  we  speak  of  a  healthy  man  (enjoying  health),  of 
a  healthy  food  or  climate  (producing  health),  and  of  a  healthy 
appearance  (caused  by  health).  Or  it  may  be  a  relation  of  sim- 
ilarity, as  when  the  term  "  fox  "  is  applied  to  an  animal,  or  to  a 
man  because  of  his  cunning.  Such  terms  as  "sweet,  brilliant, 
terrible,  awful,  smart,"  etc.,  have  many  analogous  uses. 

3.  Division  of  Both  Terms  and  Ideas.  —  (a)  Considering  their 
object,  we  have  the  following:  (i)  Positive  and  negative,  according 
as  they  mean  the  presence  or  the  absence  of  a  reality.     "Good," 
"man,"    "organic,"  .  .  .  are    positive.     "Immature,"    "abnor- 
mal,"  "inorganic,"  ...  are  negative.    If  the  reality  which  is 


214  LOGIC 

absent  ought  to  be  present,  the  term  is  called  privative, e.g.  "deaf," 
"dumb,"  or  "blind,"  when  applied  to  man.  It  must  be  noted 
that  certain  terms  are  positive  in  appearance,  yet  really  negative, 
like  "bad,"  "blind,"  etc.  Others  are  negative  in  appearance, — 
i.e.  preceded  by  a  negation  or  by  negative  prefixes  like  im,  in,  a, 
dis,  etc.,  or  followed  by  negative  suffixes  like  less — and  yet  in  real- 
ity positive,  because  they  are  the  negation  of  a  negation,  e.g. 
"immortal."  "Death"  (mors)  is  the  cessation  of  a  reality  (life), 
hence  negative;  and  "immortal"  is  thus  really  positive.  Some 
terms  may  be  regarded  as  positive  or  negative  according  to  the 
point  of  view.  Thus  "unpleasant"  may  mean  simply  "that 
which  is  not  pleasant,"  or  "that  which  produces  a  painful  feeling." 
(2)  Categorematic  or  syncategorematic,  according  as  they  can  or 
cannot  stand  alone  as  subjects  or  predicates  in  a  judgment. 
"Man,"  "good,"  white,"  .  .  .  are  categorematic;  "very,"  "with," 
"  through,"  .  .  .  and  in  general,  conjunctions,  adverbs,  prepositions, 
and  interjections  are  syncategorematic.  (3)  Concrete  or  abstract, 
according  as  they  mean  a  subject,  or  a  determination  without 
its  subject.  "Man,"  "white,"  ...  are  concrete;  "humanity," 
"whiteness,"  ...  are  abstract.  N.B.  Adjectives  are  always 
concrete,  for  they  apply  to  a  subject.  (4)  Substantive  or  adjec- 
tive, according  as  they  represent  a  thing  as  existing  in  itself,  e.g. 
"man,"  "blueness,"  "humanity,"  or  in  a  subject,  e.g.  "blue," 
"human."  (5)  Real  or  logical,  according  as  the  object  repre- 
sented can  or  cannot  exist  independently  of  the  mind.  Names  of 
individuals  are  real;  genera  and  species  are  logical. 

(b)  Considering  their  relations  to  other  terms,  some  terms  may 
be  associated  together,  like  "man"  and  "wise,"  "man"  and 
"white,"  "paper"  and  "blue."  Others  are  opposed  to  and  exclude 
one  another,  like  "white"  and  "black,"  "cold"  and  "hot," 
"square"  and  "circle."  Opposition  may  be  (i)  contradictory, 
when  a  term  simply  denies  the  other,  i.e.  when  one  is  positive  and 
the  other  negative,  e.g.  "white"  and  "not-white";  (2)  privative, 
in  the  sense  already  explained;  (3)  contrary,  when  one  implies  more 
than  is  necessary  to  deny  the  other,  e.g.  "white"  and  "black," 
"good,"  and  "bad."  Between  contradictory  terms  there  is  no 
middle;  a  thing  is  white  or  not-white.  Between  contrary  terms 


DEFINITION    AND     DIVISION  215 

there  are  intermediates.    Between  white  and  black  there  are  vari- 
ous shades  of  gray;  between  good  and  bad  there  is  indifference. 

(c)  Considering  their  extension,  (i)  Singular  terms  apply  only 
to  one  individual,  and  are  indicated  by  a  proper  name,  or  by  a 
demonstrative  with  a  common  name;  particular  terms  apply  to  a 
part  of  a  whole  class,  and  are  indicated  by  such  particles  as  "  some," 
"those,"  "a  part  of,"  .  .  .  ;  universal  terms  apply  to  all  individ- 
uals of  the  same  class.  (2)  A  distinction  must  also  be  made 
between  the  distributive  term,  applying  to  all  taken  individually, 
e.g.  "soldier,"  "book,"  .  .  .  and  the  collective  term,  applying  to 
all  taken  together,  e.g.  "army,"  "library."  ...  A  collective 
term  may  also  be  used  universally:  "All  armies  are  composed  of 
soldiers";  particularly:  "Some  armies  are  composed  of  volun- 
teers"; or  singularly:  "This  army  is  commanded  by  General 
X."  But  with  regard  to  the  soldiers  that  compose  it,  army  is 
always  a  collective  term.  Not  the  individual  soldiers,  but  only 
the  aggregate  can  be  called  an  army. 

II.   DEFINITION   AND   DIVISION 

In  psychology  attention  has  been  called  to  the  confusion  that 
may  arise  from  language.  It  is  very  important  both  to  under- 
stand the  meaning  intended  by  other  men,  and  to  use  expressions 
that  will  manifest  clearly  one's  own  ideas.  The  use  of  definition 
and  division  is  intended  to  make  the  meaning  of  terms  clearer,  and 
also  to  make  the  ideas  themselves  more  distinct. 

I.  DEFINITION 

1.  Meaning  of  Definition.  —  In  general,  to  define   (de-finire, 
finis)  is  to  assign  limits.    Hence  to  define  a  thing  is  to  say  what 
it  is,  so  as  to  distinguish  it  from  everything  else.    To  define  a 
word  is  to  explain  its  meaning  by  indicating  its  comprehension. 
Complex  ideas  become  clearer  when  their  total  comprehension  is 
analyzed  and  reduced  to  simpler  ideas. 

2.  Kinds  of  Definition.  —  A  definition  is  nominal  when  it  ex- 
presses the  meaning  of  a  term;  real,  when  it  expresses  the  nature 
of  an  object. 


2l6  LOGIC 

(a)  Nominal  definition  is  (i)  Private  and  conventional  when  a 
man  uses  a  new  term,  or  when  he  assigns  a  special  meaning  to  an 
already  existing  term;  (2)  common  when  it  gives  the  accepted 
meaning  or  meanings  as  found  in  dictionaries.    A  nominal  defini- 
tion consists  in  describing  the  idea  which  a  term  expresses  in  such 
a  way  that  it  will  be  distinguished  from  all  others.    To  the  nominal 
definition  are  reduced  etymology  —  which  is  sometimes  misleading, 
e.g.  in  "physiology,"  "geology,"  "geometry,"  —  the  use  of  syn- 
onyms the  meaning  of  which  is  better  known,  and  the  translation 
into  another  language  in  which  the  meaning  of  the  equivalent  term 
is  known. 

(b)  Real  definition  is  perfect  or  essential  when  it  indicates  com- 
pletely the  essential  elements  of  an  idea  and  of  the  things  which 
the  idea  represents,  i.e.  the  genus  proximum  and  differentia  speci- 
fica.    These  elementary  ideas  in  turn,  if  not  clear,  may  have  to 
be  defined  again  until  some  simple  and  therefore  indefinable  idea 
is  reached.    Hence  some  ideas  cannot  be  defined  because  of  their 
simplicity;  others,  on  the  contrary,  because  of  their  complexity 
and  of  the  great  number  of  elements  entering  into  their  com- 
prehension.   Thus  individuals  cannot  be  defined  perfectly.    In 
such  cases  we  have  to  be  satisfied  with  some  of  the  following 
imperfect  modes  of  definition,  which  are  frequently  used,  because 
a  perfect  definition  supposes  that  the  thing  to  be  defined   is 
known  completely  and  definitely,  which  is  seldom  the  case. 

A  descriptive  definition  gives  a  certain  number  of  accidental 
features  sufficient  to  make  the  object  distinctly  recognizable,  e.g. 
shape,  color,  density,  properties,  etc. 

A  genetic  definition  indicates  the  process  by  which  a  thing  is 
produced,  e.g.  the  materials  and  manufacturing  process  of  alcohol, 
paper,  cigars,  etc.,  or  the  factors  of  a  psychological  process. 

An  analytic  definition  indicates  the  materials  out  of  which  a 
thing  is  made.  Chemistry  commonly  uses  such  definitions. 

A  definition  by  the  effects  indicates  what  a  thing  is  capable  of 
doing,  e.g.  the  explosion  of  a  chemical  substance,  or  the  purpose 
of  a  mechanism. 

All  kinds  of  definitions  agree  in  pointing  out  some  feature  com- 
mon to  several  things,  and  some  specific  characteristics ,  that  is,  some 


DEFINITION    AND    DIVISION  217 

agreement  and  some  difference  which  in  the  perfect  definition  are 
expressed  by  the  genus  proximum  and  the  differentia  specifica. 
Thus  I  define  water  as  a  compound  (common  notion)  of  oxygen 
and  hydrogen  in  certain  definite  proportions  (difference) ;  or  a  pen 
as  an  instrument  (common  notion)  to  write  with  (difference  which 
is  also  common  to  pencils)  by  letting  the  ink  flow  regularly  on  the 
paper  (more  special  difference),  etc. 

3.  Rules  of  Definitions.  —  (a)  Definitions  must  be  reciprocal, 
i.e.  there  must  be  a  complete  identity  of  the  thing  defined  with  its 
definition.    In  other  words,  the  definition  must  apply  "omni  et 
soli  definite,"  and  be  coextensive  with  the  object.    Examples. .  .  . 

(b)  Definitions  must  be  clear,  i.e.  convey  a  definite  idea  of  the 
term  to  be  defined.  Hence,  as  far  as  possible,  (i)  Do  not  use 
merely  negative  terms  which  indicate,  not  what  a  thing  is,  but 
what  it  is  not.  (2)  Use  neither  metaphors,  nor  obscure,  ambig- 
uous, and  vague  expressions.  (3)  Avoid  the  "circulus  in  defi- 
niendo,"  i.e.  in  the  definition  do  not  use  the  term  itself  to  be 
defined.  Examples.  .  .  . 

4.  Place  of  Definition.  —  What  is  the  place  of  the  definition  in 
the  process  of  knowledge?    Nominal  definitions  are  presupposed  in 
the  beginning  of   any  investigation.    As  to  the   essential   defi- 
nition, it  is  the  very  purpose  of  the  investigation.    Hence,  except 
in  cases  in  which  the  definition  is  clear,  and  used  as  a  principle 
(e.g.  in  geometry),  its  place  is  at  the  end,  since  it  supposes  a  com- 
plete and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  object.     If  it  is  placed  at  the 
beginning,  it  is  only  as  a  hypothesis  to  be  verified. 

II.  DIVISION 

i.  Meaning  of  Division.  —  (a)  To  define  is  to  analyze  or  unfold 
the  comprehension  of  a  term,  and  to  go  up  to  less  complex,  but  more 
extensive,  notions.  To  divide  is  to  analyze  or  unfold  the  extension 
of  a  term,  and  to  go  down  to  more  complex  —  because  new  differ- 
entiae are  added  —  but  less  extensive  notions.  If  "man"  is 
defined  by  the  genus  "animal,"  and  the  differentia  "rational,"  divi- 
sions will  be  obtained  by  adding  new  differences  like  white  and 
colored,  young  and  old,  etc. 


2l8  LOGIC 

(b)  We  speak  here  of  the  logical  division,  by  which  a  logical 
whole,  an  abstract  representation,  a  genus  or  class,  is  divided  into 
the  species  or  sub-classes  which  are  contained  under  it,  and  which 
are  formed  by  adding  new  specific  or  accidental  differences.  Thus 
I  divide  the  class  "book"  into  bound  or  unbound;  scientific  and 
non-scientific;  quartos,  octavos,  etc.  "Scientific  books"  again 
may  be  subdivided  into  books  dealing  with  theoretical  and  books 
dealing  with  practical  sciences,  and  so  on.  Hence  we  do  not  speak 
here  of  (i)  physical  division  by  which  the  actual  physical  whole, 
made  up  of  parts  really  united  in  the  physical  world,  is  divided 
into  its  component  parts,  e.g.  the  dissection  of  an  organism;  (2) 
metaphysical  division  by  which  the  actual  metaphysical  whole, 
made  up  of  ideas  that  are  not  separate  except  in  our  conception, 
is  divided  into  these  ideas;  e.g.  the  division  of  "animal"  into  life 
and  sensation.  If  these  ideas  are  the  essence  of  the  object,  meta- 
physical division  is  the  same  as  perfect  definition,  otherwise  it  is 
the  same  as  imperfect  descriptive  definition. 

2.  Main  Rules  of  Logical  Divisions,  (i)  Each  process  of  divi- 
sion must  have  only  one  basis  or  principle,  i.e.  the  differentia  which  is 
added  must  be  the  same.  Thus  "man"  should  not  be  divided 
into  "white,  learned,  and  tall."  The  basis  of  division  varies  with 
the  purposes  for  which  the  division  is  made.  (2)  As  a  conse- 
quence, the  sub-classes  of  the  same  degree  must  be  mutually  exclu- 
sive according  as  the  new  difference  is  present  or  absent.  (3) 
The  division  must  be  adequate,  i.e.  all  the  parts  must  be  mentioned, 
and  no  individual  of  the  general  class  must  be  found  which  will 
not  have  a  place  in  one  of  the  sub-classes.  In  other  words,  the 
parts  taken  together  must  be  coextensive  with  the  whole,  and 
none  separately  must  be  coextensive  with  it.  (4)  The  processes 
of  division  and  subdivision  must  be  gradual,  proceed  without  jumps, 
always  going  to  the  immediately  following  sub-classes.  (Find 
instances.) 


JUDGMENTS    AND     PROPOSITIONS        2IQ 


ARTICLE  II.    THE  JUDGMENT 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  JUDGMENT  AND  PROPOSITION 

In  Psychology  (p.  107  ff)  we  have  spoken  of  the  process  of  judg- 
ing. It  consists  in  pronouncing  on  the  agreement  or  disagreement 
of  two  ideas.  Hence  its  elements  are  (i)  two  ideas,  the  subject 
—  that  of  which  something  is  affirmed  or  denied  —  and  the 
predicate  —  which  is  affirmed  or  denied;  these  two  ideas  are 
called  the  matter  of  the  judgment;  (2)  the  copula,  that  is,  the 
affirmation  or  denial;  it  is  called  the  formal  element  of  the 
judgment. 

A  proposition  is  the  expression  of  a  judgment,  and  hence  has,  at 
least  implicitly,  the  same  three  elements  as  the  judgment.  The 
one  Latin  word  "amo"  expresses  a  judgment:  "ego"  (subject) 
"sum"  (copula)  "amans"  (predicate).  All  grammatical  sen- 
tences are  not  logical  propositions;  for  instance,  interrogative, 
imperative,  optative  sentences,  as  such,  express  no  judgment. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  logic  the  subject  and  predicate  are 
not  always  the  same  as  from  the  point  of  view  of  grammar.  Log- 
ically, a  proposition  contains  nothing  but  the  subject,  the  predi- 
cate, and  the  copula,  and  always  contains  these.  Thus  in  "  Dogs 
bark,"  "bark"  is  not  the  predicate,  but  contains  both  the  copula 
"are"  and  the  predicate  "beings  that  bark."  When  I  say:  "The 
boy  who  learns  his  lesson  is  worthy  of  praise,"  the  logical  sub- 
ject is  "the  boy  who  learns  his  lesson,"  and  the  predicate  is  "worthy 
of  praise."  Whatever  is  found  in  a  proposition  besides  the  cop- 
ula, which  is  invariably  the  verb  "to  be,"  is  always  logically 
reducible  to  the  subject  or  the  predicate. 

II.  DIVISION  OF  JUDGMENTS  AND  PROPOSITIONS 

i.  If  we  Consider  the  Quantity,  i.e.  the  extension  of  the  subject, 
judgments  are  singular,  particular,  collective,  or  universal.  Ex- 
amples: "Paul  is  tall."  "Some  men  are  virtuous."  "The  fam- 
ily is  numerous."  "All  men  are  mortal."  N.B.  In  logic,  the 
singular  proposition  is  considered  as  universal,  since  the  subject  is 


220  LOGIC 

in  fact  taken  in  its  total  extension.    Hence  it  has  the  same  prop- 
erties as  the  universal  proposition. 

2.  If  we  Consider  the  Connection  between  the  Subject  and  the 
Predicate :  —  (a)  Judgments  are  contingent  or  necessary  according 
as  the  relation  which  is  affirmed  between  the  subject  and  the  predi- 
cate can  or  cannot  be  otherwise.     Thus,  "The  part  is  not  so  large 
as  the  whole"  is  necessary.     "The  part  is  one-third  of  the  whole" 
is  contingent. 

(b)  In  a  closely  related  sense,  but  with  special  reference  to  the 
mode  of  acquisition,  a  judgment  is  a  priori,  when  it  is  not  based 
directly  on  sense-perception,  e.g.   "The  whole  is  greater  than  its 
part,"  or  a  posteriori,  when  experience  is  required,  e.g.  "This  line 
is  four  inches  long." 

(c)  If  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate  is  per- 
ceived immediately,  either  by  reason  or  by  experience,  the  judg- 
ment is  intuitive;  if  mediately,  the  judgment  is  discursive.     "I  am 
suffering,"  "This  paper  is  white,"  "Two  and  two  are  four,"  are 
intuitive.     "The  soul  is  immortal "   is  discursive.    For  further 
development,  and  for  the  distinction  between  analytic  and  syn- 
thetic judgments,  see  Psychology  (p.  109). 

(d)  The  absolute  judgment  simply  affirms  or  denies.    In  the 
conditional  judgment,  the  affirmation  or  denial  depends  on  a  sup- 
position.    "I  am  pleased"  is  absolute;   "If  he  comes  back  I  shall 
be  pleased  "  is  conditional.     To  the  conditional  proposition  may 
be  reduced  the  disjunctive  proposition,  when  it  is  affirmed  or  de- 
nied that  the  subject  is  this,  or  that,  or  .  .  .  ;  and  the  conjunctive 
proposition,  when  it  is  affirmed  that  this,  and  that,  and  .  .  .  can- 
not belong  to  the  subject  at  the  same  time.     For  instance,  "To-day 
is  either  Sunday,  or  Monday,  or  Tuesday,  or  .  .  .  "  is  disjunctive. 
"A  man  cannot  be  sitting  and  standing  at  the  same  time"  is  con- 
junctive.   More  will  be  said  on  these  propositions  when  we  speak 
of  the  syllogism. 

3.  From   the   Point  of  View  of  Unity  and   Simplicity.  —  (a) 
Simple  propositions  are  those  in  which  there  is  only  one  subject 
and  one  predicate,  e.g.  "The  rose  is  fragrant." 

(b)  If  various  explicative  or  restrictive  terms  or  propositions 
are  used  to  qualify  the  one  subject  or  predicate,  the  proposition 


JUDGMENTS     AND     PROPOSITIONS        221 

becomes  complex.  It  may  include  several  propositions,  one  prin- 
cipal, and  the  others  subordinate.  For  instance:  "The  rose  which 
you  gave  me"  (subject)  is  "the  most  beautiful  I  have  ever  seen" 
(predicate). 

(c)  If  the  proposition  has  two  or  several  principal  subjects  or 
predicates,  it  is  called  compound,  and  is  equivalent  to  a  number  of 
propositions  equal  to  the  number  of  the  subjects  multiplied  by  the 
number  of  the  predicates.  Thus :  "  Exercise  and  pure  air  are  neces- 
sary to  health  "  is  equivalent  to  two  propositions,  each  with  one 
of  the  two  subjects.  "Peter  and  Paul  are  tall  and  strong"  is 
equivalent  to  four  propositions:  "Peter  is  tall,"  "Paul  is  tall," 
"Peter  is  strong,"  "Paul  is  strong."  A  proposition  may  be  both 
complex  and  compound. 

4.  If  we  Consider  their  Quality,  i.e.  their  formal  element  or  cop- 
ula, propositions  are  affirmative  or  negative. 

Looking  at  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  propositions,  we  have 
four  kinds  of  propositions  symbolized  by  four  vowels: 

Universal  affirmative,  A  (affirmo) 
Universal  negative,      E  (nego) 
Particular  affirmative,  I  (afftrmo) 
Particular  negative,     O  (nego) 

As  already  noted,  individual  propositions  are  reduced  to  uni- 
versal. 

5.  Intension  and  Extension  of  the  Terms  in  Propositions.  —  It 
is  very  important  to  know  what  are  the  extension  and  intension 
of  the  terms  in  a  proposition. 

(a)  In  a  proposition  A  like  "All  birds  are  vertebrates,"  it  is  clear 
that  the  subject  is  taken  according  to  its  complete  extension. 
But  it  is  not  taken  according  to  its  whole  intension,  for  there  are 
elements  in  it  —  e.g.  living,  animal,  egg-laying,  etc.  —  to  which 
the  predicate  "vertebrate"  cannot  be  attributed. 

As  to  the  predicate  "vertebrates,"  it  is  taken  according  to  its 
whole  intension,  since,  in  order  to  be  truly  called  vertebrates, 
birds  must  have  all  the  essential  characteristics  of  vertebrates. 
But  it  is  not  taken  according  to  its  whole  extension,  for,  besides 
birds,  there  are  other  vertebrates.  In  other  words,  birds  do  not 


222  LOGIC 

exhaust  the  extension  of  vertebrates;  they  are  only  some  of  the 
vertebrates. 

It  would  be  easy  to  show  similarly  that  in  a  proposition  7  as 
"Some  men  are  prudent,"  the  subject  is  taken  according  to  its 
partial  extension  and  comprehension,  and  the  predicate  according 
to  its  partial  extension,  but  according  to  its  whole  comprehension. 

Hence  the  first  general  rule  of  the  predicate:  In  affirmative  prop- 
ositions the  predicate  is  undistributed,  i.e.  not  universal  in  exten- 
sion, but  must  be  taken  according  to  its  complete  intension.  This 
is  always  true  in  formal  logic.  However,  if  we  consider  the  con- 
tents or  matter  of  the  proposition,  it  may  happen  that  the  predi- 
cate has  the  same  extension  as  the  subject,  namely,  in  cases  of 
definitions.  E.g.  "  Logic  is  the  science  of  the  formal  laws  of 
thought,"  "A  triangle  is  a  plane  figure  bounded  by  three  straight 
lines." 

(b)  If  we  take  a  proposition  E,  as  "No  mollusks  are  verte- 
brates," the  subject  is  universal  in  extension,  but  its  comprehen- 
sion is  limited  —  e.g.  the  idea  of  "animal,"  which  is  an  essential 
element  of  it,  does  not  exclude  the  predicate  "vertebrates." 

The  predicate  is  taken  according  to  its  whole  extension  — 
"mollusks  are  none  of  the  vertebrates,"  i.e.  the  whole  class  of  ver- 
tebrates is  excluded,  —  but  not  according  to  its  whole  comprehen- 
sion, for  certain  ideas  included  essentially  in  that  of  "vertebrates  " 
—  e.g.  the  idea  of  "animal " — may  also  belong  to  mollusks. 

In  the  same  manner,  in  a  proposition  O,  as  "Some  elements  are 
not  metals,"  the  subject  is  taken  according  to  a  part  of  its  exten- 
sion and  comprehension;  the  predicate,  according  to  its  whole 
extension,  but  not  according  to  its  whole  comprehension. 

Hence  the  second  general  rule  of  the  predicate:  In  negative 
propositions,  the  predicate  is  distributed,  i.e.  universal  in  extension, 
but  taken  only  according  to  a  part  of  its  comprehension. 

III.  RELATED  PROPOSITIONS 

Propositions  are  related  in  several  manners,  namely,  as  opposed, 
obverted,  converted,  contraposed,  and  immediately  inferrible. 

i.  Opposition.  —  In  the  strict  sense,  propositions  are  opposed 
when  the  same  predicate  is  affirmed  in  one  and  denied  in  the 


JUDGMENTS    AND     PROPOSITIONS        223 

other,  of  the  same  subject,  in  the  same  sense,  and  from  the  same 
point  of  view.  In  a  broader  sense,  propositions  are  opposed  when 
they  differ  in  quantity,  or  in  quality,  or  in  both.  If  they  differ 
in  both,  they  are  contradictory,  A  and  O,  E  and  /.  If  they  differ 
in  quality  only,  when  universal,  they  are  contrary,  A  and  E;  when 
particular,  they  are  subcontrary,  7  and  0.  If  they  differ  in  quan- 
tity only,  they  are  subalterns,  A  and  7,  E  and  0,  the  universal 
A  or  E  being  the  "subalternans,"  and  the  particular  7  or  0  being 
the  "subalternate." 

There  is  a  strict  opposition  only  between  contradictories  and 
between  contraries.  Subalterns  have  the  same  quality.  In 
subcontraries,  there  is  not  necessarily  identity  of  subject,  for  the 
part  of  which  the  predicate  is  affirmed  may  not  be  the  same  as 
that  of  which  it  is  denied.  The  following  diagram  shows  the  vari- 
ous kinds  of  opposition. 

A  E 

All  men  are  wise  Contrary  No  men  are  wise 

1 ;     s 

\  X    X.  o 

Some  men  are  wise  Subcontrary  Some  men  are  not  wise 

2.  Obversion  consists  in  negativing  both  the  copula  and  the 
predicate  of  a  proposition,  i.e.  in  changing  the  quality  of  the 
proposition,  and  giving  it  as  predicate  the  term  contradictory  of 
the  former  predicate.    Thus,  Obvertend:  "All  men  are  mortal"; 
Obverse:  "No  men  are  not-mortal."    Again,  Obvertend:  "No  birds 
are  quadruped  ";  Obverse:  "All  birds  are  not-quadruped."    Obver- 
tend: "Some  men  are  unhappy."    Obverse:  "Some  men  are  not 
not-unhappy,"  or  "Some  men  are  not  happy." 

3.  Conversion  consists  in  transposing  the  subject  to  the  place 
of  the  predicate,  and  the  predicate  to  the  place  of  the  subject, 
without  changing  the  quality  of   the    proposition,  and  without 
distributing  an  undistributed  term.      A  distributed  term  in  the 
convertend  may  be  undistributed  in  the  converse,  for  what  was 
affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  may  evidently  be  also  affirmed 


224  LOGIC 

or  denied  of  its  various  parts.    N.B.    In  the  following,  S  stands 
for  Subject,  P  for  Predicate. 

(a)  A  proposition  E  is  susceptible  of  simple  conversion,  i.e.  of  a 
conversion  in  which  the  same  quantity  is  retained.    SP(e)  becomes 
PS(e),  for  both  terms  are  universal  in  both  propositions,  one  as 
the  subject  of  a  universal  proposition,  the  other  as  the  predicate 
of  a  negative  proposition. 

A  proposition  /  also  is  susceptible  of  simple  conversion.  SP(i) 
becomes  PS(i),  for  both  terms  are  particular  in  both  propositions, 
one  as  the  subject  of  a  particular  proposition,  the  other  as  the 
predicate  of  an  affirmative  proposition. 

(b)  A  proposition  A  cannot  be  converted  except  by  limitation, 
i.e.  from  a  universal  SP(a)  (convertend)  it  becomes  a  particular 
PS(i)  (converse).    For,  in  the  convertend,  P  is  particular  as  the 
predicate  of  an  affirmative  proposition,  and  it  must  remain  par- 
ticular in  the  converse. 

(c)  A  proposition  0  cannot  be  converted  at  all,  because  S  is  par- 
ticular, and  if  it  became  the  predicate  of  a  negative  proposition 
it  would  become  universal.    SP(o)  can  only  be  contraposed. 

N.B.  Let  the  student  find  applications  and  concrete  instances 
of  these  and  of  other  rules  of  formal  logic. 

4.  Contraposition   consists  in  negativing   the  copula  and  the 
predicate,  and  then  converting  the  proposition.    In  other  words: 
First  obvert,  then  convert.     E.g.  "All  men  are  mortal ";  /'No  men 
are  not-mortal";  "No  immortal  beings  are  men"  (contraposed). 
"Some  men  are  not  just  ";  "Some  men  are  not- just  ";  "Some  un- 
just beings  are  men "   (contraposed).    From  what  precedes  it 
follows  that  a  proposition  7  has  no  contrapositive,  since  by  obver- 
sion  it  becomes  O,  which  is  not  convertible. 

5.  Immediate  Inference  is  the  immediate  passage  from  one 
proposition  to  another.     Knowing  or  supposing  the  truth  or  fal- 
sity of  a  proposition  we  may  be  able  to  infer  at  once  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  certain  others. 

(a)  Inferences  owing  to  the  opposition  of  propositions,  (i)  Of 
two  contradictories  one  must  be  true  and  the  other  false.  Hence  if 
one  is  known  or  supposed  to  be  true,  the  other  is  false.  If  one  is 
known  to  be  false,  the  other  is  true.  If,  for  instance,  it  is  true  to 


JUDGMENTS    AND    PROPOSITIONS        225 

say  that  "some  men  are  just"  (/),  it  is  false  to  say  that  "no  men 
are  just"  (E).  If  it  is  false  to  say  that  "all  men  are  just"  (A), 
it  is  true  to  say  that  "some  are  not  just"  (O). 

(2)  Of  two  contraries  one  must  be  false,  and  both  may  be  false. 
If  one  is  known  to  be  true,  the  other  is  false;  but  if  one  is  known 
to  be  false,  the  truth  of  the  other  cannot  be  inferred.    If  I  know 
the  truth  of  "All  men  are  mortal"  (4),  I  know  the  falsity  of  "No 
men  are  mortal  "  (£).     But  if  I  know  the  falsity  of  "All  men  are 
just"  (A),  I  cannot  infer  the  truth  of  "No  men  are  just"  (E). 
The  reason  is  that,  between  these  two  extreme  propositions,  there 
is  room  for  a  third  assertion  in  which  alone  perhaps  truth  is  to  be 
found,  namely,  "Some  men  are  just"  (7). 

(3)  In  the  case  of  two  subalterns,  the  truth  of  the  subalternans 
implies  the  truth  of  the  subalternate,  and  the  falsity  of  the  subalter- 
nate  implies  the  falsity  of  the  subalternans,  because  what  is  true  of  the 
whole  is  a  fortiori  true  of  the  part,  and  what  is  false  of  the  part  is 
a  fortiori  false  of  the  whole.     But  we  cannot  say  that  what  is  true 
of  the  part  is  also  true  of  the  whole,  nor  that  what  is  false  of  the 
whole,  is  also  false  of  the  part.     From  the  truth  of  "Some  men 
are  just"  (7),  I  cannot  infer  the  truth  of  "All  men  are  just"  (A). 
From  the  falsity  of  "All  men  are  unjust"  (A),  I  cannot  infer 
the  falsity  of  "Some  men  are  unjust"  (7).    It  must  be  remarked 
that  logically,  in  such  sentences  as  "Some  men  are  just,"  we  con- 
sider only  that  which  is  affirmed,  not  that  which  is  frequently 
implied  and  meant,  namely,  that  some  others  are  not  just. 

(4)  Of  two  subcontraries  one  must  be  true,  and  both  may  be  true. 
If  one  is  known  to  be  false,  the  other  is  true;  but  if  one  is  known  to 
be  true,  it  cannot  be  inferred  that  the  other  is  false.    If  it  is  false 
to  say  "Some  men  are  immortal"  (7),  it  is  true  to  say  "Some 
men  are  not  immortal  "  (O).     The  first  proposition  7  is  false,  as 
we  suppose;  then  E  is  true  as  being  its  contradictory,  and  also  a 
fortiori  O  as  the  subalternate  of  E.    But  both  7  and  0  may  be 
true,  for  the  predicate  which  is  affirmed  or  denied  does  not  neces- 
sarily apply  to  the  same  subject  in  each  proposition.    The  part 
of  which  it  is  affirmed  in  7  may  be  different  from  the  part  of  which 
it  is  denied  in  0.    E.g.  "Some  men  are  virtuous";    "Some  men 

rirt 

16 


226  LOGIC 

(b)  From  the  obvertend,  the  obverse  may  be  inferred,  and  vice 
versa. 

(c)  From  the  convertend,  the  converse  may  be  inferred,  and  vice  versa; 
except  in  the  conversion  by  limitation,  for  SP(a)  gives  PS(i), 
which  can  be  converted  only  into  SP(i). 

(d)  From  a  proposition  its  equivalent  is  inferred,  for  instance, 
when  synonyms  are  used,  e.g.  "Peter  is  not  just,"  and  "Peter  is 
unjust." 

(e)  Inferences  are  also  obtained  by  the  use  of  determinants,    "All 
metals  are  chemical  elements,"    "All   heavy  metals  are  heavy 
chemical  elements";  and  by  complex  conception,  "All  metals  are  ele- 
ments," "A  mixture  of  metals  is  a  mixture  of  elements."    Great 
care  must  be  taken  in  this  process  of  inference,  as  frequently  the 
determinant  has  not  the  same  relative  meaning  when  added  to 
the  predicate  and  when  added  to  the  subject.    For  instance, 
"Voters  are  men,"  "The  majority  of  voters  is  the  majority  of 
men";  "Flies  are  animals,"  "Big  flies  are  big  animals." 

ARTICLE  III.    REASONING 
I.    THE   PERFECT  SYLLOGISM 

I.  NATURE  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 

i.  Reasoning  and  Syllogism.  —  As  explained  in  Psychology 
(p.  115  ff),  reasoning  is  a  mediate  inference.  It  consists  in  proceed- 
ing from  two  or  several  known  judgments  to  another  unknown 
or  less  known  judgment.  It  may  be  denned:  The  logical  infer- 
ence of  a  judgment  from  two  or  several  others.  An  argument 
means  either  the  mental  process  of  reasoning  or  its  expression. 
We  have  seen  also  in  psychology  that,  if  the  mind  proceeds  from 
a  general  law  or  principle  to  particular  or  individual  instances,  the 
process  is  deductive,  i.e.  the  individual  or  sub-class  is  derived 
(de-duco)  from  the  more  general  class  in  which  it  is  contained. 
If  the  mind  proceeds  from  individual  or  particular  instances  to  a 
general  law  or  principle,  the  process  is  inductive,  i.e.  individuals 
or  sub-classes  are  classified  under,  or  put  in  (in-duco),  a  more 
general  class. 


THE  PERFECT  SYLLOGISM       227 

A  syllogism  is  a  perfect  form  of  deductive  reasoning.  The  pres- 
ent article  will  deal  only  with  the  syllogism,  and  with  other  forms 
of  reasoning  reducible  to  it.  The  laws  of  the  syllogism  are  gener- 
ally applicable  to  inductive  reasoning.  But  the  latter  is  a  more 
complex  process  in  which  the  series  of  steps  to  be  taken  is  more 
numerous.  We  shall  speak  of  it  in  the  second  chapter. 

2.  Elements  of  the  Syllogism.  —  The  formal  element  of  the  syl- 
logism and  of  any  reasoning  is  the  consequence,  that  is,  the  right 
to  assert  the  conclusion,  owing  to  the  nexus  between  the  inferred 
proposition  and  those  from  which  it  is  inferred. 

The  material  elements  of  the  syllogism  are: 


proximate:      three  propositions 


j  antecedent  or  premises 


remote:     three  terms 


major  proposition 

minor  proposition 

conclusion,  consequent 

major  term,  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion 
minor  term,  the  subject  of  the  conclusion 
middle  term,  not  found  in  the  conclusion,  but  in  both 

premises 

The  conclusion  expresses  the  relation  of  a  predicate  with  a  sub- 
ject after  they  have  been  compared  with  the  same  third  (middle) 
term  in  the  premises.  The  predicate  of  the  conclusion,  having 
generally  a  greater  extension  than  the  subject,  is  called  the  major 
term,  and  the  subject  is  called  the  minor  term.  The  premise  in 
which  the  third  or  middle  term  is  compared  with  the  major  term 
is  called  the  major  premise,  and  that  in  which  it  is  compared  with 
the  minor  term,  the  minor  premise. 

All  virtues  are  praiseworthy;       Major  premise    t  . 


Prudence  is  a  virtue;  Minor  premise 

Therefore  prudence  is  praiseworthy.  Conclusion 

II.  FIGURES  AND  MOODS  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 

i.  Figures.  —  Syllogisms  are  divided  into  four  figures  according 
to  the  four  places  which  the  middle  term  may  occupy  in  the  premises, 
namely,  as  (i)  Subject  in  the  major  and  predicate  in  the  minor. 
(2)  Predicate  in  both.  (3)  Subject  in  both.  (4)  Predicate  in 
the  major  and  subject  in  the  minor.  Or  as  a  Latin  mnemonic 


228  LOGIC 

verse  expresses  it:  "Sub  prae,  turn  prae  prae,  turn  sub  sub,  denique 
prae  sub."  (Sub  stands  for  subiectum,  prae  for  praedicatum.) 
Representing  the  major  term  by  P,  the  minor  by  S,  the  middle 
by  Af,  we  have: 


ist  fig. 

2d  fig. 

3d  % 

4th  fig. 

Major  premise 

MP 

PM 

MP 

PM 

Minor  premise 

SM 

SM 

MS 

MS 

Conclusion 

SP 

SP 

SP 

SP 

2.  Moods.  —  The  moods  of  the  syllogism  are  the  various  man- 
ners according  to  which  the  three  propositions  in  a  syllogism  may  be 
arranged  considering  their  quantity  and  quality.  If  for  the  present 
no  attention  is  paid  to  the  validity  of  the  syllogism,  the  four  kinds 
of  propositions  (A,  E,  I,  0)  may  occupy  one  of  three  positions 
(major,  minor,  conclusion).  With  a  proposition  A  as  major,  we 
may  have  a  minor  A  and  four  conclusions,  A,  E,  /,  or  0;  or  a  minor 
E  and  the  same  four  conclusions;  or  a  minor  7  and  four  conclu- 
sions; or  a  minor  O  and  four  conclusions,  giving  us  sixteen  moods 
for  this  one  major.  The  same  will  be  true  for  majors  E,  I,  and  O, 
giving  a  total  of  sixty-four  moods.  Combining  these  now  with 
the  four  figures  we  find  a  total  of  two  hundred  and  fifty-six  moods. 
But  the  majority  of  these  are  against  the  rules  of  the  syllogism. 
Only  nineteen  are  valid,  some  of  which  are  seldom  used: 

istfig.   AAA,  All,  EAE,  EIO 

2dfig.    AEE,  AGO,  EAE,  EIO 

3d  fig.    AAI,  All,  EAO,  EIO,  IAI,  OAO 

4th  fig.  AAI,  AEE,  EAO,  EIO,  IAI 

N.B.  Let  the  student  construct  syllogisms  according  to  the 
various  moods  and  figures,  and,  after  studying  the  rules  of  the 
syllogism,  indicate  why  the  other  moods  are  not  valid. 

III.  RULES  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 

There  are  eight  rules  of  the  syllogism,  four  of  which  refer  to  the 
terms,  and  four  to  the  propositions. 
i.  Rules  for  the  Terms: 
(a)  ist.   Terminus  esto   triplex,    maior,    mediusque,   minorque. 


THE  PERFECT  SYLLOGISM       229 

There  must  be  three  terms,  only  three,  and  they  must  be  used  with 
the  same  meaning.  From  the  very  nature  of  the  syllogism  two 
terms  only  are  not  sufficient,  and  if  there  are  more  than  three,  there 
can  be  no  comparison  of  two  with  the  same  third.  Hence  it  is 
necessary  to  pay  attention  to  the  meaning  of  the  terms  to  see 
whether  it  is  the  same,  since  a  term  used  with  two  different  mean- 
ings is  equivalent  to  two  terms;  e.g.  "  All  men  are  mankind;  Peter 
is  a  man;  therefore  Peter  is  mankind."  "All  men,"  i.e.  taken 
together.  Peter  is  only  "one"  man. 

(b)  2d.  Latins  has  quam  praemissae  conclusio  non  wit.    No 
term  must  have  a  greater  extension  in  the  conclusion  than  in  the 
premises,  otherwise  the  conclusion  contains  a  surplus  which  is 
not  justified  by  the  premises,  since  this  surplus  was  not  compared 
with  the  middle  term.     E.g.  "Liars  are  not  to  be  believed;  liars 
are  men;  men  are  not  to  be  believed." 

(c)  3d.    Nequaquam  medium  capiat  conclusio  fas  est.    The  middle 
term  must  be  found  only  in  the  premises,  not  in  the  conclusion, 
where  it  has  nothing  to  do.    It  can  only  vitiate  the  conclusion. 
"This  boy  is  poor;  this  boy  is  a  ball  player;  this  boy  is  a  poor  ball 
player." 

(d)  4th.   Aut  semel  aut  iterum  medius  generaliter  esto.    Once 
at  least  the  middle  term  must  be  taken  according  to  its  whole 
extension.    Otherwise  the  two  parts  to  which  it  refers  might  be 
different  in  each  premise,  and  thus  there  would  be  in  reality  no 
common  middle  term.    The  syllogism  would  have  four  terms. 
"Thieves  are  men;  saints  are  men;  therefore  saints  are  thieves." 

2.   Rules  for  the  Propositions: 

(a)  5th.   Ambae   affirmantes   nequeunt   generare   negantem.     If 
both  premises  assert  the  agreement  of  the  subject  and  of  the  pred- 
icate with  the  same  middle  term,  the  conclusion  must  evidently 
assert  the  agreement  of  the  subject  with  the  predicate. 

(b)  6th.    Utraque   si   praemissa   neget   nil   inde   sequetur.    No 
conclusion  can  be  inferred  from  two  negative  premises,  because 
two  ideas  disagreeing  with  the  same  third  may  or  may  not  agree 
with  each  other. 

(c)  yth.  Peiorem  sequitur  semper  conclusio  partem.    The"peior" 
or  weaker  part  is  the  negative  as  compared  to  the  affirmative, 


232  LOGIC 

in  order  to  be  true.  But,  if  there  are  more  than  two  members, 
and  one  member  is  affirmed  or  denied  in  the  minor,  all  the  others 
must  be  denied  or  affirmed  disjunctively  in  the  conclusion.  E.g. 
"To-day  is  either  Sunday,  or  Monday,  or  ...  Saturday;  it  is 
Sunday;  therefore  it  is  neither  Monday,  nor  Tuesday,  nor  .  .  .  "; 
or,  "it  is  not  Sunday;  therefore  it  is  either  Monday,  or  Tuesday, 
or  .  ..."  The  disjunctive  syllogism  may  also  be  reduced  to 
the  conditional  and  the  categorical  syllogism. 

(d)  A  dilemma  is  a  disjunctive  argument  in  which,  whichever 
member  of  the  disjunction  be  selected,  something  is  inferred  against 
an  adversary.  E.g.  "Speaking  irreverently  of  Holy  Scripture  is 
done  either  in  jest  or  in  earnest;  if  in  jest,  it  is  not  respectful;  if  in 
earnest,  it  is  not  good."  Rules:  (i)  The  disjunction  must  be  com- 
plete. (2)  The  consequences  inferred  from  each  member  must 
be  valid. 

2.  Imperfect  and  Incomplete  Syllogisms,  (a)  The  enlhymeme 
is  an  abbreviated  argument,  either  one  of  the  premises  or  the 
conclusion  being  understood.  E.g.  "He  must  be  sick,  for  he  has 
not  come." 

(6)  The  epicheirema  is  an  argument  in  which  to  one  or  both  of 
the  premises  its  reason  or  proof  is  added  immediately.  E.g. 
"Order  requires  an  intelligence,  for  chance  does  not  produce 
order;  there  is  order  in  the  world,  otherwise  it  could  not  continue 
to  exist  as  it  is;  therefore  the  world  requires  an  intelligence." 

(c)  The  polysyllogism  is  a  series  of  complete  syllogisms  in  which 
the  conclusion  of  one  is  assumed  immediately  as  the  major  of  the 
following.    "A  is  B\  B  is  C;  therefore  A  is  C;  C  is  D-,  therefore  A 
is  A" 

(d)  The  sorites  is  a  series  of  incomplete  syllogisms  or  enthy- 
memes  in  which  only  one  conclusion,  the  last,  is  expressed.     It 
includes  as  many  complete  syllogisms  as  there  are  propositions 
minus  two.    To  test  its  validity,  it  is  useful  to  reduce  it  to  com- 
plete syllogisms.     "A  is  B\  B  is  C\  C  is  Z>;  D  is  £;  therefore  A  is 
£."    There  are  two  special  rules  for  the  sorites:  (i)  Only  one  par- 
ticular premise  is  allowable,  namely,  the  first;  otherwise  the  argu- 
ment is  against   the   4th   rule  of   the   syllogism.     (2)  Only  one 
negative  premise  is  allowable,  namely,  the  last  major;  otherwise 


PRINCIPLES    OF    THE    SYLLOGISM       233 

the  argument  is  against  the  2d  rule.  The  student  may  ver- 
ify for  himself  that,  if  any  premise  except  the  first  is  particular, 
the  middle  term  will  be  undistributed  in  one  of  the  syllogisms, 
and,  if  any  premise  except  the  last  is  negative,  the  major  term  will 
have  a  greater  extension  hi  one  of  the  conclusions  than  in  the  major 
premise  of  the  same  syllogism. 

N.B.  Sometimes  in  order  to  reduce  an  argument  to  a  perfect 
syllogism  it  is  necessary  to  use  equivalent  propositions.  E.g. 
"Those  who  are  not  good  will  not  be  rewarded;  Peter  is  not  good; 
therefore  Peter  will  not  be  rewarded. "  Both  premises  are  appar- 
ently negative,  and  yet  the  syllogism  is  certainly  valid,  because  in 
reality  the  minor,  as  compared  to  the  major,  is  affirmative.  Again 
this  syllogism  contains  apparently  four  terms:  (i)  "those  who 
are  not  good,"  (2)  "rewarded,"  (3)  "Peter,"  (4)  "good."  By 
using  equivalents,  we  have  "Men  in  the  class  not-good  will  not 
be  rewarded;  Peter  is  in  the  class  not-good;  therefore  he  will  not 
be  rewarded."  Again  "Iron  (i)  is  a  useful  metal  (2);  this  bridge 
(3)  is  made  of  iron  (4) ;  therefore  this  bridge  (3)  is  made  of  a  useful 
metal  (5)."  Here  we  have  apparently  five  terms.  But  it  must 
be  noticed  that  besides  the  mediate  inference  by  reasoning,  we 
have  an  immediate  inference  by  complex  conception  (p.  226)  and 
the  argument  is  perfectly  valid.  This  type  of  reasoning  is  used 
very  frequently. 


III.    PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 

i.  Points  of  View  of  Extension  and  of  Comprehension.  —  In 
a  syllogism,  the  propositions  may  be  considered  from  the  point 
of  view  of  comprehension  or  from  that  of  extension.  The  predi- 
cate may  be  looked  upon  as  an  idea  contained  in  the  comprehension 
of  the  subject,  or  as  a  class  containing  the  subject.  "All  men  are 
mortal,"  interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  comprehension 
means  "Mortal  is  an  attribute  of  all  men,"  or  "Man  owing  to  his 
nature  is  mortal."  Interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  exten- 
sion it  means  "Man  is  a  sub-class  of  the  class  mortal,"  or  "Man 
is  one  of  the  mortal  beings."  In  the  former  case  it  is  meant  that 
man  has  a  greater  comprehension  than  mortal;  in  the  latter,  that 


232  LOGIC 

in  order  to  be  true.  But,  if  there  are  more  than  two  members, 
and  one  member  is  affirmed  or  denied  in  the  minor,  all  the  others 
must  be  denied  or  affirmed  disjunctively  in  the  conclusion.  E.g. 
"To-day  is  either  Sunday,  or  Monday,  or  ...  Saturday;  it  is 
Sunday;  therefore  it  is  neither  Monday,  nor  Tuesday,  nor  .  .  .  "; 
or,  "it  is  not  Sunday;  therefore  it  is  either  Monday,  or  Tuesday, 
or  ...  ."  The  disjunctive  syllogism  may  also  be  reduced  to 
the  conditional  and  the  categorical  syllogism. 

(d)  A  dilemma  is  a  disjunctive  argument  in  which,  whichever 
member  of  the  disjunction  be  selected,  something  is  inferred  against 
an  adversary.  E.g.  "Speaking  irreverently  of  Holy  Scripture  is 
done  either  in  jest  or  in  earnest;  if  in  jest,  it  is  not  respectful;  if  in 
earnest,  it  is  not  good."  Rules:  (i)  The  disjunction  must  be  com- 
plete. (2)  The  consequences  inferred  from  each  member  must 
be  valid. 

2.  Imperfect  and  Incomplete  Syllogisms,  (a)  The  enthymeme 
is  an  abbreviated  argument,  either  one  of  the  premises  or  the 
conclusion  being  understood.  E.g.  "He  must  be  sick,  for  he  has 
not  come." 

(b)  The  epicheirema  is  an  argument  in  which  to  one  or  both  of 
the  premises  its  reason  or  proof  is  added  immediately.    E.g. 
"Order  requires  an  intelligence,  for  chance   does  not  produce 
order;  there  is  order  in  the  world,  otherwise  it  could  not  continue 
to  exist  as  it  is;  therefore  the  world  requires  an  intelligence." 

(c)  The  polysyllogism  is  a  series  of  complete  syllogisms  in  which 
the  conclusion  of  one  is  assumed  immediately  as  the  major  of  the 
following.     "A  is  B\  B  is  C;  therefore  A  is  C;  C  is  Z);  therefore  A 
is  D." 

(d)  The  sorites  is  a  series  of  incomplete  syllogisms  or  enthy- 
memes  in  which  only  one  conclusion,  the  last,  is  expressed.     It 
includes  as  many  complete  syllogisms  as  there  are  propositions 
minus  two.    To  test  its  validity,  it  is  useful  to  reduce  it  to  com- 
plete syllogisms.     "A  is  B\  B  is  C;  C  is  D\  D  is  E\  therefore  A  is 
.E."    There  are  two  special  rules  for  the  sorites:  (i)  Only  one  par- 
ticular premise  is  allowable,  namely,  the  first;  otherwise  the  argu- 
ment is  against   the   4th   rule  of   the   syllogism.     (2)  Only  one 
negative  premise  is  allowable,  namely,  the  last  major;  otherwise 


PRINCIPLES    OF    THE     SYLLOGISM       233 

the  argument  is  against  the  2d  rule.  The  student  may  ver- 
ify for  himself  that,  if  any  premise  except  the  first  is  particular, 
the  middle  term  will  be  undistributed  in  one  of  the  syllogisms, 
and,  if  any  premise  except  the  last  is  negative,  the  major  term  will 
have  a  greater  extension  in  one  of  the  conclusions  than  in  the  major 
premise  of  the  same  syllogism. 

N.B.  Sometimes  in  order  to  reduce  an  argument  to  a  perfect 
syllogism  it  is  necessary  to  use  equivalent  propositions.  E.g. 
"Those  who  are  not  good  will  not  be  rewarded;  Peter  is  not  good; 
therefore  Peter  will  not  be  rewarded."  Both  premises  are  appar- 
ently negative,  and  yet  the  syllogism  is  certainly  valid,  because  in 
reality  the  minor,  as  compared  to  the  major,  is  affirmative.  Again 
this  syllogism  contains  apparently  four  terms:  (i)  "those  who 
are  not  good,"  (2)  "rewarded,"  (3)  "Peter,"  (4)  "good."  By 
using  equivalents,  we  have  "Men  in  the  class  not-good  will  not 
be  rewarded;  Peter  is  in  the  class  not-good;  therefore  he  will  not 
be  rewarded."  Again  "Iron  (i)  is  a  useful  metal  (2);  this  bridge 
(3)  is  made  of  iron  (4) ;  therefore  this  bridge  (3)  is  made  of  a  useful 
metal  (5)."  Here  we  have  apparently  five  terms.  But  it  must 
be  noticed  that  besides  the  mediate  inference  by  reasoning,  we 
have  an  immediate  inference  by  complex  conception  (p.  226)  and 
the  argument  is  perfectly  valid.  This  type  of  reasoning  is  used 
very  frequently. 


HI.    PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  SYLLOGISM 

i.  Points  of  View  of  Extension  and  of  Comprehension.  —  In 
a  syllogism,  the  propositions  may  be  considered  from  the  point 
of  view  of  comprehension  or  from  that  of  extension.  The  predi- 
cate may  be  looked  upon  as  an  idea  contained  in  the  comprehension 
of  the  subject,  or  as  a  class  containing  the  subject.  "All  men  are 
mortal,"  interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  comprehension 
means  "Mortal  is  an  attribute  of  all  men,"  or  "Man  owing  to  his 
nature  is  mortal."  Interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  exten- 
sion it  means  "Man  is  a  sub-class  of  the  class  mortal,"  or  "Man 
is  one  of  the  mortal  beings."  In  the  former  case  it  is  meant  that 
man  has  a  greater  comprehension  than  mortal;  in  the  latter,  that 


234  LOGIC 

mortal  has  a  greater  extension  than  man.  This  is  in  agreement 
with  what  has  been  mentioned  concerning  the  relations  of  inten- 
sion and  extension. 

2.  Principles  of  the  Syllogism.  —  (a)  From  the  point  of  view  of 
comprehension  the  eight  rules  of  the  syllogism  are  based  on  the 
following  principle:  "Quod  dicitur  de  continente  dicitur  etiam  de 
con  ten  to."    That  which  is  predicated  —  affirmatively  or  nega- 
tively—  of  that  which  contains  must  be  predicated  also  of  that 
which   is   contained.     If   "mortal"   is   contained    explicitly   or 
implicitly  in  the  comprehension  of   "man,"  and  "man"  in  the 
comprehension  of  "Peter,"   "mortal"  is  also  contained  in   the 
comprehension  of  "Peter." 

(b)  From  the  point  of  mew  of  extension,  the  principle  of  the  syl- 
logism is  stated  briefly  as  "Dictum  de  omni "  and  "Dictum  de 
nullo."     Whatever  is  predicated  —  affirmatively  or  negatively  — 
of  the  genus  or  class  must  also  be  predicated  of  the  species,  sub- 
classes, and  individuals  under  this  genus  or  class.     If  "man"  is 
a  sub-class  of  "mortal,"  and  "Peter  "  is  an  individual  man,  Peter 
is  also  mortal. 

(c)  More  generally  the  principles  of  the  syllogism  are  three, 
(i)  Two  terms  agreeing  with  one  and  the  same  third  agree  with 
each  other.     (2)  Two  terms  one  of  which  agrees  and  the  other 
disagrees  with  the  same  third  disagree  with  each  other.     (3)  Two 
terms  neither  of  which  agrees  with  the  same  third  cannot  be 
said   to    agree  or  to  disagree   with  each  other.     It  would  be 
easy  to  show  that  all  the  rules  of  the  syllogism  are  but  applica- 
tions of  these  principles. 

N.B.  It  may  be  found  useful  to  represent  syllogistic  processes 
by  means  of  circles  which  diagrammatically  show  their  value  (see 
on  opposite  page  two  illustrations  showing  how  this  can  be  done). 
By  applying  the  rules  given  for  the  quantity  of  the  predicate, 
one  may  verify  which  inferences  are  valid,  and  which  are  invalid. 

3.  Quantitative  Syllogisms.  —  So  far  we  have  spoken  only  of 
the  logical  or  qualitative  syllogism.    There  is  also  a  mathemat- 
ical  or   quantitative   syllogism   based   on   quantity,    succession, 
equality  of  relations,  etc.     For  instance:   "A  is  equal  to  B;  B  is 
equal  to  C;  therefore  A  is  equal  to  C."    "A  is  greater  than  B; 


PRINCIPLES     OF    THE     SYLLOGISM       235 

B  is  greater  than  C;  therefore  A  is  greater  than  C."  "A  (a 
musical  instrument)  is  in  tune  with  B;  B  with  C.  .  .  ."  "A  is 
a  brother  of  B.  .  .  ."  "  A  lived  before  5.  .  .  ."  In  each  of  these 
arguments  we  have  four  terms.  Yet  they  are  valid,  because  they 
are  based  on  quantitative  self-evident  relations:  "Two  things  equal 
to  the  same  third  are  equal  to  each  other  ";  "The  greater  than  the 


Point  of  view  of  extension  Point  of  view  of  comprehension 

MP(a);  SM(a);  Conclusion:  SP(a) 


MP(e);  SM(i);  Conclusion:  SP(o) 

greater  is  greater  than  the  great,"  etc.  In  the  syllogism:  "A  is 
greater  than  B;  B  greater  than  C;  therefore  A  is  greater  than  C," 
if  A's  greatness  is  a,  B's  greatness  b,  and  C's  greatness  c,  we  have: 
a  =  b  +  x;  b  =  c  -f  y;  therefore  a  =  c  +  y  +  x. 

4.  Primary  Laws  of  Thought.  —  All  the  principles  and  rules 
of  the  syllogism  are  ultimately  reducible  to  three  primary  laws 
of  thought  implied  in  all  affirmations,  negations,  and  processes  of 


236  LOGIC 

reasoning,  (i)  Law  of  identity:  "A  thing  is  what  it  is."  Or 
logically:  "Every  subject  is  its  own  predicate";  "A  is  A."  (2) 
Law  of  contradiction:  "The  same  thing  cannot  at  the  same  time  and 
from  the  same  point  of  view  be  and  not  be."  Or  logically:  "The 
same  predicate  cannot  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  sense  be 
affirmed  and  denied  of  the  same  subject."  (3)  Law  of  excluded 
middle:  "A  thing  is  or  is  not."  Or  logically:  "Of  two  contradic- 
tory attributes  one  must  be  affirmed  and  the  other  denied  of  the 
same  subject."  These  laws  are  the  basis  on  which  the  syllogism 
rests,  and  are  implied  in  every  process  of  thinking  and  judging. 


CHAPTER   II 

METHOD 
OBJECT  OF  THIS  CHAPTER 

1.  Meaning.  —  Method  (68os  ftera,  road  or  way  toward)  in  gen- 
eral signifies  the  adaptation  of  means  in  order  to  do  something  and 
to  reach  safely  a  determined  end.    In  logic,  it  signifies  the  adap- 
tation of  means  in  order  to  reach  scientific  truth,  i.e.  the  knowl- 
edge of   things  from  their  causes  and  in  their  relations  to  other 
things.    To  know,  in  the  strict  sense,  is  not  simply  to  apprehend 
a  fact  or  an  event,  but  also  to  perceive  the  reasons,  laws,  causes, 
and  relations  of  facts  and  events.    Methodology  teaches  how  to 
proceed  in  order  to  acquire  science.    In  every  syllogism  there  is 
a  progress  from  the  premises  to  the  conclusion.    Knowledge  is 
generally  acquired  by  a  series  of  reasonings.    Hence,  although  a 
method  is  required  for  one  single  reasoning,  method  as  understood 
here  applies  to  a  more  complex  progress  in  which  arguments  of 
different  value  and  from  different  sources  are  used. 

2.  Importance.  —  It   is   important   to   proceed   methodically, 
(i)  Unless  the  road  is  known,  one  is  likely  to  go  astray,  or  at  least 
to  lose  much  time  in  finding  the  way.    This  will  be  made  clear  if 
you  compare,  with  regard  to  both  quantity  and  quality,  the  work 
of  two  men,  one  of  whom  proceeds  methodically,  and  the  other 
does  not.     (2)  It  is  necessary  to  proceed  gradually,  not  by  jumps; 
precipitation  is  likely  to  mislead  the  mind.     (3)  What  is  acquired 
with  method,  and  orderly  arranged,  is  more  easily  memorized,  and 
only  such  a  methodical  arrangement  of  ideas  deserves  the  name  of 
knowledge. 

Thus,  whereas  the  first  chapter  of  logic  indicated  how  to  make 
a  valid  formal  syllogism,  and  as  such  is  indispensable,  there  re- 
mains to  show  (i)  the  value  of  the  premises  used;  if  the  form  be 
correct,  but  the  materials  weak,  the  whole  edifice  lacks  solidity; 

237 


238  LOGIC 

(2)  the  use  to  be  made  of  the  syllogism,  and  the  mode  of  proceed- 
ing step  by  step  from  one  conclusion  to  another;  (3)  the  danger  of 
fallacies  which  may  come  either  from  the  form  or  the  matter  of 
the  syllogism. 

3.  Division  of  this  Chapter.  —  Method  being  a  progress  supposes 
two  extremes:  one,  the  starting-point;  the  other,  the  end  to  be 
reached.  As  the  direction  of  any  movement  or  progress  is  derived 
from  the  term  to  which  it  tends,  —  "motus  specificatur  a  ter- 
mino  "  —  we  must  begin  with  the  end  to  be  reached,  for  it  is  from 
this  end  that  the  process  derives  its  orientation.  As  to  the  proc- 
ess itself  from  the  starting-point  to  the  terminus,  it  supposes  that 
we  know  the  value  of  the  instruments  to  be  used,  the  various  kinds 
of  methods,  and  the  wrong  ways,  fallacies  or  errors.  Hence  our 
division:  (i)  The  extremes;  (a)  the  terminus  ad  quern,  or  end  to 
be  reached,  (b)  the  terminus  a  quo,  or  starting-point.  (2)  The 
progress  itself;  (a)  the  value  of  the  arguments,  (b)  the  two  main 
general  methods,  (c)  the  obstacles. 


ARTICLE  I.     THE   TERMINI 

I.    THE   END   TO  BE   REACHED 

Man's  intelligence  strives  after  science,  that  is,  a  certain  mode 
of  knowledge  to  which  his  innate  curiosity  instinctively  impels 
him.  Man  not  only  wants  to  see  things  and  events,  but  he  is 
anxious  to  know  their  "how"  and  "why"  —two  words  which 
are  frequently  used  by  both  the  child  and  the  adult. 

I.  THE  NATURE  OF  SCIENCE 

The  term  "science"  is  used  with  both  a  subjective  and  an 
objective  meaning.  It  signifies  the  knowledge  and  the  object  of 
knowledge,  and  we  speak  of  the  science  which  a  man  possesses, 
and  of  the  various  sciences  which  he  studies. 

i.  Characteristics  of  Scientific  Knowledge.  —  Science  is  always 
knowledge,  but  knowledge  in  its  broad  sense  is  not  always  sci- 
ence, (i)  Sense-perception,  of  itself,  is  not  scientific  knowledge. 
(2)  Things  known  directly  and  immediately  by  the  intellect,  i.e. 


SCIENCE  239 

self-evident  principles,  are  not  said  to  be  known  scientifically, 
but  are  the  bases  of  science.  Scientific  knowledge  is  essentially 
the  knowledge  of  things  through  their  causes  and  their  common  prin- 
ciples. It  possesses  the  three  following  characteristics: 

(a)  //  is  certain.    It  starts  from  something  certain,  and  uses  valid 
inferences  that  lead  to  certitude.    This  certitude  is  based  on  rea- 
sons and  justified  by  proofs.     Unscientific  knowledge  is  frequently 
doubtful  and  accepted  without  proof. 

(b)  It  is  general.    The  fact  or  individual  as  such  is  not  the  object 
of  science.     Science  has  for  its  object  the  causes  common  to  several 
happenings,  the  types  common  to  several  beings,  the  laws  com- 
mon to  several  phenomena.     To  know  that  a  man  died  is  not  sci- 
ence; to  know  that  he  died  on  account  of  his  swallowing  a  certain 
poison  which,  under  the  same  circumstances,  is  capable  of  killing 
not  only  this  man,  but  any  other  man,  because  it  has  such  or 
such  effects  on  the  organism,  is  scientific.    To  see  a  dog  is  not 
science;  to  know  its  nature  and  essential  features  belongs  to  sci- 
ence.   To  perceive  that  the  stone  thrown  up  in  the  air  falls  down 
is  not  science;  the  law  of  gravitation  gives  a  scientific  explanation 
of  the  fact. 

(c)  It  is  systematic.    Facts  are  only  the  materials  of  science. 
They  are  not  science  itself  any  more  than  the  materials  of  a  house 
are  a  house.    The  materials  become  a  house  by  their  adjustment 
according  to  certain  relations.     So  also  facts  become  science  only 
when  their  connections  and  relations  are  perceived,  and  when  they 
are  reduced  to  common  principles  and  laws. 

2.  Two  Meanings  of  Science.  —  (a)  If  stress  is  laid  on  the  knowl- 
edge of  causes  and  on  certitude ,  it  may  be  insisted  that  such  causes 
give  necessary  conclusions,  i.e.  conclusions  which,  under  existing 
circumstances,  the  mind  conceives  as  incapable  of  being  otherwise. 
Mathematical  sciences  are  the  best  types  of  this  meaning  of 
science. 

(b)  If  stress  is  laid  on  the  element  of  systematization,  the  limits 
of  science  are  widened  and  may  be  made  to  include  not  only  con- 
clusions that  are  certain,  but  also  others  that  are  more  or  less 
conjectural  and  hypothetical.  These,  it  is  true,  do  not  consti- 
tute science  in  the  strict  sense;  they  are  called  scientific  because 


240 


LOGIC 


they  are  obtained  methodically,  connected  with  strictly  ascer- 
tained conclusions,  and,  for  the  present,  offer  a  plausible  explana- 
tion of  facts.  Many  such  conclusions  are  found  in  empirical 
sciences. 

3.  Advantages  of  Scientific  Knowledge.  —  From  the  charac- 
teristics of  scientific  knowledge  its  advantages  are  easily 
derived. 

(a)  It  enables  the  mind  to  understand  and  explain  things;  to 
know  not  only  what  happens,  but  also  why  it  happens. 

(b)  It  makes  it  possible  to  foresee  the  future,  so  that  measures 
may  be  taken  accordingly.    Certain  events,  like  an  eclipse  of  the 
sun  or  an  explosion  of  dynamite,  may  be  foreseen  and  predicted 
with  certitude.    Others,  like  a  storm,  human  actions,  political 
events,  etc.,  can  be  foreseen  only  with  varying  degrees  of  prob- 
ability.   Besides  freedom  which  is  found  in  human  actions,  the 
reason  of  this  difference  is  the  complexity  of  the  causes  that  con- 
tribute to  produce  a  given  phenomenon,  and  the  difficulty  of 
knowing  them  all  in  their  various  relations. 

(c)  It  increases  our  power  over  nature,  for,  when  the  causes  that 
produce  a  thing  are  known,  they  may  be  brought  about,  or  avoided, 
or  combined  in  a  thousand  ways,  so  as  to  give  rise  to  intended 
results.    Machinery  is  an  obvious  instance.    It  is  the  adaptation 
of  many  causes,  laws,  and  principles  for  certain  purposes.    To 
know  the  cause  of  a  disease  is  the  first  step  toward  curing  it.    To 
know  the  character  of  a  man  is  of  great  importance  in  dealing 
with  him. 

II.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  SCIENCES 

i.  Distinction  and  Subordination. —  (a)  Sciences  are  distin- 
guished and  classified  according  to  their  formal  objects,  that  is,  not 
according  to  the  object  itself  of  which  they  treat  considered  in  its 
totality  (material  object),  but  according  to  the  special  point  of 
view  which  they  take  of  it  (formal  object).  Thus  many  sciences 
have  the  human  body  for  their  material  object :  anatomy,  physiol- 
ogy, pathology,  histology,  hygiene,  etc.  .  They  are  distinct 
sciences  because  they  do  not  study  the  human  body  under  the 
same  aspect. 


SCIENCE  241 

(b)  Sciences  may  be  subordinated  in  several  ways,  (i)  //  we 
consider  their  objects,  some  are  more  general,  and  the  knowledge 
of  them  is  supposed  by  the  more  special.  Thus  ethics  supposes 
psychology;  trigonometry  supposes  geometry,  etc.  This  does  not 
mean  that  the  higher  sciences  must  always  be  studied  first;  some- 
times the  inferior  and  more  special  sciences  may  be  a  necessary 
means  toward  the  superior.  (2)  //  we  consider  their  utility,  some 
sciences  are  speculative,  and  others  more  immediately  practical. 
As  a  rule  practical  sciences  are  based  on  theoretical  sciences. 
(3)  //  we  consider  their  origin,  empirical  sciences  come  or  should 
come  first,  since  psychologically  experience  comes  before  general- 
ization. (4)  //  we  consider  their  excellence,  the  higher  the  object, 
the  nobler  the  science.  Thus  the  knowledge  of  God  and  of  the 
human  soul  is  higher  than  that  of  nature. 

2.  Classification.  —  It  is  difficult,  not  to  say  impossible,  to 
give  a  satisfactory  classification  of  sciences,  (i)  In  fact,  scien- 
tists do  not  agree  in  all  details.  (2)  The  number  of  distinct 
sciences  increases  with  experience,  and  mere  chapters  of  former 
sciences  little  by  little  become  special  sciences.  (3)  The  limits 
separating  distinct  sciences  are  largely  artificial.  Since  all  the 
objects  of  nature,  and  all  aspects  of  these  objects,  are  in  close  con- 
nection, it  is  not  possible  for  any  science  to  be  independent;  it 
must  necessarily  go  beyond  its  own  limits  into  the  domain  of  other 
sciences. 

Without  stopping  to  consider  the  merits  of  other  classifications, 
the  following  seems  sufficiently  complete  and  satisfactory.  Gen- 
eric sciences  alone  will  be  mentioned,  and  these  again  may  be 
subdivided. 

I.  Physical  and  natural  sciences,  i.e.  sciences  of  the  material 
world. 


i.  Inorganic 


(a)  General  properties  of  matter,  Physics 

Nature,  composition,  and  special  properties 

of  elements  and  compounds,  Chemistry 

(c)  Minerals,  Mineralogy 

(d)  Description  of  the  earth,  Physical  Geography 

(e)  Constitution  of  the  earth,  Geology 
(/)  Other  mundane  bodies,     Astronomy,  Cosmogony,  etc 


242 


LOGIC 


2.  Organic 


(a)  Life  in  general, 

(b)  Plant  life, 

(c)  Animal  life, 


Biology 
Botany 
Zoology 


N.B. — Both  botany  and  zoology  are  subdivided  into 
the  study  of 


(a)  General  structure  of  organisms, 

(&)  Minute  structure, 

(c)   Functions, 

(J)  Diseases, 

(e)  Early  development, 

(/)  Fossil  remains, 


Anatomy 

Histology,  Cystology 

Physiology 

Pathology 

Embryology 

Paleontology 


truth, 

duty, 
beauty, 

Psychology 
Logic  and  Episte- 
mology 
Ethics 
Msthetics 

II.   Sciences  of  man  considered  as  intelligent,  free,  and  social, 
either  as  an  individual  or  in  his  social  relations. 


:.  Individual  (a)  Conscious  processes, 
(6)  Normative  sciences  of 


2.  Social          (a)  Language,  Philology 

(b)  Wealth,  Political  Economy 

(c)  Social  ethics  and  politics,  Law  and  Jurisprudence 

(d)  Description  of  States,  Political  Geography 

(e)  Past    events,   History  and  Historical    Sciences,   e.g. 

Epigraphy,  Archeology,  etc. 

(/)  Early  human  development,  Anthropology 

(g)  Human  races,  Ethnology 


III.   Mathematical  sciences,  i.e.  sciences  of  abstract  quantity. 


1.  Of  numbers, 

2.  Of  extension, 

|3.  Of  movement  and  force, 


Arithmetic,  Algebra 

Geometry,  Trigonometry 

Mechanics 


IV.   Metaphysical  sciences,  i.e.  higher  constitution  and  nature, 


1.  Of  material  substances, 

2.  Of  the  human  soul, 

3.  Of  God, 


Cosmology 

Philosophy  of  mind 

Theodicy 


THE     STARTING-POINT  243 


II.     THE   STARTING   POINT 

1.  Doubt.  —  Any  question  and  any  desire  for  learning  suppose 
in  the  mind  both  knowledge  and  doubt;  namely,  the  knowledge, 
however  vague  and  imperfect,  of  something  concerning  the  object 
we  want  to  study,  for,  if  man  were  altogether  ignorant  of  it,  he 
would  not  even  suspect  that  any  question  may  be  asked  about  it; 
and  a  doubt  with  regard  to  the  special  points  to  be  examined  and 
the  answer  to  the  questions  proposed.    This  doubt,  however, 
bears  on  a  special  point.    It  is  not  universal,  for,  if  everything, 
including  sense-experience,  the  value  of  the  faculties  of  knowledge, 
and  the  first  principles  be  doubted,  it  becomes  absolutely  impos- 
sible ever  to  reach  anything  certain.     Since  they  are  primary, 
self-evident  facts  and  principles  cannot  be  reconstructed  out  of 
anything  else. 

Descartes  began  by  a  universal  doubt,  but  did  not  reach  certi- 
tude except  through  inconsistencies,  implicitly  admitting  later 
on  what  he  had  formerly  rejected  as  doubtful.  He  warns  us  him- 
self that  his  example  is  not  to  be  followed  indiscriminately.  Log- 
ically, certitude  can  come  only  from  certitude,  universal  doubt  can 
beget  only  doubt,  since  the  conclusion  must  be  contained  in  the 
premises.  Moreover,  it  is  impossible  to  demonstrate  everything, 
for,  if  a  proposition  M  be  demonstrated  by  L,  L  by  K,  K  by  /, 
and  so  on,  without  ever  reaching  a  proposition  standing  by  itself 
and  on  its  own  merits,  no  certitude  can  ever  be  obtained. 

2.  Positive  Data.  —  The  process  may  be  analytical  or  synthet- 
ical.   In  the  former  case,  the  positive  starting-point  will  be  a  fact 
or  a  series  of  facts;  in  the  latter,  it  will  be  self-evident  and  indemon- 
strable principles.    Facts  will  be  gathered  from  internal  or  external 
experience.     Principles  will  be  either  general,  or  special  to  each 
science.    Thus  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  general;  the 
axioms  and  definitions  of  geometry  are  more  special.    In  all  these 
are  contained  implicitly  or  explicitly  the  fact  of  the  subject's 
existence,   which  is   implied   in    every    conscious    process;    the 
subject's   power  to  know  which  is  implied  in  the  act  itself  of 
knowledge;   the  primary    laws    of    thought  —  identity,    contra- 


244  LOGIC 

diction,  and  excluded  middle  —  without  which  consistent  thinking 
is  an  impossibility. 


ARTICLE  II.    THE  PROGRESS 

I.    THE   VALUE   OF  THE  ARGUMENTS 

Method  is  the  way  to  make  progress  from  the  known  to  the 
unknown,  or  from  the  better  known  to  the  less  known.  Hence 
the  importance  of  knowing  the  value  of  inferences  and  reasonings. 
These  may  be  (i)  certain,  i.e.  start  from  premises  that  are  certain, 
and  lead  to  conclusions  that  are  also  certain;  (2)  more  or  less  prob- 
able and  worthy  of  assent;  (3)  false,  either  because  the  premises 
are  false,  or  because  the  rules  of  the  syllogism  are  not  observed. 
Only  the  first  two  classes  belong  here  as  instruments  of  science, 
and  as  yielding  scientific  results,  permanent  or  provisional.  The 
last  class,  on  the  contrary,  is  an  obstacle  to  science,  and  will  be 
considered  later. 

I.  DEMONSTRATION 

1.  Nature  of  Demonstration.  —  Demonstration  is  a  process  of 
reasoning  in  which  from  premises  known  to  be  certain  a  conclu- 
sion which  is  also  certain  is  inferred.    Hence  two  conditions  are 
required:   (i)  The  formal  validity  of  the  process  of  reasoning; 
(2)  the  certainty  of  the  premises,  either  because  they  are  self-evi- 
dent, or  because  they  are  ultimately  reducible  to  self-evident 
facts  and  principles,  since,  as  was  said  above,  the  process  of  demon- 
stration requires  indemonstrable  principles.    Thus  the  last  the- 
orems of  Euclidean  geometry  are  based  on  the  preceding  ones,  and 
ultimately  on  principles,  axioms,  and  definitions. 

2.  Various   Kinds   of  Demonstration.  —  A   demonstration   is: 
(a)  (i)  Direct,  when  it  proceeds  by  positive  arguments,  and  shows 
positively  that  the  predicate  does  or  does  not  belong  to  the  sub- 
ject.    (2)  Indirect,  when  it  shows  the  falsity  of  the  contradic- 
tory or  of  opposite  propositions.    To  prove  the  freedom  of  the  will 
from  consciousness  is  to  proceed  directly;  to  prove  it  from  the 
consequences  of  determinism  is  to  proceed  indirectly. 

(b)  (i)  A  priori,  synthetic,  or  deductive,  when  it  proceeds  from 


VALUE     OF    ARGUMENTS  245 

that  which  is  in  reality  prior,  namely,  from  the  cause  to  the  effect, 
from  the  essence  to  the  property,  from  the  law  to  the  phenomenon. 
(2)  A  posteriori^  analytic,  or  inductive,  when  it  proceeds  from  that 
which  is  in  reality  posterior,  namely,  from  the  effect  to  the  cause, 
from  the  property  to  the  essence,  from  the  phenomenon  to  the  law. 
To  prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul  from  the  soul's  spirituality 
is  to  proceed  a  priori;  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  from  the  world 
is  to  proceed  a  posteriori.  In  natural  sciences,  these  two  methods 
are  generally  combined.  We  proceed  first  from  the  effects  to  the 
cause,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  cause  leads  again  to  the  knowledge 
of  other  effects. 

N.B.  Prioriness  and  posterioriness  here  are  taken  in  the  natural, 
not  in  the  logical,  order,  since  logically  the  premises,  whatever 
be  their  natural  relation  to  the  conclusion,  are  always  prior  to  the 
conclusion.  In  the  a  posteriori  demonstration,  the  fact  is  better 
known  than,  or  logically  prior  to,  the  law,  although  in  the  natural 
order  it  is  but  an  application  of  the  existing  law. 

(c)  (i)  Perfect  —  propter  quid,  8«m,  "why"  —  when   it   gives 
the  necessary,  proximate,  special,  and  adequate  reasons  or  prin- 
ciples of  the  conclusion.    Hence  it  is  always  a  priori.     (2)  Imper- 
fect —  quia,  on,  "that  "  —  when  it  shows  simply  the  existence  of 
a  thing,  or  does  not  give  its  intrinsic,  special,  or  proximate  reasons. 

N.B.  Causes  and  reasons  are  necessary  when  they  make  it 
impossible  for  the  conclusion  to  be  otherwise;  proximate  and  spe- 
cial when  there  is  no  link  omitted  between  the  conclusion  and  its 
premises;  adequate  when  they  give  the  complete  reason  of  the 
conclusion.  The  perfect  demonstration  is  possible  chiefly  in  math- 
ematics, logic,  and  metaphysics,  where  it  can  start  from  the 
axioms  of  quantity,  and  from  self-evident  principles  considered 
either  as  laws  of  thought  or  as  principles  of  being  and  existence. 

(d)  (i)  Absolute  when  the  premises  are  true  in  themselves  and 
for  all  men.     (2)  Relative,  or  ad  hominem,  when  the  premises  are 
admitted  by  an  adversary,  although  they  may  not  be  certain. 
The  former  is  valid  for  all,  not  the  latter.    To  base  a  demonstra- 
tion on  principles  or  facts  which  are  admitted  by  an  opponent, 
but  known  to  be  false  by  the  one  who  uses  them,  is  a  lack  of  intel- 
lectual honesty.    Probabilities  are  frequently  used  in  this  way. 


246  LOGIC 

II.  PROBABLE  ARGUMENTS 

i.  Nature  of  Probable  Arguments.  —  (a)  Probable  arguments 
are  those  in  which  one  of  the  premises  is,  or  both  premises  are, 
probable,  and  lead  to  a  probable  conclusion.  Probability  means 
likelihood,  approach  to  truth,  or  greater  force  of  argument.  It 
refers  to  the  object,  and  produces  in  the  mind  the  state  of  opin- 
ion, that  is,  an  assent  without  the  firmness  of  certitude.  Degrees 
of  probability  are  numberless,  and  the  corresponding  states  of 
opinion  are  more  or  less  firm,  nearer  to,  or  farther  from,  doubt  and 
certitude.  In  fact,  doubt  and  certitude  exist  only  in  one  point, 
at  each  extreme  of  the  line  of  mental  assent;  doubt  is  the  absence 
of  assent;  certitude  is  full,  complete,  and  unrestricted  assent. 
Opinion  with  its  various  degrees  occupies  the  whole  range  between 
these  two  extremes.  Probability  is  much  more  frequent  than 
certitude,  especially  in  practical  matters,  in  historical,  moral, 
social,  political,  and  even  natural  sciences.  But  in  many  cases, 
as  explained  in  psychology,  subjective  motives  are  added  to  objec- 
tive evidence,  and  make  one  consider  as  certain  that  which  pru- 
dently and  logically  should  be  considered  only  as  probable  (p. 
117  ff.). 

(b)  The  general  rule  of  probable  arguments  is  that  the  conclu- 
sion cannot  have  a  greater  probability  than  the  weaker  premise.  We 
must  understand  in  this  sense  also  the  general  rules:  "Latius  hos 
quam  .  .  .  ."  and:  "Peiorem  sequitur  semper.  ..."  If  in  a 
series  of  arguments,  or  in  the  same  argument,  two  or  several  prop- 
ositions are  only  probable,  the  conclusion  represents  their  combined 
weakness.  A  mathematical  example  will  illustrate  this:  In  toss- 
ing a  coin,  the  chances  of  turning  tails  are  ^;  the  chances  of  turning 
tails  twice  in  succession  are  i  X  i,  i.e.  £,  for  there  are  four  chances 
in  all,  two  for  tails  and  two  for  heads.  In  the  same  way  probabil- 
ity means  a  chance  for  truth.  If  to  this  be  added  another  chance, 
the  probability  of  both  chances  coinciding  with  truth  is  smaller 
than  it  would  be  if  only  one  proposition  were  probable. 

However,  probabilities,  when  independent,  form  a  cumulative 
evidence,  and  may  produce  certitude.  Thus  a  coincidence  of  inde- 
pendent facts,  each  one  only  probable  in  itself,  may  show  the  guilt 


VALUE     OF    ARGUMENTS  247 

of  an  accused  person,  because  his  guilt  is  the  only  sufficient  reason 
of  this  coincidence.  Cumulative  evidence  is  frequently  used  in 
all  sciences. 

The  main  probable  arguments  are  analogy  and  example,  statis- 
tics, hypothesis,  and  authority. 

2.  Analogy  and  Example.  —  (a)  Analogy  applies  to  an  object 
what  is  known  to  apply  to  another  object  having  with  the  former 
one  or  several  points  of    resemblance.      From  certain  features 
known  to  be  common  certain  other  features  are  inferred  to  be  also 
common.     Example  and  analogy  are  closely  related,  and  these 
terms  are  frequently  used  for  each  other.     Strictly  speaking, 
however,  analogy  argues  from  one  instance  to  another  by  passing 
through  a  general  law;  it  is  inductive  and  deductive.     Example 
goes  directly  and  conjecturally  from  one  instance  to  another. 
Thus,  knowing  that  a  certain  disease  is  produced  by  micro-organ- 
isms, I  infer  by  analogy  that  another  disease  having  some  similar 
symptoms  is  also  due  to  a  similar  cause.    Here  is  implied  the  gen- 
eral principle  that  the  same  symptoms  are  due  to  the  same  cause. 
To  deter  a  man  from  excess  in  drinking,  I  may  point  out  to  him  the 
example  of  this  or  that  man  who  is  an  habitual  drunkard. 

(b)  Analogy  and  example  are  of  frequent  use  in  all  sciences  and 
in  daily  life.  They  are  the  starting-point  of  many  discoveries, 
by  suggesting  solutions  which  later  on  may  be  proved  true.  Their 
value  depends  on  the  number  and  character  of  the  observed  re- 
semblances, and  thus  ranges  anywhere  from  certitude  to  zero. 
Hence  extreme  caution  is  necessary  in  using  and  admitting  these 
arguments.  They  are  sources  of  metaphors  and  allegories  which 
must  not  be  taken  as  true  beyond  the  legitimate  value  of  the 
inference.  Points  of  resemblance  must  not  cause  one  to  over- 
look the  differences. 

3.  Statistics  consist  in  noting  the  absolute  and  relative  fre- 
quency of  certain  happenings.    All  happenings  of  a  certain  nature 
and  within  a  certain  period  are  numbered,  and  averages  are  taken 
and  compared  with  various  circumstances  which  are  conjectured 
to  be  the  causes  of  these  happenings.    Thus  I  may  note  the  number 
of  divorces  for  a  whole  nation  or  for  a  certain  class  of  people  dur- 
ing a  certain  period  of  time,  compare  their  increasing  or  decreas- 


248  LOGIC 

ing  rate  with  changes  in  social,  political,  and  religious  conditions, 
and  thus  find  out  the  causes  which  influence  their  frequency. 
Statistics  are  of  frequent  use  in  social  sciences,  for  mortality, 
births,  diseases,  crimes,  accidents,  suicides,  etc.,  and  also  in  many 
other  sciences,  e.g.  for  harvests,  money  circulation,  mineral  and 
agricultural  products,  etc.  Statistics  are  very  useful  because  ob- 
served coincidences  help  to  find  the  causes  of  phenomena,  or  at 
least  the  various  influences  under  which  they  happen.  But  they 
are  difficult  both  to  make  and  to  interpret  correctly  because  the 
causes  and  influences  of  events  may  be  very  complex  and 
varied.  There  is  danger  of  mistaking  a  mere  fortuitous  coinci- 
dence for  the  true  cause,  and  of  overlooking  some  important 
factors. 

4.  Hypothesis  (Greek,  "placing  under")  in  general  consists  in 
supposing  (Latin,  sub-positio)  or  presuming  the  solution  looked 
for,  and  dealing  with  it  as  if  it  were  known.  It  is,  therefore,  a 
tentative  explanation  to  be  verified. 

(a)  When  a  fact  or  a  series  of  facts  has  been  observed,  we  may 
not  know  its  law  immediately.     Or  even  if  the  law  is  known  in 
its  generality,  we  may  not  know   all   its   determinations.     A 
hypothesis  consists  in  supposing  the  law  to  be  true,  and  in  working 
on  this  assumption  so  as  to  ascertain  whether  it  is  true  and  justi- 
fied.   The  principle  which  impels  to  frame  hypotheses  is  the  prin- 
ciple of  sufficient  reason  which  applies  to  all  phenomena.    The 
faculty  that  frames  them  is  the  imagination  under  the  guidance 
of  reason. 

(b)  The  main  utilities  of  hypotheses  are,  (i)  to  offer  a  more  or 
less  probable  solution  of  a  problem  which  perhaps  cannot  be  solved 
definitively,  or  which  has  not  yet  received  a  satisfactory  solution; 

(2)  to  coordinate  and  group  results  already  obtained,  and  to  sys- 
tematize them  into  a  class  that  will  be  more  or  less  permanent; 

(3)  to  incite  to  work  in  a  certain  direction  in  order  to  ascertain  if 
the  hypothesis  is  verifiable;  (4)  to  throw  many  side-lights  on  the 
problem,  even  if  the  hypothesis  is  disproved,  and  to  point  the  way 
to  a  true  solution. 

(c)  The  conditions  of  a  scientific  hypothesis  are  the  following: 
(i)  It  must  not  be  taken  as  an  end,  but  as  a  means;  not  as  a  prop- 


VALUE     OF     ARGUMENTS  249 

osition  to  be  proved,  but  as  a  proposition  to  be  tested.  (2)  It  must 
not  contradict  any  well-ascertained  facts,  conclusions,  or  principles, 
but  sometimes  may  overthrow  conclusions  hitherto  accepted  as 
certain.  (3)  It  must  not  be  gratuitous,  but  based  on  facts.  (4)  It 
must  be  adequate,  i.e.  applicable  to  all  the  observed  phenomena, 
and  assign  to  them  what  is,  or  seems  to  be,  a  sufficient  explana- 
tion. A  hypothesis  which  certainly  contradicts  one  fact  which  is 
certain,  ceases  to  be  valid.  (5)  It  must  be  capable  of  some  veri- 
fication or  disproof,  for  its  value  consists  chiefly  in  the  hope  of 
testing  it. 

5.  Authority.  —  Historical  sciences  are  based  on  human  author- 
ity. In  all  other  sciences,  as  well  as  in  daily  life,  men  frequently 
rely  on  the  authority  of  others.  Few  are  the  beliefs  and  actions 
prompted  exclusively,  and  even  principally,  by  personal  reflec- 
tion, when  compared  with  the  number  of  those  prompted  by  the 
authority  of  others,  common  opinion,  education,  individual  ad- 
vice and  suggestion. 

(a)  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  the  value  of  human  author- 
ity as  such  ordinarily  does  not  go  beyond  probability,  for  any  man 
may  be  deceived  or  be  a  deceiver.    Yet  there  may  be  found  such 
guarantees  in  one  single  witness  or  in  several  independent  wit- 
nesses—  cumulative  probability  —  as  to  give  a  moral  certitude. 
On  questions  of  facts,  especially  of  facts  that  are  easily  observable, 
it  is  possible  in  many  cases  to  reach  certitude,  but  in  other  cases 
probability  alone  can  be  obtained.    On  questions  of  doctrine  and 
systems,  a  competent  man  has  greater  authority;    yet  none  is 
infallible,  and  for  a  man  who   can   appreciate   and  weigh   the 
reasons  that  are  given,  an  authority  is  worth  these  reasons. 

(b)  Hence  two  extremes  must  be  avoided:  (i)  Making  of  sci- 
ence a  mere  study  and  repetition  of  the  opinions  of  others.    This 
does  not  give  a  scientific  knowledge;  it  is  a  lazy  process  dis- 
pensing   with    private    research  and  progress.      (2)  Neglecting 
completely  what  others  have  said.      We  may  profit  by   their 
discoveries   and  discussions,  avoid  doing  the  same  work  twice, 
proceed    more   safely  where   they   have    groped    and,   perhaps, 
lost   their  way,  appropriate   the  conclusions  of   science  already 
acquired. 


250  LOGIC 

II.     THE   TWO   GENERAL   METHODS 

1.  Induction  and  Deduction.  —  The  two  general  methods  are 
induction  and  deduction.     Induction  goes  from  the  particular  to 
the  universal,  from  the  effect  to  the  cause,  from  the  phenomenon 
to  the  law.     It  tries  to  generalize,  to  find  uniformities  and  general 
truths.     Deduction  follows   the   reverse  process.     Hence,  consid- 
ering the   real   order  of    things,  induction  is  regressive;    deduc- 
tion, progressive.    The  cause  is  prior  to  the  effect,  but  the  effect 
may  be  known  better  than  the  cause  (cf.  p.  116.).    The  chief 
instrument  of  induction  is  analysis;  of  deduction,  synthesis. 

2.  Analysis  and  Synthesis.  —  By  analysis  (re-solutio)  is  meant  a 
decomposing,  a  passing  from  the  more  complex  to  the  simpler. 
By  synthesis  (com-positio)  is  meant  a  putting  together,  a  passing 
from  the  simpler  to  the  more  complex.     The  whole  which  is  decom- 
posed by  analysis,  and  the  parts  that  are  put  together  by  synthesis, 
are  to  be  understood,  not  according  to  extension,  but  according  to 
comprehension.    Thus  the  human  organism  is  more  complex  than 
a  single  organ,  since  it  includes  this  organ,  and  others  besides.   The 
fact  is  more  complex  than  the  law,  since  it  is  a  concrete  appli- 
cation of  the  law,  i.e.  it  is  the  law  plus  some  individual  determina- 
tions.   In  general,  analysis  proceeds  from  the  conditioned  to  the 
condition;  synthesis,  from  the  condition  to  the  conditioned. 

(a)  In  the  case  of  facts  or  of  concrete  realities,  analysis  reduces 
the  whole  to  its  parts  or  components;  either  really,  as,  for  instance, 
water  to  oxygen  and  hydrogen;  white  light  to  the  colors  of  the 
spectrum;  the  organism,  plant  or  animal,  to  its  organs,  tissues, 
etc.;  or  mentally,  as,  for  instance,  in  psychology  we  have  tried  to 
analyze  the  complex  mental  states  into  their  elements  which  do 
not  exist  separately  as  simple.     Synthesis  proceeds  in  the  opposite 
direction. 

(b)  In  the  case  of  ideas  or  mental  truths,  e.g.  in  mathematics, 
analysis  proceeds  from  a  more  complex  to  a  more  simple  statement 
until  known  principles  are  reached.     Synthesis  starts  from  the 
principles,  and  deduces  consequences  from  them.    Thus  when  I 
consider  the  theorem  "The  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  is  equal 
to  two  right  angles,"  I  may  ascend  from  it  to  simpler  principles 


INDUCTION    AND     DEDUCTION  251 

(analysis),  or,  as  is  commonly  done  in  learning  geometry,  descend 
toward  it  from  the  simpler  principles  (synthesis). 

I.  INDUCTION 

We  do  not  speak  here  of  complete  induction,  or  induction  per 
enumerationem  simplicem,  which  consists  in  affirming  of  the 
whole  in  the  conclusion  that  which  has  been  affirmed  of  all  the 
parts  enumerated  separately  in  the  premises.  E.g.  "It  rained 
Sunday,  Monday,  Tuesday  .  .  .  and  Saturday;  but  these  are  all 
the  days  of  the  week;  therefore  it  rained  every  day  of  the 
week."  "Peter,  Paul,  John  ...  are  under  thirty;  but  Peter, 
Paul,  John  .  .  .  are  all  the  men  here  present;  therefore  .  .  .  ." 
Such  an  induction  is  not  scientific,  and  leads  to  no  new  result.  It 
is  a  mere  process  of  addition  based  on  the  principle  that  the  total- 
ity equals  the  sum  of  its  parts.  We  speak  only  of  incomplete  in- 
duction, e.g.  "This  water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen; 
therefore  all  water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen." 

i.  Description  of  the  Inductive  Process.  — The  inductive  proc- 
ess includes  three  steps:  knowledge  of  individual  facts,  generaliza- 
tion, verification. 

(a)  The  knowledge  of  facts,  internal  or  external,  is  acquired  by 
observation  and  experiment.  Experiment  is  a  special  mode  of, 
and  includes,  observation.  To  observe  is  to  watch  attentively 
phenomena  as  they  occur  in  nature  when  it  is  left  to  itself.  To 
experiment  is  to  question  nature.  It  consists  in  varying  and  con- 
trolling circumstances  so  as  to  see  what  results  will  follow.  When- 
ever possible,  experiment  is  superior  to  simple  observation,  because 
it  creates  circumstances,  and  consequently  results  which  other- 
wise might  never  occur.  I  may  simply  observe  the  behavior  of 
an  animal,  or  experiment  with  drugs  to  see  how  the  animal's  be- 
havior will  be  affected  by  them.  Observation  and  experiment 
are  very  important.  If  the  facts  are  not  observed  correctly,  the 
theory  based  on  them  cannot  fail  to  be  weak  for  lack  of  sufficient 
foundation. 

The  qualities  required  are:  (i)  On  the  object's  side  (a)  precision 
as  to  the  circumstances;  (b)  the  variation  of  these  circumstances 
in  a  precise  manner;  (c)  the  isolation,  as  far  as  possible,  of  the 


252  LOGIC 

phenomenon  under  observation  from  other  phenomena.  (2)  On  the 
observer's  side,  (a)  physiological  and  physical  conditions:  health  and 
normal  state  of  organs;  use  of  good  instruments;  (b)  intellectual: 
attention  to  all  circumstances  and  to  analogies;  desire  to  know; 
(c)  moral:  patience,  impartiality,  carefulness  to  discriminate  accu- 
rately between  what  is  observed  and  what  is  inferred,  between 
what  is  really  perceived  and  what  is  imagined. 

(b)  When  a  fact  or  a  sufficient  number  of  facts  have  been  ob- 
served, their  uniformities  are  noted,  and  their  laws  assigned,  first 
generally  in  a  tentative  way. 

(c)  The  theory  must  be  verified  by  new  observations  and  exper- 
iments. 

2.  Methods  of  Induction.  —  Observation  ?.nd  experiment  are 
made  according  to  four  methods  known  as  the  four  inductive 
methods.  All  inductions,  both  in  science  and  in  daily  life,  depend 
on  the  use  of  one  or  several  of  these  methods  by  which  experience 
is  interpreted. 

(a)  Method  of  agreement.    When  a  phenomenon  occurs  in  two 
or  several  cases  which  agree  only  in  one  circumstance,  this  circum- 
stance is  probably  the  cause  of,  or  at  least  causally  related  to,  the 
phenomenon.    In  other  words,  if,  in  several  instances  where  a 
phenomenon  occurs,  there  is  only  one  common  antecedent,  this 
antecedent  is  the  cause.    The  value  of  the  conclusion  depends  on 
the  constancy  and  multiplicity  of  coincidences  under  varying 
circumstances.    Thus,  if  after  eating  a  certain  food  —  whatever 
other  food  I  may  also  take  with  it  —  I  invariably  feel  sick,  this 
article  of  food  is  very  likely  the  cause  of  my  sickness. 

(b)  Method  of  difference.    Two  or  several  instances  are  observed, 
one  in  which  the  phenomenon  occurs,  and  the  others  in  which  it 
does  not.    If  all  the  circumstances  except  one  are  the  same  in 
all  cases,  this  one  circumstance  is  probably  the  cause.    In  other 
words,  the  one  difference  in  the  antecedent  is  the  cause  of  the  dif- 
ference in  the  result.    Thus  sickness  or  death  is  ascribed  to  a  cer- 
tain poison  because,  everything  else  being  identical,  the  taking  of 
the  poison  is  followed  by  ackness  or  death. 

N.B.  The  joint  method  of  agreement  and  difference  combines 
these  two  methods. 


INDUCTION    AND    DEDUCTION  253 

(c)  Method  of  residues.    It  is  a  modification  of  the  method  of 
difference.    When  in  a  group  of  consequents,  a,  bt  c,  d,  some,  for 
instance,  a,  b,  c,  are  known  to  be  due  to  certain  antecedents  A,  B, 
C,  the  residual  consequent  d  is  probably  caused  by  a  residual 
antecedent  D.    If  I  have  bought  three  articles,  a,  b,  c,  and  know 
how  much  I  have  spent  in  all  and  how  much  a  and  b  cost,  I  can  find 
the  cost  of  c.    Knowing  what  effects  are  due  to  the  presence  of 
certain  elements  in  a  compound,  a  new  effect  is  ascribed  to  the 
presence  of  a  new  element. 

(d)  Method  of  concomitant  variations.    If  variations  of  a  phe- 
nomenon occur  simultaneously  with  variations  in  the  antecedent, 
it  is  probable  that  these  two  variations  are  causally  related.    Thus 
the  concomitant  variations  of  the  number  of  vibrations  with  the 
pitch  of  a  sound,  or  of  the  thermometer  with  the  temperature, 
show  that  these  phenomena  are  causally  related. 

N.B.  As  much  as  possible  these  methods  must  be  used  to- 
gether to  test,  correct,  verify,  and  strengthen  one  another.  The 
experiments  in  each  must  be  varied  and  multiplied  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  case. 

3.  The  Principle  of  Induction.  —  (a)  In  induction,  the  conclu- 
sion has  a  greater  extension  than  the  premises,  since  from  observed 
particular  instances  a  general  conclusion  is  drawn  applying  to  un- 
observed instances.  If  the  process  is  valid,  there  must  be  some 
principle  that  makes  this  passage  legitimate.  Observation  and 
experiment  are  always  limited  to  few  cases,  and,  by  themselves, 
justify  only  the  affirmation  of  the  facts  observed.  Nor  is  the 
association  of  ideas  sufficient  to  justify  this  passage. 

According  to  associationists,  as  mentioned  in  Psychology  (p. 
113),  because  several  times  a  man  has  observed  that  the  same  ante- 
cedents were  followed  by  the  same  consequents,  he  is  led  to  expect 
this  succession  in  every  case.  Little  by  little  these  associations 
and  partial  uniformities  lead  to  the  formation  by  the  mind  of  the 
general  principle  of  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature:  "Nature 
always  acts  in  the  same  manner  under  the  same  circumstances." 
In  addition  to  its  psychological  difficulties,  this  view  is  open  to 
the  following  objections:  (i)  This  principle  would  have  only  a 
subjective  and  relative  value;  it  could  be  changed  by  subsequent 


254  LOGIC 

experiences  and  habits.  (2)  A  law  is  frequently  discovered  after 
one  observation,  or  very  few  observations,  and  hence  not  through 
constant  associations.  On  the  contrary,  sometimes  induction 
corrects  long-standing  prejudices  due  to  associations  and  habits 
of  thought.  (3)  The  number  of  cases  in  which  constant  uniform- 
ities are  perceived  by  the  senses  is  very  small  when  compared  to 
the  number  of  cases  in  which  they  are  not  observed. 

(b)  Some  other  criterion  is  needed  since  experience  can  never 
account  for  the  universality  and  necessity  of  knowledge.  In  fact, 
the  principle  of  induction  is  the  principle  of  the  uniformity  of  nature: 
"The  same  causes  produce  the  same  effects,"  or  "Causal  relations 
are  constant,"  or  "Nature  is  governed  by  constant  laws."  This 
principle  is  not  derived  from  mere  sense  association,  but  rests  imme- 
diately on  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  which  in  turn  is  but  an 
application  of  the  principle  of  contradiction.  Not  only  does  every 
single  fact  require  a  sufficient  reason  without  which  it  could  not 
occur,  but  a  series  of  coincidences,  or  harmonious  and  constant 
occurrences,  must  be  assigned  an  adequate  reason.  A  single  fact 
requires  a  proportionate  cause.  The  recurrence  of  the  same  fact 
requires  the  sameness  of  natural  inclination  and  of  energy,  which 
alone  can  explain  the  observed  uniformities,  and  from  which  we 
are  led  to  know  future  and  unobserved  uniformities.  Wherever 
there  is  the  same  nature,  i.e.  the  same  source  of  activity,  there 
also  the  same  effects  will  necessarily  occur. 

II.  DEDUCTION 

i.  Description  of  the  Deductive  Process.  —  (a)  Deduction 
starts  from  principles,  and  goes  to  their  special  applications.  These 
principles  may  either  be  self-evident,  like  the  axioms  and  defini- 
tions of  geometry,  or  result  from  a  previous  inductive  process,  like 
the  various  laws  of  natural  sciences.  Deduction  is  used  especially 
in  abstract  sciences,  the  best  types  of  which  are  mathematics  and 
geometry.  In  physical  sciences  it  is  used  to  demonstrate  that 
which  has  been  found  to  be  the  truth.  The  professor  may  some- 
tunes  proceed  deductively  in  proving  what  he  has  discovered  by 
induction.  Generally  speaking,  however,  the  method  of  demon- 
stration should  be  essentially  the  same  as  the  method  of  invention. 


INDUCTION    AND    DEDUCTION  255 

(b)  Deduction  includes  three  steps:  (i)  Definition,  i.e.  the  unfold- 
ing of  the  intension  of  the  terms,  and  the  indication  of  the  exact 
meaning  in  which  they  are  used.  (2)  Division,  i.e.  the  unfolding 
of  the  extension  of  the  terms,  and  classification.  (3)  Proof,  i.e. 
the  assigning  of  the  reasons,  or  demonstration  proper. 

2.  Utility  of  Deduction.  —  Two  main  objections  are  raised  by 
Stuart  Mill  against  the  usefulness  of  the  deductive  syllogism. 

(a)  It  is  sterile,  and  teaches  nothing  new,  since  the  major  already 
contains  the  conclusion.    In  the  following  syllogism,  "All  men  are 
mortal;  Socrates  is  a  man;  therefore  Socrates  is  mortal,"  in  order  to 
be  able  to  affirm  the  major,  I  must  already  be  certain  of  the  conclu- 
sion, for,  the  major  would  not  be  true  if  Socrates  were  not  mortal. 

Answer:  (i)  The  conclusion  may  be  contained  only  virtually 
and  implicitly  in  the  premises.  The  syllogistic  process  makes 
it  explicit.  Who  can  say  that  deduction  is  sterile  in  geometry, 
and  that  he  who  knows  the  principles  knows  also  all  the  theorems 
which  these  principles  serve  to  prove?  (2)  Deduction  teaches  the 
reason  why  the  conclusion  is  true.  I  might  know  that  Socrates 
was  mortal  because  in  fact  he  died,  that  the  number  275  is 
divisible  by  5  because  I  have  tried  the  division,  and  that  the 
square  built  on  the  hypothenuse  of  a  right-angled  triangle  is 
equal  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  built  on  both  its  sides  because 
I  have  measured  them.  But  demonstration  will  give  me  the 
reason  of  these  truths,  show  not  only  that  they  are  so,  but  why 
they  are  so,  and  why  they  are  universal. 

(b)  The  syllogism  is  a  petitio  principii;  in  affirming  the  major 
we  already  suppose  the  truth  of  the  conclusion. 

Answer,  (i)  In  the  example  given  by  Mill,  the  major  is  not 
taken  extensively,  but  comprehensively.  "All  men  are  mortal" 
does  not  mean  primarily  "All  men  numerically  are  mortal,"  but 
"mortal"  belongs  to  the  comprehension  of  "man,"  or  "Human 
nature  implies  mortality,"  an  assertion  which  is  based  on  the 
knowledge  of  human  nature  acquired  by  an  inductive  process. 
(2)  Hence  induction  does  not  require  the  complete  enumeration 
of  all  cases. 

(c)  Mill  also  says  that,  in  fact,  we  do  not  argue  from  the  general 
to  the  individual,  but  from  the  individual  to  the  individual.    For 


256  LOGIC 

instance,  a  matron  unhesitatingly  prescribes  a  remedy  for  her 
neighbor's  child  simply  because  it  has  cured  her  own  child. 

Answer.  Universal  principles  are  implied  here;  that  the  same 
symptoms  are  signs  of  the  same  disease;  and  that  what  has  cured 
the  disease  in  one  case  is  likely  to  cure  it  in  all  cases.  The  matron 
would  give  the  same  advice  to  anybody  else,  thus  showing  that, 
in  the  case  of  her  neighbor's  child,  she  only  applies  a  general 
principle. 

3.  Induction  and  Deduction  Compared.  —  In  conclusion  we 
may  briefly  compare  the  uses  of  induction  and  of  deduction. 

(a)  Induction  gives  to  deduction  many  of  its  principles.    It  is 
the  main  method  of  the  sciences  of  nature.    But  with  the  progress 
of  sciences,  more  laws  are  discovered,  and  deduction  of  particular 
instances  from  these  known  laws  is  more  frequent. 

(b)  Deduction  is  necessary  even  in  the  inductive  process.    It  is 
by  deduction  that  hypotheses  are  verified,  and  laws  applied  to 
particular  cases. 

(c)  Some  sciences  are  chiefly  deductive;  others,  chiefly  induc- 
tive; others,  like  politics,  political  economy,  ethics,  make  frequent 
use  of  both  processes.    Thus  I  may  demonstrate  the  advantages 
of  a  certain  form  of  government  either  from  facts  or  from  principles. 

N.B.  Find  concrete  applications  of  these  methods  hi  the 
sciences  which  you  have  studied. 

III.    OBSTACLES 

Besides  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  problems  themselves,  the 
main  obstacles  met  with  in  an  investigation  are  fallacies,  which, 
together  with  other  causes  to  be  mentioned  later,  are  sources  of 
error.  As  to  controversy,  contradiction,  and  discussion,  they  may 
also  be  obstacles,  or  may  become  great  helps,  according  to  the  use 
which  is  made  of  them. 

I.  FALLACIES 

i.  Nature  of  Fallacies.  —  (a)  A  fallacy  (fallacia,  fallere,  to 
deceive)  is  an  erroneous  argument,  or  a  reasoning  which,  for  some 
reason,  fails  to  lead  to  a  valid  conclusion.  The  term  "fallacy"  is 
more  general  than  the  terms  "paralogism"  and  "sophism."  A 


OBSTACLES  257 

paralogism  supposes  in  the  logical  form  of  the  reasoning  a  defect 
which  is  apt  to  deceive  the  reasoner  himself.  As  generally  used, 
the  term  sophism,  and  its  derivatives,  have  an  ethical  implication, 
namely,  that  the  reasoner  is  aware  of  the  weakness  of  the  argu- 
ment, but  nevertheless  uses  it  with  an  intention  to  deceive. 

(b)  It  is  difficult  to  give  a  satisfactory  classification  of  fallacies. 
The  following,  though  imperfect,  is  sufficient  for  the  present  prac- 
tical purpose. 


Fallacy 


(i)  of  simple  inspection,  or  a  priori 


(2)  of  inference 


(a)  logical  or  formal 


purely  logical  and  formal 


semilogical,  verbal,  or  in  dic- 

tione 

(&)  real  or  material,  or  extra  dictionem 
(c)  special  fallacies  of  induction 

2.  Fallacies  of  Simple  Inspection,  or  a  priori  fallacies,  in 
general  consist  in  the  acceptance  of  certain  principles,  maxims, 
and  generalizations  without  sufficient  evidence.  By  some  these 
fallacies  are  said  to  be  wholly  a  priori,  i.e.  accepted  without  any 
reasoning.  It  seems  truer,  at  least  in  most  cases,  to  say  that 
such  principles  are  accepted  on  the  strength  of  an  implicit  reason- 
ing, hasty  and  insufficient  induction,  or  common  acceptance  and 
authority.  They  are  looked  upon  as  self-evident  and  as  requiring 
no  proof,  and  many  inferences  are  based  on  them. 

Many  are  popular,  like  omens,  the  interpretation  of  dreams, 
prognostics,  superstitions,  lucky  or  unlucky  days  or  numbers, 
prejudices,  etc.  They  are  found  in  the  most  ordinary  assents  of 
daily  life,  and  in  the  highest  pursuits  like  religion  and  morality. 
Others  have  a  higher  character  in  science,  philosophy,  and  religion, 
like  such  ambiguous  principles  as:  "All  men  are  born  equal;" 
"Progress  and  evolution  are  the  law  of  nature";  "Man  is  essen- 
tially truthful";  "Nature  and  the  supernatural  cannot  meet"; 
"All  religions  are  equally  good";  "It  is  enough  for  man  to  live 
honestly";  and  a  multitude  of  other  maxims  either  admitted 
almost  universally  or  special  to  a  certain  region  or  class  of  men. 
To  avoid  them  it  is  necessary  to  exercise  constant  watchfulness. 
Because  they  are  common  to  all  or  to  many,  and  because  they 
18 


258  LOGIC 

are  habitual,  they  attract  no  attention.  Yet  they  need  to  be 
explained,  tested,  and  verified.  Observe  the  conversation  of 
certain  persons,  and  see  how  many  principles  of  this  kind  are 
appealed  to.  (Cf.  p.  118  ff.) 

3.  The  Formal  or  Purely  Logical  Fallacies  are  those  which 
result  from  violating  any  of  the  logical  rules  of  propositions  and 
reasonings.    The  most  frequent  are:  (i)  In  immediate  inferences: 
the  confusion  of  contrary  and  contradictory  terms  and  proposi- 
tions;  the  violation  of  the  rules  of  opposition,  conversion,  and 
contraposition.      (2)   In  mediate  inferences:   the   fallacy  of   four 
terms,  of  undistributed  middle,  of  the  illicit  process  or  undue 
extension  of   either  the  major  or  the  minor  term,  of  negative 
premises,  and  of  the  consequent,  i.e.  the  violation  of  the  rules  of 
hypothetical  syllogisms. 

4.  Verbal  Fallacies — fallacies  in  dictione,  or  fallacies  of  language 
—  arise  from  the  use  of    terms.    They  include  a  defect  in  the 
form  of  the  syllogism,  and  consequently  a  violation  of  its  rules, 
but  this  defect  comes  from  the  matter,  that  is,  from  the  terms 
which  are  used.    Hence  they  are  also  called  semilogical  fallacies. 
The  most  important  are: 

(a)  Amphibology,  or  the  use  of  ambiguous  grammatical  struct- 
ures and  sentences,  e.g.  "The  noble  hound  the  wolf  hath  slain," 
or  this  sign  at  the  entrance  of  a  store:   "Why  go  elsewhere  to  be 
cheated?    Come  in  here." 

(b)  Equivocation,  or  the  use  of  a  term  —  more  frequently  of 
the  middle  term  —  in  two  senses,  so  that  the  syllogism  has  really 
four  terms:    "What  produces  intoxication  is  evil,  and  should  be 
prohibited;    the  use  of  alcoholic  liquors  produces  intoxication; 
therefore  it  should  be  prohibited."    Distinctions  should  be  made 
between  the  various  alcoholic  beverages,  their  various  uses,  and 
the  various  circumstances  in  which  they  may  be  used. 

(c)  Composition,  or  affirming  of  the  totality  that  which  is  true 
only  of  the  parts  taken  distributively;  "All  the  angles  of  a  triangle 
are  less  than  two  right  angles  "  is  true  of  any  angle  taken  separately, 
not  of  their  sum. 

(d)  Division,  or  affirming  of  the  parts  distributively  that  which 
is  true  only  of  the  totality.     "All  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal 


OBSTACLES  259 

to  two  right  angles  "  is  true  of  the  totality,  not  of  any  one  angle. 
From  the  collective  vote,  i.e.  the  vote  of  the  majority  of  Congress, 
or  from  the  verdict  of  a  jury,  I  cannot  infer  the  votes  of  the 
various  members  taken  individually. 

(e)  Accent,  or  the  ambiguity  arising  from  the  difference  in  the 
stress  laid  on  a  particular  syllable  of  a  word,  or  on  a  special  word 
in  the  sentence. 

5.  Real  Fallacies  —  fallacies  extra  dictionem,  or  material  fal- 
lacies —  depend  not  so  much  on  the  form  as  on  the  matter  of 
the  syllogism.  Hence  they  suppose  the  knowledge,  not  only 
of  the  rules  of  syllogism,  but  also  of  the  subject  with  which 
the  syllogism  deals. 

(a)  The  fallacy  of  accident  —  a  dicto  simpliciter  ad  dictum 
secundum  quid  —  consists  in  the  erroneous  inference  of  a  special 
or  conditional  statement  from  a  general  and  unconditional  state- 
ment. "  In  a  republican  government,  subjects  have  the  right  to 
vote;  criminals  are  subjects;  therefore  they  have  the  right  to  vote." 

(6)  The  converse  fallacy  of  accident  —  a  dicto  secundum  quid  ad 
dictum  simpliciter  —  is  the  reverse  of  the  preceding.  "We  must 
avoid  intoxication;  wine  produces  intoxication  ;  therefore  we  must 
not  drink  wine."  Only  a  certain  use,  or  rather  abuse,  of  wine 
produces  intoxication. 

(c)  Begging  the  question  —  petitio  principii  —  is  a  fallacy  in 
which  the  truth  of  the  conclusion  itself  is  presupposed  in  the 
premises,  that  which  is  to  be  proved  being  assumed  as  the  very 
ground  of  proof.    This  occurs  frequently  when  the  principle  of 
proof  is  a  popular  axiom  accepted  a  priori  and  without  question- 
ing.    "Nothing  exists  but  what  the  senses  can  perceive;    the 
senses  cannot  perceive  God;  therefore  God  does  not  exist."    The 
major  cannot  be  true  unless  we  already  suppose  the  conclusion 
that  an  invisible  God  does  not  exist.    This  fallacy  is  also  called 
circulus  in  probando,  vicious  circle,  or  argument  in  a  circle.    The 
really  identical  propositions  are  generally  separated  by  several 
intermediate  steps,  and  expressed  in  different  forms,  so  that  the 
fallacy  is  not  always  easy  to  detect. 

(d)  Irrelevant  reasoning,  or  evading  the  question  —  ignoratio 
elenchi  —  consists  in  arguing  —  perhaps   validly  —  to  the  wrong 


260  LOGIC 

point;  in  proving  a  conclusion  which  was  not  in  question,  in  such 
a  way  that  the  right  conclusion  seems  to  have  been  proved.  If 
a  man  is  accused  before  the  court,  the  lawyer  may  praise  his 
family,  his  moral  and  civic  virtues  and  qualities,  or  appeal  to 
feelings,  instead  of  proving  that  he  is  not  guilty  of  the  offence  for 
which  he  is  tried.  It  is  the  great  resource  of  those  who  have  a 
weak  cause  to  defend,  and  is  used  in  many  ways. 

6.  Special  Fallacies  of  Induction.  —  (a)  Referring  to  observa- 
tion, (i)  Non-observation  of  instances.  We  are  inclined  to  notice 
affirmative  rather  than  negative  instances,  coincidences  rather 
than  their  absence,  especially  when  they  suit  a  preconceived 
theory.  Or  certain  relevant  facts  or  groups  of  facts  may  be  over- 
looked. (2)  Non-observation  of  circumstances.  One  may  neglect 
the  circumstance  which  is  the  true  cause,  or  which  is  important 
for  the  explanation  of  a  fact.  (3)  Mai-observation,  either  because 
of  the  imperfection  of  the  senses  and  instruments,  or  because  of 
intellectual  dispositions  which  make  man  see  what  he  is  anxious 
to  find,  and  prevent  him  from  seeing  what  he  does  not  want  to 
find.  This  leads  to  the  fallacy  of  the  false  cause  —  non  causa 
pro  causa,  post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc  —  which  considers  as  the  true 
cause  a  fact  or  circumstance  which  is  a  mere  accidental  coinci- 
dence. One  must  always  be  careful  to  distinguish  between 
what  is  really  perceived  or  observed,  and  what  is  inferred  from 
such  observations. 

(b)  False  analogy    and   example,  or  the  exaggeration  of  the 
points  of  likeness  or  difference,  as  "  Ab  uno  disce  omnes.)y 

(c)  The  wrong  application  of  inductive  methods;  hastiness;   the 
exaggeration  of  the  value  of  theories  and  hypotheses. 

II.  ERROR 

i.  Causes.  —  Error  is  a  false  judgment.  Its  mam  causes  may 
be  assigned  as  follows: 

(a)  External  causes,  (i)  In  the  object:  The  difficulty  and 
complexity  of  the  object  under  investigation.  Hence  the  neces- 
sity of  a  long,  complex,  and  manifold  process  of  inference  at  any 
step  of  which  error  may  creep  in  and  vitiate  all  subsequent  results. 
(2)  In  the  means  used  to  reach  the  object:  The  reliance  on  incompe- 


OBSTACLES  261 

tent  authority  and  on  customary  views;  language,  which  may  be 
ambiguous,  and  hence  a  source  of  many  misunderstandings;  the 
impossibility  of  reaching  the  same  certitude  and  of  using  the  same 
methods  in  all  sciences. 

(b)  Internal  or  subjective  causes  (see  Psychology),  (i)  Intel- 
lectual: (a)  In  general,  the  weakness  and  fallibility  of  the  human 
mind;  its  dependence  on  organic  conditions;  preconceived  ideas, 
prejudices,  and  intellectual  surroundings;  education  and  the  result- 
ing habits  of  thought,  (b)  In  a  more  special  manner,  the  senses 
and  imagination  which  should  be,  but  are  not  always,  guided 
by  the  understanding;  the  defects  of  memory,  forgetfulness  and 
inaccurate  memory;  the  lack  of  attention  and  of  the  power  of 
observation  and  inference;  irreflection  and  hastiness  in  judging 
things  and  persons.  (2)  Moral:  In  general,  the  passions,  which 
prevent  us  from  seeing  things  in  their  true  light;  especially  pride 
and  exaggerated  self-confidence,  which  cause  a  man  to  affirm  or 
deny  rashly,  and  make  him  loath  to  abandon  a  position  once  he  has 
taken  it;  love  and  hatred,  that  make  him  exaggerate  or  mini- 
mize; the  will,  in  things  that  are  practical;  the  desire  to  prove 
instead  of  investigating,  owing  to  which  the  value  of  reasons  is 
overestimated,  and  facts  are  adapted  so  as  to  fit  in  with  a  pre- 
conceived theory. 

2.  Remedies.  — The  main  remedies  of  error  are  easily  inferred 
from  what  has  just  been  outlined  concerning  its  causes,  (i)  Try 
to  apply  the  rules  of  logic,  both  of  induction  and  deduction.  Use 
definitions  and  divisions.  (2)  Pay  attention  to  the  validity  of 
every  step  you  take.  (3)  Without  falling  into  scepticism,  be 
careful  in  receiving  information  from  others,  and  be  not  always 
ready  to  swear  by  it.  In  matters  where  proofs  are  possible  and 
where  you  can  appreciate  them,  ask  for  them.  Always  examine 
the  value  of  a  testimony  before  you  accept  it.  (4)  Acquire  habits 
of  reflection,  calmness  of  judgment,  steadiness  and  seriousness  of 
study.  They  are  indispensable  to  success.  (5)  Endeavor  to 
develop  intellectual  feelings,  especially  a  great  disinterestedness 
and  a  sincere  love  of  truth. 


CONCLUSION 

Main  Rules  to  be  Observed  in  Controversies  and  Discussions.  — 
Discussions  arise  from  the  diversity  of  opinions.  They  are  very 
useful  when  carried  on  with  the  proper  spirit  and  disposition.  But 
in  many  cases,  a  discussion  becomes  a  dispute  and  an  intolerant 
altercation,  in  which  the  purpose  is  not  so  much  to  find  the  truth 
or  inculcate  it  as  to  triumph  over  and  to  down  an  opponent,  cost 
what  may,  and  even  should  the  truth  suffer  thereby.  In  some 
cases,  on  certain  subjects,  or  with  certain  persons,  it  will  be  much 
more  profitable  to  avoid  any  discussion,  because  it  is  sure  to  be 
useless,  and  may  be  harmful.  Some  rules  will  be  stated  to  be 
followed  before,  during,  and  after  a  written  or  oral  discussion. 

i.  Before.  —  "Id  faciam  quod  in  principio  fieri  in  omnibus 
disputationibus  oportere  censeo,  ut  quid  illud  sit  de  quo  disputa- 
tur  explanetur,  ne  vagari  et  errare  cogatur  oratio,  si  ii  qui  inter 
se  dissenserint  non  idem  esse  illud  de  quo  agitur  intelligant" 
(Cicero,  De  Oratore,  I,  c.  48).  This  precept  is  very  prudent,  and, 
if  it  were  always  followed,  many  discussions  would  become  need- 
less. It  often  happens  that,  for  lack  of  previous  understanding, 
two  bitter  opponents  come  to  find  out,  at  the  end,  that  they  fight 
for  almost  the  same  ideas.  Hence  (i)  Ascertain  the  meaning  of  the 
terms,  especially  of  those  that  are  vague  and  ambiguous.  (2) 
Ascertain  the  meaning  of  the  propositions  on  both  sides.  See 
whether  they  are  universal  or  particular,  or  restricted  in  any 
manner,  etc.  (3)  To  avoid  the  ignoratio  elenchi  and  the  petitio 
principii,  see  to  what  school  of  science,  philosophy,  religion,  etc., 
the  adversary  belongs,  so  as  to  start  from  principles  admitted  on 
both  sides.  Against  an  atheist  I  cannot  suppose  the  existence  of 
God.  Against  a  rationalist  I  may  suppose  the  existence  of  God, 
but  I  cannot  argue  from  divine  revelation,  and  so  on  with  other 
classes  of  men.  No  discussion  is  possible  unless  it  is  based  on 
principles  common  to  both  parties. 

262 


RULES     OF     DISCUSSION  263 

2.  During.  —  Logical  and  moral  rules  are  to  be  observed. 

(a)  Logical,   (i)  Take  care  that  all  the  rules  of  logic  are  ob- 
served on  both  sides.     Keep  a  close  watch  on  all  the  facts  brought 
forward  and  on  all  the  principles  used.    Examine  whether  they 
are  clear  and  certain.     (2)   Frequently  facts  and  personal  inter- 
pretation of  facts  are  presented  together  as  one.    Keep  them 
distinct.     (3)   Keep  yourself  and  your  opponent  to  the  point  at 
issue.    A  man  who  feels  the  weakness  of  his  position  frequently 
will  tend  to  shift  the  problem  to  some  other  point,  and  drift  away 
from  the  main  question.     (4)   Avoid,  and  make  your  opponent 
avoid,  verbosity,  that  is,  an  abundant  flow  of  words  making  up 
for  the  paucity  of  ideas.    Hence,  after  a  long  presentation,  sum 
up  the  ideas  expressed,  and  reduce  them  to  stricter  forms  of  syllo- 
gism in  order  to  test  their  value  more  easily.     See  also  that  the 
same  terms  are  always  used  in  the  same  sense.     (5)   When  con- 
tending against  a  view,  beware  of  the  common  tendency  to  go  too 
far,  to  fall  into  the  opposite  extreme,  and  to  try  to  prove  too  much. 
(6)   While  following  the  preceding  recommendations,  avoid  the 
ridicule  of  rigid  formalism  that  wants  to  use  none  but  perfect 
syllogisms,  and  affects  pedantry. 

(b)  Moral,   (i)   Practise   moderation.    Avoid   the   anxiety   to 
make  your  opinion  prevail.    Look  for  light,  not  for  triumph. 
(2)   Avoid  anger  and  impatience.     To  abuse  an  adversary  is 
not  to  prove  the  truth  of  one's  contention;  on  the  contrary,  it  is 
frequently  a  sign  of  weakness.    Truth  stands  in  no  need  of  in- 
jurious and  ungentlemanly  remarks  and  abusive  epithets.    More- 
over, passion  has  for  its  effect  to  blind  the  mind  and  prevent  it 
from  seeing  things  in  their  true  light.     (3)   Avoid  intolerance. 
All  men  are  fallible.     Practise  the  great  principle:    "In  dubiis 
libertas."    Do  not  try  to  impose  your  view  simply  because  it  is 
yours,  but  because  you  are  convinced  that  it  is  true.     (4)  Honesty 
and  fairness  must  be  practised   all  the  time.     It  is  always  dis- 
honest knowingly  to  use  inaccurate  statements  or  distorted  facts 
in  order  to  prove  one's  contention.    It  is  the  more  so  when  arguing 
against  uneducated  persons,  who  cannot  see  the  falsity  of  such 
assumptions,  and  are  more  easily  misled. 

3.  After.  —  (a)   If  victorious,  practise  modesty.     Nothing  is 


264  LOGIC 

more  cowardly  than  to  abuse  a  defeated  opponent.  Arrogance  is 
a  sign  of  conceit,  and  indicates  that  a  man  loves  his  own  satis- 
faction more  than  the  truth,  (b)  Be  not  depressed  by  defeat, 
and  be  honest  enough  to  accept  the  truth.  Always  remember 
Cicero's  maxim:  "Cuiusvis  hominis  est  errare,  nullius  nisi  insipi- 
entis  in  errore  perseverare  "  (Philipp.  XII,  c.  2). 


AESTHETICS  OR  THE    NORMATIVE 

SCIENCE    OF  THE    FEELINGS 

OF   THE    BEAUTIFUL 


INTRODUCTION 

I.  WHAT  is  ^ESTHETICS? 

1.  The     term     "^Esthetics."  —  Etymologically,     "aesthetics" 
(cu'sflijTiKi},  from  alMvofjMi ,  to  perceive)  is  an  adjective  form  now 
used  substantively,  and  indicates  that  which  has  reference  to 
sensation  or  perception.    Its  meaning  has  been  narrowed  down 
to  a  special  kind  of  feelings  or  sentiments,  namely  those  originating 
from  the  perception  of  beauty.     As   an  adjective,  "  aesthetic  " 
has  either  a  subjective  or  an  objective  meaning.     We  speak  of 
an  aesthetic  taste,  i.e.  a  just  and  keen  appreciation  or  judgment 
of  beauty;   and  we  also  speak  of  a  thing  as  being  more  or  less 
aesthetic.     As   a  substantive,    "aesthetic,"   or    more    frequently 
"aesthetics,"  is  objective,  and  includes  the  science  of  beauty,  the 
rules  of  taste  and  of  art.    It  is  the  normative  science  of  the  cesthetic 
feelings. 

2.  ^Esthetic  Feelings.  —  If    we  examine  the    whole  group  of 
mental  states  known  as  feelings  or  the  affective  life,  we  find  that 
the  feelings  proper  —  pleasure  and  pain  —  cannot  be  assigned 
any  special  norm.    Experience  and  association  manifest  which 
things  or  uses  of  things  are  pleasurable,  and  which  are  painful. 
All  that  can  be  done  is  to  seek  the  former  and  avoid  the  latter. 
To  a  great  extent  emotions  are  also  subjective.     In  so  far  as  they 
can  be  controlled  and  governed,  they  fall  under  the  rules  of  morality, 
politeness,  decency,  sociability,  etc.    Besides  these  general  norms, 

265 


266  AESTHETICS 

no  other  can  be  assigned  to  either  self-regarding  or  altruistic  emo- 
tions.   The  will  to  subdue  them  if  they  are  wrong  or  excessive, 
and  the  will  to  acquire  them  if  they  are  good  and  lacking;  in  every 
case,  the  will  to  control  them  —  as  explained  in  psychology  - 
is  about  the  only  rule  that  can  be  given  for  this  class  of  feelings. 

Intellectual,  moral,  and  religious  sentiments  must  be  governed  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  logic,  ethics,  and  religion. 

There  remain  therefore  the  aesthetic  feelings  which  require  a 
special  treatment  here,  but  which  can  be  allowed  but  a  few  pages 
in  this  elementary  course. 

3.  The  Science  of  Esthetics.  —  ^Esthetics  is  the  science  which 
tries  to  determine  the  conditions  of  beauty,  to  analyze  the  elements 
that  constitute  it  and  enable  it  to  produce  aesthetic  feelings. 
Beauty  may  be  natural  or  artificial;  aesthetics  deals  with  both. 
Because  tastes  and  appreciations  differ,  it  has  been  said  that 
aesthetics  cannot  be  a  science,  and  that  no  rules  Can  be  given  for 
aesthetic  feelings.  But  the  fact  that,  notwithstanding  many 
divergences,  there  are  certain  objects  which  practically  all  men 
agree  in  finding  beautiful,  and  others  which  all  agree  in  finding 
ugly,  shows  that  there  must  be  some  reason  in  the  subject,  or  in 
the  object,  or  in  both,  for  this  uniformity.  Moreover,  without 
considering  how  other  individuals  are  affected,  I  find  different 
types  of  beauty,  and  I  may  ask  in  what  respect  those  different 
objects  —  a  piece  of  music,  a  statue,  a  building,  a  person,  a  poem, 
etc.  —  agree  so  as  to  deserve  the  common  adjective  "beautiful" 
which  I  apply  to  them.  Undoubtedly  there  is  a  science  of  the 
beautiful.  Even  if  conclusions  are  not  always  clear  and  cogent, 
there  are  reasons  accounting  for  the  aesthetic  feeling.  Esthetics 
is  not  a  strict  science  like  mathematics  or  even  like  physics.  The 
rules  of  art  cannot  compare  with  the  laws  of  chemical  combina- 
tion. Yet  certain  principles  must  be  observed,  although  they 
may  be  applied  differently,  and  much  is  left  to  individual  con- 
ception and  interpretation. 

II.  THE  PLACE  OF  ^ESTHETICS 

The  object  of  logic  is  the  true,  that  of  ethics,  the  moral  good, 
that  of  aesthetics,  the  beautiful.  Logic  is  the  normative  science 


NATURE     OF    .ESTHETICS  267 

of  the  intellect,  ethics,  of  the  will,  aesthetics,  of  the  feelings  of  the 
beautiful.  This  leads  us  to  inquire  into  the  relations  of  the  beau- 
tiful with  the  true  and  the  good. 

i.  Relations  Between  Beauty  and  Truth.  —  (a)  Beauty  can- 
not be  identified  with  truth.  Some  beautiful  things,  like  poetry, 
romance  ...  are  not  true,  but  fictitious.  Others,  without  being 
fictitious,  cannot  be  called  true,  e.g.  music.  On  the  other  hand, 
some  truths  are  not  beautiful,  or  may  be  positively  ugly.  We 
do  not  find  any  beauty  in  the  truths  "four  and  four  are  eight "; 
"the  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points"; 
"it  rained  yesterday  ";  "John  Smith  died  last  week,"  etc. 

(b)  Yet  there  are  relations  between  the  true  and  the  beautiful, 
(i)  That  which  is  false,  unlikely,  and  unnatural  is  not  beautiful. 
A  picture  in  which  the  proportions  are  not  kept,  a  novel  in  which 
events  appear  impossible  or  unlikely,  produce  a  disagreeable  im- 
pression. A  statue  or  drawing  with  certain  defects  and  depart- 
ures from  nature  will  be  pronounced  ugly,  etc. 

(2)  Many  truths  of  the  intellectual  order,  when  taken  together 
systematically,  are  beautiful  for  those  who  can  understand  and 
penetrate  them.    There  may  be  no  beauty  in  a  geometrical  axiom, 
yet  the  science  of  geometry,  with  its  numerous  deductions,  is  not 
without  beauty.    There  may  be  no  beauty  in  a  single  physical 
conclusion,  e.g.  that  heat  expands  metals,  or  that  matter  attracts 
matter  in  direct  ratio  to  its  mass,  and  in  inverse  ratio  to  the  square 
of  the  distances.    But  certainly  physical  sciences  reveal  the  beauty 
and  harmony  of  the  material  world,  either  in  the  largest  bodies 
(like  astronomy),  or  in  the  smallest  (like  the  science  of  radio- 
activity). 

(3)  The  effort,  success,  and  power  of  certain  minds  in  grasping 
the  truth,  in  passing  from  truth  to  truth  and  in  perceiving  rela- 
tions, is  also  worthy  of  admiration. 

(4)  The  perceived  beauty  of  a  science  is  an  incentive  to  its 
pursuit.    The  man  who^  admires  the  laws  of  nature,  the  marvellous 
structures  of  living  organisms,  etc.,  will  become  more  enthusiastic 
for  the  study  of  physical  and  biological  sciences,  because  every 
new  step  discovers  some  new  harmony  and  some  new  beauty. 

(5)  However,  even  where  the  true  and  the  beautiful  coincide, 


268  ESTHETICS 

the  formal  reason  of  the  true  and  the  formal  reason  of  the  beauti- 
ful are  not  identical,  and  the  effects  produced  on  the  mind  by  these 
two  aspects  are  not  the  same.  I  may  perceive  the  truth  without 
admiring  the  beauty,  or  admire  the  beauty  without  reference  to 
the  truth. 

2.  Relations  Between  Beauty  and  Goodness.  —  Good  means 
(i)  agreeable,  (2)  useful,  (3)  conformable  to  the  rules  of  morality. 

(a)  The  sentiment  of  beauty  is  always  pleasant  and  agreeable, 
but  many  things  are  agreeable  without  being  beautiful.    The 
taste  of  an  apple,  a  walk  in  the  country,  the  smell  of  a  rose,  rest 
after  fatigue,  etc.,  are  agreeable,  yet  not  beautiful.     Beauty  is 
one  special  source  of  pleasure.    An  object  is  not  beautiful  because 
it  is  agreeable;   it  may  be  agreeable  because  it  is  beautiful. 

(b)  The  useful  is  not   always   beautiful;    instruments,   tools, 
clothes,  etc.,  are  useful;   they  frequently  are  not  beautiful.    On 
the  other  hand,  many  beautiful  things  have  no  practical  use  in 
themselves  besides  satisfying  man's  aesthetic  taste  or  giving  him 
some  recreation,  e.g.  a  statue,  a  picture,  a  flower-bed,  etc.    Or 
they  may  be  useful  indirectly  by  reminding  one  of  noble  examples, 
and  inciting  to  follow  them.    It  may  even  happen  that  the  beauty 
of  a  thing  seems  to  make  it  less  useful,  as  certain  architectural 
ornaments,  or  the  hart's  antlers  which  hinder  him.    Even  where 
the  two  coincide  in  the  same  thing,  the  reason  why  it  is  beautiful 
is  not  the  same  as  that  for  which  it  is  useful.    Beauty  is  an  end 
in  which  the  mind  rests  without  looking  beyond.    The  feeling  of 
beauty  is  disinterested  and  stops  at  the  contemplation  and  enjoy- 
ment of  its  object.    Utility  is  essentially  the  quality  of  a  means. 
A  thing  is  not  useful  purely  and  simply;  it  is  useful  for  this  or  that 
end.    A  plain  dress,  a  simple  house  may  be  as  useful  as,  and  even 
more  useful  than,  other  dresses  and  residences  which  are  much 
more  beautiful.    Where  beauty  and  utility  are  combined,  beauty 
is  added  as  something  distinct  from  utility. 

(c)  Not  all  actions  morally  good  are  beautiful.    To  speak  the 
truth,  to  return  a  lost  article  to  its  owner,  to  respect  one's  parents, 
to  give  alms,  are  good  actions  which,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
excite  in  us  no  feelings  of  admiration.    On  the  contrary,  certain 
hideous  characters  in  a  novel  or  a  drama,  moral  monsters,  may 


NATURE     OF    AESTHETICS  269 

contribute  by  contrast  to  foster  the  total  aesthetic  satisfaction. 
But  immorality  as  such  cannot  be  beautiful  either  in  real  life  or 
in  works  of  art. 

The  close  relations  of  beauty  and  morals  were  emphasized  by 
the  Greeks,  who  frequently  put  together  the  beautiful  and  the 
good.  They  speak  of  KoXos  K&ya06s,  or  even  in  one  word 
KoAoKayatfos.  To/caXov  is  frequently  moral  beauty  or  virtue,  and 
in  fact  the  Stoics  identified  the  two.  Without  going  to  this 
extreme,  the  influence  of  artistic  beauty  on  morals  cannot  be 
denied.  The  beautiful,  being  agreeable  and  attractive,  is  a  spring 
of  action.  To  represent  the  immoral  as  beautiful  and  attractive 
is  therefore  morally  wrong.  Art  may  be  of  great  service  in  moral- 
izing, as  is  clear  from  experience,  and  from  the  principles  laid  down 
in  psychology  concerning  the  influence  of  imagination  and  feelings 
on  the  passions,  the  will,  and  the  character.  Art  need  not  always 
be  at  the  service  of  morals,  and  all  works  of  art  need  not  be  under- 
taken for  the  purpose  of  teaching  lessons.  (But  at  least  art  must 
never  be  immoral,  nor  represent  that  which  is  wrong  under  the 
aspect  of  beauty,  j 

By  way  of  comparison  and  elimination,  the  preceding  considera- 
tions have  already  given  some  ideas  concerning  the  nature  of 
beauty.  We  shall  now  proceed  to  a  more  positive  analysis. 


CHAPTER  I 

BEAUTY 

Whatever  is  agreeable  is  not  thereby  beautiful.  Yet  the  aes- 
thetic feeling  is  one  of  the  forms  of  agreeable  feelings.  What  are 
its  special  characteristics?  Both  a  subjective  and  an  objective 
analysis  will  help  in  finding  them. 

I.  SUBJECTIVE  ASPECT 

We  shall  recall  and  complete  what  has  been  said  in  psychology 
on  the  aesthetic  feeling  (p.  155). 

i.  Several  Mental  Factors  contribute  to  produce  aesthetic 
feelings. 

(a)  The  senses  through  which  the  beautiful  object  is  perceived. 
They  are  sight  and  hearing. 

(b)  The  imagination  and,  with  it,  the  association  of  ideas  and 
suggestion.    The  perceived  object  arouses  in  the  mind  images  of 
objects  already  perceived  or  constructed  by  the  imagination,  and 
ideals  formed  by  the  higher  mental  powers.     All  these  give  a 
certain  coloring  to  the  actual  perception.    Hence  the  feeling  of 
beauty  is  the  combined  result  of  the  actual  perception  and  of  the 
images  and  ideals  which  the  object  recalls  or  suggests. 

(c)  The  intellect.    The  object  must  not  only  be  perceived,  but, 
to  some  extent,  understood.     Its  elements  must  be  known  in  their 
mutual  relations.    The  harmonies  of  the  world  are  beautiful  only 
for  those  who  understand  them.    The  intellectual  element  appears 
also  in  the  absolute  judgment  which  every  man,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
has  a  tendency  to  pass  on  the  aesthetic  qualities  of   an  object. 
When  perceived,  beauty  seems  to  have  such  a  character  of  evi- 
dence that  one  is  inclined  to  suffer  no  contradiction  on  this  point. 

(d)  Activity.    What  is  so  simple  and  obvious  as  to  leave  no 
room  for  personal  activity  produces  no  feeling  of  beauty.    This 

270 


BEAUTY  271 

feeling  is  greater  when  the  beauty  is  discovered  little  by  little,  and 
when  it  requires  a  certain  application  to  perceive  it.  If  we  are 
almost  exclusively  passive,  to  glance  rapidly  at  a  painting,  or  to 
listen  distractedly  to  a  musical  composition,  will  produce  little  or 
no  aesthetic  feeling.  A  man  must  work  his  own  way  into  the 
object  in  order  to  grasp  its  inner  beauty. 

2.  Essential  Factor.  —  From  the  preceding  remarks  we  infer 
that  the  feeling  of  beauty  results  from  the  harmonious  activity  of 
several  mental  faculties.    However,    the   fundamental,  or  rather 
essential,  process  seems  to  be  the  understanding  of  the  object,  which 
depends  on  natural    endowments   and   on   aesthetic   education. 
Why  is  it  possible  for  children,  and  even  for  a  number  of  adults, 
to  find  the  music  of  the  street-organ  as  beautiful  as  —  perhaps 
more  beautiful  than  —  the  first-class  performance  of  a  master- 
piece?   Undoubtedly  because  they  cannot  understand  the  latter. 
In  the  same  way  some  will  derive  more  aesthetic  satisfaction  from 
a  ten-cent  picture  with  glaring  colors  than  from  a  real  work  of  art. 
The  aesthetic  feeling  is  greater  in  proportion  as  the  object  is  under- 
stood better  and  as  the  relations  of  its  parts  among  themselves 
and  with  the  totality  are  grasped  and  mastered  more  completely. 

3.  Diversity  of  Esthetic  Judgments.  —  The  diversity  of  these 
individual  factors  in  different  persons  accounts  for  the  diversity 
of    aesthetic    judgments.    Appreciations  vary    with   individuals, 
countries,  races,  degrees  of  civilization,  and  periods  of  time.    With- 
out referring  to  the  caprice  of  fashion  in  dress  and  ornamentation, 
it  is  otherwise  evident  that  tastes  vary.    The  source  of  this  diver- 
sity is  to  be  found  in  the  complexity  of  mental  factors  that  influ- 
ence the  feeling  of  beauty.    Every  individual  has  his  own  ideals 
to  which  he  refers  objects,  and  his  own  images  with  their  different 
associations.    As  a  consequence,  actual  perception  will  arouse 
various  ideas  and  images  in  the  mind.    Education,  surroundings, 
character,  habit,  novelty,  etc.,  will  also  exercise  a  marked  influence 
on  the  aesthetic  judgment. 

II.  OBJECTIVE  CONDITIONS 

Besides  these  subjective  factors,  objective  elements  must 
admitted.      Certain  things  are  beautiful  for  all  men  and  at  all 


272  AESTHETICS 

times,  although  their  beauty  may  not  always  be  fully  appreciated. 
Moreover,  men  are  agreed  that  there  is  a  good  and  a  bad  taste. 
The  possibility  of  developing  the  aesthetic  taste  means  again  that 
there  are  some  rules  for  the  beautiful.  It  was  said  above  that  the 
chief  source  of  aesthetic  pleasure  is  the  understanding;  but  the 
understanding  of  what?  Not  of  the  truth  of  the  object,  since 
the  beautiful  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  true.  There  are 
therefore  other  aspects  in  the  object  which  account  for  the  sub- 
jective feeling.  To  these  we  now  pass. 

/  i.  Three  Conditions  are  Required  in  the  Object:  (i)  Ful- 
lness, perfection,  and  completeness,  (2)  unity  amid  variety,  (3) 
\splendor  and  clearness. 

(a)  To  be  beautiful,  an  object  must  not  lack  any  of  its  essential 
parts,  functions,  or  elements.     //  must  possess  a  certain  perfection, 
completeness,  energy,  and  life,  varying  of  course  with  the  type  to 
which  it  belongs.     Incompleteness  and  deformity  are  always  ugly 
and  displeasing.    The  application  of  this  is  clear  in  the  natural 
order.    See  why  one  horse  is  pronounced  beautiful,  and  another 
not;    why  a  fertile   cornfield,  or  a  forest  with  abundant  vege- 
tation, or  a  high  mountain,  etc.,  are  beautiful,  whereas  the  field 
with  brambles  or  a  few  corn-stalks,  the  small  elevation  and  hill, 
produce  no  such  impression.    We  rather  call  pretty  (not  to  say 
cute)  that  which  is  of  small  proportions.    The  elements  or  aspects 
of  the  whole  object  may  be  considered  apart,  and  found  beautiful, 
e.g.  the  facade  of  an  edifice,  the  face  of  a  hunchback,  etc.,  but  then 
they  are  considered  as  complete  in  themselves.    Again,  and  for 
the  same  reason,  an  ugly  person  may  perform  a  beautiful  action; 
in  an  ordinary  composition  there  may  be  found  beautiful  passages, 
etc.    What  is  true  of  material  objects  is  true  also  of  intellectual 
and  moral  beauty.    It  requires  some  perfection,  power,  or  special 
greatness. 

(b)  Variety  means  a  multiplicity  of  parts,  or  a  successive  change. 
There  is  variety  in  an  edifice  because  it  has  several  parts,  several 
ornaments,  windows,  doors,  columns,  etc.    There  is  variety  in 
poetry  or  in  a  novel  because  different  ideas,  events,  circumstances 

...  are  evolved  successively.    There  is  variety  in  music  because 
there  is  at  the  same  time  a  multiplicity  of  combined  sounds,  and 


BEAUTY  273 

successive  changes  of  sounds,  tempo,  rhythm,  etc.  Generally, 
monotony,  sameness,  and  lack  of  change  are  tedious  and  disagree- 
able. The  variety  and  number  of  parts  must  be  in  proportion  to 
the  nature  of  the  object,  and  must  not  be  exaggerated.  Too 
many  parts,  too  many  successive  changes,  a  superfluity  of  orna- 
ments, decorations,  and  colors  are  also  opposed  to  beauty,  because 
generally  they  are  obstacles  to  the  unity  which  is  also  required. 

It  is  not  enough  to  have  many  elements,  they  must  harmonize 
together  in  some  unity.  Many  disparate  things,  unconnected  parts 
and  incoherent  details,  are  not  beautiful;  there  must  be  symmetry, 
proportion,  order,  and  adaptation.  A  common  centre,  a  unity 
of  action  and  of  plan  are  required  to  prevent  the  attention  from 
being  diffused.  This  harmony  must  be  found  not  only  between 
the  parts  of  the  object,  but  also  between  the  object  and  its  surround- 
ings. A  statue  or  ornament  will  produce  a  different  effect  accord- 
ing to  the  objects  found  around  it.  High-flown  eloquence  is  out 
of  place  in  conversation.  A  beautiful  frame  may  not  be  adapted 
to  a  certain  painting,  etc. 

(c)  Finally,  a  certain  splendor,  neatness,  or  clearness  is  required. 
The  qualities  mentioned  above  must  be  sufficiently  apparent. 
There  must  be  enough  light  to  see  a  picture  or  a  drawing;  its  lines 
and  colors  must  be  visible  without  too  much  strain,  etc.  The 
unity  amid  variety  should  be  perceived  without  too  great  an 
effort  and  tension. 

2.  There  are  Various  Types  of  Beauty.  —  (a)  Ideal  beauty  is 
a  type  or,  as  the  word  itself  indicates,  an  ideal  according  to  which 
beautiful  concrete  objects  are  judged,  or  which  the  artist  strives 
to  realize  and  express.  Real  beauty  is  that  which  is  found  in 
existing  objects.  It  is  more  or  less  perfect  according  as  it  realizes 
more  or  less  completely  the  conceived  ideal. 

(b)  Beauty  is  natural  or  artificial  according  as  it  is  found  in 
nature  without  man's  intervention,  or,  on  the  contrary,  is  the 
work  of  man.    The  sea,  mountains,  animals,  the  songs  or  colors 
of  birds,  are  natural.    Statues,  buildings,  music  .  .  .  are  artificial. 
Man  may  embellish  nature,  and  the  result  is  partly  natural  and 
partly  artificial. 

(c)  Physical  beauty  is  expressed  in  matter;    intellectual  beauty 

19 


274  AESTHETICS 

results  from  the  exercise  of  reason;  moral  beauty  depends  on  the 
mode  of  exercise  of  free  activities. 

(d)  Finally,  we  mention  again  the  distinction  already  explained 
in  psychology  between  the  simply  beautiful,  the  sublime,  and 
the  pretty  (p.  156).  We  need  not  discuss  the  question  whether 
these  objects  produce  more  or  less  intensive  forms  of  the  same 
feeling,  or  specifically  distinct  feelings. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  FINE  ARTS 

I.  NATURE  or  THE  FINE  ARTS 

1.  Meaning  of  Art.  —  In  general,  art  means  a  collection  of  rules 
or  of  activities  necessary  for  the  skilful  production  of  certain  works. 
Art  is  frequently  contrasted  with  nature ,and  artificial  with  natural. 
The  former  is  produced  by  human  activity,  the  latter  without  it. 

Art  is  also  opposed  to  science.  The  fundamental  difference 
between  them  is  that  science  refers  to  knowledge;  art,  to  practice. 
Hence  arise  two  other  points  of  difference,  (i)  True  science  is 
based  on  universal  laws,  and  is  valid  for  all  men  and  at  all  times. 
Art  is  more  personal,  and  more  changeable  according  to  times 
and  places.  (2)  Science  is  acquired  by  study;  art,  chiefly  by 
practice.  Science  also,  it  is  true,  may  have  a  practical  purpose, 
and  in  fact  certain  sciences,  e.g.  logic,  medicine,  etc.,  may  also 
be  arts,  but  the  formal  difference  remains.  As  sciences  they  deal 
with  what  is,  with  the  truth,  and  with  the  reasons  of  things.  As 
arts  they  deal  with  the  production  of  what  does  not  yet  exist, 
with  the  practice  and  the  action.  A  man  may  have  the  com- 
plete science  of  medicine  without  ever  applying  it.  He  knows  the 
causes  and  remedies  of  diseases  without  using  this  knowledge. 
On  the  contrary,  a  man  may  possess  only  the  art  of  medicine.  His 
own  experience  or  that  of  others  may  have  taught  him  the  value 
of  certain  plants  or  remedies  which  he  may  use  to  good  effect 
without  knowing  the  reasons  why  they  are  beneficial. 

2.  Meaning  of  Fine  Arts.  —  Arts  are  divided  into  useful  or 
mechanical,  and  aesthetic  or  fine  arts.    The  former  tend  to  the 
production  of  something  useful;   the  latter  to  the  production  of 
something  beautiful.    The  artisan  will  select  materials  such  as 
wood,  steel,  or  stone  in  order  to  make  something  useful,  a  table, 

275 


276  AESTHETICS 

a  saw,  or  a  house.  This  object  itself  is  destined  to  serve  a  purpose; 
it  is  a  means  to  something  else,  not  an  end  in  itself.  The  artist 
tries  to  produce  something  which  is  an  end  in  itself,  and  not  simply 
a  means.  It  is  often  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  the  two 
because  the  beautiful  is  also  frequently  useful,  e.g.  a  building; 
but,  as  already  indicated,  the  two  aspects  must  be  distinguished. 
From  what  precedes  it  may  be  inferred  that  eloquence  is  not, 
strictly  speaking,  one  of  the  fine  arts,  for  it  aims  at  persuading 
others.  The  same  is  true  of  the  history  of  heroic  deeds,  and  the 
lives  of  the  saints,  which  are  written  for  the  purpose  of  instruction. 
However,  these  may  become  arts  if  the  grace  of  the  gestures,  the 
harmony  of  vocal  inflections,  the  charms  of  the  style  and  composi- 
tion, etc.,  are  intended.  Fine  arts  tend  primarily  to  the  produc- 
tion of  beautiful  works  without  regard  to  any  other  purpose  except 
the  satisfaction  of  the  mind's  aspirations  toward  beauty. 

II.  ART  AND  NATURE 

i.  Realism  and  Idealism.  —  Beauty  is  found  both  in  nature 
independently  of  human  intervention,  and  in  art,  that  is,  in  works 
which  are  intentionally  produced  by  man.  Moreover,  we  have 
said  that  beauty  always  supposes  two  elements,  one  sensible  and 
real,  the  other  ideal  and  intelligible.  Hence  the  questions:  Must 
artificial  beauty  be  a  simple  imitation  of  natural  beauty?  Must 
it  reproduce  the  real  and  the  sensible  of  nature  as  closely  as  possi- 
ble? Or,  on  the  contrary,  must  the  artist  overlook  nature  so  as 
to  form  higher  and  independent  ideals?  Realism  chooses  the  first 
alternative;  idealism,  the  second.  In  their  extreme  forms,  both 
are  to  be  rejected,  and  the  true  answer  is  found  between  them. 
Works  of  art  must  be  based  on  nature  and  inspired  from  it.  Yet 
they  must  not  be  mere  imitations  or  copies,  but  idealized  repre- 
sentations. 

(a)  Art    borrows    its    materials  —  sounds,  colors,    etc.  — from 
nature.    Moreover,  what  is  against  nature  is  never  beautiful,  e.g. 
a  statue  without  due  proportions.    Finally,  pure  idealism  tends  to 
abstraction,  i.e.  to  the  absence  of  reality  and  life,  and  therefore 
has  less  power  to  arouse  aesthetic  feelings. 

(b)  But  art  cannot  be  a  sterile  imitation  of  nature,     (i)  Music 


THEFINEARTS  277 

is  not  a  mere  imitation  of  natural  sounds;  nor  architecture,  of 
natural  forms.  Painting  and  sculpture  are  not  the  same  as  photo- 
graphing and  casting.  (2)  Nor  can  art,  if  it  merely  imitates  nature, 
be  as  beautiful  as  nature,  for,  in  many  cases,  it  is  incapable  of  repre- 
senting the  details,  greatness,  life,  and  movement  that  are  found 
in  nature.  It  represents  only  some  of  the  realities  of  nature. 
(3)  Not  everything  in  nature  is  beautiful;  nor  is  any  object  per- 
fectly beautiful,  for  none  realizes  completely  the  type  of  beauty 
of  the  class  to  which  it  belongs. 

(c)  Art,  therefore,  must  borrow  its  materials  and  objects  from 
nature,  but  also  idealize,  purify,  and  refine  them,  making  abstrac- 
tion of  certain  features  and  emphasizing  others. 

2.  Advantages  of  Art  over  Nature.  —  Art  cannot  reproduce 
all  the  realities  of  nature.  Thus  sculpture  reproduces  forms,  but 
not  colors.  Art,  however,  has  several  advantages. 

(a)  It  is  not  subject  to  the  same  laws  of  space  and  time  that 
are  found  in  nature.    A  landscape  covering  in  reality  many  square 
miles,  which  cannot  be  embraced  at  a  single  glance,  may  be  repre- 
sented on  a  small  canvas  where  its  harmonious  beauty  will  be 
grasped  at  once.    A  multitude  of  events  which  would  require  a 
long  period  of  time  may  be  condensed  in  a  theatrical  play.    The 
deterioration  which  occurs  in  nature,  especially  in  living  organ- 
isms, is  avoided  in  art,  etc. 

(b)  Art  is  not  subject  to  the  physical  laws  which  prevent  nature 
from  realizing  a  complete  and  perfect  type.    Art  supposes  abstrac- 
tion, and  represents  only  certain  features  which  it  idealizes. 

III.  THE  PRODUCTION  OF  WORKS  OF  ART 

We  shall  examine  the  conditions  required  in  the  work  itself  and 
the  processes  by  which  the  artist  produces  it. 

i.  Qualities  Required  in  the  Work.  —  The  object  must  be  one, 
true  and  good,  and,  in  general,  have  the  qualities  of  the  beautiful. 

(a)  We  have  already  spoken  of  unity  in  variety  as  one  of  the 
conditions  of  beauty.  Thus,  in  an  edifice  we  require  the  unity 
of  style  and  architecture,  and  the  proportion  of  the  various  parts, 
for  if  the  style  is  not  the  same,  or  if  the  parts  are  out  of  proportion, 
the  result  is  not  harmonious.  In  a  play  or  a  novel  we  require  the 


278  AESTHETICS 

unity  of  composition  —  one  plot  around  which  other  events  are 
centred.  In  a  picture  we  require  things  that  are  not  disparate, 
but  can  associate  together  to  form  one  complete  whole.  In  a 
volume  of  essays  we  do  not  expect  one  unit,  but  several.  We 
expect  a  sequence  throughout  a  novel. 

(b)  Truth  does  not  mean  that  the  work  of  art  must  be  a  mere 
imitation  of  nature,  for  art  idealizes  nature.    Yet  it  must  be  what 
we  generally  call  natural  or  likely.    Thus  a  personage  supposed 
to  be  gifted  with  a  certain  quality,  to  have  a  certain  character,  or 
to  be  subject  to  a  certain  passion,  must  be  made  to  speak  and  act 
naturally,  i.e.  in  conformity  with  these  endowments.    To  fail  in 
this,  or  to  exaggerate  beyond  measure,  shocks  the  aesthetic  feelings. 
The  statue  or  painting  of  a  man  need  not  represent  any  man  who 
exists  or  ever  existed,  but  it  must  represent  a  human  form  with 
all  its  essential  features. 

(c)  Vice  and  immorality  as  such  cannot  be  beautiful.    If  they 
cause  pleasure,  it  is  either  on  account  of  the  skill  of  the  artist,  or 
because  of  the  passions  of  those  who  perceive  such  works.    It  is 
not  allowable  to  represent  as  beautiful  and  worthy  of  admiration 
that  which  is  in  opposition  to  the  rules  of  morality.     But,  with 
due  caution,  it  may  be  represented  as  an  object    of    aversion 
which,  by  contrast,  makes  virtue  more  beautiful. 

2.  The  Realization  of  Beauty.  —  The  artist  must  form  an  ideal, 
find  the  means  of  expressing  it,  and  use  these. 

(a)  The  conception  of  an  ideal  is  based  on  the  study  of  nature. 
Before  applying  the  colors  to  the  canvas,  the  painter  must  have 
in  his  mind  the  representation  of  the  figure  or  the  objects  which 
he  wants  to  paint.  Before  starting  to  write,  the  poet,  novelist, 
or  playwright  must  know  what  human  passion  he  will  describe, 
what  plot  he  will  unravel,  and  what  circumstances  he  will 
represent.  This  ideal  is  higher  or  lower  according  to  the  artist's 
power  to  understand  the  beauties  of  nature,  rise  above  them,  and 
abstract  the  beautiful  features  from  the  common,  insignificant,  or 
ugly  features  with  which  they  are  mixed.  The  nature  and  loftiness 
of  the  ideals  and  interpretations  will  vary  with  the  personal 
qualities  of  the  artist. 

In  their  relation  to  nature,  the  artist  and  the  scientist  have  an 


THE     FINE    ARTS  279 

altogether  different  attitude.  The  scientist's  aim  is  to  know  what 
is,  and  his  mind  must,  as  far  as  possible,  grasp  the  whole  reality 
in  all  its  complex  details.  He  must  express  his  knowledge  accu- 
rately, neglecting  nothing,  and  describing  facts,  events,  and  things 
in  their  various  aspects.  In  scientific  books,  illustrations  are  not 
necessarily  beautiful,  they  may  even  be  positively  repugnant,  for 
instance  in  books  on  medicine,  but  they  must  be  true  to  nature. 
The  artist  selects  only  what  suits  his  purpose,  and  is  free  to  change 
and  adapt  the  materials  found  in  nature.  He  is  original,  and 
supplies  something  out  of  his  own  mind.  In  this  process  of  con- 
ception, imagination,  sensibility,  and  artistic  taste  are  the  most 
prominent  factors. 

(b)  The  artist  must  find  the  means  and  materials  best  adapted 
to  express  his  ideal.    He  follows  general  rules  already  mentioned, 
and  more  special  rules  like  those  of  concord  and  discord,  rhythm 
and  tempo  in  music;  unity,  rhythm,  and  rhyme  in  poetry,  etc. 
In  this  process  of  finding  and  choosing  the  means,  the  main  faculties 
necessary  are  imagination  and  memory,  association,  attention, 
sensibility,  and  the  aesthetic  taste  which  directs  the  selection. 

(c)  Execution  is  the  expression  itself  of  the  ideal.    To  a  great 
extent  it  is  a  question  of  practice  and  of  the  proper  use  of  instru- 
ments.   The  artist's  purpose  is  to  reproduce  in  matter  that  which 
he  has  conceived  in  his  mind,  and  the  perception  of  which  will 
produce  in  others  the  same  emotions  and  arouse  the  same  ideals. 
Hence,  as  far  as  possible,  the  work  of  art  must  be  animated, 
resplendent,  and  have  a  soul  that  reveals  itself  through  sense- 
perception. 

IV.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  FINE  ARTS 

i.  General.  —  (a)  It  is  difficult  to  give  a  satisfactory  classi- 
fication of  the  fine  arts;  difficult  also,  and  even  impossible,  to  give 
a  complete  enumeration  of  them,  for  it  is  not  always  possible  to 
establish  a  clear  distinction  between  several  minor  subdivisions; 
nor  is  it  always  possible  to  determine  whether  a  given  art  should 
be  counted  among  the  fine  arts. 

(b)  It  is  generally  admitted  that  there  are  five  principal  fine 
arts :  architecture,  sculpture,  painting,  music,  and  poetry.  Among 


280  ESTHETICS 

the  secondary  or  auxiliary  fine  arts,  mention  may  be  made  of 
dancing,  which  is  subordinate  to,  though  widely  different  from, 
music;  acting,  which  is  auxiliary  to  poetry;  embroidery,  pottery, 
jewelry,  gardening,  park-making,  dress-making,  house-ornament- 
ing, cabinet-making,  etc.,  which  are  subsidiary  to  painting,  sculpt- 
ure, and  architecture.  We  shall  not  attempt  to  give  any  definition 
of  these  several  arts,  still  less  their  special  technical  rules.  Their 
mutual  relations  will  be  shown  best  by  indicating  the  most  impor- 
tant principles  of  classification  which  have  been  proposed. 

2.  Principles  of  Classification.  —  (a)  The  first  and  most  com- 
mon distinction  is  derived  from  the  senses  by  which  the  work  of 
art  is  perceived.  These  are  vision  and  hearing.  Hence  there 
are:  (i)  Visual  arts  —  sculpture,  architecture,  and  painting.  (2) 
Auditory  arts  —  music  and  poetry.  Acting  and  dancing  are  visual 
and  also  auditory,  since  they  are  subsidiary  to  music  and  poetry. 

(b)  In  a  similar  way  are  distinguished:    (i)    The  arts  of  repose, 
plastic  or  formative,  in  which  all  the  parts  may  be  perceived  simul- 
taneously.    (2)    The  arts  of  motion  and  speech,  in  which  the  parts 
are  successive  and  can  be  perceived  only  after  one  another.    The 
former  have  reference  chiefly  to  space;  the  latter,  to  tune. 

(c)  Considered  in  their  relation  to  nature,  arts  are  either  imita- 
tive (representative),  or  non-imitative  (presentative),  according  as 
they  imitate  natural  objects  —  painting,  sculpture,  poetry,  drama; 
or  are  in  a  stricter  sense  creative  —  music  and  architecture. 

(d)  We  have  seen  above  that  beauty  is  essentially  distinct  from 
utility.    Yet,  although  the  special  point  of  view  of  beauty  is  always 
different  from  that  of  utility,  the  two  may  be  combined  in  the 
same  object.    A  new  principle  of  classification  may  be  derived 
from  this  fact.    Architecture  is  generally  serviceable.    Even  if 
there  are  exceptions  for  certain  monuments,  its  object  is  generally 
to  build  that  which  is  both  useful  and  beautiful.    The  other 
principal  arts  are  primarily  non-serviceable.     Of  the  minor  arts, 
many  are  serviceable,  like  pottery,  embroidery,  jewelry,  glass- 
making,  dancing,  and  many  others  which  tend  to  produce  or 
ornament  objects  which  have  a  practical  use. 


ETHICS   OR   THE    NORMATIVE 
SCIENCE   OF  THE   WILL 


INTRODUCTION 

I.    THE   MEANING   OF  ETHICAL   SCIENCE 
I.  FACTS 

Certain  facts  of  internal  and  external  experience  with  which 
ethics  is  concerned  must  first  be  mentioned. 

i.  The  Ethical  Aspect  of  Human  Actions.  —  (a)  Besides  their 
psychological  aspect,  i.e.  their  nature  as  processes  and  the  mode 
of  their  actual  production,  human  actions  have  other  important 
aspects  or  relations.  Besides  the  manner  in  which  they  are  per- 
formed and  actually  take  place,  there  is  the  manner  in  which  they 
should  take  place  in  order  to  reach  certain  ends,  and  to  have 
certain  qualities  that  are  considered  as  good  or  advantageous. 
In  other  words,  there  are  rules  or  norms  of  action. 

In  the  ball  player,  it  is  not  so  much  the  psychological  or  physio- 
logical processes  that  are  of  interest  as  their  special  adaptation  to 
the  end  in  view,  which  is  to  score  or  help  team-mates  to  score  runs, 
and  to  prevent  the  opposing  team  from  scoring,  according  to  the 
rules  of  the  game.  The  value  of  the  complex  actions  performed 
on  the  diamond  is  judged  by  this  standard.  We  speak,  not  only 
of  what  is  done,  but  of  what  should  be  or  should  have  been  done. 
Again,  to  be  successful,  the  merchant  must  act  according  to  certain 
principles.  We  call  men  good  or  bad  in  their  respective  occu- 
pations, fit  or  unfit  for  their  business,  prudent  or  imprudent  in 
their  transactions,  when  we  compare  what  they  do  with  what 
they  ought  to  do,  and  when  we  examine  their  action  to  see  whether 
it  is  adapted  to  the  end  which  they  have  in  view. 

281 


282  ETHICS 

(b)  There  is  another  sense  —  the  ethical  or  moral  sense  —  in 
which  actions  are  called  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong,  praiseworthy 
or  blameworthy.     Whatever  this  may  mean  —  a  question  to  be 
examined  later  on  —  it  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  have  an 
immediate  reference  to  utility  or  advantage,  at  least  not  in  the  same 
sense  as  the  actions  mentioned  above.   However  useful  it  may  hap- 
pen to  be  for  an  individual,  stealing  is  wrong,  and  helping  those 
who  are  in  need  is  right,  even  if  giving  alms  imposes  some  sacrifice. 
I  do  not  consider  in  the  same  light  the  failure  to  avail  myself  of 
a  good  business  opportunity,  and  the  failure  to  keep  my  contract 
made  with,  or  even  my  word  given  to,  my  fellowman. 

(c)  All  actions  which,  considering  all  circumstances,  are  wrong 
must  always  be  omitted.     I  must  never  commit  perjury  or  act 
unjustly.    But  all  right  actions  do  not  appear  obligatory.    Some, 
it  is  true,  seem  to  impose  themselves  on  man  in  such  a  way  that  to 
omit  them  is  to  fail  in  one's  duty.    Others,  on  the  contrary,  seem 
to  be  optional;   to  perform  them  is  good;   to  omit  them  is  not 
wrong.    Thus,  even  if  I  do  not  comply  with  the  obligation,  I 
consider  myself  obliged  to  restore  that  which  is  clearly  somebody 
else's  property,  and  to  abide  by  my  valid  contract.    I  do  not  feel 
obliged  in  all  cases  to  give  alms  to  every  poor  man  whom  I  meet  on 
the  street,  or,  if  I  have  the  means,  to  endow  hospitals  or  educational 
institutions,  although  all  this  is  good. 

(d)  The  question  here  is  not:   Which  actions  are  good,  and 
which  are  bad;    which  are  obligatory,  and  which  are  free?    The 
standards  vary  with  the  different  degrees  of  culture  and  with  differ- 
ent classes  of  persons.    History  also  shows  that  there  has  been  a 
great  diversity  in  the  past.    The  question  is:    Are  some  actions 
morally  good,  and  others  morally  bad?    The  fact  is  universally 
true  that  man,  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  recognizes  the  distinc- 
tion of  right  and  wrong,  and  has  a  sense  of  duty. 

The  consequence  of  this  sense  of  obligation  is  the  feeling  of  re- 
morse or  satisfaction  which  is  experienced  according  as  one  has 
acted  wrongly  or  rightly,  and  the  bestowing  of  blame  or  praise 
on  other  men. 

2.  Moral  Law.  —  From  what  precedes,  the  common  notions  of 
good,  obligation,  and  duty  are  sufficiently  clear  as  facts.  Now 


NATURE    OF    ETHICS  283 

there  is  no  obligation  without  a  principle  of  obligation,  without  a 
law ,  and  consequently  without  a  lawgiver.  At  this  point,  if  asked  for 
an  explanation,  the  ordinary  man,  and  very  frequently  even  the 
most  learned,  will  hardly  be  able  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer. 
Of  course  it  is  wrong  to  exceed  the  speed  limit  with  your  motor 
car  and  to  sell  certain  articles  without  a  license.  But  wrongness 
here  means  rather  imprudence  and  liability  to  the  penalty  pro- 
vided by  the  law  in  such  cases.  I  do  not  mean  the  same  when  I 
say  that  it  is  morally  wrong  for  me  to  set  fire  to  my  neighbor's 
house,  or  to  steal  his  purse. 

Hence  what  is  commonly  called  the  law,  namely  the  civil  law, 
is  not  always  assumed  and  accepted  as  the  standard  of  moral 
obligation.  Who  then  is  the  judge  of  this  moral  obligation? 
What  is  its  standard?  And  when  you  tell  another  man:  You 
must  not  do  this,  it  is  morally  wrong;  or  when  you  accuse  him  of 
being  unjust,  on  what  authority  do  you  pronounce?  How  do  you 
know  that  it  is  so?  What  is  your  standard?  And  is  your  standard 
necessarily  the  same  as  his,  or  any  other  man's?  Is  it  universal 
and  must  it  be  accepted  by  all?  In  a  word,  what  is  the  supreme 
court  that  is  to  decide  on  the  question  of  right  and  wrong?  This 
is  an  important  problem  suggested  by  obvious  facts. 

3.  Conscience.  —  It  is  clear  that,  in  order  to  make  its  deci- 
sions known,  the  law  or  supreme  tribunal,  whatever  it  may  be 
ultimately,  must  do  so  through  the  human  mind.  When  applied 
to  human  actions,  the  decision  must  always  appear  in  human 
consciousness  in  the  form  of  a  judgment.  This  is  what  we  call 
conscience,  the  application  to  a  concrete  action  of  the  general 
principles  concerning  its  moral  character.  Conscience  is  the 
actual  judgment  regarding  the  morality  of  actions,  and  every  indi- 
vidual man  has  his  own  conscience  just  as  he  has  his  own  under- 
standing. In  the  same  way  that,  if  I  do  not  see,  I  may  rely  on, 
and  be  guided  by,  those  who  do,  and  that  my  eyes  may  be  treated 
by  the  oculist,  and  my  errors  corrected  by  others  or  by  my  own 
deeper  study  and  reflection,  so  my  moral  judgment  may  be  based 
on  another  man's  authority,  changed,  improved,  and  corrected; 
but  I  can  no  more  judge  with  another  man's  conscience  than  I 
can  see  with  his  eyes. 


284  ETHICS 

4.  Meaning  of  Morality.  —  The  special  relation  of  an  action 
to  the  rules  of  right  and  wrong  is  what  we  call  its  morality. 
"Moral"  comes  from  the  Latin  "mos"  (plural,  "mores"),  which 
signifies  habit.  Applied  to  actions,  it  means,  (i)  that  which  has 
relation  to  the  rules  of  duty  and  obligation,  (2)  that  which  is  in 
conformity  with  these  rules. 

(a)  In  the  first  sense,  moral  is  opposed  to  non-moral,  that  is,  to 
that  which  has  no  reference  whatever  to  any  rules  of  right  and 
wrong.    Only  human  actions  are  called  moral.    A  stone  or  bullet 
that  kills  a  man  is  not  blamed,  but  the  man  who  wilfully  threw 
the  stone  or  fired  the  pistol  is  considered  as  having  done  wrong. 
Morality  supposes  some  psychological   conditions  which  are  not 
found  in  beings  inferior  to  man.    Nor  are  all  human  actions  moral, 
but  only  those  of  which  man  is  truly  the  cause  and  the  free  agent, 
and  which  he  commits  with  sufficient  knowledge  and  freedom. 
The  man  who  is  under  coercion,  and,  for  instance,  is  carried  to  a 
certain  place  against  his  will,  is  not  the  real  agent;   the  action  is 
not  his,  and,  for  him,  is  not  moral.     (Cf.  p.  167  ff.)    There  is  no 
morality  in  the  actions  of  a  man  who  accidentally  falls  and  kills 
himself,  or  who  speaks  and  walks  in  his  sleep.    Such  actions  are 
non-moral. 

(b)  In  the  second  sense,  moral  is  opposed  to  immoral,  that 
is,  to  that  which  is  in  opposition  to  the  rules  of  morality  and 
therefore  is  bad  and  wrong.    In  order  to  be  moral  in  the  second 
sense,  or  immoral,  it  is  clear  that  an  action  must  be  moral  in 
the  first  sense. 

II.  THE  SCIENCE  OF  ETHICS 

i.  Nature  of  Ethical  Science.  —  (a)  Ethics  (from  i}0os, 
character)  means  the  same  as  moral  science,  namely,  the  science  of 
right  and  wrong,  or  the  science  of  right  conduct.  It  endeavors 
to  account  for  the  facts  which  have  been  indicated  above,  and  to 
explain  their  nature,  origin,  and  bearings.  It  also  endeavors  to 
direct  human  actions,  to  find  the  general  moral  laws  by  which  they 
should  be  governed,  and  to  apply  these  laws  to  the  various  cir- 
cumstances of  life.  Hence  ethics  includes  two  parts,  or  has  two 
functions;  one  is  essentially  practical,  and  tries  to  determine  what 


NATURE     OF    ETHICS  285 

we  should  do  and  avoid;  the  other  is  more  speculative,  and  tries 
to  determine  why  ultimately  we  should  do  or  avoid  it. 

(b)  From  this  it  follows  that,  as  a  whole,  ethics  is  a  normative 
science.    It  deals  with  human  actions,  to  find  out,  not  how  they 
are  actually  performed,  but  whether  and  how  they  should  be  per- 
formed.   History    and   psychology    are   not    directly    normative 
sciences.    They  simply  state  what  takes  or  took  place,  and  how 
events  or  processes  occur  or  occurred.    Ethics  passes  a  judgment 
on  the  moral  value  of  these  actions  and  determines  whether  they 
are  right  or  wrong. 

(c)  The  term  "law"  does  not  apply  to  human  actions  and  to 
physical  events  in  the  same  sense.     Physical  laws  are  abstractions 
for  the  facts;  they  are  not  rules  to  which  events  ought  to  conform, 
but  to  which  we  see  that  events  do  in  fact  conform.    And  when 
what  was  thought  to  be  a  law  is  found  to  conflict  with  facts  that 
are  certain,  the  law  has  to  be  abandoned  or  modified.    Not  so 
with  moral  laws.    They  are  ideals  to  which  human  actions  do  not 
necessarily  conform,  but  to  which  they  should  conform  in  order 
to  be  good. 

2.  Importance  of  Ethics.  —  From  the  scope  of  ethics  its  impor- 
tance may  be  inferred.    In  order  to  live  well,  perform  his  duty, 
and  shape  his  conduct  aright,  man  must  first  know  in  what  these 
consist.    It  is  true  that  there  is  innate  in  every  man  a  certain  moral 
sense  which  tells  him  his  duty,  but,  on  many  points,  it  is  vague, 
and,  even  where  it  is  clear,  one  must  examine  whether  and  why 
its  dictates  are  legitimate.     It  is  not  enough  to  feel  that  an  action 
is  right  or  wrong,  one  must  know  that  it  is  so.     Moreover,  the  moral 
feeling,  precisely  because  it  is  a  feeling,  is  often  uncertain  and  mis- 
leading.   It  has  to  be  interpreted,  justified,  and  directed.    Although 
knowledge  is  insufficient  for  good  conduct,  —  one  may  know  the 
good  and  fail  to  practise  it  —  it  is  an  essential  condition  of  morality. 

3.  The   Relations  of  Ethics  to  Other  Sciences  will  now  be 
understood  easily. 

(a)  Physical  sciences  have  only  a  remote  relation  to  ethics, 
inasmuch  as  the  knowledge  or  ignorance  of  physical  laws  may 
change  the  morality  of  an  action  by  modifying  the  intention, 
motives,  and  foresight  of  the  agent.  Thus,  according  as  one  is, 


286  ETHICS 

or  is  not,  aware  of  the  poisonous  nature  of  a  certain  substance,  the 
morality  of  giving  it  to  a  fellowman  to  swallow  will  differ.  Bio- 
logical sciences  also  are  indirectly  connected  with  ethics.  Many 
obligations  refer  to  human  life  and  health,  but  generally  they  may 
be  known  and  discussed  without  any  detailed  physiological  knowl- 
edge. 

(b)  Psychology  is  much  more  closely  related  to  ethics,  and  for  this 
reason  a  few  pages  will  be  devoted  to  the  psychological  implica- 
tions of  morality.    At  present  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  pointing 
out  the  difference  between  psychology  and  ethics.    The  psychol- 
ogist studies  human  actions  as  processes,  to  find  out  how  mental 
functions  are  related.    The  moralist  tries  to  regulate  human  actions. 
Psychology  gives  to  ethics  its  materials,  but  ethics  does  not  place 
the  same  value  upon  all.    The  psychologist  is  like  the  botanist 
who  studies  the  growth,  nature,  and  characteristics  of  all  plants. 
The  moralist  is  more  like  the  gardener  who  arranges  certain  plants 
according  to  an  order,  cultivates   some  and  carefully  excludes 
others.     No  action  is  moral  which   is  not   also   in   some  way 
psychological. 

(c)  Pedagogy  and  ethics  should  also  be  kept  in  close  contact. 
A  complete  education  trains  the  whole  man,  and  moral  character 
is  essential  to  man.    Man  must  be  accustomed  not  only  to  think 
consistently,  but  also  to  act  rightly. 

(d)  ^Esthetics  and  logic,  although   different  from  ethics,  agree 
with  it  in  being  normative  sciences,  or  in  dealing  with  ideals  and 
standards,  the  first  with  the  ideals  of  beauty,  the  second  of  truth, 
the  third  of  moral  goodness.     Frequently  terms  are  transferred 
from  one  science  to  another.    A  man  who  is  true  to  himself  is  one 
who  acts  according  to  his  principles;  a  beautiful  soul  or  character 
is  one  that  includes  certain  moral  characteristics,  etc. 

(e)  Sociology  is  also  related  to  ethics,  since  it  considers  man  in 
his  social  aspect,  which  is  the  source  of  many  duties.    Society  is 
an  important  factor  in  the  morality  of  individuals  on  account  of 
the  laws  by  which  it  is  ruled   and  of  the  mere  fact  of  men 
associating  with  one  another. 

N.B.     We  shall  see  later  that  ethics  is  also  related  to  meta- 
physics and  religion. 


CONDITIONS    OF    MORALITY  287 

4.  Division  of  This  Treatise.  —  Ethics  will  be  divided  into  two 
parts;  the  first  more  speculative  and  more  formal,  dealing  with 
duty  in  general,  its  nature  and  conditions;  the  other  more  practi- 
cal, more  detailed,  and  dealing  with  the  various  duties  and  obliga- 
tions. Before  passing  to  these,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  indicate 
the  main  psychological  conditions  of  moral  life. 


II.    PSYCHOLOGICAL   CONDITIONS   OF   MORALITY 

Psychological  conditions  and  influences  may  be  grouped  under 
the  three  headings  of  knowledge,  feeling,  and  will. 

I.  KNOWLEDGE 

1.  Knowledge  Necessary  to  Morality.  —  In  general,  from  what 
was  said  above  and  in  Psychology  on  the  relations  of  intellect  and 
will,  it  is  evident  that  knowledge  is  a  condition  without  which 
an  action  cannot  be  voluntary.    A  man  cannot  be  morally  bound 
by  an  obligation  unless  this  obligation  is  known  to  him.    It  is 
impossible  to  conceive  that  a  man  should  be  responsible  for  failing 
in  a  duty  of  which  he  has  no  knowledge.    Moreover,  a  man  must 
be  aware  of  what  he  is  doing.    For  instance,  he  is  not  responsible 
for  an  action  performed  automatically  during  sleep.    The  killing 
of  a  man  by  the  accidental  discharge  of  a  pistol  which  was  thought 
to  be  unloaded  may  be  the  result  of  imprudence,  but,  as  such,  it 
is  not  morally  imputable.    Hence  a  twofold  knowledge  is  required, 
(i)  of  what  one  is  doing,  (2)  of  the  relations  of  this  action  to 
the  rules  of   morality.     These  general  principles  need  a  little 
further  explanation. 

2.  Effects  of  Ignorance.  —  (a)  Ignorance  may  be  involuntary 
or  voluntary.    It  may  be  unsuspected  and  unavoidable,  when 
sufficient  care  has  been  taken  to  know  one's  duty;  or  it  may,  to 
some  extent,  be  due  to  negligence  in  investigating  one's  duty  when 
there  was  a  suspicion  of  it,  or,  worse  still,  when  the  investigation 
was  omitted  precisely  in  order  to  act  more  freely  and  without 
restraint.    The  action  due  to  involuntary  ignorance  is  itself  invol- 
untary, and  the  will  has  no  share  in  it.    The  action  due  to  volun- 
tary ignorance  is  not  voluntary  in  itself,  yet  the  will  has  a  share  in 


288  ETHICS 

it  inasmuch  as  the  ignorance  from  which  it  proceeds  was  voluntary. 
Hence  such  an  action  is  called  voluntary  in  its  cause.  Thus  the 
physician  who  is  aware  of  his  incapacity  and  incompetence,  either 
in  general  or  in  special  cases,  is  accountable  for  the  lives  he  loses 
since  he  knows  that  he  lacks  the  sufficient  knowledge  of  his  art. 
It  is  clear  that  the  amount  of  diligence  to  be  used  depends  on  the 
importance  of  the  interests  in  question,  the  time  at  one's  disposal, 
the  qualifications  and  opportunities  for  investigating,  the  urgency 
of  the  action  to  be  performed,  and  so  on. 

(b)  The  effects  of  ignorance  are  the  same  whether  it  affects  the 
nature  and  consequences  of  an  action,  or  the  existence  of  a  law 
which  commands  or  prohibits  it.    I  may  speak  an  untruth  in 
good  faith  thinking  that  it  is  the  truth  —  ignorantia  facti  —  or 
may  fail  to  see  that  in  the  present  circumstances  lying  is  wrong  — 
ignorantia  iuris. 

(c)  In  order  to  prevent  possible  confusion,  it  must  be  noted 
that  we,  speak  here  of  the  moral  obligation,  and  not  merely  of  the 
obligation  to  obey  the  civil  law  in  any  concrete  case.    When  duly 
promulgated,  the  civil  law  is  supposed  to  be  known  by  all  the 
citizens  for  whom  it  is  intended.    Hence  a  penalty  may  be  inflicted 
on  a  man  for  breaking  a  law  of  which  he  was  bona  fide  ignorant. 
But  if  the  ignorance  is  involuntary,  there  is  no  moral  wrong, 
although  the  civil  law  may  be  the  source  of  a  moral  obligation 
and  bind  in  conscience. 

II.  FEELINGS 

Feelings  exercise  a  great  influence  on  the  intellect  and  the  will. 
Among  them  the  most  important  in  the  present  question  seem  to 
be  love,  fear,  and  anger.  A  great  love  or  passion  blinds  the  mind 
more  or  less  completely.  The  fear  of  losing  that  which  one  loves, 
or  the  anger  caused  by  a  sense  of  injury,  frequently  influences  man 
to  take  a  certain  course  of  action.  This  action  is  less  voluntary 
than  it  would  be  if  performed  coolly  and  deliberately.  It  will 
perhaps  be  performed  with  greater  vehemence  and  stronger  incli- 
nation, but  this  inclination  proceeds  from  feeling,  not  from  reason. 
In  the  case  of  the  fear  of  an  impending  danger,  however,  a  man 
may  freely  and  deliberately  choose  a  less  evil,  e.g.  promise  a  liberal 


CONDITIONS     OF     MORALITY  289 

reward  to  his  rescuer,  although  he  would  not  otherwise  do  so.  How 
far,  in  concrete  instances,  responsibility  is  lessened  by  passions  and 
emotions  is  frequently  impossible  to  determine  exactly.  Their 
influence  varies  from  the  slightest,  and  even  imperceptible,  im- 
pulse to  a  complete  blinding  of  the  mind,  absence  of  mastery  over 
oneself,  and  consequently  of  freedom  and  responsibility. 

III.  WILL 

1.  Coercion.  —  An  action  may  be  due  to  violence  or  coercion. 
Instead  of  proceeding  from  the  command  of  the  will,  it  may  pro- 
ceed from  some  external  power  opposed  to  the  will.     Such  an  action 
is  therefore  involuntary.    The  real  agent  is  the  external  power, 
and  if  this  be  a  person,  he  alone  incurs  the  responsibility.     Thus 
a  man  may  be  dragged  to  a  forbidden  place,  or  compelled  to  per- 
form unjust  actions.    Provided  of  course  that  he  resists  as  much 
as  the  nature  of  the  case  allows,  the  action  cannot  be  attributed  to 
him.    The  gravity  of  the  obligation  to  offer  resistance  varies  with 
the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  chances  of  success 
in  overcoming  the  violence,  and  the  necessity  of  showing  one's 
opposition   and   reluctance.    If   the   possible   resistance   is   not 
offered,  the  action  is  voluntary  to  some  extent,  and  the  responsi- 
bility remains  in  varying  degrees.    The  physical  violence  of  which 
we  speak  here  is  actual,  and  must  not  be  understood  in  the  sense 
of  a  mere  fear  referring  to  the  future,  which,  as  said  above,  generally 
leaves  the  action  voluntary. 

2.  Habit.  —  (a)  As  explained  in  Psychology  (p.  175  ff.),  habit 
produces  uniformity  of  action,  facility  and  pleasure  in  acting. 
Hence  it  lessens  the  control  of  the  will,  both  because  the  action 
proceeding  from  a  habit  is  frequently  performed  without  conscious- 
ness, or  at   least  without  distinct   consciousness,  and   because, 
even  if  there  is  distinct  consciousness,  the  impulse  toward  the 
action  is  greater,  and  consequently  more  difficult  to  overcome, 
in  proportion  as  the  habit  is  stronger  and  more  inveterate.    The 
influence  exercised  by  habit  varies  in  nature  and  intensity  accord- 
ing to  the  nature,  origin,  and  strength  of  the  habit. 

(b)  A  habit  may  be  (i)  acquired  and  preserved  wilfully;    (2) 
acquired  wilfully  and  preserved  unwilfully,  when  one  is  making 

20 


2QO  ETHICS 

serious  efforts  to  overcome  it;  (3)  acquired  and  preserved  unwil- 
fully.  The  "wilfulness"  in  all  these  cases  is  itself  more  or  less 
perfect. 

In  the  first  instance  the  morality  of  the  habitual  action  is  not 
diminished  by  the  fact  itself  of  habit.  "Qui  vult  causam  vult  et 
effectum";  the  actions  due  to  habit  are  rightly  attributed  to  the 
man  who  consents  to  the  good  or  bad  habit  from  which  they  pro- 
ceed. In  the  second,  the  morality  is  lessened  in  various  degrees 
according  to  the  strength  of  the  habit,  the  actual  consciousness 
and  consent,  and  the  amount  of  effort  made  to  resist  and  uproot 
it.  In  the  third,  the  morality  is  still  more  reduced,  and  may  even 
be  totally  destroyed.  The  liquor  habit  may  be  given  as  an  illus- 
tration of  these  various  cases.  A  man  may  acquire  this  habit 
knowingly  and  freely,  and  indulge  in  it  although  he  realizes  that 
it  is  bad.  Or  he  may  acquire  it  almost  without  noticing  it,  owing 
to  physiological  conditions,  to  circumstances,  to  the  presence  of 
alcohol  in  medicine  which  he  had  to  use,  etc.  As  soon,  however, 
as  he  becomes  aware  of  it,  he  is  under  the  obligation  of  resisting  it 
and  of  taking  the  proper  means  to  overcome  it. 

(c)  Habit  is  a  very  complex  factor  in  human  actions,  and  it  is 
frequently  impossible  to  trace  back  all  its  antecedents  in  all  their 
details  and  ramifications.  A  habit  may  be  so  strong  as  to  be 
almost  invincible.  But  generally  it  can  be  overcome  by  good 
resolutions  and  the  use  of  proper  means.  Even  when  the  individual 
declares  it  invincible,  in  most  cases  his  "I  cannot"  is  to  be  inter- 
preted as  meaning  "I  do  not  want  to."  The  man  who  is  not 
willing  to  try  seriously  and  use  his  best  effort  shows  that,  in  reality, 
he  consents  to  the  habit. 

3.  Freedom  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  the  moral  char- 
acter of  human  actions.  This  has  been  indicated  already  in 
Psychology  (p.  180  ff.),  and  only  a  few  considerations  will  be 
added  here. 

(a)  At  all  ages  and  in  all  places  mankind  has  recognized  two 
distinct  orders  of  facts.  Some  are  necessary  and  worthy  of  neither 
blame  nor  praise.  Others  are  free,  and  their  agents  are  held  account- 
able for  them.  A  man  is  not  blamed  for  being  sick  or  for  acci- 
dentally hurting  himself.  He  is  blamed  for  wilfully  killing  his 


CONDITIONS     OF     MORALITY  291 

fellowman,  stealing  his  neighbor's  property,  indulging  in  vices 
which  caused  the  disease  or  accident. 

(b)  Obligation  supposes  the  power  to  do  or  omit  the  obligatory 
action,  and  hence  postulates  freedom.     There  can  be  no  obliga- 
tion if  human  actions  are  necessarily  determined  and  are  ruled  by 
laws  as  necessary  as  those  which  are  found  in  the  physical  world. 
Obligation  is  an  absurdity  if  man  is  not  the  master  of  his  own 
actions,  and  if  all  are  strictly  and  necessarily  determined. 

(c)  The  same  consideration  applies  to  the  notions  of  right  and 
duty  as  correlative.    A  man  has  a  right  when  he  can  exact  some- 
thing from  his  fellowman;   he  has  a  duty  when  he  ought  to  give 
that  which  is  exacted.    The  right  to  exact  and  the  duty  to  give 
suppose  the  actual  power  to  give  what  is  exacted. 

(d)  Responsibility,  merit,  virtue  or  vice,  self-satisfaction  and 
remorse  suppose  freedom. 

(e)  Hence  freedom  is  at  the  very  basis  of  the  essential  factors  of 
morality.    Without  it,  the  terms  "obligation,"  "responsibility," 
"right"  and  "wrong,"  are  meaningless,  and  every  action  takes  place 
with  the  same  necessity  with  which  the  stone  falls  to  the  earth 
and  obeys  the  law  of  gravitation.  Such  actions  can  neither  be  pre- 
scribed nor  forbidden;  they  are  neither  right  nor  wrong,  and  deserve 
neither  blame  nor  praise.    It  is  true  that  some  actions  performed 
by  man  are  necessary,  but  neither  does  he  feel  himself  responsible, 
nor  is  he  held  responsible  for  them.     If  they  are  bad,  he  regrets 
them  as  he  would  regret  an  unavoidable  misfortune  or  bodily 
deformity,  not  in  the  same  way  that  he  is  sorry  for  an  action 
known  to  be  wrong,  and  yet  freely  committed.     On  this  point  the 
practice  of  determinists  agrees  with  the  practice  of  those  who 
admit  freedom.     The  inconsistency  of  the  former  is  a  sign  of  the 
connection  which   exists  between  the  fact  of  freedom  and  the 
facts  and  elements  of  morality. 


CHAPTER   I 

FUNDAMENTAL  ETHICS 

The  object  of  this  chapter  is  to  indicate  the  bases  on  which 
morality  rests,  and  to  discuss  briefly  the  problems  suggested  by 
the  obvious  facts  mentioned  above.  Although  this  chapter  is 
rather  theoretical,  its  practical  importance  is  evident,  since,  hi 
order  to  be  effective,  the  rules  of  morality  must  rest  on  secure 
foundations. 

ARTICLE  I.    THE  MORAL  NORMS  OR  LAWS 

The  idea  of  obligation  supposes  that  of  a  law  to  which  actions 
should  conform,  and  of  a  rule  which  they  should  follow.  This 
rule  may  be  considered  in  its  external  reality,  as  a  law  properly  so 
called,  and  in  its  internal  application  or  conscience. 

I.    LAW 

I.  DEFINITION  AND  DIVISIONS 

i.  Meaning  of  Law.  —  In  general,  law  signifies  a  constant  or 
uniform  rule  according  to  which  actions  take  place.  A  distinc- 
tion is  to  be  made  between  physical,  civil,  and  ethical  laws.  The 
first  apply  only  to  material  beings,  the  second  and  third  to  men 
as  intelligent  and  free  agents. 

(a)  Physical  laws  are  abstract  expressions  or  formulae  for  the 
constant,  necessary,  and  uniform  mode  of  happening  of  phenomena; 
thus  the  laws  of  gravitation,  attraction,  chemical  affinity,  etc. 
Ethical  laws  do  not  express  what  necessarily  and  constantly  hap- 
pens, but  what  should  happen.    They  are  not  indicative,  but 
imperative  formulae. 

(b)  When  asked  why  I  have  certain  documents  signed  before 

2Q2 


THEMORALLAW  293 

a  notary  public,  or  why  I  do  not  build  a  house  without  a  permit 
from  the  city  authorities,  I  answer  that  it  is  the  law,  and  that  its 
violation  would  make  me  liable  to  a  penalty.  This  answer  refers 
to  what  is  called  the  civil  law,  i.e.  a  set  of  rules  promulgated  by 
competent  authorities,  varying  with  different  countries  and  govern- 
ments, and  the  violation  of  which  is  punished  in  different  ways. 
Were  I  in  another  state  or  country,  or  at  another  time,  I  would 
not  have  on  this  point  the  same  obligations  under  which  I  am 
now. 

(c)  If  asked  why  I  do  not  steal  my  neighbor's  property,  or  kill 
my  innocent  fellowman,  I  may  also  answer:  Because  the  law  for- 
bids it.    But  I  feel  that  the  meaning  is  not  the  same  as  above, 
that  the  obligation  is  of  a  higher  character,  that  it  would  follow 
me  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  and  that  it  would  continue  to 
exist  even  did  the  civil  code  make  no  mention  of  it  and  inflict  no 
penalty  for  its  transgression.    It  is  based  on  human  nature  itself, 
and  for  that  reason  called  natural  law. 

(d)  The  civil  law  supposes  the  natural  law.     In  certain  cases 
it  is  only  the  expression  or  enforcement  of  what  human  reason  it- 
self dictates,  as  when  it  forbids  to  kill.    In  other  cases,  it  is  reason 
again  that  requires   obedience  to  any  just  command  of  the  civil 
power,  and  to  any  law  enacted  by  the  proper  authority  for  the 
welfare  of  the  subjects. 

2.  The  Natural  or  Moral  Law  in  the  strict  sense  is  that  which 
imposes  a  universal  and  strict  obligation.  It  indicates  an  ideal 
to  be  realized,  and,  although  one  may  fail  to  submit  to  its  com- 
mands, yet,  in  failure,  one  always  has  the  consciousness  of  a  dis- 
order and  of  a  lack  of  harmony  between  what  is  done  and  what 
should  be  done.  As  the  term  indicates,  the  natural  law  is  derived 
from  our  rational  nature  itself;  it  is  based  on  man's  essential  rela- 
tions to  other  beings,  and  manifested  by  the  light  of  reason.  Some 
of  its  fundamental  and  general  precepts  are  self-evident,  like:  "Do 
good  and  avoid  evil;  "  "Do unto  others  as  you  would  like  to  have 
others  do  to  you."  Others  are  less  general  and  already  touch 
upon  something  concrete  like:  " Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mqther  "; 
"  Thou  shalt  not  kill " ;  " Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness."  Other 
points,  finally,  are  very  complex,  and,  in  many  concrete  cases, 


2Q4  ETHICS 

their  morality  may  seem  doubtful,  e.g.  lying  to  procure  a  great 
advantage;  committing  suicide  to  avoid  shame,  etc. 

Natural  law  and  moral  law  have  almost  the  same  meaning, 
yet  the  latter  term  seems  to  have  a  greater  extension,  for  civil 
laws  may  also  impose  a  strict  moral  obligation.  But,  even  here, 
this  obligation  is  based  on  the  natural  law  commanding  to  obey 
superiors  when  they  give  just  orders.  The  civil  law  rules  only  on 
matters  that  refer  to  the  public  material  welfare.  The  moral 
law  reaches  a  number  of  other  actions,  even  internal  feelings  like 
hypocrisy,  dissimulation,  and  evil  desire;  and  some  external 
actions  like  ingratitude,  egoism,  gluttony,  which  the  civil  law  does 
not  consider.  What  follows  applies  strictly  to  the  natural  law. 

II.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW 

The  moral  law  is  given  in  consciousness  with  the  following 
characteristics. 

1.  Obligation.  — The  moral  law  is  not,  like  physical  laws,  the 
expression  of  what  happens  fatally  and  unavoidably,  not  merely 
a  generalized  fact.    It  is  a  rule  which  does  not  register  a  fact, 
but   commands,   although,  even   when   acknowledging   this  rule, 
man  may  depart  from  it  and  disobey.    Obligation  is  distinct  both 
from  the  determinism  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  from  a  mere 
attraction,  desirability,  or  counsel,  which  does  not  command  strictly 
in  the  form  of  a  "Thou  shalt  .  .  .  ."    In  a  word,  it  is  an  imper- 
ative. 

2.  Absoluteness.  —  The   moral   law   is   a   categorical,   not   a 
hypothetical,  imperative.    A  law  is  conditional  when  it  enjoins 
a  certain  means  to  reach  an  end.     It  is  absolute  when  it  enjoins  a 
thing  as  an  end  in  itself  independently  of  any  condition.     In  the 
former  case  the  obligation  may  be  shirked  by  renouncing  the  con- 
ditioning end.    In  the  latter,  the  obligation,  even  if  not  complied 
with,  is  unavoidable.     Thus,  "Thou  shalt  not  steal,"  "Thou  shalt 
not  kill,"  are  absolute  commands.    But  if  I  say:  "You  must  work 
in  order  to  preserve  your  health,  or  to  become  rich,"  or  "Avoid 
defrau<Jing  others  if  you  want  to  increase  your  business,"  I  use  a 
conditional  form,  and  the  command  depends  on  a  supposition  which 
may  or  may  not  be  verified.    The  moral  imperative  imposes  itself 


THE    MORAL    LAW  295 

simply  because  it  is  good  and  necessary,  and  because  doing  other- 
wise is  acting  against  one's  nature,  reason,  and  conscience.  I  may 
not  feel  obliged  to  be  a  healthy  or  rich  man,  but  I  feel  obliged  to 
act  as  a  man.  This  is  expressed  by  the  proverb:  "Do  your  duty, 
come  what  may." 

3.  Universality.  —  (a)  The  moral  law  is  independent  of  indi- 
vidual character,  persons,  countries,  and  times.  It  may  pre- 
scribe different  things  according  to  different  circumstances,  but  it 
is  independent  of  personal  interests  and  passions.  Its  principles 
are  unchangeable,  since  they  are  based  on  human  nature  itself. 
Interests,  pleasures,  and  desires  vary  with  every  individual.  Not 
so  the  moral  law  which  Kant  sums  up  in  this  maxim:  "So  act  that 
the  maxim  of  thy  will  can  at  the  same  time  be  valid  as  the  prin- 
ciple of  universal  legislation,"  i.e.  act  in  such  a  manner  that  all 
men  can  act  in  the  same  manner;  or  again,  in  a  more  personal  way: 
Do  unto  others  as  you  would  have  them  do  unto  you.  Thus  even 
if  it  were  my  own  interest  to  steal,  I  do  not  wish  others  to  steal 
from  me.  I  know  the  law,  and  may  not  wrongfully  make  an 
exception  in  my  own  favor. 

(b)  It  is  true  that  practical  applications  vary  almost  endlessly 
with  times  and  places.  The  law:  "Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  may  be 
interpreted  in  many  ways,  and  admit  of  many  excuses.  More- 
over, it  may  seem  to  conflict  with  other  principles  and  thus  become 
obscured.  Thus  in  certain  tribes  it  is  deemed  lawful  to  kill  parents 
in  old  age  so  as  to  avoid  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy, 
or  to  shorten  their  sufferings.  These  excuses  are  understood  as 
applications  of  the  law  which  obliges  us  to  love  parents  and  do 
them  good.  Variations  in  practice  are  accounted  for  by  (i)  the 
misinterpretation  of  certain  principles;  (2)  the  real  or  apparent 
conflict  of  several  principles;  (3)  the  difficulty  in  agreeing  on  some 
points  of  morality  which  are  obscure  in  themselves;  (4)  the  deprav- 
ity of  the  will  which  makes  it  disobey  known  laws;  (5)  habits  and 
customs  which  modify  or  deprave  the  moral  sense. 

III.  EXISTENCE  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW 

In  the  second  article  we  shall  speak  of  the  basis  on  which 
the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  rests.  For  the  present 


296  ETHICS 

we  want  to  show  that  such  a  distinction  exists.  Two  points 
must  be  established,  (i)  that  this  distinction  is  recognized  in 
consciousness;  (2)  that  it  is  valid. 

i.  Testimony  of  Consciousness.  —  To  formulate  the  moral 
law  and  explain  its  characteristics  is  already  to  demonstrate  its 
existence.  The  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  conduct  is 
as  natural  and  as  evident  for  man  as  the  distinction  between  true 
and  false  assent.  Both  impose  themselves  with  the  same  cogent 
force,  and  neither  can  be  denied  without  renouncing  human 
reason  itself.  Let  us,  however,  sum  up  a  few  facts  which  will 
illustrate  this  conclusion. 

(a)  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  we  find  this  distinction  recog- 
nized, praise  or  blame  bestowed,  honor  or  disgrace  attached  to  cer- 
tain actions.    In  all  languages  expressions  are  found  for  these  ideas. 
Standards  differ,  it  is  true,  yet  the  fact  at  issue  is  admitted,  for 
we  are  not  concerned  at  present  with  the  practical  determination 
of  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong,  but  only  with  the  fact  that  there 
are  right  and  wrong  actions. 

(b)  The  testimony  of  individual  consciousness  is  equally  clear. 
The  consciousness  of  freedom  is  inseparable  from  the  conscious- 
ness that  freedom  is  restricted  by  the  moral  law  which  it  may  trans- 
gress.    Sometimes  at  least,  before  acting,  there  is  a  feeling  that 
one  of  two  possible  courses  of  action  is  right  and  honorable,  the 
other  wrong  and   dishonorable.    After  acting,  feelings   of   self- 
approval  or  self-blame  are  experienced.    These  feelings  are  not 
merely  feelings  of  joy  and  regret,  such  as  might  be  experienced  on 
the  occasion  of  some  fortunate  or  unhappy  event,  success  or  fail- 
ure, luck  or  accident.    In  these  latter  cases,  unforeseen  circum- 
stances, or  even  personal  imprudence,  may  be  deplored,  but  we 
do  not  feel  that  our  real  value,  moral  worth,  intrinsic  and  genuine 
honorableness,  have  been  lost  or  lessened. 

From  being  rich  a  man  may  become  poor,  and  in  consequence 
receive  less  external  honors;  he  may  regret  the  loss  of  wealth, 
advantages,  and  honors,  but  he  may  feel  nevertheless  that  his  own 
personal  worth  remains  what  it  was  before.  On  the  contrary,  the 
man  who,  from  being  poor,  becomes  rich  by  using  unjust  means, 
may  receive  honors;  yet  he  has  lost  some  of  his  essential  worth, 


THE     MORAL     LAW  297 

and  feels  it  unless  he  has  stifled  his  moral  sense  by  depraved  habits 
of  thought  and  will.  It  is  possible  to  hush  the  voice  of  conscience 
and  become  hardened  against  its  warnings.  Monsters  are  found 
in  the  moral  as  well  as  in  the  physical  world,  men  who  commit 
the  greatest  crimes  without  experiencing  any  shame  or  remorse. 
A  man  may  be  born  sickly,  or  deprived  of  some  external  sense; 
or  disease  and  the  loss  of  a  sense  may  develop  later.  So  also  a 
man  may  be  born  a  moral  monster  owing  to  organic  or  mental 
defects;  or  he  may  little  by  little  allow  his  moral  sense  to  be 
destroyed.  These  are  exceptions,  and  no  more  proofs  against 
the  reality  of  the  moral  law  than  the  existence  of  insane  or  sick 
persons  is  a  proof  against  the  reality  of  sanity  and  health. 

2.  Attempts  to  Explain  Away  This  Fact.  —  How  will  these  feel- 
ings or  data  of  consciousness  be  accounted  for?  Can  we  ascribe 
to  them  an  artificial  origin,  or  must  we  say  that  they  are  nat- 
ural, innate,  and  rooted  in  human  nature  itself?  Some  facts  are 
important  and  must  be  admitted. 

(a)  Education   contributes   to   develop   and   direct   the   moral 
sense.    According  as  the  child  is  taught  by  word  and  example, 
he  will  in  life  consider  certain  things  as  right  or  wrong.    The 
influence  of  education  on  morality  is  an  obvious  fact. 

(b)  Owing  to  habit  and  custom,  actions  which,  at  first,  shock  the 
moral  sense  in  time  appear  quite  natural  and  indifferent;  or  actions 
performed  previously  without  any  sense  of  wrong-doing  appear 
blameworthy.    Hence  attempts  have  been  made  to  explain  the 
moral  law  by  education,  habits,  surroundings,  and  by  the  exist- 
ence of  the  civil  law. 

(c)  According  to  the  schools  of  positivism  and  associationism, 
all  actions  are  originally  indifferent.     Some  become  indissolubly 
associated  with  pleasurable  or  displeasurable  feelings  and  with 
useful  or  harmful  results.     Gradually  such  associations  of  actions 
with  their  consequences   cause  men  to  look  upon  the  actions  as 
good  or  bad  in  themselves.    These  estimates  of  the  value  of  actions 
are  transmitted  by  education.    Parents,  instructed  by  their  own 
experience,  give  orders  to  their  children,  and  rulers  lay  down  laws 
for  their  subjects;  or  contracts  are  made  by  which  men  bind  them- 
selves to  behave  in  certain  ways  toward  their  fellowmen.    These 


298  ETHICS 

associations   become   necessary   and   indissoluble,   and   thus   are 
explained  the  universality  and  absoluteness  of  the  moral  law. 

3.  The  Preceding  Explanation  is  Insufficient.  —  (a)  Education 
may  make  the  child  look  upon  certain  actions  as  good,  and  upon 
certain  others  as  bad.  It  may  direct  the  moral  sense,  but  supposes 
already  in  the  child's  mind  the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong, 
between  praiseworthy  and  blameworthy  actions.  It  influences  it, 
strengthens  it,  and  directs  it,  but  does  not  create  it.  The  animal 
may  be  "educated,"  or  trained,  but  it  can  be  taught  only  the  util- 
itarian expediency  of  certain  actions,  because  it  lacks  the  necessary 
foundation  for  morality.  Moral  education  is  not  simply  a  matter 
of  prudence,  expediency,  or  interest.  These  are  at  most  hypothet- 
ical imperatives,  not  moral  laws.  Moreover,  wherefrom  would 
the  educator  derive  the  idea  of  obligation,  morality,  and  responsi- 
bility? No  associations  can  change  the  idea  of  useful  into  that  of 
right,  nor  the  idea  of  harmful  into  that  of  wrong.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  —  at  present  we  deal  with  morality  only  as  a  fact  —  conscious- 
ness refuses  to  identify  these  two  aspects  of  human  actions.  Edu- 
cation is  for  morality  what  logic  is  for  the  intellect.  Logic  supposes 
the  distinction  of  truth  and  falsity,  but  does  not  create  it.  Moral 
education  also  supposes  the  distinction  of  right  and  wrong. 

(b)  We  need  not  insist  on  the  supposition  that  the  sense  of  obli- 
gation arises  from  contracts.    It  is  clear  that  contracts  presuppose 
the  obligation  of  observing  them.     What  is  the  use  of  giving  my 
word,  if  I  feel  that  it  is  indifferent  to  break  it?    Justice  alone,  i.e. 
moral  law,  can  unite  human  wills  in  one  common  agreement. 

(c)  Finally,   the  civil  law  gives  no  satisfactory  explanation, 
(i)  The  civil  law  may  be  just  or  unjust,  tyrannical  or  advanta- 
geous; it  may  respect  or  disregard  individual  rights,  etc.     To  say 
this  is  to  appeal  to  a  higher  law  as  criterion.    (2)  The  authority  of 
the  civil  law  is  derived  from  the  natural  law,  which  tells  us  that  it 
is  good  and  obligatory  to  obey  legitimate  authorities.    If  obedience 
is  not  already  due  to  a  civil  law,  it  ceases  to  be  a  law  at  all.     (3) 
There  are  good  and  evil  actions,  both  internal  and  external,  about 
which  the  civil  law  says  nothing.     (4)  If  morality  is  derived  from 
the  civil  law,  the  door  is  opened  to  all  forms  of  tyranny,  since, 
in  this  case,  there  is  no  higher  standard  of  morality  than  this  law. 


CONSCIENCE  299 

(d)  In  conclusion,  if  morality  had  an  artificial  origin,  the  notion 
of  moral  obligation  would  vanish  from  the  mind  as  soon  as  one 
would  come  to  know  this  fact.  On  the  contrary,  it  always  persists, 
thus  showing  that  it  comes  from  human  nature  itself. 


H.    CONSCIENCE 

I.  NATURE  OF  CONSCIENCE 

What  has  been  said  so  far  applies  as  much  to  conscience  as  to 
moral  law.  Even  if  the  moral  law  is  imposed  on  man  from  without, 
— '  a  question  which  is  out  of  consideration  here,  —  it  remains  cer- 
tain that  it  cannot  reach  and  affect  man  except  through  the  knowl- 
edge of  it,  that  is,  through  conscience.  And  the  arguments  which 
prove  the  existence  of  the  moral  law  do  so  by  proving  at  the  same 
time  the  fact  of  moral  conscience.  What  then  is  conscience? 

i.  Conscience  Implies  Two  Elements,  one  belonging  to  the 
intellect,  the  other  to  the  feelings. 

(a)  Conscience  appreciates  the  moral  value  of  human  actions. 
This  judgment  is  not  merely  logical,  it  is  imperative.    It  does  not 
simply  state   what   takes   place,  it   dictates   what  should   take 
place. 

(b)  Conscience  produces  feelings  of  joy  or  blame  according  as 
the  recognized  obligation  has  been  complied  with  or  not.    This 
element  is  the  consequence  of  the  former,  which  is   the  more 
important. 

(c)  Hence  conscience  may  be  defined  as  the  practical  judgment 
which  dictates  what  is  good  and  what  is  bad,  what  is  obligatory  and 
what  is  optional,  in  every  individual  case.    Such  at  least  is  the  strict 
meaning  of  the  word.     But  frequently  it  is  used  to  denote,  not  so 
much  the  act  of  judging  as  the  habit  of  forming  correct  judgments 
on  the  morality  of  actions.    Thus  we  say  of  a  man  that  his  con- 
science is  erroneous  on  certain  points,  meaning  that  he  habitually 
has  misconceptions  of  their  moral  aspect.     Sometimes  also  con- 
science refers  to  the  agreement  between  a  man's  conduct  and  his 
principles.      To  say  of  a  man  that  he  has  no  conscience  generally 
implies   that   he   knows  what   he  ought  to  do,  but  fails  to  act 


300  ETHICS 

accordingly.     Conscientious  and  conscientiousness  refer   also  to 
the  same  idea. 

2.  Conscience  and  Reason.  —  From  what  precedes,  conscience 
is  not  simply,  nor  even  primarily,  "moral  feelings,"  or  "moral 
sense."  An  action  is  not  primarily  looked  upon  as  good  or  bad 
because  it  is  attractive  or  repulsive,  or  because  it  produces  feel- 
ings of  self-approval  or  self-blame,  but  rather  these  are  felt  because 
the  action  is  judged  to  be  good  or  bad.  Moral  judgment,  or  con- 
science, is  an  intellectual  judgment  proceeding  from  reason,  based 
on  implicit  or  explicit,  actual  or  habitual,  deliberation,  compari- 
son, and  reasoning,  and  capable  of  truth  and  error.  In  order  to 
answer  the  question :  Is  this  action  which  I  propose  to  do  right  or 
wrong?  I  appeal  to  reason  and  try  to  solve  my  doubt  by  making 
use  of  higher,  better  known,  and  more  certain  principles.  All  this 
is  essentially  the  function  of  reason. 

II.  VALUE  OF  CONSCIENCE  AS  THE  RULE  OF  ACTIONS 

i.  In  General,  since  conscience  is  a  function  of  reason,  its  dic- 
tates are  not  necessarily  true.  The  very  fact  that  judgments  on  the 
morality  of  the  same  action  vary  with  times  and  places  indicates 
that  some  must  be  false.  Sometimes  also  personal  experience 
shows  clearly  how  difficult  it  is  to  reach  a  conclusion,  and  how 
uncertain  this  conclusion  may  remain  after  the  most  careful  investi- 
gation. But  from  these  facts  it  cannot  be  inferred  that  conscience 
has  no  value  at  all,  and  that  its  dictates  are  always  arbitrary  and 
never  to  be  relied  on.  To  reason  this  way  is  no  more  justifi- 
able than  to  disclaim  the  validity  of  all  scientific  conclusions  be- 
cause some  are  false,  or  to  deny  absolutely  that  highly  probable 
conclusions  have  any  value  because  they  are  not  certain. 

In  some  cases  duty  is  certain,  and  conscience  manifests  it  clearly. 
As  to  the  variations  in  moral  estimates,  they  do  not  apply  to  the 
first  principles  of  morality,  such  as  the  distinction  of  right  and 
wrong,  the  obligation  to  avoid  moral  evil,  and  so  on.  The  differ- 
ences in  their  practical  applications  are  due  to  habits,  circum- 
stances, modes  of  life,  civil  law,  and  chiefly  to  the  real  or  apparent 
conflict  of  duties.  The  murder  of  enemies  taken  as  prisoners 
may  seem  legitimate  to  tribes  which  are  constantly  at  war;  weak 


CONSCIENCE  301 

children  or  old  people  may  be  looked  upon  as  hindrances  to  public 
welfare,  etc.  (cf.  p.  295). 

2.  Various  Kinds  of  Conscience.  —  Conscience  may  be  true  or 
false;  ignorant,  doubtful,  or  probable.    It  is  important  to  note  the 
difference  between  speculative  and  practical  reason.    The  solution 
of  a  problem  of  mathematics  or  natural  science  may  be  postponed 
indefinitely,  or  even  never  be  reached.     But  action  cannot  always 
wait.    In  a  concrete  circumstance,  I  must  do  one  thing  or  abstain 
from  it,  perform  one  action  or  another.    To  doubt  is  possible; 
to  do  nothing  is  not  always  possible,  and  may  be  wrong. 

(a)  If  conscience  is  certain,  leaves  no  doubt,  and  shows  clearly 
what  should  be  done,  it  must  be  followed.    What  it  commands 
must  be  done;  what  it  forbids  must  be  omitted;  what  it  allows  may 
be  done  or  omitted.    This  is  true  even  in  the  case  of  unsuspected 
or  invincible  error.    When  a  man,  after  taking  all  prudent  avail- 
able means  —  available  means  will  of  course  vary  with  the  intel- 
lectual capacity  and  special  disposition  of  the  agent,  and  with 
the  urgency  of  the  action  —  judges  bona  fide  that  he  should  do 
so  or  so,  he  is  obliged  to  follow  his  conscience,  since  it  is  the  only 
rule  he  can  apply  to  his  actions.    Nor  is  absolute  certitude  required 
such  as  would  exclude  completely  every  doubt,  but  only  such  as 
would  exclude  every  prudent  doubt.    In  moral  questions  it  would 
be  useless  to  look  for  mathematical  certitude.    A  greater  certitude 
is  required  in  actions  which  have  more  serious  consequences. 

(b)  Where  no  certitude  is  possible  and  yet  it  is  necessary  to  take 
a  course  of  action,  man  must  do  his  best.    An  obligation  which 
is  strictly  doubtful  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  real  obligation  and  there- 
fore to  bind.    In  such  cases,  especially  where  great  interests  are 
at  stake,  the  best  rule  is  to  take  the  course  which  appears  the 
safest  and  least  likely  to  injure  anybody's  rights  and  interests. 
But  it  is  always  necessary  to  ascertain   carefully  which  course 
should  be  pursued,  and,  if  possible,  to  delay  until  this  has  been 
done.    How  is  it  to  be  done? 

3.  The  Formation  or  Education  of  Conscience  is  general  or  spe- 
cial,    (a)  The  general  education  of  conscience  consists  in  the  habit 
of  forming  correct  practical  judgments.    Besides   the    external 
helps,  such  as  studying,  reading,  consulting,  inquiring  on  ethics 


302  ETHICS 

in  general  or  on  special  matters,  it  is  important  for  the  individual 
to  be  careful  about  the  acquisition  of  intellectual,  volitional,  and 
emotional  habits,  since  all  these,  as  explained  previously,  influence 
moral  judgments. 

(b)  In  special  cases,  when  a  man  doubts  whether  a  given  action 
is  right  or  wrong,  he  must,  as  far  as  time  allows,  reflect,  consider, 
and  consult.  Especially  when  one's  own  interests  are  engaged,  and 
when,  in  consequence,  there  is  danger  of  passing  a  less  correct 
and  less  impartial  judgment  in  one's  own  cause,  the  consultation 
of  trustworthy  and  prudent  persons  is  preferable  to  reflection. 
We  may  and  must  consult  competent  moralists  as  we  may  and 
must  sometimes  consult  a  physician,  lawyer,  or  scientist.  The 
more  important  the  action,  the  greater  must  be  the  diligence  in 
ascertaining  its  morality. 

4.  Determinants  of  Concrete  Morality.  —  From  the  preceding 
doctrine  it  follows  that  the  morality  of  a  concrete  action  depends 
on  several  factors,  the  nature  itself  of  the  action,  the  intention, 
and  the  circumstances. 

(a)  Since  certain  actions  in  themselves  are  good,  and  others  bad, 
it  is  clear  that  morality  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  action  itself, 
that  is,  on  its  relation  with  human  reason.     From  this  exclusive 
point  of  view  a  number  of  actions  are  neither  good  nor  bad  in 
themselves,  but  indifferent,  or,  rather,  non-moral,  like  walking, 
sitting,  singing,  etc.    But  they  become  moral,  i.e.  good  or  bad, 
owing  to  the  intention  of  the  agent  and  the  circumstances  in  which 
they  are  performed. 

(b)  For  instance,  walking  to  relieve  a  poor  man  is  good;  walking 
to  commit  a  theft  is  wrong.     It  may  even  be  said  that  the  inten- 
tion is  the  primary  determinant  of  concrete  morality,  since  con- 
science  is   the  immediate   norm  of  human  actions.     The   final 
purpose,  being  that  on  which  the  will  is  fixed,  is  really  the  directive 
principle  of  everything  else.    This  must  not  be  understood  in 
the  sense  that  the  end  justifies  the  means,  or  that  any  means, 
even  those  that  are  wrong,  may  be  taken  in  order  to  reach  a 
good  end,  but  in  the  sense  that  means  known  to  be  indifferent  in 
themselves  derive  their  morality  from  the  end  in  view. 

(c)  Circumstances  of    time,    place,  person,  quantity,  quality, 


OPINIONS     ON     MORAL     STANDARD       303 

etc.,  may  also  increase,  diminish,  or  change  the  morality  or  immo- 
rality of  an  action.  We  often  hear  the  plea  of  aggravating  or 
extenuating  circumstances.  To  kill  unjustly  is  wrong;  to  kill  in 
self-defence  is  lawful.  To  give  alms  is  right  in  general;  to  give 
alms  when  a  bad  use  will  certainly  be  made  of  it  is  wrong. 


ARTICLE    II.    THE    MORAL   STANDARD 

I.    THE    QUESTION    STATED 
I.  THE  OBJECT  OF  THE  PRESENT  ARTICLE 

1.  Necessity  of  a  Rule.  — The  proximate  rule  of  morality  is 
the  actual  dictate  of  conscience.     But  on  what  basis  does  this 
dictate  itself  rest?     Or  rather,  on  what  basis  should  it  rest? 
Men    act    for  certain  motives,  and  in  order  to  secure  certain 
ends,  and  yet  some  of  these  motives  and  ends  are  approved  as 
good,  noble,  and  moral,  while  others  are  condemned  as  bad,  base, 
and  immoral.     A  man  who  always  acts  for  his  own  personal  satis- 
faction, in  whose  conduct  no  place  is  found  for  a  disinterested 
motive  and  for  self-sacrifice,  will  generally  be  looked  upon  as  a  low 
type  of  morality  to  be  shunned  and  despised.    There  are  there- 
fore rules  that  govern  conscience  and  guide  it  in  pronouncing  on 
the  morality  of  the  end  which  a  man  proposes  to  himself.    There 
is  a  standard  to  which  we  do  and  must  refer  human  actions,  mo- 
tives, intentions,  and  ends.    Why  are  some  actions  morally  good, 
and  others  morally  wrong? 

2.  What  is  a  Rule?  —  (a)  In  a  material  sense,  a  rule  or  ruler 
is  a  straight-edged  instrument  used  as  a  measure,  or  as  a  guide  in 
drawing  straight  lines.    A  standard  is  a  measure  or  value  estab- 
lished by  law  or  by  universal  consent,  to  which  other  things  are 
referred.    By  analogy  these  material  meanings  are  applied  to 
immaterial  things,  and  especially  to  human  actions.    In  the  school, 
the  child  uses  his  ruler  to  draw  a  straight  line.    If  the  pen  or  pencil 
fails  to  follow  it,  the  line  is  no  longer  straight;  it  becomes  crooked 
or  curved.    So  also  the  action  which  deflects  from  the  rules  of 
morality  is  crooked  and  wrong.    Measures  are  referred  to  a  stand- 


304  ETHICS 

ard.  The  length  of  all  foot-rules  must  agree  with  the  standard 
foot  accepted  by  law. 

(b)  When  we  speak  of  morality  there  is  no  positive  law,  nor 
universal  agreement  establishing  a  moral  standard.  In  fact,  we 
shall  see  that  philosophers  have  proposed  different  systems.  This 
is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  as  we  deal  here  with  ideals,  the  determina- 
tion of  which  is  influenced  by  many  circumstances,  and  especially 
by  the  whole  complex  psychology  of  the  individual.  Sometimes 
also,  apparent  contradictions  are  only  at  the  surface,  while  at 
bottom  there  is  essential  agreement.  Some  divergences  may  be 
radical;  others  may  come  either  from  the  incomplete  expression 
of  a  view,  or  from  laying  too  much  stress  on  what  is  only  a 
secondary  aspect  of  the  question.  Thus  theories  become  one-sided. 

3.  Conditions  Required  in  the  Standard.  —  The  moral  stand- 
ard cannot  be:  (i)  A  mere  consequence  of  morality.  Thus  remorse 
and  self-approval  are  only  effects  of  moral  actions,  and  cannot  be 
the  standard  we  are  now  looking  for.  (2)  Something  variable  and 
changing.  Morality  is  not  something  dependent  on  individual 
peculiarities,  interests,  or  character.  There  is  not  one  morality 
for  one  man,  and  another  for  another  man.  The  ultimate  stand- 
ard of  morality  is  universal.  (3)  Something  merely  optional 
which  man  can  accept  or  renounce.  The  laws  of  morality  are 
frequently  obligatory.  In  some  cases,  it  is  true,  they  are  per- 
missive, but  in  others,  man  is  not  given  the  moral  choice  between 
doing  or  omitting;  he  is  under  the  obligation  of  acting  so  or  so, 
and  of  omitting  such  or  such  an  action. 

II.  DIFFERENT  VIEWS  CLASSIFIED 

i.  Logical  Classification.  —  It  is  almost  impossible  to  give  a 
logical  classification  of  the  various  systems  of  morality.  They 
merge  insensibly  into  one  another. 

(a)  In  the  first  place  one  may  claim  that  we  have  a  direct  appre- 
hension, or  intuitive  knowledge,  or  feeling,  of  morality.  But  evi- 
dently, if  a  man  claims  to  know  in  the  strict  sense,  he  may  be  asked 
for  the  grounds  of  his  knowledge,  and  unless  he  appeals  to  imme- 
diate evidence — in  which  case  he  will  be  in  near  agreement  with 
some  feeling-theory  —  he  will  appeal  to  some  form  of  reasoning. 


OPINIONS     ON    MORAL     STANDARD       305 

If,  on  the  contrary,  a  man  claims  that  he  feels  an  action  to  be  right 
or  wrong  in  the  same  way  that  he  feels  an  impression  to  be  pleas- 
urable or  painful,  no  more  questions  can  be  asked  him,  although 
such  an  assertion  may  be  discussed. 

In  the  second  place,  morality  may  be  determined  by  a  calcula- 
tion of,  or  reasoning  upon,  the  fitness  of  an  action  to  reach  a  certain 
end  which  is  conceived  as  a  bonum  in  se.  From  this  point  of 
view  it  is  clear  that  the  discussion  of  the  criterion  of  morality 
centres  around  the  end  itself  which  determines  the  morality  of 
actions. 

(b)  Looking  at  the  question  from  another  point  of  view,  all 
will  agree  that,  in  acting,  man  always  looks  for  some  good,  since  by 
all  it  is  admitted  that  morality  enables  us  to  classify  actions  as 
good  or  bad,  and  goodness  is  the  quality  which  all  must  strive 
to  realize.  This  good  may  be  (i)  the  satisfaction  of  the  senses 
or  that  of  reason;  (2)  my  own  good  (egoism)  or  the  good  of  others 
(altruism).  Hence  the  following  synopsis. 

I.  According  to  the  mode  of  knowledge  of  morality.  The  dis- 
tinction between  right  and  wrong  may  be  known 


(i)  immediately.    Intuitionalism 


emotional 
intellectual 


(2)  mediately 


by  reason.    Rationalism 
by  experience.    Empiricism 


II.  According  to  the  good  which  morality  must  realize.  This 
good  is 

(1)  the  pleasure  of  the  senses.    Sensualistic  ethics 

(2)  the  satisfaction  of  rational  aspirations.    Rational  ethics. 

In  either  case  one  may  seek 

(1)  personal  good.          Egoism    lrrj,.,..    . 

.      \  Utthtanamsm 

(2)  the  good  of  others.  Altruism } 

2.  Order  of  the  Following  Questions.  —  Combining  these  dif- 
ferent aspects  and  points  of  view,  we  shall  examine  successively 
(i)  the  true  nature  and  foundation  of  duty  and  moral  obligation, 
and  we  shall  try  to  determine  the  true  standard  and  criterion  of 
morality;  (2)  the  other  systems,  which  contain  only  a  part  of  the 


306  ETHICS 

truth,  or  one  aspect  of  the  answer,  and  which,  therefore,  may  be 
false  in  their  exclusiveness,  i.e.  not  so  much  in  what  they  as- 
sert as  in  what  they  deny.  Here  we  shall  consider  the  theories 
basing  morality  on  (a)  feelings;  (b)  pleasure  and  utility;  (c) 
reason.  (3)  Finally,  we  shall  attempt  to  determine  the  ultimate 
foundation  of  morality. 

H.    THE    QUESTION   DISCUSSED 

I.  POSITIVE  DETERMINATION  OF  THE  MORAL  GOOD 

i.  The  Notion  of  End.  —  (a)  All  actions  which  belong  to  mo- 
rality are  purposive,  and  frequently  the  reason  why  they  are  good  or 
bad  is  that  the  purpose  is  good  or  bad.  The  purpose  or  end  toward 
which  an  action  is  directed  may  be  objective,  or  subjective,  or 
both.  Thus  an  action  may  be  wrong  because  it  leads  of  itself  to 
some  bad  result,  or  because  the  agent  intends  to  produce  some  re- 
sult which  he  looks  upon  as  bad;  and  if  this  estimation  is  cor- 
rect, the  action  is  both  objectively  and  subjectively  wrong.  The 
science  of  ethics  determines  objective  morality.  It  cannot 
reach  subjective  morality,  which  depends  on  psychological,  and 
therefore  individual,  factors. 

(b)  Since  morality  is  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  purpos- 
ive action,  the  notion  of  end  is  essential  in  the  question  of  the  moral 
good.    If  an  action,  by  its  very  nature,  deprives  my  fellowman  of 
an  essential  right,  this  result  makes  the  action  wrong.     Thus,  load- 
ing a  pistol  and  firing  are  wrong,  if  the  result  of  it  is  murder  by 
which  an  individual  is  deprived  of   his    essential    right  to  live. 
In  this  case,  the  several  actions  leading  to  the  final  result  are 
coordinated  by  a  preconceived  mental  purpose. 

(c)  To  answer  the  question:  What  is  the  standard  of  morality? 
it  is  necessary  to  answer  this  other  question :  What  are  the  legit- 
imate ends  of  human  actions?    To  what  final  result  must  they 
tend?    Ends  may  be  proximate  or  remote  according  as  they  are 
reached  immediately  or  only  after  a  succession  of  coordinated 
actions.    One  may  eat  to  support  the  body,  thereby  to  make  men- 
tal work  possible  in  order  to  acquire  riches  and  finally  enjoy  one- 
self.    For  the  present  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  natural  ends, 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL     STANDARD      307 

attainable  on  this  earth,  as  our  previous  studies  do  not  yet  en- 
title us  to  speak  of  God  as  the  natural  end  of  man,  still  less  of  the 
supernatural  end  to  which  man  has  been  raised. 

2.  Morality  Relative  to  Human  Nature.  —  Whenever  man  acts 
as  a  man  —  that  is,  uses  his  faculties  with  a  sufficient  knowledge 
of  what  he  is  doing,  and  a  sufficient  consent  of  the  will  —  what  he 
seeks  is  always  the  satisfaction  of  some  of  his  aspirations  and 
desires,  i.e.  the  reaching  of  some  end.  But  human  aspirations 
correspond  to  human  faculties  and,  like  them,  are  very  com- 
plex. Man  desires  happiness,  but  this  may  be  the  happiness  of 
sensual  pleasure  or  that  of  reason;  it  may  be  his  own  selfish  hap- 
piness or  also  that  of  others.  For,  not  only  is  man  complex  within 
himself,  but  living,  as  he  does,  amid  complex  social  surroundings, 
many  new  relations  arise  from  this  social  aspect  of  life.  It  is  im- 
possible to  satisfy  all  human  faculties  because  frequently  they 
stand  in  opposition  to  one  another.  Reason  and  the  senses  are 
in  many  cases  antagonistic,  reason  dictating  duties  which  impose 
a  restriction  on  the  senses,  and  the  senses  craving  for  gratifications 
which  reason  condemns.  If  man  had  only  one  faculty,  the  devel- 
opment and  perfection  of  this  faculty  would  be  his  duty  and  the 
source  of  his  legitimate  happiness.  In  the  real  complexity  and 
frequent  opposition  of  his  faculties,  what  is  he  to  do?  To  "fol- 
low nature  "  may  be  a  good  precept,  but  what  is  it  to  follow  nature 
when  nature  is  so  complex? 

(a)  Human  nature  is  human  owing  to  that  which  distinguishes 
it  from  other  natures.    It  possesses  certain  properties  identical  with 
or  analogical  to  those  of  other  beings.     Like  the  stone,  the  human 
body  obeys  the  law  of  gravitation.     Like  the  plant,  it  assimilates 
foreign  substances,  grows,  etc.     Like  the  animal,  man  sees,  hears, 
remembers,  etc.    These  faculties,  therefore, are  not  special  to  man; 
they  do  not  make  of  man  a  being  distinct  from  other  beings.    As 
we  proceed  upwards  in  the  scale  of  beings,  we  find  that  every  su- 
perior degree  shares  in  the  properties  of  the  preceding  one  and  adds 
something  to  them.     The  perfection  of  every  being  consists  prima- 
rily in  the    degree  of  perfection    of  its    specific    properties    and 
faculties. 

(b)  The  perfection  of  man  consists,  therefore,  not  in  the  satis- 


308  ETHICS 

faction  of  such  faculties  as  he  possesses  in  common  with  lower 
beings,  but  of  such  as  are  special  to  him,  that  is,  reason  and  will, 
together  with  the  sense  of  obligation  and  duty  which  is  based  on 
these.  The  body,  the  senses,  and  the  feelings  have  their  claims, 
it  is  true,  but  they  must  always  be  subordinated  to  those  of  rea- 
son, and,  in  case  of  conflict,  the  former,  not  the  latter,  must  yield. 
Whatever  man  does  he  does  in  order  to  complete  and  perfect  his 
nature,  since  he  does  it  in  order  to  satisfy  a  desire  and  an  as- 
piration, i.e.  in  order  to  fill  a  deficiency.  Every  desire  and  aspi- 
ration is  essentially  the  avowal  of  the  lack  of  something.  A  man 
can  desire  only  what  he  does  not  yet  possess,  and  his  actions  tend 
to  acquire  it. 

(c)  Hence  the  primary  duty  of  man  is  to  preserve  in  himself  the 
essential  harmony  and  subordination  of  his  faculties.  Both  in 
the  individual  and  in  society  reason  discovers  a  certain  order  which 
imposes  itself.  Every  faculty  in  the  individual  and  every  member 
in  the  society  have  their  proper  nature  and  place.  Reason  commands 
us  to  respect  this  order,  and  to  give  to  every  faculty  and  to  every 
fellowman  their  dues.  From  this  general  principle  are  derived 
the  complex  duties  relating  to  self  or  to  other  men.  Concrete 
moral  good  includes  both  that  which  is  necessary  and  that 
which  is  permitted  according  to  the  general  principle  just 
mentioned. 

3.  Morality  is  not  Obedience  to  Law,  whether  external  or  inter- 
nal. This  is  a  consequence  of  what  has  been  said  above,  since 
law,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  itself  the  expression  of  a  good,  and 
obligatory  only  in  so  far  as  it  commands  some  good.  Obedience 
to  law  is  itself  dictated  by  reason,  and  hence  not  primary.  More- 
over, laws,  divine  or  human,  contain  points  which  are  evidently 
of  unequal  importance,  and  which  may  come  to  conflict  with  one 
another.  Thus  the  law  forbidding  homicide  may  conflict  with 
the  duty  of  self-preservation.  This  is  true  not  only  of  external 
law,  but  also  of  the  internal  law  or  conscience,  for  conscience  is 
largely  a  matter  of  education,  feeling,  and  habit,  and  these  may  con- 
flict with  reason.  If,  however,  by  conscience  be  meant  reason  it- 
self as  applied  to  a  line  of  conduct,  we  come  back  to  the  solution 
given  above.  In  practice  the  separation  of  reason  from  other 


DISCUSSION     OF     MORAL     STANDARD      309 

mental  faculties  is  never  perfect;  hence  the  diversity  of  moral 
standards. 

To  sum  up :  The  moral  good  for  man  is  to  live  in  accordance  with 
his  specific  nature,  to  perfect  it  as  much  as  possible,  to  respect  the 
nature  of  other  beings,  to  treat  his  own  faculties  and  every  other 
being  according  to  the  place  which  they  occupy.  This  is  the  ideal 
which  one  cannot  conceive  without  feeling  the  obligation  of  realiz- 
ing it  as  far  as  possible.  Whatever  system  does  not  take  all  this 
into  consideration  will  be  false  or  incomplete,  as  will  appear  more 
clearly  from  the  following  discussion. 

II.  MORALTTY  BASED  ON  A  SPECIAL  SENTIMENT 

i.  Importance  of  Feelings.  —  (a)  Undoubtedly  feelings  are 
very  important  in  morality.  Merely  to  perform  one's  duty,  or  to 
perform  it  reluctantly,  hesitatingly,  and  faint-heartedly,  is  less 
easy  and  less  noble  than  to  love  it  and  perform  it  with  readiness. 
Not  that  all  duties  are  agreeable,  but  the  sense  of  duty  and  the  love 
of  whatever  is  known  to  be  right  make  man  fulfil  it  with  the  pleas- 
ure of  doing  right,  and  the  satisfaction  of  obeying  conscience. 
When  duty  is  found  agreeable,  this  feeling  can  in  no  way  destroy 
the  value  of  the  action  by  which  it  is  accomplished.  Man  is  not 
merely  a  rational  being,  but  a  feeling  being  as  well,  and  even  if 
the  ideal  of  morality  does  not  consist  in  acting  for  pleasure,  yet 
the  pleasure  found  in  right  conduct  is  a  sign  that  the  principles 
of  morality  are  interwoven  with  other  elements  in  the  human 
mind. 

Feelings  increase  the  energy,  and  make  it  possible  to  accomplish 
actions  that  would  otherwise  be  above  human  strength.  St. 
Augustine's  words  express  a  truth  which  is  daily  experienced: 
"Ubi  amatur  non  laboratur,  aut  si  laboratur  labor  amatur."  A 
cold  idea  has  but  little  motor  power,  but  it  derives  much  strength 
from  the  feeling  that  accompanies  it.  All  noble  and  heroic  ac- 
tions proceed  from  the  idea  of  duty,  the  will  to  accomplish  it,  and 
also  a  certain  passion  that  impels  to  it.  To  try  to  eliminate  all 
feelings  from  morality,  and  look  upon  them  as  obstacles  to  be 
removed,  as  the  Stoics  and  Kant  did;  to  look  upon  duty  as  being 


3io 


ETHICS 


by  its  very  nature  a  burden  to  be  carried  painfully  and  by  dint  of 
effort;  to  place  the  ideal  of  man  in  a  state  of  perfect  calmness  and 
rest  undisturbed  by  any  feeling  or  emotion,  is  to  misunderstand 
human  nature,  to  overlook  human  psychology,  and  to  give  a  rule 
unfit  to  guide  men,  since  it  fails  to  take  men  as  they  are  essentially. 

(b)  But  if  feelings  play  an  important  r61e,  this  role  must  not 
be  exaggerated,  (i)  Feelings  are  blind;  they  must  be  controlled 
and  guided,  and  hence  cannot  be  the  standard  of  morality.  (2) 
They  attract,  but  do  not  command  or  create  any  obligation.  (3) 
They  are  not  universal,  but  vary  with  every  individual.  (4)  What 
is  agreeable  to  all  men  is  not  thereby  obligatory.  (5)  It  must  be 
noted  especially  that  moral  feelings  presuppose  the  idea  of  morality. 
Why  do  we  experience  moral  pleasure,  if  not  because  we  know  that 
we  are  doing  right?  Why  do  we  experience  moral  displeasure, 
if  not  because  we  know  that  our  actions  are  against  our  duty? 
Why  do  we  love  duty,  if  not  because  duty  appears  to  us  as  good? 
Feelings  do  not  explain  the  moral  standard,  but  presuppose  it. 
They  are  not  its  basis,  but  its  derivatives.  Yet  certain  theories 
propose  feelings  as  the  very  basis  of  morality.  To  these  we  now 
pass. 

2.  Moral  Sense.  —  (a)  Some  philosophers  like  Shaftesbury, 
Hume,  and  especially  philosophers  of  the  Scottish  school,  after 
Reid,  assert  the  existence  of  a  special  moral  sense  which  intuitively 
distinguishes  right  from  wrong  in  about  the  same  way  that  the 
sense  of  taste  distinguishes  bitter  from  sweet,  and  the  sense  of 
vision,  blue  from  red.  It  is  a  kind  of  natural  instinct  which  reveals 
what  is  good  and  what  is  bad.  It  may  also  be  compared  to  the 
aesthetic  sense  or  taste  which  at  once  makes  us  find  certain  objects 
beautiful,  and  others  ugly.  Among  Greek  philosophers  we  already 
find  the  identification  of  the  good  with  the  beautiful,  and  it  must 
be  admitted  that  ethics  and  aesthetics  have  many  points  of  con- 
tact. Some  actions  are  beautiful  or  sublime  on  account  of  their 
moral  excellence  and  they  cause  feelings  of  admiration  akin  to 
purely  aesthetic  feelings. 

(b)  Criticism.  —  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  habit  of  respect- 
ing the  moral  law,  and  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  it,  contribute  to 
develop  in  man  something  like  an  instinct,  a  kind  of  moral  taste, 


DISCUSSION     OF     MORAL     STANDARD      311 

or  moral  sense,  by  which,  in  ordinary  cases,  he  is  guided  in  the 
choice  between  right  and  wrong  actions  without  any  effort  of 
reasoning.  Education  and  social  surroundings  create  in  man  a 
second  nature,  moral  as  well  as  psychological. 

But,  precisely  because  it  is  a  second  nature,  it  cannot  be  looked 
upon  as  primary.  It  depends  on  something  else.  As  it  is  neither 
obligatory  nor  constant,  this  taste  cannot  be  the  moral  standard. 
Still  less  can  it  decide  which  of  two  feelings  must  prevail  in  case 
the  same  action  is  both  agreeable  or  disagreeable  from  different 
points  of  view.  Thus  a  physician  may  have  to  choose  between 
self-sacrifice  in  relieving  the  sufferings  of  a  man  having  a  conta- 
gious disease,  and  the  love  of  his  own  life  and  of  his  family.  In 
such  cases  appeal  must  be  made  to  some  other  norm  and  ideal. 
In  other  words,  we  may  speak  of  moral  taste,  but  a  rational  ex- 
planation of  it  must  be  given.  It  must  be  determined  why  certain 
actions  are  in  conformity  with,  and  others  in  opposition  to,  the 
moral  sense.  Thus  it  becomes  possible  to  criticize  the  actions  of 
others,  and  to  refer  them  to  certain  rules  which  are  not,  like  indi- 
vidual feelings,  subject  to  endless  variations.  In  fact,  all  admit 
that  there  is  a  depraved  and  a  correct  moral  taste,  and  therefore 
refer  it  to  some  higher  norm. 

3.  Benevolence.  —  (a)  According  to  Hutcheson,  man  is  moved 
by  two  kinds  of  affections,  self-love  and  benevolence.     In  case  of 
conflict  between  them,  the  moral  sense  decides  in  favor  of  benevo- 
lence, for  it  approves  actions  which  follow  from  a  desire  to  do  good 
to  others  without  regard  to  any  personal  advantage  to  be  derived 
from  them. 

(b)  Criticism.  —  This  is  only  one  side  of  the  question.  It  leaves 
out  the  duties  toward  self,  and  fails  to  account  for  the  obligatory 
character  of  the  moral  law.  If  self-abnegation  is  sublime,  its  foun- 
dation should  be  the  more  secure,  since  the  principle  of  obligation 
must  be  more  certain  in  proportion  as  the  sacrifice  imposed  is 
greater.  And  are  there  no  duties  toward  those  with  regard  to 
whom  no  benevolent  feelings  are  experienced,  but  who  excite 
feelings  of  antipathy,  often  unexplainable? 

4.  Sympathy.  —  (a)  Adam  Smith  proposes  the  feeling  of  sym- 
pathy as  fundamental  in  ethics.    By  sympathy  is  meant  the  ten- 


312  ETHICS 

dency  to  share  the  feelings  of  others,  to  suffer  when  they  are 
afflicted,  and  to  rejoice  when  they  are  joyful.  It  is  a  fact  that 
man  naturally  sympathizes  with  other  men,  and  chiefly  wants 
them  to  sympathize  with  him.  According  to  Smith,  sympathy 
is  not  only  a  fact,  but  a  principle  of  morality.  To  approve  or 
condemn  the  actions  of  others  is  simply  to  recognize  that  we  are, 
or  are  not,  in  sympathy  with  them,  and  that  we  also  should  feel 
right  or  wrong  if  we  performed  the  same  actions.  The  sentiment 
of  obligation  is  simply  the  fear  of  exciting  antipathy  in  others. 
Hence  one  must  endeavor  to  have  the  sympathy  of  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  men.  As  those  who  judge  the  value  of  actions 
may  be  more  or  less  depraved  and  prejudiced,  and  as  the  danger 
of  prejudice  is  greater  when  a  man  passes  a  judgment  on  the  value 
of  his  own  actions,  an  appeal  must  be  made  to  an  ideal  onlooker, 
disinterested  and  impartial.  It  is  his  sympathy  which  man  must 
try  to  deserve. 

(b)  Criticism.  —  Sympathy  as  the  rule  of  moral  conduct  is 
insufficient,  (i)  Like  all  other  feelings  it  varies  with  indi- 
viduals and  their  surroundings.  Those  who  live  in  corrupt  com- 
pany would  win  their  fellowmen's  sympathy  by  doing  wrong. 
(2)  It  is  not  obligatory.  It  is  at  most  a  fact,  not  a  law.  To  make 
it  a  guide  is  to  expose  oneself  to  the  danger  of  going  astray,  for 
not  all  forms  of  right  excite  sympathy,  nor  all  forms  of  wrong, 
antipathy.  (3)  To  appeal  to  an  impartial  onlooker  and  judge  is 
hardly  consistent  with  Smith's  theory.  This  ideal  judge  is  pre- 
cisely one  in  whom  abstraction  is  made  of  the  feelings  of  sympathy 
and  antipathy.  He  is  a  judge  who  bases  his  judgment  on  delib- 
erate reasonable  evidence.  Hence  the  criterion  of  feeling  is  aban- 
doned for  that  of  reason.  How  can  I  know  that  my  action  will  be 
approved  by  an  ideal  and  impartial  onlooker?  The  only  means 
is  to  reason  out  for  myself  whether  it  is  worthy  of  praise  or  of 
blame,  that  is,  to  find  out  by  reason  whether  it  is  morally  good 
or  bad. 

5.  Honor.  —  (a)  What  has  been  said  so  far  applies  also  to  all 
theories  which  base  morality  on  a  sense  of  honor.  Honor  is  a 
vague  term,  but,  in  its  most  common  meaning,  it  applies  to  a 
man's  reputation  as  based  especially  on  social  relations.  Every 


DISCUSSION     OF    MORAL     STANDARD      313 

condition  of  life  has  its  own  special  line  of  honor.  The  soldier's 
honor,  the  gentleman's  honor,  the  citizen's  honor,  nay,  even  the 
thief's  honor,  are  not  according  to  the  same  standard.  These 
meanings,  however,  are  not  strictly  ethical  —  not  all,  at  any  rate 
—  but  conventional.  They  are  based  on  custom,  etiquette,  habit, 
etc.  If  they  are  ethical,  they  do  not  refer  to  the  basis  of  moral- 
ity, but  only  to  certain  applications  of  it,  to  some  special  virtue 
or  behavior  characteristic  of  this  or  that  profession.  Hence  honor 
is  neither  a  universal  nor  a  constant  norm.  Nor  is  it  obligatory 
in  all  cases;  frequently  one  feels  that  its  precepts  are  not  at  all 
moral  obligations,  but  simply  rules  established  by  custom  and 
convention.  There  is  also  the  danger  of  making  of  this  sense  of 
honor  a  purely  external  affair,  and  of  paying  no  attention  to  secret 
wrong-doing  as  long  as  reputation  is  intact. 

(b)  This,  it  is  true,  is  a  false  and  hypocritical  sense  of  honor. 
True  and  genuine  honor  is  based  on  human  dignity.  It  refers  to 
self-approval  and  is  not  satisfied  with  merely  external  decorum. 
As  such  again,  it  is  not  fundamental.  True  honor  is  distinguished 
from  false  honor  by  reason,  not  by  feeling.  To  live  according  to 
true  honor  and  true  human  dignity  is  to  live  according  to  duty 
and  reason.  The  sense  of  honor,  although  it  must  be  inculcated 
and  cultivated  as  early  and  as  carefully  as  possible,  will  always 
remain  something  accessory  and  require  another  basis. 

III.  MORALITY  RELATIVE  TO  PLEASURE  AND  UTILITY 

i.  Theories  Outlined.  —  (a)  There  is  no  a  priori  reason  to 
oppose  duty  and  morality  to  pleasure  and  utility.  There  seem 
to  be  no  contradictory  elements  in  these  two  notions.  Nor  is  there 
any  reason  a  posteriori,  i.e.  from  experience.  The  accomplish- 
ment of  duty  is  frequently  pleasurable,  and  may  become  so  by 
practice  and  habit.  Even  when  the  action  is  difficult  and  cannot 
be  performed  without  checking  some  natural  tendency,  it  produces 
the  nobler  and  purer  happiness  resulting  from  the  satisfaction 
of  the  sense  of  duty,  whereas  acting  in  a  contrary  manner  will 
produce  the  painful  feeling  of  remorse  and  self-condemnation. 

(b)  From  this  it  does  not  follow  that  pleasure  and  duty  are 
identical.  There  are  many  kinds  of  pleasure,  all  of  which  per- 


314  ETHICS 

haps  are  not  in  conformity  with  duty.  Even  if  it  should  be  proved 
that  in  all  circumstances  duty  is  pleasurable,  the  two  notions 
would  nevertheless  be  distinct.  Duty  imposes  itself  as  an  obli- 
gatory end;  pleasure  does  not.  Even  where  right  conduct  is 
pleasant,  consciousness  testifies  that  it  is  not  right  because  it  is 
pleasant,  but  pleasant  because  it  is  right. 

(c)  Hedonism  (^So^,  pleasure)  is  a  doctrine  identifying  the 
moral  with  the  pleasurable,  and  holding  that  actions  are  good  or 
bad  according  to  their  pleasurable  or  painful  results.  It  has  two 
main  forms:  (i)  Egoistic  or  individual  hedonism,  which  considers 
only  the  agent's  personal  happiness.  (2)  Altruistic  or  universal 
hedonism,  which  considers  the  happiness  of  others,  or  of  the  great- 
est number  of  men.  This  latter  form  has  been  called  Utilitarian- 
ism by  Stuart  Mill,  its  chief  exponent. 

2.  Egoistic  Hedonism.  —  (a)  We  need  not  insist  on  systems 
looking  upon  morality  as  an  affair  of  personal  pleasure,  chiefly 
of  sensual  pleasure.  These  systems  have  come  to  be  condemned 
universally  as  lowering  man  to  the  level  of  the  brute,  (i)  In 
antiquity,  Aristippus  of  Cyrene  gives  as  a  rule  to  look  only  for  the 
present  and  immediate  pleasure  to  be  derived  from  an  action. 
The  end  of  man  is  happiness,  and,  as  the  future  is  uncertain, 
man  must  always  follow  the  instinct  that  prompts  him  to  strive 
after  the  greatest  sum  of  pleasure  in  the  present.  The  same  doc- 
trine found  advocates  among  the  French  materialists  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century.  (2)  Epicurus  insists  more  on  the  happiness  of 
life  as  a  whole.  True  happiness  does  not  consist  so  much  in  sen- 
sual pleasure  as  in  the  calmer,  purer,  and  more  lasting  pleasure 
of  the  soul.  Hence,  although  pleasure  is  the  end  of  man,  not  all 
pleasures  are  to  be  placed  on  the  same  level,  because  many  pleas- 
ures are  followed  by  pain,  and  pain  is  often  followed  by  pleasure. 
Prudence  and  judgment  are  necessary  to  know  which  pleasures 
are  to  be  chosen,  and  which  pains  are  to  be  avoided.  Hence, 
also,  the  necessity  of  virtue,  temperance,  honesty,  justice,  etc., 
which  are  conditions  of  true  pleasure.  This  moral  principle  is 
much  higher  and  nobler  than  that  of  Aristippus. 

(b)  Criticism,  (i)  To  identify  lightness  with  the  pleasure  of 
the  senses  is  to  vilify  human  nature,  to  look  merely  at  its  lowest 


DISCUSSION     OF    MORAL     STANDARD      315 

aspect,  and  to  neglect  its  highest  aspirations.  (2)  Pleasure  is 
not  an  end  but  a  means;  not  a  principle  but  an  effect.  The  end 
of  man  is  to  act  in  conformity  with  his  nature,  and  thus  to  exercise 
his  activity  and  develop  his  faculties.  Pleasure  may  result  from 
this,  and  the  desire  of  pleasure  may  stimulate  it,  but  it  is  not  the 
end.  (3)  Consciousness  shows  that  pleasure  is  not  obligatory, 
absolute,  and  universal,  hence  not  a  standard  of  morality.  Fre- 
quently pleasure  is  followed  by  remorse  of  conscience.  (4)  To 
apply  this  principle  of  hedonism  is  to  open  the  door  to  all  abuses. 
If  pleasure  is  the  end,  it  has  to  be  sought  and  enjoyed  at  whatever 
price,  and  in  whatever  circumstances.  No  room  is  left  for  dis- 
interested motives  and  self-sacrifice.  Personal  pleasure  may  be 
procured,  even  should  pain  be  thereby  inflicted  on  others. 

3.  Bentham's  System  is  fundamentally  egoistic  and  seconda- 
rily altruistic.  His  main  principles  are  the  following: 

(a)  Pleasure  is  the  only  good;  pain,  the  only  evil.     From  this 
principle  is  to  be  derived  the  only  standard  of  the  value  of  actions. 
An  action  is  useful,  and  consequently  good,  when  the  sum  of  its 
pleasurable  consequences  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  its  painful 
consequences. 

(b)  Pleasures  are  to  be  chosen  prudently.    Attention  must  be 
paid  to  their  (i)  intensity;  (2)  duration;  (3)  certainty  or  uncer- 
tainty; (4)  propinquity  or  remoteness;  (5)  fecundity,  i.e.  capacity 
of  producing  other  pleasures;   (6)  purity,  according  as  they  are, 
or  are  not,  mixed  with  pain;    (7)  extent,  i.e.  the  number  of  per- 
sons who  enjoy  them.    On  these  bases  Bentham  builds  an  arith- 
metical determination  of  good  and  bad  actions,  of  virtues  and 
vices,  according  to  the  quantity  of  pleasure  and  pain  that  results. 

(c)  Personal  and  universal  utility  are  inseparable.    Man  can- 
not live  and  be  happy  except  in  society.    Hence  it  is  necessary 
to  procure  pleasure  for  others  in  order  to  receive  some  from  them. 
Altruism  is  a  condition  of  true  egoism. 

Criticism.  —  (a)  To  this  system  are  opposed  all  the  reasons 
given  against  making  pleasure  the  standard  of  morality.  Per- 
sonal interest  is  not:  (i)  Obligatory  absolutely,  but  only  hypothet- 
ically.  In  order  to  succeed,  perhaps  the  merchant  must  be  honest, 
but  he  is  not  obliged  to  succeed.  (2)  Absolute  and  universal. 


316  ETHICS 

It  is  hardly  possible  to  find  anything  more  changeable  according 
to  persons,  conditions,  times,  and  places.  (3)  Practical.  Often 
the  consequences  are  unforeseen  before  acting,  and  yet  it  is  from 
them  alone  that  the  action  is  supposed  to  derive  its  whole  value. 
(4)  Safe.  If  personal  utility  and  pleasure  are  always  the  goal  of 
man,  it  will  not  always  be  true  that  "honesty  is  the  best  policy." 
It  will  be  true  only  when  the  lack  of  honesty  would  be  known  to 
others  so  as  to  become  a  source  of  pain. 

(b)  Bentham's   arithmetic  of  pleasures  is  impossible  because 
there  is  no  common  measure  applying  to  all.    Pleasures  vary  with 
individuals.     Consequently  Bentham's  calculations  to  show,  for 
instance,  that  drunkenness  is  immoral  because,  notwithstanding 
the  pleasures  which  it  procures,  the  pains  of  which  it  is  the  source 
are  more  numerous,  will  fail  to  convince  a  large  number  of  indi- 
viduals who  will  calculate  on  a  basis  different  from  that  of  Bentham. 
This  whole  arithmetic  is  a  matter  of  personal  taste. 

(c)  From  egoism  it  is  impossible  to  derive  altruism.    Even  if 
praise  and  reward,  or  blame  and  punishment  are  sources  of  pleas- 
ure and  pain,  and  if  man  must  seek  the  former  and  avoid  the  lat- 
ter, the  following  facts  remain,     (i)  Secret  actions,  like  theft  or 
murder,  would  be  good  if  productive  of  pleasure.     (2)  If  self- 
interest  is  primary,  it  is  primarily  worthy  of  praise.    Frequently 
a  man  knows  his  action  to  be  right  or  wrong  before  being  praised 
or  blamed  for  it.     (3)  Why  should  men  be  so  inclined  to  praise 
self-sacrifice  and  benevolence?    Benevolence  or  altruism  is  not  to 
be  derived  from  a  purely  egoistic  starting-point.    In  this  view,  it 
always  remains  a  means  toward  egoism  and  toward  securing  per- 
sonal pleasures.    It  is  at  most  an  indirect  altruism  in  the  service 
of  egoism. 

4.  Stuart  Mill.  —  While  admitting  also  that  happiness  is  the 
end  of  man  and  the  supreme  test  of  morality,  Stuart  Mill  modifies 
the  hedonistic  doctrine  on  two  important  points. 

(a)  It  is  not  enough  to  pay  attention  to  the  quantity  of  pleasure, 
as  Bentham  had  done,  but  pleasures  also  differ  in  quality.  Some 
are  higher,  nobler,  and  more  refined,  and  hence  to  be  preferred  to 
others,  not  because  they  are  greater,  but  because  they  are  superior 
in  quality.  This  qualitative  determination  depends  both  on  the 


DISCUSSION     OF     MORAL     STANDARD      317 

pleasurable  object  and  on  the  faculty  in  which  the  feeling  resides. 
"It  is  better  to  be  a  human  being  dissatisfied  than  a  pig  sat- 
isfied; better  to  be  a  Socrates  dissatisfied  than  a  fool  satisfied.'* 
(Utilitarianism,  ch.  II.) 

(b)  It  is  not  true  that  individual  and  general  interests  are  insep- 
arable; they  may  conflict.    The  aim  of  man  is  to  work,  not  for  any 
personal  interest,  nor  even  for  the  private  interest  of  a  family  or 
a  nation,  but  for  the  general  good  of  humanity.    The  standard  of 
morality  is  the  greatest  and  truest  happiness  taken  altogether. 
Hence   "to  do  as  you    would  be  done  by,  and  to  love  your 
neighbor  as  yourself,  constitute  the  ideal  perfection  of  utilitarian 
morality."     (Utilitarianism,  ch.  II.) 

(c)  Mill's  system  of  morality  must  be  taken  together  with  his 
psychological  doctrine  of  associationism.    Moral  feeling,   duty, 
conscience,  self-approbation,  remorse,  etc.,  result  from  the  asso- 
ciations of  certain  actions  with  the  subsequent  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  displeasure.    Hence  actions  performed  at  first  for  the  sole  mo- 
tive of  personal  interest,  are  little  by  little  considered  as  good. 
Morality  is  thus  largely,  if  not  exclusively,  dependent  on  associa- 
tion and  habit,  and  consequently  arbitrary  and  artificial,  varying 
with  times,  places,  and  other  circumstances. 

Criticism.  —  This  conception  of  morality  is  nobler  than  that  of 
Bentham,  and,  on  many  points,  will  give  a  satisfactory  line  of 
conduct.  Yet  it  is  insufficient. 

(a)  To  appeal  to  a  distinction  between  the  quantity  and  the 
quality  of  pleasure  is  to  renounce  the  principle  that  pleasure  is 
the  end  of  man  and  the  norm  of  morality.  Some  pleasures  are 
said  to  be  more  desirable  than  others,  not  on  account  of  their  pleas- 
antness, but  on  account  of  their  purity,  nobleness,  disinterested- 
ness, beauty,  etc.,  i.e.  on  account  of  something  else  which  is  itself 
primarily  desirable.  How  shall  we  know  which  pleasures  are 
qualitatively  superior  unless  we  appeal  to  reason,  which,  indepen- 
dently of  the  pleasant  character  of  experiences,  pronounces  that  the 
satisfaction  of  some  faculties  and  aspirations  is  preferable  to  that 
of  others?  How  shall  we  convince  the  thief  and  the  sensual  man 
that  their  pleasures  are  inferior  in  nature  to  other  pleasures  unless 
we  go  beyond  the  hedonistic  principle? 


3l8  ETHICS 

(b)  If  interest  is  the  only  standard,  why  should  an  individual 
prefer  the  general  good  to  his  own  private  advantage?    This  can- 
not be  shown  to  be  obligatory  without  introducing  again  some 
higher  standard.    If  pleasure  is  the  end  of  man,  my  pleasure  is 
my  end,  and  it  is  what  /  am  entitled  to  reach)  even  if  I  do  not  thereby 
foster  the  happiness  of  mankind.    On  a  mere  utilitarian  basis, 
nobody  can  show  me  that  I  am,  in  any  circumstance  whatsoever, 
obliged  to  sacrifice  myself  for  the  good  of  others.    It  is  necessary 
in  this  case  to  show  that  there  is  an  absolute  order,  an  ideal  of 
reason,  and  a  duty  different  from  pleasure.    The  principle  of  altru- 
istic utilitarianism  throws  no  light  on  the  duties  of  man  toward 
himself.    Even  with  regard  to  altruistic  duties,  it  is  far  from  clear, 
for  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  what  will  be  the  good  of  mankind  in 
general. 

(c)  Undoubtedly  the  association  of  ideas  is  an  important  factor 
in  ethics,  and  on  it,  to  a  great  extent,  current  ideas  of  morality 
depend.    But  it  is  insufficient,     (i)  Certain  principles  of  morality 
are  demonstrable,  and  based  on  reason.    As  was  shown  in  Psychol- 
ogy mere  habitual  sequence  will  not  of  itself  produce  the  feeling  of 
"oughtness"  any  more  than  it  can  produce  a  universal  and  neces- 
sary judgment.    When  I  reflect  on  it,  the  habit  of  lying  does  not 
destroy   the    conviction  that  it  is   wrong,   even    though   lying 
should  bring  me  some  advantage.    On  the  other  hand,  the  habit  of 
washing  one's  face  and  hands  every  morning,  of  smoking  tobacco, 
etc.,  produces  no  feeling  of  moral  obligation.     Moral  obligation, 
therefore,  rests  on  something  else.    (2)  If  habits  are  the  very  start- 
ing-point of  morality,  they  are  of  themselves  indifferent  or  non- 
moral.    Hence  I  may  change  them  as  I  please.    Thus  it  becomes 
perfectly  lawful  to  stifle  the  voice  of  conscience  and  to  refuse  to 
heed  remorse,  since  all  these  are  simply  results  of  non-moral  asso- 
ciations.    Conscience  will  disappear  by  the  same  means  which 
gave  rise  to  it,  and  with  equal  right. 

5.  Spencer's  addition  to  utilitarianism,  namely,  the  position 
he  gives  it  in  his  general  scheme  of  universal  evolution,  does  not 
remedy  its  intrinsic  weakness.  According  to  him,  primitive  man 
is  exclusively  egoistic.  Soon  he  perceives  that  his  own  personal 
interest  will  gain  by  associating  with  others,  and  doing  them  good. 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL    STANDARD      319 

Little  by  little,  altruistic  feelings  arise  and  struggle  with  egoism. 
This  is  the  present  state  of  humanity,  but  the  day  will  come  when 
altruism  will  have  conquered,  and  be  natural  to  man.  Then, 
and  only  then,  will  Comte's  fundamental  principle  of  ethics  be 
realizable:  "Live  for  others." 

This  system  does  not  explain  the  character  of  obligation.  It 
tells  us  what  conscience  dictates;  it  cannot  tell  us  why  it  has  the 
right  to  dictate.  Moreover,  as  was  remarked  against  Mill,  if 
the  moral  views  which  man  has  to-day  are  the  artificial  products 
of  evolution  and  of  adaptation  to  surroundings,  man  cannot  be 
obliged  morally  to  respect  them.  There  can  be  at  most  a  certain 
organic  and  mental  necessity  resulting  from  habit.  All  that  man 
can  do  is  to  follow  blindly  his  hereditary  tendencies,  good  and  bad, 
and  this  is  precisely  against  true  morality. 

6.  Solidarity.  —  A  word  must  also  be  said  of  solidarity.  It  is 
a  fact  that  no  man  is  independent.  All  men  form  one  body,  and 
receive  advantages  from  the  other  members  of  society.  Hence 
man  is  obliged  to  return  these,  to  work  for  others  as  others  have 
worked  for  him,  to  behave,  not  merely  as  an  individual,  but  as  a 
part  of  a  whole.  He  must  respect  others,  as  well  as  himself. 

There  is  much  that  is  true  in  this  view;  but  it  presupposes  a 
deeper  basis.  Even  if  solidarity  is  a  fact,  it  is  not  a  duty  until 
appeal  is  made  to  higher  principles  of  justice  which  oblige  a  man 
to  return  what  he  receives.  And  even  this  justice  and  obligation 
must  rest  on  some  other  principle  of  reason  antecedent  to  the 
fact  of  solidarity. 

IV.  MORALITY  DEPENDENT  ON  REASON 

Morality  is  dependent  on  reason,  but  how?  We  have  now  to 
examine  briefly  the  various  systems  proposed  in  this  direction. 
"Morality  for  its  own  sake,  and  independently  of  the  results  which 
the  moral  action  may  have,"  such  would  be  the  motto  of  those 
moralists  whom  we  are  to  study.  They  stand  at  the  opposite  ex- 
treme of  those  according  to  whom,  as  we  have  seen,  morality 
depends  primarily  on  the  results  of  human  actions.  The  moral 
action  is  an  end,  not  a  means  subordinate  to  something  else,  as 
hedonists  assert.  Resulting  pleasure  and  utility  have  nothing 


320  ETHICS 

to  do  in  the  determination  of  the  moral  aspect  of  an  action.    The 
norm  of  morality  is  reason  alone  with  its  practical  dictates. 

1.  Stoics.  —  (a)  According  to  the  Stoics,  virtue,  i.e.  action  in 
conformity  with  the  laws  of  human  nature,  is  the  only  good,  and 
vice,  i.e.  action  against  the  laws  of  human  nature,  the  only  evil, 
(i)  Since  human  nature  consists  essentially  in  reason,  which  dif- 
ferentiates it  from  other  natures,  virtue  is  a  mode  of  action  in  con- 
formity with  reason.     (2)  Virtue  must  be  sought  for  its  own  sake,  and 
is  its  own  reward  and  the  only  happiness.    To  act  for  any  ulterior 
end  and  any  other  reward  or  happiness  is  wrong.     (3)  All  other 
things,  sometimes  called  good,  like  health,  reputation,  pleasure,  etc., 
are  not  really  so;  nor  are  pain,  disease,  ignominy,  etc.,  real  evils. 
They  are  given  no  attention  by  the  wise.     (4)  All  feelings  and 
emotions  are  opposed  to  reason.    To  subdue  them,  and  reach  a 
complete  apathy  is  the  duty  of  man.    The  wise  man  is  not  subject 
to,  or  rather  not  affected  by,  pleasure  or  pain,  fear  or  desire,  etc. 
Even  the  pleasure  found  in  the  practice  of  virtue  should  never 
be  an  end,  but  only  a  consequence  of  virtue. 

(b)  This  view,  however  much  truth  it  may  contain,  is  based  on 
an  incomplete  psychology.  Virtue  is  necessary  to  happiness,  but 
other  conditions  are  also  required.  The  man  who  suffers  physi- 
cally or  mentally  is  not  completely  happy.  Pain  is  a  true  evil, 
although  not  a  moral  one.  Moreover,  human  nature  includes  emo- 
tions no  less  essentially  than  it  includes  reason.  That  feelings  should 
be  controlled  is  true.  That  they  should  be  suppressed  is  against 
reason  itself,  which  must  recognize  them,  and  finds  in  them, 
sometimes  enemies,  it  is  true,  but  sometimes  also  allies. 

2.  Kant.  —  The  essential  points  in  Kant's  fundamental  ethics 
may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

(a)  The  existence  of  the  moral  law  is  a  primitive  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, universal  and  necessary.     "Oughtness"  manifests  it- 
self clearly  to  the  mind.    It  is  not  derived  from  any  motive  like 
pleasure  or  happiness,  but  is  autonomous,  and  imposes  itself  for 
its  own  sake,  independently  of  anything  else. 

(b)  Hence  the  moral  law  is  a  categorical  imperative.    An  imper- 
ative because  it   does  not   merely  advise  or   recommend,   but 
commands   strictly,   and   imposes   an   obligation.    A   categorical 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL    STANDARD      321 

imperative  because  it  is  unconditional.  A  conditional  imperative 
would  make  the  command  dependent  on  a  condition,  as  "Trans- 
act this  business  in  such  or  such  a  way  if  thou  wouldst  be 
successful."  But  the  categorical  imperative  is  subject  to  no 
condition,  and,  for  instance,  without  any  restriction  or  ulterior 
end,  commands:  "Thou  shalt  not  lie." 

(c)  The  only  moral  action  is  that  which  is  performed  out  of 
respect  for  the  moral  law  itself,  and  disregards  all  other  ends  and 
results.     "Good-will,"  i.e.  the  will  to  act  in  conformity  with  duty, 
is  the  only  real  good.     Goodness  or  Tightness  is  not  antecedent, 
but  consequent  to  obligation.    An  action  is  not  obligatory  because 
it  is  good,  but  it  is  good  because  it  is  obligatory  and  performed  out 
of  respect  for  the  moral  law. 

(d)  The  two  most  important  principles  which  must  be  kept  in 
mind  for  the  concrete  determination  of  moral  actions  are:  (i)  "So 
act  as  to  treat  humanity,  whether  in  thine  own  person  or  in  that  of 
any  other,  in  every  case  as  an  end  withal,  never  as  a  means  only." 
Reasonable  and  free  will  is  that  which  constitutes  essentially  human 
personality,  and  since  it  is  absolute,  it  should  never  be  made  an 
instrument  destined  to  gratify  passions  or  desires.     (2)  "So  act 
that  the  maxim  of  thy  will  can  always  at  the  same  time  'hold  good 
as  a  principle  of  universal  legislation,"  i.e.  Never  perform  an  action 
which  thou  wouldst  not  allow  to  be  performed  by  everybody  else. 
Thus,  in  my  individual  case,  breaking  a  promise  is  wrong,  because, 
if  it  were  admitted  to  be  right  for  me,  it  should  be  right  for  all 
men.    Hence  there  could  be  no  faith  at  all  in  promises.    Promises 
themselves  would  therefore  cease  to  be  made,  and  the  maxim  that 
promises  may  be  broken  lawfully  would  thus  destroy  itself.    Hence, 
since  it  is  not  lawful  for  all  men  to  break  promises,  it  is  not  lawful 
in  my  individual  case.    This  principle  is  the  practical  test  of  mo- 
rality, and  its  application  will   lead  to  the  realization  of  the 
supreme  moral  ideal,  a  "republic  of  ends,"  in  which  men  will  re- 
spect and  help  one  another  out  of  pure  respect  for  the  moral  law. 

Criticism.  —  Kant's  system  contains  a  great  number  of  true  and 
noble  principles.  He  brings  duty  to  the  foreground  instead  of 
making  it  a  mere  result  derived  from  utility,  and  subordinated 
to  it.  He  shows  the  dignity  of  the  human  person  and  insists  on 

22 


322  ETHICS 

its  intrinsic  value.  Without  showing  here  the  place  of  ethics  in 
Kant's  whole  system  of  philosophy,  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to 
some  remarks  concerning  his  moral  teaching. 

(a)  Human  nature,  precisely  because  it  is  reasonable,  will  always 
ask  for  the  reason  why  any  command  should  be  obeyed.     To  obey 
blindly  a  law  which  man  finds  within  himself,  without  inquiring 
if  the  law  is  valid  and  binding,  is  not  reasonable.    The  law  must 
exhibit  its  claim  to  man's  obedience.    To  examine  this  claim  is 
to  examine  something  anterior  to  the  law,  some  good  which  the  law 
presupposes  but  does  not  create.    The  principle  that  this  law 
makes  the  goodness  of  actions  is  therefore  in  contradiction  with 
reason.    Far  from  being  autonomy,  as  Kant  calls  it,  it  is  pure 
despotism. 

(b)  Moreover,  if  the  will  is  autonomous,  it  is  so  for  all  men, 
good  or  bad;  for  all  consciences,  right  or  wrong;  and  Kant  has  no 
means  of  proving  the  existence  of  the  categorical  imperative  which 
he  experiences  to  another  man  who  does  not  experience  it.    Even 
when  the  categorical  imperative  is  accepted,  since  man  is  autono- 
mous, and  since  the  will  is  the  only  principle  of  obligation,  he  may 
transgress  its  commands  without  any  injustice.    Hence  Kant's 
categorical  imperative  is  really  hypothetical:  "Obey  duty  if  thou 
wilt  live  conformably  to  reason."    Why  should  I  treat  humanity 
in  myself  and  in  others  as  an  end,  and  not  as  a  means,  if  not  because 
this  is  recognized  as  good  before  my  practical  reason  commands  it? 

(c)  Good-will,  says  Kant,  is  the  will  of  performing  duty  for  its 
own  sake,  independently  of  any  feeling.    This  exclusion  of  pleas- 
ure as  vitiating  morality  is  excessive.    A  mother  attends  to  her  sick 
child  because  she  loves  him.     Who  will  condemn  her  on  that 
ground?    And  who  will  say  that  the  philanthropist  is  not  perform- 
ing moral  actions,  or  that  his  will  is  not  good,  when  he  helps  his 
fellowmen  out  of  sympathy  and  pity? 

(d)  Kant's  ethics  fail  to  distinguish    between  the  obligatory 
and  the  non-obligatory  good.    There  are  things  which  I  may  do, 
although  I  am  not  obliged  to  do  them,  like  helping  the  ordinary 
poor  man  on  the  street,  or  giving  him  more  than  he  strictly  needs. 
Even  if  the  categorical  imperative  clearly  commands  or  forbids 
certain  actions,  conscience  does  not  merely  command;    some- 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL     STANDARD      323 

times  it  permits  or  counsels,  and  this  is  no  less  an  immediate 
fact  than  the  categorical  imperative.  To  fulfil  all  strict  obliga- 
tions is  only  one  aspect  of  morality.  Many  morally  good  actions 
are  not  obligatory. 

(e)  The  norm  of  the  morality  of  individual  actions,  namely,  the 
possibility  of  their  being  universalized  into  general  principles,  good 
as  it  is  as  a  negative  guide  telling  what  to  avoid,  is  insufficient 
as  a  positive  guide  telling  what  to  do.  In  short,  Kant  has  not  taken 
a  complete  view  of  man  and  of  all  the  exigencies  of  human  nature. 

V.  THE  ULTIMATE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  MORAL  LAW 

1.  Human  Nature.  —  The  moral  good  consists  essentially  in 
the  conformity  of  an  action  with  human  nature  considered  both  in 
itself  and  in  its  relations  with  other  men.     Human  nature  is  not 
merely  reason,  nor  feelings,  nor  will,  and  on  this  ground  we  reject 
the  systems  mentioned  above.    All  contain  some  truth,  but  con- 
sider only  one  aspect  of  human  nature.    Their  point  of  view  is 
too  narrow.     Emphasizing  the  claims  of  the  feelings,  utilitarians 
neglect  those  of  reason.    They  fail  to  see  the  intrinsic  value  of 
actions,  and  look  only  at  the  value  of  their  results.     Kant,  on 
the  contrary,  considers  only  reason  and  will,  and  has  no  regard 
whatever  for  the  results  of  actions. 

The  view  which  was  explained  above  recognizes  the  claims  of 
both.  It  is  more  complete,  and  more  in  accordance  with  human 
nature  as  a  whole.  It  alone  accounts  for  the  distinction  between 
that  which  is  obligatory  and  that  which  is  good  without  being 
imposed,  because  certain  things  are  strictly  required  by  human 
nature,  while  others  are  in  accordance  with  it,  but  not  necessary. 
Right  and  wrong  are  known  by  comparing  actions  with  the  exi- 
gencies of  man's  rational  nature.  This  is  the  true  norm  or  stand- 
ard according  to  which  the  morality  of  actions  should  be  judged. 

2.  Reason  Not  Autonomous.  —  Hence  morality  rests  on  human 
reason  as  the  standard  according  to  which  the  value  of  human  ac- 
tions is  measured.    But  is  reason  the  ultimate  and  self-sufficient 
foundation  of  morality?    To  this  question  we  must  answer  that, 
while  reason  manifests  what  is  right  and  what  is  wrong,  what  is 
obligatory  and  what  is  optional,  it  does  not  make  it  so.    It  shows 


324  ETHICS 

in  what  direction  we  should  act,  but  does  not  create  the  obliga- 
tion. We  have  here  something  similar  to  what  takes  place 
in  the  knowledge  of  truth.  Reason  is  not  free  to  declare  certain 
things  true  or  false,  but  it  must  conform  to  evidence.  It  perceives 
truths  that  exist  independently  of  itself.  In  the  same  way,  the 
moral  good  is  not  made,  but  only  perceived,  by  reason.  Hence 
in  neither  case  can  reason  be  called  autonomous,  since  it  must 
conform  to  the  nature  of  things. 

3.  The  Ultimate  Basis  of  Morality.  —  (a)  Can  we  say  that  the 
will  is  autonomous  and,  of  itself,  obliges  man  to  act  according  to 
the  dictates  of  reason?  In  other  words:  Why  is  the  moral  good, 
in  some  cases  at  least,  obligatory  ?  Whence  comes  the  strict  duty  of 
acting  in  conformity  with  our  rational  nature?  No  man  can  give 
me  a  binding  order  without  showing  his  credentials,  and  without 
being  my  superior.  I  will  not  consider  a  law  as  valid  unless  it  is 
enacted  by  the  proper  authority.  There  is  no  law  without  a  law- 
giver. Who  is  the  lawgiver  in  the  moral  order?  (i)  Some 
answer  that  obligation  results  from  the  very  nature  of  the  moral 
good,  which  is  sufficient  to  give  rise  to  a  strict  duty.  (2)  Kant, 
on  the  contrary,  asserts  that  duty  is  the  primitive  fact,  and  that 
an  action  is  good  because  it  is  prescribed.  (3)  In  both  cases, 
reason  is  looked  upon  as  independent  of  any  higher  authority, 
and  as  the  sufficient  and  ultimate  source  of  obligation. 

(b)  This  view  cannot  be  accepted.  The  moral  law  is  not  explain- 
able finally  without  rising  above  human  nature  to  God  Himself  as 
the  author  of  human  nature  and  of  every  reality,  and  as  the 
supreme  ruler  of  the  world.  Duty  necessarily  implies  two  terms, 
an  authority  and  a  subject,  a  superior  who  imposes  the  law  and  an 
inferior  who  must  comply  with  it.  Hence  man  cannot  be  his  own 
lawgiver.  An  obligation  which  would  arise  primarily  from  human 
reason  or  will  leaves  man  alone  with  himself,  and  consequently 
ceases  to  be  a  real  obligation.  "It  is  good"  does  not  mean  the 
same  as  "You  ought."  An  action  is  good  because  it  is  in  conform- 
ity with  human  nature,  but  the  duty  to  live  in  conformity  with 
human  nature  supposes  a  superior  intelligence  as  the  source  of  the 
moral  order,  and  a  superior  will  as  the  lawgiver  who  commands 
us  to  respect  this  order. 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL    STANDARD      325 

(c)  We  are  thus  led  to  this  dilemma:  Human  reason  either 
makes  the  law  or  simply  perceives  it.    In  the  first  supposition, 
the  law  ceases  to  be  authoritative  and  stable.    What  reason  has 
done  it  can  undo  and  modify;  duty  no  longer  exists.    We  must 
therefore  accept  the  second  supposition,  that  reason  knows  a  law 
which  is  universal,  superior  to  the  reason  that  perceives  it  and  to 
the  will  on  which  it  is  imposed;  and  which,  consequently,  comes 
from  God  Himself.    It  is  in  my  power  to  break  the  moral  law,  but 
I  know  that  it  persists  even  when  it  is  violated.    If  the  moral 
order  does  not  rest  on  God,  it  is  but  an  abstraction,  an  idea  of  the 
human  mind,  and  why  should  we  bow  before  it?    Shall  we  be 
accountable  to  a  mere  idea  for  our  actions?    If  this  idea  is  able 
to  rule,  and  to  impose  an  obligation,  it  is  because  it  is  the  idea  of 
God  Himself,  the  source  of  the  moral  order. 

(d)  Hence  God  is  not  necessary  as  the  criterion  of  our  knowledge 
of  right  and  wrong,  but  as  the  only  foundation  on  which  the  moral 
law  can  rest  ultimately.    Without  knowing  God,  I  may  know 
my  duty,  but  I  cannot  account  for  it.     God's  law  is  not  given 
from  without  —  except  in  the  case  of  positive  divine  law,  with 
which  we  are  not  concerned  here  —  but  from  within,  through 
our  reasonable  nature.     Yet  this   natural   law   must   rest   on, 
and   derive   its  validity  from,  the  eternal  law,  i.e.  the  wisdom 
of  God  ordering  all  things,  and  the  will  of   God  commanding 
that  this  order  be  preserved.    The  binding  force  of  conscience 
can  come  only  from  the  fact  that  it  is  the  voice  of  God  within 
ourselves. 

4.  Summary.  —  We  may  therefore  conclude  that  psycholog- 
ical analysis  alone  does  not  suffice  to  furnish  us  with  the  ultimate 
foundation  of  morality.  Good  as  far  as  it  goes,  it  necessarily 
leaves  something  unexplained.  Human  reason  gives  only  the 
contents  or  material  elements  of  morality:  namely,  it  tells  us  what  is 
right  and  what  is  wrong.  The  formal  element  of  morality,  or  duty, 
which  is  known  through  reason,  can  be  derived  only  from  God.  Hence 
ethics  is  intimately  bound  to  metaphysics  and  religion.  An  im- 
manent obligation,  i.e.  an  obligation  which  is  recognized  within 
oneself,  supposes  a  transcendent  ruler,  i.e.  a  superior  being  dis- 
tinct from  human  reason  and  will.  To  discover  a  true  law,  a  true 


326  ETHICS 

obligation,  is  ipso  facto  to  find  oneself  in  presence  of  a  higher 
intelligence  and  will,  in  presence  of  God  Himself. 

VI.  CONCLUSION 

1.  Responsibility.  —  From  the  existence  of  duty  follows  respon- 
sibility, i.e.  the  imputability  to  the  agent  of  the  actions  which  he  per- 
forms.   Responsibility  presupposes  the  knowledge  of  the  morality 
of  an  action,  and  freedom  in  performing  it.    Hence  responsibility 
varies  with  the  degree  of  freedom   and  knowledge.    Whatever 
affects  these   conditions    affects   also   responsibility.      As   these 
conditions  are  not  known  to  any  one  but  the  agent,  it  follows  that 
others,  while  being  justified  in  passing  judgment  on  the  value  of 
an  action  in  itself,  should  abstain  from  passing  judgment  on  the 
agent.     "Judge  not,"  since  you  have  no  sufficient  data  to  judge 
others.    You  know  what  they  do,  but  you  are  ignorant  of  the 
hidden  springs  that  prompt  them  to  act. 

2.  Virtue    is  the  habit  of  doing  right;  vice,  the  habit  of  doing 
wrong.    Virtue  has  many  degrees.    It  may  stop  at  that  which  is 
strictly  obligatory,  or  may  extend  to  actions  that  are  good,  but  not 
prescribed.    In  every  case,  it  must  avoid  extremes.    The  prin- 
ciples "Ne  quid  nimis  "  and  "In  medio  stat  virtus  "  express  an 
important  truth.    In  all  things,  not  only  defect,  but  also  excess, 
is  reprehensible. 

3.  Sanction.  —  (a)  Every  law  must  have  a  sanction;  rewards 
for  those  who  respect  it,  and  penalties  for  those  who  violate  it. 
A  sanction  is  a  necessity  of  justice,  since,  without  it,  the  law  can 
be  violated  with  impunity.    To  be  perfect,  it  should  be  universal, 
i.e.  reach  all  men  and  all  actions,  and  be  proportionate  to  the 
degree  of  merit  or  demerit. 

(b)  The  main  sanctions  of  the  moral  law  are:  (i)  The  legal 
sanction,  i.e.  that  which,  in  some  cases,  comes  from  the  civil  law. 
(2)  The  social  sanction,  i.e.  of  public  opinion.     (3)  The  natural 
sanction,  i.e.  the  various  physical,  physiological,  and  mental  ad- 
vantages and   disadvantages   resulting  from   the   observance  or 
neglect  of  moral  laws.     (4)  The  moral  sanction,  i.e.  satisfaction 
and  remorse. 

(c)  That  none  of  these  sanctions  is  sufficient  is  almost  self- 


DISCUSSION    OF    MORAL    STANDARD      327 

evident,  for  they  are  neither  universal  nor  proportionate.  Human 
justice  can  reach  neither  all  men  nor  all  actions,  and  is  sometimes 
mistaken.  The  same  is  true  of  public  opinion,  of  natural  sanctions, 
and  of  satisfaction  and  remorse.  Their  value  depends  on  habit 
and  on  the  delicacy  of  one's  conscience.  Nor  are  such  sanctions 
in  proportion  to  merit.  Hence,  if  there  is  a  true  sanction,  if 
ultimately  all  things  are  to  be  righted,  there  must  be  a  final 
sanction  beyond  this  life.  Otherwise  the  moral  world  lacks 
rationality  and  order.  And  here  again  we  are  led  to  God  as  the 
Supreme  Judge,  who  alone,  in  His  infinite  science  and  justice,  can 
give  to  every  man  what  he  has  merited  by  his  deeds.  It  is  not  to 
himself,  nor  to  other  men,  but  to  God,  as  the  author  of  the  moral 
order,  that  man  is  ultimately  accountable  for  his  actions. 


CHAPTER  II 

APPLIED  ETHICS 

We  shall  now  endeavor  to  indicate  man's  most  important  duties, 
and  this  determination  will  be  based  on  the  principle  enunciated 
above,  namely,  the  exigencies  of  the  rational  nature  of  man  as  the 
basis  of  his  rights  and  duties.  First,  however,  it  is  necessary  to 
say  a  few  words  about  rights  and  duties  in  general. 

RIGHT  AND  DUTY 

1.  Meaning  of  Right  and  Duty.  —  All  men  and  societies  insist 
on  their  rights.    Disputes,  lawsuits,  and  wars  are  undertaken  in 
order  to  protect  real  or  imaginary  rights.   Less,  perhaps  too  little,  is 
heard  about  the  correlative  of  right,  namely,  duty,  and  we  are  more 
prone  to  assert  our  rights  than  to  think  of  our  duties.      As  a  sub- 
stantive, a  right  is  the  moral  power  which  a  person  has  to  do,  omit, 
or  exact  certain  things.    Duty  corresponds  to  right.    Whenever  a 
man  has  a  right,  others  have  the  duty  to  leave  him  free  in  the 
exercise  of  it.     Duty,  therefore,  is  the   moral   obligation  to  do  or 
omit  certain  things. 

A  right  is  called  a  moral,  not  a  physical,  power.  Yet  rights 
may  be  exacted;  and  the  power  of  coercion,  especially  by  legal 
authority,  is  a  consequence  of  the  moral  power.  Duty  is  also  a 
moral  obligation,  not  a  physical  necessity.  Man  is  free  to  fulfil 
it  or  not.  A  right  is  inviolable,  i.e.  even  if  another  man  fails  to 
respect  it,  it  nevertheless  remains;  for  instance,  stolen  property 
continues  to  belong  to  the  original  owner. 

2.  Division  of  Rights  and  Duties.  —  (a)  Rights  are: 

(i)  natural,  i.e.,  resulting  from  human  nature  itself,  and  the  essential 
order  of  things;  hence  they  are  equal  in  all  men.  They  are  the  rights 

(a)  to  be,  i.e.  to  life  and  the  necessaries  of  life. 

(b)  to  do,  i.e.  to  the  free  exercise  of  one's  faculties  within  due  limits. 

(c)  to  have,  i.e.  to  the  possession  of  the  means  of  living. 

328 


II. 


III. 


I. 


RIGHT    AND    DUTY  329 

(2)  acquired,  e.g.  the  right  to  own  a  determined  property,  to  exact  cer- 
tain work  from  a  hired  servant,  to  exact  wages  for  one's  labor,  etc. 

(1)  absolute,  which  involve  duties  on  the  part  of  all  other  persons,  e.g. 

the  right  of  ownership  of  a  certain  property. 

(2)  relative,  which  involve  duties  only  on  the  part  of  some,  e.g.  the 

rights  of  parents  with  regard  to  their  children,  of  a  buyer  with 
regard  to  the  vender,  etc. 

(1)  real,  i.e.  to  possess  a  thing  already  acquired. 

(2)  personal,  i.e.  to  acquire  a  thing  by  compelling  a  person  to  give  it. 

In  the  former  case,  the  object  is  mine,  in  the  latter,  I  can  force  a 
person  to  do  certain  things  in  my  behalf. 

Duties  are: 

(1)  positive,  when  they  command  what  must  be  done. 

(2)  negative,  when  they  forbid  what  must  not  be  done. 


N.B.  Many  duties  may  be  expressed  in  both  a  positive  and  a 
negative  way.  Positive  duties  bind  to  act  in  such  or  such  a  way 
only  at  the  time  for  which  the  action  is  commanded.  Negative 
duties  oblige  at  all  tunes.  For  instance,  it  is  never  lawful  to  steal, 
whereas  a  man  is  not  bound  to  give  alms  all  the  time.  Negative 
duties  are  more  elementary;  they  simply  forbid  evil.  Positive 
duties  command  to  do  good. 


II. 


(1)  natural,  based  on  natural  rights. 

(2)  positive,  depending  on  positive  laws. 


Note  the  two  meanings  of  positive,  one  opposed  to  negative, 
the  other  to  natural. 


III. 


(1)  personal,  toward  self. 

(2)  social,  toward  others. 


IV.   regarding  (i)  external  goods  (property). 

(2)  bodily  goods  (e.g.  life,  health). 

(3)  spiritual  goods  (e.g.  truth,  dignity,  freedom). 

N.B.  The  duties  toward  God,  which  are  the  most  important, 
should  occupy  the  first  place  here.    As,  however,  they  suppose 


330  ETHICS 

some  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God  and  of  the  relations 
of  man  to  God,  it  will  be  more  convenient  to  speak  of  them  in 
Theodicy. 

3.  Relations  of  Rights  and  Duties,     (a)  In  the  same  person, 
right  and  duty  are  intimately  connected.    A  right  is  generally 
based  on  a  duty,  and  man  has  the  duty  before  he  has  the  right. 
In  other  words,  the  reason  why  man  has  rights  is  that  their 
exercise  is  necessary  to  fulfil  certain  duties.    Thus  the  rights  of 
parents  are  based  on  their  duty  to  educate  their  children;  the 
rights   of  civil    authorities  are  based   on    their   duties   toward 
society,  etc.     All  rights  are  based  on  the  fundamental  duty  of 
every  man  to  reach  his  rational  end. 

(b)  In  different  persons,  right  and  duty  are  correlative,  in  such 
a  way  that  a  right  is  prior  to  the  corresponding  duty,  since  the 
duty  is  the  obligation  to  respect  the  rights  of  others.    To  all  rights 
correspond  duties.    To  all  duties  do  not  necessarily  correspond 
rights  in  the  strict  sense,  but  only  to  duties  based  on  justice. 
Thus  it  may  be  my  duty  to  give  alms,  yet  another  man  has  not, 
on  this  ground,  any  right  to  my  property,  nor  can  he,  for  instance, 
exact  it  before  the  courts. 

(c)  Rights  are  subordinated,  not  opposed.    Hence  in  the  case  of 
apparent  conflict,  one  predominates,  namely,  the  stricter  —  e.g. 
life    compared    to    property;    the  more  extensive  —  e.g.   social 
compared  to  individual  good;  the  clearer  —  e.g.  parents  have  a 
clearer  claim  to  be  helped  by  their  children  than  strangers.    The 
same  is  true  of  duties.     Sometimes  they  seem  to  be  opposed  and 
cannot  be  fulfilled  at  the  same  time.    In  this  case,  their  relative 
value  or  excellence  and  their  extension  must  be  considered,  and  the 
more  important  must  prevail.    Thus  moral  is  to  be  preferred  to 
temporal  good,  life  to  riches,  etc. 

4.  The  Subjects  of  Rights  and  Duties  are  only  persons,  i.e.  in- 
telligent and  free  agents.    Rights  and  duties  suppose  a  capacity 
for  moral  obligation  and  moral  power.     Hence,  strictly  speaking, 
animals  have  no  rights,  and  man  has  no  duties  toward  them. 
However,  man  owes  to  himself  and  to  his  reasonable  nature  to 
treat  animals  according  to  their  nature,  not  to  ill-treat  them  or 
make  them  suffer  uselessly,  etc. 


DUTIES    TOWARD     SELF  331 

The  two  following  articles  will  deal  with  personal  and  with 
social  ethics. 

ARTICLE  I.    PERSONAL  ETHICS  OR  DUTIES  TOWARD 

ONESELF 

EXISTENCE  OF  DUTIES  TOWARD  ONESELF 

1.  Has  Man  any  Duties  to  Fulfil  toward  Himself?  —  (a)  Since 
man  is  obliged  to  act  in  conformity  with  reason,  and  to  respect 
in  himself  the  dignity  of  the  moral  person,  he  is  obliged  to  use  his 
faculties  in  the  manner  which  reason  dictates.    As  Kant  expresses 
it,  he  must  treat  human  nature,  wherever  found,  as  well  in  himself 
as  in  others,  as  an  end,  not  as  a  means. 

(b)  Some  duties  toward  others  suppose  duties  toward  oneself; 
for  instance,  unruly    passions  like    anger,  intemperance,  sloth, 
carelessness,  are  obstacles  to  the  fulfilment  of  duties  of  justice  and 
charity  toward  others. 

(c)  The  objection  that  man,  being  identical  with  himself,  can- 
not be  obliged  toward  himself  has  no  value,  for  man  is  bound 
always  to  act  reasonably.    Nor  can  man  renounce  all  his  rights, 
as  some  of  these  are  essential,  and  to  renounce  them  is  to  renounce 
his  own  reason.    Nor,  finally,  can  it  be  said  that  man,  by  fail- 
ing in  his  duties  toward  himself,  injures  himself  alone,  and  is 
at  liberty  to  do  so.    On  account  of  the  law  of  solidarity  among 
members  of  a  society,  on  account  also  of  heredity,  scandal,  etc., 
the  harm  of  one  member  is  also  the  harm  of  others.    Moreover, 
the  neglect  of  duties  toward  self  tends  to  make  man  incapable  of 
fulfilling  duties  toward  others,  as  was  said  above.    Finally,  the 
moral  law  does  not  merely  forbid  to  injure  oneself,  it  commands  us 
to  perfect  our  own  nature.    It  may  be  added  that  these  duties 
are  closely  related  to,  and  based  on,  man's  duties  toward  God,  for 
man  owes  it  to  God  to  make  good  use  of  the  faculties  received 
from  Him. 

2.  Basis  of  These  Duties. — The  primary  root  of  man's  duties 
toward  himself  is  the  duty  of  self-respect.    Self-love  is  a  natural 
fact  which  cannot  be  eradicated;  but  self-love  must  be  according 
to  reason.     Man  is  a  very  complex  being,  and  he  must  love  in  him- 


332  ETHICS 

self  that  which  is  loveworthy,  and  in  the  relative  degree  in  which 
it  is  loveworthy.  "Charity  begins  at  home"  is  a  very  ill-used 
proverb,  yet  it  is  true  that,  unless  we  first  know,  revere,  and  perfect 
human  nature  in  ourselves,  we  shall  never  do  so  in  others. 


I.    DUTIES    REFERRING    CHIEFLY   TO   THE    MIND 

I.  PERSONAL  DIGNITY 

i.  Self -Respect.  —  (a)  By  his  reason,  will,  and  freedom,  man 
is  superior  to  other  beings.  He  must  always  keep  in  mind  this 
dignity,  and  not  lower  himself,  nor  suffer  himself  to  be  lowered, 
to  their  level.  Hence  self-respect  will  always  make  man  place 
duty  before  pleasure,  reason  before  the  senses,  and  the  will  before 
the  lower  appetites  and  tendencies.  It  will  prevent  him  from 
being  arrogant  and  proud,  and  from  exacting  from  his  fellowmen 
more  than  is  due  to  him,  and  even  from  claiming  every  possible 
advantage  and  pleasure  which  he  may  think  himself  entitled  to. 
It  is  hi  conformity  with  human  dignity  to  forbear  and  overlook  a 
great  many  things.  This  shows  better  man's  mastery  over  himself. 
But  there  is  one  thing  which  it  would  be  against  his  essential  dig- 
nity to  surrender,  namely,  the  right  and  freedom  to  perform  his 
duty,  whatever  it  may  be.  This  right,  man  must  vindicate  against 
all  who  would  prevent  its  exercise. 

(b)  Due  self-respect  and  self-esteem  will  proceed  from  self-knowl- 
edge. Cicero  says:  "Illud  IVaifli  o-eavrov  noli  putare  ad  arrogan- 
tiam  minuendam  solum  esse  dictum,  verum  etiam  ut  bona  nostra 
norimus  "  (Epist.  ad  Q.  Fratrem,  III,  6).  Self-knowledge  makes 
man  aware  of  what  is  respectworthy  in  himself,  chiefly  his  moral 
nature,  and  prevents  him  from  lowering  or  allowing  anybody  to 
lower  his  human  personality.  At  the  same  time  it  prevents  him 
from  glorying  in  small  advantages  which  neither  come  from  him 
nor  add  anything  to  his  real  worth.  Pride  and  vanity  not  only 
cause  men  to  place  their  dignity  in  those  advantages  in  which  it 
does  not  consist,  but  tend  to  make  them  "trust  in  themselves 
and  despise  others,"  and  thus  neglect  in  others  the  esteem  due  to 
their  human  dignity.  Bodily  advantages,  wealth,  dress,  etc., 


DUTIES     REFERRING    TO     MIND  333 

should  be  of  small  importance  to  a  man  who  knows  himself  and 
his  true  value.  Both  in  yourself  and  in  others,  respect  and  esteem 
the  human  person.  Humility  is  truth,  and  while  making  man 
aware  of  his  own  weakness,  failings,  and  defects,  it  must  not  make 
him  forget  his  prerogatives. 

2.  Honor  and  Reputation.  —  "A  good  name  is  better  than  great 
riches"  (Prov.  xxii,  i).  Man  must  be  jealous  of  his  honor  and 
good  name.  He  must  not  do  anything  that  would  lessen  the 
good  opinion  others  have  of  him.  We  speak  here  of  true  honor, 
that  is,  of  the  homage  due  primarily  to  genuine  excellence,  sec- 
ondarily to  old  age,  excellence,  authority,  etc.  We  do  not  speak 
of  the  worldly  praise  bestowed  too  often  on  external  and  vain 
advantages.  Frequently  the  sense  of  honor  degenerates  into  a 
base  human  respect  which  makes  one  pay  undue  attention  to  prej- 
udices and  fashions,  and  even,  in  consequence,  omit  what  is  known 
to  be  one's  duty.  At  times  human  judgments  are  based  on  ap- 
pearances, wealth,  etc.,  while  the  real  value  is  overlooked.  Hence 
too  much  attention  is  not  to  be  paid  to  the  opinions  of  men. 
Perhaps  a  man  will  not  be  honored  when  he  deserves  it,  but  he 
must  be  honorable.  His  endeavor,  according  to  St.  Thomas,  must 
be  "ut  studeat  facere  ea  quae  sunt  honore  digna,  non  tamen  sic  ut 
pro  magno  aestimet  humanum  honorem  "  (Summa  Theologica, 
II-II,  Q.  129,  Art.  i  ad  3). 

II.  INTELLIGENCE 

i.  In  General.  —  Since  intelligence  is  a  fundamental  prerog- 
ative of  man,  and  on  it  depends  his  whole  reasonable  conduct,  it 
is  important  to  cultivate  it,  both  negatively  and  positively.  Neg- 
atively, by  avoiding  everything  that  would  tend  to  obscure  it  and 
prevent  its  legitimate  exercise,  like  the  undue  influence  of  pas- 
sions or  imagination.  Positively,  by  exercising  the  intelligence, 
developing  habits  of  attention  and  reflection,  and  acquiring  the 
science  of  general  duties  common  to  all  men,  and  of  duties  special 
to  every  man's  vocation.  All  men  need  not  and  cannot  have 
the  same  instruction,  but  all  men  must  know  (i)  the  general 
duties  of  all  men  toward  God,  themselves,  and  their  fellowmen, 
(2)  the  special  duties  incumbent  upon  them  on  account  of  their 


334  ETHICS 

condition  in  life,  e.g.  the  duties  of  a  lawyer,  physician,  professor, 
etc.  The  more  a  man  knows,  the  better  able  he  is  to  discharge 
his  obligations,  and  be  useful  to  his  fellowmen.  (Cf.  p.  133  ff.) 

2.  Veracity,  Sincerity,  Intellectual  Honesty,  must   always  be 
practiced.   Man  ought  not  to  deceive  others,  still  less  deceive  him- 
self, by  his  imprudence  and  temerity.    Avoid  temerity  in  assent- 
ing, dissenting,  and  doubting;  in  thinking  and  reading.    Above  all, 
avoid  stifling  the  voice  of  conscience,  and  making  up  your  mind 
that  your  action  is  right  and  legitimate  simply  because  you  want 
to  perform  it. 

As  to  veracity  toward  others,  it  is  not  necessary  in  every  case 
to  speak  the  whole  truth,  still  less  to  try  by  all  possible  means 
to  make  one's  opinions  prevail,  but  dissimulation  and  lying  make 
a  man  abominable  in  the  eyes  of  others,  and  should  make  him 
abominable  in  his  own  eyes.  On  this  duty  more  will  be  said 
later. 

3.  Prudence  is  essentially  an  intellectual  virtue  which  enables 
man  to  know  where  his  true  interests  and  those  of  others  are  to 
be  found.    It  supposes  habits  of  deliberation,  discernment,  and 
rectitude  of  judgment.    It  excludes  rashness  and  precipitation. 
The  greater  the  interests  at  stake,  the  more  prudent  should  one 
be  in  finding  out  the  means  to  safeguard  them.    Intuitions  of 
genius  are  rare.    In  most  cases  the  rule  is  that  man  does  not  at 
once  see  the  path  to  be  followed,  but  has  to  reflect,  consult,  and 
deliberate.    Little  by  little  the  mind  acquires  habits  of  perspicac- 
ity, sagacity,  and  sound  judgment.    The  subordination  of  inter- 
ests is  always  to  be  kept  in  mind,  so  that  lower  interests  will  be 
subordinated  to  higher  ones,     (i)  Prudence  makes  man  foresee. 
It  is  not  enough  to  see  present  advantages  or  disadvantages. 
Attention  must  be  given  to  consequences  so  as  to  compare  the  pres- 
ent with  the  future,  and,  later  on,  to  have  no  occasion  to  be  sorry. 
(2)  Profit  by  every  experience,  happy  or  unhappy,  so  as  to  compare 
the  present  issue  with  past  success  or  failure. 

III.  WILL 

The  will  must  always  follow  reason,  hence  avoid  precipitation 
and  obstinacy.  It  is  above  the  senses,  the  passions,  and  the  imag- 


DUTIES     REFERRING    TO     MIND  335 

ination,  hence  let  it  guide  and  rule  them.  Its  main  prerogative 
is  freedom,  hence  it  must  not  allow  itself  to  be  enslaved  by  external 
surroundings  and  human  respect,  nor  by  internal  influences  like 
passions  and  lower  tendencies.  (Cf.  p.  185  ff.) 

1.  The  Will  must  be  Strong.  —  The  coward  who  fears  to  assert 
himself  when  duty  requires  it,  and  has  not  enough  courage  to  fol- 
low the  dictates  of  his  conscience,  is  despicable  if  his  weakness  is 
voluntary,  and  worthy  of  pity  if  it  is  not  voluntary. 

(a)  Courage  is  necessary  not  only  to  the  soldier  on  the  battle- 
field, nor  is  it  the  exclusive  virtue  of  some  classes  of  men;  it  is 
necessary  everywhere,  since  everywhere  there  are  duties  to  perform, 
and  obstacles  to  overcome  in  order  to  fulfil  these  duties.    To  resist 
corruption  and  bribery,  to  attend  to  one's  duties  notwithstanding 
perhaps  the  attacks  and  mockery  of  others,  to  resist  the  tempta- 
tion of  human  respect,  to  acknowledge  one's  mistakes  and  wrongs, 
to  watch  constantly  and  resist  energetically  the  lower  tendencies 
of  human  nature,  in  a  word,  to  proceed  manfully  along  the  path  of 
duty  in  spite  of  all  contrary  influences,  requires  courage  at  every 
instant,  a  courage  which  is  not  the  result  of  a  transitory  impulse 
or  of  the  hope  of  glory,  but  of  a  calm  deliberation,  a  determined 
will,  and  strong  moral  habits.    In  every  condition  of  life,  courage 
and  strength  of  will  are  indispensable. 

(b)  Courage  is  needed  also,  not  merely  to  act,  but  to  suffer. 
Patience,  equanimity,  and  strength  in  adversity  are  signs  of  a  strong 
mind.     The  will  must  strive  to  create  better  conditions,  but 
the  inevitable  cannot  be  remedied.     The  will  shows  courage  hi 
accepting  it  with  resignation. 

(c)  Perseverance  in  spite  of  difficulties  is  an  enduring  courage, 
both  in  action  and  resignation.     Courage  and  perseverance  are 
not  obstinacy.     If  a  man  comes  to  see  that  he  is  wrong,  his  duty  is 
to  come  back  to  the  right  path,  and,  at  times,  this  also  may  require 
an  uncommon  courage. 

2.  Moderation  and  Equality  of  Temper  are  signs  that  the  will 
controls  the  lower  tendencies.     Irascibility  and  passion  show  that 
man  is  subject  to,  and  ruled  by,  them.     Exuberant  joy  in  prosper- 
ity and  depression  in  adversity  indicate  the  undue  influence  of 
external  circumstances  on  the  will. 


336  ETHICS 

Temperance,  both  in  its  most  general  sense  as  the  avoidance  of 
every  form  of  excess,  and  in  its  more  special  application  as  the 
avoidance  of  excess  in  drinking,  is  an  indispensable  virtue.  Noth- 
ing is  more  degrading  to  man  than  the  abuse  of  intoxicating 
beverages  which  ruin  his  health,  obscure  his  mind,  weaken  his 
will,  are  sources  of  innumerable  evils  both  individual  and  social, 
and  lower  him  to  the  level  of  the  lowest  brute.  "Principiis 
obsta,"  for,  chiefly  on  account  of  the  physiological  effects  of  alco- 
hol, the  habit  of  excess  is  easily  contracted.  Gradually  a  need  is 
created  which  soon  becomes  too  strong  for  the  will.  "Modera- 
tion in  all  things"  should  be  the  principle  guiding  all  men,  since 
lack  or  excess  are  opposed  to  the  dictates  of  reason. 

3.  Self-Control.  —  All  the  duties  concerning  the  will  may  be 
reduced  to  mastery  of  and  control  over  oneself.  The  man  who  is 
even-tempered,  whom  prosperity,  favor,  praise,  and  success  do 
not  blind  or  make  proud  and  arrogant;  whom  adversity,  contra- 
diction, and  failure  do  not  make  impatient,  angry,  or  discouraged; 
the  man  who  tries  to  overcome  all  obstacles  that  oppose  his  prog- 
ress on  the  road  of  duty;  the  man  who  truly  possesses  his  own  soul 
and  mind  and  is  his  own  master,  this  man  is  truly  great  and  worthy 
of  the  admiration  of  all. 

IV.  CONCLUSION 

i.  Realization  of  a  Moral  Ideal.  —  One  must  have  a  high  moral 
ideal,  and  constantly  keep  it  before  his  eyes.  It  will  be  realized, 
or  at  least  approached,  by  constant  effort  and  work.  Work, 
mental  or  bodily,  is  both  a  pleasure  and  a  necessity,  and  the  idle 
man  is  a  danger  to  himself  and  to  society.  Idleness  lessens  the 
will's  strength,  and  leaves  it  unprepared  for  the  time  of  struggle. 
Like  tools  which  become  rusty  for  lack  of  use,  the  faculties  be- 
come dull  for  lack  of  exercise.  All  men  have  duties  to  fulfil, 
and  to  fulfil  them  requires  work  and  effort.  In  themselves  all 
useful  works  are  noble,  and  all  occupations,  intellectual  or  manual, 
praiseworthy.  The  first  place  must  be  given  to  necessary  work, 
then  to  useful  work,  and  finally  leisure  may  be  employed  in  agree- 
able work,  in  healthy  and  becoming  recreation  which  rests  the 
mind  and  the  body,  and  prepares  them  for  further  labor. 


DUTIES     REFERRING    TO     BODY  337 

2.  Self -Examination.  —  It  is  necessary  for  success  to  keep  busi- 
ness accounts.  It  is  no  less  necessary  to  keep  ethical  accounts. 
Know  how  you  stand  with  regard  to  your  duties  and  resolutions; 
verify  your  gains  and  losses  so  as  to  repair  mistakes  and  prepare 
the  future.  Examine  your  conscience  frequently,  and  always 
strengthen  your  will  more  and  more  by  new  resolutions  and  by 
fidelity  in  keeping  them.  Know  your  principal  defect,  and  coura- 
geously lay  the  axe  to  the  root  of  the  tree.  Resist  your  evil 
habits,  and  endeavor  to  contract  only  those  that  are  praiseworthy. 
Know  yourself,  and  always  keep  your  eyes  turned  on  the  feelings 
and  desires  of  your  heart. 

Thus  by  constant  attention  in  cultivating  his  faculties  and  per- 
fecting his  nature  will  man  rise  higher  and  higher,  and  enjoy  the 
happiness  which  comes  from  the  satisfaction  of  fulfilling  his  duties, 
and  from  the  feeling  that  he  is  truly  the  master  of  all  that  is  in 
himself. 


II.    DUTIES    REFERRING    CHIEFLY   TO    THE    BODY 

These  duties  do  not  refer  to  the  organism  independently  of  the 
mind,  but  in  so  far  as  the  organism  is  the  necessary  condition  of 
life,  and  therefore  of  the  fulfilment  of  all  duties.  Health,  strength, 
and  life  are  valuable  as  instruments  of  the  human  person.  Duties 
referring  to  the  body  are  negative  or  positive. 

I.  NEGATIVE  DUTIES 

The  chief  negative  duty  of  man  is  to  avoid  taking  his  own  life 
by  suicide. 

i.  Suicide  is  direct  and  intentional  self-murder  committed  on 
one's  private  authority.  We  say  "direct  and  intentional"  to 
indicate  that  the  natural  result  of  the  action  is  the  destruction  of 
life,  and  that,  in  fact,  no  matter  what  reason  or  motive  one  may 
have,  such  is  the  purpose  for  which  the  action  is  performed.  Hence 
it  is  not  suicide  for  a  man  to  endanger  his  own  life  when  there  is 
a  sufficient  reason  to  do  so,  or  a  higher  duty  to  fulfil.  The  soldier 
on  the  battlefield,  the  physician  treating  contagious  diseases,  the 
man  who  exposes  his  life  in  order  to  save  that  of  another,  do  not 
23 


338  ETHICS 

directly  kill  themselves,  but  indirectly,  by  exposing  themselves 
to  danger.  Nor  do  they  intend  to  do  away  with  their  lives,  but 
they  have  in  view  the  good  of  their  country  and  of  their  fellow- 
men,  which  requires  this  sacrifice.  In  some  cases  this  sacrifice  is 
obligatory,  namely,  when  required  by  one's  strict  duty.  In  other 
cases  it  is  praiseworthy,  and  may  be  an  act  of  heroism.  Suicide, 
instead  of  proceeding  from  noble  feelings  of  self-sacrifice  on  behalf 
of  others,  generally  proceeds  from  egoism,  fear,  weakness,  and 
false  honor.  It  has  been  excused  by  the  Epicureans,  the  Stoics, 
and  some  modern  philosophers,  as  at  least  a  remedy  against  the 
evils  of  life.  When  life  becomes  unbearable,  they  say,  man  is 
at  liberty  to  renounce  it. 

2.  The  Reasons  Against  Suicide  are  of  two  kinds.  Some  may 
be  used  as  arguments  ad  hominem  because  they  are  suited  to  the 
frame  of  mind  and  principles  of  certain  individuals.  Others  are 
more  fundamental  and  apply  to  all  men.  Among  the  former  may 
be  mentioned  the  following.  For  the  Christian,  this  life  is  but  a 
preparation  for  a  future  endless  life.  Man  must  not  pay  too 
much  attention  to  the  transitory  sufferings  of  this  life  which  are 
means  of  purification  for  his  immortal  soul.  Moreover,  man  is 
not  the  master  of  his  own  life.  It  belongs  to  God  who  gave  it  to 
him,  and  reserves  for  Himself  the  right  of  life  and  death.  He  has 
assigned  a  post  to  every  man,  and  man  has  no  more  right  to  aban- 
don it  than  the  soldier  has  the  right  to  abandon  the  post  assigned  to 
him  by  his  superiors.  Frequently,  also,  suicide  may  be  shown  to  be 
an  act  of  cowardice;  the  motives  that  prompt  to  it  may  be  proved 
to  be  valueless,  and  the  need  which  others  have  of  one's  life  may 
be  pointed  out. 

The  following  reasons  apply  to  all.  (a)  The  natural  wish  to 
live,  which  is  experienced  by  all,  prevents  man  from  committing 
suicide  as  long  as  life  is  enjoyable.  Suicide  is  committed  in  order 
to  avoid  shame,  misery,  or  suffering  of  some  kind.  But  to  leave 
man  free  to  take  his  own  life  in  such  cases  is  to  constitute  him  a 
judge  in  his  own  cause,  —  and  no  man  can  be  a  good  judge  in  his 
own  cause  —  and  therefore  permit  suicide  whenever,  for  any 
reason,  a  man  is  tired  of  life. 

(b)  Man's  life  has  a  moral  purpose,  and  the  moral   law  is 


DUTIES     REFERRING     TO     BODY  339 

absolute  and  categorical.  Suicide  withdraws  man  from  all  these 
duties,  and  therefore  makes  the  moral  law  merely  hypothetical; 
it  commands  if  man  does  not  choose  to  shirk  its  obligations.  Man 
thus  fails  to  respect  in  himself  the  moral  person;  he  makes  it  a 
mere  instrument;  a  thing  instead  of  a  person. 

(c)  To  commit  suicide  is  to  injure  others,  for  it  is  a  bad  example; 
it  deprives  society  of  one  of  its  members  who  might  still  be  useful, 
were  it  only  as  an  example  of  courage,  patience,  and  resignation. 

The  mam  reasons  against  suicide  are  derived  from  religious 
considerations,  as  God  positively  forbids  it.  Those  we  have  just 
given  will  be  made  clearer  by  answering  the  main  objections. 

3.  Objections.  —  (a)  Suicide  is  a  courageous  action.  —  Answer. 
In  reality  it  is  cowardice,  for  it  is  a  sign  that  man  lacks 
strength  and  energy  to  bear  the  trials  and  difficulties  of  life. 
The  suicide  avows  himself  vanquished  since  he  abandons  the 
struggle. 

(b)  Life  is  miserable;  sufferings  are  too  great;  the  disease  is 
incurable,  or  the  failure  irretrievable.     In  short,  life  is  an  unbear- 
able burden  for  the  individual  and  for  society.  —  Answer.     The 
purpose  of  this  life  is  not  immediate  happiness.    Moreover,  suffer- 
ing is  made  intolerable  largely  because  it  is  thought  to  be  so.    The 
patience  of  a  number  of  men  amid  the  greatest  and  most  excruciat- 
ing pains  and  afflictions  shows  that,  with  courage,  everything  is 
possible.    As  St.  Paul  wrote  (II  Cor.  vii,  4) :  "  I  exceedingly  abound 
with  joy  in  all  our  tribulation."    And  such  patience  is  always  a 
great  edification  for  others,  while  for  the  sufferer  it  is  a  source  of 
moral  perfection. 

(c)  Death   is   preferable   to   shame.  —  Answer.    Suicide   adds 
another  shame  to  the  former.     If  a  man  has  done  nothing  wrong, 
the  testimony  of  his  conscience  is  enough,  and  life  will  give  him 
the  means  of  proving  his  innocence.     If  he  has  committed  some 
blameworthy  action,  life  will  be  an  expiation,  and  will  enable 
him  to  give  an  example  of  repentance  and  of  effort  toward  a 
better  life. 

(d)  Man  may  desire  death,  therefore  he  may  cause  it.  —  Answer. 
It  is  true  that  in  some  cases  death  appears  as  a  deliverance;  but  as 
the  soldier  may  wish  to  be  relieved  from  a  certain  duty,  and  yet 


340  ETHICS 

is  not  free  to  leave  it,  so  man  cannot,  on  his  own  authority,  renounce 
his  own  life. 

4.  The  Main  Causes  of  Suicide  are:  (i)  Insanity,  perpetual  or 
temporary.    The  mind  may  be  so  disturbed  as  to  lose  its  freedom. 
This  insanity  make  take  the  form  of  despondency  and  melancholia, 
which  deprive  the  mind  of  energy;  or  that  of  exaltation  and  pas- 
sion, which  blind  the  mind  and  deprive  it  of  the  power  of  reflec- 
tion.   Ordinary  dispositions  and  character,  temperament,  nervous 
diseases,  as  well  as  other  special  circumstances,  may  lead  to  suicide. 
A  good  moral  education  of  the  intellect  and  the  will,  a  physician's 
care,  bright  surroundings,  healthy  exercise  and  distraction,  sound 
advice  and  encouragement,  will  be  useful  to  do  away  with  ideas 
of  suicide.    (2)  A  sensual  life,  which  looks  for  present  happiness, 
prefers  it  to   duty,  and  makes  man  too  weak  to  bear  disap- 
pointment and  suffering.     (3)  The  example  of  others.     Suicides, 
especially  sensational  suicides,  when  published,  are  generally  fol- 
lowed by  others.    It  becomes  like  a  contagious  disease.     Avoid 
sensational  reading. 

To  counteract  these,  religious  and  moral  education  showing  the 
true  value  of  life  both  in  its  present  and  future  aspects,  the  culti- 
vation of  the  will  by  the  practice  of  true  virtue  and  courage,  will 
prove  auxiliaries. 

5.  Self-Neglect.  —  For  the  same  reasons  for  which  suicide  is 
immoral,  any  mutilation  of  the  body  and  unjustified  danger  of 
death  are  also  forbidden.    Hence  temperance,  sobriety,  modera- 
tion, etc.,  are  duties  based  on  the  duty  of  self-preservation.    There 
are  cases,  however,  where  it  is  necessary  to  remove  a  part  of  the 
body  in  order  to  save  life;  and  there  are  circumstances  in  which 
the  temporary  loss  of  reason,  e.g.  by  the  use  of  anaesthetics,  is 
also  necessary.    The  body  is  the  instrument  of  the  soul,  and  must 
be  treated  as  such,  i.e.  preserved  in  its  integrity  and  normal  condi- 
tion unless  the  higher  interests  of  life  require  that  a  part  of  it  be 
sacrificed.    Nor  is  this  duty  opposed  to  the  discreet  and  prudent 
use  of  mortification  and  austerity  by  which  the  will  is  strengthened, 
and  the  spirit  of  self-renunciation  and  self-sacrifice  is  acquired. 
A  little  violence  to  one's  natural  inclinations,  even  if  they  are  not 
bad,  prepares  man  for  the  greatest  acts  of  virtue. 


DUTIES    TOWARD     OTHER    MEN  341 

II.  POSITIVE  DUTIES 

1.  Care  of  Life.  —  Man  must  not  only  avoid  whatever  would 
injure  his  health,  he  must  also  preserve  it  by  hygiene,  cleanliness, 
exercise,  etc.     He  must  take  ordinary  care  and  precaution  when 
sick.    Extraordinary  means,  such  as  very  expensive  cures  or  dan- 
gerous operations,  are  not  obligatory.    Two  extremes  must  be 
avoided:  (i)  excessive  care  and  fear,  which  make  one  indulge  in 
every  little   comfort,  and    dread    the    slightest    privation    and 
inconvenience;    (2)  excessive  carelessness  and  negligence,  which 
make  one  abuse  one's  strength  by  intemperance,  privation  of 
sleep,  unnecessary  exposure  to  heat  and  cold,  etc.    In  all  things, 
the  body  is  to  be  treated  according  to  its  nature,  as  inferior  to  the 
mind,  and  as  an  instrument  which  must  serve  the  mind,  but  also 
as  the  mind's  auxiliary,  and  as  the  condition  necessary  for  the  mind 
to  fulfil  its  duties. 

2.  External  Appearance.  —  What  is  true  of  the  health  of  the 
body  is  true  also  of  its  external  appearance.    Extremes  are  to  be 
avoided  by  the  practice  of  modesty  and  moderation.    If  neglect, 
carelessness,  and  lack  of  cleanliness  are  to  be  avoided,  to  put 
one's  pride  in  external  advantages  and  ornaments  is  no  less  to  be 
blamed.    The  mind  manifests  itself  in  these  details.    Show  that 
yours  is  orderly  and  careful,  yet  withal  simple,  unostentatious, 
and  that  its  first  care  is  for  internal  beauty  and  nobleness,  in  which 
man's  real  worth  consists. 


ARTICLE   II.    SOCIAL   ETHICS   OR   DUTIES   OF   MAN 
TOWARD   OTHER    MEN 

EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  THESE  DUTIES 
i.  In  General.  —  Man  does  not  and  cannot  live  alone.  From 
his  necessary  intercourse  with  his  fellowmen  a  great  number  of 
duties  arise,  some  toward  all  men  in  general,  others  toward  mem- 
bers of  the  same  group  or  society.  The  former  may  be  called  social 
duties,  social  indicating  a  special  reference  to  all  men.  It  is 
better,  however,  to  refer  to  them  as  duties  toward  individual  men 


342  ETHICS 

irrespective  of  the  various  groupings,  and  to  reserve  the  term  "  so- 
cial "  for  duties  that  arise  from  such  groupings.  Since  all  men  have 
the  same  essential  nature,  all  have  the  same  essential  rights.  Too 
often  man  is  inclined  to  look  upon  himself  as  a  privileged  person, 
insisting  on  his  own  rights  and  on  the  duties  of  others,  forgetting 
that  he  must  also  consider  their  rights  and  his  own  duties  toward 
them.  These  duties  may  be  summed  up  in  the  two  fundamental 
maxims:  (i)  "Do  not  to  others  what  you  would  not  have  them 
do  to  you."  (2)  "Do  to  others  what  you  would  have  them  do 
to  you."  These  two  maxims  are  but  the  application  of  the 
Christian  precept:  "Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

2.  Justice  and  Charity.  —  (a)  The  first  maxim  refers  especially 
to  duties  of  justice.  Justice  is  the  respect  of  the  strict  rights  of 
others,  and  rests  on  the  equality  of  all  men.  The  duties  which  it 
commands  are  chiefly  negative,  and  determined:  "Thou  shalt  not 
injure  thy  neighbor  "  is  their  general  expression.  They  forbid  any 
action  which  would  be  against  the  rights  of  others,  and  hence  are 
strictly  binding,  always,  in  every  case,  and  toward  everybody; 
and  as  a  consequence  they  can  be  exacted. 

(b)  The  second  maxim  refers  especially  to  duties  of  charity, 
which  rest  on  the  community  of  nature  of  all  men,  and  on  human 
brotherhood.  Charity  consists  in  helping  others  and  giving  bodily 
and  spiritual  assistance.  Its  duties  are  chiefly  positive  and  in- 
determined.  "Thou  shalt  help  thy  neighbor"  is  their  general  ex- 
pression. They  prescribe  some  action,  but  do  not  oblige  always, 
nor  in  every  case,  nor  toward  everybody;  and  as  a  consequence, 
they  cannot  be  exacted.  For  instance,  justice  forbids  killing  or 
stealing;  charity  commands  to  help  a  sick  man  and  to  give  alms. 
In  the  former  case,  I  am  forbidden  to  be  an  obstacle  preventing 
my  neighbor  from  exercising  his  essential  rights.  In  the  latter, 
I  am  bound  to  help  him  although  he  has  no  strict  right  to  exact 
this  help  from  me  or  from  any  determined  man.  I  must  pay  my 
debts  exactly  and  at  the  appointed  time.  There  is  no  fixed  amount 
or  time  for  my  obligation  of  giving  alms.  However,  as  noted 
already,  the  same  duty  may  be  both  positive  and  negative  from 
different  points  of  view.  I  am  obliged  to  pay  a  debt  (positive 
action)  because  I  must  not  keep  my  fellowman's  property  (nega- 


DUTIES     TOWARD     OTHER    MEN  343 

tive).  Moreover,  there  are  also  positive  duties  arising  from  jus- 
tice, and  negative  duties  arising  from  charity. 

(c)  Distinct  though  they  are,  justice  and  charity  are  in  close 
relation.  Charity  supposes  justice.  Before  helping  others,  it 
is  necessary  to  do  them  no  harm;  a  man  cannot  steal  in  order  to 
give  alms.  A  strict  and  determined  obligation  comes  before  a 
general  and  indetermined  one.  Even  in  the  exercise  of  charity 
there  may  be  some  kind  of  justice  or  equity;  certain  persons,  e.g. 
members  of  the  same  family,  have  a  special  title  to  be  assisted  in 
their  needs.  On  the  other  hand,  justice  is  not  complete  without 
charity.  Strict  rights  should  not  always  be  exacted,  because  in 
some  cases  other  men's  rights  would  thereby  be  injured.  Thus 
for  the  rich  man  to  refuse  food  to  the  hungry,  or  for  the  employer 
to  exact  too  hard  or  too  long  a  labor  from  the  workingman,  is  a 
real  injustice.  Justice  must  always  be  tempered  by  equity,  which, 
before  applying  the  strict  rights  of  justice,  considers  all  circum- 
stances of  time  and  person.  In  this  sense  Cicero  quotes  the  ax- 
iom: "Summum  ius,  summa  iniuria"  (De  Officiis,  I,  c.  10).  To 
be  strict  to  the  extreme  in  matters  of  justice  is  to  become  unjust. 

It  may  be  noted  that  what  is  a  duty  of  charity  for  one  may  be 
a  duty  of  justice  for  another  on  account  of  his  special  position. 
An  ordinary  man  is  not  bound  in  justice  to  prevent  a  criminal 
from  wrong-doing,  but  this  is  the  strict  duty  of  the  policeman. 

3.  Love.  —  (a)  "He  that  loveth  his  neighbor  hath  fulfilled  the 
law"  (Rom.  xiii,  8).  We  do  not  speak  here  of  the  special  love 
due  to  some  individuals  who  are  "nearer"  or  more  strictly  "neigh- 
bors" than  others  (cf.  p.  151),  but  of  the  love  due  to  all  men  in 
general  simply  because  they  are  men  having  the  same  nature  as 
ours,  and  moral  persons  enjoying  the  same  prerogatives.  Hence 
this  duty  extends  even  to  enemies,  because  of  their  human  nature 
with  its  inalienable  rights,  though  not  in  the  sense  that  we  must 
love  their  depravity  or  offences.  The  love  of  others  excludes 
hatred  and  the  spirit  of  revenge,  although  a  man  may  by  lawful 
means  seek  redress  for  the  wrongs  he  has  suffered.  It  also  ex- 
cludes scandal,  bad  advice,  and  in  general  whatever  would  lead 
others  to  harm  themselves  in  any  manner. 

(b)  There  are  several  degrees  of  love.     i.    Negative:  (i)  Not  to 


344  ETHICS 

return  evil  for  good,  i.e.  not  to  be  ungrateful.  This  is  the  mini- 
mum and  the  lowest  degree.  (2)  Not  to  injure  those  who  have 
not  injured  us,  i.e.  to  avoid  injustice  and  cruelty.  (3)  Not  to 
return  evil  for  evil,  i.e.  to  avoid  vengeance;  a  man's  wrong-doing 
is  not  excused  or  justified  by  that  of  others. —  All  these  duties 
refer  to  strict  justice.  2.  Positive:  (i)  To  return  good  for  good 
—  gratitude.  (2)  To  do  good  to  those  who  have  done  us  neither 
good  nor  evil  —  charity  and  benevolence.  (3)  To  return  good 
for  evil.  It  is  the  most  sublime  degree  of  virtue.  —  These  duties 
refer  to  charity. 


I.    DUTIES    TOWARD    INDIVIDUAL    MEN 

These  duties  may  refer  to  their  persons  and  personal  faculties, 
or  to  their  property. 

I.  DUTIES  TOWARD  THE  PERSON  OF  OTHERS 

i.  Life.  —  The  first  right  of  man,  and  the  condition  of  all  other 
rights,  is  the  right  to  live.  Hence  the  taking  of  human  life  on 
one's  private  authority,  and  apart  from  the  necessity  of  self- 
defence,  is  always  an  injustice. 

*  (a)  This  does  not  apply  to  the  killing  of  another  man  by  public 
authority,  as  in  the  case  of  the  executioner,  or  of  soldiers  during 
war.  If  the  state  has  the  right  to  inflict  the  death  penalty 
and  to  protect  its  rights  by  war,  it  also  has  the  right  to  the 
necessary  means.  The  individual  acts  as  the  agent  or  instrument 
of  public  authority. 

(b)  In  the  case  of  self-defence,  the  principle:  "Prima  sibi  cha- 
ritas  "  may  be  applied.  As  public  justice  would  be  too  late  in  pro- 
tecting my  life  and  property,  I  may  protect  it  myself,  provided 
the  two  following  conditions  be  verified:  (i)  There  must  be  actual 
danger.  If  the  danger  is  passed,  there  is  no  longer  self-defence, 
but  homicide  and  vengeance.  (2)  The  violation  of  the  rights  of 
others  must  be  as  limited  as  possible.  Whatever  is  not  necessary 
is  unjustified;  it  is  intentional  wrong-doing.  An  adversary  who 
can  no  longer  do  any  harm  because  he  is  wounded  or  without  power, 
ought  not  to  be  killed.  This  right  of  self-defence  extends  —  in 


DUTIES     TOWARD    INDIVIDUALS         345 

justice  —  not  only  to  the  protection  of  life,  but  also  to  that  of  great 
interests,  fortune,  freedom,  or  property;  and  —  in  charity  —  to 
the  defence  of  others. 

(c)  Duelling  is  the  meeting  of  two  parties  in  order  to  fight  with 
weapons  apt  to  kill,  after  a  private  agreement  as  to  the  time,  the 
place,  and  the  weapons.  The  motive  of  duels  is  generally  to  avenge 
an  insult.  But  this  reason  has  no  value  whatever,  and  a  duel 
is  a  most  unjust  and  unreasonable  action.  It  can  decide  at  most 
which  of  the  two  adversaries  is  the  more  skilful  or  the  stronger. 
It  can  never  decide  on  whose  side  right  and  justice  are  found.  It  is 
an  act  of  vengeance,  which  makes  of  justice  a  private  affair,  and 
constitutes  a  man  a  judge  in  his  own  cause.  It  exposes  him  to  the 
danger  of  suicide  by  exposing  his  own  life  without  reason,  and 
to  that  of  homicide  by  exposing  himself  to  the  danger  of  killing 
another  on  his  own  authority. 

N.B.  What  has  been  said  of  the  life  of  others  applies  also,  in 
varying  degrees,  to  any  action  by  which  their  body  would  be 
injured,  or  their  health  impaired. 

2.  Dignity  and  Freedom. — The  respect  for  essential  human  dig- 
nity forbids  any  action  by  which  others  would  be  deprived  of  the 
legitimate  use  of  their  freedom. 

(a)  Slavery,  which  makes  of  man  the  thing  or  property  of  another 
in  such  a  way  that  the  master  may  dispose  of  his  slave  as  he  pleases, 
and  almost  without  any  restriction,  is  against  morality.  It  lowers 
man  to  the  level  of  animals,  and  even  of  inanimate  tools,  deprives 
him  of  his  essential  dignity,  and  prevents  him  from  being  a  truly 
human  person. 

(6)  Man  has  the  right  to  work,  to  choose  his  own  profession, 
exercise  it,  and  enjoy  the  fruit  of  his  labor,  since  work  is  but  the 
extension  and  product  of  his  own  faculties. 

(c)  Conscience,  which  applies  in  every  case  and  for  every  man  the 
laws  of  morality,  must  not  be  violated.    In  things  which  are  not 
otherwise  against  the  rights  of  other  men,  or  against  public  order, 
the  individual  is  entitled  to  freedom  of  conscience.    He  may  be 
shown  that  he  is  mistaken,  but,  after  due  investigation,  the  voice 
of  his  conscience  is  for  him,  and  must  be  for  others,  sacred. 

(d)  Freedom  of  thought  cannot  mean  that  human  intelligence  is 


346  ETHICS 

free  to  accept  anything  as  true  or  false  as  it  pleases,  but  that  man 
has  the  right  to  use  his  faculties  in  order  to  discover  the  truth, 
to  examine  the  foundation  of  his  beliefs,  and  to  stand  by  his  con- 
clusions. It  even  implies  the  spreading  of  his  opinions  by  publi- 
cation. But  this  right  is  limited,  because  certain  opinions,  even  if 
adhered  to  honestly  and  bona  fide,  would  be  injurious  to  society, 
for  instance,  when  they  encourage  immorality  or  excite  to  crime 
directly  or  indirectly. 

3.  Honor  and  Reputation.  —  Man  has  a  right  to  his  honor  and 
reputation.     Honor  is  based  on  excellence,  and  hence  varies  with 
individuals.    The  same  marks  of  honor  are  not  due  to  a  stran- 
ger and  to  a  high  public  official.    Yet  to  all  men  some  honor  is 
due.     Reputation  or  good  name  is  acquired.    Hence,  although 
some  honor  is  due  to  a  stranger,  he  has  no  reputation  with  those  by 
whom  he  is  not  known. 

Detraction,  which  reveals  the  real  defects  and  faults  of  a  man 
to  those  who  do  not  know  them,  and  calumny,  which  falsely  attrib- 
utes defects  or  faults  to  others,  are  opposed  to  the  right  which  all 
men  have  to  their  reputation.  Calumny  is  never  lawful.  In 
some  cases,  and  for  serious  reasons,  it  may  be  justifiable  to  reveal 
the  real  wrong-doings  of  others,  e.g.  for  the  sake  of  good  order,  to 
preserve  the  innocent,  etc. 

Rash  judgment  is  against  both  the  good  use  of  our  faculties  and 
the  rights  of  others  to  our  good  opinion  of  them.  A  little  reflection 
will  suffice  to  convince  man  that  many  of  his  judgments  concerning 
others  are  without  sufficient  basis,  and  therefore  rash,  for  man  is 
ignorant  of  all  the  subjective  conditions  which  influence  the  con- 
duct of  others.  Only  by  one  who  would  know  all  the  hidden  motives 
and  springs  of  action  could  an  equitable  judgment  be  passed.  No- 
body can  determine  how  far  another  man  is  personally  responsible 
for  his  actions,  and  how  much  must  be  attributed  to  his  surround- 
ings, education,  native  disposition,  and  in  general  to  circumstances 
that  do  not  depend  on  him.  This  should  make  man  very  careful 
in  judging,  and  especially  in  expressing  unfavorable  judgments. 

4.  Truthfulness.  —  (a)  Man  owes  it  to  himself  and  to  others 
to  speak  the  truth.     To  himself,  because  it  is  a  disorder  to  use 
words  that  express  ideas  contrary  to  those  that  are  present  in  the 


DUTIES    TOWARD    INDIVIDUALS          347 

mind.  To  others,  because  social  relations  and  contracts  are  impos- 
sible if  man  is  allowed  to  lie.  A  man  may  deceive  others  in  good 
faith  when  he  is  himself  mistaken.  This  is  not  a  lie;  to  lie  is  to 
speak  intentionally  against  one's  mind. 

(b)  The  obligation  to  speak  the  truth  does  not  always  imply 
the  obligation  to  speak  the  whole  truth.    Discretion  is  also  a  neces- 
sary virtue,  and  frequently  a  man  would  be  wrong  if  he  told  all 
he  knew.    Things  are  to  be  kept  secret  (i)  on  account  of  their 
nature,  when  their  revelation  would  be  injurious  to  others,  and 
when  the  person  whom  they  concern  is  known  to  be  opposed  to 
their  manifestation;    (2)  by  promise,  when  the  engagement  has 
been  taken  not  to  reveal  a  certain  imparted  information;  (3)  by 
trust,  when  the  information  is  given  only  on  the  expressed  or  im- 
plied condition  that  it  will  not  be  communicated.     Such  are  pro- 
fessional secrets,  e.g.  of  lawyers  and  physicians.    All  secrets  must 
be  kept  unless  there  should  be  serious  reasons,  proportionate  to 
the  nature  of  the  case,  which  make  it  obligatory  to  reveal  them. 

(c)  Whenever  a  man  speaks  untruly  without  being  questioned 
he  is  guilty  of  lying.    He  also  lies  when  he  deceives  those  who 
have  the  right  to  know  the  truth.    But,  for  good  reasons,  the  truth 
may  be  concealed  by  giving  the  questioner  to  understand  that 
we  are  not  at  liberty  to  speak,  or  by  using  expressions  which  are 
understood  by  all.    Thus  a  servant  answers   that  his  master  "is 
not  at  home,"  meaning  that  he  is  not  at  home  to  receive  visitors  in 
general,  or  this  visitor  in  particular.     Expressions  even  more  mis- 
leading may  be  used  if  the  circumstances  justify  it.     In  the  con- 
flict of  two  rights,  the  right  of  my  neighbor  not  to  be  deceived, 
and  my  right  to  keep  a  secret,  the  former  must  yield,  since,  as  we 
suppose,  my  neighbor  has  no  strict  right  to  know  the  truth,  whereas 
I  have  a  strict  duty  to  keep  a  secret.     But  in  all  things  acquire 
habits  of  rectitude  and  truthfulness.     You  may  not  say  everything 
you  think,  but  generally  let  everything  you  say  be  the   true 
expression  of  your  thought. 

II.  DUTIES  TOWARD  THE  PROPERTY  OF  OTHERS 

i.   Fact  of  Ownership.  —  (a)  Men  look  upon  certain  things  as 
their  property  (proprium,  one's  own  exclusively).    They  claim  and 


348  ETHICS 

exercise  the  right  to  use  these  things  and  dispose  of  them  as  they 
please.  This  right  is  called  the  right  of  ownership,  and  the  limits 
of  its  exercise  are  determined  by  the  natural  laws  of  justice  and 
charity,  and  by  civil  laws  such  as  those  concerning  contracts,  wills, 
etc. 

(b)  Ownership  is  private  or  public  according  as  the  property 
belongs  to  the  individual  or  to  the  community  (municipality, 
state,  nation).    Public  property  is  sometimes  used  for  specified 
purposes  and  by  certain  individuals  only   (e.g.   certain  public 
buildings  and  offices).    Sometimes  the  free  use  of  it  is  allowed  to 
all  (e.g.  streets,  parks). 

(c)  Private  ownership  extends  to  whatever  is  useful  or  pleasur- 
able and  capable  of  being  appropriated.    It  does  not  extend  to 
those  things  which  are  necessary  to  all  and  the  supply  of  which  is 
sufficient  for  all,  like  air,  the  heat  and  light  of  the  sun,  etc.    Ob- 
jects of  ownership  may  be  reduced  to  (i)  natural  products,  indepen- 
dent of  man's  industry  (e.g.  fruit,  fish,  game) ;  (2)  the  products  of 
labor  and  industry  (e.g.  machinery,  manufactured  articles);  (3) 
mixed  products  (e.g.  domestic  animals,  vegetables  in  a  garden, 
land  which  is  improved  by  culture).     From  another  point  of  view 
the  objects  of  ownership  are  either  non-productive,  when  they 
are  owned  simply  for  the  enjoyment  which  may  be  derived  from 
them;  or  'productive  (capital),  when  they  are  used  as  means  of 
production. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  such  objects  have  been  appropriated;  whether 
justly  or  not  remains  to  be  seen. 

2.  Socialism.  —  It  is  needless  to  speak  of  the  extreme  views  of 
communism  according  to  which  not  only  should  private  ownership 
be  abolished,  but  the  state  should  have  perfect  control  of  every- 
thing, including  labor,  religion,  social  relations,  marriage,  etc. 
Such  theories  are  commonly  abandoned  to-day,  even  by  the  adver- 
saries of  private  ownership,  whose  views  are  generally  included 
under  the  general  term  of  socialism. 

But  it  is  very  difficult,  not  to  say  impossible,  to  give  a  definition 
of  socialism  because  of  the  many  forms  which  it  takes.  In  general 
it  is  the  tendency  to  reduce  individualism  and  to  increase  the  rights 
of  the  community  in  matters  referring  to  ownership.  It  denies  all 


DUTIES     TOWARD     INDIVIDUALS          349 

or  some  forms  of  private  ownership.  In  general  it  allows  it  for 
objects  that  are  non-productive,  e.g.  books,  pictures,  food  and 
drink,  etc.  On  the  contrary,  capital,  that  is,  all  means  of  pro- 
duction, such  as  mines,  canals,  railroads,  mails,  telegraphs,  land, 
machinery,  factories,  etc.,  should  be  owned  collectively,  and  man- 
aged by  the  rulers  of  the  community.  Some,  however,  would  allow 
the  private  ownership  of  everything  except  land. 

Thus  primarily  socialism  advocates  economical  reforms.  But 
in  many  instances,  it  has  also  advocated  moral  and  religious  re- 
forms, and  manifested  unequivocal  hostility  to  Christian  beliefs 
and  practices.  With  these  extreme  views  we  have  nothing  to  do 
at  present. 

3.  Foundation  of  Private  Ownership.  —  The  following  rights 
are  natural  to  man,  and  must  always  be  respected. 

(a)  Man  has  a  strict  right  to  the  necessaries  of  life,  not  only  for 
the  present,  but  also  for  the  future,     (i)  Sickness  and  want  may 
come,  and  old  age  will  certainly  come.    The  prudent  man  fore- 
sees and  prepares  the  future  in  a  stable  and  permanent  manner. 
(2)  Moreover,  the  healthy  man's  work  is  not  always  actually 
remunerative.    Time  is  required  for  planning,  trying,  and  experi- 
menting.    During  this  interval  it  is  necessary  for  man  to  have 
the  means  of  subsistence.    To  permanent  needs  must  correspond 
permanent   resources.     (3)  Finally,  progress   requires   a   certain 
freedom  from  need,  and  even  from  the  care  concerning  the  means 
of  living.     Frequently  the  best  works  of  art  "don't  pay,"  and  even 
the  most  useful  inventions  are  not  recognized  at  once.    Happiness 
requires  some  leisure  and  freedom.    If  following  always  one's  own 
good  pleasure  is  not  the  highest  ideal,  the  other  extreme,  doing 
always  what  pleases  others,  is  still  farther  from  giving  satisfaction 
to  human  aspirations. 

(b)  What  is  true  of  the  individual  is  true  also  of  the  family. 
Man  must  not  only  provide  for  himself,  but  for  his  wife  and 
children.     To   this   end  he   needs  property  which  he  can  keep 
permanently  and  of  which  he  can  dispose. 

(c)  Any  theory  of  property  must  safeguard  these  rights.    It 
seems  evident  that  some  kind  of  private  ownership  is  required, 
since  otherwise  man  does  not  obtain  the  full  value  of  his  labor, 


350  ETHICS 

laziness  and  crime  are  encouraged,  and  it  becomes  impossible  to 
provide  for  one's  own  welfare.  This  is  commonly  accepted  by 
moderate  socialists,  who  admit  the  private  ownership  of  commod- 
ities, but  reject  the  private  ownership  of  capital.  The  question 
thus  becomes  chiefly  a  social  and  economical  problem  which 
cannot  be  discussed  at  length  here.  Only  a  few  indications  will 
be  given. 

4.  Discussion.  —  By  capital  is  meant  any  source  of  wealth  and 
any  means  of  production.  That  the  state  may  own  some  of  these 
goes  without  saying.  The  state  owns  land.  Monopolies  are 
restrictions  of  the  rights  of  individuals  to  manufacture  and  sell 
certain  articles.  Whether,  how  far,  and  in  regard  to  what  articles 
state-monopoly  is  expedient  is  a  question  to  which  no  general 
answer  can  be  given,  as  expediency  varies  with  times,  places,  and 
conditions.  But  the  question  is  whether  all  means  of  production 
should  be  common  property  administered  by  the  state  authorities. 

(a)  With  regard  to  production,  better  care  is  taken  of  what  is 
one's  own  than  of  what  is  common  property.     More  labor  will  be 
given,  and  greater  diligence  will  be  used  by  the  individual,  if  the 
products  are  to  remain  his  own  than  if  they  are  to  be  shared  in 
common.    The  hope  to  turn  again  the  fruit  of  one's  labor  into  new 
capital  is  a  great  incentive  to  work  and  application.     Capital  is 
generally  transformed  labor.     It  is  a  surplus  which  the  individual 
does  not  need,  and  which  belongs  to  him  as  the  product  of  his  own 
faculties.     Competition,  notwithstanding  its  disadvantages,  serves 
a  good  purpose  in  stimulating  activity  and  inventiveness. 

(b)  With  regard  to  consumption  and  distribution,  common  owner- 
ship is  open  to  many  objections.    Will  the  products  be  divided 
among  all  equally,  or  according  to  merit,  or  according  to  need?    (i) 
Equality  will  tend  to  make  man  lazy.     Moreover,  it  seems  unjust 
to  treat  all  men  alike,  whether  they  be  diligent  or  careless.    (2)  On 
the  other  hand,  who  will  pronounce  on  respective  merits  and  needs? 
Here  the  door  is  open  to  innumerable  abuses.     How  can  the  merits 
be  estimated?    On  the  quantity  or  the  quality  of  the  work?    In 
both  cases  there  will  be  dissatisfaction. 

(c)  With  regard  to  the  work  to  be  done.     Some  kinds  of  work  are 
agreeable;  others  disagreeable.     Some  are  looked  upon  as  noble; 


DUTIES    TOWARD     INDIVIDUALS         351 

others  as  menial.  How  will  it  be  possible  to  give  satisfaction  to 
everybody?  There  is  too  much  room  for  discrimination  and 
favoritism. 

(d)  The  same  arguments  apply  to  land.  Even  if  it  is  not  to- 
tally the  fruit  of  labor,  it  has  been  improved  by  labor,  and  of  itself 
would  produce  very  little.  In  many  cases  land  has  been  acquired 
with  one's  earnings.  It  must  also  be  noticed  here  that  the  common 
right  to  live  does  not  mean  the  right  to  the  same  means  and  mode 
of  living.  It  is  true  that  ultimately  everything  necessary  to  life 
comes  from  the  land,  but  man  can  live  without  actually  owning 
any  land,  for  he  can  procure  its  products  by  exchange. 

5.  Conclusion.  —  (i)  In  conclusion  we  may  note  that  social- 
ism  tends   to   lessen  individual  freedom.      (2)  If  the  exclusive 
right  of  ownership  is  unjust,  socialism,  which  advocates  state- 
property,  is  also  unjust.     Even  then  property  is  held  exclusively 
by  a  certain  group  of  men,  and  the  same  inequality  which  socialism 
seeks  to  remove  recurs  on  a  larger  scale.    Logically  socialism  leads 
to  the  abolition  of  national  ownership.      (3)  Finally  socialism 
supposes  falsely  that,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  private  owner- 
ship, the  rights  of  owners  are  unlimited,  that  the  owner  can  use, 
misuse,  and  abuse  his  property.     It  insists  on  present  social  evils 
which  cannot  be  denied,  but  suggests  an  extreme  and  dangerous 
remedy,  worse  perhaps  than  the  evil  itself.    Inequality  and  dis- 
satisfaction will  always  be  found,  and  perfection  is  not  attainable. 

Moreover,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  (i)  getting  rich 
by  making  others  poorer,  e.g.  by  theft,  open  or  concealed;  (2)  get- 
ting rich  without  changing  the  condition  of  others;  (3)  getting 
rich  while  helping  others,  e.g.  manufacturers,  railroad  companies. 
Laws  must  be  made  to  prevent  the  first  of  these  modes,  which  is 
strictly  unjust,  and  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  working  classes. 
Present  conditions  may  be  bettered  by  wise  legislation  and  by 
the  prudent  intervention  of  the  state.  Owners  must  be  reminded 
of  their  duties  of  justice  and  charity.  Generally  a  sound  view 
is  to  be  found  between  extreme  and  radical  theories. 

6.  Main  Rights  and  Duties  of  Proprietors.  —  (a)  Rights:    (i) 
To  give,  exchange  by  contract,  and  bequeath  by  will.    This  right 
is  not  unlimited,  but  restricted  by  the  natural  laws  of  justice  and 


352  ETHICS 

charity,  as  well  as  by  civil  laws  enacted  for  the  common  good. 
(2)  To  exclude  others.  Hence  theft,  open  robbery,  fraud,  cheat, 
are  against  justice.  (3)  These  rights  must  be  exercised  according 
to  reason,  and  with  due  respect  for  the  rights  of  others. 

(b)  Duties:  (i)  All  men  have  a  strict  right  to  live.  Hence  in 
case  of  extreme  necessity  they  may  appropriate  what  they  strictly 
need,  and  this  help  cannot  be  refused  without  injustice.  (2)  In 
labor  contracts  both  parties  must  stand  by  their  mutual  agreement. 
The  workingman  must  respect  his  employer's  person  and  property, 
and  use  diligence  in  fulfilling  his  duties.  The  employer  must  give 
a  just  salary  to  the  workingman,  respect  his  human  dignity,  and 
consequently  give  him  necessary  rest,  as  well  as  the  time  and 
opportunity  to  fulfil  all  his  duties.  (3)  Charity  commands  alms- 
giving and  beneficence.  (4)  Those  who  are  rich  and  influential 
are  more  strictly  obliged  to  give  good  example. 


II.     SOCIAL   DUTIES 

Society  in  General.  —  (a)  Social  duties  result  from  man's  condi- 
tion as  a  member  of  society.  As  understood  here,  society  is  the 
permanent  union  of  several  men  working  together  to  reach  a 
common  end.  (i)  Members  of  the  society  supply  the  capital, 
will,  energy,  activity,  etc.,  necessary  to  the  common  purpose. 

(2)  The  permanence  that  is  required  varies  with  the  different  kinds 
of  societies.    A  mere  fortuitous  meeting  and  cooperation  do  not 
constitute  a  society.     (3)  The  community  of  end  brings  about 
the  union,  but  this  union  cannot  subsist  without  some  authority 
which  will  preserve  it,  prevent  abuses,  keep  the  members  together, 
and  give  to  all   a   uniform   direction.     Without   it,  individual 
members  could  never  cooperate  effectively. 

(b)  Societies  differ:  (i)  According  to  their  origin.  They  are 
natural  when  required  by  human  nature  itself,  like  the  family; 
conventional  when  based  on  a  free  agreement,  e.g.  a  scientific 
or  industrial  association.  (2)  According  to  their  purpose.  They 
may  be  religious,  moral,  scientific,  benevolent,  commercial,  etc. 

(3)  According  to  the  mode  of  union.     They  may  be  based  on 
justice,  when  the  members  have  strict  rights,  e.g.  partnership, 


SOCIAL    DUTIES  353 

insurance  companies,  etc.;  or  on  merely  friendly  or  charitable 
relations,  when  the  union  can  be  broken  without  injustice  because 
the  members  have  no  strict  rights. 

Here  two  societies  only  deserve  our  attention,  the  family  and 
the  state,  which  are  natural  societies.  The  others  are  more 
arbitrary,  and  depend  on  special  free  agreements. 

I.  THE  FAMILY 

i.  Nature.  —  (a)  Sometimes  the  term  " family"  denotes  a  group 
or  succession  of  persons  connected  by  blood  relationship,  and 
includes  even  distant  relatives  and  ancestors.  It  may  even  be 
restricted  to  a  distinguished  and  ancient  lineage.  Properly  it 
means  a  natural  group  of  persons  consisting  of  parents  and  chil- 
dren, especially  children  who  still  live  with  their  parents. 

(b)  A  family  is  constituted  by  marriage,  i.e.  by  a  contract  which 
unites  a  man  and  a  woman  for  the  special  purpose  of  raising  chil- 
dren,    (i)  Marriage  is  a  union  contracted  freely,  to  which  neither 
party  is  compelled.     (2)  In  most  civilized  countries  marriage  is 
contracted  between  one  man  and  one  woman.    Polyandry  or  plu- 
rality of  husbands  is  not  practised.    Polygamy  or  plurality  of 
wives  is  recognized  in  a  few  nations,  but  is  opposed  not  only  to 
peace  and  harmony  in   the  family,  but  to   the  dignity  of  the 
woman,  who  is  bound  where  the  man  is  free. 

(c)  Marriage  is  a  lasting  and  permanent  union,  for  both  parents 
are  necessary  to  the  welfare  and  education  of  their  children.    Di- 
vorce, however,  is  not  strictly,  essentially,  and  in  all  cases,  opposed 
to  the  essential  purpose  of  marriage,     (i)  Indissoluble  marriage 
is  better,  and  almost  indispensable  for  the  nurture  and  education 
of  children.     (2)  The  possibility  of  divorce  suggests  the  adoption 
of  the  means  necessary  to  secure  it.     (3)  Most  domestic  troubles 
would  be  adjusted  if  divorce  were  impossible.    Marriage  would  not 
be  looked  upon  as  so  light  and  easy  an  affair,  nor  contracted  so 
carelessly.     (4)  Divorce  is  a  source  of  dissension  among  families; 
it  lowers  the  sense  of  duty  and  responsibility. 

N.B.    Looking  at  marriage  as  a  sacrament  under  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  Church,  absolute  divorce  with  the  freedom  to  marry 
again  is  unlawful. 
24 


354  ETHICS 

2.   Duties   of   the   Members   of   the   Family.  —  (a)  Duties   of 

married  persons,  (i)  Before  marriage  great  care  must  be  taken 
by  them  to  know  each  other  well,  and  not  to  be  prompted  by  mere 
motives  of  passion.  They  must  also  preserve  their  health  and 
purity,  and  do  nothing  which  they  would  be  ashamed  to  have  the 
other  party  know.  (2)  After  marriage  they  must  keep  the  mutual 
faith  which  they  have  pledged  to  each  other.  Disguised  or  secret 
polygamy  is  an  injustice  for  both  the  husband  and  the  wife,  who 
have  the  same  rights.  They  also  owe  to  each  other  mutual  love 
and  assistance.  The  husband,  because  he  is  stronger,  contrib- 
utes more  to  the  material  means  of  living  and  to  the  protection 
of  the  family.  He  is  the  head,  but  must  remember  that  the  wife 
in  her  household  duties,  does  a  work  equally  essential,  that  she  is 
not  a  slave,  but  a  companion  equal  in  rights  and  dignity.  Finally, 
husband  and  wife  must  always  keep  in  view  the  essential  end  of 
marriage  and  do  nothing  that  would  be  opposed  to  it. 

(b)  Duties  of  parents.    Children  require  the  care  of  their  parents 
for  their  physical,  mental,  and  moral  development.    Hence  the 
natural  duties  of  parents  are  to  give  to  their  children  the  neces- 
saries of  life,  instruction,  moral  and  religious  education.    They 
must  remember  the  importance  of  good  example  and  of  the  early 
education  of  both  the  intelligence  and  the  will.    On  these  the 
child's  future  depends.    The  authority  of  parents  decreases  as 
the  child  grows  older  and  better  able  to  guide  and  direct  himself. 

(c)  Duties  of  children.    Children  owe  their  parents  (i)  love, 
respect,  and  gratitude;  (2)  obedience,  except  where  the  command 
would  be  opposed  to  morality  and  the  dictates  of  conscience;   (3) 
help  and  assistance  in  their  need.    Moreover,  duties  of  charity 
bind  children  of  the  same  family  among  themselves  in  a  special 
manner. 

II.  THE  STATE 

i.  Nature.  —  (a)  Obvious  facts,  (i)  Men  live  in  certain  groups 
determined  by  territories  with  natural  or  conventional  limits,  by 
community  of  language  and  of  interests,  etc.  (2)  Some  of  these 
groups  are  under  the  same  government.  They  vary  in  size,  popu- 
lation, and  form  of  government.  (3)  A  state  is  one  of  these  groups, 


SOCIAL    DUTIES  355 

with  a  certain  number  of  men,  in  the  same  territory,  and  under  the 
same  authority. 

(b)  Explanation  of  terms.     The  Greeks  used  the  word  TroXts  for 
both  the  city  and  the  state.    (Cf.  "policy,"  "politic,"  and  deriva- 
tives.)  The  Roman  "  civitas  "  was  the  body  of  citizens,  and  also  the 
city  as  the  nucleus  of  the  state.    (Cf .  "  citizen,"  "  civil,"  and  deriva- 
tives.)   The  res  publica  referred  to  the  good  of  the  state  in  general, 
and  did  not,  like  our  term  "republic,"  mean  a  special  form  of  gov- 
ernment distinct  from  monarchy.   (Cf.  the  English  term  "common- 
wealth.")    To-day  the  term  "state,"  which  originally  means  any 
condition,  is  appropriated  to  mean  the  political  organization,  and 
chiefly  those  who    exercise  authority.     "Nation"  refers   to  all 
aspects  of   the  state's  collectivity,  and  "people"  to  the  persons 
living  in  the  same  state.    These  terms,  however,  are  frequently 
used  for  one  another.    Other  terms  like  "empire,"  "kingdom," 
"republic,"  "country,"  "land,"  "fatherland,"  have  a  more  re- 
stricted meaning. 

(c)  The  essential  elements  of  a  state  are:  (i)  A  plurality  of  men 
and  families,  the  number  of  which  varies  greatly.     (2)  A  unity 
and  cohesion  under  the  same  common  authority  and  with  the  same 
organization.     (3)  A  fixed  territory.    Nomadic  peoples  are  not  — 
or    rather    were    not  —  perfect    states.     (4)  Independence    and 
freedom  in  administration  and  government.     Colonies  are  not 
perfect  states,  and,  as  in  our  Republic  individual  states  have  only 
a  limited  autonomy  under  the  same  constitution  and  the  same 
federal  authorities  for  points  determined  by  their  mutual  agree- 
ment, the  "United  States"  is  the  true  and  perfect  state  and 
nation. 

2.  Origin.  —  Without  discussing  at  length  the  various  theories 
concerning  the  origin  of  civil  society,  it  may  not  be  without  interest 
and  utility  to  mention  briefly  the  most  important. 

(a)  Hobbes,  in  England,  and  Rousseau,  in  France,  are  the  most 
conspicuous  advocates  of  the  theory  according  to  which  the  origin 
of  civil  society  is  not  to  be  sought  in  human  nature  itself,  but  in 
a  free  agreement  or  social  contract. 

Starting  from  the  principle  that  the  end  of  man  is  pleasure  and 
happiness,  and  that  every  man  is  the  judge  of  what  makes  him 


356  ETHICS 

happy,  Hobbes  infers  that  man  has  a  natural  right  to  whatever  is 
conducive  to  happiness.  Hence  all  men  have  natural  rights  to 
all  things.  This  necessarily  creates  an  antagonism,  or  "the  war 
of  every  man  against  every  man."  Such  an  individualism  is 
natural  to  man,  and  the  state  of  society  is  against  nature.  This 
condition,  however,  being  an  obstacle  to  happiness,  men,  by  mutual 
agreement,  surrender  their  rights  and  establish  a  power  which 
must  be  strong  enough  to  paralyze  individual  forces.  Hence  the 
stronger,  the  more  extensive,  and  the  more  absolute  the  power 
of  the  state,  the  better  will  it  be  able  to  fulfil  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  instituted.  Thus  are  justified  the  most  abso- 
lute despotism  and  tyranny  which  man  can  no  longer  resist  or 
change,  since  he  permanently  renounced  his  rights. 

According  to  Rousseau,  all  men  are  equal  by  nature,  and  no 
man  has  the  right  to  command  another.  Society  which  sup- 
poses superiors  and  inferiors  cannot  therefore  be  natural.  It 
originates  from  a  free  contract  by  which  men  surrender  their 
individual  rights  to  a  common  authority  constituted,  not  necessarily 
by  all  men  unanimously,  but  by  the  majority.  Hence  Rousseau's 
conclusion  is  diametrically  opposed  to  that  of  Hobbes:  Au- 
thority is  binding  only  as  long  as  the  individuals  want  it.  What 
the  majority  has  done  it  can  undo  at  will,  and  the  state  is 
complete  and  absolute  democracy. 

(b)  What  is  to  be  thought  of  these  views?  (i)  Historically 
they  are  gratuitous  —  for  there  is  no  record  of  such  a  contract; 
and  false  —  for  history  shows  that  man,  at  all  times  and  every- 
where, lived  in  society,  and  traces  back  the  state  to  an  extension 
and  a  development  of  the  family.  (2)  The  assumptions  of  the 
system  are  either  contradictory  or  impossible.  Thus  the  right  of 
every  man  to  everything  amounts  to  the  negation  of  rights,  since 
a  man  cannot  have  a  right  unless  other  men  have  the  duty  to 
respect  it.  That  all  men  are  born  equal  is  true  only  if  we  speak  of 
an  equality  of  nature;  but  is  there  equality  of  health,  intelligence, 
will,  capacities,  power,  etc.?  That  all  men  are  born  free  is  true  of 
psychological  freedom,  not  of  moral  freedom.  The  very  nature 
of  man  imposes  duties  on  him.  (3)  Such  a  contract  is  impossible,  or 
rather  invalid,  both  because  the  parties  did  not  know  the  extent 


SOCIAL    DUTIES 


357 


of  the  obligations  which  they  were  assuming,  and  because,  in  order 
to  be  binding,  a  contract  supposes  at  least  some  general  duties  of 
justice,  and  the  general  obligation  of  abiding  by  contracts.  But 
this  is  impossible  if,  as  it  is  claimed,  the  social  contract  is  the 
principle  of  all  determined  rights  and  duties.  (4)  The  conse- 
quences of  the  system  are  either  despotism  (Hobbes),  or  anarchism 
(Rousseau). 

(c)  To  live  in  society  is  natural  to  man,  i.e.  required  by  man's 
very  nature,  (i)  At  all  times,  history  shows  man  living  in  society. 
(2)  Social  organization  is  needed  for  the  complete  physical  and 
mental  development  of  the  individual.  Otherwise  the  individual 
and  the  family  are  left  to  their  own  private  resources,  which  are 
uncertain  and  frequently  insufficient.  In  other  words,  human 
progress  requires  organization,  diversity  and  subordination  of 
functions,  analogical  to  those  which  take  place  in  the  human 
organism.  (3)  Freedom,  far  from  being  destroyed  by  the  social 
organization,  is  really  preserved.  Without  such  an  organization, 
the  weaker  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  stronger;  his  life  and  property 
are  insecure.  (4)  The  social  feelings  of  love,  sympathy,  etc., 
manifest  the  nature  of  man.  Progress  and  civilization  in  their 
various  aspects  result  from  combined  efforts. 

3.  Civil  Authority.  —  (a)  As  civil  society  is  natural  to  man, 
so  also  is  civil  authority,  for  there  can  be  no  organization  without 
a  directive  power.  The  persons  in  whom  such  authority  will  be 
vested  are  designated  by  the  community.  The  methods  of  designa- 
tion and  of  transmission  of  power  vary  with  the  different  political 
constitutions,  the  power  being  sometimes  hereditary,  sometimes 
elective.  The  people  are  not  the  government,  but  simply  indicate 
those  who  will  govern. 

(b)  There  are  three  elementary  types  of  government:  (i)  Mon- 
archy, when  the  authority  resides  in  one  man.  (2)  Aristocracy, 
when  it  resides  collectively  in  several  citizens.  (3)  Democracy, 
when  all  the  citizens  take  a  more  or  less  direct  part  in  the  govern- 
ment. These  elementary  forms  may  be  combined  in  varying 
manners  and  degrees.  Absolute  monarchy  has  disappeared  from 
the  civilized  world.  The  monarch's  power  is  limited  by  a 
constitution,  and  by  parliaments  composed  of  the  people's  repre- 


358  ETHICS 

sentatives.  Every  one  of  these  forms  has  its  advantages  and 
disadvantages,  and  consequently  it  is  impossible  to  determine 
universally  which  is  the  best.  It  depends  on  the  aptitudes, 
aspirations,  traditions,  etc.,  of  the  various  nations. 

(c)  The  government  includes  the  legislative  power,  i.e.  the  power 
to  make  laws;  the  executive  power,  which  enforces  these  laws  and 
takes  the  means  to  have  them  respected;  the  judicial  power,  which 
applies  the  laws  to  particular  cases  and  punishes  the  offenders. 
(See  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.) 

4.  Functions  and  Rights  of  the  State.  —  (a)  The  function  of 
the  state  is  twofold:  (i)  To  protect  the  rights  of  individuals  and 
families  by  imposing  the  respect  of  these  rights,  determining  them 
when  they  are  uncertain,  and  settling  the  various  conflicts  of  rights. 
(2)  To  help  and  promote  public  interests  in  the  intellectual  and 
the  economic  order. 

(b)  The  state  has  the  rights  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  these 
two  functions,  namely,  the  rights:  (i)  To  impose  certain  conditions 
respecting  contracts,  sales,  wills,  etc.,  and  to  make  other  regulations 
for  the  public  good;  to  settle  disputes,  e.g.  between  capital  and 
labor;  and  to  determine  and  protect  the  rights  of  all.  (2)  To 
promote  public  welfare  by  encouraging  private  enterprises,  and  by 
undertaking  what  is  impossible  for  individuals,  e.g.  roads,  canals, 
etc.  (3)  To  help  parents  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  duties  referring 
to  the  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  education  of  their  children. 
(4)  To  punish  all  infractions  of  laws  by  inflicting  just  penalties, 
proportionate  to  the  gravity  of  the  offence,  and  capable  of  pro- 
tecting society.  As  far  as  possible  penalties  must  be  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  deter  others,  repair  the  wrong  caused,  and  give  the 
offender  chances  and  opportunities  to  amend.  Whether  or  not 
the  death  penalty  is  advisable  depends  on  how  far  it  is  neces- 
sary to  prevent  crime.  (5)  To  protect  the  rights  of  the  whole  nation 
by  war.  But  war  being  a  duel  of  nations,  the  same  objection 
already  given  against  the  duel  applies  here  also.  War  manifests  the 
strength,  wealth,  and  military  organization,  not  the  moral  right 
or  wrong,  of  a  nation.  Moreover,  the  harm  done  by  war  is  in- 
calculable, and  for  this  reason,  war,  especially  offensive  war,  is 
not  to  be  undertaken  except  for  the  gravest  reasons.  It  is  to  be 


f 


v/ 

SOCIAL    DUTIES  359 

hoped  that  some  other  means  of  settling  international  disputes 
will  soon  be  universally  agreed  upon. 

(c)  What  are  the  limits  of  the  rights  of  the  state  ?  How  far  must 
it  allow  individual  liberty?  This  question  cannot  be  given  an 
answer  applying  to  all  nations.  It  must  vary  with  the  circum- 
stances, traditions,  degrees  of  civilization,  modes  of  government, 
and  a  number  of  other  influences.  What  would  be  looked  upon  as 
tyranny  in  one  nation  may  be  the  wisest  course  in  another. 

5.  The  Rights  and  Duties  of  Citizens  are  especially  the  follow- 
ing: 

(a)  To  obey  laws  and  respect  the  authority  of  those  whose  duty 
it  is  to  enforce  them.    A  law  is  for  the  common  good,  and  enacted 
by  those  to  whom  the  people  themselves  have  delegated  the  legis- 
lative power.    The  only  exception  is  for  obviously  unjust  and 
tyrannical  laws. 

(b)  To  pay  taxes.    The  state  needs  resources  to  protect  the 
rights  and  freedom  of  the  citizens,  and  to  foster  their  welfare. 

(c)  To  show  their  patriotism,  both  in  time  of  peace  and  in  time 
of  war;   to  love  and  revere  the  flag  which  is  the  emblem  of  the 
nation. 

(d)  To  take  part  in  government  a/airs  as  much  as  the  constitu- 
tion allows;    hence,  in  a  democratic  state,  to  vote  for  worthy 
officers  and  representatives. 

Although,  in  general,  obedience  is  due  to  civil  authority,  resist- 
ance becomes  lawful  when  the  government  is  habitually  tyrannical 
and  unable  to  fulfil  its  functions.  However,  there  must  be  a 
chance  of  success,  and  all  possible  moderation  is  to  be  used.  A 
government  which  is  no  longer  fit  to  fulfil  its  mission,  which 
destroys  instead  of  building  up,  is  no  longer  for  the  good  of 
the  people.  (Cf.  Declaration  of  Independence  of  the  United 
States.) 


CONCLUSION 

The  faithful  fulfilment  of  all  his  duties  increases  man's  moral 
worth.  Acting  according  to  the  dictates  of  his  conscience  cannot 
fail  to  make  man  better.  This  increase  constitutes  essentially 
what  is  called  merit.  Merit  is  also  frequently  used  to  mean 
the  right  to  the  retribution  due  to  good  and  to  bad  actions.  The 
degrees  of  merit  vary  in  proportion  to  (i)  the  importance  of  the 
duty  which  is  fulfilled  and  of  the  good  which  an  action  realizes; 

(2)  the  difficulty  of  the  duty  and  of  the  effort  which  it  requires; 

(3)  the  intention  of  the  agent.    Thus  it  is  more  meritorious  to 
sacrifice  oneself  for  common  than  for  private  interests;    to  give 
alms  out  of  pure  charity  than  out  of  vanity;   to  resist  a  strong 
passion  than  to  do  good  without  effort,  etc.    It  is  more  blamable 
to  kill  than  to  hurt  a  man;    to  hate  one's  parents  than  to  hate 
strangers;  to  fail  in  one's  duty  through  malice  and  wickedness, 
than  to  do  so  out  of  weakness  and  human  respect,  etc. 

Virtue  is  the  habit  of  acting  according  to  the  dictates  of  con- 
science. It  is  not  merely  an  external  appearance,  but  an  intrinsic 
reality.  It  does  not  make  man  act  well  "in  order  to  be  seen  by 
men,"  but  out  of  respect  for  the  moral  law;  not  because  otherwise 
he  would  be  punished,  but  because  the  dictates  of  his  conscience  are 
higher  for  him  than  anything  else.  The  moral  law  extends  farther 
than  the  civil  law,  and  governs  even  the  hidden  motives  and  secret 
thoughts.  The  virtuous  man  does  not  ask  himself  whether  human 
justice  can  and  will  reach  him.  He  simply  acts  according  to  what 
he  knows  to  be  his  duty.  Virtue  is  susceptible  of  progress,  and, 
since  the  noblest  prerogative  of  man  is  his  moral  nature,  his  highest 
ambition  should  be  to  become  greater,  worthier,  more  and  more 
perfect,  and  to  be  instrumental  in  helping  others  toward  the  same 
end. 

From  what  has  been  said  in  psychology  and  in  the  present 
treatise,  the  student  will  easily  infer  the  importance  of  giving  an 

360 


CONCLUSION  361 

early  attention  to  the  moral  nature  of  man,  and  the  most  important 
means  by  which  this  should  be  done.  The  facts  of  imitation  and 
example,  the  influence  of  early  impressions,  the  necessity  of  con- 
sistency between  a  man's  principles  and  his  conduct,  cannot  be 
insisted  upon  too  strongly.  The  good  should  not  only  be  known, 
but  loved  and  practised.  Let  every  man  work  constantly;  effort 
strengthens  the  will  and  increases  the  energy.  Let  the  effort  be 
generous;  it  cannot  fail  to  bring  its  reward. 


EPISTEMOLOGY   OR  THE  THEORY 
OF   KNOWLEDGE 


INTRODUCTION 

I.    THE    NATURE   OF   EPISTEMOLOGY 

i.  The  Aim  of  Epistemology.  —  (a)  Among  the  various  mani- 
festations of  conscious  activity  psychology  numbers  cognitive 
processes,  and  examines  their  nature  and  development.  Logic 
deals  with  the  rules  to  which  such  processes  must  conform  in  order 
to  avoid  contradiction  and  reach  valid  conclusions.  But  neither 
psychology  nor  logic  touches  upon  the  question  of  the  relation  of 
ideas  and  judgments  in  the  mind  to  the  reality  of  things  outside 
the  mind.  Both  remain  confined  within  the  mind  itself.  They 
do  not  examine  whether  knowledge,  which  they  assume  to  be 
objective,  is  so  in  reality;  whether,  how  far,  and  under  what 
circumstances  we  may  be  said  truly  to  know  extramental  objects; 
whether  the  facts  and  principles  which  are  looked  upon  as  true  are 
anything  but  a  dreamlike  mental  play,  a  product  of  our  own  facul- 
ties, springing  from  the  very  nature  of  our  minds;  whether,  in 
other  words,  we  do  not  know  things  as  we  are  rather  than  as 
they  are. 

(b)  Both  hi  the  course  of  ages  as  well  as  at  the  same  period  of 
time,  the  ceaseless  contradictions  of  men  on  almost  every  point 
of  science  and  philosophy,  the  changes  of  opinion  that  take  place 
in  the  same  mind  and  on  the  same  subject,  the  numerous  illusions 
of  both  senses  and  intellect,  the  influence  of  a  multitude  of  cir- 
cumstances, especially  of  intellectual  surroundings  and  education, 
on  all  our  judgments,  arouse  in  the  mind  the  suspicion  that  perhaps 
knowledge  in  its  totality,  not  only  needs  a  thorough  revision,  but 

362 


NATURE     OF     EPISTEMOLOGY  363 

is  only  an  illusion  of  the  mind  that  mistakes  for  objective  realities 
that  which  is  merely  subjective.  The  purpose  of  epistemology  is  to 
ascertain  the  validity  of  knowledge  and  the  conditions  of  this  validity. 

2.  The  Term  "Epistemology."  —  Etymologically,  epistemology 
(eTrwrriJ/xT;,  knowledge   or    science,  and  Aoyo?,  speech  or  thought) 
means  the  science  of  knowledge,  i.e.  the  part  of  philosophy  which 
deals  with  the  value  of  human  knowledge.    It  is  also  called  the 
"Theory  of  Knowledge,"  "Criteriology,"  or  "Critical  Philosophy," 
because  its  aim  is  to  criticise  the  faculties  of  knowledge  and  to 
indicate  the  signs  or  criteria  of  valid  knowledge.    The  names  of 
"Applied,"    "Material,"  or  "Critical  Logic"  are  unsatisfactory 
because  logic,  as  understood  to-day,  deals  exclusively  with  the 
formal  laws  of  thought.    Nor  is  epistemology  to  be  identified  with 
metaphysics.    It  is  rather  an  introduction  to  metaphysics  which 
studies  reality  in  order  to  determine  its  true  nature.    Epistemology 
completes  psychology  and  logic,  and  leads  into  metaphysics,  since 
the  value  of  knowledge  can  hardly  be  examined  without  saying 
something  on  the  objects  of  knowledge.    Here  epistemology  will 
be  treated  as  a  transition  from  the  subjective  to  the  objective  world. 

3.  The  Importance   of  Epistemology  can  hardly  be  overesti- 
mated, although,  as  a  special  science,  it  is  of  comparatively  recent 
origin.    Partial  discussions  are  found  in  older  philosophers,  but 
Locke  is  the  first  clearly  to  state  the  problem,  and  Kant  the  first 
to  attempt  its  solution  on  epistemological  and  critical  principles. 

In  the  beginning  of  philosophical  speculation,  as  well  as  in  the 
beginning  of  the  individual  man's  cognitive  life,  knowledge  in 
general  is  accepted  as  valid  without  any  discussion.  Soon,  how- 
ever, contradiction,  error,  conflicts  of  opinion,  the  necessity  of 
discarding  as  worthless  some  assents  formerly  looked  upon  as  valid, 
lead  the  mind  to  compare,  test,  and  revise  these  assents.  If  what 
was  thought  to  be  a  truth  is  later  on  proved  to  be  an  error,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  find  out  whether  there  is  any  kind  of  knowl- 
edge which  is  certainly  valid,  and  what  are  the  tests  of  valid  truths. 
This  is  the  fundamental  problem  of  epistemology  and  the  basis 
of  every  investigation,  rational  or  religious.  That  opinions  change 
on  a  great  number  of  points  is  undeniable.  A  truth  for  one  is 
an  error  for  another.  A  truth  at  one  time  is  an  error  at  another 


364  EPISTEMOLOGY 

time.    Does  everything  change?    Are  there  truths  the  assent  to 
which  is  and  always  should  be  unanimous?    If  so,  what  are  they? 


II.    FACTS   AND    PROBLEMS 
I.  FACTS 

All  men  desire  to  know,  but  not  the  same  things,  nor  through 
the  same  means;  there  is  no  man  whose  curiosity  is  not  frequently 
aroused,  and  who  is  not  eager  to  see,  hear,  understand,  obtain 
information,  reach  the  truth,  do  away  with  doubt  and  perplexity. 
In  order  to  be  understood,  this  fact  supposes  some  definitions  of 
truth  and  certitude  —  not  final  and  forever  settled  definitions; 
this  is  impossible  now  —  but  definitions  of  the  terms  as  commonly 
understood  by  all  men. 

i.  Truth. — The  term  "truth,"  clear  as  it  may  seem  at  first, 
is  difficult  to  define,  and  has  several  meanings.  Thus  we  say  of 
a  man  that  he  is  a  true  orator;  of  a  metal  that  it  is  true  or  genuine 
gold;  of  a  man  that  he  knows  the  truth,  i.e.  that  his  ideas  corre- 
spond to  reality  and  are  such  as  they  should  be;  of  a  man  that  he 
is  truthful,  i.e.  that  he  speaks  according  to  what  he  thinks.  We 
are  thus  led  to  distinguish  three  kinds  of  truth,  every  one  of  which 
consists  in  the  relation  of  something  extramental  to  something  mental. 

(a)  Moral  truth,  referred  to  in  ethics,  is  the  conformity  of  the 
expression  with  the  thought.    We  need  not  stop  to  consider  this 
meaning. 

(b)  Ontological  truth  is  a  relation  of  conformity  between  a  thing, 
as  existing  outside  the  mind,  and  the  representation  of  it  in  the 
mind.     True  wine  is  for  me  what  I  consider  as  essential  to  wine, 
namely,  a  certain  composition,  certain  properties,  etc.    True  gold 
is  a  substance  corresponding  really  to  the  definition  given  by  the 
physicist.    I  may  mistake  an  adulterated  product  for  wine,  or 
another  metal  for  gold,  or  an  imitation  for  a  precious  stone.    The 
error  will  be  in  the  mind,  yet  the  thing  itself  will  be  truly  what 
it  is. 

(c)  Logical  truth  is  the  conformity  between  the  subjective  or 
mental  representation  and  the  objective  reality  or  ontological 


FACTS     AND     PROBLEMS  365 

truth.  Thus,  if  adulterated  wine  is  offered  as  true  or  genuine,  and 
I  accept  it  as  such,  my  judgment  is  false;  if  I  recognize  it  as  an 
adulteration,  my  judgment  is  true.  If  I  believe  that  true  gold 
is  only  an  imitation,  I  am  mistaken;  if  I  admit  its  genuineness, 
I  judge  truly. 

(d)  Thus  ontological  truth  resides  primarily  in  things;   logical 
truth,  primarily  in  the  mind.    The  former,  however,  implies  the 
comparison  of  a  concrete  object  with  something  mental,  namely, 
with  a  definition,  an  abstract  type,  and  certain  characteristics 
conceived  by  the  mind  as  essential.    The  latter  implies  the  com- 
parison of  a  concrete  idea  with  things  themselves  as  known,  for 
instance,  by  the  manufacturer  in  the  examples  given  above.    A 
true  photograph  or  statue  represents  faithfully  the  features  of  the 
original;  a  true  Murillo  is  a  painting  which  is  really  the  work  of 
this  artist;  true  wine  is  really  made  of  grapes,  etc.    True  in  this 
sense  may  be  synonymous  with  such  terms  as  genuine,  original, 
faithful,  etc.    It  always  implies  that  a  thing  is  what  it  should  be 
when  judged  according  to  a  certain  mental  standard  or  ideal, 
which,  of  course,  may  vary  indefinitely.    A  true  judgment  is  one 
that  corresponds  to  the  fact  or  the  thing  as  it  is.    Thus  I  buy  a 
picture  as  a  true  Murillo,  and  if  it  is  so  in  reality  my  judgment 
is  true. 

(e)  The  epistemological  problem  goes  farther  than  these  simple 
facts.    Epistemology  investigates  whether  our  standards  them- 
selves have  anything  objective,  and  how  much;  whether  what  we 
conceive  as  true  is  in  reality  what  it  seems  to  be.    Soluble  or 
insoluble,  this  problem  has  been  raised  and  must  be  examined. 

(/)  From  what  has  been  said  it  follows  as  a  conclusion  that  both 
forms  of  truth  consist  in  a  certain  conformity  between  external 
things  and  the  mind,  a  relation  which  goes  from  things  to  the  mind 
hi  ontological  truth,  and  from  the  mind  to  things  in  logical  truth. 
Primarily  ontological  truth  is  found  in  things;  logical  truth,  in 
the  mind.  With  regard  to  the  logical  truth  contained  in  a  given 
judgment,  mental  attitudes  vary  greatly  and  include  many  degrees 
of  confidence  or  distrust.  The  assent  or  dissent  may  be  more  or 
less  firm  and  stable.  There  may  be  certitude  or  incertitude.  In 
other  words,  the  attitude  of  the  mind  varies. 


366  EPISTEMOLOGY 

2.  Mental  Attitudes.  —  (a)  Before  a  question  or  fact  is  pre- 
sented to  my  mind:  "Is  it  so  or  not  so?  "  I  am  in  the  state  of  com- 
plete ignorance  concerning  such  a  question  or  fact.  "I  don't 
know,"  and  I  am  not  even  aware  of  my  ignorance  on  this  special 
point,  since,  in  order  to  be  aware  of  it,  I  should  at  least  be  aware 
that  such  a  question  or  problem  may  be  raised. 

(b)  As  soon  as  the  question  is  asked,  I  may  have  no  reason  to 
affirm  or  deny;    I  answer  again:    "I   don't  know."    Properly 
speaking,  this  is  negative  doubt,  frequently  also  called  ignorance, 
the  state  of  a  mind  totally  ignorant  of  the  reasons  pro  and  con, 
and  hence  unable  to  give  any  assent  owing  to  the  lack  of  evidence 
on  both  sides. 

(c)  Reasons  may  be  given  in  favor  of  one  alternative,  which 
would  sway  the  mind  in  this  direction,  were  it  not  for  reasons 
equally  strong  on  the  opposite  side.    As  it  is,  reasons  pro  and  con 
balance  each  other,  and  again  the  same  answer  is  given:    "I  don't 
know."    Although  I  do  know  a  great  deal,  perhaps  even  all  that 
can  actually  be  known  on  the  subject,  I  cannot'  give  my  assent 
either  to  the  affirmation  or  to  the  negation.    This  is  positive  doubt, 
a  state  of  suspense  because  the  mind  is  unable  to  pronounce 
on   account   of   the   equal  weight   of   reasons  for   the   opposite 
alternatives. 

(d)  The  reasons  on  one  side  may  clearly  outweigh  those  on  the 
other.    The  latter,  however,  retain  some  force,  and,  when  I  give 
my  adhesion  to  the  former  alternative,  it  cannot  be  an  unlimited 
and  perfectly  secure  adhesion.     I  may  answer  that  "I  know," 
but,  strictly  speaking,  I  should  answer  that  "I  think  it  is  so,"  or 
that  "I  believe  it."    This  is  opinion,  the  state  of  a  mind  assenting 
to  a  proposition   (which  is  called  probable),  knowing  that  the 
opposite  proposition  has  also  good  reasons  in  its  favor,  and,  in 
consequence,  fearing  lest  the  judgment  it  pronounces  be  erroneous. 
Frequently  this  will  be  expressed  by  saying:    "I  think  so,  but 
have  some  doubts  about  it." 

(e)  Finally,  I  may  see  the  truth  clearly  and  evidently.    There 
are  no  reasons  against  my  adhesion,  or  these  reasons  have  lost 
their  value  so  completely  that  they  can  in  no  way  influence  my 
assent.    Now  properly  I  say:  "I  know  it  is  so,"  or  "I  am  certain 


FACTS    AND     PROBLEMS  367 

and  sure,"  "It  is  beyond  doubt."  This  is  certitude,  the  state 
of  a  mind  assenting  unreservedly,  fearlessly,  without  thinking  that 
it  is  possible  for  it  to  be  mistaken. 

3.  Various  Kinds  of  Certitude.  —  (a)   I  say  that  "I  am  cer- 
tain," and  also  that  " Something  is  certain."     "Certain"  applies 
both  to  the   mind  or  subject,  and  to  the  proposition  or  object. 
Thus  a  first  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  subjective  certitude 
or   simply  certitude,  and  objective    certitude  or  rather  certainty. 
Compare  the  three  statements:    "It  is  true";    "It  is  certain"; 
"I  am  certain  that  it  is  true,"  and  see  their  relations. 

(b)  I  may  be  certain  either  spontaneously  or  after  mature 
reflection.    Hence  certitude  is  direct  or  reflex.    Reflex,  philosoph- 
ical, or  epistemological  certitude  is  the  certitude  to  be  examined 
here,  for  reflection  changes  many  spontaneous  certitudes  into 
incertitudes.    Frequently  spontaneous  certitude  is  hardly  a  certi- 
tude at  all,  but  an  assent  which  may  be  changed  readily.    Thus 
I  have  no  doubt  about  the  news  which  I  read  in  the  morning  news- 
paper, although  I  am  ready  to  disbelieve  it  if  denied  in  another 
paper,  or  in  a  later  issue  of  the  same  paper. 

(c)  Certitude  is  immediate  or  mediate  according  as  it  is  obtained 
immediately — as  when  I  say:  "This  is  my  friend  John,"  because 
I  see  him;    or  mediately  —  as  when  a  conclusion  is  reached  through 
a  process  of  reasoning. 

(d)  Finally,  certitude,  although  always  excluding  the  fear  of 
error,  has  various  degrees  according  to  the  nature  of  the  objects  to 
which  it  applies.    All  objects  are  not  capable  of  the  same  evidence, 
and,  in  a  long  series  of  reasonings,  the  evidence  may  become  less 
and  less  clear.    I  may  be  certain,  on  the  one  hand,  that  two  and 
two  are  four,  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  any  one  of  its  parts, 
or  that  the  man  I  see  is  John;   and,  on  the  other,  that  a  personal 
God  exists,  that  Napoleon  campaigned  in  Egypt,  or  that  honesty 
is  the  best  policy.     Yet,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  mental  processes 
by  which  I  know  the  truth  of  the  latter  propositions,  I  feel  that 
there  is  a  difference  in  the  assent  given  to  them,  and  the  assent 
given  to  the  former. 

4.  How   the   Epistemological   Problems   Arise.  —  As    a   fact, 
spontaneous    certitude    must    be    accepted.     It   is   the   natural 


368  EPISTEMOLOGY 

tendency  of  the  mind.  Doubt  arises  only  later  through  reflection. 
But  is  certitude  justified?  Such  is  the  question  suggested  by  many 
facts  equally  certain,  and  already  mentioned  in  Psychology  and 
Logic  (pp.  117  ff.  256  ff.).  Whatever  is  mental  depends  on  many 
psychological  variations  due  to  heredity,  education,  environ- 
ment, etc.  We  think  as  we  are,  and,  to  a  great  extent,  we  are 
what  circumstances  and  surroundings  have  made  us.  What  is 
truth  for  one  individual  is  error  for  another;  and  what  is  accepted 
at  one  time  of  life  is  rejected  at  another  time.  Even  the  senses, 
on  which  the  whole  mental  life  depends,  are  subject  to  illusions, 
and  always  depend  on  the  physiological  conditions  of  the  organism. 
Defects  of  vision,  such  as  color-blindness,  long  or  short  sightedness, 
etc.,  prevent  a  man  from  seeing  things  as  others  do.  Certain 
diseases,  drugs,  or  conditions  will  change  the  trend  of  mental  life, 
and  affect  assent  and  dissent,  certitude  and  incertitude.  Hence 
arise  epistemological  problems. 

II.  PROBLEMS 

Since,  in  many  known  cases,  the  mind  is  certain  where  it  should 
not  be,  is  it  not  so  in  every  case?  Since  frequently  it  tinges  reality 
with  its  own  coloring,  does  it  not  always  do  so?  Since  the  subjec- 
tive mingles  so  closely  with  the  objective,  is  not  all  knowledge 
subjective?  And  where  shall  we  stop?  Where  and  how  shall 
we  draw  the  line  between  the  objective  and  the  subjective?  We 
distrust  the  man  who  has  deceived  us  several  times.  Should  we 
not  distrust  our  faculties  that  have  also  misled  us?  It  may  be 
the  very  nature  of  the  mind  to  represent  things  as  it  does,  and  to 
picture  them,  not  as  they  are,  but  after  its  own  fashion.  Even  the 
normal  mind,  apart  from  external  influences,  always  mixes  its  own 
activity  with  objective  reality,  and  in  a  proportion  which  cannot 
be  determined.  What  we  are  aware  of  is  always  a  mixture  of 
subjective  and  objective  elements,  and,  in  a  mixture,  the  pro- 
portion of  the  elements  cannot  be  determined  unless  the  elements 
are  known  separately.  Here  we  know  only  the  total  result,  or 
combination  of  the  two  elements.  The  object  can  never  be  known 
except  in  the  subject. 

(a)  The  first  question  then  is:  Does  reflection  justify  certitude? 


METHOD  369 

Is  man  capable  of  certain  knowledge?  In  a  general  way,  dogma- 
tism answers,  "Yes,"  scepticism,  "No,"  while  agnosticism 
endeavors  to  define  the  limits  of  the  knowable  beyond  which 
lies  the  unknowable. 

(b)  This  leads  to  a  second  problem:    Which  certitudes  survive 
the  scrutiny  of  reflection  ?    If  there  is  any  valid  knowledge,  how  can 
it  be  acquired,  and  what  kind  of  knowledge  is  valid?    The  data 
of  experience  alone  are  declared  valid  by  empiricism,  while  the 
claims  of  reason  are  urged  by  rationalism. 

(c)  Strange  as  it  may  seem  to  have  postponed  this  question  so 
far,  we  have  now  to  ask:  What  is  knowledge?    Since  knowledge 
as  a  mental  function  is  within  the  mind,  yet  with  a  peculiar  essen- 
tial relation  to  some  extramental  reality,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
examine  the  value  of  this  representative  aspect.    Idealism  claims 
that  it  is  merely  the  result  of  the  mind's  inner  activity,  while 
realism  admits  some  external  reality  which  is  reflected  in  the  mind. 
And,  if  such  an  external  reality  exists,  what  can  be  known  about 
it?    What  is  the  relation  between  the  idea  in  the  mind  and  the 
thing  outside? 

(d)  Even  if  knowledge  —  some  knowledge  at  least  —  is  valid, 
since  error  is  also  undeniable,  how  will  truth  be  distinguished  from 
error?    How  shall  we  ascertain   which  certitudes  are  justified? 
What  are  the  signs  or  criteria  of  truth?    Such  systems  as  intellec- 
tualism,  mysticism,  pragmatism,  traditionalism,  etc.,  offer  different 
answers. 

Before  studying  these  problems,  a  few  words  on  the  method  to 
be  followed  are  necessary. 


III.    METHOD 

i.  Positive  Starting-point.  —  (a)  Epistemology  starts  with  the 
obvious  fact  of  spontaneous  certitude,  which  cannot  be  denied.  By 
a  critical  and  reflective  analysis  it  endeavors  to  find  out  if  this  certi- 
tude is  legitimate.  Unless  we  start  with  this  fact,  no  solution  can 
ever  be  reached.  But  we  neither  affirm  nor  deny  that  this  certitude 
is  valid,  or  that  our  mind  can  reach  objective  truth.  Nor  do  we 
pretend  to  investigate  whether  the  mind  can  know  things-in-them- 
25 


370  EPISTEMOLOGY 

selves,  as  they  are  in  reality,  and  apart  from  their  mental  represen- 
tations. First  to  isolate  the  mind  from  external  reality,  and  then 
ask  how  it  can  nevertheless  come  in  contact  with  this  reality,  makes 
the  problem  forever  insoluble. 

(b)  Hence  Locke's  principle  that   "knowledge  is  conversant 
only  about  our  ideas"  is  opposed  to  facts.      Knowledge  is  essen- 
tially representative.    The  idea  imposes  itself  as  the  idea  of  some 
reality.    Knowledge   becomes   conversant   with   ideas   later,   by 
reflection.     For  any  unprejudiced  mind,  knowledge  is  conversant 
primarily  with  external  things. 

(c)  To  speak  of  things-in-themselves,  i.e.  apart  from  the  ideas 
we  have  of  them,  is  nothing  short  of  an  absurdity,  since  evidently 
the  mind  can  only  reach  things-in-the-mind,  i.e.  things  as  repre- 
sented.    As  the  Scholastics  so  often  repeat,  knowledge,  being  an 
act  of  the  mind,  partakes  of  the  nature  of  the  mind:    "Cognitum 
est  in  cognoscente  ad  modum  cognoscentis."    The  idea  is  one 
thing;   the  object  represented  is  another;  but  the  object  is  never 
reached  by  the  mind  except  through  the  idea.    Hence  the  question 
is  whether  the  idea,  though  conforming   to  the  nature  of  the 
knowing  mind,  conforms  also  to  the  nature  of  the  known  object, 
or  whether,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  mere  mental  product. 

2.  Descartes'  Universal  Doubt.  —  (a)  In  order  to  examine 
the  problem  of  certitude,  Descartes  begins  by  emptying  the  mind 
completely  of  all  that  it  had  formerly  accepted  as  valid  knowledge. 
Reflecting  that  we  are  frequently  mistaken,  he  rejects  every  form 
of  knowledge  as  uncertain,  so  as  to  be  sure  that  the  mind,  being 
emptied  of  all  its  contents,  will  be  free  from  every  source  of  error. 
This  universal  doubt,  it  is  true,  is  not  real,  final,  or  sceptical,  but 
methodical.  It  is  an  expedient  in  order  to  find  a  safer  basis  for 
certitude.  This  basis  Descartes  finds  in  the  undeniable  fact  that 
he  thinks  and  therefore  exists:  "Cogito,  ergo  sum." 

(b)  This  method  has  for  its  most  serious  defect  that  it  makes 
any  subsequent  certitude  impossible.  In  fact  it  is  only  through  a 
glaring  inconsistency  that  Descartes  emerges  out  of  his  doubt. 
Like  everything  else,  the  fact  of  thought  may  be  a  dream,  and  the 
necessary  connection  between  thinking  and  existing  may  be  illusory. 
How  in  fact  can  such  a  necessity  be  asserted  without  assuming  the 


METHOD  371 

principle  of  contradiction  which,  with  every  other  principle,  has 
been  rejected  by  Descartes?  Consistent  thinking  can  never  take 
place  without  supposing  the  laws  of  thought.  If  the  facts  of 
thought  and  personal  existence  lawfully  emerge  out  of  a  universal 
doubt,  a  number  of  other  facts  have  the  same  right,  because  their 
evidence  is  no  less  clear.  And  if  the  necessity  of  the  connection 
between  existing  and  thinking  is  admitted,  a  number  of  other 
necessary  principles  must  also  be  accepted.  As  it  is,  Descartes' 
method  necessarily  goes  around  in  a  circle  (circulus  in  probando). 
Starting  then  from  the  obvious  fact  of  spontaneous  certitude, 
we  shall  examine  successively  the  problems  mentioned  above. 


CHAPTER  I 

IS  CERTITUDE  JUSTIFIED? 

The  fact  has  already  been  pointed  out  that  a  distinction  is  to 
be  made  between  the  spontaneous  or  natural  certitude  of  the  mind 
and  its  reflective  certitude  which  persists  even  after  its  value  has 
been  tested.  Reflection  may  show  that  the  mind  was  mistaken, 
and  that  assent  has  to  be  refused  to  propositions  to  which  it 
had  been  given  formerly.  More  frequently  it  will  be  found  that 
former  certitudes  are  only  opinions;  truths,  only  probabilities. 
Generally  speaking,  mankind  is  misled,  not  by  too  much  doubt, 
but  by  too  much  certitude,  or  rather  by  states  of  mind  which  man 
spontaneously  calls  certitude,  and  which  even  a  summary 
analysis  reveals  to  be  only  more  or  less  firm  opinions,  accompanied 
by  a  great  deal  of  doubt.  Both  for  speculative,  and  chiefly  for  prac- 
tical, truths,  man  has  to  be  satisfied  in  the  majority  of  cases  with 
assents  that  fall  short  of  perfect  certitude,  and  that  may  be  called 
either  highly  probable  opinions,  or  perhaps  "moral"  certitudes. 
Assents  are  morally  certain  when  they  are  warranted  by  sufficient 
evidence,  although  there  is  some  very  remote  possibility  of 
their  being  given  wrongly.  Thus  opinion  gradually  merges  into 
certitude,  and  no  strict  line  can  be  drawn  between  them. 

The  questions  to  be  examined  now  are  not:  Of  what  truths  can 
we  be  certain?  Are  they  many  or  few?  Which  certitudes  are 
justified?  and  the  like;  but  simply:  Is  the  state  of  mind  called 
certitude  ever  justified?  Can  we  be  certain  of  anything?  Strictly 
speaking,  only  two  answers  can  be  given:  (i)  "Yes,"  and  (2) 
"No  ";  or  rather,  since  even  a  negative  answer  implies  the  certi- 
tude of  the  impossibility  of  certitude,  (i)  "Yes,"  or  "No,"  and 
(2)  "I  do  not  know."  For  the  present  we  shall  speak  briefly  of 
Scepticism,  Agnosticism,  and  Dogmatism,  but  many  questions 

372 


CERTITUDE  373 

referring  to  these  systems  will  necessarily  have  to  be  left  over  for 
subsequent  chapters. 

I.  SCEPTICISM 

1.  Meaning.  —  (a)  The  many  uses  of  the  terms  "scepticism," 
"sceptical,"  etc.,  make  it  almost  impossible  to  give  any  definition 
of  them.    I  call  a  man  sceptical  when  he  does  not  believe  my 
present  assertion  of  which  I  am  certain.    Again  I  call  sceptical  a 
man  who  is  generally  hard  to  convince,  requires  strict  proofs,  and 
discusses  every  point  before  he  gives  his  assent.    I  also  call  scepti- 
cal the  man  who  says  that  nothing  is  certain,  disbelieves  every- 
thing, is  inclined  to  disregard  the  opinions  of  other  men,  and  is 
generally  ready  to  answer  "I  don't  know,"  to  every  question. 

(b)  Etymologically,   "scepticism "  is    a    Greek  word  (oveetyt?, 
doubt,  from  <rK€7nre<r0at,    to    look    at    carefully,  to    scrutinize), 
which  even  in  philosophy  has  more  than  one  meaning.    In  general 
it  is  opposed  to  dogmatism,  and  denotes  the  doctrine  denying  the 
aptitude  of  the  mind  to  reach  truth,  or  at  least  to  be  aware  that  it 
has  reached  it,  so  that  no  certitude  can  be  justified. 

(c)  Theoretically,  we  may  imagine  a  man  who  professes  to  be 
certain  of  nothing,  not  even  of  his  existence,  of  the  first  principles 
of  reason,  of  the  distinction  between  the  state  of  sleep  and  the  state 
of  wakefulness,  nor  of  his  own  doubt.    This,  however,  is  merely 
an    abstract    supposition.    The   existence    of   such   out-and-out 
sceptics  seems  impossible,  and  no  instance  justifies  it  historically. 
As  it  presents  itself  in  history,  scepticism  is  only  relative.    It 
admits  some  facts  and  principles  as  certain,  otherwise  thought  and 
speech  are  utter  impossibilities.    The  very  fact  that  sceptics  argue, 
discuss,  and  write,  shows  that  they  pretend  to  know  something, 
were  it  only  that  knowledge  is  not  possible.    Scepticism,  however, 
is  distinct  from  agnosticism.    The  latter  admits  the  validity  of 
some  forms  of  knowledge,  but  draws  a  strict  line  beyond  which 
everything  is  unknowable.    The  former  attacks  knowledge  and 
certitude  in  general,  and  tries  to  show  the  incapacity  of  all  cognitive 
faculties,  senses  as  well  as  reason. 

2.  Historical  Outline.  —  (a)  The  Sophists,  especially  Protagoras 
and  Gorgias,  point  to  the  contradictions  of  earlier  philosophers, 


374  EPISTEMOLOGY 

and  reach  the  practical  conclusion  that,  in  regard  to  any  ques- 
tion, both  the  negative  and  the  affirmative  answers  are  equally 
plausible. 

(b)  Pyrrho  professes  that  real  things  are  inaccessible  to  human 
knowledge  because,  on  the  one  hand,  the  senses  manifest  only 
appearances,  and  on  the  other,  reason  rests  on  custom,  habit,  and 
education.    Hence  man  must  abstain  from  pronouncing  on  any- 
thing.   To  abstain  from  denning  and  judging  (CTT^O/)  will  give 
peace  to  the  mind  (aTo/xx&a),  and  hence  true  happiness. 

(c)  Arcesilaus  and  Carneades  also  reject  the  possibility  of  knowl- 
edge and  certitude,  but  admit  that  some  probability,  sufficient  in 
practice,  may  be  attained.     Since,  according  to  them,  the  criterion 
of  truth  is  perception,  and  perception  may  be  irresistibly  false,  it 
follows  that  unreserved  assent  must  always  be  refused. 

(d)  The  main  school  of  scepticism  is  that  of  Alexandria,  with 
^Enesidemus,  Agrippa,  and  Sextus  Empiricus,  who  systematize 
scepticism,  and,  under  the  name  of   tropes,  classify  the  reasons 
leading  to  doubt.    All  conclude  that  assent  should  always  be 
withheld.    Scepticism  proper  is  restricted  almost  entirely  to  Greek 
philosophy.     Elsewhere  doubt  assumes  a  special  character,  and 
applies  only  to  certain  forms  of  knowledge. 

3.  Criticism.  —  Nothing  could  be  said  to  a  man  whose  answer 
to  every  question  would  be:  "I  don't  know."  A  common  ground 
which  is  indispensable  for  every  discussion  could  never  be  found. 
It  may  be  added  that  any  such  sceptic  could  be  placed  in  constant 
contradiction  with  himself,  both  in  his  practical  life  and  in  his 
theoretical  views.  The  man  who  knows  nothing  has  no  right  to 
think  or  speak.  Finally,  as  the  fact  of  spontaneous  certitude  is 
undeniable,  it  suffices  briefly  to  examine  the  objections  of  scepticism 
against  the  validity  of  knowledge. 

(a)  Fact  of  error.  It  is  certain  that  sometimes  man  mistakes 
falsity  for  truth,  and  adheres  to  error  with  the  same  tenacity  with 
which  he  adheres  to  truth.  Both  the  senses  and  reason  are  sources 
of  transitory  or  permanent  error. 

Answer.  —  To  this  it  may  be  answered  that  error  supposes  truth. 
Since  these  two  ideas  are  correlative,  if  nothing  is  true,  nothing  is 
false.  If  sometimes  man  recognizes  that  he  errs,  it  is  a  sign  that 


CERTITUDE  375 

sometimes  also  he  knows  that  he  does  not  err.  From  the  fact  that 
we  sometimes  err  nothing  can  be  inferred,  except  that  we  should 
be  prudent  in  affirming  and  in  giving  our  unreserved  assent. 

The  same  is  true  for  probability.  It  is  a  participation  of,  or  an 
approach  to,  certainty;  and  the  certainty  of  some  propositions  is 
the  only  ground  for  affirming  that  others  are  more  or  less  probable. 
Thus  the  certitude  that  a  bag  contains  more  red  than  white  balls 
is  the  only  ground  for  affirming  that  the  probability  of  drawing  a 
red  ball  is  greater  than  the  probability  of  drawing  a  white  one. 
There  could  be  no  participation  if  there  was  nothing  to  be  parti- 
cipated in,  no  justifiable  probability  if  there  was  no  justifiable 
certitude. 

(b)  Facts  of  contradictions  and  of  the  diversity  of  human  opinions; 
in  space  —  different  contemporary  individuals;   in  time  —  succes- 
sion of  opinions;  in  objects — science,  politics,  religion,  morality, 
etc. ;   in  the  same  individual  —  changes  in  his  views.    All  are 
convinced  that  they  possess  the  truth,  yet  it  is  certain  that  some 
do  not,  since  contradictories  cannot  be  true  at  the  same  time. 

Answer.  —  (i)  There  is  agreement  on  certain  general  truths, 
principles,  axioms,  and  facts.  Thus  men  have  in  common  the  per- 
ceptions of  color,  solidity,  etc.  All  are  certain  of  their  own  exist- 
ence and  of  the  immediate  data  of  consciousness.  All  admit  some 
principles  of  reason;  for  instance,  all  look  for  the  causes  of  what- 
ever happens  (principle  of  causality).  There  is  also  agreement 
on  many  points  of  abstract  sciences,  e.g.  of  mathematics.  (2) 
As  stated  elsewhere,  on  many  questions,  especially  in  practical 
matters,  we  have  to  be  satisfied  with  more  or  less  probable  opinions. 
Contradictions  are  more  numerous  in  proportion  as  these  questions 
are  more  complex  and  more  influential  on  practical  life. 

(c)  Diallelus,   or    Circulus    in    Probando.    The    reliability    of 
human  faculties  cannot  be  proved  except  by  using  these  same 
faculties  whose  validity  is  still  doubtful.     Some  reason  must  be 
given  for  admitting  the  value  of  human  faculties.    This  reason 
itself,  since  it  proceeds  from  the  same  faculties,  must  rest  on 
another  reason,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 

Answer.  —  (i)  This  argument  leads  to  absolute  and  universal 
scepticism,  which  is  absurd.  The  sceptic  uses  his  reason  to  prove 


376  EPISTEMOLOGY 

the  weakness  of  reason,  and  hence  also  supposes  its  validity.  To 
be  consistent,  he  must  doubt  even  his  own  doubt.  (2)  The 
objection  assumes  wrongly  that  demonstration  is  the  only  source  of 
certitude.  Demonstration  is  only  an  indirect  means  of  throwing 
light  on  a  hidden  truth.  Where  there  is  full  light,  such  a  means 
is  unnecessary.  While  most  propositions  do  not  at  first  clearly 
appear  as  true  or  false,  others  have  in  themselves  the  stamp  of 
truth  or  error,  which  is  obvious  to  all  men.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  the  reliability  of  human  faculties  cannot  be  proved,  but  it 
need  not  be.  In  some  cases  the  use  of  them  is  its  own  justification. 

II.  AGNOSTICISM 

i.  Meaning.  —  (a)  Like  the  term  "scepticism,"  the  term 
"agnosticism"  is  vague,  and  applies  to  different  views  and  sys- 
tems. Etymologically  it  means  the  attitude  of  one  who  does  not 
know  (a  and  yvoxrriKos),  and  thus  would  denote  something  even 
more  radical  than  scepticism,  since  the  sceptic  is  simply  one  who 
"examines."  As  used  to-day,  however,  agnosticism  is  a  milder 
term  than  scepticism,  and,  whereas  scepticism  is  looked  upon  as  a 
term  of  reproach,  many  pride  themselves  on  being  called  agnostics. 

(b)  The  term  "agnosticism,"  coined  by  Huxley  in  1869,  has 
been  applied  to  the  views  of  thinkers  whose  opinions  were  and  are 
greatly  at  variance  on  many  points.    The  feature  common  to  all 
is  an  attitude  of  doubt  or  denial  toward  certain  objects  of  knowl- 
edge.   The  agnostic  assigns  limits  to  the  mind's  knowing  powers, 
beyond  which  lies  an  unknowable  region.    There  is  light  up  to  a 
certain  point  which  can  be  determined,  and  beyond  which  the  human 
mind  finds  itself  in  complete  darkness.     The  recognition  of  some 
unknowable  seems  to  be  the  essential  feature  of  agnosticism.    But 
the  dividing  line  between  the  knowable  and   the   unknowable 
occupies  different  places  according  to  different  agnostics. 

(c)  Thus,  in  its  mildest  form,  agnosticism  joins  hands  with 
gnosticism  —  this  term  being  taken  here  in  its  etymological  signifi- 
cation —  since  every  man  must  confess  that  many  things  are 
beyond  the  human  grasp.    The  man  who  says:  "I  do  not  know," 
and  chiefly,    "I  cannot  know,"  or,  "Nobody  can  know,"  assigns 
limits  to  human  faculties  of  knowledge.    The  agnostic  goes  farther. 


CERTITUDE  377 

He  has  found  the  exact  boundaries  of  the  realm  of  the  knowable, 
and  the  range  of  human  faculties.  Beyond  the  knowable  objects 
there  are  others  which  the  mind  cannot  reach. 

(d)  For  all  agnostics,  that  which  is  primarily  unknowable  is  the 
Absolute,  the  First  Cause,  the  unconditioned  Reality,  God.  Hence 
sometimes  agnosticism  has  .been  identified  with  atheism.  Yet 
they  are  distinct.  An  agnostic,  Spencer  for  instance,  may  admit 
the  existence  of  the  Absolute,  although  he  denies  the  mind's  power 
to  know  its  nature.  Frequently  also  agnosticism  coincides  with 
.positivism  and  empiricism.  It  admits  the  value  of  empirical 
science,  and  denies  that  of  every  form  of  metaphysics. 

2.  Critical  Remarks.  —  A  thorough  criticism  of  agnosticism 
would  include  the  whole  of  epistemology,  together  with  meta- 
physics and  theodicy.  Here  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  a  few 
remarks  of  a  general  nature. 

(a)  The  agnostic  attitude  is  attractive  on  account  of  its  apparent 
humility .    In  reality  it  includes  a  great  presumption,  that  of  deter- 
mining exactly  how  far  human  reason  can  go.    There  is  some 
humility  in  saying:    "I  do  not  know,"  but  it  is  quite  different  to 
say:    "It  is  unknowable." 

(b)  In  fact,  how  can  one  say  of  a  thing  that  it  is  unknowable 
without  having  made  a  comparison  of  it  with  the  capacity  of  the 
human  mind,  and  therefore  without  having  already  some  accurate 
knowledge,  not  only  of  the  mind's  power,  but  also  of  the  object 
which  is  supposed  to  transcend  this  power? 

(c)  Can  we  know  the  existence  of  a  thing,  and  at  the  same  time 
be  utterly  ignorant  of  its  nature?    Do  not  the  facts  by  which  it 
manifests  its  existence  necessarily  manifest  also  something  of  its 
nature?    The  same  mental  processes  used  in  natural  science  will 
necessarily    lead   higher   into   metaphysics.    The   knowledge   of 
physical  causes  will  lead  to  the  First  Cause,  and  so  on. 

III.    DOGMATISM 

i.  Meaning.  —  (a)  As  understood  here,  dogmatism  is  opposed 
to  scepticism,  and  means  the  system  that  admits  some  principles 
or  facts  as  certain,  or  more  generally,  the  possibility  of  certitude. 
In  a  more  restricted  sense,  which  is  in  frequent  use,  dogmatism 


378  EPISTEMOLOGY 

applies  to  systems  or  assertions  that  are  altogether  uncritical, 
make  unnecessary  assumptions,  and  fail  to  give  proofs  where  they 
are  needed.  In  this  sense  dogmatism  is  a  term  of  reproach,  whereas 
in  the  former  sense,  which  alone  will  be  used  here,  it  simply  stands 
for  the  admission  of  valid  knowledge. 

(b)  Dogmatism  does  not  claim  that  everything  can  be  proved,  for 
this  would  involve  an  endless  regressive  process  of  demonstration. 
It  admits  that  certain  principles  or  facts  need  no  proof,  but  stand  on 
their  own  merits.    To  prove  is  to  borrow  light  from  principles, 
so  as  to  throw  it  on  the  conclusion  which  otherwise  would  remain 
in  the  dark.    These   principles   either   have  light  in  themselves 
or  derive  it  from  some  other  source.    Ultimately  principles  must 
be  reached  whose  light  is  not  derived  from  any  other  principle, 
which  shine  of  themselves,  are  clearly  seen  by  the  mind,  and 
shed  their  light  around  on  other  objects.     We  say:  "It  is  as  clear 
as  daylight,"  to  mean  something  which  everybody  must  admit. 
We  are  certain  of  these  principles  because  their  truth  manifests 
itself  directly  and  immediately  to  the  mind,  and  because  it  mani- 
fests itself  in  the  same  way  to  all  men. 

(c)  Nor  can  it  be  said  that,  in  such  cases,  the  mind  knows  things, 
not  as  they  are,  but  as  it  is,  and  that  cognition  is  determined  only 
by  the  mind's  nature.    We  are  conscious  that  such  truths  are 
imposed  on  the  mind  from  without.     My  judgment  must  agree 
with  the  reality  of  things,  otherwise  it  is  pure  fiction,  and  all  men 
make  the  distinction  between  fiction  and  reality.    The  present 
question,  however,  is  not  that  of  the  nature  of  knowledge,  but 
that  of  certitude.    No  matter  whence  this  certitude  comes,  reflec- 
tion, as  well  as  spontaneous  adhesion,  justifies  it.    Why? 

2.  Two  Classes  of  Judgments  are  Pronounced  with  Certitude. 
Some  are  facts.  Thus  I  say:  "I  am  as  sure  as  if  I  had  seen  it 
with  my  own  eyes,"  or  "I  am  certain  that  I  did  or  said  so  and  so." 
Others  are  principles.  Thus  I  say:  "I  am  as  certain  of  this  as  I 
am  of  the  proposition:  two  and  two  are  four."  In  both  cases  I 
oppose  my  knowledge,  as  true,  to  something  fictitious.  I  appeal 
to  propositions  which  everybody  must  accept,  to  a  standard  which 
all  men  admit  and  on  which  all  are  agreed. 

These  facts  and  principles  are  true  because  I  see  that  they  are, 


CERTITUDE  379 

because  they  shine  to  my  mind  like  daylight  to  my  eyes.  No 
amount  of  reflection  can  ever  make  me  depart  from  them.  To 
deny  them  is  to  commit  mental  suicide,  and  to  place  oneself  in  the 
absolute  incapacity  of  ever  thinking  and  speaking.  That  I  exist, 
think,  and  act;  that  two  and  two  are  four;  that  the  whole  is 
greater  than  any  of  its  parts,  etc.,  are  truths  that  are  certain  and 
beyond  the  possibility  of  any  doubt,  although  men  may  dispute 
as  to  the  real  meaning  of  such  propositions,  and  examine  what 
correspondence  is  found  between  the  mental  representation  and 
the  objective  reality.  This  is  a  different  question,  which  will  be 
raised  later  on,  when  we  shall  examine  the  nature  of  knowledge. 
At  present  the  fact  of  certitude  stands  the  test  of  reflection.  If 
the  extent  of  certitude  has  been  questioned,  we  may  say  that  its 
existence  has  never  been  doubted  seriously.  All  men  hold  some 
truths  as  certain,  nor  can  they  be  thinking  men  without  certitude. 


CHAPTER  II 
CERTITUDES 

I.  FACTS 

i.  Existence  of  Certitude.  —  (a)  Upon  reflection  many  spon- 
taneous certitudes  resolve  themselves  into  higher  or  lower  proba- 
bilities, that  is,  into  incertitudes.  The  absence  of  doubt  was  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  value  of  the  evidence  had  not  been  weighed 
with  sufficient  accuracy,  or  evidence  to  the  contrary  had  been 
neglected,  or  the  possibilities  of  error  overlooked.  But,  as  was 
said  in  the  preceding  chapter,  there  are  certitudes  which  persist, 
and  which  even  the  most  radical  sceptic  cannot  but  imply  in  his 
very  denials.  These  certitudes  belong  to  two  groups:  Facts  of 
experience  and  principles  of  reason.  In  any  scientific  investigation, 
both  are  combined  in  varying  degrees.  Thinking  is  not  a  merely 
mental  function,  proceeding  independently,  and  free  to  follow  its 
own  caprice.  It  must  conform  to  something  which  is  extramental. 
I  am  not  free  to  think  that  two  and  two  are  four.  This  truth 
imposes  itself  on  my  mind  from  outside.  I  do  not  make  it,  but 
recognize  it. 

(b)  Truth  is  the  right  which  a  certain  proposition  has  to  be  accepted, 
and  this  right,  like  the  right  of  ownership,  persists  even  when  it  is 
ignored  or  violated.  In  some  cases  this  right  is  not  clear,  and,  even 
after  a  diligent  investigation,  may  not  become  evident.  In  other 
cases,  it  is  in  itself  shining  for  the  mind,  and  immediately  mani- 
fest. Facts,  i.e.  concrete  experiences,  both  internal  and  external, 
and  principles,  i.e.  self-evident  propositions,  are  the  necessary 
bases  of  thought.  If  they  are  rejected,  nothing  is  left  but  to  stop 
thinking  altogether  or  go  to  an  asylum. 

Not  that  some  propositions  may  not  at  first  seem  self-evident 
without  being  so;  nor  that  facts  may  not  be  investigated  to  dis- 
tinguish true  immediate  experience  from  the  interpretation  which 

380 


CERTITUDES  38! 

the  mind  may  rashly  add  to  it.  But  even  after  this  sifting  is  done, 
there  is  left  a  residue  of  facts  and  laws,  of  concrete  experiences  and 
abstract  principles,  which  are  absolutely  certain,  and  about  which 
no  other  state  of  mind  is  possible  but  certitude. 

(c)  Later  on  we  shall  have  to  examine  whether  and  how  far 
the  mental  representation  corresponds  with  external  reality.  For 
the  present  we  simply  observe  that  the  mental  attitude  is  one  of 
absolute  and  unreserved  certitude  which  nothing  can  shake.  "  Two 
and  two  are  four";  "a  straight  line  is  shorter  than  a  curve  uniting 
the  same  two  points";  "the  same  thing  cannot  at  once  be  one 
way  and  the  contradictory  way";  "I  am  now  thinking  and  writ- 
ing"; "the  paper  on  which  I  am  writing  is  white,  and  the  ink 
I  use  black;"  "I  experience  a  headache,"  etc.,  are  so  many 
assertions  of  which  I  am  so  certain  that,  should  any  one  try  to 
destroy  or  even  weaken  this  certitude,  I  should  at  once  suspect 
his  seriousness  or  his  mental  sanity. 

2.  Facts  of  Experience  and  Principles  of  Reason.  —  (a)  Under 
certain  conditions,  inferences  from  self-evident  facts  and  principles 
lead  to  unreserved  certitude,  while,  in  other  cases,  the  conclusions 
are  accepted  with  more  or  less  fear  of  error.  In  many  circum- 
stances, I  may  be  certain  that  my  fellowmen  do  not  deceive  me 
in  what  they  claim  to  have  seen,  heard,  or  experienced.  Although 
the  fact  itself  to  which  they  testify  is  not  directly  evident  for  me, 
I  can  entertain  no  doubt  about  it.  Again,  once  the  demonstration 
is  understood,  I  am  certain  that  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of  a 
triangle  equals  two  right  angles,  because  the  connection  of  this 
assertion  with  self-evident  principles  is  clear.  Once  I  have  studied 
physics  and  chemistry,  I  cannot  doubt  that  this  pure  water,  which 
I  have  not  analyzed,  and  which  I  have  never  seen  frozen,  is  com- 
posed of  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  the  proportion  1:2,  and  that  it 
will  freeze  at  32  degrees  Fahrenheit.  Should  the  event  prove 
otherwise,  it  would  be  a  sign  for  me  that  the  water  is  not  pure, 
or  that  my  thermometer  is  at  fault.  Few  perhaps  are  the  laws 
established  beyond  doubt,  but  the  certainty  of  some  cannot  be 
denied. 

(b)  The  mind  proceeds,  and  this  very  advance  supposes  some- 
thing fixed  and  settled,  both  as  a  starting-point  and  as  a  guiding 


382  EPISTEMOLOGY 

light.  Remove  these,  and  science  becomes  at  once  an  impossibility, 
man  must  renounce  thinking,  since  every  step  would  involve  him 
in  a  contradiction.  Or  rather  there  is  no  vagary  which  could  not 
be  indulged  in,  since  there  would  remain  nothing  to  go  by,  no 
directive  principle.  Whether  we  proceed  from  experience  —  as 
in  the  sciences  of  nature  —  or  from  self-evident  principles  —  as 
in  geometry  —  the  starting-point  must  be  stable,  firm  and  certain. 
In  its  inductive  and  deductive  processes,  the  mind  has  to  avoid 
contradiction  and  be  guided  by  the  sidelights  of  truth  and  facts 
already  ascertained.  Certitudes  of  abstract  principles  must 
always  be  verifiable  in  all  concrete  instances,  and  facts  must  be 
organized  with  the  help  of  principles. 

But  are  facts  and  principles  irreducible  to  each  other?    If  so, 
will  either  one  suffice,  or  are  the  two  necessary? 

II.  EMPIRICISM 

1.  Meaning.  —  As  its  name  indicates,  empiricism  derives  all 
valid    knowledge    from   experience    (e/x7rapia),    either   internal   or 
external.     It  is  opposed  to  innatism,  which  admits  innate  ideas 
independent  of  experience,  and  to  rationalism,  which  admits  that 
the  mind  possesses  some  knowledge,  which,  even  if  it  depends 
on  the  senses,  is  irreducible  to  sense-knowledge.    According  to 
empiricism,  the  knowledge  of  universal  and  necessary  principles 
is  simply  a  strong  association  which,  by  repetition,  has  become 
indissoluble.     Every  form  of  knowledge  is  ultimately  reduced  to 
concrete  experience,  the  laws  of  the  mind  being  alone  responsible 
for  their  abstract,  general,  and  necessary  character. 

2.  Criticism.  —  (a)  In  Psychology  we  have  shown   the  irre- 
ducibility  of  the  concept  to  the  image  (p.  94  ff.  102  ff.)  and  of 
necessary  judgments  to  associations,      (p.  112  ff.).    Only  a  few 
words  will  be  added  here.    The  perception  of  what  is  cannot  give 
the  certitude  of  what  must  be.     Knowledge  of  what  happens  cannot 
give  the  knowledge  of  what  will  necessarily  happen.    The  empiricist 
takes  it  for  granted  that  concrete  knowledge  alone  is  true  knowl- 
edge.   But  this  a  priori  assertion  is  far  from  self-evident,  and  no 
argument  is  forthcoming  to  demonstrate  it.    There  are,  on  the  con- 
trary, self-evident  principles  which  we  do  not  even  think  of  testing 


CERTITUDES  383 

by  experience,  because  their  certitude  is  immediate.  Two  and  two 
are  known  to  be  four  as  soon  as  the  terms  are  understood,  and  this 
assertion  is  at  once  accepted  as  applying  universally,  at  all  times 
and  everywhere.  It  is  known  simply  by  comparing  the  predicate 
with  the  subject. 

(b)  To  become  orderly  and  scientific,  experience  constantly  needs 
principles  which  are  not  given  in  experience,  like  those  of  con- 
tradiction, causality,  etc.  Experience  and  reason  are  not  used 
successively,  that  is,  reason  does  not  only  continue,  surpass,  and 
transcend  experience.  In  any  science,  the  use  of  the  two  is 
simultaneous,  and  they  compenetrate  each  other  at  every  step. 
Scientific  experience  is  impossible  without  the  use  of  principles 
transcending  experience. 

III.  RATIONALISM 

1.  Meaning.  —  We  are  certain  of  concrete  facts,  but  there  is 
another  certitude,  namely,  that  of  principles,  which  is  acquired  as 
the  result  of  a  direct  intuition  of  the  intellect.    As  understood 
here,  rationalism  is  opposed  to  empiricism,  and  denies  that  every 
form  of  knowledge  can  be  reduced  to  experience.    It  admits  the 
radical  difference   between  the  concrete  and    the  abstract,  and 
refuses  to  identify  the  universal  with  the  collective.    It  asserts 
that  the  certitude  of  principles  is  not  the  direct  result  of  experience, 
but  of  an  intuition  of  the  understanding.    It  is  the  theory  ex- 
plained in  Psychology  when  we  spoke  of  the  origin  of  necessary 
principles  (p.  112  ff.). 

Hence  rationalism  here  does  not  mean  the  abuse  of  rationalism, 
which  consists  in  relying  exclusively  on  reason  and  neglecting 
experience,  or  in  relying  exclusively  on  human  reason  and  denying 
the  possibility,  fact,  or  usefulness  of  a  divine  revelation.  Ration- 
alism may  or  may  not  admit  the  innateness  of  ideas  and  principles. 
This  is  an  independent  question  which  has  been  answered  in  Psy- 
chology. Rationalism  is  not  opposed  to  the  legitimate  use  of 
experience,  but  admits  the  certitude  of  principles  transcending 
experience.  The  union  of  the  two  is  indispensable  in  science. 

2.  Value.  —  Rationalism  is  the  only  satisfactory  explanation 
of  the  certitude  which  we  have  of  principles.  (See  Psychology.) 


384  EPISTEMOLOGY 

Nor  does  it  lessen  the  value  of  knowledge,  since  it  does  not  profess 
to  create  anything  new,  but  simply  to  apprehend  aspects  of  reality 
which  are  already  found  in  sense-experience,  hidden,  as  it  were, 
under  the  concrete  envelope  which  limits  such  reality  in  space 
and  time.  Reason  goes  deeper,  to  the  core  itself,  which,  once  the 
outer  envelope  is  removed,  is  no  longer  restricted  to  one  individual. 


CHAPTER  III 

WHAT  IS  KNOWLEDGE? 

So  far  we  have  simply  analyzed  our  certitudes  and  shown  that 
the  human  mind  cannot  possibly  remain  in  the  state  of  doubt, 
but  that,  even  in  its  denials,  it  implies  the  power  to  know  with 
certitude.  There  remains  the  crucial  question  of  epistemology: 
What  is  it  to  know?  And  what  is  the  value  of  the  relation  estab- 
lished in  knowledge  between  a  knowing  mind  and  a  known  object? 

I.    FACT   OF   KNOWLEDGE 

i.  Nature  of  Knowledge.  —  (a)  Knowledge  is  essentially  the 
awareness  of  an  object,  i.e.  of  anything  —  fact  or  principle  —  which 
may  in  any  manner  be  reached  by  our  cognitive  faculties.  The 
existence,  size,  and  color  of  the  tree  out  there,  a  geometrical  theo- 
rem, the  existence  of  God,  etc.,  may  be  so  many  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. Knowledge  always  implies  both  the  antithesis  of  a  knowing 
activity  and  of  a  known  object,  and  their  close  union.  The  known 
object  must  in  some  way  be  present  within  the  knowing  subject. 
I  can  know  the  tree  out  there  only  in  so  far  as  it  acts  on  me,  and 
thereby  contributes  to  produce  in  my  mind  a  representation  of 
it.  Any  activity  which  may  be  conceived  as  purely  subjective 
can  never  be  a  cognitive  process,  and  any  attempt  to  identify  the 
object  of  knowledge  with  the  subjective  experience  by  which  it  is 
known,  leads  to  destroying  the  fact  itself  of  knowledge,  which 
implies  the  object  as  essentially  as  it  does  the  subject. 

(b)  This  objective  relation  is  expressed  in  an  implicit  or  explicit 
judgment  by  which  the  perception  or  intuition  is  referred  to  the 
object.  Thus  in  sense-perception,  there  is  implied  the  assertion 
that  my  sensations  refer  to  this  or  that  object.  "I  see  a  tree  out 
there"  means  that  the  color-sensations  which  I  experience  are 
referred  to  an  object  with  certain  characteristics,  which  I  call  a 
26  385 


386  EPISTEMOLOGY 

tree,  and  which  is  located  in  a  certain  direction,  and  at  a  certain 
distance.  (Cf.  Psychology,  p.  62  ff.). 

2.  Truth  and  Certitude  are  Conditions  of  Knowledge.  —  (a) 
A  man  may  be  under  the  irresistible  illusion  that  he  knows,  when 
he  mistakes  error  for  truth,  and  gives  an  unconditional  assent  to 
a  false  statement.  Here  we  have  only  the  appearance  of  knowledge. 
The  man  thinks  that  he  knows,  but  a  better  informed  man  is  aware 
of  the  mistake.  Even  if  the  error  is  common  to  all  men,  it  remains 
true  that  the  knowledge  is  not  real,  but  only  apparent. 

(b)  As  long  as  a  serious  doubt  remains  in  his  mind,  a  man 
cannot  say  that  he  knows.  "I  think  so"  is  far  from  meaning  "I 
know  it  is  so."  The  mental  attitude  of  a  man  who  "thinks  so" 
is  that  of  opinion,  not  that  of  certitude,  and  for  this  reason  he  does 
not  strictly  know.  He  passes  a  judgment  on  an  object,  it  is  true, 
but  a  judgment  which  is  always  subordinated  to  the  implicit 
condition:  "If  I  apprehend  this  object  correctly." 

II.    VALUE   OF   THE   REPRESENTATIVE  ASPECT  OF 
KNOWLEDGE 

There  is  agreement  on  the  fact  that  knowledge  as  a  conscious 
process  is  essentially  objective,  as  has  been  explained  above,  but 
the  questions  remain :  What  is  the  meaning  of  "  objective  "?  What 
is  the  object  of  knowledge?  What  is  the  value  of  the  claim  of  the 
knowing  mind  that  it  apprehends  an  extramental  reality? 

I.  IN  GENERAL 

i.  The  Question  Stated.  —  As  remarked  already,  the  object 
of  knowledge  may  be  something  concrete — internal  or  external,  — 
or  something  abstract  —  either  a  physical  law,  found  and  verified 
through  experience,  or  a  self-evident  principle  admitted  simply 
because  of  the  rational  intuition  of  its  truth.  This  object  seems 
to  exist  apart  from  the  knowing  process,  to  impose  itself  on  the 
mind  from  without,  and  to  have  an  existence  and  a  nature  inde- 
pendent of  the  fact  that  it  is  known.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
knowledge  of  an  object  depends  also  on  the  mind.  Otherwise 
how  would  the  fact  of  error  be  explainable,  and  how  would  it  be 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  387 

possible  to  change  one's  judgment?  These  facts  have  led  to 
theorizing  on  the  real  meaning  of  the  "object  of  knowledge," 
and  the  solutions  that  have  been  proposed  may  be  reduced  to 
three:  Idealism,  Criticism,  Realism. 

2.  Idealism.  —  It  is  almost  impossible  to  define  idealism.  It 
presents  so  many  varieties  —  sometimes  hardly  reconcilable  with 
one  another;  it  receives  so  many  qualificatives  which  indicate 
every  individual  author's  point  of  view,  that  any  attempt  to  give 
a  definition  is  sure  to  fall  short  of  embracing  the  various  meanings 
of  the  term. 

(a)  If  we  proceed  etymologically,  "idealism  "  applies  primarily 
to  Plato's  view,  according  to  which  this  world  which  we  perceive 
with  the  senses  is  only  a  shadow  of  the  real  world,  or  world  of 
ideas.    In  the  world  of  ideas,  the  types  —  like  beauty,  goodness, 
virtue  —  of  which  the  concrete  realities  of  our  world  are  only  dim 
participations,  are  really  existent.    This,  however,  is  realism  par 
excellence,  recognizing  the  true  and  exclusive  reality  of  objective, 
absolute,  and  self-existent  ideas. 

(b)  It  is  on  our  own  mental  and  subjective  ideas  that  idealism 
insists.     Its  motto  is  Berkeley's:    "Esse  est  percipi."    The  whole 
reality  of  a  thing  consists  in  the  idea  which  we  have  of  it.     It 
starts  from  Locke's  principle  that  "knowledge  is  conversant  only 
with  ideas,"  or  that  "the  mind  in  all  its  thoughts  and  reasonings 
hath  no  other  immediate  object  but  its  own  ideas  which  it  alone 
does   or   can   contemplate"    (Essay    concerning   Human   Under- 
standing, IV,  I,  i).    Hence  the  idea,  it  is  true,  has  a  character 
of  objectivity,  but,  as  the  object  is  within  the  knowing  subject, 
and  as  the  subject  cannot  go  out  of  himself,  it  follows  that  human 
knowledge  is  necessarily  limited  to  the  knowledge  of  the  mind's  ideas. 

(c)  Should  ideas  have  any  objects  outside  of  the  mind  these 
objects  could  never  be  reached  by  the  mind,  since  the  mind  is 
necessarily  confined  within  its  own  sphere,  and  can  never  go  out- 
side of  it.     Ideas  are  objective,  but  the  object  itself  has  no  reality 
outside  of  the  idea.     What  we  call  the  external  world  is  a  mental 
idea,  or  rather  a  system  of  ideas;    and  what  we  call  truth  is  the 
consistent  working  of  the  mind  in  this  complexity  of  ideas.    What- 
ever we  know,  we  know  in  and  through  the  mind.     To  know  a 


388  EPISTEMOLOGY 

thing  is  to  have  an  idea  of  it.  But  as  the  idea  is  the  only  reality 
we  are  aware  of,  no  matter  what  it  represents  or  claims  to  represent, 
it  follows  that  knowledge  is  only  a  series  of  conscious  representa- 
tions. There  is  nothing  else,  for,  what  reason  could  there  be  to 
assert  the  existence  of  what  we  know  absolutely  nothing 
about?  Not  only  is  the  mind  active  in  knowledge,  but  it  alone 
is  active. 

3.  Realism.  —  (a)  Realism    admits   that   objects  exist   outside 
the  mind,  and  that  ideas  represent  them.    Not  only  in  the  mind, 
but  also  in  nature,  the  tree  is  green  and  occupies  such  or  such  a 
place.    Not  only  in  the  mind,  but  in  reality  also,  two  and  two  — 
whatever  objects  they  may  be  applied  to  —  are  four.    It  is  true 
that  my  knowledge  is  in  myself,  that  it  is  a  part  of  my  mind;  but 
what  I  know  exists  independently  of  the  fact  that  I  happen  to 
know  it.    Its  "esse"  is  not  its  "percipi."     It  would  be,  even  if 
it  were  not  perceived.    In  this  case  it  would  not  be  for  me,  since  it 
would  have  no  relation  to  my  mind,  but  it  would  be  in  itself 
as  an  external  reality. 

(b)  Realism  does  not  claim  that  we  know  things  in  their  absolute 
reality  —  for,  evidently  the  known  object  must  be  in  relation  with 
the  mind  —  but  that  we  really  know  things  which,  in  addition  to 
their  mental  existence  as  ideas,  have  also  an  existence  outside  the 
mind,  and  that,  finally,  the  fact  of  its  being  known  does  not  make 
or  change  the  object  of  knowledge.  There  is  an  external  world  which 
we  really  perceive  in  experience  —  how  and  how  far  will  be  seen 
later.  And  there  are  absolute  truths  which  the  understanding 
apprehends  by  a  direct  intellectual  intuition. 

4.  Criticism.  —  (a)   Criticism  is  the  name  given  to  the  philoso- 
phy of  Kant.    In  itself  it  signifies  neither  realism  nor  idealism,  but 
a  method  which  consists  in  criticising  our  faculties  of  knowledge 
in  order  to  test  their  objective  value.     Kant  speaks  of  his  own 
system   as   "transcendental   idealism,"   and   also   as   "empirical 
realism,"  thus  indicating  that  it  partakes  of  both  idealism  and 
realism.     In  fact  Kant  admits  the  existence  of  something  external, 
but  this  is,  and  will  forever  remain,  ^an  unknown  X,  because  it 
cannot  be  reached  except  through  a  priori  mental  forms  or  cate- 
gories.    The  mind  does  not  conform  to  things,  but  our  knowledge  of 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  389 

things  conforms  to  the  mind.    We  do  not  think  objects  according 
to  their  laws,  but  according  to  the  laws  of  our  minds. 

(b)  Whatever  appears  necessary  and  universal  in  knowledge 
cannot  come  from  experience,  which  is  always  contingent;  it  comes 
from  the  mind  itself.  Thus  space  and  time,  which  are  necessary 
and  universal  elements  of  sensation,  are  not  real  attributes  of 
things-in-themselves,  but  a  priori  forms  of  sensibility.  Facts 
given  in  experience  are  coordinated  and  unified  in  thought  by  the 
categories,  or  a  priori  forms  of  the  understanding,  which  estab- 
lish relations,  —  e.g.  of  causality,  inherence,  etc.  —  between  the 
various  phenomena  given  in  sensation.  Hence  knowledge  is  always 
a  synthesis  of  two  elements,  one  of  which  is  given  from  outside  and 
the  other  is  an  a  priori  mental  form  through  which  the  former 
is  perceived.  The  result  is  the  "phenomenon,"  or  thing-as-it- 
appears,  the  only  thing  that  we  can  know.  The  "  thing-in-itself  " 
is  forever  unknowable,  since  we  cannot  think  except  through  the 
mind's  a  priori  forms. 

II.  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD 

1.  The  Problem.  —  Knowledge  begins  with  the  senses,  and  the 
senses  are  commonly  assumed  to  manifest  the  existence  and  prop- 
erties of  an  external  world.    All  men  agree  in  making  a  distinction 
between  their  own  bodies  and  other  bodies;    to  both  they  attribute 
reality  and  materiality.     Solid  matter  around  us  is  believed  to 
manifest  itself  primarily  through  the  sense  of  touch,  and  later  by 
association,  through  other  senses,  especially  sight.    To  fall  on  the 
ground,  to  receive  a  blow,  to  strike  some  part  of  one's  body  against 
something  else,  show  with  clearness  the  hardness  and  resistance  of 
both.    Through  the  other  senses  this  matter  manifests  itself  as 
colored,  sonorous,  hot,  etc.    Are  these  perceptions  manifestations 
of  real  objects  and  qualities?    Sense-perception  is  in  the  mind.   It 
is  a  conscious  state,  and  how  can  a  conscious  state  represent  any- 
thing material,  when  the  antagonism  and  irreducibility  of  mind 
and  matter  are  facts  admitted  by  all? 

2.  Arguments  for  Realism.  —  The  arguments  on  which  realism 
is  based  are  but  an  emphasis  of  the  fact  itself  of  knowledge  as 
manifested  in  consciousness.    Even  if  this  fact  is  mysterious; 


3QO  EPISTEMOLOGY 

even  if  no  good  account  of  it  can  be  given,  it  cannot  for  this  reason 
be  denied. 

(a)  Both  common  and  scientific  experience  make  a  distinction 
between  ideas  and  things,  between  the  mental  and  the  physical 
world,     (i)  There  is  a  real  book  here  on  the  table,  nine  by  six 
inches,  with  a  red  binding,  near  another  book,  etc.     When  I  grasp 
it,  I  grasp  something  real.    When  I  read  it,  I  believe  that  the 
black  characters  are  really  printed  on  the  white  paper.     (2)  The 
scientist  always  assumes  that  his  studies  are  about  real  matter, 
and  that  the  laws  which  he  discovers  or  applies  —  e.g.  the  laws 
of  gravitation  or  of  chemical  composition  —  are  not  mere  mental 
formulas,  but  expressions  of  the  way  according  to  which  things 
really  happen  in  nature.     Science  can  foresee  and  generalize,  not 
On  mental  laws,  but  on  natural  laws. 

My  idea  of  a  foot  is  not  longer  than  that  of  an  inch.  Yet  every 
man  with  his  senses  knows  that  the  foot  is  twelve  times  as  long 
as  the  inch.  The  association  of  ideas  in  the  mind  produces 
expectation,  but  the  expected  result  takes  place  in  nature.  It  is 
to  physical,  not  to  mental,  realities  that  knowledge  is  referred 
in  perception,  and  every  man  is  convinced  naturally  that  his 
mind  comes  in  contact  —  it  may  be  difficult  for  him  to  say  how  — 
with  material  objects  outside  of  it. 

(b)  Mental  processes  are  essentially  private.    They  may  even 
differ  in  regard  to  the  same  object.     But  objects  are  common. 
Even  if  my  idea  of  an  object  which  we  are  now  looking  at  is  differ- 
ent from  yours,  it  will  never  occur  to  anybody  to  say  that  we  are 
not  looking  at  the  same  object.     Even  if  other  minds  do  not 
perceive  exactly  as  I  do,  they  nevertheless  perceive  the  same  world. 
No  amount  of  effort  can  ever  make  two  men  walking  together 
think  that  they  are  not  perceiving  the  same  objects  with  their 
respective  minds. 

(c)  The  distinction  between  percepts  and  images  is  an  evident 
one.     My  images  are  largely  dependent  on  my  will.     By  imagi- 
nation I  may  travel  where  I  please,  as  I  please,  with  more  or  less 
rapidity;    or  I  can  see  and  hear  things  which  I  choose  to  recall  to 
my  mind,  and  as  I  choose  to  recall  them.     Perception  is  indepen- 
dent of  me.     I  must  travel  where  and  when  the  train  carries  me, 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  391 

and  my  various  perceptions  are  dependent  on  something  external 
which  determines  what  I  shall  see,  hear,  or  experience.  I  cannot, 
by  taking  thought,  change  the  color  of  the  paper  before  me,  nor 
the  sound  of  the  church  bell.  I  light  the  fire,  place  a  kettle  of 
water  on  it,  go  away,  and  come  back  a  little  later.  During  my 
absence,  while  I  had  no  perception  of  it,  there  was  a  real  action 
of  the  fire  on  the  water,  which  is  now  boiling.  Independently  of 
perceptions,  material  beings  persist  and  act  upon  one  another. 
Before  there  was  any  human  mind  at  all,  these  beings  were  evolving 
toward  their  present  condition,  as  astronomy,  geology,  and  other 
sciences  now  teach. 

(d)  In   perception,   consciousness   testifies   that   the   mind   is 
passive,  i.e.  acted  on  by  something  else.     This  can  be  accounted 
for  only  if  there  is  something  outside  the  mind,  capable  of  acting 
on  it. 

(e)  Unless  I  fall  into  absolute  solipsism,  and  deny  the  existence 
of  any  mind  except  my  own,  —  a  step  which  no  sane  man  will 
be  willing  to  take  —  I  must  admit  that  I  am  not  alone.     Besides 
myself  there  are  other  men.    How  do  I  know  it?    Minds  do  not 
communicate  with  one  another  immediately,  but  only  through 
the  organism,  by  speech,  writing,  or  gestures.     If  I  admit  that 
there  are  other  men,  with  bodies  like  mine,  I  admit  also  that  the 
report  of  the  senses  which  manifest  their  bodies  is  valid.    The 
senses  therefore  give  me  valid  information  about  the  external 
world,  of  which  the  bodies  of  my  fellowmen  are  a  part. 

(/)  Psychology  —  whether  of  realists  or  of  idealists  —  admits  a 
certain  correlation  between  mental  processes  and  brain  processes. 
The  brain  and  its  processes  are  assumed  by  the  idealist  to  be 
mere  representations  in  consciousness.  For  him,  to  say  that 
mental  processes  depend  on  cerebral  processes  simply  amounts 
to  saying  that  a  conscious  process,  e.g.  a  sensation,  depends  on 
another  conscious  representation,  e.g.  of  a  motion  or  change 
in  the  idea  called  brain.  This  surely  is  not  the  meaning  of  psy- 
chologists, who  distinguish  the  relations  of  mind  and  organism 
from  a  mere  association  of  ideas,  and  claim  that  the  organism 
is  really  the  physical  instrument  of  sensations. 

3.   Objections.  —  It  seems  to  be  almost  a  defiance  to  common- 


3Q2  EPISTEMOLOGY 

sense  to  reject  these  arguments  for  realism.  Yet  the  objections 
of  idealists  oblige  us  to  emphasize  them.  We  shall  briefly  exam- 
ine some  of  the  objections  of  idealism,  and  thus  see  how  a  man  may 
come  to  contradict  so  openly  common-sense  and  experience. 

(a)  The  main  argument  of  idealism  is  the  supposed  impossibil- 
ity for  perception,  as  a  conscious  process,  to  reveal  anything  exter- 
nal to  the  mind.  The  mind  is  aware  only  of  its  own  contents,  i.e. 
of  ideas.  And  since  it  can  no  more  step  out  of  its  own  mental 
limits  than  the  organism  out  of  its  skin,  it  follows  that  we  are  for- 
ever restricted  to  the  awareness  of  conscious  processes,  which  are 
toto  coelo  different  from  any  external  and  material  reality. 

Answer,  (i)  Were  the  fact  unexplainable,  no  right  would  be 
given  thereby  to  deny  it.  Here  the  fact  is  obvious.  When,  for 
instance,  I  shake  hands  with,  and  speak  to,  a  friend,  I  cannot 
doubt  his  real  presence;  I  feel  his  touch,  and  he  feels  mine;  I  hear 
him  and  he  hears  me. 

(2)  The  mind  perceives  external  objects  through  the  organism 
with  which  it  is  united  intimately.    Obviously  man  is  not  a  pure 
spirit  separated  from  the  organism,  but  a  living  organism  united 
to  a  mind.    What  we  perceive  as  external  is  not  only  extramental, 
but  also  extraorganic. 

(3)  The  mind  does  not  know  only  its  own  ideas.    It  does  not  even 
know  them  primarily,  but  through  reflection.    What  I  am  aware 
of  primarily  in  perception  is  an  external  reality,  and  subsequently, 
by  reflection,  I  consider  the  mental  process  of  perception. 

(4)  The  perception  of  external  objects  is  immediate  because  ex- 
ternal objects  act  on  the  organism.    The  organism  is  not  simply 
a  physical  reality,  but  matter  animated  by  the  soul.    To  a  great 
extent  idealism  is  the  outcome  of  the  Cartesian  doctrine  relegating 
the  soul  to  some  part  of  the  brain,  and  thus  cutting  it  off  from  every- 
thing external.    But,  in  fact,  the  "action"  of  the  external  object 
is  at  the  same  time  the  "passion"  of  the  organ.    Both  are  one, 
since  they  are  united  in  this  common  process,  and  the  "patiens" 
need  not  go  out  of  himself  to  perceive  the  foreign  action  which  is 
in  himself  at  the  time  of  sensation.    The  abyss  between  the  sub- 
ject and  the  object  is  imaginary.    Imaginary  also,  therefore,  the 
need  of  a  bridge  which  idealism  declares  to  be  an  impossibility. 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  393 

This  fact  is  clear  in  perceptions  of  touch,  but  from  psychology  we 
know  that  the  other  senses  also  require  some  immediate  contact. 
The  organic  stimulation  is  not  a  mere  mechanical  process,  for  the 
soul  is  wherever  the  animated  organ  is,  as  we  shall  see  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Mind  (p.  480  ff.). 

(5)  Consciousness,  it  is  true,  takes  place  only  when  the  external 
impression  has  been  conveyed  to  the  brain  through  the  sensory 
nerve.    Yet  it  is  the  hand  that  feels,  the  eye  that  sees,  etc.    The 
brain  is  necessary,  but  of  itself   insufficient  for  sensation.    The 
complete  organ  includes  the  peripheral  apparatus,  the  afferent 
nerve,  and  the  brain  centre. 

(6)  If  it  were  not  so,  the  objectivation  or  exteriorization  of  sen- 
sations, i.e.  the  fact  that  they  are  spontaneously  referred  to  an 
external  reality,  would  be  unexplainable.     (a)  The  habit  of  exteri- 
orization  supposes   a   first  exteriorization,  which  is  impossible, 
(b)  The  association  of  internal  images  can  never  give  anything 
but  complex  internal  images,    (c)  An  inference,  by  which  ideas 
would  be  referred  to  some  external  object  as  their  only  adequate 
cause,  already  supposes  the  knowledge  of  an  objective  cause,  and 
of  the  existence  of  something  real,  external,  distinct  from  the 
mind,   material,  and    capable    of    acting.  —  Hence   these   three 
theories  which  have  been  proposed  to  account  for  the  fact  are 
insufficient. 

Briefly:  It  is  true  that  the  external  world  is  not  known  except 
through  sensations,  but  it  is  true  also  that  a  sensation  is  always  an 
experience  of  the  external  world. 

(b)  Mental  dispositions  influence  perception.  Perception  is  dif- 
ferent according  as  the  organs  are  in  a  normal,  or  in  a  more 
or  less  abnormal,  condition.  It  varies  with  mental  attitudes, 
feelings,  actual  contents  of  the  mind,  etc. 

Answer,  (i)  Even  then  sensations  are  always  referred  to 
external  objects.  (2)  The  mind  has  its  share  in  determining 
the  nature  of  perception,  but  is  not  the  only  factor.  (3)  In  most 
cases  we  can  point  out  the  physiological  or  mental  causes  that 
modify  perception.  Moreover,  we  are  not  concerned  here  with 
determining  where  and  when  the  senses  are  trustworthy. 

(cj  What  appears  in  consciousness  as  color,  sound,  heat,  etc., 


394  EPISTEMOLOGY 

is  reduced  by  physical  science  to  vibrations  of  ether,  air,  and 
molecules,  differing  in  length  and  number,  and  totally  unlike  the 
sensations. 

Answer,  (i)  At  present  we  are  concerned  only  with  the  exist- 
ence of  the  external  world,  not  with  the  nature  of  the  properties 
manifested  in  sensation.  This  is  a  task  for  inductive  science. 
But  it  is  clear  that  if  there  is  movement,  there  is  something  mov- 
ing, and  that  if  there  are  vibrations,  there  is  something  vibrating. 
(2)  It  is  by  using  their  senses  that  scientists  come  to  know  the  real 
nature  of  physical  qualities.  To  admit  the  validity  of  this  objec- 
tion is,  therefore,  sheer  contradiction  for  the  idealist.  (3)  Other 
qualities,  like  resistance,  relative  size,  etc.,  cannot  be  reduced  to 
something  depending  on  the  percipient  organism.  I  see  plainly 
that  a  foot  is  longer  than  an  inch.  For  all  men  it  is  true  that 
water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen. 

4.  Kant's  View.  —  A  few  words  will  suffice  on  Kant's  view  of 
external  perception.  According  to  him,  two  elements  are  found 
in  external  perception,  one  varying  with  every  perception,  the 
other  necessary  and  common  to  all  perceptions,  namely,  space. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  consciousness  of  every  mental  process, 
the  invariable  element  being  time.  Hence  the  ideas  of  space  and 
time  are  not  derived  from  experience.  They  are  conditions  of  ex- 
perience, and  a  priori  mental  forms.  The  ideas  of  space,  extension, 
geometrical  figure,  etc.,  cannot  be  derived  from  the  perception 
of  bodies;  nor  those  of  "before"  and  "after"  from  the  con- 
sciousness of  mental  processes.  Things  and  processes  cannot  be 
perceived  without  these  spatial  or  temporal  relations,  which  are 
therefore  in  the  mind  as  a  priori  forms  antecedently  to  sensations. 

Answer,  (i)  The  "where"  and  "when"  are  given  in  percep- 
tion, and  spontaneously  attributed  to  things  and  events.  This  event 
took  place  at  such  a  date,  before  this,  and  after  that.  Historical 
events  are  not  given  their  dates  by  the  mind.  It  is  not  through 
any  a  priori  form  that  President  Taf t  succeeded  Roosevelt,  or  that 
the  discovery  of  America  took  place  before  George  Washington 
commanded  the  troops  of  the  United  States  against  the  forces  of 
England.  Again,  this  object  is  really  square,  higher  or  lower,  on 
the  right  or  on  the  left  of  this  other  object;  its  relative  position  is 


OBJECTIVITY     OF     KNOWLEDGE  395 

independent  of  the  mind.    Such,  at  any  rate,  is  the  universal 
consent  of  men. 

(2)  That  sensations  necessarily  manifest  things  in  space  and  time 
may  be  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  things  really  are  always  in 
space  and  time,  as  well  as  by  any  a  priori  forms.    Both  are  pos- 
sible explanations,  and  the  former  is  the  one  which  experience 
suggests. 

(3)  In  fact,  we  make  a  distinction  between  objective  space  and 
time  and  our  'perception  of  it.    I  want  to  measure  a  stick  with  a 
real  objective  foot.    The  same  for  time:  my  perception  of  duration 
may  differ  greatly  from  objective  duration. 

(4)  Kant  fails  to  distinguish  space  and  time  as  (a)  real,  i.e.  the 
spatial  relations  of  a  body  and  the  real  successive  duration  of  a 
movement;  (b)  ideal,  i.e.  the  general  concepts  of  space  and  time; 
(c)  imaginary,  i.e.  imagined  to  exist  before  or  after  there  was  or 
will  be  any  real  succession,  or  beyond  any  real  occupation  of  space. 
In  perception,  real  space  and  time  are  given ;  the  concepts  of  space 
and  time  are  elaborated  by  the  mind;  imaginary  space  and  time 
are  altogether  unreal,  as  we  shall  see  in  Cosmology  (p.  449  ff.). 

III.  IDEAL  TRUTHS 

i.  Analytic  and  Synthetic  Judgments.  —  (a)  The  difference 
between  analytic  and  synthetic  judgments  was  explained  in  Psy- 
chology (p.  109).  The  former  are  obtained  by  the  analysis  of 
the  terms  themselves,  which  leads  to  the  immediate  intuition  of 
their  relation.  Such  judgments  are  not  adhered  to  because  they 
are  verified  in  experience.  They  are  pronounced  to  be  true  inde- 
pendently of  their  application  to  concrete  objects.  Even  if  there  were 
actually  no  divisible  substances,  it  would  still  be  true  that  the  whole 
is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts.  Even  if  there  are  no  perfect 
geometrical  triangles,  the  sum  of  the  angles  in  any  triangle  equals 
two  right  angles.  A  synthetic  judgment  depends  essentially  on 
experience.  Analyzing  its  terms  will  not  reveal  their  relation,  but 
it  is  necessary  to  perceive  concrete  existing  objects.  The  judg- 
ments: " Water  boils  at  212  degrees";  " birds  are  oviparous"; 
"Havana  tobacco  is  good,"  etc.,  are  synthetic. 

(b)  Analytic  judgments  are  very  important,  not  only  in  rational 


396  EPISTEMOLOGY 

sciences,  like  mathematics,  which,  starting  from  them,  derive  other 
judgments  equally  necessary  and  analytic,  but  also  in  empirical 
sciences  which,  as  was  explained  above  (p.  383).  require  principles 
transcending  experience.  Here  we  shall  not  speak  of  synthetic 
judgments,  as  they  have  been  dealt  with  in  the  preceding  ques- 
tion on  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world  (p.  389  ff.).  Nor  need 
we  come  back  to  empiristic  theories  concerning  analytic  judgments, 
as  they  have  been  discussed  in  our  second  chapter  (p.  382),  and 
in  Psychology  (p.  112  ff.).  A  few  words  must  be  said  on  Kant's 
views,  but  we  shall  first  establish  the  value  of  analytic  judgments, 
so  as  to  dispose  of  idealistic  subjectivism,  which  claims  that  such 
principles  are  not  objective,  but  simply  laws  of  the  mind. 

2.  Objectivity  of  Analytic   Judgments.  —  Analytic  judgments 
are  objective,  that  is,  in  accepting  them,  the  mind  knows  truths 
which  are  independent  of  the  mind  itself,  and  which  it  does  not 
create  according  to  the  laws  of  its  own  nature.    The  analysis  of 
the  conscious  process  itself  is  the  proof  of  this  assertion.    When  I 
say:  "The  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts,"  I  do  so  because 
I  see  clearly  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate 
of  this  proposition.    The  understanding  of  the  terms  is  enough 
to  perceive  that  such  a  proposition  is  true,  certain,  and  necessary, 
and  that  objectively  the  whole  cannot  be  equal  to,  or  smaller 
than,  but  must  be  greater  than,  a  part.      I  do  not  merely  see  that 
it  is  so,  nor  is  any  other  relation  simply  inconceivable  and  incom- 
prehensible, but  it  is  clearly  impossible,  and  contradictory  to  the 
terms  themselves  of  the  proposition.     "The  sum  of  the  angles 
in  a  triangle  equals  two  right  angles,"  or  "8  X  13  =  104."    These 
propositions  may  not  at  first  be  accepted  as  true.      But  as  soon  as 
they  are  analyzed,  the  agreement  of  the  subject  with  the  predicate 
becomes  clear,  and  the  assent  is  given  in  consideration  of  this  objec- 
tive evidence.    As  long  as  I  have  not  perceived  this  objective  evi- 
dence, I  refuse  my  assent.    Or  the  evidence  may  appear  gradually, 
and  the  mind  passes  from  doubt  to  certitude  through  varying 
degrees  of  opinion. 

3.  Kant's  View.  —  Kant  admits  two  kinds  of  universal  and  nec- 
essary judgments:  analytic  and  synthetic.    The  former  are  those 
in  which  the  predicate  is  contained  in  the  comprehension  of  the 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  397 

subject.  They  have  no  scientific  value,  since  they  manifest  noth- 
ing new;  they  are  mere  repetitions  or  tautologies.  Synthetic 
judgments  may  be  simply  matter-of-fact,  contingent,  a  posteriori 
and  empirical,  like:  "This  man  is  tall."  Or  they  may  be  neces- 
sary and  a  priori  like:  "7  -f-  5  =  12  "  (mathematical) ;"  the  straight 
line  is  the  shortest  distance  from  one  point  to  another  "  (geomet- 
rical); "through  all  changes  in  the  material  world  the  quantity  of 
matter  is  constant";  "in  every  transmission  of  motion,  action  and 
reaction  must  be  equal  to  each  other"  (physical);  "everything 
that  begins  to  exist  has  a  cause  "  (metaphysical). 

These  judgments,  according  to  Kant,  are  not  analytic.  They 
really  combine  or  synthetize  a  subject  with  a  predicate  taken  out- 
side of  the  comprehension  of  the  subject.  Hence  they  are  syn- 
thetic. As,  however,  the  synthesis  is  not  given  a  posteriori,  i.e. 
from  experience,  —  since  experience  cannot  give  universality  and 
necessity  —  they  are  a  priori,  and  suppose  in  the  mind  the  exist- 
ence of  categories  or  a  priori  forms  of  the  understanding.  Such 
judgments  are  the  most  important  in  science,  which  is  universal 
and  necessary. 

Criticism.  —  (a)  An  analytic  judgment  is  not  merely  that  in 
which  the  predicate  is  already  contained  in  the  subject,  but  also 
that  in  which,  from  the  analysis  of  the  subject  and  predicate  in 
their  essence  and  essential  properties,  their  necessary  relation  is 
perceived  by  the  mind.  (Cf.  Psychology,  p.  109.) 

(b)  Such  judgments  are  not  acquired  from  experience  alone,  but 
by  the  mind  abstracting  and  generalizing,  i.e.  elaborating  the 
data  of  experience. 

(c)  With  his  a  priori  forms,  Kant  cannot  explain  the  fact  that 
sometimes  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  analytic  truths  little  by 
little  and  through  various  stages  of  opinion.    The  only  explana- 
tion of  this  fact  is  that  the  objective  light  is  seen  more  or  less 
clearly. 

(d)  There  is  no  room  for  synthetic  a  priori  judgments.    All 
judgments  are  either  analytic,  a  priori,  and  independent  of  their 
empirical  verification;  or  synthetic,  a  posteriori,  and  dependent  on 
experience.      The  examples  given  by  Kant  do  not  prove  his  con- 
tention,    (i)  The  judgment  "7  +  5  =  12"  is  analytic.     It  does 


398  EPISTEMOLOGY 

not  mean,  as  Kant  claims,  that  7  +  5  is  a  sum  which  experience 
alone  can  verify  to  be  12,  but  it  means  that  7  +  5  and  12,  when 
compared  together,  are  necessarily  found  to  be  equal.  In  fact, 
it  means  (1+1  +  1  +  1  +  1  +  1  +  1)  +(1  +  1  +  1  +  1  + 
i)=i  +  i  +  i-f-i  +  i  +  i-fi-{-i  +  i-fi  +  i  +  i,  which 
shows  the  judgment  to  be  analytic  and  pronounced  on  objective 
evidence.  (2)  "A  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  from  one 
point  to  another"  is  also  analytic.  It  means  that,  compared  to 
other  lines,  the  straight  line  is  the  shortest,  and  this  is  evident 
when  we  consider  that  not  to  go  straight  is  to  cover  more  space. 
In  the  straight  line  we  have  only  one  spatial  relation  and  the  same 
direction  throughout,  whereas  in  the  curve  the  direction  changes 
at  every  point,  and,  in  the  broken  line,  at  every  angle.  (3)  Both 
principles  taken  from  physical  science  are  synthetic,  but  not  at  all  a 
priori.  There  is  no  a  priori  contradiction  in  denying  them.  As  far 
as  they  are  to  be  admitted,  these  principles  are  verified  by  experi- 
ence. (4)  The  principle  of  causality  is  analytic,  and  based  directly 
on  the  principle  of  identity,  "  A  =  A,"  which  means  that,  of  itself, 
a  being  is  always  itself,  and  that  there  must  be  some  foreign  addi- 
tion or  subtraction  to  make  it  more  or  less.  Thus  when  we  have 
o  =  o,  we  cannot  have  o  =  i  unless  to  o  we  add  a  new  factor, 
o  +  x  =  i.  The  predicate  is  not  contained  formally  in  the  sub- 
ject, but  is  seen  to  be  essentially  and  necessarily  connected  with  it. 
4.  Objectivity  of  Concepts.  —  Ideal  truths  express  the  rela- 
tions of  agreement  or  disagreement  between  concepts.  What  is 
the  value  of  concepts?  For  Kant,  the  intelligible  object  is  unreal 
because  the  activity  of  the  mind  consists  precisely  in  creating  ap- 
pearances or  phenomena.  As  long  as  judgments  are  referred  only 
to  phenomena,  they  are  correct,  but  the  noumena  or  things-in-them- 
selves  are  unknowable.  In  Psychology  we  have  discussed  the 
theories  proposed  to  explain  the  concept  (p.  98  fL).  From  the 
conclusions  reached  there  it  may  be  inferred  that  concepts  are  not 
mere  names  (nominalism)  or  labels  to  which  no  idea  corresponds 
in  the  mind;  nor  merely  collective  and  associated  perceptions 
(associationism)',  that  concepts  are  not  simply  ideas  in  the  mind 
without  any  corresponding  reality  (conceptualism) ;  that  con- 
cepts do  not  correspond  to  realities  as  they  exist  outside  of  the 


,- 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE  399 

mind  (exaggerated  realism)]   but  that    nevertheless  some  reality 
corresponds  to  concepts  (moderate  realism). 

Concrete  reality  is  determined  and  individual,  while,  owing  to 
mental  abstraction,  concepts  are  abstract  and  universal.  When 
the  notes  which  individualize  an  object  are  mentally  removed, 
what  remains  is  abstract,  and  no  longer  restricted  to  one  individual. 
The  concrete  is  real,  and  really  contains  the  object  of  our  concepts. 
This  man,  with  all  his  concrete  determinations,  is  a  being,  a  sub- 
stance, a  living  organism,  etc.  Hence  the  objects  of  these 
abstract  concepts  are  really  found  in  the  concrete  man,  but  under 
a  multiplicity  of  other  characteristics. 

IV.  SUMMARY  AND  COROLLARIES 

\J  i.  What  is  Knowledge? — (a)  To  know  is  to  be  aware  of  an  ob- 
•  *ject,  concrete  or  abstract,  individual  or  universal,  which  does  not 
exist  in  the  mind  alone,  but  is  a  reality  independent  of  the  fact 
that  it  is  known.  The  mind  does  not  make  the  truth,  but  becomes 
aware  of  it;  facts  and  laws  are  imposed  on  it  from  without.  That 
knowledge  is  a  conscious  process  is  true,  but  it  is  only  a  part  of 
the  truth.  Knowledge  is  a  mental  process  conditioned  by  external 
evidence.  The  right  of  a  proposition  to  be  accepted  as  true  persists 
even  when  the  mind  fails  to  accept  it.  The  law  of  gravitation 
was  true  before  it  was  discovered  by  Newton. 

(b)  Knowledge  may  be  intuitive  or  discursive,  more  or  less  cer- 
tain, and  more  or  less  immediate.  The  really  objective  may  be 
difficult  to  disentangle  from  subjective  influences.  Yet  it  is  there, 
and  under  proper  conditions  may  be  found.  To  be  known,  the 
object  must  be  present  in  the  mind,  but  ideas  and  judgments 
truly  represent  objects.  The  mind  contributes  its  share  in  the 
act  of  knowledge,  but  is  not  the  only  factor. 

2.  The  Relativity  of  Knowledge.  —  Knowledge  is  necessarily 
proportioned  to  the  capacity  of  the  mind  and  the  manifestation  of 
the  object. 

(a)  Owing  to  native  and  acquired  dispositions,  minds  — both 
senses  and  intelligences  —  differ  in  keenness,  perspicacity,  and 
power.  Not  all  men  have  the  same  keenness  of  vision  or  hearing, 
nor  the  same  intellectual  aptitudes.  Certain  animals  are  endowed 


400  EPISTEMOLOGY 

with  keener  senses  than  those  of  man.  We  may  imagine  senses 
much  more  perfect  than  those  with  which  we  are  acquainted. 
We  may  even  imagine  that  the  material  world  is  endowed  with 
properties  which  none  of  our  senses  is  adapted  to  perceive. 
Understandings  more  powerful  than  ours  would  discover  laws 
and  relations  of  which  we  are  ignorant. 

These  limitations  do  not  invalidate  the  knowledge  which  we 
acquire  with  the  faculties  with  which  we  are  endowed,  any  more 
than  a  man's  horizon,  or  the  presence  of  fog  which  bounds  his 
view,  prevents  him  from  seeing  more  or  less  distinctly  the  objects 
found  within  his  range  of  vision.  The  fact  that  we  do  not  know  all 
things  is  no  justification  for  the  assertion  that  we  know  nothing. 

It  is  true  also  that  knowledge  depends  on  subjective  conditions, 
but  this  must  not  be  exaggerated.  Men  agree  on  many  proposi- 
tions both  of  the  ideal  and  of  the  empirical  order.  They  differ 
not  so  much  on  objects  of  knowledge  as  on  objects  of  opinion;  not 
so  much  on  what  they  really  know  as  on  what  they  think  they 
know;  not  so  much  on  immediate  evidence  as  on  more  remote  con- 
clusions reached  after  difficult  and  complex  processes  of  inference. 
In  immediate  sense-perception  or  intellectual  intuition,  the 
"fringe"  of  consciousness  may  vary  with  the  different  mental 
attitudes  and  acquired  dispositions,  but  the  "focus"  is  essentially 
the  same  for  all  minds. 

(b)  Reality  manifests  itself  in  different  ways.  Sometimes  it  is 
bright  in  itself.  Sometimes  light  must  be  thrown  on  it  from  else- 
where by  reasoning,  analogy,  etc.  One  professor  may  give  clearer 
explanations  than  another.  Text-books  on  the  same  matter  are 
not  equally  suited  to  meet  the  needs  of  students.  A  landscape  is 
seen  better  on  a  clear  day  than  through  a  misty  atmosphere. 
The  manifestation  of  the  object  must  be  adapted  to  the  mind.  A 
demonstration  which  is  clear  for  one  mind  may  not  be  sufficient 
for  another.  Some  truths  are  hidden  and  to  be  sought  for.  In  a 
word,  truths  are  more  or  less  easily  accessible. 

3.  The  Limits  of  Knowledge.  —  Knowledge  is  limited.  We  do 
not  and  cannot  know  everything.  Nor  can  we  know  any  object 
perfectly,  in  all  its  relations,  and  with  all  its  properties.  Human 
knowledge  is  always  inadequate.  But,  with  the  agnostic,  to  assign 


OBJECTIVITY    OF    KNOWLEDGE          401 

clearly  defined  limits  to  our  power  of  knowing  is  unjustifiable. 
Without  break  we  gradually  pass  from  one  object  of  knowledge 
to  another.  The  limits  of  both  the  range  and  the  perfection  of 
knowledge  vary  with  every  individual  mind.  Yet  the  same  prin- 
ciples which  the  agnostic  uses  in  acquiring  what  he  admits  to  be 
valid  knowledge  will  necessarily  lead  him  higher  into  regions  to 
which  he  arbitrarily  applies  the  name  of  unknowable.  Starting 
from  self-evident  facts  or  principles,  we  may  proceed,  inductively 
or  deductively,  as  far  as  we  can.  As  we  go  along,  the  progress  will 
become  more  and  more  complex  and  difficult;  dangers  of  error 
will  be  greater.  Hence  greater  caution  will  be  needed.  But  no 
one  has  the  right  to  say:  "Thus  far  shalt  thou  go  and  no  farther." 
Objects  of  knowledge  are  common  property,  and  we  may  always 
go  farther  in  exploring  them. 


27 


CHAPTER   IV 

THE  CRITERIA  OF  VALID  KNOWLEDGE 

The  Meaning  of  Criterion.  —  (a)  The  human  mind  is  nat- 
urally qualified  to  know.  As,  however,  the  facts  of  error,  of 
change  in  the  successive  assents  of  the  same  mind,  and  of  dissent 
among  several  individuals,  are  undeniable,  there  must  be  a  stand- 
ard or  test  by  which  truth  is  distinguished  from  error.  In  fact, 
we  make  a  constant  use  of  such  tests.  I  say:  "Such  a  man  is  tall, 
black-haired;  his  voice  is  deep,  etc."  —  "How  do  you  know?" 
some  one  asks.  —  "Because  I  saw  and  heard  him."  Again: 
"Water  freezes  at  32  degrees."  —  "How  do  you  know?  "  -  "Be- 
cause I  have  observed  it  in  a  sufficient  number  of  cases  and  condi- 
tions to  warrant  this  general  assertion."  Again:  "The  sum  of  the 
angles  in  a  triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles."-  — "How  do 
you  know?"  —  "Here  is  the  demonstration."  And  so  on. 

A  criterion  (/c/ai'veiv,  to  judge)  is  necessary  as  the  distinctive  sign  of 
truth,  and  as  the  basis  on  which  it  rests.  In  the  instances  just 
given,  different  criteria  were  used:  the  testimony  of  the  senses, 
induction,  and  demonstration,  which  justified  my  assertions.  But 
why  are  these  criteria  accepted?  Are  they  self-sufficient,  or  do 
they  themselves  rest  on  something  else? 

(b)  This  leads  us  to^distinguish  two  kinds  of  criteria,  one  supreme, 
ultimate,  universal,  and  applicable  to  all  kinds  of  truths;  the  other 
derived,  proximate,  and  applicable  only  within  a  restricted  field. 
How  do  I  know  that  Peking  is  a  city  of  China?  Because  witnesses 
have  told  me.  Why  do  I  believe  them?  Because  they  are  trust- 
worthy. Why  are  they  trustworthy?  Because  they  know  and 
would  not  deceive  me.  Why?  .  .  .  Why?  ...  In  a  series  of 
"whys  "  the  ultimate  criterion  is  the  answer  to  the  last.  All  the 
others,  like  senses,  induction,  demonstration,  derive  their  value 

402 


ULTIMATE     CRITERION  403 

from  it.    It  is  common  to  all,  and,  without  it,  proximate  criteria 
would  serve  no  purpose.    Hence  the  division  of  this  chapter. 


I.    THE   ULTIMATE   CRITERION 

Three  theories  or  groups  of  theories  are  to  be  examined.  Some 
claim  that  the  supreme  criterion  is  to  be  found  outside  both  the 
knowing  subject  and  the  known  object.  Others  place  it  within 
the  subject,  but  outside  the  object.  Others  finally  make  it  both 
subjective  and  objective,  intrinsic  to  both  the  knower  and  the 
object  of  knowledge. 

I.  THEORIES  OF  A  CRITERION  EXTRINSIC  TO  BOTH  THE  KNOWING 
MIND  AND  THE  OBJECT  KNOWN  BY  THIS  MIND 

1.  Traditionalism.  —  Various  systems,   which  we  may  group 
together  under  the  name  of  traditionalism,  agree  in  asserting  the 
radical  incapacity  of  personal  reason  for  knowing  with  certitude 
either  any  truth  at  all,  or  at  least  the  truths  of  the  metaphysical, 
religious,  and  moral  order.     Hence  appeal  is  made  to  tradition, 
i.e.  to  universal  reason,  to  the  consent  of  mankind,  or  of  the 
majority  of  men,  which  manifests  a  primitive  divine  revelation 
made  to  man.    The  ultimate  criterion  is  a  divine  revelation.    Ac- 
cording to  Lamennais  the  sign  of  this  revelation  is  the  common 
agreement  of  men,  i.e.  general,  as  opposed  to  individual,  reason. 
De  Bonald  argues  from  the  fact  that  man  has  the  power  of  speech. 
According  to  him,  speech  is  indispensable  to,  and  precedes,  thought, 
and  consequently  could  not  have  been  acquired  by  man.     It  must 
have  been  revealed   by  God  together  with  the  ideas  which  it 
expresses. 

2.  Criticism  of  Traditionalism.  —  It  is  true  that  divine  revela- 
tion is  a  great  help  to  the  human  mind  in  acquiring  moral  and  reli- 
gious truths.     True  also  that  in  many  cases  individual  reason  feels 
uncertain,  whereas  the  agreement  with  other  men  increases  its 
confidence,  and,  under  certain  conditions  to  be  mentioned  later, 
may  become  a  sign  of  truth.    Actual  knowledge  is  the  accumu- 
lated wisdom  of  preceding  ages.     Man's  plight  would  be  a  sad  one, 
could  he  not  avail  himself  of  the  results  obtained  by  those  who  have 


404  EPISTEMOLOGY 

gone  before  him.    Yet  tradition  cannot  be  the  ultimate  criterion 
of  truth. 

(a)  In  general,     (i)  This  system  is  opposed  to  the  testimony 
of  consciousness,  which  certifies  that,  in  some  cases  at  least,  knowl- 
edge is  acquired  independently  of  any  external  teaching.    (2)  Cer- 
titude cannot  be  based  on  faith  in  a  divine  revelation.    This  faith 
is  either  certain  or  uncertain.    In  the  latter  case,  it  cannot  be  the 
criterion  of  certain  knowledge.     In  the  former,  it  supposes  the  cer- 
titude of  God's  existence,  of  His  knowledge  and  truthfulness,  and 
of  the  fact  itself  of  a  revelation,  hence  of  reason  by  which  these 
are  demonstrated.     (3)  This  criterion,  even  if  admitted,  is  not 
universal.     It  does  not  apply,  for  instance,  to  conscious  facts, 
actual  experiences,  historical  events,  etc.    Hence  all  other  cri- 
teria are  not  participations  of  this  one.    No  authority,  divine  or 
human,  can  be  the  final  test  of  truth. 

(b)  With  De  Bonald  we  may  admit  that  without  speech  thought 
would  be  very  difficult.     But  it  does  not  seem  true  to  say  that 
it  would  be  absolutely  impossible.     Moreover,  if  it  were  not  asso- 
ciated already  with  the  thought  it  expresses,  language  would  be  a 
mere   physical    sound.     Hence    thought    precedes    language.     (Cf. 
Psychology,  p.  126  ff.).    Finally,  even  if  God  revealed  language, 
He  would  not  necessarily  reveal  ready-made  propositions.    Lan- 
guage may  express  error  as  well  as  truth. 

(c)  Common  consent,  however  useful  it  may  be,  cannot  be  the  cri- 
terion we  are  now  looking  for.    Even  if  it  is  a  criterion,  it  is  de- 
rived, not  ultimate,     (i)  It  supposes  the  reliability  of  the  senses 
through  which  a  man  is  aware  of  the  existence  of  other  men,  and 
the  certitude  that,  under  some  circumstances,  and  under  these  only, 
the  unanimous   consent  of  man  is  an  infallible  source  of  truth. 
Hence  personal  reason  precedes  universal  reason  as  a  test  of  truth. 
(2)  The  reason  of  all  men  is  but  the  sum  of  the  reasons  of  every 
individual.     If  all  individually  are  incapable  of  certain  knowledge, 
how  can  the  collection  give  certitude?     (3)  How  can  this  unanim- 
ity or  quasi-unanimity  be   ascertained?    A  whole  lifetime  would 
be  spent  before  any  truth  would  be  known  with  certitude.     Must 
it  be  understood  of  all  men  at  all  times?    Then  the  task  is  utterly 
impossible.    Must  it  be  understood  of  all  men  living  together  at 


ULTIMATE     CRITERION  405 

the  same  time?    Then  history  shows  that  common  and  universal 
errors  are  possible. 

II.  THEORIES  OF  A  SUBJECTIVE  CRITERION,  INTRINSIC  TO  THE 
KNOWER,  BUT  EXTRINSIC  TO  THE  OBJECT 

Traditionalism  failed  to  recognize  the  fact  that,  since  the  mind 
knows  by  its  own  faculties,  the  criterion  must  be  intrinsic  to  the 
mind.  We  pass  now  to  subjective  theories. 

1.  Common    Sense    and    Feelings.  —  (a)  Some    philosophers 
have  appealed  to  a  blind  impulse  or  instinct  which  prompts  man 
to  accept  spontaneously  the  truthfulness  of  his  faculties.     It 
is  a  common  law  of  our  nature,  and  no  account  of  it  can  be  given. 
Reid  speaks  of  a  "common  sense,"  i.e.  of  an  invincible  propen- 
sity common  to  all  men;  Jacobi,  of  a  "feeling,"  or  affective  disposi- 
tion of  the  mind,  which  makes  it  assent  to  the  reality  of  what  the 
senses  and  reason  manifest. 

(b)  This  criterion  is  insufficient.  Everybody,  even  the  sceptic, 
admits  this  natural  impulse,  but  the  question  remains  whether  it 
is  justified  or  not.  If  it  is  not,  it  cannot  be  a  criterion.  If  it  is, 
an  appeal  must  be  made  to  something  else  by  which  it  is  justified. 
This  view  is  rather  a  refusal  to  meet  the  epistemological  issue  than 
a  solution  of  it.  The  fact  manifested  in  consciousness  is  that  we 
are  certain,  not  because  a  blind  impulse  makes  us  assent,  but 
because  we  see  the  truth.  While  we  may  be  aware  of  impelling 
motives  within  us,  we  are  also  aware  that  we  are  not  only  impelled 
from  within,  but  also  drawn  from  without.  Many  subjective 
motives,  like  interest,  utility,  habits  of  thought,  education,  etc., 
may  impel  man  to  accept  error,  and  there  must  be  something 
whereby  he  may  recognize  the  object  itself  as  true  or  false. 

2.  Clear  Idea  and  Divine  Veracity.  —  (a)  Descartes  emerged 
from  his  methodical  doubt  through  the  affirmation:  "I  think, 
therefore  I  am,"  which  he  accepts  because,  in  the  fact  of  thinking, 
he  clearly  sees  the  necessary  implication  of  being.    Hence  the 
general  rule  that  "whatever  things  we  conceive  very  clearly  and 
very  distinctly  are  true."    According  to  Descartes,  the  guarantee 
of  truth  is  ultimately  the  perfection,  wisdom,  and  veracity  of  God, 
who  cannot  be  the  cause, of  error,  and  cannot  endow  us  with 


406  EPISTEMOLOGY 

faculties  that  would  deceive  us.  Ontologists  asserted  that  all 
things  are  seen  in  God,  who  is  known  to  man  immediately. 

(b)  Criticism,  (i)  The  clearness  of  an  idea  as  such  cannot  be 
the  criterion  of  truth.  It  is  merely  subjective,  and  varies  with 
individuals.  It  is  not  primitive,  but  must  itself  be  tested.  More- 
over, if  clear  means  certain,  nothing  is  explained.  If  it  means  dis- 
tinct, the  fact  that  we  may  be  certain  of  things  which  we  do  not 
perceive  distinctly  and  adequately  is  overlooked.  (2)  The  guar- 
antee mentioned  by  Descartes  is  insufficient.  The  existence  and 
perfections  of  God  are  not  known  intuitively,  but  by  demonstra- 
tion; and  demonstration  must  be  based  on  principles  that  are 
certain.  If  the  certitude  of  these  principles  is  said  to  depend  also 
on  God's  veracity,  we  are  involved  in  a  petitio  principii.  If  it  is 
said  to  depend  on  something  else,  certitude  may  be  derived  from 
our  own  faculties.  (3)  The  same  applies  to  ontologism.  We  do 
not  see  God  immediately,  but  know  Him  only  by  a  process  of 
reasoning. 

3.  Consistency,  and  Inconceivability  of  Negation.  —  (a)  Con- 
sistency, i.e.  the  harmony  between  judgments,  has  been  proposed 
as  the  criterion  of  truth  by  certain  philosophers  imbued  with  ideal- 
istic or  agnostic  tendencies.  If  knowledge  is  limited  to  our  own 
mental  states,  what  other  criterion  can  be  given?  Spencer  writes: 
"  There  is  no  mode  of  establishing  the  validity  of  any  belief  except 
that  of  showing  its  entire  congruity  with  all  other  beliefs.  ...  If, 
by  discovering  a  proposition  to  be  untrue,  we  mean  nothing  more 
than  discovering  a  difference  between  a  thing  expected  and  a  thing 
perceived,  then  a  body  of  conclusions  in  which  no  such  difference 
anywhere  occurs  must  be  what  we  mean  by  an  entirely  true  body 
of  conclusions."  (First  Principles,  §  40.) 

Yet  Spencer  himself  goes  farther,  and  gives  another  criterion, 
namely,  the  inconceivability  of  the  negation  of  a  proposition.  This 
inconceivability  comes  from  hereditary  associations,  so  strong 
that  the  associated  ideas  can  no  longer  be  thought  of  as  separated. 
"To  assert  the  inconceivableness  of  its  (a  cognition's)  negation  is 
at  the  same  time  to  assert  the  psychological  necessity  we  are  under 
of  thinking  it,  and  to  give  our  logical  justification  for  holding  it 
to  be  unquestionable."  (Principles  of  Psychology,  §  426.) 


ULTIMATE     CRITERION  407 

(b)  Criticism.  —  Inconsistency  is  a  sign  that  one  of  the  incon- 
sistent propositions  is  false.  Consistency  is  a  useful,  but  second- 
ary, test  of  validity.  Nor  is  it  infallible.  A  whole  system  of 
errors  may  be  consistent,  the  falsity  being  at  the  starting-point. 
Consistency  shows  that  the  rules  of  logic  have  been  observed, 
not  that  knowledge  possesses  objective  validity.  If  it  must  be 
the  criterion  of  validity,  it  must  have  something  else  to  rest  on. 
Moreover,  several  facts  or  principles  may  be  perceived  sepa- 
rately, so  that  their  consistency  will  not  be  known.  They  may 
nevertheless  be  true. 

As  to  inconceivability:  (i)  Sometimes  Spencer  confounds  it  with 
the  incapacity  for  imagining.  Many  things  are  conceivable  for 
the  intellect  without  being  imaginable,  e.g.  a  polygon  with  a  thou- 
sand sides.  And  the  impossibility  of  imagining  the  contradictory 
of  a  statement  is  no  sign  of  the  truth  of  that  statement.  (2)  In- 
tellectual inconceivability  may  be  subjective  or  objective,  i.e.  it  may 
depend  on  the  mind's  lack  of  power  to  unite  both  terms  of  a  judg- 
ment, or  on  the  fact  that  these  terms  are  mutually  exclusive.  In 
the  former  case,  it  is  purely  negative  and  proves  nothing.  The 
incapacity  to  see  how  a  thing  could  be  otherwise  than  it  is  con- 
ceived does  not  prove  that  it  cannot  really  be  otherwise.  What  is 
inconceivable  for  one  mind  may  be  conceivable  for  a  more  perfect 
mind.  In  the  latter  case,  the  inconceivability  is  positive,  and  we 
see  why  a  thing  cannot  be  otherwise.  In  this  supposition,  incon- 
ceivability is  a  criterion  of  truth,  but  not  the  first  criterion.  It 
supposes  that  we  know  the  necessity  for  the  object  of  being  as  it 
is  conceived.  Two  and  two  are  four,  and  it  is  inconceivable  that 
it  should  be  otherwise.  Why  inconceivable?  Because  I  perceive 
the  necessary  equality  of  "two  plus  two"  and  of  "four."  The 
truth  of  this  statement  is  not  tested  by  the  inconceivableness 
of  its  opposite,  but  this  inconceivableness  results  from  the  clear 
perception  of  the  truth. 

4.  The  Exigencies  of  Practical  Life.  —  (a)  The  conclusion  of 
Kant's  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  is  the  mind's  utter  incapacity 
to  acquire  valid  knowledge.  We  must  be  satisfied  with  knowing 
things-as-they-appear,  and  they  appear  in  consciousness  accord- 
ing to  the  mind's  a  priori  forms  or  categories.  Kant,  however, 


408  EPISTEMOLOGY 

does  not  stop  at  this  sceptical  conclusion,  but  emerges  out  of 
his  doubt  in  the  "Critique  of  Practical  Reason."  On  the  fact  of 
the  categorical  imperative  as  a  foundation  (see  Ethics,  p.  320  ff.) 
Kant  builds  up  again  three  central  truths:  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
the  existence  of  God,  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  which  are 
necessary  postulates  of  the  categorical  imperative  as  given  in  con- 
sciousness. Of  these  truths  Kant  professes  to  have  a  true  cer- 
titude which  nothing  can  shake,  but  not  a  scientific  certitude 
reached  by  demonstration.  He  calls  it  "moral"  certitude,  faith, 
or  "belief  of  reason." 

(b)  The  many  contradictions  of  thinkers  have  led  some  modern 
philosophers  to  doubt  the  ability  of  human  reason  to  reach  cer- 
tain knowledge.    There  is  a  wide-spread  tendency  to  follow  Kant 
in  attributing  to  practical  reason  a  superiority  over  pure  reason. 
This  tendency  manifests  itself  in  various  ways  which  are  more  or 
less  divergent,  but  all  of  which  start  from  the  same  assumption 
of  the  weakness  of  reason,  and  tend  to  the  same  end  of  reconstruct- 
ing knowledge  on  a  practical  basis;   on  action   rather  than  in- 
tellect, on  practice  rather  than  speculation.     Since  all  this   is 
dynamic  and  ever-changing;  since,  moreover,  the  mind's  relations 
to  objects  of    knowledge   may   change,  the   term   belief  rather 
than  the  term  knowledge  is  held  by  many  to  express  the  mind's 
attitude  in  regard  to  truth. 

(c)  The  main  aspects  of  this  general  tendency  are  the  following: 
(i)  Since  the  intellect  is  unable  to  give  certitude,  and  yet  moral 
life  has  imperious  exigencies,  the  will  is  the  main  cause  of  our  as- 
sents.   Such  is  the  position  of  Neo-criticism,  with  Renouvier,  and 
of  many  who  advocate  a  voluntaristic  as  opposed  to  an  intellectual- 
istic  primacy.     (2)  Not  only  the  will,  but  all  the  complex  exigen- 
cies of  human  nature  lead  man  to  assent,  and  a  great  prominence 
is  given  to  the  satisfaction  of  human  feelings  and  aspirations^ 
especially  of  the  need  of  belief  and  certitude.     (3)  Action  may  also 
be  made  the  central  element.    Thought,  they  say,  cannot  reach 
objects,  because  it  is  immanent  in  the  mind.     But  action  reaches 
external  reality,  and  establishes  the  contact  with  it,  which  is 
impossible  to  reason.     The   consciousness  of   activity  leads   to 
the  knowledge  of  objects.    This  view  is  completed  again  by  the 


ULTIMATE     CRITERION  409 

theory  of  the  primacy  of  the  will.  (4)  Somewhat  along  the  same 
lines,  Pragmatism  claims  that  the  criterion  of  truth  consists  in 
practical  results.  By  these  are  meant  not  only  external  useful 
results,  but  also  subjective  satisfaction,  consistency,  good  influ- 
ence on  moral  life,  etc.  An  assertion  is  worth  its  results.  It  is 
to  be  tested  by  its  effects;  and  its  meaning  itself  can  be  expressed 
only  in  terms  of  its  practical  results. 

Criticism.  —  (a)  Kant's  attempt  at  reconstructing  certitude  with 
practical  reason  alone  is  a  failure.  In  practical  as  well  as  in  spec- 
ulative matters,  the  same  reason  judges  and  decides.  There  are  not 
two  reasons  in  man,  but  only  one  reason  with  a  twofold  function, 
speculative  and  practical.  If  liberty,  immortality,  and  God  are 
realities,  the  categorical  imperative  on  which  they  rest  must  itself 
be,  not  only  an  appearance,  but  a  reality,  and  the  nexus  between 
these  truths  and  the  imperative  must  also  be  real.  How  is  all 
this  perceived  with  certitude?  The  postulates  of  practical  rea- 
son resort  naturally  and  necessarily  to  the  logic  of  pure  reason. 
Morality  cannot  be  blind;  it  must  be  enlightened  and  reasonable. 
If  the  noumena  are  not  accessible  to  the  pure  reason,  they  cannot 
be  accessible  to  the  practical  reason. 

(b)  We  shall  not  discuss  the  general  question  of  the  primacy  of 
will  and  intellect.    It  has  too  many  points  of  view  from  which 
it  may  be  considered,  and  according  to  which  the  answers  must 
vary.    In  epistemology,  when  we  speak  of  the  test  of  truth  and 
certitude,  and  of  the  justification  of  our  assents,  it  is  impossible 
to  give  our  preference  to  will,  action,  or  practice.    We  always  find 
ourselves  in  the  same  dilemma:  Either  these  are  enlightened  or 
blind.    If  blind,  they  can  give  no  certitude  of  the  truth.    If  en- 
lightened, tested,  and  shown  to  be  correct,  where  is  the  light,  and 
where  is  the  test?    Of  itself,  the  will  is  blind,  and  what  we  mean 
by  mental  light  is  the  knowledge  of  the  "why"  of  an  assent,  i.e 
the  objective  reason  of  its  truth,  not  the  subjective  motives  of 
the  assent. 

(c)  The  intellect  is  falsely  declared  incapable  of  giving  any  cer- 
titude.   Few,  perhaps,  are  the  legitimate  certitudes,  but  it  has 
been  shown  that,  in  some  cases,  they  are  possible.    Moreover, 
why  should  the  will  impose  on  the  mind's  assent  inevident  certi- 


410  EPISTEMOLOGY 

tude?  Experience  teaches  that  we  are  not  free  to  think  as  we 
please.  Our  assents  are  motived  by  something  which  is  not  within 
us,  and  the  will  cannot  force  us  to  accept  the  uncertain.  Certain 
truths  are  accepted  because  they  are  evident  for  the  intellect. 

(d)  It  must  be  admitted  that  truth  satisfies  the  exigencies  of 
human  nature.     We  need  certitude.     Scepticism  is  opposed  to  the 
very  nature  of  the  mind.     But  it  is  also  the  nature  of  the  mind 
to   require    that   this   certitude   be   justified   intellectually.    At 
times,  truth,  even  opposed  to  feelings,  imposes  itself  on  our  accept- 
ance.    Why,  if  not  because  it  has  rights  which  we  may  be  forced 
to  recognize,  and  because  primarily  our  assents  are  rational? 

(e)  We  have  discussed  already  the  postulate  that  thought  is 
immanent  in  the  mind,  and  cannot  reach  external  reality.    How 
can  action,  which  alone  is  supposed  to  place  the  mind  in  contact 
with  external  objects,  be  taken  cognizance  of,  if  not  by  an  intel- 
lectual process  of  reflection  and  thought?    Here  again  the  intel- 
lect must  be  called  in  as  the  ultimate  test,  unless  we  rest  satisfied 
with  a  blind  assent. 

(/)  Pragmatism  seems  to  identify  truth  with  goodness  or  use- 
fulness, and  this  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  gratuitous  postulate.  More- 
over, granting  that  truth  always  has  good  results,  it  does  not 
follow  that  it  is  to  be  identified  with  them,  but  rather  that  it  is 
distinct  from  them  as  a  cause  from  its  effects.  A  statement  is  not 
true  because  it  is  useful,  but  rather  it  is  useful  because  it  is  true. 
Many  subjective  influences  impel  us  to  believe  or  assent.  But  re- 
flection is  not  satisfied  with  spontaneous  assents.  In  order  to 
test  their  value,  the  mind  endeavors  to  rid  itself  of  these  influ- 
ences and  to  consider  the  object  on  its  own  merits.  It  may  be 
added  that,  in  order  to  know  which  results  and  consequences  are 
good,  a  test  distinct  from  them,  or  another  criterion,  is  required. 
Finally,  self-evident  statements  are  accepted  independently  of 
whatever  results  they  may  have,  simply  because  they  are  seen  to 
be  true. 

5.  Conclusion.  —  The  conclusion  seems  now  justified  that 
subjective  criteria,  whatever  they  may  be,  are  insufficient  as  tests 
of  objective  truth,  and  cannot  produce  more  than  probable  beliefs. 
In  fact,  among  those  who  propose  them,  many  claim  no  more 


ULTIMATE    CRITERION  411 

than  a  higher  or  lower  degree  of  probability  for  all  our  knowl- 
edge. However,  it  must  be  recognized  that  these  various  systems 
which  insist  on  practical  reason,  will,  action,  etc.,  rightly  empha- 
size the  great  influence  of  subjective  dispositions  on  all  assents, 
and  the  necessity  for  man  of  seeking  the  truth  with  his  whole  mind. 
If  we  deal  with  practical  truths,  it  is  not  enough  for  the  intellect 
to  accept  them,  the  whole  man  must  comply  with  them.  Will, 
action,  feelings,  too  frequently  prevent  man,  not  only  from  acting 
according  to  his  knowledge,  but  even  from  seeking  or  accepting 
the  truth.  All  this,  however,  is  the  psychological,  not  the  episte- 
mological,  point  of  view.  (Cf.  p.  117  ff.)  When  applied  as  tests 
of  truth,  these  systems  fail.  They  do  not  show  where  the  truth 
is,  but  only  why,  how,  and  by  what  process  we  accept  certain 
things  as  true. 

III.  THEORY  OF  A  CRITERION  INTRINSIC  TO  THE  OBJECT  AND,  IN 
A  CERTAIN  SENSE,  ALSO  TO  THE  KNOWER 

As  the  criterion  which  we  seek  must  be  the  distinctive  sign  of 
truth,  it  must  be  in  the  object  which  it  distinguishes  from  others, 
and  on  which  it  imprints  the  characteristic  stamp  of  truth.  It 
must  also  be  somehow  in  the  subject,  since  it  is  the  motive 
justifying  certitude.  This  is  possible  if  we  look  upon  knowl- 
edge as  the  vital  union  of  subject  and  object  in  the  cognitive  act. 

i.  Nature  of  Evidence.  —  (a)  Evidence  (e,  videre)  etymolog- 
ically  refers  to  the  light  of  truth,  and  hence  to  its  visibility.  Many 
current  expressions  are  borrowed  from  the  sense  of  vision.  After 
giving  an  explanation,  a  man  asks:  "Now  do  you  see?  "  that  is,  do 
you  understand?  Or  one  says:  "See  how  this  tastes,"  or  "Let  us 
see  how  these  men  sing,  play,  etc.,"  i.e.  let  us  hear,  etc.  To  see 
is  used  of  every  sense-perception  and  of  every  function  of  the 
understanding.  Evidence  is  the  property  of  truth  —  fact,  prin- 
ciple, or  argument  — by  which  it  is  enlightened  so  as  to  be 
perceived  by  a  knowing  power.  It  includes  three  elements:  an 
object,  its  light,  and  the  mind's  perception  of  such  light.  Evidence 
is  the  object  itself,  shining  and  manifesting  itself  to  the  mind  so  as 
to  determine  the  mind's  assent. 


412  EPISTEMOLOGY 

(b)  Evidence  may  mean  the  proof  by  which  a  claim  is  established, 
or  a  claim  which  needs  no  proof  because  it  is  self-evident.  In  other 
words,  it  may  be  mediate  or  immediate,  according  as  the  object 
possesses  full  light  in  itself,  or  must  borrow  it  from  other  sources. 
In  any  discursive  process,  the  self-evident  must  ultimately  be 
reached,  and  there  are  different  degrees  of  evidence  according  as 
a  statement  is  more  or  less  closely  connected  with  something 
self-evident,  and  the  nexus  itself  perceived  more  or  less  clearly. 

2.  Evidence  is  the  Criterion  of  Truth.  —  (a)  This  is  hardly  more 
than  a  corollary  of  the  preceding  pages  in  which  scepticism,  ideal- 
ism, and  various  theories  of  criteria  were  discussed.     Subjectively 
we  know  that  our  assents  must  be  justified,  and  rest  on  some 
foundation  distinct  from  ourselves.    We  feel  that  we  have  to  con- 
form, not  only  to  the  laws  of  thought,  but  also  to  the  laws  of  things. 
We  are  compelled  to  accept  truth  as  it  is.    Objectively  we  per- 
ceive clearly  at  times  the  necessity  of  truth.    We  see  it  because  it 
is  shining,  and  we  can  no  more  see  it  otherwise  than  we  can  see  as 
red  the  wall  which  is  white. 

(b)  Hence  it  is  always  to  evidence,  mediate  or  immediate, 
that  we  appeal  when  asked  to  give  an  account  of  our  assents.  To 
justify  a  statement,  I  may  say:  "It  is  so  because  I  see  that  it 
cannot  be  otherwise,  because  it  clearly  manifests  itself."  Or  I  may 
answer  by  a  series  of  "becauses,"  the  last  one  of  which  will  be 
something  self-evident.  The  mind  may  see  more  or  less  clearly, 
and  the  firmness  of  its  assent  should  be  in  proportion  to  the  degree 
of  evidence.  But  surely  we  need  not  ask  ourselves  why  we  see  in 
broad  daylight.  We  see  because  we  have  the  power  of  vision, 
and  the  proper  external  conditions  are  verified.  Asking  the  reason 
of  self-evidence  would  be  tantamount  to  asking  to  light  a  candle 
in  order  to  see  the  light  of  the  sun. 

3.  Difficulties  Examined.  —  This  will  be  made  clearer  by  answer- 
ing a  few  difficulties. 

(a)  Evidence  may  be  apparent  and  illusory,  as  it  is  in  hallucina- 
tion and  delusion.  A  man  may  mistake  subjective  phenomena 
for  objective  facts  and  truths,  and  invincibly  believe  that  he  has 
full  and  satisfactory  evidence. 

Answer. — These  are  abnormal  cases  in  which  the  causes  of 


ULTIMATE     CRITERION  413 

error  are  frequently  known  and  traceable  to  some  definite  organic 
defect.  They  may  be  corrected  by  other  evidences.  For  instance, 
a  visual  hallucination  may  be  corrected  by  using  the  sense  of 
touch,  or  even  the  sense  of  vision  itself  when  it  recovers  its  nor- 
mal condition.  The  problem  here  is  psychological  rather  than 
epistemological. 

(b)  How,  then,  can  the  mind  be  sure  of  objective  evidence?    As 
noted  already,  evidence  cannot  be  proved;  it  is  perceived,     (i) 
One  must  be  careful  not  to  exaggerate  it.    Frequently  rashness 
impels  to  assents  which  objective  light  does  not  warrant.     (2)  It 
must  be  ascertained  that  the  object  perceived  is  really  external. 
Judgment  must  control  the  data  of  the  senses,  and  the  under- 
standing   must   proceed   with    caution.     (3)  A    complex   object 
must  be  analyzed,  and  every  one  of  its  elements  examined.    As 
remarked  in  Logic,  one  small  error  at  a  given  point  of  the  process 
may  ultimately  lead  far  astray. 

(c)  If  evidence  is  the  test  of  truth,  how  can  there  be  error  ?    Dif- 
ferences of  opinions,  as  remarked  elsewhere,  are  chiefly  on  matters 
in  which  we  have  only  probabilities,  and  they  depend  on  innate 
and  acquired  dispositions.    On  evident  truths   there  is  agree- 
ment.   We  are  not  concerned  at  present  with  their  number.     Even 
if  they  are  few,  they  are  accepted  because  of  their  evidence.    Error 
may  come  from  rashness,  and  from  subjective  dispositions  which 
blind  man,  and  impel  him  to  assent  without  sufficient  evidence. 
This  will  happen  especially  in  questions  which  have  a  practical 
bearing.    Moreover,  owing  to  the  complexity  of  the  object,  the 
need  of  long  demonstrations,  the  difficulty  experienced  in  extri- 
cating various  elements  of  a  complex  process,  the  mind   may 
be   led  astray  without  being  aware  of  it.    But  the  progress  of 
science  consists  largely  in  ascertaining,  verifying,  and  correcting 
conclusions  already  reached. 

In  many  cases  we  must  rest  satisfied  with  a  greater  or  smaller 
probability,  and  admit  the  possibility  of  error.  He  is  a  wise  man 
who  does  not  give  to  his  assents  more  firmness  than  evidence 
entitles  them  to,  and  knows  how  to  doubt  when  there  is  not 
enough  light. 

Error  may  be  caused  by  the  nature  of  the  object,  or  by  influ- 


414  EPISTEMOLOGY 

ences  within  the  subject.  It  is  a  judgment  which  exceeds  that 
which  is  really  given  in  intuition  or  reasoning.  But  the  fact  that 
all  men  speak  of  error  indicates  that  all  have  a  test  of  truth.  Error 
could  never  be  mentioned  if  truth  were  unknowable.  The  proc- 
ess of  detecting  error  always  consists  in  applying  evidence,  in  its 
various  forms,  as  the  criterion  of  truth. 


H.    DERIVATIVE   CRITERIA 

As  the  ultimate  criterion,  evidence  manifests  itself  to  different 
faculties,  and  in  various  ways.  We  shall  now  speak  of  these  de- 
rived criteria.  They  may  be  reduced  to  two  groups  according 
as  the  truth  is  reached  by  one's  own  personal  effort  and  seen 
in  itself,  or,  on  the  contrary,  is  reached  only  through  mediate 
contact,  i.e.  through  another  mind  that  has  perceived  it  in  itself. 

I.  PERSONAL  FACULTIES  COMING  IN  DIRECT  CONTACT  WITH  THE 
KNOWN  OBJECT 

i.  Senses.  —  (a)  The  reliability  of  the  senses  has  already  been 
asserted  against  idealism.  They  rightly  testify  to  the  existence 
of  our  own  body  and  of  an  external  world.  The  subject  and  the 
external  object  being  united  in  the  "action"  of  the  object  which 
is  at  the  same  time  the  "passion  "  of  the  subject,  no  bridge  is  neces- 
sary between  the  two,  and  no  transformation  of  the  physical 
cause  into  a  psychical  result. 

Each  sense  manifests  only  some  aspects  of  objects.  Knowl- 
edge is  thus  acquired  in  a  fragmentary  way,  but  the  intellect 
combines  these  fragments  and  reaches  a  more  complete  knowledge 
of  reality.  It  is  true  also  that  individual  perceptions  may  differ 
owing  to  the  condition  and  the  degree  of  perfection  of  the  senses, 
but  this  does  not  invalidate  perception.  The  distinction  must 
also  be  remembered  between  what  is  actually  perceived  and  what 
is  imagined  or  inferred.  We  naturally  interpret  and  complete 
perceptions.  (See  Psychology,  pp.  62  ff.,  79  ff.,  nS  ff.) 

(b)  Some  conditions  are  necessary  for  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
senses,  (i)  Each  sense  is  fully  reliable  only  within  its  own  spe- 
cial sphere,  for  what  has  been  called  in  psychology  its  sensile 


DERIVATIVE    CRITERIA  415 

per  se  proprium.  The  sensile  commune  should  be  ascertained  by 
more  than  one  sense.  As  to  the  sensile  per  accidens,  it  may  be 
the  occasion  of  many  errors.  Wrong  habits  and  accidental  causes 
of  error  are  frequent;  hence  great  caution  is  required  in  inferring 
the  nature  of  objects.  The  eye  may  mistake  salt  for  sugar  owing 
to  their  common  whiteness.  The  ear  may  mistake  one  man's 
voice  for  another  man's  owing  to  their  likeness,  etc.  (2)  The 
object  must  be  within  due  limits  of  distance,  intensity,  etc.,  and 
there  should  be  no  obstacle  between  the  object  and  the  sense. 
Owing  to  its  distance,  the  moon  looks  like  a  disk,  and  not  like  a 
sphere.  Owing  to  a  refracting  medium,  a  stick  half-dipped  in 
water,  not  perpendicularly,  appears  broken  to  the  eye,  and  rightly 
so,  since,  in  fact,  the  rays  are  refracted.  (3)  The  organ  must  be 
in  a  normal  condition.  Many  physiological  influences  modify 
perception.  Error  is  due  to  rashness  in  judging  hastily  that 
sensations  are  objective. 

(c)  Induction  must  complete  the  immediate  data  of  the  senses 
to  ascertain  the  physical  nature  of  the  perceived  qualities,  cor- 
rect illusions,  and  verify  the  reports  of  an  "educated"  sense  by 
those  of  another.  The  evidence  in  sense-perception  is  sometimes 
direct  and  intuitive,  sometimes  indirect  and  mediate. 

2.  Consciousness,  by  which  we  become  aware  of  our  own  in- 
ternal states,  ideas,  emotions,  volitions,  etc.,  is  an  infallible  cri- 
terion.   I  may  err  in  referring  these  processes  to  wrong  causes, 
but,  as  far  as  consciousness  manifests  my  present  subjective  experi- 
ences, e.g.  my  feeling  of  pain,  my  thinking,  imagining,  doubting, 
etc.,  its  evidence  is  intuitive,  and  can  be  denied  by  no  one,  not 
even  by  the  out-and-out  sceptic.    Illusions  and  hallucinations  are 
real  for  consciousness;  the  images  are  really  present  in  the  mind. 
The  error  consists  in  referring  them  wrongly  to  external  objects, 
and  in  judging  that  they  are  faithful  representations  of  exter- 
nal reality.     Consciousness  also  apprehends  vaguely  the  ego  or 
subject,  but  not  its  nature. 

3.  Memory.  —  (a)  Memory  includes  both  the  recall  of  the  past 
and  its  recognition  as  past.    Its  veracity  is  to  be  admitted,  and  in 
many  cases  can  be  verified.     I  may,  for  instance,  note  my  impres- 
sions, and  later  on  compare  what  my  memory  recalls  with  what 


416  EPISTEMOLOGY 

I  have  written.  Or  I  may  compare  my  impressions  with  those  of 
others  who  have  perceived  the  same  object.  Without  memory, 
comparing,  identifying,  distinguishing,  reasoning,  etc.,  would  be 
impossible.  The  validity  of  memory  is  thus  shown  in  its 
very  exercise,  and  may  be  tested  by  experiments  proving  its 
agreement  with  past  perception. 

(b)  However,  it  has  its  limitations.    We  do  not  recall  at  will 
everything  we  have  perceived  or  known;  and  we  may  recall  an 
image  of  the  past  without  recognizing  it.    But  these  limitations 
are  negative,  and  do  not  affect  the  trustworthiness  of  memory,  as 
far  as  memory  goes,  any  more  than  the  ignorance  of  certain  things 
affects  the  validity  of  the  knowledge  one  possesses. 

(c)  It  is  also  to  be  admitted  that  there  are  not  only  limitations, 
but  also  positive  errors  of  memory.     Memory  may  combine  a  repro- 
duction of  the  past  with  fanciful  additions  and  changes,  and  yet 
we  may  be  led  to  think  that  the  whole  is  a  faithful  copy.    This 
simply  shows  that  an  imprudent  use  of  memory  is  possible,  and 
that,  owing  to  habit,  lack  of  care,  of  exactness  and  reflection, 
one  fails  to  verify  the  elements  of  an  image  before  passing  a  judg- 
ment on  its  value.    Because  of  the  close  relation  between  memory 
and  imagination,  great  caution  is  necessary.    But,  if  proper  care 
is  taken,  in  normal  conditions  at  least,  the  evident  testimony  of 
memory  is  reliable.    If  it  remains  doubtful  —  and  frequently  it 
should  be  held  as  such — assent  must  be  suspended  until  further 
research  by  means  of  the  laws  of  association  brings  full  light. 

4.  Reason.  —  Enough  has  been  said  on  the  objective  value  of 
concepts  and  of  intuitive  necessary  judgments.  As  to  judgments 
derived  by  inductive  or  deductive  reasoning  from  self-evident 
facts  or  principles,  the  degree  of  their  validity  depends  on  the 
necessity  by  which  they  are  connected  with  the  self-evident 
starting-point.  The  nearer  such  judgments  are  to  self-evidence 
and  the  more  necessary  their  connection,  the  greater  also  is  their 
evidence,  and  consequently  the  firmer  should  be  the  mind's  assent. 
Here,  as  well  as  in  the  use  of  other  cognitive  faculties,  error  does  not 
come  from  the  instrument  itself  of  knowledge,  but  from  the  bad 
use  that  is  made  of  it.  In  inference  we  connect  facts  and  principles 
with  other  facts  and  principles.  Not  only  must  these  be  certain 


DERIVATIVE    CRITERIA  417 

and  valid,  but  the  application  of  them  must  be  made  with  pru- 
dence. In  a  series  of  inferences,  principles  that  are  not  demon- 
strated, and  yet  that  are  far  from  self-evident,  are  sometimes 
used  or  implied,  and  the  rules  of  logic  also  may  be  violated. 
(Cf.  Psychology,  pp.  115  ff.) 

II.  INDIRECT  RELATION  OF  THE  MIND  WITH  THE  KNOWN 

OBJECT 

i.  Authority.  —  (a)  Agreement  with  others  always  strengthens 
personal  conviction.  But  there  are  cases  in  which  the  testimony 
of  others  does  not  merely  strengthen,  but  also  is  a  valid  motive  of, 
assent.  A  truth  may  not  have  been  perceived  directly  by  me, 
yet  I  accept  it  because  it  has  been  perceived  by  others  who  tell 
me,  i.e.  I  accept  it  on  their  authority.  For  me,  the  evidence  is 
not  in  the  object  itself,  since  none  of  my  cognitive  faculties  has 
come  in  direct  contact  with  it.  What  must  be  evident  is  (i)  that 
those  who  tell  me  really  know,  and  (2)  that  their  testimony  is 
reliable.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  human  knowledge  is  acquired 
on  the  authority  of  others.  Not  only  is  history  in  all  its  branches 
dependent  on  it  altogether,  but  even  the  majority  of  contempo- 
rary facts,  events,  and  circumstances  are  known  from  the  rela- 
tion of  others.  Personal  experience  is  restricted  within  narrow 
limits,  and  would  give  but  little  knowledge,  if  it  were  not  possible 
to  profit  by  the  experience  or  science  of  others  who  live  at  present 
or  have  lived  in  the  past.  Personal  experience  lasts  only  a  short 
time  and  extends  to  only  a  small  space. 

(b)  In  practical  as  well  as  in  scientific  life,  man  must  believe 
his  fellowmen.  The  physician  believes  the  chemist;  the  chemist 
trusts  the  physician's  knowledge;  the  physicist  accepts  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  mathematician,  and  so  on.  Even  the  greatest  sci- 
entist and  philosopher  is  obliged  to  believe  his  cook  on  many 
points.  All  records  of  transactions  between  individuals  or  na- 
tions depend  on  testimony.  The  decisions  of  courts  are  given  in 
view  of  the  testimony  of  witnesses.  At  all  its  stages,  education 
depends  on  the  authority  of  parents  and  teachers.  History  is 
essentially  based  on  human  testimony.  Faith  in  other  men  is 
implied  in  every  endeavor  of  life,  and  without  it  progress  would 

2$ 


418  EPISTEMOLOGY 

be  an  impossibility.  Who  can  estimate  the  influence  of  the  daily 
newspaper  or  the  magazine  on  human  assents  and  on  human  con- 
duct? Think  a  moment  of  the  number  of  things  which  we  have 
to  take  on  authority,  and  of  the  number  of  things  which  we  do  take 
on  authority  so  as  to  save  ourselves  the  trouble  of  ascertaining 
them. 

(c)  (i)  Belief  is  the  assent  given  to  testimony.  It  may  be 
certain,  but  frequently  is  more  or  less  probable.  (2)  Testimony  is 
the  communication  of  some  information  by  a  witness.  (3)  The 
authority  of  a  witness,  or  his  reliability,  is  based  on  the  fact  that  he 
knows,  or  is  not  deceived,  and  that  he  speaks  the  truth,  or  does  not 
deceive.  (4)  The  matter  of  his  testimony  may  be  a  universal  law 
—  e.g.  that  water  is  composed  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen;  a  per- 
manent fact — e.g.  that  Washington  City  is  on  the  Potomac;  or  a 
transient  fact, — e.g.  an  eclipse,  a  battle,  an  earthquake.  (5)  These 
facts  may  be  contemporary  or  more  or  less  remote.  (6)  The  wit- 
ness may  be  an  eye-witness  (immediate),  when  he  has  been  present 
at  the  occurrence  which  he  relates,  or  he  may  rely  on  the  testi- 
mony of  others  (mediate  witness).  (7)  Finally,  the  testimony 
may  be  given  in  speech,  writing,  or  in  the  form  of  monuments, 
coins,  statues,  etc. 

2.  On  Questions  of  Fact.  —  (a)  The  nature  of  the  fact  itself 
must  be  taken  into  account,  and  compared  with  the  competence 
of  the  witness  to  observe  it.  The  observation  of  some  facts  and 
experiments  requires  a  special  training  of  the  observer's  mind. 
Furthermore,  if  the  fact  is  unlikely  and  extraordinary,  a  higher 
authority  or  a  greater  number  of  witnesses  will  be  required. 

(b)  If  there  is  only  one  witness,  his  qualifications  must  be  ascer- 
tained.   Some  men  lack  the  power  of  attention,  judgment,  and 
memory.    Others  have  it  only  along  certain  lines.     Hence  the 
special  aptitudes  and  dispositions  of  the  witness  must  be  consid- 
ered in  reference  to  the  special  fact  which  he  relates.     His  verac- 
ity is  also  to  be  ascertained.    To  this  end  it  may  be  necessary  to 
know  his  moral  character,  to  find  out  whether  he  had  any  interest 
in    deceiving,   etc.     When   there   is   only   one   witness,   greater 
severity  is  required  in  testing  his  authority. 

(c)  Several  unanimous  and  independent  witnesses  give  a  greater 


DERIVATIVE     CRITERIA  419 

certitude  than  one  witness.  If  they  disagree,  it  is  necessary  not 
so  much  to  number  those  on  each  side  as  to  weigh  their  author- 
ity. They  must  be  independent,  i.e.  not  prompted  by  the  same 
interests  or  passions,  nor  following  the  same  original  witness, 
for  otherwise  there  is  really  only  one  testimony  Frequently  the 
impossibility  of  deception  is  certain,  for  instance,  when  wit- 
nesses relate  important  contemporary  events,  and  their  testimony 
has  not  been  contradicted.  In  general,  the  greater  the  number 
of  witnesses,  their  independence,  and  their  competence  to  observe 
the  fact,  the  greater  also  the  certitude. 

3.  On  Questions  of  Doctrine,  human  authority  has  less  value 
than  on  questions  of  fact,  because  the  human  mind  is  more  fallible 
in  its  deductions  and  inductions  than  in  ordinary  easy  observa- 
tions, and  because  there  is  less  agreement  among  men.     Yet  in 
every  discussion,  men  appeal  to  authorities,  and  rightly  so,  for  a 
specialist  has  more  chance  to  reach  the  truth  in  his  special  branch 
than  another  man.     However,  the  general  principle  to  be  applied 
here  is  that  the  authority  of  a  man  is  worth  the  reasons  which  he 
gives,  at  least  for  one  who  can  understand  these  reasons.     As  to 
those  who  cannot  understand,  they  must  accept  the  statements 
with  more  or  less  reserve  according  to  the  qualities,  fairness,  prej- 
udices, etc.,  of  the  man  who  makes  them.     The  common  consent 
of  mankind,  in  questions  on  which  man  in  general  is  competent, 
shows,  not  only  the  propensity  of  human  nature,  but  also  objective 
evidence. 

4.  Oral  Tradition  is  a  difficult  criterion  because  it  is  too  vari- 
able.    By  passing  from  man  to  man,  the  same  fact  may  become 
gradually    distorted    by    additions,    subtractions,    and    changes. 
Experience  shows  that  if  the  same  fact  is  narrated  by  one  person 
to  another,  by  this  one  to  a  third,  and  so  forth,  the  narration  made 
by  the  tenth  person  may  be  greatly  different  from  the  original. 
Hence  the  greatest  care  must  be  used  in  distinguishing  truth  from 
legend.     Yet,  as  a  rule,  even  after  a  long  time  of  oral  tradition, 
there  remains  a  nucleus  of  truth  which  may  be  disentangled  by 
controlling  oral    tradition  with  the  help  of   written  documents, 
and  comparing  one  line  of  oral  tradition  with  other  lines  indepen- 
dent of  it.    If  the  tradition  happens  to  be  mentioned  in  writing, 


420  EPISTEMOLOGY 

the  circumstances  of  the  writing  are  to  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion. Moreover,  the  nature  of  the  fact  must  be  examined,  as  also 
the  customs  and  characteristics  of  the  people  by  whom  the  tradi- 
tion has  been  preserved.  When  the  tradition  is  a  popular  one, 
known  to  all,  adulterations  are  less  likely  to  occur,  because  the 
statement  of  one  man  is  corrected  by  the  statement  of  others  on 
the  same  point. 

5.  Written  Documents.  —  The  conditions  required  in  a  written 
document  are  its  authenticity,  integrity,  and  veracity. 

(a)  The  authenticity  or  genuineness  of  a  book,  that  is,  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  written  by  the  author  whose  name  it  bears,  is  es- 
tablished by  (i)  internal  evidence:  its  style  as  compared  to  the 
style  of  works  that  are  certainly  genuine;  the  agreement  of  its 
contents  with  the  time  and  place  at  which  it  is  supposed  to  have 
been  written;  the  agreement  of  its  contents  with  the  author's 
views  and  opinions,  etc.;  (2)  external  evidence:  the  testimony  of 
other  writers,  oral  tradition,  the  silence  of  those  who  would  be 
interested  in  denying  its  authenticity,  etc. 

(b)  The  integrity  of  a  book,  that  is,  the  freedom  from  additions, 
subtractions,  or  changes,  is  proved  by  different  circumstances: 
the  multiplicity  of   independent   editions,  the  comparison  with 
manuscripts,  the  difficulty  of  introducing  interpolations  or  mutila- 
tions, the  importance  of  the  contents,  the  comparison  with  other 
documents,  etc. 

(c)  The  veracity  is  ascertained  by  showing  the  author's  knowl- 
edge and  fairness,  and  by  comparing  the  book  with  other  docu- 
ments. 

N.B.  A  general  principle  to  be  observed  in  the  application  of 
the  criterion  of  authority  is  that  one  must  always  guard  against 
both  excessive  credulity  and  exaggerated  scepticism.  Few 
sciences  are  more  difficult  than  history,  which  endeavors  to  find 
out  the  truth  of  facts  related  in  written  documents  or  oral 
traditions. 

To  discuss  here  the  question  of  the  authority  of  divine  revela- 
tion would  be  to  anticipate  a  number  of  conclusions  on  the  exist- 
ence and  the  attributes  of  God,  and  on  the  criteria  of  revelation. 
All  we  can  say  at  present  is  that,  granting  God's  omniscience  and 


CONCLUSION  421 

sanctity,  and  also  the  fact  of  revelation,  divine  faith  gives  to  man 
the  highest  possible  certitude. 


CONCLUSION 

The  conclusion  of  this  treatise  is  that  certitude  is  possible  for 
man,  but  that  it  requires  some  conditions.  Not  only  is  certitude 
possible,  but  it  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  thought.  Knowl- 
edge is  a  complex  process.  It  always  needs  correction  and  read- 
justment, but  its  bases  are  secure.  Man's  endeavor  should  be  to 
build  as  strong  and  as  high  an  edifice  as  possible  on  the  twofold 
foundation  of  facts  and  principles  that  are  certain.  He  must 
know  the  limitations,  and  imperfections  of  his  own  mind,  and  hence 
be  satisfied  with  opinion  and  even  doubt  where  certitude  is  not 
justified.  He  must  also  proceed  cautiously,  and  use  all  possible 
tests  of  his  knowledge.  But  the  field  to  be  explored  has  no  lim- 
its, and,  provided  the  mind  starts  from  evidence  and  proceeds  with 
evidence,  there  is  no  reason  to  assign  any  border  line  beyond 
which  would  lie  the  unknowable.  What  is  unknown  for  the 
science  of  to-day  may  be  known  for  the  science  of  to-morrow. 


COSMOLOGY   OR   THE    METAPHYS- 
ICAL    STUDY     OF     THE 
PHYSICAL   WORLD 


INTRODUCTION 

i.  General  Introduction  to  Metaphysics. —  (a)  The  name 
"metaphysics"  owes  its  origin  to  the  arrangement  of  Aristotle's 
works  by  Andronicus  of  Rhodes  (first  century  B.C.),  who  gave  the' 
general  title  of  TO.  ^era  TO,  <£vo-iKa  to  all  the  treatises  that  fol- 
lowed Aristotle's  treatise  on  Physics.  The  name  given  by  Aris- 
totle himself  was  that  of  " First  Philosophy."  Metaphysics 
means  the  science  which  rises  higher  than  physical  sciences,  and 
considers  things  from  a  more  abstract,  hence  more  general,  point 
of  view. 

All  sciences  are  more  or  less  abstract,  and  all  suppose  general 
principles.  But  physical  sciences  use  experience  as  their  chief 
instrument,  and  call  upon  experience  to  test  and  verify  their  con- 
clusions. Moreover,  every  science  considers  only  certain  classes  of 
beings,  and  from  a  special  point  of  view.  Metaphysics  endeavors 
to  complete  special  sciences  by  a  higher  unification.  Thus  all 
physical  sciences  deal  with  material  substances;  but  what  is  matter 
which  is  common  to  all?  They  use  the  principle  of  causality; 
but  what  is  a  cause?  and  so  on.  Physical  sciences  are  empirical; 
the  present  science  is  metempirical  or  metaphysical.  Its  con- 
clusions cannot  be  verified  directly  by  experience,  yet  must  be 
based  on  it  and  harmonize  with  it.  Metaphysics  is  not,  and 
cannot  be,  divorced  from  physical  science. 

(b)  That  its  object  is  real  has  been  shown  in  epistemology,  and 
those  who  claim  that  metaphysics  is  an  impossibility,  or  deals 

422 


NATURE     OF     COSMOLOGY  423 

with  the  unknowable,  do  so  on  account  of  preconceived  ideas  on 
the  nature  of  knowledge.  In  a  series  of  subordinated  "whats" 
the  mind  is  not  satisfied  till  it  reaches  the  last.  What  is  ice?  .  .  . 
What  is  water?  .  .  .  What  are  oxygen  and  hydrogen?  .  .  .  What 
is  an  element?  .  .  ,  What  is  matter?  .  .  .  And  although  it  is 
more  abstract,  the  object  of  metaphysics  is  nevertheless  real. 
Hence  metaphysics  is  not  a  mere  science  of  words  and  ideas,  and 
the  discredit  into  which  it  has  fallen  is  due  to  agnostic  tendencies, 
and  also  to  the  abuse  which  has  sometimes  been  made  of  meta- 
physics, by  asking  and  trying  to  solve  idle  questions,  or  by  making 
it  a  purely  a  priori  and  ideal  construction. 

(c)  The  objects  of  metaphysics  may  be  reduced  to  three  main 
groups:  the  physical  world,  the  human  soul,  and  the  ultimate 
ground  of  all  things.  Hence  we  shall  have  three  parts:  Cos- 
mology, Philosophy  of  Mind,  and  Theodicy.  The  method  will 
be  both  inductive  and  deductive,  i.e.  .proceed  from  experience  and 
from  self-evident  principles.  But  everywhere  we  shall  keep  in 
touch  with  concrete  reality. 

2.  Cosmology  (KOO-/AOS,  mundus,  universe)  is  the  philosophical 
science  of  the  physical  world,  (i)  It  deals  with  the  physical 
world,  and,  in  this  respect,  its  object  is  the  same  as  that  of  natural 
sciences,  with  this  difference,  however,  that  it  deals  with  all  physi- 
cal realities,  while  each  of  them  is  concerned  only  with  certain 
groups.  (2)  It  is  a  philosophical  science,  and,  in  this,  its  point 
of  view  differs  from  that  of  the  other  sciences.  Thus  physics 
deals  with  the  common  properties  of  matter;  chemistry  with  its 
changes;  mineralogy  with  the  description  and  classification  of 
minerals;  geology  with  the  formation  of  the  crust  of  the  earth, 
etc.  None  touches  upon  the  higher  questions  of  the  intimate  and 
ultimate  constitution  of  matter.  They  assume  that  matter  exists, 
and  they  show  its  various  properties  and  activities,  but  do  not 
consider  its  essential  nature. 

Cosmology,  therefore,  completes  natural  sciences.  It  endeavors 
to  answer  questions  which  they  do  not  answer.  Yet  it  evidently 
depends  on  them,  since  it  tries  to  explain  the  real  world.  Its  method 
is  chiefly  inductive,  starting  from  common  experience  or  from 
scientific  conclusions,  and  rising  to  higher  generalizations,  by 


424  COSMOLOGY 

the  use  especially  of  the  principles  of  causality  and  of  sufficient 
reason. 

3.  Division  of  Cosmology.  —  (a)  To  be  complete,  cosmology 
should  include  the  following  subjects:  (i)  Inorganic  beings; 
their  properties  and  nature.  (2)  Organic  beings;  life  in  general; 
plants,  and  animals.  (3)  Man;  his  activities  and  nature.  (4) 
Genesis  and  evolution  of  the  world,  both  of  the  individual  beings 
that  compose  it  and  of  the  universe  as  a  whole;  of  life  and  of  the 
various  forms  of  life;  of  man.  (5)  The  end  or  purpose  of  the 
world.  (6)  The  cosmos,  or  the  universe  considered  as  a  whole, 
and  the  relations  by  which  its  unity  is  realized. 

(b)  Of  these  questions,  however,  some,  like  the  question  of 
evolution,  belong  chiefly  to  natural  sciences,  and  cannot  receive 
a  full  treatment  here.  Others,  like  the  ultimate  efficient  or  final 
cause,  will  find  a  more  suitable  place  in  Theodicy.  The  questions 
referring  to  man,  owing  to  their  special  importance,  will  be  the 
special  object  of  the  next  treatise.  Hence  we  shall  have  the  four 
following  chapters:  (i)  Inorganic  beings.  (2)  Life.  (3)  Origin 
and  evolution.  (4)  The  Cosmos. 


CHAPTER  I 

INORGANIC  SUBSTANCES 

I.    PROPERTIES 

The  properties  of  inorganic  substances  may  be  reduced  to  two 
groups,  passive  and  active  properties,  or  extension  and  energy. 

1.  Extension.  —  (a)  All  material  substances  are  endowed  with 
extension.    Such,  at  any  rate,  is  the  constant  testimony  of  the 
senses  of  touch  and  vision.    Such  also  is  the  assumption  of  sciences, 
like  mechanics,  physics,  and  chemistry.    Psychology  itself  would 
be  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  perception  of  extension,  if  extension 
were  a  reality  neither  in  the  external  world  nor  in  the  organism. 
For  the  present  it  is  enough  to  note  that  the  phenomenon  of  ex- 
tension is  undeniable.    Whether  extension  be  real  or  not,  its 
appearance  at  least  will  have  to  be  explained. 

(jb)  However,  extension  cannot  constitute  the  whole  essence 
of  bodies,  as  Descartes  claimed.  He  based  this  conclusion  on  the 
fact  that,  even  if  all  qualities  —  temperature,  shape,  resistance, 
etc.  —  of  a  material  substance  be  changed,  its  extension  always 
remains.  But  (i)  when,  for  instance,  a  stone  is  broken  into  several 
parts,  every  part  has  the  same  essential  nature  as  the  whole, 
although  not  the  same  extension.  Large  or  small,  it  has  the  same 
essence.  (2)  When  we  want  to  distinguish  one  substance  from 
another,  we  never  do  so  by  its  extension  alone,  but  by  other  prop- 
erties, which,  therefore,  are  more  characteristic  than  extension. 

(c)  In  consequence  of  their  extension,  bodies  occupy  a  certain 
space,  have  a  multiplicity  of  parts  distributed  hi  this  space,  and 
although,  in  a  continuous  body,  such  parts  are  mutually  exclusive, 
they  exist  only  potentially  before  an  actual  division  takes  place. 
The  right  is  not  the  left,  but  actual  division  alone  makes  a 
determined  number  of  parts. 

2.  Activity.  —  Material  substances  act,  i.e.  are  endowed  with 

425 


426  COSMOLOGY 

forces  and  energies  by  means  of  which  they  cause  changes  in  other 
substances.  Thus  electricity,  heat,  etc.,  are  powerful  agents; 
the  forces  of  attraction,  resistance,  repulsion,  etc.,  are  constantly 
at  work.  Substances  act  upon  one  another  in  a  multitude  of  ways, 
and  man  strives  to  master  and  control  these  forces  so  as  to  make 
them  subservient  to  his  ends.  That  these  forces  are  real  is  evi- 
dent from  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  for  we  are  aware  of  the 
actions  —  heat,  resistance,  electricity,  etc.  —  of  external  bodies 
on  our  own,  and  from  the  testimony  of  external  senses  which  mani- 
fest the  interaction  of  all  material  substances.  These  forces  are 
distinct  from  extension,  and  physicists  commonly  oppose  matter 
to  energy. 

II.    CONSTITUTION 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 

i.  The  Problem. — The  present  problem  is  that  of  the  ulti- 
mate constitution  of  material  substances  in  general;  not  of  this 
or  that  special  substance,  but  of  all  bodies.  Chemistry  resolves 
certain  substances,  called  compounds,  into  others  which  can  be 
analyzed  no  further,  and  are  called  simple  substances  or  elements. 
Both  physics  and  chemistry  agree  in  admitting  that  material 
substances  are  not  continuous,  but  composed  of  distinct  molecules 
(smallest  units  of  compound),  and  atoms  (smallest  units  of  ele- 
ments). And  even  what  until  recently  was  looked  upon  as  the 
atom,  i.e.  the  indivisible  unit,  is  now,  owing  to  the  discovery  of 
radio-activity,  looked  upon  as  made  up  of  a  number  of  corpuscles 
or  electrons. 

Our  point  of  view  here  is  different  from  that  of  physical  and 
chemical  sciences.  The  element  is  a  specific  material  substance. 
The  atom  or  electron  is  also  a  physical  reality.  Hence  concerning 
both  the  element  and  the  atom  the  questions  may  be  raised:  What 
are  they?  What  is  their  nature?  These  questions  cannot  be 
answered  by  natural  sciences,  for  their  methods  will  always  lead 
them  to  something  physical,  and  what  we  want  to  know  is  whether, 
starting  from  physical  facts,  reason  cannot  proceed  farther  in  the 
mental  analysis  of  substances,  and  discover  principles  which, 
although  they  may  be  inseparable,  are  nevertheless  distinct. 


CONSTITUTION     OF     MATTER  427 

2.  Theories.  —  The  theories  may  be  reduced  to  three,  two  of 
which  advocate  one  single  principle,  whilst  the  other  advocates  a 
twofold  principle.  One  insists  on  quantitative  properties,  ad- 
mits extension,  and  denies  real  energies.  The  other  insists  on 
energy,  and  denies  real  extension.  The  third  tries  to  account  for 
extension,  energy,  and  specific  properties. 

(a)  As  a  philosophical   system,  atomism  not  only  admits  the 
physical  reality  of  atoms   endowed  with  extension,  but  asserts 
that  we  can  proceed  no  farther  in  our  rational  analysis.    The 
atom  is  the  ultimate    reality  of    matter.    Atomism   is  a  very 
ancient  theory,  advocated  in  Greece  by  Leucippus,  Democritus, 
and  Epicurus,  and  in  Rome  by  Lucretius.     These  philosophers 
hold  that  atoms  are  eternal,  infinite  in  number,  and  that  their 
fortuitous    meeting    formed    the    various    substances.     Gassendi 
modified  the  theory  on  minor  points  in  order  to  reconcile  it  with 
Christian  dogmas,  but  admitted  also  a  pure  atomism.    To-day, 
owing  to  the  discredit  into  which  metaphysical  investigation  has 
fallen,  there  is  a  tendency  to  stop  at  the  atoms  as  physical  units, 
without  pushing  the  analysis  any  further.     Atomism  may  attempt 
to  explain  everything  with  atoms  of  the  same  kind,  endowed  with 
various  motions  (mechanical  atomism),  or  it  may  admit  different 
kinds  of  atoms,  with  specific  properties  (dynamic  atomism). 

(b)  Dynamism  in  general  holds  that  matter  consists  essentially 
of  simple,  and  consequently  indivisible,  units  or  forces.    Extension 
is  not  real,  but  only  apparent.    The  first  vestiges  of  dynamism 
may  probably  be  found  in  the  school  of  Pythagoras.     It  is  only 
later,  however,  that  this  doctrine  is  held  explicitly  by  some  Arabian 
philosophers.     In  more  recent  times,  Leibniz  claims  that  matter 
is  composed  of  "monads,"  i.e.  of  simple  substances  without  parts 
or  extension,  all  dissimilar,  and  endowed  only  with  an  internal 
activity.     Matter   can   never   act   on   other  matter.     Boscovich 
reduces  matter  to  an  aggregate  of   homogeneous  points  without 
extension,  which,  by  their  different  numbers,  groupings,  distances, 
and  interaction,  produce  the  diversity  of  so-called  material  sub- 
stances.   To-day  many  scientists  advocate  an  electrotonic  theory 
of  matter  according  to  which  matter  is  ultimately  reduced  to  elec- 
trons which  have  no  real  extension.    Under  the  name  of  energetism, 


428  COSMOLOGY 

an  attempt  is  also  made  to  reduce  the  concept  of  matter  to  that 
of  energy. 

(c)  Hylomorphism,  or  physical  dualism,  holds  that  no  theory 
can  account  for  all  the  properties  of  matter  by  one  principle  only. 
It  admits  a  twofold  principle,  matter,  or  rather  primary  matter 
(vXr;),  and  form  (pop<i>iq).  This  applies  to  all  substances,  even 
to  the  "elements"  of  chemistry,  and  the  "atoms"  of  physics  and 
chemistry.  Matter  is  the  principle  of  quantity,  but  is  of  itself 
indetermined,  the  same  in  all  substances,  and  incapable  of  exist- 
ence apart  from  the  form.  The  form  is  the  specific  or  determining 
principle,  the  source  of  all  determinations.  The  union  of  both 
principles,  each  of  which  is  incomplete  in  itself  and  inseparable  from 
the  other,  gives  the  complete  specific  material  substance.  The 
two  always  go  together,  and  cannot  be  perceived  separately  by 
the  senses.  What  we  call  matter  in  the  usual  sense  is  always 
primary  matter  together  with  the  substantial  form  with  which  it 
is  intimately  united.  This  theory  was  proposed  by  Aristotle. 
It  was  the  common  doctrine  of  the  scholastics  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  after  which  it  was  almost  forgotten  until  recently. 

II.    DISCUSSION  OF  THE   SYSTEMS 

i.  Atomism  has  the  general  defect  of  not  answering  the  question 
proposed.  To  say  that  what  we  call  matter,  and  what  appears  to 
the  senses  as  one  material  substance,  is  in  reality  composed  of  a 
multitude  of  smaller  bodies  leaves  the  problem  without  solution, 
for  this  problem  refers  to  the  smallest  body  or  atom  as  well  as  to 
the  largest.  Physical  division  cannot  here  substitute  itself  for 
reasoning.  The  atom  is  one  and  supposedly  indivisible.  Yet, 
however  small  it  may  be,  it  occupies  space,  has  different  parts, 
and  a  point  on  its  surface  is  not  the  same  as  another  point.  Atoms 
are  real,  but  their  reality  must  be  explained. 

(a)  If  different  forces  and  properties  are  admitted,  one  may 
ask:   Where  do  these  come  from?    What  is  their  ultimate  source? 
If  the  atoms  are  of  different  size,  why  are  all  equally  indivisible? 

(b)  Mechanical  atomism  rejects  all  specific  properties,  admits 
that  atoms  are  all  of  the  same  nature,  and  tries  to  explain  all  the 
facts  by  their  different  motions.    But  it  fails  in  this  attempt.    To 


CONSTITUTION    OF    MATTER  429 

mention  only  a  few  facts:  (i)  Chemical  affinity,  in  virtue  of 
which  certain  elements  combine  only  with  certain  others,  and 
always  in  definite  proportions,  supposes  laws  which  the  atoms 
invariably  obey,  and  which  their  motions  alone  cannot  account 
for.  (2)  Whatever  explanation  be  given  of  the  difference  between 
a  chemical  mixture  and  a  chemical  compound,  this  difference 
implies  in  the  elements  the  presence  of  specific  properties  which 
do  not  manifest  themselves  in  a  simple  mixture,  but  only  in  a  com- 
bination. If  the  elements  have  been  completely  altered  in  the 
compound,  how  do  they  always  reappear  in  the  analysis?  If 
they  have  not  been  altered,  where  do  the  new  properties  come  from? 
(3)  Affinity,  cohesion,  molecular  and  molar  attraction,  cannot 
be  explained  satisfactorily  by  mechanism.  They  suppose  an 
internal  principle  of  tendency.  (4)  In  a  word,  chemical  and 
physical  laws  are  not  reducible  to  mere  mechanical  movements. 
(5)  Even  if  they  were,  mechanism  would  still  be  inadequate,  for 
motion  itself  cannot  be  communicated  without  supposing  intrinsic 
forces.  The  communication  of  a  movement  supposes  in  the  mobile 
an  aptitude  and  power  which  is  actualized  by  the  impulsion  of 
the  motor.  When  the  actual  impact  of  the  two  has  taken  place, 
and  the  mobile  keeps  on  moving,  its  motion  cannot  actually  come 
from  the  motor,  with  which  it  is  no  longer  in  communication.  It 
is  therefore  the  unfolding  of  an  intrinsic  energy.  (6)  In  general, 
as  will  be  explained  later,  there  is  in  every  substance  an  internal 
principle  of  tendency.  (Cf.  pp.  452,  455.) 

2.  Dynamism.  —  (a)  Dynamism  cannot  explain  real  exten- 
sion. It  is  clear  that  a  multitude  of  "naughts"  of  extension  put 
together  can  never  give  a  positive  quantity.  If  points  without 
extension  are  supposed  to  touch  one  another,  all  necessarily  coin- 
cide in  the  same  point.  If  they  are  supposed  to  be  at  a  distance 
from  one  another,  it  becomes  necessary  to  admit  an  actio  in  distans, 
the  possibility  of  which  is  generally  denied  by  physicists.  More- 
over, this  would  not  give  real,  but  only  apparent,  extension,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  this  appearance  or  illusion  of  extension, 
if  there  is  no  extension  anywhere,  not  even  in  the  sense-organs. 

(b)  It  is  true  that  matter  does  not  manifest  itself  to  the  senses 
except  through  its  activities  (radiations,  vibrations,  resistance, 


430  COSMOLOGY 

heat,  etc.),  but  it  does  not  follow  that  real  extension  is  to  be  denied. 
Without  matter  it  is  difficult  to  understand  energy,  for  in  this 
case,  what  is  it  that  moves,  rotates,  vibrates? 

(c)  The  recent  discoveries  in  radio-activity  are  not  given  the 
same  interpretation  by  all.  Some  deny,  while  others  admit, 
that  the  electron  has  extension,  and  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  answer  this  question  from  the  physical  standpoint. 

3.  Hylomorphism.  —  (a)  We  distinguish  the  matter  and  form 
—  i.e.  the  materials  and  shape  —  of  any  object,  e.g.  of  a  marble 
statue.  We  may  go  farther,  and  ask  what  the  substance  which 
we  call  marble  is  itself  composed  of.  We  shall  find  that  it  is 
composed  of  carbon,  calcium,  oxygen,  etc.  These  may  be  vari- 
ously combined  with  other  elements  so  as  to  form  new  compounds, 
with  properties  different  from  those  of  the  former  compound,  and 
from  those  of  the  component  elements  themselves.  The  element  has 
in  itself  a  principle  which  may  indifferently  be  this  or  that  spe- 
cific substance,  and  which  is  called  "primary  matter"  as  opposed 
to  " secondary  matter"  (marble  or  any  other  substance).  That 
by  which  it  is  determined  as  marble,  and  not  anything  else,  is 
the  "substantial  form,"  as  opposed  to  "accidental  forms,"  i.e. 
the  various  determinations  like  shape  and  physical  properties, 
which  the  marble  may  receive. 

Thus  physical  matter  is  composed  of  a  deeper  reality,  indeter- 
mined,  and  capable  of  being  indifferently  one  substance  or  another 
(primary  matter),  and  of  a  determining  principle  by  which  it  is 
a  special  kind  of  substance  (substantial  form).  The  many  changes 
which  the  same  elements  undergo  in  forming  different  compounds 
lead  to  the  admission  of  a  twofold  principle.  The  element  itself 
always  has  a  principle  of  indetermination,  and  a  determining 
principle;  a  principle  common  to  all  substances,  and  a  specific  prin- 
ciple which  differentiates  one  substance  from  another;  a  principle 
of  passivity  capable  of  receiving  successively  different  modifica- 
tions, and  a  principle  which  makes  it  to  be  what  it  is. 

(b)  It  is  true  that,  understood  in  this  way,  matter  and  form 
are  only  abstractions.  They  do  not  exist  separately  as  physical 
realities,  and  cannot  be  perceived  by  the  senses.  But,  like  all 
abstractions,  they  are  not  purely  mental  products;  they  are 


CONSTITUTION     OF     MATTER  431 

realities  that  compose  the  physical  substance  and  cannot  exist 
apart  from  each  other. 

In  fact,  even  atomism  and  dynamism  are  obliged  to  admit  that 
homogeneous  units,  by  their  movements,  groupings,  and  activities, 
form  substances  that  are  widely  different  in  their  properties.  Hence 
they  must  admit  some  kind  of  a  form  or  law  according  to  which 
these  differentiations  take  .place.  Should  various  substances 
ultimately  consist  of  only  one  kind  of  elements,  that  is,  should  it 
be  ascertained  that  the  elements  of  chemistry  are  reducible  to 
identical  units  like  the  electrons,  it  would  still  be  necessary  to 
explain  how  these  ultimate  identical  materials  are  what  they  are, 
and  how  they  unite  to  form  the  various  substances.  They  always 
obey  certain  laws  which  indicate  a  true  determination  or  formal 
principle.  Hence  this  would  always  lead  to  a  dualism  of  the 
indetermined  and  the  determinant,  of  the  common  and  the  specific, 
of  a  substratum  and  its  superstructure,  of  matter  and  form. 


CHAPTER  II 
LIVING  BEINGS 
I.    THE  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  LIFE 

I.  IN  GENERAL 

i.  Common  Idea  of  Life.  —  (a)  A  distinction  is  made  by  all 
men  between  certain  beings  —  animals  and  plants  —  which  are 
called  living,  and  certain  others  which  are  called  lifeless.  It  may 
not  always  be  possible  to  indicate  which  beings  have  life,  and 
which  are  deprived  of  it  —  especially  in  the  case  of  micro-organ- 
isms where  the  biologist  himself  is  not  always  able  to  make  this 
distinction  with  certainty  —  yet  a  sharp  distinction  is  always 
recognized  between  living  and  dead,  and  between  organic  and 
inorganic  matter. 

(b)  The  common  basis  of  this  distinction  is  the  presence  or  the 
absence  of  movements  or  changes  which  originate  within  the  being, 
that  is,  the  principle  or  cause  of  which  is  not,  or  at  least  does  not 
seem  to  be,  external.  Thus  an  animal  is  distinguished  from  an 
automaton  because  the  latter  must  be  pushed  or  "wound  up." 
Were  not  this  necessary  condition  known,  the  automaton  would 
easily  be  mistaken,  e.g.  by  the  child  or  ignorant  man,  for  a  living 
being.  An  animal  or  a  man  ceases  to  live  when  he  ceases  to  move, 
when  the  respiratory  process  stops,  when  the  heart  ceases  to  beat, 
etc.  A  plant  ceases  to  live  when  the  sap  no  longer  circulates, 
when  ordinary  changes  in  the  growth,  foliage,  etc.,  no  longer  take 
place.  Many  metaphorical  expressions  are  derived  from  this  fact. 
We  speak  of  a  living  fountain  as  opposed  to  stagnant  water;  we 
say  of  a  man,  animal,  or  plant  that  they  are  full  of  life  when  they 
change  rapidly.  (Compare  such  expressions  as  "lively  imagina- 
tion," "living  faith,"  "live  wire,"  "live  coal,"  "the  company  was 
alive,"  etc.) 

To  live,  therefore,  is  to  move,  and  to  undergo  changes  due  to  an 

432 


CHARACTERISTICS    OF    LIFE  433 

internal  principle,  although  an  external  stimulus  may  be  present, 
as  in  the  case  of  a  rabbit  running  away  from  a  dog.  In  the  same 
circumstances,  lifeless  matter  would  not  move  or  change.  It 
must  be  pushed  or  acted  upon  by  some  mechanical  force. 

(c)  The  changes  that  are  most  commonly  taken  as  signs  of  life 
are  local  movements  of  the  whole  being,  or  of  some  of  its  parts 
(heart,  head,  arms,  etc.);  the  functions  of  nutrition  and  growth, 
and  various  modifications  in  the  general  appearance  (foliage, 
flowers,  fruits,  etc.);  a  certain  shape,  size,  and  organization; 
and  consciousness,  which  some  of  these  changes  manifest. 

2.  Scientific  Conception  of  Life.  —  The  following  points  sum- 
marize the  differences  which  biological  science  observes  between 
living  and  inorganic  substances. 

(a)  Chemical   composition.    Evidently  living  matter   as    such 
cannot  be  analyzed,  since  the  process  of  analysis  deprives  it  of 
life.     The  analysis  of  an  organism  yields  primarily  the  following 
elements:  carbon,  oxygen,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  sulphur,  and  phos- 
phorus.   In  living  beings,  the  elements  unite  to  form  proteids, 
and  these  compounds  are  always  highly  unstable  and  constantly 
changing.    A  mere  glance  at  the  formulae  of  organic  and  of  in- 
organic chemistry  shows  how  much  more  complex  the  former  are 
than  the  latter,  and  how  many  more  atoms  are  required. 

(b)  Shape  and  structure,     (i)   Whereas  the  organism  always 
has  a  special  determined  shape  according  to  its  kind,  the  mineral 
has  no  determined  shape,  except  in  crystals.    The  shape  of  crystals 
is  always  angular;    angles  are  generally  excluded  from  the  shape 
of  the  whole  organism  and  of  its  elementary  structures.    The 
outlines,  both  of  the  organism  and  of  its  parts,  are  generally  curve 
lines.     (2)  The  mineral  is  homogeneous;   the  organism  is  differ- 
entiated.   This  is  clear  for  higher  organisms,  in  which  a  cross 
section  will  reveal  a  multitude  of  different  tissues.   It  is  true  of  the 
lowest  also,  for  the  cell,  which  constitutes  the  whole  of  unicellular 
organisms,  and  which  is  the  last  unit  in  multicellular  organisms, 
is  itself  already  heterogeneous  and  very  complex  in  its  structure. 
Its  natural  shape  is  spheroidal,  and   it  possesses   the  essential 
properties  of  nutrition,  growth,  multiplication,  irritability,  etc. 

(c)  Origin.    Life  cannot  be  produced  in  the  laboratory.    The 

29 


434  COSMOLOGY 

rule  is  general:  "Omne  vivens  ex  vivo,"  or  "Omnis  cellula  ex 
cellula."  A  crystal  is  but  a  special  regular  arrangement  of  a 
substance  under  certain  conditions.  -1 

(d)  Nutrition,  growth,  duration,  (i)  Living  substances  alone 
have  the  power  of  assimilation,  i.e.  they  manufacture  proteids  out 
of  inorganic  matter,  and  elaborate  foreign  substances  which  they 
incorporate  into  their  own.  (2)  Minerals  are  stable,  and  inorganic 
matter  always  tends  to  the  most  stable  equilibrium.  Living 
matter  changes  constantly.  A  continual  decay  and  a  continual 
repair  take  place  within  it.  Living  matter  returns  to  the  inorganic 
world,  and,  from  the  inorganic  world,  new  living  substances  are 
formed.  (3)  The  growth  of  minerals  is  not  limited  to  any  size 
or  shape.  Living  matter  has  a  maximum  for  every  species,  and 
is  always  shaped  according  to  a  specific  type.  (4)  The  growth  of 
minerals  —  crystals  included  —  takes  place  by  accretion,  i.e. 
juxtaposition  of  particles;  that  of  living  beings  takes  place  by 
intussusception,  i.e.  assimilation.  (5)  Inorganic  substances,  of 
themselves,  have  no  limited  or  definite  duration-,  they  change 
only  when  they  are  acted  upon  by  external  agents.  In  living  sub- 
stances, the  period  of  growth  and  of  life  itself  is  subject  to  laws 
varying  with  the  different  species. 

3.  Philosophical  Notion  of  Life.  —  If  we  now  try  to  find  out  the 
essential  characteristics  of  living  beings,  all  the  special  properties 
of  living  beings  have  the  following  points  in  common,  (i)  They 
imply  changes  that  are  constant  and  uninterrupted,  owing  to  the 
unstable  equilibrium  of  living  matter.  This  is  the  fundamental 
characteristic  of  nutrition  which  is  the  first  vital  function.  (2) 
They  are  immanent,  i.e.  they  modify  and  perfect  primarily  the 
living  substance  itself.  There  are  many  transitive  activities,  but 
the  final  term  of  these  is  within  the  organism  itself.  Inorganic 
substances,  on  the  contrary,  (i)  tend  to  the  most  stable  combina- 
tion and  equilibrium;  (2)  act  only  on  one  another.  They  do  not 
modify  or  perfect  themselves,  but  other  substances. 

II.  MANIFESTATIONS  OF  LIFE 

i.  Hylozoism  (ZXrj,  matter,  and  £o>ij,  life)  asserts  that  matter  is 
essentially  living,  and  hence  that  even  so-called  inorganic  matter 


CHARACTERISTICS     OF     LIFE  435 

possesses  a  very  low  degree  of  life.  This  name  is  sometimes  re- 
stricted to  the  system  according  to  which,  not  only  some  degree  of 
life,  but  also  some  degree,  of  consciousness,  must  be  attributed  to 
all  forms  of  matter.  Proposed  in  various  forms  by  ancient  philoso- 
phers, this  view  has  been  advocated  recently  under  various  names 
like  the  German  "  Allbeseelung  "  (all-animation),  or  Panpsychism. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  science,  this  assertion  is  evidently 
gratuitous,  and  even  contrary  to  facts.  It  is  advocated  on  a  priori 
grounds,  such  as  monism,  or  the  assumed  identity  of  all  things; 
evolution,  or  the  assumed  necessity  for  life  and  consciousness  to 
have  originated  from  lower  forms  of  matter;  and  the  endeavor 
to  exclude  every  intervention  of  God.  The  main  differences 
pointed  out  above  between  living  and  non-living  substances  show 
their  irreducibility  to  each  other. 

2.  Plants  and  Animals.  —  Living  beings  may  be  divided, 
according  to  their  complexity,  into  unicellular  and  multicellular; 
according  to  their  size,  into  visible  and  miscroscopic.  But  the 
main  division,  according  to  their  functions,  is  into  plants,  animals, 
and  men.  The  reason  for  assigning  to  man  a  special  place  will  be 
given  in  rational  psychology.  There  are  many  differences  between 
plants  and  animals.  The  main  difference,  however,  consists  in 
the  absence  or  the  presence  of  consciousness.  Animals,  at  least  the 
higher  forms  of  animals,  give  unmistakable  signs  of  consciousness. 
They  have  sense-organs,  and  respond  to  stimuli  in  the  same  way 
as  man.  By  analogy,  we  know  that  they  experience  sensations, 
that  they  have  imagination,  memory,  feeling,  and  instinct.  Other- 
wise their  behavior  is  unexplainable.  Plants,  on  the  contrary, 
give  no  signs  of  consciousness.  They  have  no  nervous  system, 
with  which  consciousness  is  always  connected  in  animals,  and 
there  is  no  reason  whatsoever  to  attribute  to  them  what  they  do 
not  manifest.  Sometimes,  it  is  true,  the  scientist  may  not  be 
certain  whether  a  living  being  (especially  among  microbes)  is  a 
plant  or  an  animal,  but  this  can  in  no  way  be  given  as  an  objection 
against  the  distinction  of  both  kingdoms.  The  degrees  of  conscious- 
ness vary  greatly  in  animals,  but  the  question  may  always  be  asked, 
if  not  answered:  Is  consciousness  present?  Then  we  have  an 
animal.  Is  consciousness  absent?  Then  we  have  a  plant. 


436  COSMOLOGY 

II.    NATURE  OF  THE  LIVING  BEING 
I.  THEORIES 

Sometimes  a  distinction  is  made  between  living  beings  that  are 
endowed  with  consciousness  and  those  that  are  deprived  of  it, 
As  consciousness  has  characteristics  irreducible  to  those  of  matter, 
it  must  also  require  a  distinct  principle.  This  conclusion  seems 
correct,  but,  for  the  present,  we  limit  ourselves  to  the  lowest  degree 
of  life,  vegetative  life,  the  main  manifestations  of  which  have  been 
described  above. 

(a)  Some  refuse  to  admit  the  existence  of  a  special  principle 
of  life.    Life  is  explained  adequately  by  the  general  properties  of 
matter,  either  by  its  mechanical  motions,  or  by  its  physical  and 
chemical  properties,  which  manifest  themselves  in  various  ways 
according  to  the  adaptation  of  the  various  organs.    But  the  point 
on  which  all  agree  is  that  life  results  simply  from  the  greater  com- 
plexity of  matter  in  living  beings,  and  from  the  natural  play  of 
its  mechanical,  physical,  and  chemical  energies. 

(b)  Others  admit  that  special  forces  are  necessary  to  explain 
life.    These  vital  forces  are  distinct  from,  irreducible  and  fre- 
quently antagonistic  to,  the  ordinary  properties  of  matter.    As 
inorganic  forces  rather  tend  to  destroy  life,  vital  forces  must 
constantly  resist  them.     Some  look  upon  this  special  energy  as  a 
spiritual,  intelligent,  and  directive  force  (Stahl);    others,  as  in- 
herent in  matter,  but  yet  superadded  to  its  ordinary  properties 
(vitalism).    All  agree  that  organized  matter  and  the  vital  principle 
are  two  distinct  realities,  irreducible  to  each  other. 

(c)  Others  finally  take  a  middle  course.    Life  is  not  merely  the 
result  of  mechanical  forces;  nor  does  it  require  any  special  forces. 
The  living  substance  is  composed,  like  every  other  material  being, 
of  a  twofold  principle,  matter  and  form.    The  form,  or  vital  prin- 
ciple, is  united  with  matter,  and,  together  with  it,  constitutes  only 
one  complete  living  substance. 

II.  DISCUSSION 

i.  Physical  Energies  in  Living  Beings.  —  Not  only  does  life 
depend  on  the  various  energies  of  matter,  but  there  seems  to  be  no 


NATURE     OF    LIVING    BEINGS  437 

necessity  for  admitting  in  the  organism  the  presence  of  any  energies 
distinct  from  ordinary  physical  energies,  still  less  for  admitting  ener- 
gies antagonistic  to  these.  There  is  no  real  opposition  or  struggle 
between  vital  phenomena  and  physico-chemical  phenomena.  On 
the  contrary,  we  see  the  physical  and  chemical  properties  of  matter 
utilized  by  the  living  substance,  and  working  together  to  main- 
tain life.  In  every  vital  process,  the  chemical  laws  of  affinity, 
attraction,  cohesion,  combination,  etc.,  and  the  physical  laws 
concerning  heat,  gravity,  osmosis,  capillarity,  levers,  etc.,  are 
obeyed,  and  numberless  applications  of  them  could  be  made  to 
the  processes  of  digestion,  assimilation,  respiration,  circulation, 
etc.  As  biology  proceeds  farther  in  its  explanation  of  vital  proc- 
esses, it  succeeds  better  in  showing  that  these  processes  presuppose 
no  forces  distinct  from  the  ordinary  properties  of  matter.  The 
general  laws  of  the  conservation  of  matter  and  of  the  conservation 
of  energy  seem  to  hold  in  the  organic  as  well  as  in  the  inorganic 
.world.  Nothing  is  created;  nothing  annihilated.  In  the  living 
substance,  and  in  the  laboratory,  changes  obey  the  same  laws  of 
equivalence,  and  are  subject  to  the  same  conditions.  The  dis- 
tinctive property  of  life,  therefore,  is  not  the  presence  of  special 
forces,  but  the  special  mode  according  to  which  these  converge  to 
the  same  end  which  is  the  life  of  the  individual. 

2.  Their  Insufficiency.  —  (a)  Life  is  not  explained  by  me- 
chanical, physical,  and  chemical  energies  alone.  Even  in  the 
lowest  organism,  they  are  many  and  complex;  and  yet  all  serve 
the  same  purpose,  the  life  of  the  organism.  It  is  precisely  this 
harmony  and  this  unity  of  direction  which  suppose  a  directive 
principle.  How,  for  instance,  do  these  forces  work  together  so 
as  to  form  a  highly  differentiated  organism,  with  very  complex 
parts  (eye,  ear,  digestive  apparatus,  etc.),  out  of  one  single  primi- 
tive cell  with  which  all  organisms  begin?  How  are  the  physical 
materials  elaborated  so  as  to  furnish  every  organ  with  the  elements 
it  needs?  This  requires  a  guiding  principle;  a  principle  of  unity, 
presiding  over  the  functions  of  the  whole  organism;  and  a  prin- 
ciple of  formation,  presiding  over  the  development  of  the  organism 
itself.  And  here  it  would  serve  no  purpose  to  appeal  to  the  elabo- 
ration of  organic  substances  in  the  laboratory.  Organic  they  may 


438  COSMOLOGY 

be  called,  but  they  are  not  living,  and  they  lack  the  essential 
principle  of  life. 

(b)  This  principle  of  unity,  directing  and  subordinating  the 
various  organs  and  functions,  is  not  distinct  from  the  living  being 
itself.  It  is  an  internal  principle,  tending  to  the  creation  and 
preservation  of  the  organism.  The  living  being  is  one,  but,  like 
the  inorganic  being,  it  is  composed  of  a  twofold  principle,  matter 
and  form.  The  substantial  form,  principle  of  determination,  unity 
and  activity,  is,  in  the  living  being,  the  "soul,"  as  Aristotle  called 
it,  i.e.  the  vital  or  animating  principle.  It  is  not  something  ex- 
trinsic to  living  matter,  guiding  it  as  the  pilot  steers  his  vessel, 
but  it  is  an  intrinsic  determining  principle  of  matter,  which  together 
with  it  forms  one  complete  liwng  substance.  (Cf.  pp.  428,  430.) 


CHAPTER  III 
ORIGIN  AND  EVOLUTION 

I.    THE  QUESTION  STATED 

One  of  the  most  striking  tendencies  of  modern  science  and 
philosophy  is  to  take  a  dynamic  and  genetic  rather  than  a  static 
and  descriptive  view  of  things.  Attention  is  given  to  the  questions: 
What  can  a  thing  do?  How  does  it  come  to  be  what  it  is?  Things 
are  looked  upon  as  moving,  changing,  becoming.  The  passage 
from  the  simple  to  the  complex  is  followed  closely.  This  tendency 
manifests  itself,  for  instance,  in  biology,  by  the  questions  concern- 
ing the  origin  of  life  and  of  the  different  forms  of  life ;  in  astronomy 
and  cosmology,  by  the  questions  of  the  formation  of  the  earth  and 
the  universe;  in  the  various  branches  of  psychology,  by  the  study 
of  mental  development,  and  the  genesis  of  various  mental  mani- 
festations. This  tendency  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  continues  to  manifest  itself  in  the 
twentieth. 

i.  The  Problems.  —  (a)  The  problems  of  the  origin  and 
development  of  the  universe  are  partly  scientific  and  partly  philo- 
sophical. Both  contributions  may  be  completed  by  information 
from  a  higher  source,  namely,  divine  revelation,  which  we  have 
not  to  deal  with  here,  (i)  Science  records  many  changes.  It 
also  examines  the  origin,  natural  or  artificial,  of  many  things, 
inorganic  and  organic,  and  follows  their  development.  In  many 
cases  it  can  form,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  test  hypotheses.  (2) 
Science  always  presupposes  the  existence  of  matter  and  its  energies. 
The  very  first  origin  of  things  belongs  to  philosophical  research. 

(b)  The  problem  may  refer  to  (i)  the  world  as  a  whole;  (2) 
the  earth  as  a  whole,  its  origin  and  formation;  (3)  life  on  the  earth, 
either  the  individual  living  beings,  or  the  first  origin  of  life,  or  the 
various  differentiated  forms  of  life  as  they  exist  to-day. 

439 


440  COSMOLOGY 

(c)  It  will  be  useful  here  to  recall  a  few  methodological  remarks, 
(i)  Many  arguments  being  analogical,  it  is  important  that  the 
analogy  should  not  be  carried  farther  than  the  facts  justify.  (2) 
All  aspects  of  the  beings  under  consideration  must  be  examined. 
(3)  Care  must  be  taken  to  distinguish  the  facts  from  the  interpre- 
tation which  they  may  receive  (e.g.  the  fact  of  the  successive 
appearance  of  the  forms  of  life  from  its  interpretation  as  filial 
descendance).  This  is  necessary  especially  when  an  author  is 
known  to  have  preconceived  ideas.  (4)  Ascertained  conclusions 
of  all  sciences  must  be  kept  in  mind.  (5)  The  problems,  and  chiefly 
the  theories,  are  still  young,  and  many  are  still  under  discussion. 
Enthusiasm  is  frequently  a  characteristic  of  youth;  hence  rash 
assertions  must  be  guarded  against. 

2.  Meaning  of  Evolution.  —  It  is  important  at  the  outset  to 
define  the  term  "evolution"  (e-volvere,  to  unfold),  which  is  so 
frequently  met  with,  and  which  is  applied  to  a  great  number  of 
different  things. 

(a)  Formerly  it  was  used  in  the  sense  of  "  pref ormation "  to 
mean  the  theory  according  to  which  the  living  germ  already  con- 
tains, in  miniature  proportions,  all  the  organs  of  the  fully  developed 
individual.    This  is  opposed  to  the  view  now  scientifically  estab- 
lished of  "epigenesis,"  according  to  which  the  organs  become 
differentiated  little  by  little  out  of  a  primitive  cell.    This  meaning 
—  pref  ormation  — of  evolution  is  universally  abandoned  to-day. 

(b)  At  present  evolution  refers  not  so  much  to  the  individual  as 
to  a  successive  group  of  individual  substances  or  processes,  the 
complexity  and  differentiation  of  which  go  on  increasing  from  the 
first  to  the  last.    It  implies  succession,  becoming,  filiation,  descent. 
Thus  we  have  cosmic  evolution,  organic  evolution,  evolution  of 
morality,  of  religion,  etc. 

(c)  Sometimes,  it  is  used  for  "monism,"  i.e.  for  the  theory  of  the 
substantial  unity  of  all  things,  deriving  life  from  inorganic  matter, 
and  man  from  lower  forms  of  life,  and  rejecting  any  intervention 
at  any  stage,  of  a  supramundane  agency,  both  as  the  first  origin 
and  cause  of  the  world,  and  as  a  factor  in  its  evolution. 

(d)  Frequently  it  is  applied  more  particularly  to  organic  evo- 
lution.    In  this  sense,  it  is  synonymous   with  "  transf ormism " 


THE     INORGANIC     WORLD  441 

or  the  " theory  of  descent."  "Evolution"  refers  to  the  race 
(phylogenesis),  whereas  "development"  applies  to  the  individual 
(ontogenesis). 

(e)  Hence  evolution  is  not,  as  sometimes  popularly  misunder- 
stood, the  theory  according  to  which  "man  originated  from  a 
monkey."  Nor  is  it  the  same  as  atheism,  for  God  may  be  admitted 
as  the  first  cause  of  the  existence  of  beings,  and  of  their  tendency 
to  evolve.  Nor  is  it  the  same  as  Darwinism,  which  is  only  one  of 
the  theories  concerning  the  mode  of  evolution.  Nor,  finally,  is 
it  the  same  as  universal  progress;  in  some  cases  evolution  may  be 
regressive. 

II.    THE  INORGANIC  WORLD 

We  shall  merely  mention  the  question  of  the  evolution  of 
the  inorganic  world,  which  belongs  to  natural  sciences  (physics, 
chemistry,  geology,  astronomy).  Our  earth  was  at  one  time 
an  incandescent  mass  which,  together  with  the  other  planets, 
was  detached  from  the  original  matter  forming  the  solar  sys- 
tem, and  the  crust  of  which  little  by  little  cooled  off  and  became 
solid.  As  to  the  solar  system,  its  matter  was  originally  spread 
throughout  the  space  it  now  occupies.  It  had  a  very  low  den- 
sity, and  as  yet  formed  no  special  bodies.  It  was  endowed  with 
a  movement  of  rotation,  and  parts  of  it  separated,  forming  groups 
independent  to  some  extent,  and  yet  in  constant  relation  with  the 
others  (movement ,  gravitation ,  etc.) .  Little  by  little  these  separate 
groups  cooled  off  and  formed  solid  bodies,  while  the  central  por- 
tion, the  sun,  is  still  incandescent.  This  nebular  hypothesis, 
which,  in  its  essentials,  is  commonly  received,  is  extended  to  all 
stars,  which  are  so  many  suns.  This  theory  leaves  without  explana- 
tion the  first  origin  of  matter,  of  the  laws  by  which  it  is  governed, 
and  of  its  first  rotary  motion.  We  pass  now  to  the  origin  of  living 
beings  on  the  earth. 

III.    THE  ORGANIC  WORLD 

Two  questions  must  be  distinguished:  the  origin  of  life  itself, 
and  the  origin  of  its  various  forms. 


442  COSMOLOGY 

I.  THE  ORIGIN  OF  LIFE 

1.  At  Present.  —  (a)  Common  experience  shows  that  at  least 
the  higher  organisms  invariably  come  from  parents  of  the  same 
species,  but  it  does  not  extend  to  all  forms  of  life  (parasites,  insects, 
infusoria,  etc.).    On  the  other  hand,  science  teaches  that  many 
organic  products  can  be  manufactured  in  the  chemical  laboratory, 
and  that  the  analysis  of  protoplasm  yields  only  a  few  inorganic 
elements.     Hence  the  questions:    Does  life  always  originate  from 
life?    Does  a  living  being  always  originate  from  a  living  being  of 
the  same  species,  or  can  parasites,  for  instance,  originate  from  a 
different  organism?     Can  dead  matter  give  rise  to  inferior  forms 
of  life? 

(6)  In  antiquity  and  in  the  Middle  Ages,  spontaneous  genera- 
tion and  generation  from  dead  matter  were  commonly  accepted  as 
facts.  Recipes  were  given  to  generate  such  highly  organized  beings 
as  mice,  birds,  snakes,  etc.  In  1668,  Redi  of  Florence  showed 
that  meat,  if  exposed  to  the  air,  is  soon  full  of  maggots,  but  that, 
if  it  is  screened,  no  maggots  are  produced.  The  reason  is  that 
their  germs  have  been  excluded.  Little  by  little  the  production  of 
other  animals,  such  as  parasites  and  others,  was  also  traced  back 
to  germs.  The  discovery  of  bacteria  revived  the  problem,  which, 
however,  was  definitely  solved  by  Pasteur  (about  1860),  who  showed 
that,  when  germs  were  effectively  excluded,  no  life  appeared. 

(c)  Hence  the  law  is  accepted  to-day:  "Omne  vivens  ex  vivo," 
and  to  this  rule  no  exception  is  known.  Notwithstanding  all 
efforts,  no  transitional  form  from  the  inorganic  to  the  organic 
world  has  ever  been  found.  The  modes  according  to  which  genera- 
tion takes  place  are  different  according  to  the  diversity  of  organisms, 
but  "biogenesis,"  or  the  origin  of  every  living  organism  from  a 
living  organism  of  the  same  kind,  is  the  universal  law.  There 
is  no  "spontaneous  generation." 

2.  First  Origin  of  Life. — How  far  can  we  go  back  in  this  regres- 
sive process,  i.e.  how  far  can  we  trace  back  the  ascending  series  of 
ancestors?     Somewhere  we  must  find  an  absolute  beginning,  for 
we  know  that  life  did  not  always  exist  on  the  earth,  since  at  one 
time  the  earth  was  incandescent,  and  therefore  unfit  for  life  and  for 


EVOLUTION    IN    ORGANIC    WORLD        443 

the  preservation  of  any  germs  of  life.  To  say,  with  Lord  Kelvin, 
that  germs  were  brought  down  from  stars  or  planets  through  cosmic 
dust  or  aerolites,  is  no  solution.  How  did  life  originate  there? 

Some  evolutionistic  monists,  however,  claim  that  what  does  not 
take  place  to-day,  namely,  spontaneous  generation,  must  have 
taken  place  in  the  past.  Otherwise,  how  could  life  have  arisen? 
And  Haeckel  describes  at  length  the  origin  and  evolution  of  the 
"moneron"  or  primitive  form  of  life.  This  assertion  is  anti- 
scientific,  and  rests  on  the  preconception  that  there  is  no  personal 
God,  that  the  world  is  not  His  work,  and  that  spontaneous  genera- 
tion is  the  only  possible  way  of  accounting  for  the  existence  of  life. 
As  far  as  science  goes,  the  origin  of  life  is  a  mystery.  Even  should 
life  ever  come  to  be  produced  artificially,  only  a  minor  advantage 
would  be  gained  by  monism,  for  the  existence  of  a  Creator  does 
not  hinge  on  this  point. 

II.  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  VARIOUS  FORMS  OF  LIFE 

i.  The  Problem.  —  (a)  That  the  forms  of  life  are  manifold 
is  evident,  (i)  Plants  and  animals  constitute  two  distinct  king- 
doms, and  within  each  kingdom  the  greatest  diversity  is  observed 
as  to  size,  shape,  organization,  etc.  (2)  A  still  greater  diversity  is 
observed  if  the  present  is  compared  with  the  past.  The  science 
of  paleontology,  which  deals  with  fossil  remains  of  organisms, 
shows  that  the  species  actually  existing  did  not  always  exist,  and 
that  many  species  now  extinct  have  succeeded  one  another  in  the 
past.  (3)  Although  living  organisms  are  generated  by  organisms 
of  the  same  kind,  the  offspring  differs  more  or  less  from  the  parents, 
and  certain  features  are  transmitted  by  heredity.  Gardeners  and 
breeders  constantly  use  this  fact  to  improve  races  and  create  new 
varieties.  Hence  the  questions:  How  did  successive  species 
arise?  How  did  life  come  to  be  differentiated  as  it  is  to-day? 
Are  successive  species  new  creations  (theory  of  the  fixity,  con- 
stancy, or  immutability  of  species),  or  are  they,  not  only  the 
successors,  but  also  the  descendants  of  former  species  (theory  of 
organic  evolution,  descent,  or  transformism)? 

(b)  The  fact  itself  of  transformism  must  be  distinguished  from 
the  theories  by  which  this  fact  is  explained.  There  may  be 


444  COSMOLOGY 

agreement  on  the  fact  without  agreement  on  the  influences  that 
caused  it.  And  the  fact  may  stand  even  if  it  cannot  be  explained. 

(c)  For  the  present  we  shall  not  speak  of  monism,  which  not 
only  admits  transformism,  but  asserts  that  life  originated  from 
inorganic  matter,  and  that  the  passage  from  the  lowest  to  the  high- 
est forms  of  life,  man  included,  took  place  without  any  extra- 
mundane  intervention.  We  cannot  speak  of  man  until  we  know 
his  nature,  and  this  will  be  considered  in  our  next  treatise.  As  to 
the  passage  from  the  vegetable  to  the  animal  kingdom,  from  the 
absence  to  the  presence  of  consciousness,  it  is  impossible.  No 
reality  comes  from  nothing.  From  unconsciousness  consciousness 
cannot  arise.  So  we  limit  ourselves  to  transformism  within  each 
kingdom.  Scientists  are  not  agreed  as  to  the  number  of  original 
types.  Some  admit  only  one  (monogenesis) ;  others,  several 
(polygenesis).  As  to  the  mode  of  evolution,  some  admit  slow 
variations;  others  the  sudden  appearance  of  new  features. 

2.  Historical  Outline.  —  Only  the  most  prominent  names  will 
be  mentioned  here.  The  history  of  transformism  begins  with  the 
nineteenth  century.  Before  this  time  we  find  only  hints  and  vague 
suggestions  which  have  no  scientific  basis. 

(a)  Lamarck  denies  the  fixity  of,  and  the  sharp  limits  between, 
species.     Changes  in  the  environment  create  new  needs.    New 
needs  call  forth  new  activities  and  create  new  organs  to  meet  these 
needs.    The  use  of  organs  perfects  them,  while  their  disuse  allows 
them   to   become   atrophied.    These   various   modifications   are 
transmitted  by  heredity. 

(b)  Geoffrey  Saint-Hilaire,  as  partisan  of  the  mutability  of 
species,  and  Cuvier,  as  partisan  of  their  fixity,  opposed  each  other, 
the  latter  being  victorious  over  his  adversary. 

(c)  In  his  "Origin  of  Species"  (1859)  Charles  Darwin  advocates 
the  theory  of  organic  evolution  by  natural  selection.    The  variations 
which  occur  in  certain  cases,  if  useful  to  the  individual,  give  it 
an  advantage  over  its  competitors  in  the  "struggle  for  life."    Hence 
such  an  individual  survives,  while  others  become  extinct.    It  is 
the  "survival  of  the  fittest."    Later  Darwin  admitted  also  other 
factors.    In  his  "Descent  of  Man"  (1871),  he  applies  the  theory 
of  transformism  to  man.    Among  other  prominent  transformists 


EVOLUTION     IN     ORGANIC     WORLD        445 

of  the  same  period  must  be  mentioned  Wallace,  Huxley,  Spencer, 
and  Haeckel. 

(d)  To-day  the  fact  of  evolution  is  commonly  accepted,  and  is 
hardly  ever  discussed,  although  this  position  seems  to  be  some- 
what rash  and  premature.  The  main  discussions  are  on  the  modes 
and  factors  of  evolution.  Darwinism  (i.e.  the  theory  of  natural 
selection)  is  generally  looked  upon  as  inadequate. 

3.  The  Reasons  for  Transformism  will  only  be  indicated  here. 
Their  study  belongs  to  natural  sciences. 

(a)  Living  organisms  are  plastic,  and  become  modified  under 
the  influence  of  (i)  surroundings,  climate,  food,  etc.;  (2)  artificial 
selection,  especially  in  domestic  plants  and  animals;   (3)  natural 
selection,  which  accentuates  useful  variations;  (4)  unknown  causes 
which  sometimes  produce  in  the  offspring  sudden  variations  or 
mutations.     To  this  it  is  added  that,  in  the  beginning,  organisms 
must  have  been  more  plastic,  and  the  causes  of  change  more  active 
owing  to  greater  geological  disturbances.    Moreover,    the  divi- 
sions of  races  within  the  same  species  are  arbitrary,  and  many 
races  would  be  looked  upon  as  distinct  species,  were  not  their 
common  origin  known  (e.g.  the  various  races  of  dogs). 

Remarks.  —  This  variability  is  limited,  moves  around  a  certain 
fixed  average,  and  frequently  a  modified  type  tends  to  return  to 
the  primitive  type.  Moreover,  as  even  with  the  best  efforts,  only 
varieties  are  produced  artificially,  how  could  new  species  arise 
naturally?  There  is  no  proof  that  a  new  species  has  ever  been 
produced  in  this  way.  And  if  it  had,  have  we  the  right  to  extend 
the  fact  to  all  species?  Hence  this  argument  does  not  prove  the 
fact  of  transformism,  but  offers  only  a  possibility. 

(b)  Mutual  affinities  of  organic  beings,     (i)  Morphology.    The 
various  groups  (e.g.  vertebrates)  are  built  according  to  the  same 
plan,  and,  from  the  lowest  class  to  the  highest,  a  gradual  increase 
in  complexity  is  observed.    The  reason  is  that  all  have  developed 
by  successive  differentiations    from    less  differentiated    types.— 
Remarks.  —  The  analogies  must  not  make  one  overlook  the  differ- 
ences.   Moreover,  it  remains  to  be  proved  that  a  closer  resemblance 
is   due   to   a   closer   relationship   by   descent.     (2)   Embryology. 
During  the  period  of  embryonic  development,  higher  forms  of 


446  COSMOLOGY 

life  pass  successively  through  inferior  stages  resembling  lower 
forms  of  life,  and  little  by  little  become  more  differentiated. 
Hence  ontogeny,  or  the  development  of  the  individual,  is  a 
recapitulation  of  phylogeny,  or  the  evolution  of  the  species. — 
Remarks.  —  In  many  cases,  the  resemblance  of  the  embryo  with 
lower  forms  of  life  has  been  grossly  exaggerated  (especially  by 
Haeckel).  Moreover,  resemblances  are  to  be  expected  in  the 
development  of  organisms  of  the  same  type,  since  all  begin  with  a 
simple  cell  and  develop  in  similar  surroundings.  (3)  Rudimentary 
organs,  and  incipient  or  nascent  organs.  In  many  higher  forms 
of  life  organs  are  found  which  are  now  useless  because  they  are  too 
small  and  undeveloped,  e.g.  the  eyes  of  the  mole,  the  rudimentary 
hind  legs  of  boas  and  whales,  etc.  These  must  be  remnants  of 
organs  once  fully  developed  and  useful.  —  Remarks.  —  The  con- 
clusion might  be  true  without  proving  transformism.  The  ances- 
tors may  have  been  of  the  same  species,  though  with  certain 
organs  more  developed  than  those  of  actual  forms.  Moreover, 
the  uselessness  of  all  such  organs  at  all  stages  of  life  is  not 
demonstrated. 

(c)  Geological  distribution  or  paleontology.  Paleontology  shows 
that  various  species  have  succeeded  one  another  on  the  earth. 
Although  the  geological  record  is  very  imperfect  and  difficult  to 
decipher,  owing  to  numerous  perturbations  in  the  strata  of  the  earth, 
in  a  general  way  the  lower  forms  of  life  appeared  first,  and  little 
by  little  more  differentiated  forms  succeeded  them.  In  some 
cases,  especially  that  of  the  horse,  a  series  of  closely  allied  forms 
can  be  traced  back,  leading  progressively  to  actually  existing 
species.  As  research  progresses,  "missing  links,"  forming  transi- 
tions between  different  species,  are  discovered. 

Remarks.  —  Sometimes  also,  forms  of  life  are  found  which  do 
not  progress  in  one  sequence,  but,  as  it  were,  in  parallel  lines.  Nor 
can  succession,  when  verified,  be  identified  with  descent;  paleon- 
tology gives  only  the  fact  of  succession.  Moreover,  this  progressive 
succession  is  established  only  in  very  few  cases  of  species  closely 
similar.  When  we  try  to  apply  it  to  larger  groups,  evidence  is 
lacking,  and  there  is  not  even  a  semblance  of  proof  which  would 
allow  us  to  connect  together  all  forms  of  life.  To  appeal  to  the 


EVOLUTION    IN    ORGANIC    WORLD       447 

imperfection  of  the  record  and  the  difficulty  of  the  task  is  no 
proof.  Conclusions  can  be  based  only  on  the  data  at  hand,  not 
on  data  which  possibly  may  —  or  may  not  —  be  gathered  in  the 
future. 

4.  Conclusion.  —  Philosophy  has  nothing  to  say  for  or  against 
evolution.  It  is  a  scientific  question  to  be  answered  by  a  patient 
investigation  of  the  facts.  As  a  scientific  conclusion  it  is,  as  yet, 
not  demonstrated.  It  is  a  hypothesis,  which,  on  the  strength  of 
established  facts,  extends  only  to  closely  allied  species.  To  make 
evolution  a  universal  law  by  which  all  forms  would  ultimately  be 
differentiations  of  one  primitive  type,  is  to  proceed  far  beyond  the 
conclusions  justified  by  actual  evidence. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  COSMOS 

INTRODUCTORY 

1.  Unity  and  Multiplicity  in  the  World.  —  There  is  plurality 
and  variety  in  nature,  yet,  in  many  cases,  multiplicity  is  reduced 
to  unity.    According  to  the  point  of  view  from  which  it  is  regarded, 
the  same  reality  may  be  spoken  of  as  one  or  as  many.    The  process 
of  unification  has  degrees,  and  is  more  or  less  inclusive.    Thus  I 
speak  of  the  earth  as  one  when  I  oppose  it  to  other  planets  or 
heavenly  bodies.    From  the  point  of  view  of  geography,  many 
mountains,  valleys,  oceans,  are  on  the  one  earth.     From  Oie  point 
of  view  of  geology,  many  rocks  of  different  nature  form  one  moun- 
tain.   Every  rock  in  turn  may  be  looked  upon  as  composed  of 
many  elements,  and  ultimately  reduced  to  atoms.    The  same  is 
true  of  the  one  human  organism  composed  of  many  organs,  every 
organ  composed  of  many  tissues,  etc.    Thus  according  as  we  look 
at  things  in  one  way  or  another,  the  same  reality  is  called  one  or 
many.    We  know  that  some  processes  of  unification  are  only 
mental  or  logical.    The  genus  under  which  species  are  classified 
exists  only  in  the  mind.    Other  processes  of  unification  are  based 
on  real  relations  of  causality,  dependence,  influence,  subordina- 
tion, etc.    The  many  existing  beings  in  some  way  form  one  universe. 

2.  Terms  Defined.  —  (i)  Cosmos  (Greek  equivalent  of  Latin 
mundus)  means  the  world  conceived  as  an  orderly  and  harmonious 
system  of  many  things,  and  is  opposed  to  chaos,  disorder,  or  law- 
lessness.    (2)  Universe  means  the  collection  of  all  material  things, 
and  indicates  completeness  and  all-inclusiveness.     Sometimes  it 
is  used  so  as  to  include  even  God.     (3)  World  may  generally  be 
used  for  cosmos  or  universe,  but  its  meaning  is  more  vague.    Fre- 
quently it  is  made  to  apply  especially  to  our  earth,  or  to  what  is 

448 


SPACE    AND    TIME  449 

nearer  to  us  on  the  earth.  Frequently  also  it  is  restricted  to  special 
systems,  not  necessarily  material,  e.g.  the  living  world,  the  world 
of  art,  religion,  literature,  fashion,  etc.  (4)  Nature  has  several 
meanings.  It  applies  either  to  the  whole  universe  or  to  the  indi- 
vidual beings  that  compose  it.  We  speak  of  nature  in  general, 
e.g.  the  works  of  nature,  or  of  the  nature  of  this  or  that  being. 
Nature  always  has  a  special  reference  to  dynamic  principles  which 
enable  beings  to  act  in  various  ways  and  to  modify  other  beings. 
It  is  the  intrinsic  principle  of  activity. 

The  many  form  one,  not  through  an  identity  of  substance,  but 
through  their  many  interrelations  which  prevent  them  from  being 
isolated.  The  most  important  of  these  relations  are  space,  time, 
causality,  teleology,  and  the  various  laws  of  nature.  Hence  the 
following  titles. 

I.    SPACE  AND  TIME 

Few  notions  are  more  usual  than  those  of  space  and  time.  We 
speak  daily  of  things  as  occupying  a  definite  part  of  space,  and  of 
events  as  occurring  at  a  certain  time.  Yet,  simple  and  clear  as 
they  seem  to  be,  these  notions  become  difficult  to  explain  as  soon 
as  we  try  to  give  an  accurate  definition. 

I.  SPACE 

i.  Place.  —  Space  and  place  are  closely  connected.  When  we 
are  asked  in  what  place  an  object  is  located,  we  answer  by  assigning 
a  determined  portion  of  space  which  it  occupies,  or  by  referring  it 
to  other  objects  the  place  of  which  is  known,  i.e.  by  defining  its 
spatial  relations.  Place  then  is  a  determined  part  of  space.  We 
may  distinguish  the  external  and  the  internal  place. 

(a)  When  I  say:  "The  fish  is  in  the  water,  and  the  water  is 
in  the  jar,"  I  assign  the  place  of  the  fish  and  of  the  water  in  refer- 
ence to  something  external  to  them,  namely,  in  reference  to  the 
immediate  surface  of  the  water  that  surrounds  the  fish,  or  of  the 
jar  that  contains  the  water.  Not  the  whole  water  is,  strictly 
speaking,  the  locus  of  the  fish,  but  only  that  which  comes  in  imme- 
diate contact  with  it.  This  is  the  locus  proprius.  Sometimes  a 
30 


450  COSMOLOGY 

locus  communis  is  assigned,  as  when  I  say  that  the  chair  is  in  the 
room  —  together  with  many  other  things. 

(b)  I  may  consider  the  space  occupied  by  an  object  without 
reference  to  anything  external,  but  simply  as  the  space  occupied 
within  the  object's  limits  and  dimensions,  as  when  I  say  that  the 
volume  of  a  body  is  so  many  cubic  feet.  This  is  the  locus  internus, 
which  remains  the  same  even  when,  owing  to  some  motion,  external 
spatial  relations  change.  The  fish  occupies  the  same  space,  whether 
in  the  water  or  out  of  it. 

2.  Space.  —  (a)  In  general,  space  implies  (i)  distance;  thus 
we  say  that  there  is  so  much  space  between  two  objects,  or  that 
the  train  flies  through  space;  (2)  capacity  and  aptitude  to  contain; 
as  when  I  say  that  the  room  is  very  spacious,  or  that  the  stars  are 
scattered  in  space;  (3)  relative  emptiness;  thus  I  say  that  there 
is  no  more  space  in  the  room,  i.e.  its  capacity  is  already  exhausted 
because  it  is  completely  occupied.  This  emptiness  is  only  relative 
to  the  use  which  is  to  be  made  of  space. 

Space,  therefore,  supposes  bodies  with  distances  between  them, 
and  consists  essentially  in  the  interval,  the  distance,  the  capacity, 
the  volume  occupied.  It  almost  coincides  with  place,  except 
that  the  term  "  place "  emphasizes  the  bounding  surface,  while 
"  space  "  emphasizes  the  voluminal  capacity. 

(b)  (i)  Concrete  space  is  thus  a  relation  of  distance  in  a  threefold 
dimension,  or  a  voluminal  distance.    It  is  not  the  body  itself,  but 
a  special  aspect  of  it.    It  may  refer  to  individual  bodies,  but  is 
frequently  applied  to  the  immense  receptacle  in  which  all  things 
are  contained,  i.e.  to  the  sum  of  all  individual  spaces.     (2)  Ideal 
space,  or  the  concept  of  space,  is  an  abstract  idea.    It  does  not 
refer  to  this  or  that  space,  with  such  or  such  dimensions,  but  only 
to  an  indetermined  distance,  capacity,  or  volume.    Like  all  abstract 
and  universal  concepts,  it  exists  only  in  the  mind,  but  is  based  on 
the  concrete  perception  of  space.     (3)  Imaginary  space  is  the  space 
which  we  imagine  to  exist  beyond  the  limits  of  the  real  world — 
if  the  world  be  limited  —  and  which  we  suppose  to  extend  ad 
infinitum  even  where  there  is  nothing. 

(c)  Hence  real  space  is  not  an  a  priori  form  of  external  sensi- 
bility (Kant),  but  an  aspect  of  real  extension;   nor  the  divine 


SPACEANDTIME  451 

attribute  of  immensity  (Newton,  Clarke),  for  God  has  no  extension 
and  is  not  material;  nor  a  distinct  reality,  an  immense  receptacle 
independent  of  bodies  (Gassendi);  nor  finally  the  extended  body 
as  such  (Descartes).  Real  space  is  a  special  relation  based  on  the 
threefold  dimension  of  matter.  It  does  not  exist  independently, 
as  a  special  reality  in  itself,  but  is  directly  based  on  reality,  namely, 
on  really  existing  bodies  which  have  a  real  extension. 

II.  TIME 

i.  Nature  of  Time. — Time  has  many  analogies  with  space. 
We  may  state  immediately  that  time,  like  space,  is  not  an  inde- 
pendent existing  reality,  but  that  it  is  based  on  something  really 
existing.  Whereas  space  is  based  on  extension  and  co-existing 
parts,  time  essentially  implies  succession,  and  is  always  moving 
on.  Its  parts  —  if  it  may  be  said  to  have  parts  —  never  co-exist. 
Another  obvious  fact  is  that  what  we  commonly  call  time  is  meas- 
ured by  spatial  relations,  e.g.  of  the  sun,  the  hands  of  a  watch,  etc. 

(a)  In  the  realities  of  the  world  we  find  duration  and  change, 
permanence   and   succession.    Things   endure,   and   yet   undergo 
successively  many  modifications  in  place,  quantity,  and  qualities. 
It  is  in  this  fact  of  succession  that  we  find  the  idea  of  time  which 
represents  a  continuous  flowing,  which  never  stops,  but  proceeds 
uniformly  while  the  real  changes  are  not  always  continuous  for 
the  senses,  and  do  not  take  place  uniformly.    Hence  time  is  the 
same  reality  as  movement  or  change,  but  viewed  from  the  special 
aspect  of  succession,  i.e.  of  an  "after"  and  a  "before."    The 
perception  of  time  evidently  supposes  in  the  mind  the  power  of 
memory. 

(b)  Thus  conceived,  time  is  composed  of  the  past,  present,  and 
future.     The    present  alone  exists  actually;   it  is  an  indivisible 
point  constantly  moving  and  becoming  past.    The  past  has  been, 
the  future  will  be,  the  present  instant  constantly  moves  into  the 
future,  and  as  soon  as  we  try  to  think  of  it,  it  is  already  passed. 
Psychologically,  however,  we  give  to  the  present  a  greater  or 
smaller  duration. 

2.   Various  Meanings  of  Time.  —  (a)  The  various  meanings 
of  time  are  analogical  to  those  of  space,     (i)  Intrinsic  concrete 


452  COSMOLOGY 

time  is  the  time  based  on  varying  concrete  changes  of  concrete 
realities.  Every  substance  has  its  own  time.  (2)  Extrinsic  con- 
crete time  is  the  one  which  has  been  adopted  as  a  standard  unit  to 
measure  other  durations,  namely,  the  revolutions  of  the  earth 
around  its  own  axis  (day),  and  around  the  sun  (year).  This  time 
is  divided  into  years,  months,  weeks,  days,  hours,  etc.  Although 
it  is  in  itself  no  more  real  than  intrinsic  time,  it  is,  owing  to  its 
regularity  and  constancy,  more  obvious  for  us,  and  hence  is 
understood  as  time  par  excellence.  Psychological  time  is  the 
apparent  duration  as  perceived  by  the  mind.  (See  Psychology, 
p.  88.)  (3)  Abstract  or  conceptual  time  is  the  idea  of  time  apart 
from  all  determinations  with  which  changes  occur  concretely  in 
the  beings  of  the  world.  (4)  Imaginary  time,  in  the  supposition 
that  the  world  had  a  beginning  and  will  have  an  end,  is  the  time 
which  we  imagine  to  be  prolonged  ad  infinitum  both  before  the 
world  existed  and  after  it  will  have  ceased  to  exist. 

(b)  Hence  real  time  is  not  an  a  priori  mental  form  (Kant), 
but  is  based  on  something  objective;  nor  the  divine  attribute  of 
eternity  (Newton,  Clarke) ;  nor  a  reality  independent  of  changing 
concrete  realities  (Gassendi);  nor  the  successive  duration  as  such 
(Descartes).  It  is  not  a  reality  as  such  in  itself,  but  is  directly 
based  on  the  real  succession  of  the  changes  which  take  place  in  the 
various  beings  of  the  world. 

II.    THE  LAWS  OF  NATURE 

I.  MEANING  AND  PROPERTIES 

i.  Meaning.  —  (a)  A  law  means  either  a  norm  for  human 
actions,  or  the  constant  mode  of  action  of  physical  agents.  (Cf. 
p.  292.)  Here  we  deal  with  physical  laws.  A  law  indicates  the 
behavior  of  certain  beings  in  various  circumstances.  It  reduces 
every  manifestation  of  their  activity  to  more  or  less  comprehensive 
formulae  which  apply  in  all  cases. 

The  term  " nature"  has  special  reference  to  the  dynamic  aspect 
of  beings,  and  means  the  substance  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  principle 
of  action.  Sometimes  it  applies  to  individual  beings,  as  when  we 
say  of  a  thing  that  it  is  natural  for  it  to  act  so  or  so,  and  that  every 


LAWSOFNATURE  453 

being  acts  according  to  its  own  nature.  Sometimes  it  applies  to  the 
whole  universe,  as  when  we  speak  of  the  beauties  of  nature,  the 
order  of  nature,  etc.  A  law  of  nature  means  a  uniformity  —  more 
or  less  comprehensive  —  of  physical  activity  in  a  given  being  or 
in  the  whole  universe. 

(b)  The  existence  of  natural  laws  needs  no  demonstration.  The 
uniformity  of  action  in  nature  is  both  an  obvious  fact  and  a  con- 
dition of  science.  We  daily  see  that  the  same  agents,  in  the  same 
conditions,  produce  the  same  effects,  and  the  endeavor  of  science 
is  to  formulate  the  laws  according  to  which  these  results  occur. 
Were  there  no  laws,  science  could  not  foresee  and  predict  results. 

"Accidental"  effects  prove  nothing  against  the  existence  of 
natural  laws,  for,  although  they  are  not  constant  and  uniform, 
they  result  from  an  unforeseen  meeting  of  several  causes,  every 
one  of  which  acts  according  to  its  own  laws.  Man  may  act  inten- 
tionally, and,  in  order  to  realize  his  purpose,  he  uses  the  "natural" 
activities  of  various  instruments  and  materials.  Physical  beings 
act  naturally  in  the  same  way.  But  if  several  physical  beings 
combine  to  produce  a  result  both  unusual,  because  this  combina- 
tion seldom  occurs,  and  unforeseen,  because  unusual,  we  call  this 
result  accidental,  although  it  is  due  to  natural  causes.  Thus  death 
in  a  mine  explosion  is  an  accident,  although  it  results  from  natural 
activities,  the  presence  of  which  was  unknown.  The  killing  of  a 
man  with  a  bullet,  when  the  shooter  was  not  even  aware  of  his 
presence,  is  also  called  accidental,  although  it  happens  in  perfect 
accordance  with  natural  laws.  Accidental  is  therefore  a  relative 
term  which  applies  to  results  due  to  an  unfamiliar  and  unforeseen 
concourse  of  circumstances. 

2.  Properties. — Natural  laws  are  necessary  and  yet  contingent. 
We  shall  explain  briefly  these  two  apparently  conflicting  properties. 

(a)  The  laws  of  nature  are  necessary,  i.e.  invariable  and  immu- 
table, as  appears  both  from  experience  and  from  reason.  From 
experience,  because,  for  instance,  everywhere  at  sea  level  pure 
water  boils  at  a  temperature  of  212  degrees,  and  will  always  be 
analyzed  into  the  same  constant  proportions  of  oxygen  and  hydro- 
gen. A  stone  thrown  up  in  the  air  will  always  fall  down.  Fire 
always  burns,  etc.  From  reason,  because  the  mode  of  activity 


454  COSMOLOGY 

must  correspond  to  the  very  mode  of  being,  and  hence  every 
individual  nature  is  so  determined  as  to  exercise  a  certain  kind 
of  activity. 

This  activity  requires  certain  conditions,  and  unless  these  are 
verified,  the  result  does  not  follow.  Thus  conditions  of  contact, 
temperature,  pressure,  etc.,  are  necessary  for  oxygen  and  hydrogen 
to  combine  into  water.  If  a  piece  of  wood  be  covered  with  asbestos, 
fire  will  not  consume  it.  If  the  stone  be  held  up  in  the  air,  it  will 
not  fall  down,  etc.  Thus  the  necessity  of  the  laws  of  nature  is 
not  absolute,  but  hypothetical.  The  conditions  must  be  verified. 

(b)  Yet  these  laws  are  contingent.  They  have  no  absolute 
a  priori  necessity,  but  are  discovered  by  experience.  They  might 
be  otherwise  than  they  are.  In  geometry,  reason  will  discover 
certain  properties,  —  e.g.  of  triangles  —  which  are  absolutely 
necessary,  and  cannot  be  otherwise.  But,  in  physics  or  chemistry, 
no  analysis  of  gunpowder  will  ever  show  that  it  is  necessary  for  it 
to  have  the  power  of  exploding;  and  no  analysis  of  oxygen  will 
ever  reveal  a  necessary  affinity  for  hydrogen  in  certain  proportions. 
Moreover,  we  can  see  no  necessity  why  things  themselves  should 
exist,  and,  in  fact,  if  certain  conditions  had  not  been  verified,  this 
individual  man,  horse,  stone,  water,  etc.,  would  not  have  existed. 
If  certain  other  circumstances  had  been  realized,  other  individuals 
would  have  existed.  The  laws  of  nature,  therefore,  are  not  derived 
from  the  essence  of  things,  but  rather  the  essence  of  things  is 
inferred  from  their  properties  and  laws. 

N.B.  From  this  we  may  simply  hint  at  the  possibility  of  an 
intervention  of  the  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world,  who  can  supply 
or  withdraw  the  conditions  necessary  to  the  activity  of  various 
substances,  and  thus  produce  miraculous  events. 

II.  EFFICIENCY  AND  TELEOLOGY 

The  chief  laws  of  nature  refer  to  the  mode  of  activity  or  efficiency 
of  physical  agents,  and  this  in  turn  implies  teleology.  Hence  the 
present  question. 

i.  Efficiency.  —  (a)  The  senses  perceive  only  the  succession  of 
phenomena,  i.e.  antecedents  and  consequents;  hence  for  empiri- 
cism causality  is  nothing  but  succession.  As  soon,  however,  as 


LAWSOFNATURE  455 

we  observe  a  regularity  of  succession,  and  an  invariability  of 
sequence,  we  are  led  to  admit  that  there  is  not  only  a  secession, 
but  a  real  influence  of  the  antecedent  on  the  production  of  the 
consequent.  If  the  consequent  did  not  depend  on  the  antecedent, 
there  would  be  no  reason  why  it  should  not  appear  without  it,  or 
after  any  other  antecedent.  As  it  is  not  so,  the  conclusion  imposes 
itself  that  the  consequent  depends  on  the  antecedent,  and  that  the 
antecedent,  by  its  activity,  is  the  cause  of  the  consequent. 

(6)  There  may  be  a  series  of  subordinated  causes;  hence 
the  distinction  between  proximate  and  remote  causes.  Causes 
may  exercise  a  more  or  less  direct  influence,  but  the  existence  of 
true  efficiency  is  attested  for  man  by  his  own  consciousness,  and 
for  other  beings  by  the  rational  interpretation  of  external  experi- 
ence. Many  causes  may  and  do  contribute  to  the  same  result. 
Which  will  be  called  the  cause  will  depend  frequently  on  the  point 
of  view  one  takes.  Thus,  the  photographer,  the  film,  the  light, 
the  object,  etc.,  are  causes  of  the  photograph.  The  decomposition 
of  the  blood,  the  bullet,  the  powder,  the  firing,  the  murderer,  etc., 
are  causes  of  death.  Any  effect  is  thus  the  result  of  a  series  of 
causes  which  contribute  their  share  in  various  ways.  The  com- 
plete causation  includes  both  a  number  of  causes,  and  of  conditions 
without  which  their  activity  could  not  be  exercised. 

2.  Teleology. —  (a)  Teleology  or  finality  is  opposed  to  mechan- 
ism. It  affirms  the  existence  of  final  causes,  that  is,  of  ends,  or 
purposes,  which  efficient  causes  tend  to  realize.  Mechanism  affirms 
that  everything  is  simply  the  result  of  mechanical  forces  acting 
without  any  presupposed  direction,  (i)  The  question  is  not 
whether  there  are  efficient  causes  or  final  causes,  but  whether,  in 
addition  to  efficient  causes,  there  are  also  final  causes;  that  is, 
whether  the  activity  of  efficient  causes  is  directed  to  certain  ends. 
The  aeroplane  flies  because  it  is  constructed  in  such  or  such  a 
way;  from  this  point  of  view,  flying  is  but  a  result  of  mechanical 
causes.  But  at  the  same  time,  the  aeroplane  is  built  in  this  way 
in  order  to  fly;  from  this  point  of  view,  flying  is  an  end.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  works  of  nature,  e.g.  the  wings  of  birds.  (2) 
Again,  the  question  is  not  that  of  conscious  and  intelligent  finality 
such  as  is  revealed  in  human  purposive  activities,  but  of  physical 


456  COSMOLOGY 

finality,  which  is  revealed  by  the  constancy  of  the  manner  in  which 
physical  beings  act. 

(b)  Finality  is  extrinsic  when  the  activity  of  a  substance  pro- 
duces results  that  are  useful   to  other  substances.    Thus  the 
mineral  is  utilized  by  the  plant,  the  plant  by  the  animal.    Or 
again,  the  heat  of  the  sun  is  a  source  of  growth  and  development. 
But  we  cannot  see  everywhere  such  an  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
extrinsic  good,  for  the  good  of  one  is  frequently  an  evil  for  another. 
The  plant  is  destroyed  by  the  animal  that  eats  it.    The  thriving 
of  microbes  may  result  in  the  death  of  the  organism.    Yet,  in  a 
general  way,  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  universe  cannot  be 
denied.    But  this  order  is  realized  by  individual  beings  acting 
according  to  their  own  nature. 

(c)  Hence  primarily  finality  is  intrinsic  or  immanent.    This 
means  that   every  being  is  endowed  with  an  internal   tendency 
to  realize  its  own  end,  and  to  strive  for  its  own  good  and  perfec- 
tion.   This  finality  manifests  itself  clearly  in  the  organic  world, 
where  we  see  the  ovum  or  primitive  cell  developing  according  to 
the  general  type  of  the  species,  and  little  by  little  evolving  into  the 
complete  organism.    It  also  manifests  itself  in  the  struggle  which 
the  organism  undertakes  against  destructive  or  harmful  agents. 
Even  in  the  inorganic  world,  the  constancy  of  the  laws  of  nature 
shows  that  nothing  happens  at  random  or  by  chance,  for  chance 
cannot  explain  stability,  but  that  there  is  an  internal  principle  of 
direction  and  orientation  which  is  no  other  than  the  nature  of  every 
being.    The  existence  of  final  causes  is  required  to  account  for 
the  orderly  and  harmonious  sequence  of  phenomena,  and  for  the 
convergence  of  diverse  activities  toward  harmonious  results  which 
persist  notwithstanding  the  manifold  changes  that  take  place  in 
the  world. 


CONCLUSION 

Cosmology  leaves  many  questions  without  an  answer.  It  as- 
sumes the  existence  of  things,  but  why,  how,  and  whence  are  they? 
What  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  reality,  i.e.  of  things  individual 
and  of  the  totality  of  things?  The  beings  of  the  world  are  many 
and  diverse,  and  yet  compose  one  universe.  Every  being  exists 
only  in  dependence  on  other  beings,  for  nothing  in  the  world  is 
absolute  and  self-sufficient.  Since  unity  cannot  come  out  of 
manifoldness  without  some  principle  which  is  itself  one,  where 
must  we  look  for  the  principle  of  order  and  harmony?  What  is 
the  ultimate  reason  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  of  the  internal 
teleological  principle  which  they  manifest?  How  have  differen- 
tiation and  order  arisen  from  the  primitive  nebular  chaos?  How 
have  highly  differentiated  organisms  evolved  out  of  more  general 
types?  How  did  life  itself  arise? 

Thus  many  questions  spring  from  the  study,  scientific  or  philo- 
sophical, of  the  material  world.  In  general,  has  the  world  in  itself 
a  sufficient  reason  of  its  existence  and  laws,  or  must  we  look  for 
a  sufficient  reason  in  some  higher  being  above  the  world?  When 
things  have  been  explained  by  their  immediate  causes,  there  re- 
mains to  explain  these  causes  themselves.  Hence  the  necessity 
to  proceed  to  Theodicy,  and  examine  whether  the  ultimate  reality, 
the  Absolute,  or  First  Cause,  is  immanent  in  the  world,  or  tran- 
scends the  world.  The  method  will  be  to  go  from  the  world  to 
God:  "For  the  invisible  things  of  Him  from  the  creation  of  the 
world  are  clearly  seen,  being  understood  by  the  things  that  are 
made;  His  eternal  power  also  and  divinity."  (Rom.  i,  20.) 


457 


RATIONAL     PSYCHOLOGY     OR 

PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE 

HUMAN    MIND 


INTRODUCTION 

1.  Subject-Matter  of  This  Treatise.  —  Psychology  deals  with 
the  empirical  study  of  the  mental  functions  of  cognition,  affection, 
conation,  and  describes  the  various  mental  processes.    We  must 
now  inquire  about  the  nature  of  the  principle  of  these  functions. 
Mind  and  matter,  subject  and  object,  consciousness  and  motion, 
have  irreducible  characteristics,  and  yet  are  connected  intimately. 
Hence  the  questions  naturally  arise:  What  is  the  mind?    How  is 
it  related  to  the  organism?    On  the  solution  of  these  two  problems 
will  depend  the  answer  to  be  given  to  the  questions:   What  is  the 
origin  of  the  human  mind  or  soul?    What  is  its  destiny? 

Hence  the  following  division:  (i)  Is  the  mind  a  substance? 
(2)  Is  it  spiritual?  (3)  How  is  it  united  to  the  organism?  (4) 
What  is  its  origin?  (5)  Is  it  immortal?  It  is  needless  to 
insist  on  the  importance  of  such  questions,  both  from  a  merely 
speculative,  and  from  a  practical  point  of  view. 

2.  Method.  —  (a)  The  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  the  mind  is 
not  intuitive  but  must  be  inferred  from  facts  of  experience.    Hence 
the  method  to  be  followed  is  chiefly  inductive.    It  starts  from 
facts,  and  assigns  to  them  an  adequate  explanation.    But  once 
the  nature  of  the  soul  is  known,  we  may  proceed  deductively,  in 
part  at  least,  and  base  on  its  nature  conclusions  concerning  its 
origin  and  destiny.    The  main  principle  to  be  used  is  that  of 
sufficient  reason.    A  cause  must  be  assigned  which  will  be  sufficient 
and  strictly  required  to  explain  all  the  facts.    To  avoid  imperfect 
and  one-sided  conclusions,  all  facts   must  be  considered.    Erro- 

458 


INTRODUCTION  459 

neous  views  may  arise  from  considering  exclusively  conscious 
processes,  or  exclusively  physiological  functions.  This  caution 
is  important  here  owing  to  the  great  complexity  of  the  subject- 
matter. 

(b)  We  cannot  agree  with  Spencer  and  other  agnostics  when 
they  assert  the  unknowableness  of  the  nature,  origin,  and  destiny 
of  the  mind,  and  consequently  the  futility  of  the  present  investiga- 
tion. It  must  be  granted  that  our  knowledge  of  the  mind  remains 
imperfect,  but  the  same  principles  that  are  used  in  all  other  sciences 
will  be  used  here,  and  will  carry  us  beyond  mere  empirical  facts. 
No  science  is  possible  without  the  use  of  the  principle  of  causality 
and  of  sufficient  reason,  and  it  is  this  principle  which  we  shall 
constantly  appeal  to:  The  effect  is  a  sign  of  the  power  and  nature 
of  its  cause. 


CHAPTER  I 

SUBSTANTIALITY 

The  existence  of  mental  states,  manifold  and  varied,  is  an  obvi- 
ous fact  of  experience  which  has  been  the  subject-matter  of  psy- 
chology. These  processes  are  spontaneously  ascribed  to  one  mind 
as  their  permanent  and  active  centre.  What  is  the  correct  inter- 
pretation of  the  facts?  Is  the  mind  a  reality  distinct  from  the 
mental  states,  or  is  the  collection  of  mental  states  the  whole  mind? 
Phenomenalism  asserts  that  the  mind  is  but  a  common  name,  a 
genus  logicum,  an  abstraction.  The  only  reality  is  the  series  of 
mental  processes.  Whatever  else  we  may  add  to  these  is  illusory. 
Substantialism  asserts  that  the  mind  is  a  deeper  concrete  reality 
of  which  mental  states  are  only  the  surface.  It  is  this  latter 
position  which  we  shall  now  explain  and  defend. 

I.  MEANING  OF  SUBSTANTIALITY 

i.  What  is  a  Substance?  —  (a)  Beings  are  divided  into  sub- 
stances and  accidents,  i.e.  into  beings  existing  in  themselves,  and 
beings  existing  in  others.  Some  realities  are,  as  it  were,  weak; 
they  need  a  support  in  which  they  are  and  to  which  they  are 
attributed.  This  character  belongs  to  mental  processes;  a  mental 
process  does  not  exist  in  itself,  but  in  the  mind.  It  is  mine,  or 
yours,  or  his,  etc.  Other  realities  stand  by  themselves,  exist  in 
themselves,  are  not  attributed  to  any  other,  but  are  supports 
of  qualities  or  accidents.  There  is  no  "white"  in  itself,  but 
"white"  is  a  quality  attributed  to  some  substance  (paper,  cloth, 
paint,  etc.). 

(b)  Hence  primarily  substance  means  that  which  subsists  in  it- 
self. It  also  has  secondary  characters,  (i)  It  is  a  principle  of 
activity.  A  substance  without  activity  would  be  altogether  un- 
knowable, meaningless,  and  unthinkable.  If  it  is  necessary  to 
conceive  the  substance  as  a  strong  being,  as  a  support,  it  is  also 

460 


SUBSTANTIALITY     OF     THE     MIND         461 

necessary  to  conceive  it  as  a  power,  an  active  principle,  which 
manifests  its  energies.  (2)  It  is  something  more  or  less  perma- 
nent, although  this  is  not  so  essential.  Here  permanence  means 
that  the  mind  endures  and  remains  identical  notwithstanding  the 
constant  flux  of  processes. 

2.  Further  Determination.  —  To  complete  this  explanation,  it 
is  necessary  to  make  a  few  remarks  as  to  what  the  assertion  "  the 
mind  is  a  substance"  does  not  mean. 

(a)  The  present  question  is  not  to  be  identified  with  other 
questions  to  be  examined  later:  What  is  the  nature  of  the  mind- 
substance?    Is  it  material  or  spiritual?    What  are  its  relations 
to  the  organism? 

(b)  To  assert  that  the  mind  is  a  substance  is  not  to  assert  that 
it  is  a  hidden  substratum,  inert  and  permanent,  under  the  visible 
surface  of  conscious  processes,  or  that  it  is  a  concrete  being  distinct 
from   concrete    accidents,  and    separable  from  them.      There  is 
only  one  concrete  being  composed  of  substance  and  accidents,  and 
the  mind-substance  is  known  only  through  its  accidents  or  activ- 
ities.   The  mind  and  its  modifications  are  perceived  in  the  same 
experience.    To  argue,  with  Spencer  (Principles  of  Psychology, 
§59),  that  we  can  never  know  the  unmodified  substance  of  the  mind 
is  correct,  but  substantialists  never  made  such  a  claim.    Accord- 
ing to  them,  what  is  known  is  the  modified  substance  of  the  mind. 
The  surface  is,  as  it  were,  transparent,  so  that  to  perceive  actions 
at  the  surface  is  to  perceive  at  once  the  mind  as  acting.    In  gen- 
eral, to  perceive  the  accidents  is  also  to  perceive  at  once  the 
substance  in  which  they  inhere  and  from  which  they  proceed. 

II.  PROOFS  OF  THE  SUBSTANTIALITY 

i.  Facts.  —  We  may  first  insist  on  some  psychological  facts 
which  imply  the  substantiality  of  the  mind. 

(a)  Consciousness  clearly  testifies  that  I  am  the  subject  of  sen- 
sations and  of  other  mental  processes,  that  I  am  the  agent  which 
produces  certain  actions,  that  I  am  distinct  from  everybody  and 
everything  else,  and  that  I  subsist  in  myself.  That  is,  not  only 
does  consciousness  manifest  the  surface,  or  mental  processes,  it 
also  manifests  that  all  converge  to,  and  start  from,  the  same 


462  PHILOSOPHY     OF    MIND 

identical  centre,  notwithstanding  the  manifoldness  and  the  changes 
at  the  circumference.  The  same  intuition  reveals  both  the  proc- 
esses —  walking,  thinking,  feeling,  etc.  —  and  the  subject  to  which 
they  are  attributed  —  my  walking,  thinking,  and  feeling.  And 
not  only  the  present,  but  the  past,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  future 
are  referred  to  the  same  substance. 

(b)  Consciousness  testifies  that  I  am  active,  that  I  am  the  cause, 
not  merely  the  witness,  of  certain  activities;  not  a  simple  spec- 
tator, but  an  agent  and  an  active  source  of  energy.     "I  did  this, 
and  I  shall  do  that,  etc." 

(c)  The  mind  is  identical  and  permanent,  as  shown  by  the  fact 
of  memory.    Mental  processes  succeed  one  another  rapidly,  yet 
memory  preserves,  reproduces,  and  recognizes  them.    Without 
a  permanent  subject,  this  would  be  impossible,  for  the  reference 
of  a  present  image  or  perception  to  a  past  experience  supposes 
that  the  same  mind  is  the  witness  of  both.     The  act  of  memory 
implies  the  consciousness  of  self -identity,  that  is,  of  the  sameness 
of  the  mind  under  the  perpetual  flux  of  its  processes.    The  same 
conclusion  is  reached  from  the  various  modes  of  thought  which 
imply  succession,  and  consequently  memory.    In  judging  and 
reasoning,  the  mind  thinks  successively  several  terms  or  proposi- 
tions, and  holds  them  together  so  as  to  perceive  their  relations. 

2.  Reality  of  the  Substance  of  the  Mind.  —  (a)  These  psycho- 
logical facts  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  illusory  without  falling  into 
out-and-out  scepticism.  Since  they  are  real,  they  require  not 
merely  an  apparent  or  logical  subject,  but  a  real  subject;  not  indeed 
a  subject  separable  from  conscious  processes,  but  nevertheless  a 
subject  underlying  the  processes  through  which  it  is  known.  The 
"permanent  possibility  of  sensations,"  of  which  phenomenalists 
speak,  is  a  fact,  but,  as  this  possibility  is  real,  it  supposes  some  real 
being  on  which  it  is  based.  There  can  be  no  possibility  with- 
out an  agent  on  which  the  possibility  depends.  To  say  that 
an  event  is  possible  is  to  say  that  there  are  causes  capable  of 
producing  it. 

(b)  The  concrete  reality  of  the  mind  is  therefore  a  substance 
plus  its  modifications,  theQwo  being  indissolubly  united  both  in 
reality  and  in  our  knowledge  of  them,  yet  being  distinct.  To 


SUBSTANTIALITY     OF    THE    MIND         463 

refuse  to  accept  this  conclusion  is  to  make  of  the  processes  them- 
selves so  many  substances,  proceeding  from  no  agent,  inhering 
in  no  subject,  and  self-subsisting.  It  is  to  overlook  the  essential 
fact  of  the  unity  of  the  mind  under  its  many  processes.  It  is  to 
make  the  supposed  illusion  of  a  substantial  reality  impossible, 
since  this  illusion  itself  presupposes  the  real  unity  of  the  onlooker. 

III.  PHENOMENALISM 

The  foregoing  view  will  be  made  clearer  by  discussing  phe- 
nomenalism in  its  various  forms.  In  general,  as  its  name  indicates, 
phenomenalism  is  the  theory  reducing  the  mind  to  phenomena 
or  appearances,  and  denying  its  substantial  reality.  It  is  a  very 
common  view  to-day,  owing  to  the  prevalent  fear  of  "metaphys- 
ical entities."  A  mind-series  is  substituted  for  the  mind-sub- 
stance. The  mind  is  reduced  to  the  collection,  aggregate,  or 
succession  of  mental  states. 

1.  The  Present  Mental  State.  —  The  mind  cannot  be  merely 
the  present  mental  state,     (i)  This  state  itself  must  be  explained, 
and  there  can  be  no  thought  without  a  thinking  principle,  no 
action  without  an  agent.     (2)  The  present  state  is  transitory, 
and  the  facts  of  memory  and  recognition  require  something  per- 
manent to  account  for  the  possibility  of  recall.     (3)  As  far  as 
experience  informs  us,  we  do  not  always  think,  but  sometimes 
thought  seems  to  be  interrupted,  e.g.  in  sleep,  swoons,  etc.    Yet 
something  must  remain,  since  the  past  is  known  again  when 
consciousness  reappears. 

2.  The  Series  of  Mental  States.  —  The  mind  cannot  be  merely 
the  series  of  mental  states,  whether  it  be  described  as  a  "bundle" 
or  "collection  of  different  perceptions"  (Hume), or  as  the  "sum  of 
our  inner  experiences  "  (Hoffding),  or  as  "a  thread  of  conscious- 
ness supplemented  by  believed  possibilities  of  consciousness," 
"a  series  of  feelings  with  a  background  of  possibilities  of  feelings  " 
(Stuart  Mill).    Many  modern  psychologists  hold  similar  views. 
Ebbinghaus  illustrates  his  position  by  the  following  comparison. 
As  the  plant  is  composed  of  various  parts  (roots,  branches,  leaves, 
flowers,  etc.)  united  into  a  whole,  each  one  supported  by,  acting 
and  depending  on,  the  others,  and  their  totality  constituting  the 


464  PHILOSOPHY     OF    MIND 

plant,  which,  however,  is  not  a  substance  distinct  from  these 
parts,  so  the  mind  is  simply  a  system  of  numerous  realities  of 
consciousness,  closely  united,  and  causally  related.  James  speaks 
of  the  mind  as  a  stream  of  consciousness,  in  which  the  ego  is 
nothing  but  the  "real,  present,  onlooking,  remembering,  judging 
thought,"  which  appropriates  and  embodies  hi  itself  all  past 
experiences. 

(a)  A  series  implies  three  things,  a  multiplicity  of  elements,  their 
succession  in  time  or  space,  and  the  connection,  real  or  logical,  of 
the  several  units.    One  thing  cannot  form  a  series;  nor  is  a  bundle 
or  heap  of  things  a  series;  nor  finally  do  disparate  and  disconnected 
things  form  a  series,    (i)  The  mind-series  has  to  be  explained, 
and,  with  it,  the  facts  already  mentioned  of  personal  identity, 
memory,  judgment,  reasoning,  etc.    Each  unit  of  the  series  re- 
quires a  support  and  an  active  principle,  since  it  is  not  a  self-sub- 
sisting reality.     (2)  The  awareness  of  the  series  as  such  supposes  a 
permanent  and  identical  subject,  witness  of  the  present  and  of  the 
past.    If  there  is  no  mind-substance,  not  only  the  series,  but  even 
the  possibility  of  speaking  of  the  mind  as  a  series,  is  to  be  denied, 
since  the  awareness  of   manifoldness,  succession,  and  connection 
supposes  something  distinct  from  the  units  that  form  the  series. 
We  do  not  deny  that  there  is  a  mental  series  of  processes,  but  at 
the  same  time  we  assert  that  something  else  is  required  to  make  it 
possible.     (3)  The  addition  of  a  "permanent  possibility"  is  not 
enough,  since  possibility  means  the  presence  of  an  adequate  cause 
by  which  certain  effects  become  possible.    There  must  be  a  reason 
for  every  possibility. 

(b)  Taine  says  that,  as  two  or  three  horses  may  be  able  to  draw 
a  cart  which  one  horse  is  insufficient  to  draw,  so  several  states  to- 
gether may  stand  without  a  support  or  substance,  even  if  one  alone 
cannot  do  so.    Or  it  may  be  said  that,  although  one  blade  of  grass 
by  itself  cannot  stand  up  straight,  a  bundle  of  them  will  stand. 
Ebbinghaus's  comparison  mentioned  above  belongs  to  about  the 
same  type,     (i)  Horses  taken  individually  are  real  powers,  and 
each  blade  of  grass  has  some  power  of  resistance.    The  parts  of  the 
plant  are  material  and  substantial,  and  thus  can  support  one 
another.    But  mental  states  are  transitory  processes,  and  in  the 


SUBSTANTIALITY    OF    THE    MIND        465 

line  of  substance  every  one  of  them  is  a  zero.  To  add  them  will 
not  make  them  able  to  stand  by  themselves.  If  a  certain  quan- 
tity is  required  to  obtain  a  given  result,  the  addition  of  positive 
quantities  will  eventually  give  the  necessary  amount.  But  the 
addition  of  ciphers  will  never  give  a  positive  quantity.  (2)  The 
plant  is  a  "complex,"  as  Ebbinghaus  says,  but  not  so  much  a  com- 
plex of  processes  and  functions  as  of  parts  or  organs.  So  also  the 
mental  processes  and  functions  do  not  form  the  "mental  complex," 
except  through  the  unity  of  the  mind  whose  functions  they  are. 

(c)  The  mind  may  be  a  "stream  of  consciousness,"  but  it  must 
be  more,  (i)  It  cannot  be  proved  to  be  an  everflowing  and  never- 
interrupted  stream.  If  it  is  interrupted,  something  must  remain 
in  the  interval  to  connect  the  section  preceding  the  interruption 
with  the  section  that  follows  it.  (2)  The  comparison  with  a  stream 
would  lead  us  to  admit  a  source  from  which  the  stream  originates. 
(3)  To  say  that  a  mental  state,  i.e.  a  function,  appropriates 
all  those  that  have  taken  place  before  is  to  give  it  a  substan- 
tiality which  of  itself  it  has  not.  It  is  true,  as  James  says,  that 
the  same  herd  may  be  transmitted  rapidly  to  different  owners. 
But  the  difference  between  this  and  our  case  is  that  the  herdsman 
and  the  cattle  co-exist,  whereas  here  the  mental  states  are  succes- 
sive. Moreover,  the  herdsman  is  a  substance  distinct  from  the 
cattle,  not  a  mere  process.  (4)  Appropriation,  even  if  possible, 
would  not  yet  be  memory  and  recognition,  and  would  offer  no 
sufficient  explanation  of  them. 

In  conclusion  we  may  state  that  phenomenalism,  which  may  be 
sufficient  for  the  psychologist,  is  not  an  ultimate  or  philosophical 
explanation.  Either  it  cannot  account  for  all  the  facts  of  mental 
life;  or,  against  the  testimony  of  consciousness  and  the  common 
consent  of  psychologists,  it  makes  of  mental  states  so  many  sub- 
stances; or  finally  it  surreptitiously  introduces  in  fact  what  it 
denies  in  words,  a  mind-substance  or  something  which  is  supposed 
to  fulfil  its  functions. 

IV.  MULTIPLE  PERSONALITY 

i.  Facts.  (See  Psychology,  p.  197).  —  (i)  In  some  abnormal 
cases,  persons  have,  as  it  were,  two,  or  even  more,  different,  suc- 
31 


466  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

cessive,  and  apparently  independent  existences  which  we  may 
represent  as  A,  B,  Ai,  Bi,  A2,  B2,  A$,  £3,  etc.,  the  series  A 
forming  one  continuous  existence,  and  the  series  B  another.  In 
the  state  An,  the  subject  remembers  the  whole  series  A}  but  knows 
nothing  of  the  series  B.  In  the  state  Bn,  the  series  B  is  remem- 
bered, while  all  the  A  periods  are  so  many  blanks.  In  each  series 
mental  dispositions  may  be  widely  different;  A  will  speak  of  B  in 
the  third  person,  etc.  Hence  the  natural  conclusion:  The  mind 
cannot  be  one  substance  identical  with  itself  at  all  times.  (2) 
The  same  conclusion  is  inferred  from  certain  conditions  in  which 
two  "persons  "  seem  to  appear  simultaneously.  Thus  while  a 
man  is  wholly  intent  on  a  rational  conversation,  his  arm  will 
write  something  else,  also  very  rational,  and  the  person  himself 
will  not  even  be  conscious  of  this  action.  There  are  two  groups  of 
intellectual  activity  proceeding  independently. 

2.  Explanation  of  the  Facts.  —  The  facts  themselves  must  be 
accepted.  As  to  their  explanation,  it  requires  some  general  and 
some  more  special  remarks. 

(a)  General  remarks,  (i)  It  is  admitted  by  all  that  these  facts 
are  extraordinary,  rare,  and  abnormal.  We  must  always  be 
careful  in  basing  any  theory  on  such  facts,  and  in  leaving  the  clear 
testimony  of  normal  consciousness  for  the  obscure  testimony  which 
it  may  seem  to  give  in  abnormal  cases. 

(2)  The/ac/  (ontological)  of  identity  must  be  distinguished  from 
the  consciousness   (psychological)  of  identity.     There  may  be  a 
real,  yet  unperceived,  identity,  i.e.  there  may  be  at  the  surface 
different  manifestations  of  the  same  deeper  reality.    The  ego 
must  be  distinguished,  although  it  cannot  be  separated,  from  the 
states  of  the  ego. 

(3)  We  may  compare  these  abnormal  cases  with  normal  cases 
to  see  if  any  hints  can  be  found  leading  to  the  understanding  of 
the  former,     (a)  In  normal  cases,  the  conscious  conflict  of  ten- 
dencies, and  the  ensuing  struggle,  rather  go  to  prove  the  identity 
of  the  ego  who  witnesses  the  two  impulses,  and  who  experiences 
the  conflict,     (b)  There  are  slow  and  gradual  changes  in  charac- 
ter, and  sometimes  we  may  say  of  a  man  whom  we  knew  formerly 
that  he  has  changed  completely,  that  he  has  reformed,  that  he  is 


SUBSTANTIALITY     OF     THE     MIND        467 

no  longer  what  he  used  to  be,  etc.  (c)  There  are  also  more  sud- 
den and  more  radical  changes  for  better  or  for  worse,  sudden  con- 
versions and  downfalls,  (d)  Many  things  are  forgotten,  either 
individual  experiences  or  whole  series  of  experiences,  (e)  At 
times,  we  may  even  assume  different  "personalities  "  which  are 
illusory,  e.g.  hi  dream,  somnambulism,  hallucination,  hypno- 
tism. (/)  Actions  and  experiences  during  hypnosis  may  be  for- 
gotten altogether  in  the  normal  state,  but  recalled  hi  subsequent 
hypnosis.  The  hypnotizer  may  suggest  different  "personalities" 
to  the  subject. 

(b)  More  special  remarks,  (i)  Even  if  the  consciousness  of 
identity  disappears,  we  have  reasons  for  saying  that  the  fact  itself 
remains,  (a)  Frequently  in  one  of  the  series  there  is  the  memory 
of  some  of  the  things  that  have  been  experienced  in  the  other. 
(b)  Sometimes  one  of  the  series  predominates  and  includes  the 
knowledge  of  what  happens  in  the  other,  (c)  These  series  are  not 
altogether  strangers.  Generally  there  is  something  common  to 
both  (knowledge  of  language,  persons,  objects,  or  localities). 
(d)  Frequently  also  A  will  speak  of  B  as  a  stranger  and  in  the 
third  person,  and  this  is  a  sign  that  A  knows  B  and  is  aware  of  the 
change,  (e)  The  fact  that  A2  is  linked  with  Ai  after  an  interval 
during  which  B  has  appeared  shows  that  something  has  persisted 
to  link  the  present  with  the  past.  (2)  Simultaneous  manifesta- 
tions are  automatic  and  due  probably  to  the  dissociation  of  cer- 
tain cerebral  or  spinal  centres  from  the  others.  (3)  Hence  what 
we  have  here  is  in  reality  a  disease  of  memory  with  illusions  and 
hallucinations.  These  phenomena  are  due  to  organic  causes  which 
cannot  as  yet  be  assigned  definitely.  (4)  What  has  disappeared 
is  not  the  ego,  but  only  the  consciousness  of  identity.  There  are 
indications  that  the  surface  only  has  changed,  not  the  deeper 
reality. 

Hence  from  these  facts  no  objection  can  be  derived  against  the 
unity,  permanence,  and  substantiality  of  the  mind.  The  term 
"personality"  is  wrongly  applied  here,  and  psychologists  generally 
have  come  to  recognize  that,  from  these  abnormal  facts,  nothing 
can  be  inferred  against  the  unity  of  the  mind.  We  adhere  there- 
fore to  the  testimony  of  normal  consciousness,  and  hold  that  the 


468  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

mind  is  not  only  the  collection  or  series  of  conscious  states,  but 
their  common  centre,  subject,  and  agent,  a  real  substance  known  by 
the  same  indivisible  act  of  consciousness  which  manifests  the  surface 
or  circumference,  i.e.  the  processes  or  accidents. 


CHAPTER  II 

SPIRITUALITY 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 

1.  Its  Importance.  —  It  is  not  enough  to  know  that  the  human 
mind  is  more  than  the  series  of  mental  states,  and  that  it  is  a  sub- 
stantial and  permanent  principle.    We  must  now  examine  its 
nature  more  closely.    That  it  is  bound  to,  and  dependent  on, 
the  organism  is  an  obvious  fact.    For  the  present  we  shall  not 
examine  the  nature  of  this  union,  but  only  the  question  whether 
the  mind  itself  is  some  form  of  matter  or  of  material  energy,  and 
whether,  in  all  its  processes,  it  acts  with  the  intrinsic  cooperation 
of  the  organism.    This  question  is  of  primary  importance,  for  on 
it  depends  the  answer  to  the  questions  of  the  origin  and  destiny  of 
the  soul.    If  in  some  of  its  actions  the  soul  is  found  to  act  by  it- 
self, and  not  through  the  organism,  it  will  not  necessarily  share 
all  the  vicissitudes  of  the  organism. 

2.  Meaning  of  the  Terms  "  Material  "  and  "  Immaterial."  —  (a) 
A  thing  is  material  when  it  has  extension  and  is  composed  of  sev- 
eral parts.    This  is  matter  itself.    Or  a  thing  is  material  when, 
although  it  is  not  matter  itself,  it  cannot  exist  and  manifest  itself 
except   through  matter.    Physicists   oppose  matter   to   energy, 
although,  in  this  latter  sense,  energy  itself  must  be  called  material 
since  it  is  the  energy  of  matter.    The  vital  principle,  as  seen  in 
Cosmology,  must  also  be  called  material  in  this  sense,  since  all 
functions  of  the  living  organism  are  exercised  in  and  through 
matter. 

(b)  Hence  immateriality  may  mean:  (i)  Simplicity,  i.e.  the  ab- 
sence of  composition,  of  parts,  and  of  quantity,  even  though  there 
be  an  essential  dependence  on  matter  for  existence  and  the 
exercise  of  activity.  (2)  Spirituality,  i.e.  simplicity  plus  independ- 

469 


470  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

ence  from  matter,  or  the  aptitude  to  exist  and  act  without  mat- 
ter. It  is  important  to  keep  this  distinction  in  mind,  for  a  thing 
may  be  immaterial  in  the  first  sense,  and  yet  altogether  depend- 
ent on  matter  in  every  respect.  The  characteristic  features  of 
the  mind  are  generally  accepted  to  be  irreducible  to  those  of  mat- 
ter. The  physical  and  the  mental  are  acknowledged  to  be  alto- 
gether different.  Yet,  without  identifying  mind  and  matter, 
many  psychologists  do  not  admit  a  spiritual  soul,  independent  of 
the  organism  in  some  of  its  activities. 

II.  SIMPLICITY  OF  THE  SOUL 

Little  space  will  be  given  to  the  simplicity  of  the  soul  because  it 
is  not  the  exclusive  characteristic  of  the  human  soul,  and,  while 
differentiating  the  soul  from  matter,  it  does  not  show  whether  or 
not  it  is  so  essentially  bound  to  matter  as  to  be  unable  to  exist 
and  act  except  hi  and  through  the  body. 

1.  Ideas.  —  (a)  Thought  is  simple  and  indivisible.    There  is 
no  half  idea  or  third  of  an  idea.    The  idea  as  a  whole  is  either  pres- 
ent in  or  absent  from  the  mind.    Even  when  it  is  composed  of 
several  logical  elements,  the  idea  is  indivisible.    If  one  of  its  essen- 
tial elements  be  absent,  the  idea  ceases  to  be.    The  idea  of  "man  " 
or  "triangle,"  for  instance,  may  be  acquired  and  perfected  by  vari- 
ous mental  processes;  it  is  a  synthesis  of  several  essential  notes. 
But,  whether  it  be  complete  or  imperfect,  as  an  idea  it  is  a  single 
and  indivisible  mental  process. 

(b)  Were  the  mind  composed  of  parts,  this  would  not  be  possible. 
Suppose  these  parts  to  be  A  and  B.  Either  A  and  B  singly  would 
apprehend  the  whole  idea,  and  in  this  case  there  would  be  two 
ideas.  Or  A  would  apprehend  some,  and  B  other  elements  of  the 
same  idea,  and  this  again  is  contrary  to  experience  which  testi- 
fies that  the  idea  is  one  and  indivisible,  as  well  as  the  process  by 
which  it  is  made  present  in  the  mind.  Even  if  this  latter  suppo- 
sition were  accepted,  we  must  go  farther  and  deeper  beyond  A 
and  B,  to  a  simple  and  indivisible  unity  which  gathers  these 
elements  into  a  single  perception  and  apprehension. 

2.  Judgment  and  Reasoning.  —  The  same  argument  holds  for 
judgment,  reasoning,  and  volition.    The  same  mind,  or  simple 


SPIRITUALITY    OF    THE     SOUL  471 

reality,  must  apprehend  both  the  subject  and  the  predicate,  and 
their  relation  of  agreement  or  disagreement.  The  same  mind 
also  must  apprehend  three  judgments,  and  see  that  the  conclu- 
sion follows  from  the  premises.  The  act  of  choice  is  one  and 
simple,  although  several  alternatives  are  present  in  con- 
sciousness. 

3.  Reflection  shows  that  the  mind  is  not  composed  of  parts. 
A  material  substance  is  not  capable  of  reflecting  upon  itself.    A 
part  may  come  in  contact  with,  and  act  on,  another,  but  not 
reflect  totally  upon  itself. 

4.  The  Mind,  not  in  Space.  —  Wherever  there  is  matter,  there 
are  also  spatial  relations.    But  conscious  processes  are  not  in  space. 
An  idea  or  feeling  is  not  on  the  right  or  on  the  left  of  another.    It 
is  not  taller  or  shorter,  greater  or  smaller,  similar  or  different  in 
shape,  etc.,  because  it  is  free  from  all  quantitative  determinations. 


SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

Not  only  the  human,  but  also  the  animal  mind  is  immaterial, 
for  consciousness  can  never  be  reduced  to  matter.  To  examine 
the  question  whether  the  human  soul  is  spiritual  necessitates  a 
comparison  with  the  animal  mind  so  as  to  ascertain  if  these  two 
differ  essentially,  for  we  hold  that  the  human  mind  alone  is 
spiritual. 

I.  SPECIFIC  HUMAN  ACTIVITIES 

i.  General  Remarks.  —  (a)  Great  caution  is  necessary  in  inter- 
preting the  behavior  of  animals.  Even  when  their  actions  are 
similar  to  human  actions,  it  would  not  always  be  justifiable  to 
suppose  that  they  are  prompted  by  the  same  motives.  A  dog  may 
show  signs  of  "remorse"  because  it  remembers  past  experiences  of 
punishment,  whereas  in  man  remorse  springs  from  moral  and  reli- 
gious ideas.  Again,  the  so-called  education  of  animals  is  the  result 
of  sensory  associations,  whereas  human  education  is  due  to  per- 
sonal effort  and  the  possession  of  universal  ideas.  The  difficulty 
of  knowing  the  animal  mind  is  greater  owing  to  the  absence  of 
language,  for  we  know  the  mental  processes  of  other  men  chiefly 


472  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

from  what  they  tell  us.  The  principle  to  be  applied  is  that  no 
faculties  are  to  be  attributed  to  animals  unless  they  are  necessary 
to  explain  their  mode  of  activity. 

(b)  We  need  not  stop  to  consider  the  theory  of  Descartes,  who 
denies  that  animals  have  any  consciousness,  and  considers  them 
as  pure  physical  mechanisms.    The  presence  of  consciousness  in 
animals  is  as  clear  as  its  presence  in  men  other  than  ourselves. 
Although  they  cannot  speak,  they  give  unmistakable  signs  of  per- 
ception, feeling,  memory,  etc.,  and  by  analogy  we  conclude  with 
certainty  that    they   are    endowed  with  consciousness.      Their 
organism  also  presents  many  analogies  with  the  human  organism, 
especially  in  regard  to  the  nervous  system,  which  is  the  physical 
accompaniment  of  consciousness. 

(c)  The  primary  and  fundamental  difference  between  man  and 
animal  is  the  presence  in  the  former,  and  the  absence  in  the  latter, 
of  abstract,  universal,  and  necessary  knowledge. 

2.  That  Man  Possesses  Such  Knowledge  is  evident  from  psy- 
chology,    (i)  No  man,  however  ignorant  and  uncivilized,  fails  to 
recognize  certain  universal  and  necessary  principles,  e.g.  the  prin- 
ciple of  contradiction,  or  the  truth  that  two  and  two  are  four. 

(2)  Language  is  not  the  expression  of  concrete  feelings,  but  of 
thought  and  of  universal  ideas.    However  imperfect  and,  from 
our  point  of  view,  ungrammatical,  such  expressions  may  be,  and 
even  if  they  are  but  simple  gestures,  they  nevertheless  manifest 
universal  ideas.    They  are  rational  in  their  origin  and  character. 

(3)  Progress,  realized  by  passing  from  principles  to  consequences, 
from  laws  to  facts,  from  causes  to  effects,  etc.,  manifests  itself  in 
many  ways.     Civilization,  science,  both  speculative  and  practical, 
etc.,  are  the  results  of  combined  processes  of  induction  and  deduc- 
tion.    (4)  Man  is  not  a  mere  automaton.    Even  in  many  activ- 
ities that  are  common  to  him  and  to  animals,  he  can  use  self- 
control  derived  from  reflection.     (5)  Morality  and  religion  suppose 
the  knowledge  of  fundamental  principles,  of  universal  laws,  the 
sense  of  obligation,  the  demonstration  of  God's  existence  and  of 
man's  relations  with  Him. 

3.  That   Animals   Do   not   Possess   Universal   Knowledge   is 
evidenced  by  the  following  facts:     (i)  They  have  no  language. 


SPIRITUALITY     OF    THE     SOUL  473 

Although  some  are  capable  of  articulate  sounds,  it  is  clear  that  the 
manner  in  which  they  use  the  few  sentences  which  they  have 
learned  from  man  manifests  only  concrete  associations.  They  do 
not  know  the  meaning  of  what  they  say,  but  simply  remember  the 
result  which  is  wont  to  follow.  No  other  kind  of  rational  communi- 
cation, e.g.  by  gestures  or  the  use  of  signs  and  symbols,  is  ever  used 
by  animals.  Their  cries  and  movements  express  only  concrete  ideas 
and  feelings.  (2)  The  behavior  of  animals,  their  "progress"  and 
"education,"  manifest  no  reason.  They  adapt  means  to  ends, 
but  there  is  not  the  slightest  indication  that  they  do  so  from 
any  abstract  knowledge  of  the  end  and  of  the  aptitude  of  the 
means  to  reach  it.  Everything  can  be  accounted  for  by  sense- 
perception,  memory,  and  association.  The  wonderful  tales  of 
animal  "intelligence"  never  require  the  power  of  reasoning,  nor 
any  abstract  knowledge  of  cause  and  effect.  (3)  Moreover,  ani- 
mals act  in  a  uniform  manner  according  to  their  species.  They 
do  not  use  tools  or  instruments,  nor  sow  to  reap  a  harvest,  and, 
after  many  attempts  to  teach  them,  they  do  not  even  know  how  to 
light  a  fire  to  protect  themselves  from  the  cold.  To  a  certain 
extent  they  may  adapt  themselves  to  their  environment,  but  man 
alone  knows  how  to  adapt  his  environment  to  himself.  (4)  They 
manifest  no  morality  or  religion  of  any  kind,  no  freedom,  and, 
in  fact,  we  do  not  hold  them  morally  responsible,  nor  attribute  to 
them  right  or  wrong,  virtue  or  vice,  etc.,  in  the  moral  sense  of 
these  terms. 

4.  Conclusion.  —  Hence,  after  a  period  of  great  enthusiasm  in 
favor  of  animal  "intelligence."  during  which  all  human  faculties, 
at  least  in  a  rudimentary  form,  were  attributed  to  animals,  a  more 
accurate  study  of  their  behavior  has  led  the  most  serious  investi- 
gators to  conclude  that  animals  do  not  reason,  that  they  have  no 
"intellect,"  no  abstract  and  universal  ideas.  We  are  therefore 
justified  in  saying  that  between  the  cognitive  faculties  of  man  and 
those  of  animals,  there  exists  not  only  a  difference  in  degree,  but  a 
difference  in  kind.  Similar  in  many  respects,  and  having  many 
activities  in  common,  man  and  animal  differ  radically  on  some 
essential  points.  If,  on  this  account,  certain  prerogatives  must 
be  attributed  to  man,  they  need  not  belong  to  animals. 


474  PHILOSOPHY     OF     MIND 

II.  SPIRITUALITY  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

Two  groups  of  activity,  namely,  intellect  and  will,  show  that  the 
soul  is  spiritual. 

i.  Intellect.  —  (a)  It  has  been  shown  in  Psychology  that  the 
fundamental  function  of  the  intellect  is  abstraction,  and  that  the 
abstract  nature  of  the  concept  is  the  source  from  which  its  other 
characteristics  —  necessity,  universality,  independence  of  space 
and  time  —  flow  (pp.  92  ff.).  It  has  been  shown  also  that  this 
abstraction  cannot  be  identified  with  a  mere  association  or 
fusion  of  images  by  addition  or  subtraction.  Now  this  function 
cannot  be  the  function  of  a  material  organ.  A  material  organ 
can  perceive  only  that  which  acts  upon  it,  i.e.  that  which  is  mate- 
rial, concrete,  determined  in  space  and  time.  It  cannot  perceive 
the  abstract,  universal,  and  immaterial,  or  the  object  divested  of 
its  material  concrete  conditions  of  existence.  To  the  concrete 
function  of  a  material  organ  can  correspond  only  a  concrete  object. 
No  material  organ  can  perceive  the  general  ideas  of  triangle,  man, 
virtue,  justice,  beauty,  love,  friendship,  freedom,  relation,  pos- 
sibility, etc.,  because  these  cannot  act  upon  the  organ.  Still  less 
could  a  material  organ  perceive  an  object  purely  spiritual  like 
God  or  the  human  soul. 

(b)  The  existence  and  nature  of  necessary  judgments  has  also 
been  examined  in  Psychology  (p.  112  ff.).    Now  a  material  organ 
can  perceive  only  what  is.    The  necessity  and  universality  of  knowl- 
edge, the  logical  sequence  of  a  reasoning,  cannot  be  derived  from 
concrete  perceptions.    Necessary  judgments  are  not  the  result 
of  material  activity. 

(c)  The  human  mind  is  self-conscious;  it  knows  its  own  knowl- 
edge and  its  own  knowing  activity;  it  thinks  its  own  thought  and 
the  thinking  subject  itself.    Self-consciousness  cannot  be  organic. 
A  particle  of  matter  acts  on  another  particle,  but  not  on  itself, 
It  cannot  fold  itself  back  so  as  to  perceive  itself  and  its  own  activ- 
ity.   It  cannot  penetrate  itself  so  as  to  be  conscious  of  itself. 
Self-consciousness  is  therefore    essentially  spiritual,   since  it  is 
directly  opposed  to  what  we  know  of  matter. 

(d)  The  mode  of  exercise  of  the  intellect  is  different  from  that 


SPIRITUALITY    OF    THE     SOUL  475 

of  the  senses.  If  stimulated  by  too  great  a  stimulus  (light,  sound, 
heat,  etc.),  the  senses  are  so  fatigued  as  to  become  dull  or  impaired. 
The  intellect  never  finds  the  evidence,  clearness,  or  brightness 
of  a  conception  or  truth  too  great. 

2.  Will.  —  (a)  The  will  does  not  tend  only  to  concrete  goods, 
but  primarily  to  abstract  good,  i.e.  to  the  ratio  boni  incorporated 
in  every  concrete  good;  not  only,  for  instance,  to  an  individual 
good  action,  but  to  the  general  class  of  good  actions.    This  ten- 
dency, like  the  corresponding  knowledge  in  the  intellect,  is  a  sign 
of  spirituality,  for  an  organ  could  only  tend  to  concrete  sensible 
good. 

(b)  The  will  tends  to  the  immaterial,  the  possession  of  truth, 
virtue,  justice,  patriotism,  etc.    These  are  man's  noblest  aspira- 
tions which  cannot  be  rooted  in  the  organism  and  exercised  through 
an  organ.    The  fact  of  conscience,  the  sentiment  of  an  obligation, 
also  transcends  every  form  of  sense-experience. 

(c)  Freedom  is  a  sign  of  spirituality,  for  matter  is  governed  by 
necessary  laws,  and  the  sequence  of  causes  and  effects  is  invari- 
able.   Hence  a  free  volition,  a  choice,  cannot  be  the  function  of  a 
material  organ.     The  freedom  of  the  will,  known  as  a  fact  from 
psychology,  finds  its  only  possible  explanation  in  the  spirituality 
of  the  soul. 

3.  Summary.  —  The  human  mind  transcends  matter.    It  has 
activities  which  are  not  merely  different  from  those  of  matter,  but 
are  in  opposition  to  the  known  properties  of  matter,  and  there- 
fore are  not  exercised  through  the  material  organism.    These 
are  therefore  spiritual,  and  since  every  being  necessarily  acts  as 
it  is,  and  according  to  its  own  nature,  that  is,  since  there  must  be 
a  proportion  between  a  being  and  its  activities,  it  follows  that  the 
soul  which  exercises  certain  activities  independently  of  matter  is 
itself  independent  of  matter  or  spiritual.    The  nature  of  this  spirit- 
uality, however,  must  now  be  explained  more  accurately,  by 
indicating  exactly  what  the  above  arguments  prove. 

4.  Nature  of  This  Spirituality.  —  (a)  The  spirituality  of  the 
soul  is  not  manifested  by  all  its  operations,  but  only  by  those  of 
intellect  and  will.    Consciousness  in  general  is  no  sign  of  spirituality, 
because  certain  forms  of  consciousness  are  essentially  and  intrin- 


476  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

sically  bound  to  the  organism  so  as  to  be  the  functions,  not  of  the 
mind  alone,  but  of  the  organism  as  well.  Later  on  we  shall  see 
how  the  soul  is  related  to  the  organism. 

(b)  Even  for  intellectual  and  volitional  activities,  spirituality 
does  not  mean  absolute  and  complete  independence  of  the  soul  from 
matter.  As  was  explained  in  Psychology  (p.  98  ff.),  intellectual 
processes  start  with  the  data  of  the  senses  which  they  elaborate. 
Common  experience  shows  the  influence  of  the  organism  even  on 
the  highest  mental  functions.  (Cf.  p.  190.)  The  intellect  is,  as  it 
were,  a  new  faculty  grafted  on  the  senses,  and  giving  new  products 
for  which  the  senses  are  inadequate.  Hence  the  spirituality  of  the 
soul  means  that  the  subject  exercising  the  operations  of  intellect 
and  will  is  not  material,  and  consequently  not  organic;  that  its 
dependence  on  the  organism  is  not  a  subjective,  intrinsic,  or  imme- 
diate one,  but  a  mediate  and  extrinsic  dependence,  due  to  the 
intellect's  necessity  of  deriving  its  materials  from  the  senses. 

III.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  MATERIALISM 

i.  Meaning.  —  (a)  Materialism  in  general  asserts  that  there  is 
no  other  reality  than  matter  and  its  essential  forces.  In  psychol- 
ogy, materialism  rejects  the  existence  of  the  soul  as  a  distinct 
reality,  and  claims  that  all  mental  processes  are  functions  of  the 
organism.  The  cruder  and  older  forms  of  materialism  denied 
even  the  simplicity  of  the  mind.  The  more  recent  are  satisfied 
with  denying  its  spirituality.  There  are  many  forms,  not  only  of 
obvious  and  avowed,  but  also  of  disguised,  materialism,  and  to-day 
many  theories  that  go  by  other  names  are  materialistic.  They 
assert  an  intrinsic  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the  organism, 
especially  on  the  brain,  a  dependence  which  is  affirmed  as  the 
conclusion  of  scientific  facts. 

(b)  In  ancient  times  may  be  mentioned  Leucippus  and  Democ- 
ritus,  Epicurus  and  Lucretius.  The  French  materialism  of  the 
eighteenth  century  is  represented  especially  by  De  La  Mettrie, 
Helvetius,  D'Holbach,  and  Cabanis.  According  to  the  latter, 
"thought  is  a  secretion  of  the  brain."  The  German  materialism 
of  the  nineteenth  century  is  represented  especially  by  Vogt,  who 
holds  that  brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver  secretes  bile  and  as 


SPIRITUALITY     OF    THE     SOUL  477 

the  kidneys  secrete  urine;  Moleschott,  who  holds  that  thought 
is  an  inexplicable  motion  of  brain  matter;  and  Biichner,  who  denies 
that  thought  is  anything  material  like  a  secretion,  but  claims  that 
it  is  the  activity  itself  of  the  brain.  To-day  this  crude  material- 
ism is  commonly  rejected;  the  irreducibility  of  mind  and  matter 
is  recognized,  and  thought  is  not  conceived  as  anything  material, 
or  as  a  product,  movement,  or  activity  of  matter.  We  shall  see 
later  on,  however,  that  some  systems,  like  epiphenomenalism, 
parallelism,  monism,  are  frequently  materialistic. 

2.  Criticism.  —  The  fundamental  argument  of  materialism  as 
applied  to  the  mind  is  as  follows:  Where  there  is  no  brain  there  is 
no  thought.  Where  there  is  a  brain  there  is  thought.  Varia- 
tions in  consciousness  depend  on  the  quantity  and  quality  of  brain 
matter,  and  whatever  affects  the  brain  affects  also  even  the  high- 
est forms  of  intellectual  thought.  Moreover,  certain  forms  of 
thought  are  localized  in  certain  portions  of  the  brain.  What 
more,  according  to  the  rules  of  induction,  is  required  to  justify 
the  conclusion  that  thought  is  essentially  and  intrinsically  depend- 
ent on  the  brain?  that  it  is  a  function  of  the  brain?  that  the  brain 
is  the  organ  of  thought? 

We  shall  begin  with  a  few  remarks  on  the  general  value  of  this 
argument,  (i)  If  by  function  of  the  brain  is  meant  "mathemat- 
ical" function,  i.e.  concomitance  of  variations,  we  may  allow  the 
expression,  although  even  then  a  strict  concomitance  may  be  ques- 
tioned and  cannot  be  proved.  If  "physiological"  function  is 
meant,  i.e.  production,  nothing  proves  that  thought  is  a  function 
of  the  brain.  On  the  contrary,  sound  reason  disproves  it.  (2) 
The  assertion  that  the  brain  is  the  organ  of  thought  is  true  of  sensi- 
tive functions,  not  of  intellectual  functions  as  such.  Yet,  even  in  this 
latter  case,  the  brain  is  the  organ  which  furnishes  the  intellect  with  the 
materials  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  its  spiritual  activity.  (3)  Con- 
comitant variations,  even  if  they  were  proved  to  be  always  verified 
—  they  are  not — show  a  dependence,  but  not  necessarily  an  imme- 
diate and  intrinsic  one.  The  instrument  by  itself  does  not  pro- 
duce the  music,  and  yet  the  quality  of  the  music  depends  on  the 
quality  of  the  instrument,  that  is,  of  the  materials  which  are  at 
the  musician's  disposal.  In  order  to  prove  that  thought  is 


478  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

material  it  is  not  enough  to  show  that  it  has  material  ante- 
cedents, concomitants,  and  consequents;  its  nature  must  be 
examined  in  itself.  Beware  of  the  fallacy:  "Post  hoc,  ergo 
propter  hoc."  We  may  now  come  to  the  more  specific  assertions 
of  materialism. 

(a)  Although  we  must  admit  that,  in  a  general  way,  intelli- 
gence depends  on  the  brain,  this  fact,  as  already  indicated,  proves 
nothing  in  favor  of  materialism.    Moreover,  no  strict  parallelism 
can  be  asserted.    Attempts  to  make  the  amount  of  intelligence 
dependent  on  the  quantity  of  brain  matter    have    failed    mis- 
erably, both  for  the  whole  animal  series  and  for  different  men. 
Intelligence  is  in  proportion  neither  to  the  absolute  weight  of  the 
brain,  nor  to  its  weight  compared  to  the  total  weight  of  the  organ- 
ism, or  of  the  nervous  system,  or  of  the  encephalon;  nor  finally  is 
it  in  proportion  to  the  dimensions  of  the  brain.    This  is  recog- 
nized to-day  by  all  physiologists.    The  same  is  true  of  the  attempts 
to  make  intelligence  essentially  dependent  on  the  qualities  of  the 
brain,  e.g.  (the  amount  of  phosphorus;  the  number,  depth,  and  vari- 
ety of  the  convolutions).    No  equation  is  to  be  found. 

(b)  The  influence  of  the  organism,  especially  the  brain,  on  the 
intellect  is  certain,  and  has  been  outlined  in  Psychology  (p.  102). 
It  is  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  changes  hi  the  brain  affect  the 
quality  of  the  materials  offered  to  the  intellect. 

(c)  Psychophysics  and  physiological  psychology  measure  only 
the  physiological  concomitants  of  mental  states. 

(d)  Cerebral  localization   applies  only  to  movements,  and  to 
sensory  functions  on  which  the  intellect  depends  and  from  which 
it  cannot  be  separated.    In  fact,  higher   mental   functions  are 
localized  nowhere  in  the  brain. 

3.  Conclusion.  —  Hence  we  may  conclude  that  the  arguments  of 
materialists  are  not  proofs  against  the  spirituality  of  the  soul. 
They  were  known  to  all  spiritualists,  even  those  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  Thus  it  is  Saint  Thomas  who  wrote  that  "it  is  necessary 
for  man  to  have  a  brain  larger  in  proportion  to  his  body  than  all 
the  other  animals."  Why?  "To  facilitate  the  activity  of  inter- 
nal senses  that  are  necessary  to  intellectual  activity"  (Summa 
Theol.,  I,  91,  3  ad  i).  He  knows  that  if,  owing  to  organic  troubles, 


SPIRITUALITY    OF    THE     SOUL  479 

memory  or  imagination  be  impaired,  intellectual  faculties  are 
also  impaired,  even  with  regard  to  the  use  of  the  knowledge  already 
acquired  (I,  84,  7).  All  this,  because  "the  organism  is  necessary 
to  intellectual  activity,  not  as  the  organ  through  which  such  activ- 
ity is  exercised,  but  on  account  of  the  materials  on  which  it  is 
exercised"  (I,  75,  2  ad  3).  These  expressions  sum  up  the  main 
ideas  and  arguments  of  the  present  chapter. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  UNION  OF  THE  SOUL  WITH  THE  BODY 

That  the  human  soul  is  in  some  manner  united  with  an  organism, 
and  that  mind  and  body  exist  together  and  in  mutual  dependence, 
are  obvious  facts.  The  nature  of  this  union  and  its  consequences 
are  the  problems  to  be  examined  in  the  present  chapter. 

II.    THE  UNION  ITSELF 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 

i.  Union  Defined.  —  Several  things  are  said  to  be  united  when, 
in  some  respect,  they  may  truly  be  called  one.  According  to  the 
nature  of  the  resulting  unity  there  are  several  kinds  of  union. 

(a)  If  we  consider  the  place  in  which  things  are  located,  their 
mere  juxtaposition  produces  some  unity;  thus  many  stones  or 
bricks  together  form  one  heap.    This  unity  is  more  striking  when 
the  juxtaposition  realizes  a  plan,  like  that  of  the  stones  or  bricks 
which  are  used  to  build  one  house. 

(b)  If  we  consider  their  activities,  several  things  may  again  be 
united  in  several  ways,     (i)  There  may  be  several  actions,  all  of 
the  same  kind,  and,  as  it  were,  on  the  same  level,  and  tending  to 
the  same  result.    Thus  several  horses  unite  their  strength  to  pull 
a  heavy  wagon.     (2)  The  several  actions  tending  to  the  same  end 
may  be  on  different  levels  and  subordinated.     Thus  we  have  the 
pilot  steering  his  vessel,  or  the  rider  guiding  his  horse.      (3)    The 
union  may  consist  in  an  interaction,  each  substance  acting  on  the 
other.    Thus  the  fire  communicating  its  heat,  or  a  man  struggling 
with  another.    (4)  There  may  be  similarity  or  parallelism  of  action, 
due  to  the  fact  that  both  actions  result  from,  or  are  influenced  by, 
the  same  causes.    Thus  the  hands  on  several  dials  may  be  moved 

480 


UNION    OF    SOUL    WITH    BODY  481 

by  the  same  clock-mechanism.     (5)  Causality  and  dependence 
also  produce  some  unity,  e.g.  one  family,  one  dynasty,  etc. 

(c)  If  we  consider  the  perfection  or  complement  which  one  reality 
receives  from  another  we  have  two  kinds  of  union:     (i)  The  union 
of  a  quality  or  attribute  with  a  substance,  e.g.  the  shape  of  a  mate- 
rial substance,  the  science  or  virtue  of  a  man.     (2)  The  union  of 
two  principles  to  form  only  one  substance,  e.g.  matter  and  form, 
as  explained  in  Cosmology,  or  two  elements  forming  one  chemical 
compound. 

(d)  Here  the  problem  will  be  restricted  to  this:  Are  body  and 
soul  united  substantially,  i.e.  in  such  a  way  that  only  one  sub- 
stance results  from  their  union?    Or  are  they  united  accidentally, 
i.e.  in  such  a  way  that,  being  two '  distinct  substances,  they  are 
united  merely  by  their  juxtaposition  or  their  interaction?     It 
is  clear  that  this  question  is  identical  with  the  question:  What  is 
man?    Is  he  primarily  (i)  a  spirit  united  accidentally  with  an 
organism?    Or  (2)  an  organism  with  an  accidental  adjunct  of 
consciousness  and  intelligence?    Or  finally   (3)  both  mind  and 
organism  united  by  interaction,  or  by  a  substantial  union,  or 
by  the  fact  that  both  are  only  appearances  or  modes  of  the  same 
deeper  reality? 

2.  Theories.  —  The  opinions  concerning  the  nature  and  mode  of 
the  union  of  body  and  soul  are  chiefly  the  following: 

(a)  According  to  Malebrahche  (Occasionalism,  or  Theory  of 
Divine  Assistance)  and  Leibniz  (Preestablished  Harmony),  the 
union  is  more  apparent  than  real.  Both  agree  on  the  general 
principles  that  body  and  soul  are  two  distinct  and  complete  sub- 
stances, and  that  no  created  substance  can  ever  act  on  another. 

According  to  Malebranche,  the  apparent  interaction  is  due  to 
God's  intervention  in  each  and  every  case;  according  to  Leibniz, 
to  the  internal  evolution  of  body  and  mind  respectively,  an  evo- 
lution which  at  every  step  corresponds  in  both  substances,  and 
proceeds  harmoniously  owing  to  the  Creator's  infinite  wisdom. 
For  Malebranche,  soul  and  body  proceed  together  like  two  inde- 
pendent clocks  that  keep  the  same  time  because,  whenever  the 
hands  of  one  move,  God  moves  the  hands  of  the  other  correspond- 
ingly. On  the  occasion  of  some  organic  processes,  God  produces  in 
32 


482  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

the  mind  the  corresponding  conscious  process,  and,  on  the  occa- 
sion of  some  volition,  God  produces  in  the  organism  the  correspond- 
ing change.  For  Leibniz,  soul  and  body  proceed  together  like  two 
independent  clocks  that  keep  the  same  time  because  from  the  begin- 
ning they  were  so  constructed,  so  regulated,  and  endowed  with  such 
an  initial  motion  that  they  always  agree,  and  that  all  the  move- 
ments of  both  correspond.  The  soul  and  the  organism  have 
been  set  and  regulated  together  from  the  beginning,  and  their 
apparent  interaction  is  but  a  harmony,  and  a  perfect  agreement 
preestablished  by  God,  the  creator  of  both. 

To-day,  psychophysical  parallelism  is  the  offspring  of  these 
views.  Body  and  mind,  or  rather  the  bodily  and  the  mental  series, 
—  parallelists  are  also  phenomenalists  —  proceed  like  two  parallel 
lines,  keep  the  same  pace,  and  yet  never  come  in  contact  by  any 
interaction.  Parallelism,  as  a  psychological  theory,  is  generally 
explained  philosophically  on  a  monistic  basis:  Body  and  mind 
are  only  appearances  or  modes  of  the  same  underlying  reality. 

(b)  According   to  Descartes,  man  is  essentially  the  soul  or 
spirit.    The  soul  is  essentially  thought,  and  matter  is  essentially 
extension.    How  are  body  and  soul  united?    Descartes's  answer 
is  not  always  consistent,     (i)  Sometimes,  especially  when  answer- 
ing objections,  he  speaks  of  this  union  as  substantial.     (2)  Some- 
times also  he  speaks  of  the  interaction  of  two  distinct  substances. 
The  soul,  located  in  the  pineal  gland,  receives  impressions  from 
the  various  parts  of  the  organism,  and  sends  back  responses. 
(3)  Sometimes,  unable  to  understand  the  possibility  of  an  inter- 
action between  spirit  and  matter,  he  seems  to  give  up  the  problem 
as  hopeless.    To-day  by  those  who  admit  the  substantiality  and 
spirituality  of  the  soul,  interactionism  is  frequently  given  as  the 
bond  of  union,  although  it  is  not  explainable. 

(c)  A  few  philosophers,  like  Cudworth  (1617-1688)  and  Leclerc 
(1657-1736),  advocate  a  third  substance,  or  plastic  medium,  as  a 
means  of  union.     It  partakes  of  both  the  spiritual  and  the  mate- 
rial nature,  and  serves  to  unite  these  opposites.    To-day,  some 
spiritists  also  assume  a  body  composed  of  a  very  subtle  matter, 
which  they  call  the  astral  body. 

(d)  Psychological  monism  admits  only  one  substance,  which 


UNION    OF     SOUL    WITH    BODY  483 

manifests  itself  in  two  ways,  consciousness  and  extension.  These 
are  only  modes  and  appearances  of  one  and  the  same  reality  which 
is  unknown  and  unknowable,  and  which  is  neither  body  nor  mind. 
Some,  however,  give  preference  to  the  mind:  The  one  substance 
must  be  conceived  rather  as  mind  than  as  matter.  Others  give 
preference  to  the  organism,  which  is  a  conscious  automaton,  and 
would  act  in  exactly  the  same  way,  even  without  the  accidental 
adjunct  of  consciousness  which  is  an  epiphenomenon,  or  a  light 
thrown  off  by  certain  activities  of  the  nervous  system.  Suppress 
this  adjunct,  and  the  world  will  go  on  just  as  before,  since  conscious- 
ness cannot  act  on  the  organism. 

(e)  Aristotle  and  the  scholastics  hold  that  body  and  soul  are 
two  principles  united  in  one  complete  substance,  as  matter  and 
form.  Like  every  other  material  being,  man  is  a  composite  sub- 
stance, neither  body  nor  soul  separately,  but  the  one  substance 
resulting  from  the  intimate  union  of  both.  This  one  substance 
is  not,  as  in  monistic  theories,  a  primitive  unknown  substance  with 
two  manifestations,  but  the  result  of  the  union  of  two  co-principles. 
This  view  is  monistic  in  admitting  a  unity  of  substance;  dualistic 
in  admitting  two  principles  necessary  to  constitute  this  substance. 
(Cf.  above,  pp.  428,  430,  436  ff.). 

II.  MAN  ONE  COMPOSITE  SUBSTANCE 

i.  Man  One  Substance.  —  (a)  Among  the  functions  and  activ- 
ities which  man  calls  his  own  some  are  unconscious,  at  least 
generally,  like  digestion,  secretion,  and  circulation.  Others  are 
conscious,  either  purely  spiritual,  or  psychophysical,  i.e.  either  inde- 
pendent of,  or  dependent  intrinsically  on,  the  organism.  All 
these  are  attributed  to  the  same  subject:  I  live,  walk,  eat;  I  see, 
hear,  feel;  I  think,  understand,  reflect.  I  speak  of  my  body  and 
of  my  mind,  thereby  implying  that  neither  is  my  complete  being. 
This  fact  of  consciousness  shows  that  the  complete  man  is  not 
simply  the  organism,  nor  simply  the  soul,  but  something  one  result- 
ing from  the  union  of  both.  It  may  be  admitted  that  the  soul  is 
the  nobler  part,  but  to  say  that  it  is  the  whole  man,  using  the  body 
as  an  instrument,  guiding  and  directing  it,  is  to  overlook  one  part 
of  the  truth,  for  when  we  speak  of  ourselves  or  of  other  men,  we 


484  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

also  refer  to  the  organism.  The  fact  that  all  functions,  material 
and  spiritual,  belong  to  the  same  person  is  inexplicable  if  the  ego, 
including  body  and  soul,  is  not  one. 

(b)  Moreover,  the  harmony  of  bodily  and  mental  functions,  and 
their  mutual  dependence,  suppose  that  man  is  one  being  composed 
of  body  and  soul,  one  nature  tending  to  develop  all  its  activities 
for  the  good  of  the  whole  ego.    Why  should  an  intense  mental 
function  affect  organic  processes,  and  vice  versa,  if  mind  and 
organism  are  distinct  substances?    Why  should  mental  work  after 
a  meal  interfere  with  the  digestion  if  bodily  and  mental  energies 
are  altogether  distinct? 

(c)  These  facts  are  overlooked  by  all  theories  of  two  distinct 
substances,     (i)  We  need  not  stop  at  the  theories  of  occasional- 
ism and  preestablished  harmony.    Both  are  based  on   the   false 
assumption  that  creatures  are  incapable  of  activity.     The  mar- 
vellous structure  of   the  organism  becomes  meaningless,  and  all 
the  facts  of  physiological  psychology  are  unexplainable.     (2)  A 
plastic  mediator  will  not  restore  man's  substantial  unity.    Fur- 
thermore, it  is  an  impossibility,  for,  in  order  to  serve  as  a  binding 
link  between  matter  and  spirit,  it  should  be  both  spiritual  and  mate- 
rial, and  this  involves  a  contradiction.     (3)  As  to  interaction,  su- 
perior though  it  is  to  the  other  theories,  it  does  not  explain  man's 
real  unity,  and  it  makes  of  the  body  an  instrument  of  the  soul 
instead  of  an  intrinsic  part  of  man.    Moreover,  there  is  the  insu- 
perable difficulty  of  understanding  how  a  spiritual  substance  and 
matter  can  act  on  each  other,  since  no  contact  is  possible  between 
them.    The  soul,  therefore,  is  not  united  to  the  organism  like  the 
musician  to  his  lyre,  or  the  pilot  to  his  vessel  (Plato),  and  man  is 
not  simply  an  intelligence  that  uses  an  organism.    The  union  of 
body  and  soul  is  more  intimate,  so  as  to  form  one  substance  which 
is  man. 

2.  Union  of  Body  and  Soul.  —  (a)  The  only  mode  of  union 
which  will  account  for  this  fact  is  that  according  to  which  the  soul 
is  the  substantial  form  of  the  body.  If  body  and  soul  are  two 
complete  substances,  they  may  be  brought  close  together,  and 
conceived  as  acting  upon  each  other,  but  they  will  always  remain 
two  distinct  beings.  Hence  body  and  soul  must  be  looked  upon 


UNION     OF     SOUL    WITH    BODY  485 

as  substantial  principles,  as  primary  matter  and  substantial  form, 
each  one  incomplete  in  itself,  and  calling  for  the  other. 

(b)  Between  the  human  composite  and  other  material  beings, 
however,  there  is  an  important  difference.  In  man  the  "forma 
substantialis  "  is  itself  a  spiritual  substance,  which  is  not  altogether, 
and  for  all  its  operations,  intrinsically  bound  to  matter.  Other 
forms,  and  inferior  "souls,"  i.e.  the  vital  principles  of  plants  and 
animals,  exercise  no  activity  except  in  and  through  matter.  All 
the  activities  of  plants  and  animals  are  functions  neither  exclu- 
sively of  matter  nor  exclusively  of  the  vital  principle,  but  of  both 
together,  i.e.  of  the  animated  organism,  or,  if  you  choose,  of  the 
animating  soul. 

But,  while  the  whole  energy  of  the  human  body  comes  from  the 
soul  as  substantial  form,  the  soul  is  not  altogether  immersed  in 
matter.  In  addition  to  vital  and  sensory  activities  which  are 
exercised  through  the  animated  organism,  the  soul  has  also  spirit- 
ual activities  which  are  not  exercised  through  any  sense-organ. 
However,  even  for  its  spiritual  activities,  the  soul  is  not  a  pure 
spirit.  It  requires  the  organism,  since  the  senses  are  necessary 
to  supply  the  materials  of  spiritual  activities.  (Cf.  p.  475.) 
This  union  is  not  against,  but  in  strict  conformity  with,  the 
nature  of  the  human  soul. 

3.  Double-Aspect  Theory.  —  (a)  Descartes  estranged  body  and 
mind  from  each  other,  and  united  them  only  by  an  interaction. 
Spinoza  made  of  them  two  attributes  of  one  and  the  same  sub- 
stance, and  to-day  monism  or  new  Spinozism  advocates  the  same 
view.  There  is,  and  there  can  be,  no  interaction  of  mind  and  mat- 
ter. Yet,  as  science  shows  the  correspondence  of  both  series  of 
processes,  they  must  be  called  parallel.  As  they  are  different  in 
nature,  they  can  never  come  in  contact  with  each  other.  So  far 
this  view  is  psycho  physical  parallelism,  at  which  many  psychologists 
stop  without  going  farther. 

(b)  But  philosophy  asks  the  reason  of  this  parallelism.  The 
answer  is  given  in  the  identity-hypothesis  or  double-aspect  theory. 
Neither  the  body  nor  the  mind  are  substances;  they  are  only 
appearances  of  the  same  two-sided  reality.  They  are  like  the 
two  aspects  of  the  same  curve,  which  is  concave  from  within 


486  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

and  convex  from  without,  or  like  the  same  story  told  in  two 
languages,  or  the  same  sum  of  money  which  is  a  debt  for 
one  man  and  a  credit  for  another.  This  psychophysical  monism 
is  connected  with  panpsychism,  universal  monism,  evolutionism, 
and  agnosticism.  Frequently  also  it  is  but  a  covert  material- 
ism, when  the  one  reality  is  identified  with  some  form  of  matter, 
and  when  a  dependence  is  admitted  of  the  mind  on  the  organism, 
but  not  of  the  organism  on  the  mind. 

Criticism,  (a)  The  expression  "psychophysical  parallelism"  is 
objectionable;  how  can  we  speak  of  two  utterly  different  series  as 
being  parallel?  They  cannot  be  so  in  space  since  mental  processes 
are  not  spatial,  and  nothing  proves  that  they  are  so  in  time,  since 
nothing  proves  that  the  mental  series  is  continuous.  If  to  every 
mental  process  corresponds  an  organic  process,  there  are  appar- 
ently many  organic,  and  even  cerebral,  processes  that  are  not 
accompanied  by  any  consciousness.  Many  parallelists  inconsist- 
ently admit  that  the  psychical  series  is  determined  by  the  physio- 
logical. Moreover,  if  it  is  completed  by  the  identity-theory, 
parallelism  admits  that  parallels  do  meet  in  the  unity  of  their 
common  substance. 

(b)  As  to  the  "double-aspect"  theory,  it  has  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion: Is  the  double  aspect  universal  for  all  kinds  of  matter,  or  is 
the  mental  aspect  to  be  found  only  in  certain  beings?    If,  with 
some  monists,  we  admit  panpsychism  —  without  a  shred  of  evi- 
dence—  we  have  nevertheless  to  explain  how  two  irreducible 
series  can  come  from  the  same  principle.    If,  with  others,  we 
reject    panpsychism,   the    appearance   of    the  psychical  aspect 
remains  unexplained. 

(c)  To  make  of  man  a  conscious  automaton  is  opposed  to  con- 
sciousness, which  testifies  that  certain  movements  are  undertaken 
in  consequence  of  visual,  auditory,  etc.,  perceptions,  and  of  other 
states  of  consciousness.    Moreover,  the  evolution  of  the  individual 
and  of  the  race,  civilization,  inventions,  etc.,  are  due  to  the  desire 
of  producing  certain  pleasurable  feelings  of  comfort  and  pleasure, 
and  of  avoiding  painful  feelings.     Finally,  the  existence  of  other 
minds  is  known  only  indirectly  from  the  various  organic  expres- 
sions that  are  supposed  to  manifest  mental  states. 


CONSEQUENCES     OF     UNION  487 

(d)  The  expression  "identity-theory"  is  also  to  be  rejected. 
I  am  not  conscious  of  a  universal  substance,  identical  with  the 
one  substance  of  all  other  things,  but  of  my  own  substance,  includ- 
ing body  and  mind.  And  I  distinguish  this  substance  from  all 
other  inanimate  or  animate  substances.  Here  monists  take  ref- 
uge in  an  agnostic  position.  The  one  substance  of  all  things  is 
unknown  and  unknowable,  and  when  safely  intrenched  there, 
monists  are  proof  against  all  attacks,  for  no  question  can  be  asked 
them  concerning  what  they  declare  to  be  unknowable.  But  is  it 
logical  to  make  the  unknowable  account  for  things  known?  Many 
things  are  in  reality  unknowable,  but  the  unknowable  must  not 
be  made  contradictory  either  with  itself  or  with  known  facts  and 
the  clear  testimony  of  consciousness.  This  whole  question  will 
have  to  be  touched  upon  again  from  a  more  general  standpoint 
when  we  speak  of  monism  as  a  world-wide  theory. 

II.    CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  UNION 

1.  Only  One  Soul  in  Man.  —  The  arguments  presented  above 
not  only  show  that  man  is  one  substance,  and  that  the  soul  is 
the  substantial  form  of  the  body,  but  also  that  there  is  only  one 
soul  in  man,  which  is  at  once  the  principle  of  spiritual  activities, 
of  sensitive  processes,  and  of  vegetative,  i.e.  vital  functions.    Some 
philosophers  hold  that  there  is  a  special  vital  principle,  distinct 
from  the  principle  of  consciousness.    This  seems  to  break  the  sub- 
stantial unity  of  man  as  manifested  in  consciousness,  and  to  offer 
no  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  intimate  relations  between  the 
two  lives.    A  violent  emotion  may  disturb  the  organism,  and 
even  destroy  life.    In  a  number  of  ways  the  dependence  of  life 
on  the  mind,  and  vice  versa,  is  manifest.  (See  Psychology,  pp.  190 
ff.)    This  strengthens  the  testimony  of    consciousness  that  one 
and  the  same  substance  lives  and  is  also  conscious. 

2.  The  Seat  of  the  Soul.  —  We  cannot  speak  of  the  locus,  place, 
or  seat  of  the  soul  in  the  same  way  that  we  speak  of  the  place 
which  a  material  being  occupies,  because  the  soul,  being  spiritual, 
has  no  spatial  relations  (right,  left,  between,  surrounded  by,  etc.). 
Hence,  when  we  ask  where  the  soul  is,  we  do  not  speak  of  a 


488  PHILOSOPHYOF     MIND 

material  localization,  or  of  a  contact,  but  simply  of  a  substantial 
and  active  presence,  which  cannot  be  imagined  —  since  the  soul 
cannot  be  perceived  by  the  senses  —  but  only  understood,  and 
even  this  imperfectly,  owing  to  our  habits  of  thinking  of  every- 
thing in  terms  of  matter. 

Since  the  soul  is  the  substantial  form  and  the  principle  of  life 
of  the  human  organism,  it  follows  that  it  is  not  only  in  one  part 
of  the  body,  but  in  the  whole  body  which  it  animates,  not  as  water 
in  a  sponge,  or  blood  in  the  veins,  but  as  a  co-principle,  an  indivis- 
ible substance  exercising  its  activity  through  the  organism.  The 
soul,  however,  does  not  exercise  its  whole  activity  through  the  whole 
organism.  Different  functions  require  different  organs,  and  hence 
are  localized  in  these  respective  organs :  vision  in  the  visual,  hear- 
ing in  the  auditory,  organs;  memory  in  the  brain,  etc.  As  to  the 
spiritual  activities,  they  are  not  exercised  through  the  intrinsic 
cooperation  of  the  material  co-principle,  but  by  the  soul  alone, 
as  explained  above. 

3.  Faculties.  —  (i)  The  soul  is  one  and,  together  with  the 
organism,  forms  the  human  substance.  (2)  As  it  is  simple  and 
indivisible,  faculties  cannot  be  parts  of  the  soul.  (3)  As  it  is  the 
principle  of  all  determinations  and  activities  in  the  body,  faculties 
cannot  mean  distinct  agents,  independent  of  the  soul,  acting  and 
reacting  upon  one  another  like  so  many  substances.  But  with- 
out meaning  this,  faculties  may  mean  more  than  mere  classifica- 
tions or  labels  of  functions.  They  mean  the  various  modes  of 
activity  of  the  soul,  exercised  either  by  the  soul  alone  —  spiritual 
faculties  —  or  by  the  soul  and  the  organism  united  in  one 
common  principle  —  faculties  of  the  compositum. 

From  what  has  been  said  on  the  seat  of  the  soul  in  the  organism, 
it  is  clear  that  organic  faculties  are  classified  according  to  the  vari- 
ous functions  of  different  organs.  Hence  some  persons  have 
the  exercise  of  faculties  lacking  in  others.  Vision  is  absent 
in  the  blind  because  the  necessary  conditions  are  not  verified. 
If  these  were  restored,  the  radical  faculty  would  become  capable 
of  exercise.  It  is  impossible  to  determine  the  number  of  distinct 
faculties;  we  can  only  group  them  according  to  different  points 
of  view.  Thus  from  one  point  of  view  we  may  have  vegetative, 


CONSEQUENCES     OF     UNION  489 

sensitive,  and  intellectual  faculties;  from  another,  knowledge, 
feelings,  and  will;  from  another,  faculties  of  immanent  or  of 
transitive  activity,  etc. 

4.  Mutual  Dependence  of  Organism  and  Mind.  —  In  Psychol- 
ogy (p.  190  ff.)  mention  was  made  of  the  reciprocal  influences  of 
body  and  mind.    We  understand  now  how  they  must  be  conceived. 
Not  as  if  body  and  mind  were  two  distinct  substances,  or  two 
distinct  agents,  acting  upon  each  other.    They  rather  act  together. 
Their  union  does  not  consist  in  an  interaction,  or  mutual  influ- 
ence, but  their  mutual  influence  is  the  result  of  their  substantial 
union.    We  have  not  so  much  an  interaction  as  a  "  simulaction," 
since  body  and  mind  form  one  man  and  one  complete  principle  of 
activity.    Owing  to  this  intimate  union,  whatever  affects  one  also 
affects  the  other. 

5.  Definitions.  —  (i)  The  human  soul  is  not  only  thought,  or 
the  power  of  thinking,  as  Descartes  claimed.    It  has  other  func- 
tions equally  essential.    It  is  a  spiritual  substance,  in  the  sense 
already  explained,  destined,  however,   to  be  essentially  united 
with,  and  to  give  life  to,  the  body.     (2)  Man  is  not  merely  a  spirit 
or  intelligence;   nor  simply  an  organism,  but  the  one  substance 
composed  of  two  principles.    He  is  body  and  mind  united  in  one 
complete  substance. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ORIGIN  OF  THE  SOUL  AND  OF  MAN 

The  Problem  Stated.  —  (a)  In  the  problem  of  origin  several 
questions  must  be  distinguished.  Owing  to  its  spiritual  nature, 
the  soul's  origin  must  be  studied  apart  from  that  of  the  organism. 
Moreover,  the  problem  may  refer  either  to  the  origin  of  individual 
men  —  organism  or  soul  —  now,  in  the  present  condition  of  man; 
or  to  the  origin  of  the  first  man.  Hence  the  following  questions: 
(i)  Origin  of  the  human  organism.  (2)  Origin  of  the  human  soul. 
(3)  Antiquity  and  specific  unity  of  mankind. 

(b)  The  main  suppositions  that  can  be  made  are  the  following: 
(i)  The  first  man  was  created  by  God,  both  as  to  his  body  and  as 
to  his  soul.  At  present,  however,  the  organism  arises  by  way  of 
generation,  and  the  soul  (a)  arises  also  by  generation,  or  (b)  is 
directly  created  by  God.  (2)  The  first  man's  soul  was  created 
by  God  —  and  subsequent  souls  originate  in  either  way  mentioned 
above.  His  organism  was  the  result  of  an  evolution  from  lower 
forms  of  animal  life.  (3)  The  whole  man,  body  and  soul,  is  a 
product  qf  evolution. 

I.    THE  HUMAN  ORGANISM 

It  is  clear  that  actually  the  human  organism  arises  by  a  process 
of  generation  similar  to  that  which  takes  place  in  other  living 
beings.  Arising  from  a  primitive  cell,  it  gradually  develops  into 
a  complete  organism.  Hence  the  present  question  refers  only  to  the 
appearance  of  the  first  human  organism.  We  know  that  man  did 
not  always  exist.  Did  his  organism  arise  by  a  direct  creation  of 
God,  or  by  an  evolution  from  other  types  which  existed  before  man 
appeared  on  the  earth? 

I.  THE  EVIDENCE 

N.B.  Transformists  do  not  claim  that  man  evolved  out  of  any 
actually  existing  type,  but  that  man  and  the  higher  apes,  known 

490 


ORIGIN     OF     ORGANISM  491 

as  anthropoid,  sprang  from  a  common  ancestor  less  differen- 
tiated than  either  man  or  ape. 

1.  Arguments  for  Descent.  —  It  must  be  admitted  that  many  of 
the  arguments  brought  forward  in  Cosmology  in  favor  of  the  the- 
ory of  transformism  apply  also  to  man,  and  the  remarks  made 
there  on  the  value  of  these  arguments  must  be  kept  in  mind. 
Thus  there  is  a  morphological  resemblance  —  on  the  main  lines  — 
between  the  human  and  other  vertebrate  organisms.    A  similar 
chemical  composition  of  the  blood  and  the  tissues  may  also  be 
pointed  out.     Rudimentary  organs  may  be  indicated.     Embry- 
ology may  show  that  the  human  organism  develops  in  a  manner 
closely  resembling  that  of  other  vertebrates.    When  all  this  has 
been  done  —  and  it  has  frequently  been  done  in  a  one-sided  way 
in  order  to  prove  a  thesis  —  the  fact  of  descent  remains  unproved, 
and  transformism,  when  applied  to  man,  as  well  as  in  the  case  of 
many  other  forms  of  life,  is  a  mere  hypothesis. 

2.  Difficulties.  —  (a)  Resemblances  must  not  make  us  overlook 
differences,  among  which  may  be  mentioned  the  vertical  attitude, 
and  the  adaptation  of  the  lower  limbs  for  this  purpose;  the  relative 
length  of  arms,  much  shorter  in  man  than  in  the  ape;  the  general 
morphology  of  the  head;  the  absence  of  hair,  etc.;  and  especially 
the  quantitative  and  qualitative  development  of  the  brain. 

(b)  The  main  stumbling-block  of  the  theory  of  descent  is  the 
absence  of  paleontological  evidence,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  man  is  of  comparatively  recent  origin,  hence  that  remains 
of  forms  of  transition  should  be  found  more  easily,  and  that  dili- 
gent research  has  been  made  in  this  direction,  in  order  to  find  the 
much  sought  for  "missing  link."  That  such  "missing  link  " 
between  man  and  ape  does  not  now  exist  is  admitted.  As  to  its 
existence  in  the  past,  much  ado  has  been  made  about  the  discov- 
ery of  certain  fossils,  especially  skulls,  which,  however,  more  calm 
and  reflective  science  has  shown  to  belong  certainly  either  to  apes 
or  to  well-developed  races  of  men. 

II.  CONCLUSIONS 

i.  Scientifically,  i.e.  judging  only  from  the  facts  at  hand,  the 
theory  of  descent  as  applied  to  the  human  body  is  not  proved, 


492  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

but  remains  a  mere  hypothesis  with  insufficient  evidence.  This 
is  acknowledged  by  the  best  scientists,  who  are  not  led  by  a  priori 
conceptions,  but  want  their  conclusions  to  rest  on  established  facts. 
To  give  more  or  less  vivid  pictures  of  "primitive  man,"  and  of 
his  evolution  out  of  inferior  organisms  to  the  present  form,  to 
indulge  in  numberless  suppositions,  is  to  pass  from  the  realm  of 
science  to  that  of  imagination,  and  to  take  dreams  for  realities. 

2.  Philosophically  there  is  nothing  contradictory  or  unlikely 
in  the  theory  of  descent  as  applied  to  the  human  organism  any 
more  than  in  the  general  theory  of  evolution.  It  is  a  question  of 
fact  which  is  not  to  be  answered  a  priori. 

II.    THE  HUMAN  SOUL 

By  zoologists  man  is  classified  —  and  rightly  —  as  a  vertebrate 
and  a  mammal  with  certain  anatomical  and  physiological  charac- 
teristics. Rightly,  I  say,  because  zoology  considers  only  one  aspect 
of  man,  namely,  his  organism.  But  there  is  something  more  in 
man.  The  reason  for  differentiating  him  essentially  from  animals 
is  not  his  organism,  but  his  soul.  Zoology  is  not  competent  to 
pass  a  final  judgment  on  the  place  of  the  whole  man  in  nature,  for 
it  leaves  out  of  consideration  man's  nobler  part,  namely,  his  mind. 

I.  THE  FIRST  HUMAN  SOUL 

i.  Not  a  Result  of  Evolution.  —  (a)  Starting  either  from  zoolog- 
ical considerations  or  from  monistic  views  of  a  universal  evolution, 
certain  philosophers  are  led  to  assert  that  the  whole  man,  body 
and  mind,  is  the  result  of  evolution.  Hence,  for  them,  the  necessity 
of  admitting  between  the  human  and  the  animal  mind,  not  a  spe- 
cific difference,  but  only  a  difference  of  degree.  Animals  must 
have  at  least  rudiments  of  whatever  mental  manifestations  are 
found  in  man.  Either  the  human  mind  is  animalized,  i.e.  lowered 
so  as  to  show  that  all  its  activities  are  reducible  to  sensory  activ- 
ities, and  that,  in  consequence,  it  is  not  spiritual;  or  the  animal 
mind  is  humanized,  i.e.  raised  so  as  to  show  that  it  possesses  — 
at  least  in  some  degree  —  the  specifically  human  activities.  By 
this  twofold  process  the  human  mind  is  successfully  (?)  linked 
to  the  animal  mind,  and  the  obstacle  to  evolution  removed. 


ORIGIN     OF     SOUL  493 

(6)  But,  as  was  shown  when  we  spoke  of  the  soul's  spirituality, 
to  interpret  the  actions  of  animals  humano  modo,  i.e.  to  assert 
that  animals  act  in  the  same  way,  and  from  the  same  motives  as 
man,  should  not  be  done  when  we  have  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
To  any  fact  only  the  minimum  of  necessary  cause  should  be  as- 
cribed, since  the  surplus,  i.e.  that  which  is  over  and  above  the  strict 
requisite,  is  asserted  gratuitously.  After  a  great  deal  of  talk  about 
animal  intelligence,  it  is  commonly  accepted  to-day  that  the  power 
of  abstract  and  universal  thought  remains  the  fundamental  dis- 
tinctive feature  of  the  human  mind.  It  constitutes  an  impas- 
sable gulf  between  animal  and  man. 

2.  Created  by  God.  —  How  could  this  gulf  be  bridged  over? 
How  could  a  difference  in  kind  arise?  How  could  the  first  man's 
spiritual  soul  be  produced?  Some  simply  assert  that  they  do  not 
know,  and  that  some  cause  unknown  to  science  must  have  been 
at  work.  This  is  a  strictly  scientific  position.  Others,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  philosophy,  recognize  the  intervention  of  God's 
creative  power.  Only  an  infinite  cause  can  bring  to  existence  some- 
thing out  of  nothing.  The  spiritual  cannot  arise  from  the  mate- 
rial. Hence,  whatever  be  said  of  the  human  organism,  the  human 
soul  at  least  is  the  direct  work  of  God.  This  view  supposes,  of 
course,  what  will  be  said  in  Theodicy  concerning  God's  existence 
and  nature. 

II.  SUBSEQUENT  HUMAN  SOULS 

i.  Various  Opinions.  —  If  God's  creative  act  was  necessary  for 
the  production  of  the  first  human  soul,  is  it  so  for  subsequent 
human  souls?  Or  can  the  parents  transmit  to  their  offspring,  not 
only  organic  life,  but  also  the  spiritual  soul  which  animates  the 
organism,  and  yet  in  some  of  its  activities  is  independent  of  it? 
This  problem  is  distinct  from  the  preceding,  for  in  the  present  case 
the  parents  are  endowed  already  with  a  spiritual  soul.  Two 
main  solutions  are  offered:  (i)  Every  individual  soul  is  created 
directly  by  God.  (2)  The  soul  of  the  offspring  comes  from  the 
parents  either  (a)  by  the  material  organic  process  of  generation,  or 
(b)  by  a  kind  of  spiritual  generation  in  which  the  offspring's  soul 
is  derived  from  the  parental  soul.  Of  these  solutions  (i),  or 


494  PHILOSOPHY    OF    MIND 

creationism,  is  commonly  accepted  by  Catholic  philosophers  and 
theologians;  (2,  a),  or  traducianism,  was  held  by  Tertullian;  (2, 
Z>),  or  generationism,  was  held  by  a  few  Catholic  theologians, 
especially  Froschammer,  who  was  reproved  by  the  Church. 

2.  Criticism.  —  (a)  (i)    Traducianism  is  impossible.     Either  it 
denies  the  spirituality  of  the  soul;  or,  if  it  admits  it,  it  does  not 
assign  to  the  soul  an  adequate  cause,  since  spirit  cannot  arise  from 
matter.     (2)  Generationism  is  also  impossible.    A  spiritual  semen 
would  suppose  the  division  of  the  parents'  soul,  and  this  is  opposed 
to  the  very  spirituality  and  indivisibility  of  the  soul.     (3)  Hence, 
since  the  soul  cannot   originate    from  any  preexistent  reality, 
whether  material  or  spiritual,  the  only  possible  mode  of  production 
of  the  soul  is  a  production  out  of  nothing,  i.e.  a  creation.    Is  there 
any  other  possibility  which  the  necessity  hi  which  we  are  of  think- 
ing of  spiritual  substances  according  to  material  analogies  pre- 
vents us  from  knowing?    To  this  no  answer  can  be  given. 

(b)  We  may  note  that  (i)  the  divine  creation  of  every  individual 
soul  is  not  a  miracle,  but  an  action  strictly  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  nature,  since  it  is  the  nature  of  the  soul  to  be  unproducible 
in  any  other  way;  (2)  the  parents  are  really  parents  since  their 
action  is  the  cause  of  a  human  being,  just  as  we  say  that  the  mur- 
derer kills  a  man  although  he  does  not  destroy  his  soul,  which, 
as  we  shall  see,  is  immortal;  (3)  heredity  is  easily  explained  by 
the  dependence  of  the  mind  on  the  organism. 

3.  Time  of  Origin.  —  At  what  tune  does  the  soul  begin  to  exist? 
Some  suppose  that  souls  exist  before  the  organism.    Thus  Plato, 
many  Origenists,  and  Leibniz.     This  theory  of  preexistence  is 
frequently  held  in  connection  with  metempsychosis  (Pythagoras), 
or  the  doctrine  of  reincarnation  advocated  by  Eastern  thinkers, 
and  by  theosophists.    But  we  say  that  the  soul  is  produced  only  at 
the  time  of  its  union  with  the  organism.    Preexistence  is  a  purely 
gratuitous  assertion  without  the  slightest  evidence.    Moreover, 
since  the  soul  is  naturally  the  form  of  the  body,  it  follows  that  it 
must  begin  to  exist  when  the  time  comes  for  it  to  "inform  "  the 
body.      When  is  this  time?    Is  it  immediately  at  conception,  so 
that  the  first  principle  of  life  is  the  spiritual  soul?    Or  is  it  some 
time  later  so  that  at  first  the  principle  of  life  is  of  an  inferior  kind, 


MANKIND  495 

and  animates  the  organism  until  it  is  sufficiently  developed  to 
receive  the  spiritual  soul?  This  cannot  be  determined,  but  the 
former  opinion  is  the  more  common  to-day. 

III.    MANKIND 

The  questions  of  the  specific  unity  and  antiquity  of  mankind 
are  to  be  answered  by  geological,  ethnological,  and  anthropolog- 
ical sciences.  Here  we  shall  simply  give  the  main  conclusions 
without  entering  into  the  detailed  account  of  the  facts  on  which 
they  are  based. 

I.  SPECIFIC  UNITY  OF  MANKIND 

The  question  of  the  specific  unity  of  mankind  is  not  identical 
with  the  question  of  the  community  of  origin  from  the  same  first 
ancestors.  Both  questions,  however,  are  closely  connected.  If 
all  men  belong  to  the  same  species,  it  is  at  once,  if  not  demonstrated, 
at  least  highly  probable,  that  all  come  from  the  same  first  parents. 
And,  in  fact,  historically  the  two  questions  have  been  looked  upon 
as  correlative. 

i.  Races.  —  Some  differences  are  always  found  between  indi- 
vidual men.  Much  more  striking  are  the  differences  between  cer- 
tain groups  of  men  forming  what  has  been  called  different  races  — 
e.g.  differences  in  color,  size,  relative  development  of  certain  parts, 
hair,  etc.  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  classify  the  vari- 
ous races  of  mankind  according  to  some  characteristic  feature. 
As  a  basis  some  have  taken  the  color  of  the  skin ;  others  the  facial 
angle;  others  the  peculiarities  of  the  hair;  others  the  geographical 
distribution;  others  the  language,  etc.  It  is  admitted  that  none 
of  these  classifications  is  perfectly  satisfactory,  as  there  is  no  clear- 
cut  distinction  between  the  many  human  types. 

However,  such  classifications  are  useful,  and  among  the  main 
ones  may  be  mentioned  the  following.  Blumenbach  distinguishes 
five  races:  Caucasian  (white),  Mongolian  (yellow),  Ethiopian 
(black),  American  (red),  and  Malay  (brown).  Cuvier  distinguishes 
three  races:  Caucasian  (white),  Mongolian  (yellow),  and  Negro 
(black).  Huxley  admits  four  races:  Australioid,  Negroid,  Mongo- 
loid, and  Xantocroic  (white).  Others  have  admitted  many  more 


496  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

distinct  races,  while  those  who  admit  a  smaller  number  are  obliged 
to  subdivide  them. 

2.  Unity  of  Species. — While  we  must  admit  several  races  or  vari- 
eties of  men,  there  is  absolutely  no  reason  for  admitting  several 
species.  Facts,  on  the  contrary,  show  the  specific  unity  of 
mankind. 

(a)  All  men  have  the  same  anatomical  organization  and  physio- 
logical functions  (upright  attitude,  blood  temperature,  number  of 
teeth  and  bones,  general  structure,  etc.).     Interracial  fecundity  is 
also  general,  and  the  offspring  of  parents  belonging  to  different 
races  are  also  prolific.    Finally  all  have  the  same  essential  and 
fundamental  characteristics  of  intelligence,  e.g.  language,  use  of 
tools,  religion,  capacity  for  progress,  etc. 

(b)  The  differences  between  human  races  are  less  important  than 
the  differences  within  certain    animal  and  vegetable  groups  the 
common  origin  of  which  is  beyond  doubt.    These  differences  can 
be  explained  easily  by  the  influence  of  surroundings,  climate,  food, 
isolation  from,  or   association  with,  other   men,  etc.    The  main 
differences  between  men   do   not  indicate   a   specific   diversity. 
Everywhere  and  at  all  times  man  is  truly  man,  and  has  the  same 
essential  characteristics. 

II.  ANTIQUITY  OF  MAN 

i.  The  Question.  —  History  cannot  tell  us  how  long  man  has 
existed  on  the  earth,  because  it  always  refers  to  groups  of  men 
already  in  existence.  Moreover,  the  chronology  of  early  histor- 
ical documents  is  most  uncertain.  Hence  recourse  must  be  had 
to  natural  sciences,  especially  geology,  so  as  to  find  traces  of 
man  in  the  form  either  of  fossil  remains  or  of  tools  and  results  of 
human  activity.  This  can  never  lead  to  an  accurate  chronology, 
because  geologists  differ  widely  as  to  the  time  necessary  for  the  for- 
mation of  the  various  strata  of  the  earth.  The  existence  of  man  in 
the  tertiary  era  is,  to  say  the  least,  very  doubtful.  The  first  un- 
mistakable signs  of  the  existence  of  man  are  found  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  quaternary  era.  How  long  a  time  has  elapsed  since  then 
it  is  impossible  to  determine.  Some  give  as  high  a  number  as  2  50,000 
or  300,000  years,  but  without  sufficient  foundation,  as  this  lapse  of 


MANKIND 


497 


time  does  not  seem  necessary  to  explain  the  transformations  of 
the  earth.    Nothing  certain  can  be  said  on  this  point. 

2.  Primitive  Man.  —  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  primi- 
tive state  of  man  was  a  state  of  savagery,  but  rather  that  the  state 
of  savagery  is  one  of  degradation  and  degeneration  from  a  higher 
condition.  Evolutionists  generally  hold  the  contrary.  For  them, 
the  savage  is  the  backward  man,  less  evolved,  nearer  to  primitive 
man,  and  therefore  to  animality.  It  is  impossible  to  reach  any 
general  law  applicable  to  all  cases.  We  may,  however,  state  the 
following  facts. 

(a)  Through  the  successive  ages  of  man's  existence,  no  essential 
physical  differences  are  observed  in  human  fossils,  and  the  differ- 
ences between  races  now  extinct  and  those  existing  to-day  are  not 
greater  than  the  differences  between  the  various  actual  races. 

(b)  Unmistakable  signs  of  true  intelligence,  and  of  a  truly  human 
mind,  are  found  wherever  primitive  man  existed.    That  he  did 
not  have  so  much  science,  comfort,  or  what  we  call  civilization,  is 
certain;  but  it  is  no  less  certain  that  he  had  the  use  of  reason  as 
well  as  we  have,  based  on  the  same  power  of  abstract  and  univer- 
sal knowledge.    And  even  to-day,  whether  a  child  will  be  a  simple 
countryman  or  a  great  scientist  depends  greatly  on  circumstances, 
and  the  countryman  may  have  more  intelligence  than  the  scien- 
tist, even  if  he  lacked  the  opportunity  to  develop  or  manifest  it. 
Hence  neither  on  the  organic  nor  on  the  mental  side  can  any 
transitional  type  be  found  between  man  and  animal. 

(c)  Some   of   the   savage   races   actually   existing   are   known 
historically  to  have  come  from  more  civilized  races  (e.g.  the  Fue- 
gians,  Bushmen).     Others  give  clear  signs  that  they  are  degen- 
erates, either  by  the  traces  of  an  ancient  civilization  (monuments, 
paintings,  etc.),  like  those  of  the  American  Indians,  especially  in 
Mexico;  or  by  their  language,  which,  like  that  of  the  Australians 
and  the  Fuegians,  is  very  rich  in  words,  declensions,  and  gram- 
matical forms.    When  thrown  into  unfavorable  circumstances,  the 
most  highly  civilized  man  returns  promptly  to  a  kind  of  savage 
condition. 


33 


CHAPTER  V 

IMMORTALITY   OF   THE   SOUL 

The  last  problem  to  be  examined  is  that  of  the  destiny  of  man, 
and  especially  of  his  soul.  After  stating  the  question,  we  shall 
examine  successively  the  possibility  and  the  fact  of  immortality. 

I.    THE  QUESTION  STATED 

I.  DEATH 

1.  The  Law  of  Death.  —  Common  experience  shows  that,  after 
a  longer  or  shorter  time,  organisms  cease  to  live.    The  law  of 
death  applies  to  all  living  beings,  at  least  to  all  those  that  are  more 
highly  differentiated.     Certain  unicellular  beings  are  reproduced 
by  simple  fission.    Death  does  not  occur,  but  the  mother-cell, 
by  fission,  gives  rise  to  two  independently  living  cells.    This,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  called  true  immortality,  because  nothing  proves 
that  the  individual  mother-cell   persists  in  its  own  life;   it  may 
disappear  when  giving  rise  to  two  different  individuals.    At  any 
rate,  although  this  kind  of  immortality  would  be  "natural,"  death 
would  result  from  a  number  of  accidental  causes.    Limiting  our- 
selves to  higher  organisms,  and  with  special  reference  to  man,  we 
see  that,  sooner  or  later,  life  disappears,  and  the  organism  becomes 
a  corpse. 

2.  The  Duration  of  Life  varies  greatly  with  the  different  species 
of  organisms,  both  vegetal  and  animal.    Although  there  is  more 
constancy  within  the  same  species,  yet,  even  there,  great  varia- 
tions are  observed.    It  must  also  be  noted  that  physiologists 
agree  that  comparatively  few  men  die  a  natural  death.    The  major- 
ity die  of  some  special  disease  before  the  system  is  worn  out. 
If  we  ask  why,  apart  from  accidental  death,  one  man  lives  longer 
than  another,  we  find  that  the  length  of  life  depends  on  many 


IMMORTALITY  499 

factors.  Among  the  most  important  are  natural  endowments 
and  heredity:  a  man  is  born  with  a  strong  or  a  weak  constitution; 
the  struggle  for  life  (climate,  food-supply,  labor,  struggle  against 
micro-organisms,  etc.);  the  mode  of  life  (kind  of  work,  use  and 
abuse  of  certain  foods  and  drinks,  drugs,  pleasures,  etc.);  mental 
life  in  its  various  aspects;  the  rest  or  unrest  of  organic  and 
mental  activity:  some  live  "faster"  than  others. 

But  when  this  has  been  said,  the  question  remains:  Why  is 
death  a  necessity  of  nature?  Why  cannot  the  same  organism  that 
has  grown  and  developed  hold  its  own  instead  of  decaying?  Why 
cannot  the  same  vital  principle  or  soul  continue  the  work  which  it 
was  formerly  capable  of  doing?  It  must  be  confessed  that  death, 
like  generation,  is  a  mystery.  When  we  have  said  that  it  is  a  law 
of  nature  hardly  anything  more  can  be  said.  We  simply  note 
that  no  objection  can  be  drawn  from  this  fact  against  the  exist- 
ence of  the  vital  principle  or  soul.  Vital  functions  are  essentially 
dependent  on  matter.  It  is  matter  that  lives,  and  the  difficulty 
confronts  not  only  those  who  admit  a  principle  of  life,  but  also 
those  who  try  to  explain  life  simply  by  physical  and  chemical 
forces.  Why  cannot  these  forces  do  always  what  they  do  in  the 
beginning? 

3.  The  Main  Signs  of  Death  are  the  lividity  of  the  face;  the  cold- 
ness and  rigidity  of  the  muscles;  the  absence  of  certain  reflexes 
(e.g.  of  the  contraction  of  the  pupil  when  a  light  is  brought  near 
the  eyes);  the  absence  of  muscular  contraction,  respiration,  and 
circulation;  in  a  word,  the  cessation  of  characteristic  vital  functions. 
These  signs,  however,  are  not  infallible,  for  there  are  cases  in 
which  life  remains  latent  without  manifesting  itself;  hence  the  pre- 
cise time  of  death  cannot  be  determined.  The  only  certain  sign 
of  death  is  the  decomposition  of  the  organism,  first  into  cells  that 
may  for  some  time  continue  to  live  independently,  and  lastly 
into  inorganic  particles,  which  again  may  enter  into  the  composi- 
tion of  new  organisms.  In  the  first  stage,  certain  vital  functions 
may  still  be  performed:  secretion,  digestion,  reflexes,  nutrition 
(e.g.  by  blood  transfusion),  growth  of  hair  and  nails,  etc.  But  the 
principle  of  unity  in  the  organism  is  absent,  and  after  a  relatively 
short  time  all  manifestations  of  life  cease. 


500  PHILOSOPHY     OF     MIND 

II.  THE  QUESTION  OF  IMMORTALITY 

1.  Meaning  of  Immortality.  —  (a)  At  death,  the  principle  of 
life  in  plants  and  animals  disappears,  since  it  was  only  an  essential 
part  of  the  compositum,  and  had  no  existence  or  activity  except 
in  and  through  matter.     It  simply  ceases  to  be,  as  the  spherical 
shape  of  a  wax  ball  disappears  when  the  wax  is  given  another  shape, 
or,  more  properly,  as  the  substantial  form  of  any  substance  dis- 
appears when  this  substance  is  changed  into  another.    Hence  the 
present  question    of   immortality   applies   only   to   the  human 
soul. 

(b)  The  assertion  that  the  human  soul  is  immortal  means  that 
the  soul  does  not  cease  to  exist  with  the  body,  but  that,  after  death, 
it  continues  to  exist  forever  as  an  active  and  conscious  reality,  (i) 
We  are  not  satisfied,  therefore,  with  the  poor  substitute  offered 
by  materialists  and  positivists  who  admit  only  a  metaphorical 
immortality,  consisting  in  a  man's  enduring  works,  his  influence, 
glory,  good  name,  the  love  and  admiration  of  mankind.  What  is, 
for  us,  the  use  of  all  this,  if  we  are  no  longer?  And  can  we  say 
that  future  glory  given  by  posterity  is  in  proportion  to  man's  worth? 
(2)  Nor  are  we  satisfied  with  the  pantheistic  conception  of  immor- 
tality, according  to  which,  it  is  true,  the  soul  survives  forever, 
but  without  its  consciousness  and  personality  being  absorbed  in 
the  Great  All,  a  part  or  emanation  of  which  it  is,  or  engulfed 
in  the  great  ocean  of  unconsciousness  and  inactivity  like  the 
Buddhistic  Nirvana. 

2.  The  Attitudes  Regarding  Immortality  are  affirmation,  nega- 
tion, and  doubt. 

(a)  The  affirmation  of  immortality  may  be  based  on  (i)  purely 
rational  grounds:  the  nature  of  the  soul,  and  its  aspirations;  (2) 
chiefly  ethical  grounds:  the  fact  of  morality  and  the  necessity  of  a 
future  sanction;  (3)  religious  grounds:  the  existence  and  nature  of 
God,  and  (4)  the  fact  of  a  divine  revelation;  (5)  empirical  grounds: 
the  facts  of  spiritism,  in  which  the  departed  souls  are  supposed  to 
manifest  themselves.  The  first  two  lines  of  argument  go  together. 
The  third  also  completes  them  as  far  as  the  rational  knowledge 
of  God  is  concerned.  The  argument  from  divine  revelation, 


THE     SOUL    IS     IMMORTAL  501 

which  does  not  belong  to  philosophy,  is  distinct  altogether.    So 
also  is  the  empirical  argument. 

(b)  The  denial  of  immortality  may  be  based  on  an  analogy 
with  the  general  laws  of  nature,  e.g.  the  law  of  death  for  every 
organism;  the  nature  of  the  soul,  its  dependence  on  the  organism, 
and  its  consequent  incapacity  to  exist  and  act  by  itself. 

(c)  The  agnostic  position  is  an  attitude  according  to  which  neither 
the  affirmation  nor  the  negation  of  immortality  is  sufficiently 
justified.    We  do  not  know;  at  most  we  may  be  allowed  to  have 
hopes.    This  view  may  be  based  on  many  grounds,  among  which 
the    positivistic    claim    that    nothing    is    certain    except    what 
experience  can  verify. 

N.B.  (i)  The  present  problem  is  closely  related  to  ethical  prob- 
lems and  to  the  existence  and  nature  of  God.  Here  we  assume 
the  theistic  position  which  will  be  justified  in  Theodicy,  that 
is,  the  existence  of  a  personal  God,  creator  of  the  world,  infinitely 
wise,  good,  and  just.  (2)  The  various  reasons  for  immortality 
must  not  be  considered  separately  as  complete  and  independent 
arguments,  but  rather  as  forming  together  one  whole  and  com- 
plete argument. 


II.    POSSIBILITY  AND  FACT  OF  IMMORTALITY 

I.  POSSIBILITY 

i.  Dependence  of  the  Soul  on  the  Organism.  —  (a)  An  objec- 
tion is  suggested  immediately  by  the  fact  that  the  soul  is  the  sub- 
stantial form  of  the  organism,  that  the  two  together  form  only 
one  complete  nature,  and  have  only  one  existence.  How,  then, 
can  the  soul  survive  the  organism?  Moreover,  does  not  the  soul 
share  all  the  organic  changes  and  vicissitudes?  It  begins  with 
the  organism,  grows  with  it,  becomes  old  with  it.  It  must  also 
cease  to  exist  with  it. 

(b)  We  must  remember  that,  if  the  soul  is  the  substantial  form 
of  the  organism,  it  is  nevertheless  a  spiritual  substance.  All  that 
the  organism  is,  it  owes  to  its  union  with  the  soul.  But  it  is  not 
true  to  say  of  the  human  soul  that  all  it  is,  it  owes  to  its  union 


502  PHILOSOPHY     OF     MIND 

with  the  organism.  This  is  true  of  the  soul  only  as  the 
principle  of  life  and  sensation,  not  as  the  principle  of  intel- 
lectual and  volitional  activities  which,  in  themselves,  are  spirit- 
ual. In  this  sense  alone  is  it  true  to  say  that  the  soul  shares  the 
fate  of  the  organism.  Owing  to  their  dependence  on  the  senses, 
intellectual  activities  seem  to  grow  with  the  organism,  and  they 
may  be  impaired  for  the  same  reason.  But  frequently  intellec- 
tual activities  are  exercised  as  perfectly  as  ever  when  the  organ- 
ism has  become  old,  weak,  and  diseased. 

2.  Activities  of  the  Soul.  —  (a)  The  dependence  of  the  soul  on 
the  organism,  whether  it  be  extrinsic  or  intrinsic,  must  make  it 
impossible  for  the  soul  to  act  at  all  once  it  is  separated  from  the 
organism.  If  it  remains,  it  cannot  be  said  to  survive,  that  is,  to 
outlive  the  organism,  since  life,  i.e.  activity,  consciousness,  intel- 
lection, becomes  impossible.  And  what  would  be  the  good  of  such 
a  bare  and  dead  persistence? 

(b)  We  admit  that  such  a  persistence  is  not  what  we  seek,  nor 
what  we  claim.  We  want  a  living  and  active  survival.  It  is  cer- 
tain also  that  the  functions  which  the  soul  exercises  in  common 
with  the  organism  cannot  remain,  except,  we  may  say, "in  radice"; 
i.e.  the  soul  retains  these  faculties  as  mere  "potentiae."  Suppos- 
ing that  the  essential  conditions  of  their  exercise  be  verified  again, 
the  soul  will  be  able  to  exercise  them. 

But  what  about  its  own  spiritual  activities?  The  soul  separated 
from  the  body  cannot  acquire  ideas  in  the  same  way  that  it  does 
now,  by  elaborating  materials  furnished  by  the  senses;  nor  can  it 
express  ideas  by  language.  We  must  remember  that  the  depend- 
ence of  the  spiritual  soul  on  the  organism  is  only  extrinsic,  and  that 
intellectual  activity  itself  is  spiritual.  Hence  if  materials  can  be 
secured  elsewhere,  this  activity  can  be  exercised. 

Where  can  these  be  found?  The  soul  can  preserve  ideas  acquired 
in  the  present  life.  Moreover,  by  reflection  it  can  know  itself  and 
its  own  processes,  and  from  these  acquire  many  ideas.  By  the 
elaboration  of  these  ideas  many  others  may  be  inferred.  Finally, 
by  communication  with  other  souls  and  spirits,  much  knowledge 
may  be  acquired.  The  love  of  the  good,  and  admiration  for 
perfection,  will  follow  knowledge.  Moreover,  it  may  safely  be 


THE     SOUL    IS     IMMORTAL  503 

said  that,  if  God  keeps  the  soul  in  existence,  He  will  give  it  the 
means  of  knowing  all  that  interests  it,  even  things  and  events  of 
this  world.  Of  course,  reason  alone  cannot  carry  us  very  far, 
since  our  knowledge  of  spiritual  substances  is  very  imperfect. 
It  can  show  only  that  it  is  not  impossible  for  certain  activities  of 
the  soul  to  be  exercised,  although  we  do  not  understand  positively 
the  manner  of  this  exercise,  nor  the  mode  of  communication 
between  spirits. 

II.  PROOFS  OF  IMMORTALITY 

The  proofs  of  immortality  may  be  reduced  to  three:  teleolog- 
ical,  ethical,  and  ontological.  To  these  some  secondary  proofs 
are  added. 

i.  Teleological.  —  The  end,  purpose,  and  destiny  of  any  being 
are  known  from  its  structure,  aptitude,  tendency,  and  activity. 
Man  has  capacities,  aspirations,  tendencies,  and  activities  which 
are  not  realized  or  fulfilled  in  this  life.  Therefore  they  point  to  a 
future  life. 

(a)  The  major  of  this  argument  is  the  principle  of  teleology  or 
finality,  which  is  used  extensively,  especially  in  biological  sciences. 
It  states  the  universal  law  that  a  being's  destiny  is  known  from  its 
activity.    In  organisms  there  is  always  a  correlation  between  an 
organ  and  its  function  and  the  mode  of  this   function.      The 
presence  of  an  organ  is  always  taken  as  a  sign  of  an  appropriate 
activity,  and  of  an  adaptation  of  all  other  organs  in  conformity 
with  this  activity.    From  one  single  fossil  bone,  the  structure  of 
the  whole  animal  to  which  it  belongs  may  be  inferred  by  the  nat- 
uralist.   If  one  organ  is  modified,  others  are  modified  accordingly. 
The  organization  manifests  the  mode  of  life,  the  kind  of  food  used, 
the  various  instincts,  and  so  on.     Man  must  be  included  in  the 
same  law,  and  his  destiny  will  be  known  from  his  activities. 

(b)  The  minor  of  the  argument  states  that  man  has  aspirations 
which  are  not  fulfilled  here  on  earth.    It  rests  on  psychological 
facts  of  intellect  and  will. 

(i)  Intellect.  In  the  first  place  human  thought  is  not  enclosed 
within  any  temporal  or  spatial  limits,  nor  within  the  limits  of  con- 
tingent, actual,  finite  beings.  It  rises  above  space  and  time. 


504  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

Beyond  the  present  it  foresees  the  future,  and  has  the  idea  of  an 
endless  duration.  It  longs  for  what  is  perfect,  necessary,  and  uni- 
versal. It  conceives  the  possibility  of  a  life  free  from  the  many 
physical  and  moral  evils  of  the  present  life.  Moreover,  the  human 
intellect  seeks  for  truth,  and  will  never  be  satisfied  with  fragments 
of  truth.  And  yet  how  little  is  known  now!  The  knowledge  which 
we  acquire  moves  a  little  farther  the  boundaries  of  our  ignorance, 
but  opens  new  unexplored  regions  and  increases  our  desire  to  know. 
Sciences  are  not  sufficient,  we  want  science,  full,  complete,  and 
perfect,  free  from  incertitude,  and  all-embracing.  If  the  human 
intellect  has  a  destiny,  it  is  the  possession  of  such  truth. 

(2)  Will.  Man  inevitably  seeks  happiness,  not  partial,  but 
complete.  No  goods  satisfy  him;  he  wants  the  good,  the  perfect 
and  unmixed  good,  the  fulness  of  life,  the  satisfaction  of  all  human 
desires.  Evidently  such  happiness  is  found  nowhere  in  this 
life.  Neither  wealth,  nor  art,  nor  science,  nor  anything  else  can 
give  it.  We  find  only  aspects  or  parts  of  happiness,  which  increase 
our  craving  for  a  more  perfect  happiness. 

(c)  (i)  The  conclusion  is  that,  if  man's  mind  moves  in  the  per- 
fect, the  eternal,  and  the  infinite,  it  is  because  it  is  destined  to  the 
perfect,  the  eternal,  and  the  infinite.    Otherwise  man  is  an  exception 
on  the  earth.    The  animal's  instincts  and  cravings  find  their  own 
satisfaction  in  nature.     How  can  man's  highest  aspirations  be 
baffled?    Is  he  alone  in  creation  endowed  with  aimless  tenden- 
cies and  with  needs  which  he  cannot  satisfy?     (2)  The  argument 
is  more  forcible  if  we  consider  that  these  higher  aspirations  are 
stronger  in  proportion  as  man  is  more  perfect.    As  man  acquires  more 
knowledge  and  happiness,  it  would  seem  that  he  should  be  better 
satisfied,  and  that  his  cravings  should  decrease.    We  know  that 
the  reverse  takes  place.    The  greatest  scientists,  artists,  and  saints 
are  those  whose  aspirations  and  desires  are  the  strongest  for  truth, 
beauty,  and  virtue.     (3)  This  merely  rational  consideration  is 
strengthened  when  we  look  upon  God  as  the  author  of  human 
nature.    Since  He  is  all  wise  and  all  good,  He  must  satisfy  the 
yearnings  which  He  has  given  to  man. 

(d)  This  argument  points  to  a  future  life,  conscious  and  per- 
sonal, and  without  end  —  since  no  happiness  is  perfect  if  there  is 


THE     SOUL     IS     IMMORTAL  505 

the  fear  of  losing  it.  It  does  not  apply  to  infants,  and  applies 
less  perfectly  to  men  whose  minds  are  less  developed.  It  also 
leaves  out  of  consideration  the  punishment  for  the  wicked,  whose 
aspirations  after  happiness  will  never  be  satisfied  if  their  chastise- 
ment is  eternal.  Here,  however,  we  touch  upon  the  ground  of 
apologetics  and  theology. 

2.  Ethical.  —  There  is  a  moral  order.    This  order  requires  a 
future  life.    Therefore  the  soul  survives  after  death. 

(a)  The  existence  of  the  moral  order,  including  the  sense  of  obli- 
gation, the  essential  distinction  of  right  and  wrong,  the  categor- 
ical imperative,  the  fact  of  conscience,  etc.,  has  been  shown  in 
Ethics. 

(b)  How  does  this  order  require  a  future  life?     (i)  Because 
otherwise  it  would  not  be  order,  but  disorder;  not  a  rational,  but 
an  irrational  condition.     Obedience  to  the  dictates  of  conscience 
cannot  ultimately  have  an  evil  result.     Compliance  with  the  moral 
law  cannot  ultimately  result  in  man's  unhappiness;  otherwise  man 
would  be  a  contradiction  to  himself.     Right    conduct    cannot 
be  man's  condemnation  to  misery.    The  accomplishment  of  duty 
cannot  be  the  cause  of  man's  unhappiness.     In  other  words, 
honesty  and  dishonesty,  the  practice  of  justice  and  of  injustice, 
virtue  and  vice,  cannot  have  the  same  final  issue,  otherwise  moral- 
ity itself  is  but  an  illusion,  and  the  natural  conclusion  is:  "Enjoy 
yourself  here  on  earth,  no  matter  by  what  means;  the  rascal's 
and  the  saint's  final  condition  is  the  same."    The  sacrifices  which 
a  man  has  to  impose  on  himself  to  obey  the  voice  of  conscience 
cannot  make  his  lot  worse  than  that  of  the  debauchee.     (2)  We 
have  seen  in  Ethics  that  no  satisfactory  sanction  is  found  in  this 
life.     Yet,  if  there  is  justice  and  reason  in  the  world,  good  must 
be  rewarded  and  evil  punished. 

(c)  Hence  the  conclusion  that,  if   the  moral   order  is  rational, 
a  future  life  is  necessary.    This  conclusion  becomes  still  more 
forcible  in  the  theistic  conception  of  an  infinitely  just  God  on 
whom  ultimately  morality  rests,  and  who  will  not  fail  to  give  to 
every  man  according  to  his  merits. 

(d)  This  argument  shows  the  necessity  of  a  future  life,  conscious 
and  personal,  but  it  does  not  show  that  such  a  life  must  be 


506  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

endless.  Temporary  rewards  and  punishments  might  suffice.  Nor 
does  it  apply  to  infants,  or  to  those  who,  owing  to  mental  defects, 
are  not  capable  of  morality. 

3.  Ontological.  —  The  human  soul,  either  in  itself  or  on  account 
of  its  dependence  on  the  organism,  has  no  principle  of  destruc- 
tion.   Moreover,  no  external  cause  will  destroy  it.    Therefore  it 
will  endure  forever. 

(a)  In  itself  the  soul  is  a  simple  and  spiritual  substance,  hence 
not  divisible.    It  cannot  be  resolved  into  parts  or  principles.    Its 
dependence  on  the  organism  is  not  intrinsic.    Being  spiritual,  the 
soul  can  exist  and  act  without  the  organism.    It  does  not,  there- 
fore, perish  on  account  of  its  union  with  the  organism.    This  is 
but  a  consequence  of  what  was  said  above  (pp.  501  ff.,  474  ff.). 

(b)  The  only  external  cause  that  could  destroy  the  soul  is  God. 
Although  this  is,  absolutely  speaking,  possible  to  God,  we  have 
reasons  to  assert  that  it  will  not  take  place.    In  His  wisdom,  He 
will  not  annihilate  a  substance  which  He  has  made  incorruptible 
by  nature.    In  His  goodness,  He  will  not  frustrate  man's  highest 
and  noblest  aspirations.    In  His  justice,  He  will  not  leave  man 
without  retribution  for  his  deeds.    In  His  holiness,  He  will  not 
suffer  vice  to  be  finally  equal  to  virtue. 

(c)  This  argument  shows  the  soul's   ability  to   survive   the 
organism,  and  when  completed  by  considerations  from  theodicy, 
psychology,  and  ethics,  it  acquires  its  full  force. 

4.  Secondary  and  Insufficient  Proofs.  —  (a)  Notwithstanding 
the  lack  of   empirical   evidence  for  immortality  it  is  a  fact  that 
belief  in  it  is  universal   among  men,  past  and  present,  civilized 
and  barbarous,  ignorant  and  learned,  as  their  writings,  practices, 
funeral  rites,  etc.,  show.    This  belief  is  a  sign  of  truth,  as  it  can 
be  explained  only  by  the  naturalness  and  necessity  of  immor- 
tality.   This   consideration  is  important,  but    only    secondary, 
because  this  common  belief  is  ultimately  based  on  the  arguments 
given  above,  explicitly  or  implicitly  recognized.     Moreover,  the 
unanimity  is  only  moral.    Numerous  individual  exceptions  are 
to  be  found,  and  some  nations,  especially  in  the  East,  do  not  seem 
to  admit  a  personal,  perhaps  not  even  a  conscious,  immortality. 

(b)  The  organism  is  not  annihilated;  how  can  the  nobler  part 


THE     SOUL    IS     IMMORTAL  '507 

of  man  perish?  It  is  true  that  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  mat- 
ter must  be  admitted,  but  the  organism  as  such  is  destroyed.  Its 
elements  are  changed  and  enter  new  combinations.  To  be  worth 
anything,  this  consideration  must  be  based  on  the  soul's  substan- 
tiality and  spirituality. 

(c)  The  proof  from  a  natural  desire  of  perpetual  life  is  included 
in  the  proof  from  the  aspirations  of  man. 

(d)  Plato's  argument  from  the  eternal  preexistence  of  the  soul 
must  be  rejected,  as  has  been  said  when  speaking  of  the  origin  of 
the  soul. 

(e)  We  cannot  admit  the  empirical  proof  given  by  spiritists, 
as  the  nature  of  spiritistic  manifestations  is  far  from  known. 
Do  any  spirits  manifest  themselves,  and,  if  so,  who  are  they? 
These  questions  are  not  answered  satisfactorily  at  present. 

5.  Cumulative  Value   of  the  Arguments.  —  We  cannot  here 
speak  ex  cathedra  and  state  what  absolute  value  these  arguments 
have,  and  how  they  must  be  received  by  everybody.    Evidently 
they  produce  no  mathematical  certitude.    They  do  not  give  a 
direct  and  immediate  knowledge  of  the  soul's  immortality.    But, 
when  taken  together,  they  give  more  than  a  mere  probable  hope. 
The  more  we  look  upon  it,  the  more  wisely  and  rationally  con- 
structed this  universe  seems  to  be,  and  the  more  impossible  it  ap- 
pears that  the  soul  should  perish.    It  may  be  added  that  the 
three  main  arguments  presented  separately  show  the  same  thing 
from   different   angles,  namely,  the  nature  of    the  soul;  hence 
all  centre  around  the  ontological  proof  to  which  they  may  be  re- 
duced.   There  is,  however,  a  reason  for  distinguishing  them,  as 
the  first  two  are  more  easily  understood,  and  do  not  presuppose 
so  many  abstract  reasonings  on  the  nature  of  the  soul.    They  seem 
to  be  more  living  and  more  practical. 

6.  Conclusion.  —  But  how  many  questions  these  arguments 
leave  without  answer,  especially  concerning  the  future  state  of 
the  soul.    They  show  that  this  life  is  only  a  preparation;  but  a 
preparation  for  what?    What  is  the  nature  of  the  happiness  which 
the  soul  is  destined  to  enjoy,  and  of  the  retribution  for  the  good  and 
the  wicked?    Here  divine  revelation  completes  the  proofs  of  rea- 
son, and  tells  us  what  reason  cannot  see.    The  very  dogma  of  the 


508  PHILOSOPHY     OF    MIND 

resurrection  of  the  body  is  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  human  soul  as  the  substantial  form  of  the  organism. 
God  has  lifted  the  veil  that  covers  the  great  beyond.  We  know 
whither  we  are  going,  and  the  meaning  of  this  life  becomes  clearer. 
It  is  a  time  of  trial  and  probation,  short,  and  yet  all-important. 
Time  is  a  preparation  for  eternity.  We  now  live  in  the  shadows, 
grasp  only  parts  and  fragments  of  the  truth,  enjoy  only  partial 
happiness,  meet  unjust  treatment,  etc.  None  of  our  highest  fac- 
ulties is  fully  satisfied.  The  full  reality  will  come  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  Infinite  Truth,  Goodness,  and  Justice. 


CONCLUSION 
HUMAN   PERSONALITY 

As  we  concluded  Psychology  by  some  general  considerations  on 
character  and  personality,  we  may  also  conclude  this  treatise  by 
a  more  accurate  definition  of  the  meaning  of  person  and  person- 
ality. Strictly  speaking,  although  the  distinction  is  not  always  ob- 
served, person  and  personality  stand  in  the  same  mutual  relation 
as  white  and  whiteness,  animal  and  animality,  etc.  One  is  con- 
crete; the  other,  abstract.  Personality  includes  the  distinctive 
characteristics  of  a  person. 

(a)  For  common  experience,     (i)  Person  is  practically  the  same 
as,  and  coextensive  with,  human  being.      Only  men  are  persons, 
and  all  men  are  persons.     Infants  are  looked  upon  as  persons  in 
somewhat  the  same  manner  that  a  tiger-whelp  is  looked  upon 
as  a  carnivorous   animal,  i.e.  inchoatively.     (2)  Hence  a  person 
includes  both  body  and  soul.    A  wax  figure  or  a  corpse  is  not  a 
person;  nor  is  a  disembodied  soul  a  person,  at  least  completely. 
Yet  some  current  expressions  refer  chiefly  to  the  body,  and  others 
to  the  mind  (e.g.  personal  charms,  a  strong  personality).     (3) 
Personification  consists  in  attributing  to  things  distinctly  human 
features,  especially  mental  features.    Might  and  power  (thun- 
der), usefulness  or  necessity  (sun),  mysteriousness  (automata), 
motion   and  apparent   purpose    (animals),   order  and  harmony 
(nature),  are  among  the  most  important  causes  of  the  process 
of  personification. 

(b)  In  psychology,  which  insists  on  the  mental  factors  of  per- 
sonality, the  main  elements  of  a  person  are  (i)  self -consciousness; 
(2)  self-conscious  memory,  i.e.  the  awareness  of  personal  iden- 
tity; (3)  activity,  purpose,  and  will. 

(c)  In  ethics,  a  person  is  (i)  an  agent,  (2)  having  the  knowledge 
of  right  and  wrong,  and  (3)  a  certain  autonomy,  freedom,  and 

509 


510  PHILOSOPHY    OF     MIND 

responsibility.  Hence  not  all  men  are  persons,  since  not  all  have 
these  faculties  (e.g.  children,  insane  people).  Nor  are  all  actions 
of  persons  always  personal  (e.g.  actions  performed  during  a  blind- 
ing passion). 

(d)  In  law.     (i)  Person  includes   both  body  and  mind  (e.g. 
murder  and  assault,  slander  and  calumny  are  personal  wrongs). 
(2)  Infants  are  persons,  at  least  for  certain  rights  which  they 
possess  (e.g.  life,  property).     (3)  Some  men  are  not  persons  with 
regard  to  certain  rights  (e.g.  outlaws).     (4)  Several  men  together 
may  be  looked  upon  as  one  person  in  certain  cases  and  for  certain 
purposes  (e.g.  corporations). 

(e)  Philosophically  a  human  person  is  not  merely  consciousness 
and  memory,  for  these  are  personal  activities,  and  hence  already 
suppose  a  person  as  the  agent.    It  implies  (i)  a  concrete  human 
nature,  i.e.  body  and  soul  united  in  one  complete  substance,  to- 
gether with  the  activities  springing  from  this  nature;  (2)  an  in- 
communicability  of  essence,  i.e.  the  distinction  from  everything 
and  from  every  other  person. 


THEODICY   OR   THE   STUDY 
OF   GOD 


INTRODUCTION 

i.  Subject-Matter  of  Theodicy.  —  (a)  We  must  now  rise  above 
the  visible  or  sensible  world  to  the  ultimate  cause,  principle,  and 
lawgiver  of  the  world.  We  see  that  beings  depend  on  one  another, 
are  caused  by  one  another,  rest  on  one  another,  and  this  naturally 
suggests  the  question:  What  is  the  first  source  of  dependence  and 
causality?  Is  it  in  the  world  itself,  or  outside  of  it?  This  is 
the  problem  of  God,  for  by  God  has  always  been  meant  the 
independent  being,  the  cause  and  the  ruler  of  the  world. 

Analogically  with  the  names  of  many  other  sciences,  this  inves- 
tigation would  aptly  be  called  "Theology"  (0«os,  God,  and  Aoyos) 
were  not  this  term  applied  almost  exclusively  to  a  special  mode  of 
the  study  of  God  and  of  divine  things,  namely,  that  which  is  based 
on  a  revelation  from  God  himself.  The  present  investigation  is 
carried  on  with  the  exclusive  light  of  reason.  It  may  be  called 
"  Rational,"  or  "  Natural  Theology,"  but  is  more  frequently  called 
"Theodicy"  (#«>s,  and  8"%  justification  or  judgment).  It 
starts  from  facts,  and  with  the  help  of  principles,  establishes 
(i)  the  existence  of  God,  (2)  His  nature,  (3)  His  relations  to 
the  world. 

(b)  It  is  impossible  at  the  outset  to  give  a  definition  of  God, 
since  this  would  suppose  already  the  knowledge  of  God.  We  want 
to  find  the  sufficient  and  necessary  explanation  of  the  world,  to 
determine  whether  it  must  be  looked  for  within  or  without  the 
world,  and  what  nature  belongs  to  this  first  principle.  To  start 
with  the  supposition  that  God  is  an  infinitely  perfect  being,  dis- 
tinct from  the  world,  is  to  limit  the  range  of  the  question,  and  also 

5" 


512  THEODICY 

to  anticipate  the  answer.  Moreover,  the  only  reason  that  could 
justify  such  a  starting-point  would  be  the  common  use  of  the  term 
"  God,"  and  we  know  that  the  meaning  of  this  term  has  not  always 
been  the  same,  and  is  not  always  the  same  to-day.  The  gods  of 
ancient  and  modern  polytheism,  the  god  of  India,  the  God  of 
Christians,  etc.,  are  not  identical.  Hence,  as  the  term  "God"  is 
not  univocal,  we  abstain  now  from  giving  a  definition.  Here  God 
means  the  ultimate  explanation  of  the  whole  universe  of  matter  and 
mind. 

2.  The  Importance  of  Theodicy  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  its 
subject-matter,  for,  as  long  as  we  have  not  reached  the  ultimate 
cause  of  the  world,  we  have  no  final  explanation.  It  completes 
the  sciences  of  the  world  of  matter  (physical  and  cosmological), 
and  of  the  world  of  mind  (psychological  and  ethical),  and 
indicates  the  duties  of  man  toward  God. 

Theodicy  is  a  branch  of  metaphysics,  and  supposes  what  has  been 
said  above  on  the  possibility  of  metaphysics,  and  on  the  theory 
and  value  of  knowledge.  Positivists  and  agnostics  deny  that  such 
an  investigation  is  of  any  utility,  since  they  claim  that  no  knowl- 
edge is  possible  except  that  of  phenomena  which  is  acquired 
through  experience.  But  we  know  that  positivism  is  a  one-sided 
view,  and  that,  while  admitting  the  validity  of  experience  only,  it 
is  unable  to  account  for  this  experience  without  implying  and  using 
principles  transcending  experience.  Science  is  the  arrangement 
and  interpretation  of  experience  by  reason.  Physical  science, 
not  only  leads  to,  but  essentially  implies  in  itself,  some  metaphysics. 

N.B.  This  treatise  should  be  supplemented  by  courses  in 
Apologetics  and  Religion.  For  this  reason  we  shall  limit  ourselves 
here  to  the  statement  and  explanation  of  the  most  fundamental 
principles. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  GOD 

These  Two  Problems  are  Closely  Related.  —  (a)  The  two 
questions  of  the  existence  and  of  the  nature  of  God  are  intimately 
related  to  each  other,  and  can  hardly  be  considered  separately. 
If  the  world  is  self-sufficient  and  self-explaining,  there  is  no  reason 
for  asking  either  question.  Both  become  useless,  and  the  vari- 
ous physical  sciences  give  the  final  answer  to  the  problems  which  a 
complete  explanation  of  the  world  suggests.  But,  if  it  is  found 
that  science  does  not  give  an  ultimate  explanation,  and  that  the 
existence  and  laws  of  the  world  postulate  something  beyond  the 
visible  world  itself,  it  seems  impossible  that  the  same  principles 
and  arguments  which  lead  us  to  admit  the  existence  of  a  first  cause 
and  lawgiver  should  not  also  manifest  something  of  its  nature. 
In  other  words,  the  answer  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  God  is 
but  the  unfolding  of  the  conclusions  by  which  His  existence  is 
known. 

(b)  And,  for  this  reason,  an  essential  inconsistency  is  found  in  the 
agnosticism  of  the  Spencerian  type,  admitting  the  existence  of 
the  unknowable.  We  shall  see  later  in  what  sense  we  may  admit 
the  unknowableness  of  God,  but  we  remark  now  that  we  can, 
neither  directly  nor  indirectly,  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the  exist- 
ence of  any  reality  without  acquiring  at  the  same  time  some  knowl- 
edge —  however  limited  and  vague  —  of  its  nature.  The  "power 
behind  the  phenomena,"  to  use  Spencer's  expression,  must  have 
some  proportion  to  the  phenomena.  I  may  not  know  who  rings 
the  door-bell,  but  I  know  that,  in  the  causal  series  ending  with 
the  ringing  of  the  bell,  every  consequent  has  its  raison  d'etre  in  the 
immediately  preceding  antecedent,  and,  no  matter  how  far  back  I 
go  in  this  regressive  series,  that  every  antecedent  —  the  person 
who  rings  the  bell  included  —  is  a  cause  which  must  be  adequate 
to  explain  the  subsequent  phenomenon.  In  every  line  of  thought 
34  Si3 


514  THEODICY 

by  which  God's  existence  is  inferred,  some  aspect  of  His  nature, 
power,  causality,  intelligence,  or  will  is  also  manifested. 

(c)  For  clearness'  sake,  however,  we  shall  first  examine  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  and  secondly  make  the  conclusions  concerning  His 
nature  and  attributes  more  explicit.  Let  us  keep  in  mind  that  this 
is  only  a  logical  expedient  and  that  the  two  questions  are  in  reality 
intimately  connected. 

I.    EXISTENCE  OF  GOD 

I.  THE  QUESTION  STATED 

i.  Meaning  of  the  Question.  —  (a)  The  question  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  not  merely  the  question  whether  all  phenomena 
in  the  world  must  be  given  a  satisfactory  explanation,  for  this  is 
admitted  by  everybody.  But  the  question  is  whether  the  mate- 
rial and  mental  world,  both  of  the  plain  man  and  of  the  man  of 
science,  finds  in  itself  a  sufficient  explanation,  i.e.  whether  we  are 
compelled  or  not  to  go  beyond  science  in  order  to  find,  in  the  world 
itself  or  out  of  the  world,  some  reality  which  science  cannot  reach 
with  its  methods,  and  which  is  nevertheless  necessary  to  account 
for  scientific  facts  and  laws. 

(b)  So  again  the  question  is  not  whether  science  leaves  an  unex- 
plained residue;  or  whether,  beyond  its  own  field,  there  are  found 
unexplored  regions;  or  whether  science  must  leave  certain  prob- 
lems without  solution.    This  leads  simply  to  the  unknowable  of 
the  agnostic.    But  the  question  is  whether  the  known  facts  and 
laws  of  science  do  or  do  not  require  some  other  specific  reality 
without  which  they  could  not  themselves  exist. 

That  scientific  equations  include  many  an  unknown  X  is  ad- 
mitted by  all.  As  science  progresses,  the  value  of  these  unknown 
quantities  becomes  known  little  by  little;  the  limits  of  science  are 
widened,  and  beyond  these  ever-receding  limits  is  the  unknown. 
This  is  not  enough.  What  we  want  to  find  out  is  whether  all 
scientific  equations,  with  their  many  X's,  do  not  of  necessity 
imply  some  higher  reality  without  which  the  equations  themselves, 
with  their  known  and  unknown  quantities,  could  not  be  given. 

(c)  Hence  it  is  seen  that  the  question  of  the  existence  of  God  is 


EXISTENCE     OF     GOD  515 

that  of  the  existence  of  a  reality  superior  to  the  world  of  phenom- 
ena with  which  science  deals,  either  immanent  in  it  or  transcending 
it,  i.e.  either  identical  in  reality  with  the  phenomena  the  substance 
of  which  it  would  be,  or  distinct  from  both  the  phenomena  and 
their  substances.  The  question  of  identity  or  distinction  will  be 
examined  later. 

Atheism  denies  the  existence  of  God,  and  asserts  the  self-suffi- 
ciency of  the  scientific  universe.  Pantheism  and  monism  assert 
that  God  is  in  reality  the  one  substance  of  the  world.  Theism 
admits  the  existence  of  a  personal  God  distinct  from,  superior  to, 
and  ruler  of,  the  world. 

N.B.  The  question  of  atheism  is  an  unimportant  one.  The 
problem  to-day  —  as  at  all  times  —  is  not  so  much  whether  there 
is  a  God,  as  what  God's  nature  is,  and  whether  God  is  distinct 
from  the  world.  Atheism  has  sometimes  been  understood  as  the 
negation  of  a  personal  God  distinct  from  the  world,  and  then  it 
seems  that  pantheism  and  atheism  coincide  although  the  terms  are 
etymological  ly  opposed. 

2.  Method.  —  (a)  The  method  to  be  used  is  the  inductive 
method,  starting  from  facts  and  interpreting  them  with  the  help 
of  the  essential  principles  of  reason.  We  shall  not  renew  the 
discussion  with  scepticism,  empiricism,  and  criticism;  we  pre- 
suppose the  validity  of  rational  knowledge  as  vindicated  in 
epistemology.  We  shall  use  chiefly  the  principle  of  causality  with- 
out which  empirical  science  itself  cannot  advance  one  step.  To 
reject  this  principle  is  to  fall  into  contradiction  with  the  fundamen- 
tal laws  of  thought.  It  is  to  make,  not  only  metaphysics,  but 
physical  science  itself,  impossible.  And  with  sceptics  no  argument 
is  possible. 

•  (b)  The  existence  of  God  is  not  known  directly,  immediately, 
and  intuitively.  It  is  true  that  the  mere  contact  with  the  external 
world  and  its  succession  of  phenomena  governed  by  constant  laws, 
as  well  as  the  aspirations  and  feelings  of  the  mind,  easily  lead  to 
a  spontaneous  ascent  of  the  mind  to  God.  This,  however,  is  not 
intuition,  but  demonstration,  at  least  implicit,  and  our  present  task 
is  to  make  it  explicit,  i.e.  to  test  by  reflection  the  spontaneous 
admission  of  God's  existence. 


516  THEODICY 

(c)  A  fact  confronts  us,  namely,  that  many  phenomena  formerly 
ascribed  to  the  direct  intervention  of  divinities  now  come  within 
the  range  of  scientific  explanation.  Will  not  God  be  pushed,  as 
it  were,  farther  and  farther,  and  finally  disappear  from  the  world 
as  a  useless  agent,  postulated  formerly  owing  to  the  ignorance  of 
real  scientific  explanations?  We  repeat  again  that  it  is  not  from 
the  unknown  that  we  prove  God's  existence,  but  from  the  known. 
His  existence  is  inferred  not  from  the  supposition  of  an  unexplored 
beyond,  but  from  facts  and  laws  of  which  we  are  certain.  That  igno- 
rance has  caused  men  to  see  the  direct  action  of  God  where  it  was 
not  will  be  for  us  a  warning  not  to  argue  from  our  ignorance  of 
causes,  but,  on  the  contrary,  from  the  causes  and  laws  which  we 
know.  We  shall  not  say:  "The  action  of  God  is  seen  behind 
phenomena  which  we  cannot  explain";  but:  "The  action  and 
presence  of  God  are  seen  in  phenomena  themselves  whose  scientific 
explanation  —  as  far  as  it  can  go  —  is  at  hand." 


II.  THE  ARGUMENT 

i.  General.  —  (a)  The  terms  "actus"  and  "potentia"  were 
used  by  the  scholastics  to  translate  Aristotle's  eve/oyoa  or  evTeAexwa 
and  8vra/us.  No  single  word  in  English  is  an  adequate  rendering 
of  either.  "Actus"  includes  the  meanings  of  act,  action,  actual- 
ity, perfection,  determination;  "potentia,"  those  of  potency, 
potentiality,  faculty,  power,  capacity.  In  general  potentia  means 
an  aptitude  to  change,  to  act  or  be  acted  upon,  to  give  or  receive 
some  new  determination.  Actus  is  the  fulfilment  of  such  an  apti- 
tude, the  actual  exercise  or  possession  of  that  which  before  was  only 
in  potentia.  In  a  word,  both  in  the  physical  and  the  mental  world, 
potentia  is  the  determinable  being,  actus  the  determined  being. 
Since  potentia  means  the  actual  non-existence  of  some  determina- 
tion and  the  capacity  for  acquiring  it,  it  follows  that  it  cannot  be 
known  in  itself,  but  only  through  the  corresponding  actus.  The 
aptitude  to  see,  walk,  understand,  melt,  solidify,  etc.,  has  no 
meaning  until  the  actus,  vision,  walking,  etc.,  is  known. 

(b)  A  change  of  any  kind  whatsoever  is  the  passage  from  poten- 
tia to  actus  and  vice  versa,  and  the  existence  of  manifold  changes 


EXISTENCE     OF     GOD 


517 


in  the  world  is  an  obvious  fact.  Beings  come  to  existence  or  dis- 
appear, and  those  that  exist  undergo  many  changes  as  to  size,  place, 
color,  shape,  temperature,  activity,  etc.  Hence  in  every  being 
there  are  actus  and  potentia,  i.e.  actual  determinations  or  perfec- 
tions, and  capacity  for  further  determinations  and  perfections. 

(c)  It  is  true  that  in  the  same  being  the  state  of  potentiality 
precedes  that  of  actuality.     Before  acquiring  a  determination,  a 
being  must  be  capable  of  acquiring  it.    But,  absolutely  speaking, 
actus  must  precede  potentia,  for,  in  order  to  change,  a  thing  must 
be  acted  upon,  or  actualized,  i.e.  it  supposes  a  being  which  is  in 
actu.    In  other  words,  nothing  passes  from  potency  to  act  of  it- 
self, but  only  under  the  influence  of  something  else.    Hence  change 
supposes  an  antecedent  actus. 

(d)  Now,  since  no  being  in  the  world  has  in  itself  a  sufficient 
reason  of  the  actus  which  it  possesses,  if  the  world  is  to  be  explained 
at  all,  we  must  proceed  to  another  being  in  actu.    If  this  being 
is  also  mixed  with  potentiality,  and  subject  to  change,  we  must 
go  higher  till  we  reach  an  "actus  purus,"  without  any  potential- 
ity.    For,  since  no  individual  phenomenon  or  change  has  in  itself 
its  raison  d'etre,  but  is  always  "relative"  to  something  else,  the 
whole  series  cannot  have  within  itself  such  a  raison  d'etre.    It 
remains  not  only  unexplainable,  but  impossible  and  contradic- 
tory until  somewhere,  —  behind,  under,  or  above  the  changes,  — 
we  find  the  unchangeable;  beyond  the  imperfect,  the  perfect; 
beyond  the  relative,  the  absolute;  beyond  potentiality,  the  "actus 


purus." 


(e)  This  general  argument,  in  some  form  or  other,  is  generally 
admitted.  But  there  are  many  controversies  concerning  the 
nature  of  the  Absolute  and  actus  purus.  We  shall  now  indicate 
a  few  applications  of  the  general  argument. 

2.  Causality.  —  (a)  There  are  in  the  world  many  kinds  of 
efficiency,  activity,  movement,  and  causality.  The  appearance 
of  every  new  reality,  whether  substantial  or  accidental,  is  always 
conditioned  by,  and  dependent  on,  something  else.  Hence  no- 
where in  the  world  do  we  find  a  self-sufficient  reality;  nowhere  con- 
sequently a  sufficient  explanation.  Therefore,  since  in  the  world 
causes  are  only  intermediary,  i.e.  caused  as  well  as  causing,  we 


518  THEODICY 

must  reach  an  unconditioned   and    independent  reality,  a  first 
uncaused  cause. 

(b)  This  is  true,  no  matter  how  great  the  number  of  interme- 
diary causes  may  be,  no  matter  how  far  back  in  the  past  we  may 
proceed.    The  length  of  a  river  does  not  dispense  with  the  neces- 
sity of  a  source,  and  to  push  back  £  difficulty  farther  and  farther 
is  not  to  give  a  solution.    Science  refers  us  back  to  a  primitive 
nebula  out  of  which  the  world  evolved.    The  fact  remains  that 
there  was  activity,  hence  a  first  source  of  activity;  there  was  depend- 
ence, hence  somewhere  the  independent;  there  were  relations,  hence 
somewhere  the  unrelated;  there  were  conditions,  hence  somewhere 
the  unconditioned  and  the  absolute. 

(c)  The  world,  they  say,  is  eternal;  from  all  eternity  the  same 
processes  went  on,  and  these  processes  originate  in  the  very  nature 
of  things.    We  have  nothing  to  do  here  with  the  eternity  of  the 
world;  nothing  to  say  against  its  eternity.    But  to  lengthen  time 
is  not  to  assign  a  cause.    If  the  time  during  which  the  cosmic 
processes  have  been  taking  place  had  a  beginning,  the  existence  of 
a  first  cause  to  explain  their  appearance  is,  of  course,  an  absolute 
necessity.      If  it  had  no  beginning,  the  first  cause  is  required  from 
all  eternity,  since,  without  it,  there  can  be  no  other  causes,  and  con- 
sequently no  sufficient  reason  for  existing  realities.    A  being,  or  a 
series  of  beings,  no  matter  how  long  it  may  be,  which  is  not  self- 
sufficient,  requires  a  self-sufficient   principle,    for  its    existence 
always  remains  contingent  and  conditioned. 

(d)  We  know  from  science  that  certain  forms  of  existing  real- 
ities had  a  beginning.    Life  did  not  always  exist,  and  man  appeared 
a  long  time  after  other  forms  of  life.    We  have  seen  elsewhere  that 
life  has  no  sufficient  explanation  in  the  preexistence  of  inorganic 
matter,  nor  consciousness  in   unconsciousness,  nor  the  spiritual 
soul  in  any  material  activity  (pp.  442,  492  ff.).     Some  higher 
principle,  therefore,  is  required  to  explain  these  new  appearances 
which  cannot  be  explained  by  antecedents  in  nature. 

N.B.  This  argument  again  is  general,  and  special  aspects 
of  it  might  be  emphasized,  e.g.  movement,  origin,  contingency, 
etc.,  and  these  new  proofs  would  proceed  in  a  direction  parallel 
to  the  one  just  indicated. 


EXISTENCE    OF    GOD  519 

3.  Teleology.  —  (a)  There  is  order  and  harmony  in  the  world; 
the  universe  is  not  a  chaos,  but  a  cosmos.  (See  Cosmology,  pp.  448, 
455.)  The  various  beings  that  compose  it  act  according  to  de- 
termined laws,  and  from  this  manifold  interaction  results  a  per- 
manent order.  We  do  not  speak  here  so  much  of  extrinsic  finality, 
that  is,  of  the  usefulness  and  adaptation  of  one  being  to  another, 
as  of  intrinsic  finality,  that  is,  the  determination  of  a  being  by  its 
own  nature  to  unfold  its  specific  energies,  every  part  contributing 
to  the  existence  and  functions  of  the  whole.  Examples  could  be 
multiplied  in  the  inorganic  as  well  as  in  the  organic  world,  from  the 
smallest  atom,  and  chiefly  the  cell  in  the  organism,  to  the  harmony 
of  heavenly  bodies. 

Efficient  causes,  it  is  true,  explain  the  world,  but  only  from  one 
point  of  view.  They  are  not  opposed  to,  but  completed  by,  final 
causes,  ends,  and  purposes,  as  explained  in  Cosmology  (p.  455). 
Everywhere  in  the  world  we  find  manifold  interaction,  and  the  more 
science  progresses,  the  greater  also  the  evidence  for  the  existence 
of  order.  The  world,  therefore,  manifests  an  intention,  a  design, 
hence  an  intelligence,  a  mind.  Otherwise,  what  explanation  can 
be  offered? 

(b)  They  say:  The  cosmos  is  a  result,  not  an  end;  it  is  what  it 
is,  and  acts  as  it  does,  because  of  the  necessary  laws  that  govern 
it.    True;  but  there  is  no  opposition  between  the  result  of  efficient 
causes  and  the  end  or  realization  of  a  plan.    The  clock  keeps  time 
as  a  result  of  its  mechanism,  and  yet  keeping  time  was  the  end 
the  clock-maker  had  in  view  in  making  it.    Without  ends  and  pur- 
poses efficient  causes  acting  at  random  will  not  produce  stability 
and  order.    Without  ends  and  purposes  the  world  will  act  as  it 
does  supposing  it  to  be  what  it  is,  but  why  is  it  what  it  is?    Laws 
govern  the  world,  it  is  true,  but  a  law  is  not  an  explanation;  it  is 
only  a  systematic  expression,  or  a  formula  of  the  facts. 

We  need  not  stop  to  consider  the  position  that  order  is  the  result 
of  hazard  or  chance.  Chance  is  but  an  avowal  of  ignorance  as 
to  the  coming  together  of  several  causes.  It  is  without  laws,  and 
essentially  without  stability,  constancy,  and  regularity. 

(c)  There  are  also  apparent  disorders,  it  is  true.    I  say  apparent, 
because  they  may  belong  to  a  more  general  and  wider  plan  and 


520  THEODICY 

order.  But  even  if  they  are  real,  they  are  exceptions,  and  simply 
prove  that  the  world,  though  orderly,  is  not  perfect.  One  mis- 
print does  not  destroy  the  order  of  the  letters  in  the  whole  page; 
and  dissonant  chords,  when  resolved  properly,  contribute  to  the 
beauty  of  the  harmony. 

(d)  Again  many  say:  The  world  is  harmonious,  and  progresses 
harmoniously,  because  of  the  general  law  of  evolution.     This  law 
is  universal;  it  is  the  great  ruler  which  dispenses  with  any  higher 
intelligence.    Let  us  repeat  here  that  a  law  is  not  a  cause;  that 
evolution  is  not  a  source,  but  only  the  mode  according  to  which  the 
stream  runs.     And  precisely   this   progressive  and  orderly  evolu- 
tion from  a  primitive  nebula  supposes  a  directive  principle  of  evo- 
lution.   Evolution  or  no  evolution,  a  principle  of  order  is  required. 
If  it  is  said  that  the  world  evolves  unconsciously,  like  the  plant 
which  grows  and  develops  into  an  organism  out  of  a  simple  seed, 
we  reply  that  unconscious  finality  is  itself  possible  only  on  condi- 
tion that  there  be  somewhere  a  consciousness  of  the  plan  to  be 
realized. 

(e)  Appeal  to  nature  and  to  natural  laws  is  always  legitimate; 
science  can  go  no  farther.     But  nature  and  laws  are  not  self-suffi- 
cient, and  must  find  elsewhere  their  explanation.     We  discover 
meaning  in  the  world,  and  do  not  put  it  there.     The  scientific  and 
philosophical  study  of  nature  is  in  fact  a  constant  attempt  to  find 
this  meaning.     If  there  is  meaning  in  nature,  there  is  a  mind  dis- 
tinct from  our  own,  with  which  our  own  tries  to  come  in  contact. 
(Compare,  for  instance,  the  meaning  of  speech,  of  works  of  art 
or  machines   for   the  student  who,  through  them,  endeavors  to 
know  the  author's  mind.) 

4.  Morality.  —  As  a  special  application  of  the  preceding  con- 
siderations, we  may  say  that  the  moral  order  also  is  not  self-suffi- 
cient. Man, as  was  seen  in  Ethics  (323  ff.),is  not  his  own  lawgiver, 
and  yet  is  subject  to  the  moral  law  which  it  is  not  in  his  power 
to  change.  The  author  of  the  moral  order  is  therefore  elsewhere. 
Moreover,  a  sanction  is  required,  and,  as  no  sufficient  sanction  is 
found  in  this  life,  there  must  be  a  judge  to  whom  man  is  account- 
able. God  is  the  ultimate  principle  of  the  moral  order  as  He  is 
the  principle  of  human  nature  itself  and  of  the  physical  world. 


NATURE     OF     GOD  521 

5.  Universal   Consent.  —  A  last,   but  secondary,  argument  is 
taken  from  the  consensus  of  mankind  in  admitting  the  existence 
of  God.    Everywhere  and  at  all  times,  the  existence  of  God  is 
and  has  been  admitted,  although  the  conceptions  regarding  the 
nature  of  God  vary  greatly.     This  shows  at  least  the  natural  pro- 
pensity of  the  human  mind  to  rise  from  the  world  to  the  cause  and 
ruler  of  the  world. 

6.  Conclusion.  —  In  conclusion  we  may  say  that  the  material 
world  as  known  by  common  experience  and  scientific  investiga- 
tion, and  the  mental  and  moral  world,  are  not  self-sufficient.     The 
universe  requires  a  ground  on  which  it  may  rest,  which  is  inacces- 
sible to  experience  and  to  physical  science,  and  is  a  self-sufficient 
reality.    In  this  there  is  scarcely  any  dissension  among  philos- 
ophers.    But   divergences   become   accentuated   when   questions 
concerning  the  nature  of  God,  and  His  distinction  from  the  world, 
are  raised. 

II.    THE  NATURE  OF  GOD 

We  shall  now  endeavor  to  outline  —  it  can  only  be  a  short  out- 
line —  the  main  points  concerning  the  nature  and  attributes  of 
God.  We  shall  first  examine  the  distinction  of  God  from  the 
world;  secondly,  His  primary  attributes,  i.e.  those  that  are  looked 
upon  by  us  as  constituting  the  divine  nature;  thirdly,  the  second- 
ary attributes.  Then  we  shall  vindicate  our  conclusions  against  the 
attacks  of  agnosticism.  Hence  the  four  following  sections. 

I.  THE  DISTINCTION  OF  GOD  FROM  THE  WORLD 

i.  The  Question  Stated.  —  (a)  When  we  assert  that  God  is 
distinct  from  the  world,  we  do  not  mean  that  God  is  estranged 
from  the  world,  far  away  from  it,  and  that  He  has  nothing  to 
do  with  it.  The  omnipresence  of  God,  and  His  providence  —  to 
be  mentioned  later  —  imply  that  God  is  present  and  acts  every- 
where. But  nevertheless  His  being  is  not  to  be  identified  with 
that  of  the  world.  The  world  is  not  the  whole  reality,  and  the 
being  of  God  is  transcendent. 

(b)  The  two  opposed  systems  here  are  Theism  and  Pantheism 
or  Monism.  Theism  admits  the  existence  of  a  personal  God, 


522  THEODICY 

distinct  from,  yet  cause  and  ruler  of,  the  world.  Pantheism  in 
general  identifies  God's  being  with  the  being  of  the  world,  so  that 
God  and  the  world  are  one  and  the  same  substance.  Hence  the 
term  Monism  (^ovos,  one  only),  by  which  it  is  frequently  called 
to-day.  Historically  it  had  many  forms  and  expressions  which 
cannot  be  discussed  here.  We  shall  limit  ourselves  to  those  forms 
which  are  found  at  present. 

(c)  Monism   is   idealistic   or   realistic,     (i)  Idealistic   monism 
denies  the  objectivity  of  the  conception  of  God  as  absolute  and 
infinite.     God  is  an  ideal  which  the  world,  through  its  successive 
evolutions,  little  by  little  realizes  without  ever  reaching  it.    He  is 
not  to  be  found  at  the  beginning  of  the  world,  but  at  the  end; 
not  in  the  past,  but  in  the  future.    Starting  from  indetermination 
and  imperfection,  i.e.  from  a  minimum  of  reality,  the  world  pro- 
gresses, and  tends  toward  determination,  perfection,  and  maxi- 
num  of  reality,  i.e.  toward  the  realization  of  God.     (2)  Realistic 
monism  admits  the  actual  existence  of  the  absolute,  but  identifies 
it  with  the  universe,  asserting  either  that  the  material  elements 
of  the  world  are  self-existing,  and  obey  essential  and  self-sufficient 
laws  (materialistic  and  mechanical  monism);  or  that  the  world  as 
we  know  it  is  only  the  surface,  the  phenomena,  the  modes  or 
aspects  of  the  one   common   underlying  substance  (pantheistic 
or  monistic  evolutionism). 

(d)  It  may  be  noted  here  once  more  that  extremes  meet.    Pan- 
theism is  close  to  atheism;  to  identify  God  with  all  things  is 
very  nearly  the  same  as  to  deny  His  reality.    Pantheism  must 
naturalize  God  or  divinize  nature. 

(e)  The  main  reasons  advanced  by  monism  are  the  impossibility 
of  creation,  the  necessity  for  the  infinite  of  including  all  things  in 
itself,  and  the  existence  of  evil  in  the  world,  for  evil  cannot  come 
from  a  supposedly  all-perfect  and  all-good  cause. 

2.  Idealistic  Monism.  —  The  assertion  that  God  is  merely  an 
ideal  is  directly  opposed  to  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  God, 
since  these,  starting  from  real  facts,  show  the  real  existence  of  a 
first  cause  and  of  an  actus  purus}  whereas  the  ideal  God  is  prima- 
rily potential.  To  start  from  indetermination  or  potentia  is 
to  fall  into  the  impossibility  of  ever  reaching  an  actus,  since  the 


NATURE     OF     GOD  523 

passage  from  potentia  to  actus  supposes  a  previous  actus.  The 
progress  and  evolution  of  the  world,  its  manifold  changes,  and  its 
activity  require  a  sufficient  principle,  an  actus  purus,  which  exists 
not  only  in  the  mind,  but  in  reality.  Becoming  supposes  being. 
The  order  of  the  world  requires  a  mind  which  unfolds  a  plan.  We 
need  not  be  detained  longer  by  this  view  which  to-day  is  looked 
upon  by  most  philosophers  and  scientists  as  a  dream,  a  confusion 
of  the  logical  with  the  real  order,  and  a  contradiction  in  terms  and 
in  reality. 

3.  Mechanical  Monism,  which  admits  only  material  elements 
and  their  "actual"  motions,  has  already  been  touched  upon  in 
the  proofs  given  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  in  Cosmology  (pp. 
428  ff.,  436  ff.,  454  ff.).    The  main  objections  against  it  are  the  fol- 
lowing:    (i)  What  is  self -existing  and  necessary  cannot  change, 
and  all  material  elements  are  subject  to  many  changes.     (2)  The 
atom  or  material  element  is  always  dependent,  relative,  and  con- 
ditioned.   Its  location,  the  exercise  of  its  activity,  its  movement, 
etc.,  are  contingent,  since  they  constantly  change  dependently 
on  external  conditions.    The  dependent,  the  conditioned,  and  the 
relative  suppose  the  independent,   the  unconditioned,  and  the 
absolute.     (3)  The  atom  is  indifferent  in  itself  to  this  or  that 
combination,  this  or  that  motion,  and  as  a  consequence  to  this  or 
that  result.    How  were  the  primordial  chaotic  elements  —  I  say 
chaotic  in  comparison  to  what  they  are  now — of  the  nebula  deter- 
mined to  arrange  themselves  so  as  to  form  the  present  world? 
How  were  they  placed  in  such  positions,  and  endowed  with  such 
movements  as  to  lead  to  the  present  order?     (4)  If  atoms  exist 
from  all  eternity,  the  present  state  of  the  world  should  have  been 
realized  sooner.     Why  only  now,  and  not  yesterday  or  last  year? 
Or  why  did  not  the  first  differentiations  of  the  nebula  take  place 
earlier?     (5)  Mechanism  looks  only  at  efficient  causes  and  neg- 
lects teleology  which  is  also  real.     (6)  It  is  unable  to  account  for 
the  origin  of  life,  and  chiefly  for  the  origin  of  intelligence  which  is 
spiritual.    Mental  ideals,  true  morality,  freedom,  etc.,  find  no 
place  in  such  a  system. 

4.  According  to  Pantheistic  Evolutionism,  or  Monism,  the  abso- 
lute, unconditioned,  and  necessary  substance  actually  exists.    It 


524  THEODICY 

is  the  only  substance,  and  the  various  beings  of  the  world  are  its 
phenomena  or  manifestations.  This  substance  is  the  one  cause  of 
all  realities,  the  one  principle  of  energy,  unfolding  itself  in  diverse 
ways  —  especially  as  matter  and  as  mind  —  not  intelligently  or 
freely,  but  according  to  its  own  essential,  necessary,  and  intrinsic 
law  of  evolution,  like  the  germ  evolving  into  the  complete  organ- 
ism. Against  common  experience  and  scientific  evidence,  this 
doctrine  must  deny  all  forms  of  interaction  between  bodies,  and 
between  body  and  mind,  since  the  One  is  also  the  whole  energy. 
(Hence  the  theories  of  parallelism  and  of  double-aspect,  with 
their  consequences,  as  mentioned  in  the  Philosophy  of  Mind, 
pp.  481  ff.) 

(a)  If  the  term  "substance"  is  used  to  mean  that  which  is  neces- 
sary and  self-existing,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  only  one  substance, 
namely,  the  Absolute  or  God.    But  this  is  not  the  usual  meaning  of 
substance.    Substance  is  not  that  which  exists  from  itself,  or  a  sey 
but  that  which  exists  in  itself,  or  in  se.    As  such  it  is  opposed  to 
accidents  which  require  a  subject  in  which  they  inhere.    It  denotes 
a  being  which,  although  it  is  dependent,  conditioned,  and  relative, 
yet  is  not  inherent  in  something  else.    In  this  sense  there  may  be 
many  substances. 

(b)  Among  substances  is  found  the  human  person,  as  conscious- 
ness clearly  testifies.    Its  esse-in-se,  and  non-in-alio,  appears  as 
a  fact,  as  well  as  its  activity  and  autonomy.     Distinct  person- 
ality and  freedom  find  no  place  in  monism. 

(c)  The  absolute,  self-existent,  and  necessary  being  cannot  be 
identified  with  the  world  because  it  is  necessarily  all  that  it  is,  and 
hence  cannot  change,  whereas  changes  in  the  world  are  evident 
facts,  and  every  change  implies  a  dependence  on  certain  condi- 
tions necessary  for  it  to  take  place. 

(d)  Why  are  not  the  cosmos  and  the  actual  order  of   the  world 
eternal?     The  only  answer  of  science  is  that  the  conditions  of  the 
present  state  were  not  always  verified.    But  we  cannot  speak  of 
anything  external  conditioning  the  one  reality.    Since  this  reality 
is  the  only  one,  it  can  depend  on  nothing  different  from  itself. 
Since  then  the  absolute  has  in  itself  the  totality  of  being,  why  did 
it  begin  with  the  part?  i.e.  since  it  has  the  superior  reality,  why 


NATUREOFGOD  525 

did  it  begin  with  the  inferior?  Why  is  evolution  a  law  of  the 
world? 

(e)  The  comparison  with  the  seed  that  develops  into  a  complete 
organism  does  not  favor  the  monistic  position.  The  germ  is  not 
the  whole  plant.  It  has  the  power  to  develop  into  a  plant,  but 
always  dependency,  for  it  requires  other  substances  external  to  itself 
which  it  assimilates,  the  influence  of  light,  heat,  moisture,  etc. 
Without  these  the  evolution  of  the  germ  would  be  impossible. 
The  germ's  change  and  development  become  intelligible  precisely 
by  reason  of  this  manifold  dependence  on  external  agencies.  Either 
the  world  depends  on  external  conditions,  and  then  it  is  not  the 
one  substance,  nor  the  absolute;  or  it  is  the  absolute  and  neces- 
sary substance,  and  then  to  speak  of  its  change  and  evolution  is 
contradictory. 

(/)  Perhaps  it  will  be  said  that  the  condition  is  not  extrinsic, 
but  intrinsic  to  the  one  substance;  that  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  absolute;  that  the  obstacle  is  not  from  without  but 
from  within.  This  supposition  introduces  into  the  one  substance 
a  dualism  of  antagonistic  and  irreconcilable  tendencies:  the  essen- 
tial tendency  to  the  realization  of  a  state,  and  the  essen- 
tial obstacle  to  such  a  realization.  Here,  therefore,  monism  seems 
to  depart  from  its  fundamental  position. 

We  may  conclude  that  the  being  of  God  is  not  to  be  identified 
with  that  of  the  world,  and  that  the  first  cause  is  not  identical 
with  the  world,  but  transcendent. 

II.   FUNDAMENTAL  OR  PRIMARY  ATTRIBUTES 

i,  Self -Existence. — The  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  shows 
that  there  must  exist  an  absolute  being,  i.e.  a  being  existing  by  itself, 
a  se,  as  the  scholastics  used  to  say,  and  independently  of  any  higher 
principle.  A  dependent  cause  cannot  be  the  adequate  explana- 
tion of  its  effect,  since  that  on  which  it  depends  also  contributes 
to  it.  The  absolute,  independent,  and  unconditioned  cause  alone 
can  be  the  final  explanation  of  all  things.  All  others  are  inade- 
quate. And  the  absolute  cause  is  self-existing,  necessary,  and 
eternal,  otherwise  it  would  necessarily  depend  on  something  else 
for  its  existence,  and  would  involve  a  contradiction.  Its  only 


526  THEODICY 

sufficient  reason  is  in  itself.  In  one  word  again,  God  is  the  actus 
purus,  without  any  admixture  of  potentiality  or  dependence. 

2.  Perfection.  —  (a)  God  is  perfect  and  cannot  acquire  more 
perfection,  otherwise  He  would  be  in  potentia  with  regard  to  the 
perfections  which  He  actually  lacks.  Moreover,  God,  as  the  first 
cause,  must  possess  in  Himself  all  the  perfections  found  in  the 
world,  since  He  is  their  source.  As  we  shall  see,  these  perfections 
need  not  be  found  in  God  in  the  same  way  as  in  beings  of  the  world 
where  they  are  always  accompanied  by  imperfection.  But  God 
must  possess  at  least  something  equivalent  or  analogical  to 
the  perfections  of  the  world.  Finally,  as  the  actus  purus  and  the 
plenitude  of  being,  God  must  be  infinite.  He  cannot  be  limited 
by  any  other  being  without  implying  dependence  on  them;  nor  by 
Himself,  since  He  is  essentially  and  from  Himself  all  that  He  is. 

(b)  But  if  God  is  not  all,  how  can  He  be  really  infinite?  The 
world  is  a  reality,  and  if  God  is  not  the  very  substance  of  the  world, 
there  are  realities  other  than  God.  Hence  a  God  who  does  not 
include  all  things  is  not  infinite,  since  His  reality  would  be 
increased  if  the  beings  of  the  world  were  added  to  Him. 

This  difficulty  rests  on  a  misunderstanding,  which  itself  is  due 
to  our  incapacity  of  understanding  the  nature  of  God  completely. 
We  use  the  same  expression  "to  be"  of  God  and  of  creatures, 
but  "being"  does  not  apply  univocally  to  God  and  to  the  world. 
God  alone  "is"  fully,  i.e.  by  himself:  "I  am  who  am"  (Exod. 
iii,  14),  that  is,  God  is  the  fulness  of  being  and  of  perfection.  The 
world  "is"  as  a  participation,  a  derivation,  a  shadow  of  the  being  of 
God.  Hence  we  cannot  speak  of  the  addition  of  the  world  to  God, 
since  units  of  different  kind  cannot  be  added  to  each  other.  God 
stands  alone  as  the  fulness  of  being,  surpassing  infinitely  everything 
else,  containing  all  perfections  eminently,  and  this  infinite  perfec- 
tion is  precisely  what  isolates  God  and  forbids  His  identification 
with  the  world.  They  are  not  on  the  same  plane,  nor  in  the  same 
genus  even  remote,  but  God  stands  alone  on  a  higher  plane,  as  the 
first  absolutely  independent  cause.  With  the  addition  of  the 
world,  were  this  possible,  there  would  be  more  "beings,"  but  there 
would  not  be  more  "being." 

We  have  here  something  similar  to  the  imparting  of  a  science 


NATUREOFGOD  527 

to  ignorant  pupils  by  a  great  scientist.  After  they  have  learned  a 
few  imperfect  rudiments,  there  are  more  "knowings,"  but  there  is 
not  more  "  knowledge,"  and  the  addition  of  the  pupils'  science  to 
that  of  the  master  would  not  increase  it,  but  rather  make  it  less 
perfect.  The  Infinite  is  transcendent.  He  is  neither  increased 
nor  decreased  by  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  other  realities 
to  which  He  gives  their  derived  being. 

3.  Simplicity.  —  There  can  be  no  composition  in  God;  He  is 
absolutely  simple.      Hence  He  is  not  material,  but  a  pure  spirit. 
The  reason  is  that  every  composition  implies  potentiality  which 
must  be  excluded  from  God.    (i)  God  cannot  be  material  because 
the  changes  in  matter  always  occur  in  dependence  on  some  agent, 
whereas  God  is  the  first  cause.      (2)  God  cannot,  like  man,  be 
composed  of  two  co-principles,  matter  and  form,  or  body  and  soul, 
because  matter  is  essentially  a  potential  and  determinable  principle. 
(3)  Nor  can  God  be  composed  of  substance  and  accidents,  because 
accidents  rest  on  the  substance  and  are  dependent  on  it.     The 
human  soul,  for  instance,  has  certain  capacities  which  it  exercises 
successively.      By  the  passage  from  potentia  to  actus  it  acquires 
new  perfections,  and  this  is  not  possible  for  God. 

Briefly,  wherever  there  is  composition  there  is  also  potentiality 
and  subsequent  determination.  The  compound  always  depends 
on  its  components  and  on  the  cause  of  their  union.  All  forms  of 
potentiality  must  be  excluded  from  the  actus  purus.  We  have  to 
speak  of  God  and  of  His  attributes  as  if  they  were  distinct,  but 
this  is  owing  to  the  imperfection  of  our  understanding  which 
cannot  grasp  at  once  God's  one  and  simple  reality. 

4.  Unicity.  —  God  is  one,  because  if  there  were  several  gods, 
none  of  them  would  be  the  plenitude  of  being  and  perfection. 
One  would  have  some  being  not  possessed  by  the  others.     The 
tendency  to  unity  is  so  marked  to-day,  both  in  philosophical  and 
natural  sciences,  that  it  is  useless  to  insist  on  this  point.      No  one 
ever  speaks  of  the  "  absolutes  "  in  the  plural.    If  there  were  several 
first  causes,  the  question  would  immediately  be  raised:  How  did 
they  act  as  one,  and  harmoniously,  unless  there  were  a  higher  cause 
and  principle  of  unity  on  which  all  others  depended?     These 
several  causes  therefore  would  not  be  first  causes,  and  we  would  be 


528  THEODICY 

led  back  to  one  first  cause.  The  existence  of  evil,  which  is  some- 
times alleged  as  a  proof  for  the  dualism  of  causes,  will  be  examined 
later. 

III.  DERIVED  OR  SECONDARY  ATTRIBUTES 

1.  Negative. —  (a)  God  is  absolutely  unchangeable  or  immutable, 
because  change  implies  acquisition,  or  loss,  or  both.     Hence  it 
implies  composition,  since  something  remains  permanent  while 
something  is  added  to,  or  subtracted    from,  the  substance.    It 
also  implies  potentiality  with  regard  to  the  new  acquired  condi- 
tion.   But  both  composition  and  potentiality  are  excluded  from 
God. 

(6)  God  is  eternal,  not  only  in  the  sense  that  He  had  no  begin- 
ning and  will  have  no  end,  but  in  the  sense  that,  existing  at  all 
times,  His  existence  is  not,  like  ours,  subject  to  a  successive  series 
of  elements,  changes,  activities,  etc.,  i.e.  to  past  and  future,  because 
succession  implies  change  and  potentiality.  God  is  free  from  all 
temporal  relations. 

(c)  God  is  immense,  i.e.  free  from  spatial  relations.  Being  a 
pure  spirit,  God  cannot  be  "localized"  like  material  substances. 
He  is  omnipresent  in  the  sense  that  His  being  and  activity  cannot 
be  restricted  or  limited.  He  is  present  wherever  there  is  something, 
present  to  every  existing  reality,  for,  wherever  there  is  something 
contingent  and  potential,  there  is  required  also  its  necessary 
support,  the  absolute  and  pure  actus. 

These  negative  attributes  exclude  from  God  all  "relations," 
since  relative  and  absolute  are  essentially  opposed. 

2.  Positive.  —  (a)  God  is  intelligent,  because  (i)  He  is  not  only 
the  principle  of  the  material  world,  but  also  of  the  world  of  minds; 
(2)  we  have  seen  that  the  world  manifests  an  intelligence.     But 
God  does  not  know  like  man  by  successive  processes  which  imply 
imperfection,  but  intuitively  and  without  acquisition  or  passage 
from  potentia  to  actus. 

Hence  God's  science  is  not  (i)  the  exercise  of  an  activity,  but 
it  is  identical  with  the  activity  itself,  which,  in  turn,  is  not  really 
distinct  from  God's  being,  which  is  simple;  nor  (2)  dependent  on 
the  objects  of  knowledge,  for  there  can  be  no  dependence  in  the 


NATURE     OF     GOD  529 

absolute  being;    nor  (3)    discursive,  for  this  implies    successive 
acquisition. 

God  knows  perfectly  and  intuitively  His  own  essence,  and,  in  it, 
everything  that  was,  is,  will  be,  or  can  be,  since  all  finite  existences 
are  but  participations  of  the  divine  essence.  In  His  eternal  pres- 
ent, God  knows  all  things,  past,  present,  and  future,  although  He 
knows  them  actually  with  their  temporal  modality.  To  say  that 
God  acquires  the  knowledge  of  things  only  when  they  come  to  pass 
would  again  introduce  succession,  dependence,  and  potentiality. 
God,  therefore,  knows  everything  from  all  eternity. 

(b)  The  same  reasons  that  oblige  us  to  attribute  intelligence  to 
God  also  oblige  us  to  attribute  a  will  to  Him.     (i)  The  existence 
of  man,  intelligent  and  free,  requires  that  the  first  cause  should 
also  have  these  perfections.     (2)  The  world  is  a  realized  plan. 
As  the  object  of  the  will  is  always  the  good,  the  object  of  God's 
will  is  primarily  His  own  essence,  which  is  the  infinite  goodness,  and, 
secondarily,  whatever  is  a  participation  of  the  divine  goodness. 
God's  freedom  does  not  imply,  as  it  does  for  us,  changeableness, 
fickleness,  caprice,  or  disorder,  but  exists  together  with  immutabil- 
ity, sanctity,  the  knowledge  of  all  things,  and  omnipotence. 

(c)  God  is  omnipotent,  i.e.  whatever  is  not  intrinsically  impos- 
sible can  be  done  by  Him.     Things  that  have  no  reality  at  all, 
like  a  square  circle,  a  triangle   whose  angles  taken  together  are 
not  equal  to  two  right  angles,  are  intrinsically  impossible,  and, 
hence  are  called  impossible  for  God  because  in  themselves  they 
involve  a  contradiction;  and  as  they  have  no  potential  reality,  it  is 
clear  that  they  are  not  actually  realizable.     Since  God  is  infinitely 
perfect,  He  is  also  infinitely  powerful.     Since  He  is  absolutely 
simple,  His  power  is  identical  with  His  will. 

IV.  VALUE  OF  THESE  CONCLUSIONS 

What  is  the  value  of  our  conclusions?  It  is  objected  that  our 
finite  minds  cannot  know  the  Infinite  (agnosticism),  and  that  to 
speak  of  it  at  all  is  necessarily  to  apply  to  it  our  human  finite 
concepts,  and  to  conceive  God  as  a  perfected  man  (anthropomor- 
phism). A  few  remarks  on  these  objections  will  make  the 
preceding  doctrine  clearer. 
35 


530  THEODICY 

i.  Agnosticism.  —  (a)  The  absolute  exists,  says  Spencer,  and 
the  belief  in  it  "has  a  higher  warrant  than  any  other  whatever"; 
but  nothing  more  can  be  said  of  it,  since  human  knowledge  is  essen- 
tially relative.  It  "cannot  in  any  manner  or  degree  be  known  in 
the  strict  sense  of  knowing."  Yet  its  existence  is  certain  as  the 
"fundamental  reality  which  underlies  all  that  appears,"  "the  real- 
ity which  is  behind  the  veil  of  appearance,"  and  as  the  "omni- 
present causal  energy  or  power  of  which  all  phenomena,  physical 
and  mental,  are  the  manifestations."  It  is  the  "inscrutable  power 
manifested  to  us  through  all  phenomena."  (First  Principles, 
p.  I,  ch.  3,  4,  5-) 

(b)  It  must  be  admitted  that  (i)  God  cannot  be  known  per- 
fectly or  comprehensively.    What  we  claim  to  know  about  God 
is  infinitely  inferior  to  the  reality.     Our  knowledge  is  largely 
negative,  i.e.  the  knowledge  of  what  God  is  not  and  cannot  be. 
In  its  positive  aspect  this  knowledge  is  analogical,  i.e.  we  know 
that  there  must  be  some  proportion  between  the  cause  and  the 
effect.     (2)  God  cannot  be  known  apart  from  His  manifestations, 
and  we  know  Him  only  in  so  far  as  He  manifests  Himself  in  the 
world.    All  other  aspects  of  His  reality  are  unknown  to  us.     (3) 
God  is  known  by  our  finite  minds  successively,  disjunctively,  and 
relatively. 

Hence  we  must  admit  that  the  little  knowledge  which  we  have  of 
God  is  as  nothing  when  compared  to  the  being  itself  of  God.  Yet 
we  claim  that  our  concepts  truly  represent,  though  very  imperfectly, 
something  of  the  divine  reality.  "  That  which  is  uncaused  cannot 
be  assimilated  to  that  which  is  caused,"  and  there  is  between  them 
"a  distinction  transcending  any  of  the  distinctions  existing  be- 
tween different  divisions  of  the  created."  (First  Principles,  §  24.) 
We  admit  this.  But  without  assimilating  God  as  "uncaused," 
to  the  world  as  "caused,"  we  may  compare  God  as  " cause" 
to  the  world  as  "caused,"  and  thus  acquire  some  knowledge  of 
God  from  His  works. 

(c)  Spencer's  inconsistency  is  glaring.     God  cannot  manifest 
Himself   without   manifesting   some   aspect   of   His   reality.    A 
"power"  behind  the  phenomena   implies   continuous  efficiency. 
A  "first  cause"  means  self -existence,  eternity,  and  activity.    And, 


NATURE     OF     GOD  531 

if  the  same  reality  is  behind  both  physical  and  mental  phenomena, 
how  can  Spencer  speak  of  it  merely  as  power,  and  not  also  as  con- 
sciousness, intelligence,  and  will?  If  God  manifests  Himself  as 
power  or  energy  in  the  physical  world,  He  must  also  manifest 
Himself  as  mind  through  the  mental  phenomena. 

(d)  So  God,  it  is  true,  is  not  definable.  But  between  compre- 
hensive knowledge  and  unknowableness  there  is  an  intermediary 
term,  namely,  true,  though  imperfect  and  analogical  knowledge. 
Human  works  manifest  some  of  the  attributes  and  thoughts  of 
their  authors;  imperfectly,  yet  truly;  incompletely,  yet  without 
essential  alteration.  In  the  same  way,  the  world  bears  the  trace 
of  God's  attributes,  and,  no  matter  how  far  beneath  the  reality  our 
interpretation  must  remain,  it  leads  to  the  knowledge  of  God. 

Spencer  professes  that  he  does  not  know  whether  the  first 
cause  is  conscious  because  it  might  have  an  attribute  distinct 
from  both  unconsciousness  and  consciousness,  and  infinitely  supe- 
rior to  both.  But  between  consciousness  and  unconsciousness  there 
is  no  middle  term;  we  have  to  choose  between  the  one  and  the  other. 
God  must  have  something  analogical  to  consciousness,  though 
infinitely  above  our  consciousness.  The  only  name  we  can  give 
it  is  consciousness,  but  we  recognize  that  it  applies  to  God  with- 
out the  imperfections  found  in  ourselves,  and  in  a  manner  which 
we  cannot  understand. 

2.  Anthropomorphism.  —  (a)  The  agnostic  urges  again:  What 
do  you  do  in  all  this  but  conceive  God  as  a  magnified  man,  and 
attribute  to  Him  human  perfections,  even  if  you  do  enlarge  them? 
You  call  them  infinite,  but  cannot,  with  your  finite  mind,  know 
even  the  meaning  of  this  term.  In  other  words,  we  are  accused 
here  of  anthropomorphism:  we  predicate  of  the  infinite  essen- 
tially human  concepts,  finite,  and  out  of  proportion  to  God.  "Is 
it  not  just  possible  that  there  is  a  mode  of  being  as  much  tran- 
scending intelligence  and  will  as  these  transcend  mechanical  mo- 
tion? "  It  is  an  erroneous  assumption  to  suppose  "  that  the  choice 
is  between  personality  and  something  lower  than  personality; 
the  choice  is  rather  between  personality  and  something  higher." 
(First  Principles,  §  31.) 

(b)  It  must  be  admitted  that,  in  our  mode  of  conceiving  God, 


532  THEODICY 

anthropomorphism  is  a  real  danger  which  has  not  always  been 
avoided  with  sufficient  care.  Sometimes  human  passions  and 
emotions,  for  instance,  have  been  attributed  to  God  without  suffi- 
cient discrimination.  Moreover,  some  anthropomorphism  is  unavoid- 
able. As  we  have  no  direct  knowledge  except  of  the  external  world 
and  of  our  own  conscious  states,  it  follows  that  we  can  think  only 
with  the  concepts  acquired  from  these  realities. 

(c)  However,  when  the  philosopher  applies  these  concepts  to 
God,  he  is  aware  that  he  cannot  do  so  univocally,  but  only  in  an 
analogical  way,  and  that  they  are  realized  in  God  in  a  manner 
which  is  transcendent  and  supereminent,  yet  not  altogether 
unlike  the  manner  in  which  they  are  found  in  finite  beings.  He 
does  not  simply  enlarge  the  finite,  but  also  recognizes  a  qualita- 
tive difference  which  he  can  neither  express  nor  conceive.  The 
agnostic's  concepts  of  force,  power,  and  cause  are  also  derived 
from  experience,  and  yet  applied  to  the  absolute;  this  objection, 
therefore,  applies  to  him  as  well  as  to  us.  But  the  analogy  used 
by  Spencer  starts  only  from  the  lowest  beings,  those  of  the  phys- 
ical world,  instead  of  including  also,  as  it  should,  the  highest  beings, 
those  endowed  with  intellect,  will,  and  personality. 

3.  The  Personality  of  God  is  but  a  corollary  of  what  precedes. 
But  it  must  be  attributed  to  God  only  in  an  analogical  way.  It  is 
the  best  conception  we  can  form  of  God's  being;  yet  His  personality 
is  as  far  above  ours  as  His  other  perfections  are  above  all  those  of 
the  world.  Why  is  man  a  person?  Because  he  is  a  complete 
substance,  sui  iuris,  and  a  conscious  free  agent.  Now,  God  is 
the  Substance,  distinct  from  other  beings,  it  is  true,  yet  supporting 
them.  Complete  in  His  fulness  of  being  and  of  perfection,  abso- 
lutely independent  and  unconditioned,  He  realizes  in  Himself  the 
plenitude  of  perfection.  Infinite  mind  and  free  agent,  He  has 
in  Himself  all  that  is  required  to  be  called  personal,  but  personal 
in  a  transcendent  and  incomprehensible  sense,  distinct  from  every- 
thing else  by  His  very  infinity. 

How  poor  are  the  substitutes  that  are  offered  for  a  personal 
God.  First,  we  are  offered  the  Divine,  i.e.  a  pure  psychological 
feeling  to  which  nothing  real  corresponds;  an  adjective  without  a 
substantive.  How  absurd  to  speak  of  the  Divine,  as  some  do, 


NATURE    OF    GOD  533 

if  there  is  no  God!  Or  will  God  be  replaced  by  Nature,  personified 
with  a  capital  initial,  or  by  an  indefinite  World-Ground,  or  some 
similar  term?  Of  course  nature  and  its  laws  explain  the  world, 
but  also  need  explaining.  They  give  an  immediate,  not  a  final  ex- 
planation. Or  shall  we  speak  of  the  indefinite,  the  indetermined, 
progress,  evolution,  and  what  not?  All  these  are  insufficient,  as 
we  have  seen.  God  exists,  distinct  from  the  world,  infinite  in  all 
perfections,  perfectly  independent;  and  yet,  while  acknowledg- 
ing our  incapacity  to  name  Him,  with  the  full  conscious- 
ness that  the  expression  applies  to  Him  in  an  infinitely  superior 
degree  than  it  is  possible  for  us  to  conceive,  we  rightly  speak  of 
Him  as  a  personal  God. 

4.  Conclusion.  —  (a)  The  knowledge  we  have  of  God  is  imper- 
fect in  many  respects,  (i)  We  have  been  obliged  to  analyze  that 
which  is  one  and  simple,  and,  owing  to  the  very  nature  of  our 
mind,  to  consider  as  distinct,  attributes  which  are  in  reality  iden- 
tical with  the  divine  essence.  (2)  We  have  reached  chiefly  a 
negative  knowledge,  the  knowledge  of  what  God  is  not,  and  we  admit 
that  our  positive  knowledge  of  His  nature  is  very  imperfect.  (3) 
We  have  tried  with  our  finite  ideas  to  reach  the  infinite,  but  evi- 
dently these  ideas  remain  infinitely  distant  from  their  object. 

(b)  This  knowledge,  however,  is  not  without  value.  Although 
it  is  only  analogical,  it  manifests  something  of  the  divine  real- 
ity. We  have  a  positive  starting-point,  the  perfections  of  the  world, 
and  we  know  that  the  first  cause  must  be  adequate  to  account 
for  all  these.  This  gives  us  a  positive,  though  inadequate  knowl- 
edge. No  matter  how  great  we  conceive  God's  perfections  to  be, 
we  must  always  remember  that  our  conception  remains  infinitely 
beneath  the  reality  of  the  divine  perfection.  Yet  there  is  in  God 
"something  like"  these  perfections.  As  St.  Gregory  says:  "Bal- 
butiendo,  ut  possumus,  excelsa  Dei  resonamus."  Here  below  we 
have  to  be  satisfied  with  a  knowledge  which  St.  Paul  calls  "through 
a  glass,"  and  "in  a  dark  manner,"  but  we  live  in  the  hope  of  one 
day  seeing  God  "face  to  face,"  and  "as  He  is." 


CHAPTER  II 

GOD   AND   THE   WORLD 

We  rise  to  God  from  the  visible  world.  There  now  remain 
to  be  examined  two  questions:  (i)  What  are  the  relations  of  God 
to  the  world?  and  (2)  What  are  and  must  be  the  relations  of  the 
world  to  God? 

I.    GOD  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  WORLD 

Two  points  of  view  may  be  considered,  being  and  becoming,  i.e. 
the  being  of  God  compared  to  the  being  and  to  the  becoming  of 
the  world.  Hence  two  questions:  (i)  Those  referring  to  the 
"esse,"  especially  the  distinction  of  God  from  the  world.  (2) 
Those  referring  to  the  "fieri,"  i.e.  the  origin  and  government  of  the 
world.  As  the  distinction  of  God  from  the  world  has  already  been 
established,  there  remain  only  the  questions  of  Creation  and 
Providence. 

i.  Creation.  —  (a)  The  distinction  of  God  from  the  world  leads 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  world  was  created  by  God.  Pantheism 
makes  of  the  world  a  manifestation  of  God,  i.e.  God  produces 
—  if  we  can  use  the  word  "produce"  —  the  world  out  of  His  own 
substance.  We  have  said  already  that  this  substantial  identity 
is  impossible. 

(b)  Philosophical  dualism,  admitting  eternal  and  increated 
matter,  coexisting  with  God,  who  thus  becomes  simply  an  intelli- 
gent designer  and  architect  using  preexisting  materials,  is  also 
impossible,  and  finds  no  advocates  to-day.  The  essential  char- 
acteristics of  matter,  its  contingency  and  dependence,  show  that 
it  cannot  be  self-existent.  In  the  dualistic  hypothesis,  God  would 
no  longer  be  unconditioned,  since  His  activity  would  depend  on 
preexisting  matter. 

534 


GOD     IN     RELATION    TO     WORLD  535 

(c)  Hence  there  remains  only  creation,  which  means  the  produc- 
tion of  a  thing  out  of  nothing,  i.e.  the  production  of  a  thing  which  is 
not  simply  a  modification  of  some  preexisting  reality,  but  which 
begins  to  exist  as  a  reality.  The  workman  or  artist  requires  apt 
matter  on  which  to  exercise  his  activity.  Everything  that  is 
produced  now  in  the  world,  either  by  nature  or  by  art,  is  produced 
out  of  preexisting  materials  endowed  with  certain  potentialities. 
From  nothing,  nothing  comes.  When  it  is  said  that  creation  is  a 
production  out  of  nothing,  it  is  not  meant  that  "nothing"  is  the 
material  out  of  which  something  is  made,  but  simply  that  in  His 
creative  act  God  is  independent  of  any  preexisting  matter  and 
potentiality. 

We  cannot,  it  is  true,  comprehend  the  act  of  creation,  but  we 
find  an  analogy  in  works  of  art,  in  which  the  artist  realizes  his 
mental  ideal.  The  greater  the  art  and  skill,  the  more  perfect  also 
is  the  result  obtainable  from  the  same  matter,  and  hence  the  less 
the  dependence  on  matter.  We  are  thus  led  to  conceive  of  a 
supreme  cause,  and  an  infinite  art  of  God,  who  is  altogether 
independent  of  matter. 

2.  Providence.  —  After  creation,  God  does  not  abandon  His 
works,  but  "provides"  for  His  creatures  the  necessary  conditions 
for  being  and  acting,  and  governs  them.  This  divine  government 
is  chiefly  what  is  meant  by  Providence.  It  has  been  rejected  by 
Deists,  who  deny  that,  after  creating,  God  has  anything  to  do  with 
the  world. 

(a)  Even  when  existing,  the  creature  is  contingent  and  dependent. 
The  first  moment  of  its  existence  does  not  necessarily  imply  the 
second  and  those  that  follow.    Hence  every  being  in  the  world 
is  at  all  times  dependent  for  its  very  existence  on  the  first  self- 
existent  being.    Not  for  its  existence  alone,  but  also  for  the  exer- 
cise of  its  activity,  the  creature  depends  on  God.    The  motor 
secundus  depends  on  the  motor  primus  immobilis;  and  the  contin- 
gent activity,  on  the  first  cause. 

(b)  Divine  providence  or  God's  government  of  the  world  is 
but  a  consequence  of  what  was  said  above.    In  the  cosmos,  every- 
thing has  its  place  in  harmony  with  the  rest,  its  own  end  in  har- 
mony with  the  general  end  of  the  world.    This  place  and  end  are 


536  THEODICY 

assigned  to  it  by  the  wisdom  of  the  Creator,  who  thus  realizes  the 
plan  of  creation.  The  infinite  mind  does  not  act  without  a  plan  and 
purpose,  and  the  infinite  power  is  adequate  to  realize  this  plan 
in  all  its  details.  So  every  being  individually  is  subject  to  God, 
who  assigns  to  it  its  place  and  role. 

But,  if  we  speak  of  the  actual  direction  or  government  of  the 
world,  it  must  be  said  that  God's  action  is  rather  general  and 
mediate  with  regard  to  individuals.  God  governs  beings  by  one 
another,  subjects  by  superiors,  physical  beings  by  general  laws 
which  contribute  to  produce  and  preserve  order  and  harmony 
in  the  world.  The  order  of  the  world  results  immediately  from 
the  efficiency  and  intrinsic  finality  of  secondary  causes.  (Cf. 
pp.  454  ff.) 

3.  Evil.  —  The  existence  of  evil  in  the  world  is  urged  as  an 
objection  against  creation,  for,  how  can  God,  infinite  in  goodness 
and  power,  produce  or  allow  evil?  and  against  providence,  for, 
how  can  a  wise  ruler  tolerate  evil  which  it  is  in  his  power  to 
eliminate?  (Cf.  above,  teleological  argument  for  the  existence 
of  God.) 

(a)  The  existence  of  evil  cannot  be  denied,  at  least  from  our  nar- 
row point  of  view.    There  are  destructions  of  inorganic  and  organic 
substances  by  others.    There  is  suffering  in  conscious  beings. 
There  are  uneasiness,  affliction,  and  unsatisfied  desires  in  the 
human  heart.    There  are  disorder,  perversity,  and  sin  in  the  human 
will.     In  general,  it  may  be  noted  that  evil  manifests  the  good, 
that  disorder  is  a  derogation  from  order,  and  hence  that  evil  supposes 
good,  order,  and  harmony. 

(b)  Moreover,  evil  is  seen  frequently  to  serve  a  good  purpose, 
namely,  a  general  higher  order.     For  instance,  if  the  reproductive 
functions  in  plants  and  animals  always  obtained  their  results, 
if  the  majority  of  seeds  were  not  wasted,  the  means  of  subsistence 
and  co-existence  of  all  living  organisms  would  not  be  found.     Yet 
this  co-existence  is  itself  a  perfection  and  a  harmony.     Again,  the 
animal,  simply  by  walking,  may  destroy  a  number  of  plants  and 
insects,   but  walking  is  life,   activity,  and   perfection.      Where 
there  is  manifold  activity,  there    is     antagonism,    and    can    we 
say  that  a  lifeless,  inactive,  crystallized  world  would  be  better 


GOD     IN    RELATION    TO     WORLD  537 

than  a  living  and  active  world?     Evil  is  thus  subordinated  to  a 
higher  good. 

(c)  Evil  is  an  inevitable  result  of  imperfection,  and  a  creature  is 
necessarily  imperfect.    The  finite  is  essentially  imperfect,  and  the 
present  order  freely  chosen  by  God,  good  and  harmonious  though 
it  may  be,  could  not  be  realized  without  imperfection  and  evil. 
For  instance,  the  death  of  some  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  existence 
of  others. 

(d)  More  specifically,  suffering  is  the  inevitable  lot  of  sensi- 
tive beings  whenever  antagonistic  activities  are  exercised  on  them. 
Frequently  suffering  is  caused  by  man's  disorderly  conduct,  and 
by  the  wrong  exercise  of  his  faculties.     Finally,  suffering  has  its 
advantages;  it  is  a  warning  against  impending  or  existing  disease; 
it  atones  for  sin,  fortifies,  purifies,  and  elevates  the  soul  to  higher 
purposes,  to  a  higher  destiny,  to  God  himself,  since  this  life  is  only 
a  preparation  for  a  future  life. 

(e)  Moral  evil  is  the  consequence  of  freedom,  which  is  a  perfec- 
tion.   It  is  not  God's,  but  man's,  doing.    Without  freedom,  man  is 
incapable  of  sin,  but  also  of  merit  and  virtue.    Freedom  is  a  good 
which  it  is  in  man's  power  to  use  or  misuse,  but  self -direction  is 
superior  to  determinism. 

(/)  Could  not  God  have  created  a  world  in  which  there  would 
be  less  evil,  less  suffering,  and  less  sin?  We  do  not  know.  Let 
us  admit  the  mystery,  and  confess  our  ignorance  of  the  divine 
plan.  God  reigns  supreme.  The  world,  man,  society,  depend 
on  Him,  and  we  have  no  right  to  investigate  His  secret  ways.  The 
world  is  good  without  being  the  best  possible.  It  has  evils  without 
being  the  worst  possible.  God  chose  the  present  order;  let  us  try, 
as  far  as  lies  in  our  power,  to  preserve  it.  We  know  little  of  the 
whole  universe,  and  our  knowledge  of  the  divine  plan,  like  that  of 
God  himself,  is  only  fragmentary.  An  ignorant  man  might  find  fault 
with  the  most  ingenious  mechanism,  and  criticise  some  details  from 
his  limited  point  of  view.  This  would  be  due  to  his  ignorance  of 
the  complete  plan  and  harmony.  He  would  be  an  object  of  ridicule 
for  those  who  know  better.  And  yet  he  would  have  more  reason 
for  finding  fault  with  human  works  than  any  man  has  to  find  fault 
with  the  works  of  God. 


538  TfiEODICY 

II.    THE  WORLD  IN  ITS  RELATIONS  TO  GOD 

We  shall  briefly  examine  here  the  general  relations  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  more  especially  those  of  man,  to  God. 

I.  THE  UNIVERSE 

The  various  relations  of  dependence  and  subordination  have 
been  indicated  already.  The  world  holds  its  existence  from  God 
as  its  ultimate  principle,  and  its  preserver.  It  obeys  the  laws 
given  to  it  by  the  Creator.  Only  one  more  question  may  be 
touched  upon  rapidly:  The  various  beings  of  the  world  have  ten- 
dencies, and  work  toward  ends.  What  is  the  ultimate  end  of  the 
universe  as  a  whole?  It  may  be  summed  up  in  these  words:  "The 
Lord  hath  made  all  things  for  Himself"  (Prov.  xvi.  4),  and  "The 
heavens  shew  forth  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament  declareth 
the  works  of  His  hands"  (Ps.  xviii.  i).  The  only  end  which  is 
worthy  of  God  is  God  Himself.  The  world,  it  is  true,  adds 
nothing  to  God's  perfection,  excellence,  and  intrinsic  glory.  Yet 
it  is  an  external  manifestation  of  the  divine  attributes  in  which 
creatures  participate. 

But  the  tribute  which  creatures  give  to  God,  except  that  which 
is  given  through  man,  is,  as  it  were,  dumb  in  itself.  Man  is  the 
spokesman  of  creation.  His  intelligence  leads  him  from  the  con- 
sideration of  the  world  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Creator.  And  as 
he  is  endowed  with  reason  and  will,  he  can  and  must  effectively 
recognize  the  glory  of  God  and  his  own  dependence  and  subjec- 
tion. Hence  we  must  speak  now  of  his  main  duties  toward  God. 

II.  MAN 

i.  General  Duties  Toward  God.  —  However  imperfect  our 
knowledge  of  God  may  be,  it  suffices  to  show  that  we  have  cer- 
tain duties  toward  Hun.  These  duties  constitute  what  is  called 
religion.  God  is  known  as  creator,  providence,  ruler,  goodness, 
wisdom,  sanctity,  etc.,  and  this  is  enough  to  create  in  man  cer- 
tain corresponding  obligations.  It  is  true  that  God  needs  nothing 
and  is  ever  self-sufficient.  But  we  need  God,  and  must  obey  the 
dictates  of  reason.  The  natural  order  of  things  requires  that 


WORLD     IN    RELATION    TO     GOD  539 

we  should  know  our  place  in  the  world,  and  fulfil  our  duties  toward 
God. 

As  He  is  the  supreme  being,  infinitely  perfect,  we  must  recog- 
nize our  dependence.  We  must  adore  Him  and  revere  His 
name,  love  Him  as  the  infinite  good,  respect  Him  as  the  infinitely 
great,  be  thankful  for  what  we  have  and  are,  since  all  comes 
from  Him,  respect  and  obey  conscience  which  is  the  divine  voice 
within  ourselves,  try  to  know  God,  the  infinite  truth,  place  Him 
above  all  creatures  in  our  thought,  will,  and  love.  Above,  infi- 
nitely above  all  creatures  is  His  real  place,  and  it  is  the  place 
which  must  always  be  assigned  to  Him  in  our  minds  and  hearts. 

2.  Prayer.  —  By  prayer  the  soul  rises  to  God  to  adore  and 
thank  Him,  to  ask  His  help  and  assistance  and  to  beg  forgiveness 
of  offences. 

(a)  However  natural  it  may  seem  for  man  to  have  recourse  to 
the  infinite  goodness  and  power  of  God,  this  aspect  of  prayer  has 
been  objected  to  on  the  ground  that  (i)  God  knows  all  our  needs, 
(2)  He  is  infinitely  good,  and  must  give  the  needed  assistance 
without  being  asked,   (3)  He  is  immutable,  and  prayer  cannot 
change  His  eternal  decrees. 

To  this  we  answer:  (i)  We  do  not  pray  to  God  simply  to  make 
our  needs  known  to  Him,  but  to  acknowledge  our  insufficiency 
and  God's  supreme  power.  This  recognition  of  our  dependence 
is  an  expression  of  the  truth,  and  therefore  agreeable  to  God. 

(2)  God  is  infinitely  good,  but  He  requires  our  activity,  intelli- 
gence, will,  and  freedom,  which  are  means  and  conditions  of  merit. 
God  does  not  work  alone;  He  requires  our  humble  cooperation. 

(3)  God's  decrees  are  eternal  and  immutable,  but  formed  in  pre- 
vision of  the  free  actions  of  men,  among  which  are  his  prayers. 

(b)  Prayer,  then,  in  its  general  sense,  is  the  natural  and  uni- 
versal manifestation  of  man's  feelings,  the  communion  of  man's 
will  with  God's  will,  by  which  man  submits  to  the  decrees  of  the 
infinite  wisdom;  acknowledges  this  wisdom  even  when  it  seems  to 
hide  itself;  accepts  suffering  and  affliction  in  the  hope  of  future 
happiness;  asks  God  to  help  him  to  wipe  away  sin  and  destroy  its 
evil  consequences. 

3.  External  Worship.  —  (a)  The  internal  worship  of  our  intel- 


540  THEODICY 

ligence,  feelings,  and  will  naturally  manifests  itself  by  external 
actions,  attitudes,  gestures,  vocal  prayers.  It  is  a  law  of  psychol- 
ogy that  mental  attitudes  tend  to  express  themselves  through  the 
organism.  Moreover,  these  bodily  actions  tend  to  foster  and 
develop  corresponding  mental  attitudes.  Finally,  not  only  the 
mind,  but  the  whole  man,  body  and  soul,  must  acknowledge  God's 
supremacy  and  excellence. 

(b)  It  may  be  added  that  man,  being  essentially  social,  must 
worship  God,  not  only  privately,  but  as  a  member  of  society. 
Individual  religion  is  strengthened  by  association  with  others. 
Public  worship  unites  men,  places  them  above  earthly  things 
by  making  them  recognize  more  fully  their  community  of  origin 
and  destiny,  and  profess  the  supreme  authority  of  God  not  merely 
over  individuals,  but  also  over  societies. 


CONCLUSION 

We  need  not  repeat  how  little  we  know  about  God.  Before  the 
Infinite,  the  proper  attitude  of  the  human  mind  is  that  of  awe, 
as  it  feels  incapable  of  formulating  the  little  knowledge  it  pos- 
sesses; and  that  of  astonishment  at  God's  greatness  and  its  own 
littleness.  This  ought  to  make  us  readier  to  accept  the  mani- 
festations of  God,  not  merely  through  the  mirror  of  His  creatures, 
but  through  His  own  revelation.  Faith  helps  human  reason, 
and  manifests  in  what  way  God  wants  to  be  served.  We  have 
spoken  only  of  natural  religion ;  positive  revealed  religion  completes 
it.  As  the  infinite  truth,  God  must  be  believed;  as  the  infinite 
ruler,  He  must  be  obeyed. 

The  little  knowledge  which  we  have  of  God  shows  enough  to 
make  us  understand  that  the  greatness  of  God  is  above  all  that 
we  can  think.  It  is  much  even  to  acknowledge  that  God  is 
incomprehensible  and  ineffable.  Chiefly  negative,  this  knowledge 
contains,  nevertheless,  positive  data  concerning  God's  nature, 
and  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  look  upon  it  as  valueless  because 
it  is  not  complete. 

God  is  the  necessary  solution  of  the  enigmas  of  the  world,  the 
supreme  principle  of  truth  and  goodness,  the  necessary  basis  of 
morality,  the  fulfilment  of  the  aspirations  of  the  human  heart. 


S4i 


OUTLINES   OF    HISTORY   OF 
PHILOSOPHY 


INTRODUCTION 

1.  Importance. — The  history   of   philosophy   is   the   natural 
complement  of  a  course  in  philosophy,  because  it  shows  the  prog- 
ress of  human  thought  in  regard  to  both  the  statement  and  the 
solution  of  philosophical   problems,  and   it  reveals   the  various 
influences  at  work  in  the  development  of  philosophy.    Philosophy 
is  not  crystallized,  but  living.    It  grows,  and  modules  its  points 
of  view.    Hence  it  is  important  to  see  the  causes  of  this  growth 
and  development,  and  the  various  relations  of  philosophical  sys- 
tems to  one    another.     Moreover,    this  study,  while  revealing 
the  many  struggles  of  thinkers,  will  enable  the  student  to  under- 
stand better  the  different  systems  of  philosophy,  to  see  the  part 
of  truth  which  they  include,  and  to  judge  where  error  begins, 
and  what  causes  led  to  it.    We  shall  find  frequent  instances  of 
the  axiom  that  extremes  meet,  that  thought  passes  easily  from  one 
extreme  to  another,  and  that  here,  as  in  physical  science  and  in 
political  history,  action  brings  about  an  equal  reaction,  till  later 
the  equilibrium  is  reestablished. 

2.  Method.  —  (a)  Only  a  short  outline  of  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy will  be  given.    The  principal  names  alone  will  be  men- 
tioned, and  the  main  systems  examined.    While   learning  this 
general  summary,  the  student  will  do  well  to  complete  it  by  col- 
lateral reading  from  the  best  historians  of  philosophy.    This  is  only 
a  sketch,  a  skeleton.    The  various  parts  must  be  connected,  so  as 
to  give  life  and  fulness  to  this  outline.    Our  purpose  is  merely 
to  enable  the  student  to  place  historically  the  various  names  and 
systems  mentioned  in  this  course. 

543 


INTRODUCTION  543 

(b)  The  method  followed  will  be  both  logical  and  chronolog- 
ical.   Logical,  tracing  out  the  relationship  and  filiation  of  the  vari- 
ous systems.     Chronological,  following  generally  the  successive 
appearance  of  schools  and  philosophers. 

(c)  We  shall  divide  the  history  of  philosophy  into  three  chap- 
ters:    (i)  Ancient  philosophy.     (2)  Mediaeval   philosophy.     (3) 
Modern  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  I 

ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY 

I.     ORIENTAL    PHILOSOPHY 

Oriental  philosophy  is  originally  and  essentially  religious,  i.e. 
connected  with  religious  beliefs  and  practices.  Speculation, 
especially  in  India  and  China,  developed  from  mythological  leg- 
ends and  religious  tenets. 

1.  Egypt. — The  Egyptians  had  two  sets  of  doctrines:  one 
esoteric,  hidden  from  the  people  and  known  only  to  the  priests 
—  what  this  mysterious  wisdom  consisted  in  is  not  known;  the 
other  exoteric,  common  and  public.    According  to  this,  there  was 
a  multitude  of  gods;  yet  in  this  polytheism  many  indications  of 
an  essential  monotheism  are  found.    One  of  the  gods,  different 
according  to  different   centres,  was  held   to  be  superior  to,  or 
even  the  principle  of,  the  others.    The  world  is  their  work,  and 
various  gods  produced  various  classes  of  beings.    Besides  his 
body    and    soul,    man    also    includes    some    kind    of    genius 
which  after  death  dwells  in  the  statue  or  mummy  of  the  dead, 
and  receives  the  offerings  of  the  living.    After  death,  the  human 
soul  is  judged  according  to  its  good  and  evil  deeds,  and  either 
receives  its  reward,  after  due  purification,  or  is  sent  back  to  the 
earth  into  other  organisms,  human  or  animal,  or  even  into  inani- 
mate objects,  to  again  go  through  a  series  of  migrations.    This 
doctrine  of  metempsychosis  is  connected  with  the  animistic  be- 
liefs of  the  Egyptians  which  made  them  attribute  souls  to  the  vari- 
ous objects  of  nature,  and  also  with  their  fetichism  and  animal- 
worship.    The  moral  precepts  of  the  Egyptians  seem  to  have  been 
of  a  high  character,  and  recommended  the  practice  of  virtue, 
both  internal  and  external. 

2.  Babylonia  and  Assyria.  —  In  Mesopotamia,  as  in  Egypt, 
under  polytheistic  forms  of  worship  may  be  found  a  form  of  mono- 

544 


ORIENTAL    PHILOSOPHY  545 

theism.  Among  the  Babylonians,  Anu  exercises  dominion  over 
the  other  gods,  and  when  Assyria  had  conquered  Babylonia  (about 
1300  B.C.)  Ashur  was  looked  upon  as  the  king  and  father  of  the 
other  divinities.  The  divinities  participate  in  different  ways 
in  the  creation  and  government  of  the  world.  As  early  as 
twenty- two  or  twenty-three  centuries  B.C.  the  Babylonians  had 
a  code  of  high  morality,  the  code  of  Hammurabi. 

3.  Persia.  —  The  sacred  books  of  the  Persians,  still  preserved 
and  used  by  the  Parsees  of  Western  India,  form  the  Zend  Avesta 
(Avesta  =  sacred    text;   Zend  =  commentary).    They   were    not 
all  composed  at  the  same  time,  and  their  date  is  uncertain.    A 
part  of  them  must  be  ascribed  to  Zoroaster  or  Zarathustra,  the 
great  priest  and  reformer,  who  lived  in  the  seventh  and  sixth  cen- 
turies B.C.    A  number  of  good  and  evil  spirits  were  admitted,  which 
constantly  struggle  to  prevail,  the  result  being  the  many  antin- 
omies and  oppositions  of  elements  in  the  inorganic  and  the  organic 
world.    Zoroastrianism  reduces  this  multitude  to  a  stricter  dual- 
ism.   The  chief  deity  is  the  principle  of  good,  Ahura  Mazda 
(Ormuzd  or  Ormazd;  hence  Mazdeism),  who  is  the  god  of  light, 
goodness,  and  holiness.    The  principle  of  evil  is  Anra  Mainyu 
(Ahriman),  who  is  the  spirit  of  darkness.    From  both  proceed  a 
number  of  spirits,  among  which  the  evil  ones  produce  moral  and 
physical  disorder  and  suffering.    The  conflict  will  come  to  an  end 
after  twelve  thousand  years,  when  the  good  will  triumph,  the  world 
will  be  purified,  and  a  new  era  will  begin.    The  human  soul  is 
judged  after  death,  and  rewarded  or  punished  for  longer  or  shorter 
periods  of  time  according  to  its  deeds. 

4.  India.  —  (a)  Among  the  sacred  books  of  the  Hindus  the  most 
important  are  the  Vedas  (Rig-Veda,  Sama-Veda,  Yagur-Veda, 
and  Atharva-Veda).    They  include  Hymns  (Mantras),  ritualistic 
treatises  (Brahmanas),  and  philosophical  commentaries  (Upan- 
ishads).    The  commentaries  were  not  composed  at  the  same  time, 
but  the  oldest  parts  of  the  Vedas  seem  to  date  from  fifteen  or 
twenty  centuries  B.C.,  although  they  were  not  written  till  much 
later,  being  first  transmitted  by  oral  tradition.    The  philosophy 
contained  in  the  Vedas  is  based  on  a  cosmic  pantheism,     (i) 
Brahma  or  Atman  is  the  absolute  and  infinite  being  who  gave 

36 


546  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

rise  to  all  other  beings  by  an  emanation  from  his  own  substance. 
He  is  the  only  reality,  so  that  everything  conceived  outside  of 
Brahma  can  only  be  an  illusion.  (2)  The  soul  is  immortal,  and, 
after  death,  migrates  from  one  organism  into  another.  Any 
human  deed  (or  karma)  has  an  eternal  value,  and  its  consequences 
endure  forever.  Every  man  is  thus  the  maker  of  his  own  condi- 
tion which  corresponds  to  his  deeds.  (3)  Ultimately  the  soul  and 
every  other  being  are  reabsorbed  in  Brahma,  and  again  merged 
into  his  universal  being.  Mortification  and  asceticism  are  neces- 
sary as  a  preparation  for  this  reabsorption.  (4)  Men  are  divided 
into  four  classes  or  castes:  priests  (who  came  from  the  head  of 
Brahma);  soldiers  (from  his  chest);  merchants  (from  his  abdo- 
men); slaves  (from  his  feet).  The  rights  and  duties  of  every  one 
of  these  differ  according  to  their  relative  dignity. 

(b)  From  these  doctrines  arose  several  schools  of  rational  and 
speculative  philosophy,  which  are  based  on  the  Vedas  and  try  to 
interpret  them.  The  Sutras  are  maxims  or  aphorisms  which 
sum  up  these  philosophical  doctrines.  There  are  found  six  main 
schools  of  philosophy,  which,  however,  go  two  by  two,  i  and  2, 
3  and  4,  5  and  6,  thus  forming  three  distinct  groups,  and  both 
schools  of  each  group  having  essential  points  in  common,  (i)  The 
Purva-Mimamsa  (=  prior  investigation),  attributed  to  Jaimini 
(place  and  date  uncertain),  is  chiefly  a  system  of  apologetics  refer- 
ring to  the  authority  of  the  Vedas  and  to  casuistic  ethics.  (2) 
The  Uttara-Mimamsa  (=  posterior  investigation)  or  Vedanta 
(=  Veda-end),  composed  or  compiled  by  Badarayana,  with  com- 
mentaries by  Qankara  (eighth  and  ninth  centuries  of  our  era),  is 
even  to-day  the  most  important  system,  and  adheres  closely  to 
the  Upanishads.  It  admits  the  identity  of  all  things,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  soul,  with  Brahma;  the  illusory  nature  of  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  phenomenal  world;  the  transmigration  of  souls,  and 
the  final  absorption  in  Brahma.  (3)  The  Sankhya,  whose  Sutras 
bear  the  name  of  Kapila  (place  and  date  unknown),  in  its  present 
form,  dates  from  the  fourteenth  century  of  our  era.  It  recognizes 
the  essential  dualism  of  spirit  and  matter.  The  world  is  real  and 
pluralistic,  and  knowledge  (sense-perception,  induction,  authority) 
is  valid.  This  philosophy  tends  to,  and  perhaps  professes,  atheism. 


ORIENTAL    PHILOSOPHY  547 

(4)  The  Yoga  of  Patanjali  (probably  second  century  B.C.)  is 
rather  theistic.  (5)  The  Vaiceshika,  attributed  to  Kanada  (of 
whom  nothing  is  known),  is  essentially  a  philosophy  of  nature, 
recognizing  six  padarthas  (=  world- things),  or  categories:  sub- 
stance, quality,  action,  genus  or  community,  species  or  partic- 
ularity, and  coherence  or  inseparability.  Substances  are  com- 
posed of  eternal,  indivisible,  and  unalterable  atoms.  (6)  The 
Nyaya  (=  going  back,  hence  syllogism),  attributed  toGotama,  is 
essentially  a  system  of  logic,  destined  to  lead  man  to  happiness  by 
the  possession  of  knowledge. 

(c)  Buddhism  was  founded  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.  by  Gotama, 
a  member  of  the  Sakya  clan,  whence  his  name  Sakya  muni  (muni 
=  solitary).    Buddhism   became   popular   largely   owing   to   its 
abolition  of  castes,  but  was  finally  driven  out  of  India  about  the 
fourteenth  century.    It  flourishes  chiefly  in  China,  Thibet,  Mon- 
golia, etc.    Although  it  denies  the  divine  authority  of  the  Vedas, 
it  borrowed  largely  from  the  atheistic  Sankya  of  Kapila,  and  from 
other    common    brahmanistic    doctrines.     Its    main    distinctive 
philosophical  tenets  are  the  following:   (i)  A  pessimistic  view  of 
life.     Suffering  comes  from  the  illusion  of  personal  and  separate 
existence  which  inclines  man  to  satisfy  his  personal  desires.     (2) 
Hence  the  natural  craving  for  individuality  must  be  eradicated 
by  ascetic  practices.     (3)  The  supreme  end  to  which  man  must 
tend  is  Nirvana,  which,  if  it  is  not  complete  annihilation,  is  at 
least  the  loss  of  personality  and  individual  consciousness. 

(d)  We   simply   mention    the    Jains,  who   still   form  a  com- 
munity in   India,   and   whose   doctrines    have   many   points  of 
contact  with  Buddhism  and  with  the  Sankya  and  Vaiceshika 
philosophies. 

5.  China.  —  In  the  earliest  traditional  religion  of  the  Chinese, 
the  supreme  source  of  all  things  is  the  animated  sky  (Tien),  person- 
ified under  the  name  of  Shang  Ti,  or  supreme  ruler.  Many  spirits 
were  also  worshipped,  especially  those  of  ancestors.  The  two 
great  philosophers  of  China,  Lao-tsze  and  Kong-fu-tse,  or  Kong- 
tse  (Confucius),  were  almost  contemporary. 

(a)  Lao-tsze  (born  about  604  B.C.)  insists  on  the  doctrine  of 
Tao  (=  way,  hence  course  of  nature).  The  Tao  is  the  one  sub- 


548  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

stance,  neither  conscious  nor  unconscious,  neither  personal  nor 
impersonal,  but  transcending  both  modes  of  existence.  He  is 
the  source  of  all  things,  and  also  the  moral  type  or  ideal.  To-day 
Taoism  is  a  popular  form  of  religion  in  China,  implying  many 
superstitious  practices. 

(b)  Confucius  (551-478)  was  a  religious  and  political  reformer. 
He  revised  the  sacred  books  of  kings  and  composed  some  himself. 
He  insisted  on  the  old  Chinese  traditions  and  developed  an  essen- 
tially conservative  system  of  ethics  referring  to  the  relations  of 
man  with  his  fellowmen.    His  doctrine  is  still  prevalent  among 
the  higher  classes  of  China. 

(c)  Among   other   Chinese   philosophers   must   be   mentioned 
Yang-chu  (fifth  century  B.C.)  who  advocates  the  ethics  of  pleas- 
ure;   Mih-tsze  (fifth  century  B.C.),  who  recommends  a  universal 
love  of  men;  Meng-tsze  (Mencius,  372-289),  who  contributed  much 
to  the  influence  of  Confucianism. 


II.    GREEK  PHILOSOPHY 

We  shall  leave  out  the  first  rudiments  of  philosophy  found  in 
the  poems  of  Homer  and  Hesiod,  and  begin  with  the  appearance 
of  philosophy  proper.  Greek  philosophy  may  be  divided  into  three 
periods,  (i)  Pre-Socratic,  devoted  exclusively  to  the  study  of 
the  external  world.  (2)  Socratic,  adding  subjective  studies,  i.e. 
psychological  and  ethical.  (3)  Post-Aristotelian,  neglecting  al- 
most entirely  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  giving  predominance 
to  ethical  problems. 

N.B.  The  Romans  did  not  develop  any  original  philosophy, 
but  borrowed  from  the  Greeks.  The  few  names  to  be  mentioned 
will  come  under  the  respective  schools  to  which  they  belong. 

I.  PRE-SOCRATIC  SCHOOLS 

The  early  speculations  of  Greece  were  cosmological. 

i.  Early  Ionian  Philosophy. — The  earlier  lonians  (Ionia,  a 
Greek  colony  of  Asia  Minor)  endeavor  to  give  an  answer  to  the 
question:  What  is  the  ultimate  substance  of  things?  They  agree 
that  matter  is  endowed  with  some  kind  of  life  (hylozoism),  and 


GREEK    PHILOSOPHY  549 

attempt  to  determine  the  nature  of  this  first  or  primordial  matter. 
Tholes  of  Miletus  (born  about  640  B.C.)  claims  that  it  is  water. 
Anaximander  of  Miletus  (born  about  610  B.C.)  admits  an  eternal 
and  infinite  matter  from  which  all  things  were  produced  by 
processes  of  condensation  and  rarefaction.  For  Anaximenes 
(born  about  588  B.C.),  the  primordial  principle  of  all  things  is 
air,  which  is  an  infinite  substance  from  which  all  things  come 
and  to  which  all  return. 

2.  Pythagoreans.  —  Pythagoras  (sixth  century  B.C.)  was  born 
at  Samos,  and  founded,  at  Crotona  in  the  Greek  colony  of  Italy,  a 
school  in  which  he  taught  his  religious  and  scientific  doctrines. 
The  basis  of  all  things  is  number,  and  the  whole  world  is  a  har- 
mony of  odd  and  even  numbers,  which  are  all  derived  from  the 
unit.    The  one,  unit,  or  monad,  is  God,  from  whom  emanates 
the  dyad,  i.e.  matter  and  spirit.    Pythagoreans  admitted  the  trans- 
migration of  souls,  and  their  doctrine  included  an  elaborate  code 
of  morality.    Little  is  known  with  certainty  about  the  meaning 
of  the  Pythagorean  theory  of  numbers,  as  we  have  but  scant, 
fragmentary,  and  second-hand  references. 

3.  The  Eleatic  School.  —  The  Eleatic  school  takes  its  name  from 
Elea,  a  city  of  southern  Italy  (then  a  Greek  colony).    Eleatics 
tend  to  identify  the  world  with  God  and  hence  to  attribute  to  the 
world  unity,  eternity,  and  unchangeableness.     Xenophanes  (born 
about  570  at  Colophon  in  Asia  Minor)  admits  only  one  God, 
whom  he  identifies  with  the  world.    Hence  the  substance  of  the 
world  is  immutable,  and  the  changes  affect  only  its  surface.     Par- 
menides  (born  about  540  at  Elea)  denies  the  fact  of  change;  the 
testimony  of  the  senses  on  this  point  is  illusory.    Real  being  is 
one  and  absolutely  immutable  and  unproduced;  hence  becoming 
and  change  are  impossibilities.    Zeno  (born  about  490  at  Elea) 
was  the  disciple  of  Parmenides,  and  by  his  dialectics  defended  his 
master's  position. 

4.  Later  Philosophers  of  Nature.  —  (a)   Heraclitus  (born  about 
500  at  Ephesus)  opposes  Parmenides.    Far  from  being  absolutely 
unchangeable,  the  world  is  on  the  contrary  always  changing  and 
perpetually  flowing.     Nothing  is,  everything  is  becoming.    The 
primordial  element  is  fire,  out  of  which  all  things  were  made. 


550  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

This  is  the  turning-point  in  Greek  speculation,  shifting  the  prob- 
*  lem  of  nature  from  the  question:  What  are  things?  to  the  question: 
"  How  did  things  come  to  be  what  they  are? 

(b)  Empedocles  (born  about  495  at  Agrigentum,  Sicily)  admits 
four  elements:   earth,   water,   air,   and  fire.    Two   antagonistic 
forces,  love  and  hatred,  tend  to  combine  and   dissociate  these 
elements;  hence  the  becoming. 

(c)  Anaxagoras  (born  about  500  at  Clazomenae  in  Ionia)  admits 
an  infinite  number  of  elements  which  at  first  formed  a  chaos. 
But  the  Spirit  or  Mind,  endowed  with  knowledge  and  power, 
gives  them  their  orderly  and  harmonious  motions. 

(d)  Leucippus,  and  Democritus  of  Abdera  (about  460-370),  pro- 
fess a  mechanistic  atomism.    Atoms  are  homogeneous  in  nature, 
dissimilar  in  size  and  shape,  infinite  in  number,  and  indivisible. 
They  move  in  an  infinite  vacuum,  and,  by  their  motions,  every- 
thing, even  thought,  must  be  explained. 

5.  Sophists.  —  (a)  The  name  "sophist,"  which  etymologically 
signifies  a  wise  man,  was  at  first  honorable,  but  later,  owing  to 
the  abuse  of  dialectics  leading  to  scepticism,  it  acquired  a  disrep- 
utable meaning.  The  sophists  dwelt  little  on  metaphysics  and 
science,  but  chiefly  on  grammar,  rhetoric,  and  logic.  They  came 
to  dispute  in  order  to  prove  any  proposition,  lost  sight  of  objective 
truth,  and  were  led  to  scepticism.  On  the  contradictions  found 
among  early  philosophers  they  based  their  arguments  to  show 
that  nothing  can  be  known  with  certitude,  and  that  the  only  useful 
science  is  that  which  enables  us  to  convince  others.  This  method 
already  included  a  beginning  of  reflection  on  the  value  of  knowl- 
edge. It  accustomed  the  people  to  philosophical  discussions, 
and  thus  formed  a  transition  to  the  following  period. 

(b)  The  most  important  sophists  are  Protagoras  of  Abdera 
(born  about  480)  and  Gorgias  (about  480-375).  According  to 
the  former,  human  knowledge  Jdeals  only  with  appearances  and  is  • 
essentially  relative,  since  what  is  true  for  one  man  is  false  for  an- 
other. According  to  the  latter,  nothing  exists  really;  if  anything 
existed,  we  could  not  know  it;  and,  supposing  that  we  knew  it,  this 
knowledge  could  not  be  communicated  to  other  men,  since  the  word 
or  sign,  which  is  different  from  the  idea,  is  the  only  thing  that  can 


GREEK    PHILOSOPHY  551 

be  perceived  by  others,  and  they  interpret  it  according  to  their 
own  minds. 

II.  SOCRATES,  PLATO,  ARISTOTLE 

These  three  names  represent  the  most  perfect  epoch  of  Greek 
philosophy. 

1.  Socrates.  —  (a)  Socrates  of  Athens  (469-399)  opposed  the 
Sophists  and  showed  the  method  of  true  knowledge.     He  left  no 
writings,  and  we  know  his  method  and  doctrine  especially  through 
his  disciples,  Plato  and  Xenophon.    His  method  is  essentially 
inductive,  starting  from  concrete  data,  and  from  them  leading 
to  a  general  idea  or  definition.     He  frequently  consulted  men  of 
all  ages  and  conditions,  and  in  his  discussions  with  them  employed 
a  twofold  process:  one  destructive  (irony),  consisting  in  showing 
that  a  definition  given  by  an  adversary  led  to  absurd  and  ridicu- 
lous consequences;  the  other  positive  or  constructive  (maieutic), 
consisting  in  finding  the  true  definition  by  an  analysis  and  com- 
parison of  common  concrete  ideas.    His  doctrine  is  no  longer  con- 
cerned with  nature,  but  primarily  with  man,  and  is  chiefly  ethical. 
Man  is  created  for  happiness,  and  he  must  first  ascertain  where 
true  happiness  is  to  be  found,  for,  as  no  man  does  wrong  know- 
ingly, to  know  the  right  is  to  be  virtuous.     Virtue  is  knowledge. 

(b)  Socrates  exercised  great  influence,  both  by  his  example  and 
his  teaching.  Among  the  philosophers  who  were  influenced  by 
him  must  be  mentioned  Antisthenes,  Diogenes  of  Sinope,  and  the 
other  Cynics,  who  claimed  that  man  must  live  according  to  nature, 
practice  virtue,  and  neglect  conventional  culture  and  customs; 
Aristippus  of  Cyrene  and  the  other  Cyrenaics,  who  advocate  hedon- 
ism, i.e.  the  theory  that  pleasure  is  the  sole  basis  of  morality; 
Euclid  of  Megara  and  the  other  Megarian  philosophers,  who  used, 
developed,  and  frequently  abused  the  Socratic  method.  In  meta- 
physics they  continue  the  tradition  of  the  Eleatic  school. 

2.  Plato.  —  (a)  Plato    (427-347)   is   the  most  illustrious  dis- 
ciple of  Socrates.    After  his  master's  death,  he  travelled  through 
Egypt,  Sicily,  Italy,  etc.,  and  went  back  to  Athens,  where  he 
taught  philosophy  in  the  gymnasium  of  Academus.     Hence  the 
name  of  "Academy"  given  to  his  school.    He  wrote  a  great  num- 


552  HISTORY    OF     PHILOSOPHY 

her  of  works,  in  the  form  of  dialogues.    His  doctrine  may  be  clas- 
sified under  the  three  headings  of  dialectics,  physics,  and  ethics. 

(b)  Dialectics,     (i)  True  science  deals  not  with  the  world  of 
the  senses,  which  is  concrete,  changing,  and  unstable,  but  with  the 
universal,  common,  and  unchangeable  essences,  independent  of 
their  concrete  realization  in  space  and  time.     (2)  These  essences 
or  ideas  are  the  real  prototypes  which  concrete  beings  participate. 
There   are,   for   instance,   individual   beautiful   beings,   persons, 
statues,  landscapes,  etc.;  therefore  there  must  exist  from  all  eter- 
nity a  beauty-in-itself  which  these  objects  participate.    Again,  a 
triangle  may  disappear,  but  the  nature  and  properties  of  the  tri- 
angle are  eternal  and  unchangeable.    To  every  one  of  our  ideas 
corresponds  a  real  prototype.     (3)  The  world  of   suprasensible 
ideas  exists  really,  since  sensible  objects  are  real,  and  the  sensible 
world  is  but  a  reflection  of  the  intelligible  world.    There  could 
be  no  good,  virtuous,  just,  beautiful,  etc.,  objects  or  actions,  if 
there  did  not  exist  really  goodness-itself,  virtue-itself,  justice- 
itself,  beauty-itself.    Thus  universal  ideas  as  such  are  objective; 
they   are  principles  not  only  of  knowledge,  but  also  of  exist- 
ence.     (4)  How  does  the  mind  pass  from  sense-knowledge  to 
intellectual  knowledge?    Since  the  ideas  are  not  realized  in  the 
sensible  world,  the  mind  cannot  find  them  there.    Plato  explains 
true  knowledge  by  the  theory  of  reminiscence.    Before  being 
imprisoned  in  the  body,  the  soul  has  preexisted  in  the  suprasensible 
world  of  ideas,  from  which  it  was  expelled  in  consequence  of  some 
sin.    Sense-perception  is  the  means  by  which  the  soul  is  led  to 
recall  some  of  the  ideas  acquired  before  its  union  with  the  body. 
(Cf.  p.  100.)     (5)  The  highest  idea  is  God,  the  supreme  good  and 
source  of  all  perfection. 

(c)  Physics  (including  the  science  of  the  human  soul),     (i)  The 
three  principles  of  the  world  are  God,  the  soul  of  the  world  which 
participates  the  divine  nature,  and  matter  which  is  eternal,  and  is 
the  principle  of  limitation  and  multiplicity.    Matter  is  also  de- 
scribed as  the  immense  receptacle  of  sensible  phenomena.     (2) 
The  soul  is  immortal,  and  its  union  with  the  body  is  against  its 
nature.     (3)  In  addition  to  the  intelligent  soul,  Plato  seems  to 
have  admitted  two  other  souls,  the  sensitive  and  the  vegetative. 


GREEK    PHILOSOPHY  553 

(d)  Ethics,     (i)  The   supreme  good  is  the  contemplation  of 
pure  ideas,  the  true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful.     (2)  Virtue  is 
identified  with  knowledge.     (3)  The  individual  exists  for  the  state, 
and  the  state  has  absolute  rights  over  the  citizen. 

(e)  Plato  and  his  immediate  disciples  form  the  school  known  as 
the  Old  Academy.    The  Middle  Academy  shows  a  tendency  to 
scepticism.    It  is   represented  especially   by    Arcesilaus   (about 
316-241),  who  claims  that  true  knowledge  or  certitude  is  impos- 
sible.   In  the  Third  Academy,  Carneades  (about  210-129)  asserts 
that  certitude  is  impossible,  and  that  man  must  be  satisfied  with 
probability.    The  New  Academy  (second  and  first  centuries  B.C.) 
with  Philo  of  Larissa  and  Antiochus  of  Ascalon  returned  to  Plato's 
dogmatism,  which  they  combined  with  Aristotelian  and  Stoic 
doctrines. 

3.  Aristotle.  —  (a)  Aristotle  (384-322)  was  born  at  Stagyra 
in  Chalcidice,  a  Greek  colony  in  Macedonia  (hence  the  name  of 
Stagyrite  frequently  given  him),  and  for  twenty  years  studied 
under  Plato.  In  342,  Philip  of  Macedon  called  him  to  his  court 
and  intrusted  him  with  the  education  of  his  son  Alexander  (the 
Great).  In  335,  Aristotle  returned  to  Athens  and,  in  the  Lyceum, 
opened  a  school  of  philosophy  known  as  the  Peripatetic  School 
(irf.pnra.Ttiv,  to  walk  about)  from  the  master's  habit  of  walking  with 
his  disciples  while  teaching.  Aristotle  wrote  a  large  number  of 
works,  logical,  metaphysical,  physical,  and  ethical.  He  agrees 
with  Plato  in  defining  the  scope  of  science,  which  is  to  deal  with 
the  universal,  the  eternal,  and  the  unchangeable,  but  differs  from 
him  in  claiming  that  these  characters  can  be  found  by  the  mind 
in  the  sensible  world.  Hence  his  philosophy  is  more  inductive 
and  more  scientific. 

(b)  Logic.  Aristotle  is  the  founder  of  scientific  logic,  and, 
apart  from  the  development  which  is  given  to  induction  owing  to 
the  growth  of  empirical  science,  our  logic  to-day  is  essentially 
that  of  Aristotle,  (i)  Scientific  demonstration  based  on  the 
syllogism  tends  to  find  the  universal  causes  and  principles  of  things. 
(2)  It  assumes  some  indemonstrable  principles,  which  are  not 
innate,  but  acquired  from  the  consideration  of  the  world,  and 
applies  them  to  concrete  facts.  (Cf.  p.  383.)  (3)  Categories 


554  HISTORY     OF    PHILOSOPHY 

are  the  general  concepts  under  which  we  classify  our  knowledge. 
There  are  ten  categories  (cf.  p.  211),  namely,  substance,  and 
nine  accidents.  The  categories  are  not  simply  classes  of  concepts, 
but  also  classes  of  things. 

(c)  Metaphysics,     (i)  In  every  reality  of  the  world  there  is 
being  and  becoming,  something  stable  and  something  changing. 
(2)  Change  is  the  passage  from  one  state  to  another.     It  implies 
the  distinction  of  "act"  (evTeAex«a)  or  actual  possession  of  a  deter- 
mination, and  "potency"  (Svra/xis)  or  capacity  for  acquiring  such 
a  determination.     (3)  The  universal  and  necessary  as  such  has 
no  existence  apart  from  individual  and  contingent  realities  in  which 
it  is  found,  not  "actually,"  but  "potentially."    Actually  it  exists 
only  in  the  mind  which  elaborates  sense-perception.     (4)  There 
are  four  causes,  material,  formal,  efficient,  and  final.    The  first 
two  are  intrinsic  and  constitute  the  being  itself;  the  latter  tw-  , 
extrinsic,  the  productive  cause  calling  forth  a  being  from  potency 
to  act,  and  the  end  being  the  motive  for  which  the  agent  exercises 
its  activity.     (5)  Act  precedes  potency,  for,  although  in  an  indi- 
vidual being  the  capacity  for  acquiring  a  determination  precedes 
the  acquisition  of  it,  yet  the  passage  from  potency  to  act  always 
requires  a  preexisting  act.     (6)  Hence  Aristotle  is  led  to  admit 
the  existence  of  the  "Actus  purus."     (Cf.  pp.  516  ff.) 

(d)  Physics  (including  the  philosophy  of  mind),     (i)  All  mate- 
rial substances  are  composed  of  two  principles,  primary  matter 
and  substantial  form.   (Cf.  pp.  428  ff.)    (2)  The  soul  is  the  substan- 
tial form  of  the  human  body.     (Cf .  pp.  483  ff .)     (3)  It  is  endowed 
with  five  faculties,   nutritive,   sensitive,  intellectual,   appetitive, 
and  locomotive.     (4)  Intellectual  knowledge  reaches  the  object 
apart  from  its  individual  features  hi  space  and  time.     (5)  The 
intellect  is  immortal. 

(e)  Ethics,     (i)  The  supreme  good  of  man  is  happiness.    It 
consists  essentially  in   the  harmonious    development  of  all  his 
faculties,  especially  of  the  highest,  i.e.  the  intellectual.     (2)  Vir- 
tue is  a  habit  consisting  in  avoiding  excess  and  defect.      (3)  The 
highest  virtues  are  intellectual  virtues. 

(/)  Among  the  most  important  peripatetic  philosophers  must 
be  mentioned  Theophrastus  of  Lesbos,  contemporary  of  Aristotle, 


GkEEK    PHILOSOPHY  555 

and  later  Apollonius  of  Rhodes  (first  century  B.C.)  who  edited 
Aristotle's  works. 

III.  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Stoics. — The  main  Stoic  philosophers  (from  oroa,  porch, 
the  place  where  Zeno  taught)  are  Zeno  of  Citium  in  the  island  of 
Cyprus  (born  about  340),  the  founder  of  the  school;  Cleanthes 
(born  about  300),  his  immediate  successor,  and  Chrysippus  (born 
about  280),  who,  by  his  dialectics,  contributed  to  the  defense  and 
spread  of  the  school.    Later,  the  Stoic  doctrines  were  propagated 
among  the  Romans,  especially  by  Seneca  (3-65),  Epictetus  (died 
about  117),  and  Marcus  Aurelius  (121-180). 

According  to  the  Stoics,  (i)  The  only  principle  of  knowledge  is 
sensation.  (2)  Matter  alone  is  real,  and  what  we  call  spirit  — 
God  and  the  soul  —  is  but  a  form  of  more  subtle  matter.  (3)  God 
is  the  soul  of  the  world,  and  must  be  conceived  as  a  primordial 
fire,  principle  of  all  activity  and  intelligence.  The  human  soul 
is  but  a  transitory  emanation  from  the  divine  spirit,  or  a  spark 
of  the  divine  fire.  (4)  The  whole  world,  including  man,  acts 
according  to  an  absolute  determinism.  (5)  Virtue  for  man  consists 
in  living  according  not  only  to  his  rational  nature,  but  also  to  all 
cosmic  laws.  This  is  man's  end  and  true  happiness,  the  only  good 
and  its  own  reward.  The  wise  man  must  be  absolutely  apathetic, 
i.e.  indifferent  to  all  motives  of  action  which  do  not  spring  from 
pure  reason.  All  passions  and  emotions,  therefore,  must  be  sub- 
dued and  annihilated.  Bear  patiently  and  without  feeling  what 
cannot  be  avoided.  Abstain  from  everything  distinct  from  pure 
reason:  Abstine  et  sustine,  sums  up  this  ethical  doctrine.  (Cf. 
p.  320.) 

2.  Epicureans.  —  Epicurus  (342  or  341-270)  opened  a  school  of 
philosophy  at  Athens.    His  disciples  added  nothing  important 
to  the  master's  doctrines,  which  were  soon  propagated  in  the  Greek 
and  Roman  world,   their  main  representative   at  Rome  being 
Lucretius  (95-51).    The  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  procure  happiness 
for  man,  and  everything  is  subservient  to  this  end.     (i)  As  the 
world  obeys  necessary  laws,  man  need  not  fear  the  gods.    They 
exist,  but  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  world  or  with  man.    The 


556  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

deliverance  from  this  fear  will  contribute  to  man's  happiness. 
Epicurus  admits  the  essential  principles  of  the  mechanical  atom- 
ism taught  by  Democritus.  (2)  Knowledge  is  reduced  to  sen- 
sation, and  sensation  is  the  only  test  and  criterion  of  certitude. 
(3)  The  soul  is  a  subtle  form  of  matter,  originating  and  ceasing  to 
exist  with  the  body;  hence  death  is  not  to  be  feared.  The  will, 
however,  is  free.  (4)  Personal  happiness  and  pleasure  is  the 
supreme  good.  It  does  not  consist  so  much  in  anything  positive  as 
in  the  absence  of  pain  and  the  repose  of  the  mind.  Sensual  pleas- 
ure must  be  tempered  and  guided  by  reason.  Not  only  the  pres- 
ent enjoyment,  but  also  the  future,  must  be  considered.  (Cf. 

P-  314.) 

3.  Sceptics  and  Eclectics.  —  (a)  The  earlier  sceptics  of  the  third 
and  second  centuries  agree  with  the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  that 
the  chief  purpose  of  philosophy  is  to  show  the  way  to  happiness, 
and  that  happiness  consists  essentially  in  the  peace  and  repose  of 
the  mind.  Hence  man  must  abstain  from  researches  and  studies, 
since  they  are  not  necessary  to  practical  happiness,  and  disturb  the 
mind.  The  main  sceptics  of  this  period  are  Pyrrho  of  Elis  (about 
360-270),  who  holds  that  the  wise  man  abstains  from  passing  judg- 
ment on  anything;  Arcesilaus  and  Carneades,  already  mentioned 
as  leaders  of  the  Academy.  (Cf.  pp.  373  ff.) 

(b)  The  Eclectics,  like  the  Sceptics,  do  not  pretend  to  reach 
speculative  certitude,  but  only  to  frame  a  working  hypothesis  on 
which  a  system  of  practical  conduct  may  be  based.    The  knowl- 
edge which  they  claim  to  have  is  sufficient  for  practical  purposes; 
it  is  felt  instinctively  rather  than  based  on  demonstration,  and 
is  therefore  more  subjective  than  objective.    Among  the  most 
important  eclectics  are  Seneca,  already  mentioned  as  a  Stoic; 
Philo  of  Larissa  (of  the  Academy);  Andronicus  of  Rhodes  (of  the 
Peripatetic  school),  and,  to  some  extent,  Cicero  (106-43). 

(c)  Eclecticism  led  again  to  scepticism,  represented  by  Mnesi- 
demus  (first  century  B.C.),  who  denies  the  value  of  both  sensitive 
and  intellectual  knowledge,    and  asserts  that    all    our   mental 
representations  are  subjective,  and  by  Sextus   Empiricus,  who 
gathered  in  his  treatises  all  the  objections  of  sceptics  against 
certitude. 


GRECO-ORIENTAL  PHILOSOPHY    557 


III.    GRECO-ORIENTAL  PHILOSOPHY 

The  main  centre  of  this  period  is  Alexandria,  where  the  western 
world  had  frequent  intercourse  with  the  eastern  world.  Although 
this  movement  occurred  in  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  it 
belongs  to  ancient  philosophy,  as  Christianity  had  no  influence 
on  it.  In  the  present  period,  the  most  important  doctrine  is  Neo- 
Platonism,  but  we  must  speak  first  of  Neo-Pythagorism  and  of 
the  Greco-Jewish  philosophy  that  preceded  Neo-Platonism.  The 
feature  common  to  these  is  a  mystical  tendency  to  an  ecstatic 
union  with  the  Divinity. 

i.  Greco- Jewish  and  Neo-Pythagorean  Philosophy.  —  (a)  The 
Jews  endeavored  to  harmonize  the  views  contained  in  their  sacred 
books  with  those  of  Greek  philosophy.  They  had  recourse  to  an 
allegorical  interpretation  of  the  Scriptures  in  order  to  find  therein 
symbols  and  figures  of  the  Greek  philosophical  doctrines.  The 
main  attempt  was  made  by  Philo,  an  Alexandrian  Jew  (30  B.C.- 
50  A.D.),  according  to  whom  (i)  God,  the  first  cause,  so  tran- 
scends the  world  that,  although  we  can  know  His  existence,  nothing 
can  be  known  of  His  nature  and  attributes.  He  is,  however,  good 
and  almighty.  (2)  The  world  was  created  by  God,  not  immedi- 
ately, but  through  certain  intermediary  "powers,"  which  may  be 
identified  with  ideas,  angels,  demons,  etc.  They  proceed  from 
God,  yet  are  distinct  from  Him.  (3)  The  primordial  divine 
"power"  is  the  Logos,  a  kind  of  world-soul  the  nature  of  which  is 
not  explained  clearly.  (4)  The  human  soul  is  a  divine  principle, 
or  angel,  united  with  a  body  which  is  a  hindrance  to  its  higher 
activities.  (5)  By  withdrawing  itself  more  and  more  from  the 
influences  of  the  organism,  the  soul  may  enter  into  immediate 
communication  with  God  by  a  mystical  ecstasy. 

(b)  Neo- Pythagoreans  also  took  their  doctrines  from  the  Greek 
schools  of  philosophy,  and  combined  them  with  the  Pythagorean 
symbolism  and  mystical  aspirations.  The  main  representatives 
of  this  movement  are  Plutarch  of  Chaeronea  (about  46-120), 
Maximus  of  Tyre,  and  the  works  collected  under  the  name  of 
Hermes  Trismegistus  (end  of  the  third  century). 


558  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

2.  Neo-Platonism  develops  the  doctrine  of  religious  mysticism, 
or  the  union  of  man  with  the  Infinite,  based  on  a  pantheistic 
monism,  God  being  the  source  from  whom  all  things  proceed 
by  emanation.  With  Plato's  teachings  as  a  basis,  it  combines 
doctrines  from  the  main  Greek  schools. 

(a)  Plotinus  (205-270)  holds  that  (i)  All  things  emanate  from 
the  One,  i.e.  the  supreme  being,  world-transcending,  indetermined 
principle,  without  any  attributes,  without  even  intelligence  and 
will.     (2)  The  first  reality  which  emanates  from  the  One  is  the 
Mind  (vovs),  or  pure  intelligence;  from  this  intelligence  emanates 
the  soul  of  the  world;  from  the  soul  of  the  world,  particular  souls; 
and  from  these,  matter.     (3)  The  human  soul  is  free  and  immortal, 
but  goes  through  a  series  of  transmigrations.     (4)  The  soul  finally 
returns  to  God  by  successively  purifying  and  almost  annihilating 
itself,  and  ascending  to  the  contemplation  of  the  Mind,  and  the 
ecstatic  union  with  the  One.     Porphyry  of  Tyre  (233-304)  was 
Plotinus's  immediate  disciple,  and  spread  his  master's  doctrine. 

(b)  lamblicus  of  Syria  (died  about  330)  also  holds  a  theory  of 
emanation  with  a  polytheistic  and  demonistic  doctrine. 

(c)  At  Constantinople  the  chief  representative  of  Neo-Plato- 
nism is  Themistius  (latter  half  of  fourth  century).     At  Athens, 
Proclus  (410-485)  and  Simplicius  also  teach  the  doctrine  of  a  series 
of  emanations  from  the  One. 


CHAPTER  II 
MEDLEY AL  PHILOSOPHY 

TRANSITION.     PATRISTIC  PHILOSOPHY 

The  Fathers  of  the  Church  are  primarily  apologists.  They 
endeavor  to  explain  Christian  dogmas  and  to  defend  them  against 
both  heresy  and  paganism.  Hence  whatever  philosophy  is  found 
in  their  writings  is  not  presented  systematically,  but  scattered 
here  and  there  as  circumstances  require.  Two  periods  may  be 
distinguished.  The  first,  ending  with  the  council  of  Nice  (325) 
includes  the  first  three  centuries,  during  which  the  main  dogmas 
were  established  and  defined.  The  second  extends  to  the  seventh 
century,  during  which  time  theology  became  more  systematic, 
and  consequently  more  attention  was  given  to  philosophy  as  an 
auxiliary. 

i.  First  Period.  —  (a)  The  question  of  the  origin  of  evil  gave 
rise  to  two  heresies,  Gnosticism  in  the  second  century,  and  Mani- 
cheism  (founded  by  Manes  in  the  third  century).  Manicheism 
holds  an  essential  dualism  of  principles,  one  of  good,  the  other  of 
evil,  and  a  doctrine  of  emanation.  Gnosticism  had  recourse  to  a 
supposed  esoteric  doctrine  of  Christ,  higher  than  revelation  and 
to  which  the  name^JIraicrts  was  given.  According  to  this  (i)  God 
is  the  principle  of  all  good,  and  from  God  emanates  a  series  of  ^Eons. 
(2)  Matter  is  the  principle  of  evil,  and  the  world  results  from  the 
union  of  the  divine  with  the  material  principle.  (3)  All  things 
will  ultimately  return  to  God.  (4)  The  Scriptures  are  to  be  inter- 
preted allegorically.  It  is  easy  to  see  in  this  teaching  a  mixture 
of  elements  borrowed  from  Philo  and  Plotinus. 

(b)  Among  the  Fathers  of  this  period  must  be  mentioned  two 
names,  both  belonging  to  the  Christian  school  of  Alexandria: 
Clement  of  Alexandria  (died  about  216)  and  Origen  (185-254). 
Both  insist  on  the  doctrine  that  God  is  not  to  be  identified, 

559 


560  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

with,  but  transcends,  the  world.  The  world  is  not  an  emanation 
from  God,  but  was  created  by  Him.  The  soul  is  spiritual  and 
immortal. 

2.  Second  Period.  —  (a)  We  simply  mention  in  passing  the 
names  of  Gregory  of  Nyssa  (331-394),  Basil  (died  379),  Ambrose 
(340-397),  and  Gregory  Nazianzen  (born  330). 

(b)  Saint  Augustine,  born  354  at  Tagaste  in  Numidia,  was 
converted  by  St.  Ambrose.    He  became  bishop  of  Hippo  in  395, 
and  died  in  430.    The  following  works  especially  are  of  interest 
for    philosophy:     "Confessiones";     "  Retractationes  " ;    "Contra 
Academicos";  "Soliloquia";  "De  immortalitate  animae";  "De 
anima  et  eius  origine";  "De  libero  arbitrio";  "De  civitate  Dei." 

Augustine  borrows  from  the  Greek  philosophers,  especially  from 
Plato,  but  adapts  their  teaching  to  Christian  dogmas,  (i)  God 
exists  as  the  one  supreme  being,  simple,  eternal,  omniscient.  He 
is  the  creator  of  all  things,  and  brought  them  out  of  nothing  accord- 
ing to  His  plan,  ideas,  or  exemplars.  (2)  The  soul  is  spiritual  and 
immortal.  (3)  Its  main  activity  is  intellectual  knowledge.  Cer- 
titude is  possible,  and  Augustine  defends  it  against  the  probabil- 
ism  of  the  Academy.  God  is  the  source  of  all  truth,  and  the  first 
light  which  illumines  the  human  mind.  (4)  God  is  the  supreme 
good,  hence  man's  ultimate  end.  Virtue  is  essentially  the  con- 
formity of  the  human  with  the  divine  will,  the  fulfilment  of  God's 
law,  especially  the  law  of  love,  in  view  of  man's  eternal  destiny. 

(c)  Some  works  formerly  attributed  to  Dionysius-  the  Areop- 
agite,  the  disciple  of  St.  PauL  are  now  knc^pto  have  been  writ- 
ten at  the  end  of  the  fifth  or  the  beginning  of  the  sixth  century. 
The  philosophy  of  Pseudo- Dionysius  is  essentially  Neo-Platonistic, 
and  reproduces  the  mysticism  of  Neo-Platonism,  although  it  rejects 
its  pantheism. 

Mediaeval  or  scholastic  philosophy  (thus  called  because  it  was 
taught  in  the  schools),  although  it  was  frequently  systematized 
along  with  theology,  is  nevertheless  distinct  from  it,  as  it  proceeds 
on  merely  rational  grounds.  We  shall  divide  it  into  three  periods: 
(i)  The  period  of  formation  and  growth  (from  the  ninth  to  the 
end  of  the  twelfth  century).  (2)  The  period  of  perfection  (thir- 


FIRST     MEDIEVAL    PERIOD  561 

teenth  century).     (3)  The  period  of  decline  (from  the  fourteenth 
to  the  sixteenth  century). 

I.    FIRST  PERIOD 

I.  BEGINNINGS 

1.  The  Schools.  —  (a)  Before  Charlemagne,   the  invasion  of 
the  barbarians  and  the  dismemberment  of  the  Roman  Empire 
made  it  impossible  to  acquire  and  develop  any  branch  of  learning. 
From  the  time  of  Charlemagne  schools  were  founded:  (i)  palace 
schools,  at  the  court  of  rulers,  especially  of   the  French  kings; 
(2)  monastic  schools,  annexed  to  monasteries,  for  the  education 
of  both  the  religious  and  strangers;  (3)  cathedral  schools,  estab- 
lished in  the  most  important  diocesan  sees.    The  seven  liberal 
arts  were  taught  in  these  schools,  namely,  the  trivium  (grammar, 
rhetoric,  and  dialectic),  and  the  quadriwum  (arithmetic,  geometry, 
astronomy,  and  music).     Little  by  little  natural  sciences,  his- 
tory, theology,  and  philosophy  were  added.     Among  the  first 
"  scholastici "  or  masters  of  the  schools  may  be  mentioned  Alcuin 
(735-804)  at  the  court  of  Charlemagne,  and  Rhabanus  Maurus 
(784-856)  at  the  Benedictine  school  of  Fulda. 

(b)  The  teaching  in  the  schools  was  chiefly  in  the  form  of  com- 
mentaries on  the  works  of  Greek  philosophers  (mostly  in  Latin 
translations)  and  of  Latin  philosophers.  Among  these  works  the 
most  important  were  the  Organon,  i.e.  the  logical  works  of  Aris- 
totle, part  of  whMfcnly  was  known  then;  the  Timaeus  of  Plato; 
the  Isagoge,  i.e.  the  introduction^to  Aristotle's  Categories,  by 
Porphyry,  and  other  commentaries  of  Plato  and  Aristotle;  some 
of  the  writings  of  Cicero,  Seneca,  an4  Lucretius;  those  of  St. 
Augustine,  Pseudo-Dionysius,  and  some  Fathers. 

2.  John  Scotus  Eriugena  (born  between  800  and  815)  is  the  first 
who  tried  to  systematize  philosophy.    The  doctrine  contained  in 
his  main  work  "De  divisione  naturae"  is  a  mixture  of  Christian- 
ity, Oriental   pantheism,  and  Alexandrian  mysticism.    There  is 
only  one  being,  namely,  God,  from  whom  all  things  proceed  by 
emanation.     God  remains  the  one  substance  of  all  things.    In 
this  process  of  emanation,  four  stages  must  be  distinguished. 

37 


562  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

(i)  Uncreated  and  creating  nature,  i.e.  God  as  the  origin  of  all 
things,  unknowable  both  for  us  and  for  Himself.  (2)  Created 
and  creating  nature,  i.e.  God  as  the  principle  and  exemplar  of  all 
things.  (3)  Created  and  not-creating  nature,  i.e.  the  world  of 
phenomena  in  space  and  time,  all  of  which  are  participations  of 
the  divine  substance,  and  theophaniae,  i.e.  manifestations  of  God 
and  of  the  divine  becoming.  (4)  Neither  created  nor  creating 
nature,  i.e.  God  as  the  end  of  all  things,  to  whom  all  things 
ultimately  return. 

Other  important  names  of  this  period  are  Remi  of  Auxerre 
(died  904)  and  Gerbert  (died  1003). 

II.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  UNIVERSALS 

i.  The  Problem  Stated.  —  (a)  Toward  the  middle  of  the  elev- 
enth century  the  problem  of  universals  becomes  the  centre  of 
scholastic  discussions.  It  is  not  the  only  problem,  as  we  shall 
see;  from  it  radiate  other  psychological  and  metaphysical  inqui- 
ries, but  it  is  the  chief  one.  Nor  is  the  discussion  of  this  problem 
an  idle  one,  for  it  is  the  very  question  of  the  value  of  our  universal 
ideas,  a  question  which,  in  some  form  or  other,  reappears  through- 
out the  whole  history  of  philosophy,  and  is  still  a  vital  one  at  the 
present  time. 

(b)  A  passage  in  Porphyry's  Isagoge  which,  in  Boethius's  trans- 
lation, was  the  text-book  of  logic  used  in  the  schools,  was  the 
starting-point  of  the  discussion.  Porphyry  asks  whether  genera 
and  species  exist  in  themselves  as  realities,  or  only  in  the  mind  that 
conceives  them.  Are  they  objective  things  or  mental  abstractions? 
Hence  two  answers  are  suggested,  (i)  Absolute  realism:  Uni- 
versal concepts  as  such  correspond  to  objective  extramental 
realities,  which  are  universal  independently  of  the  mind.  (2) 
Conceptualism :  The  idea  alone  is  universal,  and  there  is  no  extra- 
mental  reality  corresponding  to  it.  Later  on,  a  distinction  was 
made  and  two  new  systems  were  evolved.  (3)  Nominalism,  more 
radical  than  conceptualism,  denies  even  the  conception  of  the 
universal  by  the  mind,  and  attributes  universality  only  to  the 
common  name.  (4)  Moderate  realism  answers  that,  as  such, 
the  universal  exists  only  in  the  mind,  that  existing  things  are 


FIRST    MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD  563 

always  individual,  but  that  there  is  in  things  a  "  fundamentum " 
for  this  universality,  namely,  their  essence  which  the  mind,  by  a 
process  of  abstraction,  may  conceive  apart  from  individual 
features.  (Cf.  p.  398.) 

2.   Realism.  —  (a)  Scotus    Eriugena    and    Remi    of    Auxerre, 
already  mentioned,  were  realists. 

(b)  In  the  twelfth  century,  William  of  Champeaux  (1070-1120), 
a  disciple  of  St.  Anselm  and  of  Roscelin,  whose  teaching  he  op- 
posed (see  below,  p.  564),  held  —  according  to  Abelard,  his  oppo- 
nent, on  whose  authority  we  have  to  depend  for  this  account — that 
universals  are  present  in  individual  things.     Hence  individuals 
are  identical  as  to  their  essence  and  differ  only  in  their  accidents. 
In  other  words,  the  essence  of  man,  for  instance,  is  one  and  iden- 
tical in  all  men,  and  contained  totally  in  every  individual  man. 
In  consequence  of  the  ridicule  heaped  on  this  doctrine  by  Abe- 
lard  —  who  objected  that  in  this  case  Socrates  at  Rome,  since  he 
contains  the  whole  human  essence,  should  also  be  at  the  same  time 
at  Athens,  where  Plato,  who  also  contains  the  whole  human  es- 
sence, is  —  William  modified  his  view,  and  finally  seems  to  have 
abandoned  realism  altogether. 

(c)  A  more  reserved  realism,  called  indifferentism,  was  taught 
by  Adelard  of  Bath  (in  the  beginning  of  the  twelfth  century)  and 
Gauthier  (Walter}  of  Mortagne  (died  1174).     In  every  individual 
we  must  distinguish  two  classes  of  realities.     Some  constitute  its 
essential  differences;  others  are  specific  and  generic,  i.e.  common 
to  all  individuals  (indijferentes) ,  hence  universal.     It  would  seem 
then  that,  according  to  the  point  of  view  one  takes,  the  same 
being  may  be  looked  upon  as  individual  and  as  universal,  but 
the  theory,  as  presented,   is    vague,   and  may    receive    various 
interpretations. 

(d)  The  school  of  Chartres  —  Bernard  of  Chartres  (died  about 
1125),  Thierry  of  Chartres  (died  1155),  William  of  Conches  (about 
1080-1154),  a  disciple  of  St.  Bernard — teaches  an  absolute  realism 
similar  to  that  of  Plato.    The  true  reality  is  universal,  and  the 
sensible  world  is  composed  only  of  fleeting  shadows.     However, 
this    doctrine    endeavors    to     avoid    pantheism,    and    admits 
creation. 


564  HISTORY     OF    PHILOSOPHY 

3.  Anti-Realism.  —  (a)  At  the  end  of  the  eleventh  century, 
Roscelin  of  Compiegne  affirms  that  reality  belongs  primarily  to 
the  individual,  and    that  universals   are   only  names,   "voces" 
(nominalism),  or  at  most  mental  conceptions  to  which  nothing 
real  corresponds. 

(b)  In  the  twelfth  century  Abelard  (1079-1142),  a  disciple  of 
Roscelin  and  of  William  of  Champeaux,  is  the  main  figure  in 
philosophical  and  theological  discussions,     (i)  He  opposes  both  the 
realism  of  William  of  Champeaux  and  the  nominalism  of  Roscelin. 
He  does  not  seem  to  look  upon  universals  as  mere  mental  ideas 
without  any  reality  whatsoever  in  things.    While  he  claims  that 
individuals  alone  exist,  his  doctrine  seems  to  be  that  of  a  moderate 
realism  not  yet  formulated  clearly.     (2)  He  is  essentially  a  ration- 
alist, even  in  regard  to  Catholic  dogmas  and  mysteries  which,  he 
claims,  can  be  understood  and  demonstrated  by  reason.     (3)  In 
his  "  Sic  et  Non  "  he  presents  pros  and  cons  on  a  number  of  ques- 
tions, but  stops  at  these  statements  without  giving  any  posi- 
tive answer.     (4)  He  also  gives  some  attention  to  cosmological, 
psychological,  and  ethical  problems. 

(c)  Gilbert  de  la  Porree  (1076-1154)  admits  that  universal  es- 
sences exist  only  in  individuals,  and  become  universal  in  the  mind 
when  the  similarities  between  them  are  discovered  by  a  process  of 
comparison. 

4.  Saint   Anselm    (1033-1109)    deserves   special   mention  on 
account  of  the  many  questions  which  he  touched  upon,  and  of 
his  efforts  to  systematize  the  results  reached  by  his  predecessors. 
He  was  influenced  greatly  by  St.  Augustine,     (i)  Faith  is  superior 
to  reason,  yet  reason  is  an  independent  source  of  knowledge. 
(2)  The  real  existence  of  God  is  proved  by  the  idea  which  we  have 
of  an  infinitely  perfect  being,  to  whom,  therefore,  existence,  as  a 
perfection,  must  belong.     (This  argument  has  been  discussed  and 
found  wanting  as  passing  from  the  ideal  to  the  real  order.)     (3) 
Truth  is  eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  therefore  based  ultimately 
on  God.     (4)  Universals  exist  in  things;  yet  St.  Anselm  does  not 
seem  to  teach  an  absolute,  but  a  moderate  realism.     (5)  Abstract 
ideas  are  not  innate,  but  have  their  origin  in  the  data  of  the 
senses. 


FIRST     MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD  565 

5.  Eclectics  and  Synthetics.  —  Efforts  to  sum  up  and  coordi- 
nate various  doctrines  were  made  by  John  of  Salisbury  (died  1180), 
and  Alanus  of  Lille  (about  1128-1202).  The  former  is  a  humanist, 
historian,  critic,  and  philosopher.  The  latter  insists  on  dialec- 
tics and  applies  himself  chiefly  to  cosmology,  psychology,  and 
metaphysics. 

III.  MYSTICISM  AND  PANTHEISM 

1.  Mysticism.  —  In  general  mysticism   admits  that,  at  least 
under  certain  conditions,  there  is  for  man  a  mode  of  knowledge  of 
God  and  of  divine  things  higher  than  logical  demonstration,  namely, 
the  direct  communication  and  union  of  the  soul  with  God  through  con- 
templation and  love.    The  purpose  of  life  is  to  develop  these  higher 
faculties,  and  to  make  the  immediate  union  with  God  closer  and 
more  perfect.    The  main  mystics  are  found  in  the  abbey  of  Saint- 
Victor  (Paris),  and  among  them  especially  the  two  abbots,  Hugh 
(1096-1141)  and  Richard  (died  1173).     Without  despising  reason 
and  dialectics,  they  look  upon  them  only  as  a  step  to  contemplation 
which  alone  gives  true  science. 

2.  Pantheism.  —  In  the  latter  half  of  the  twelfth  century  there 
was  a  revival  of  pantheistic  doctrines,     (i)  The  pantheism  of 
the  school  of  Chartres  is  represented  by  Bernard  of  Tours,  who, 
about   1150,  wrote  his  "De  mundi  universitate,"  in  which  he 
follows  the  Neo-Platonistic  doctrines,  and  admits  a  theory  of 
emanation.     (2)  The  pantheism   of   Amaury  of  Benes  and   his 
disciples  admits  that  God  is  immanent  in  all  things,  and  that  all 
things  are  substantially  identical  with  God.     (3)  The  material- 
istic pantheism  of  David  of  Dinant  asserts  that  God  is  the  primary 
matter  identical  in  all  things.    Three  classes  of  substances  are 
distinguished,    God,  the   soul,  and    matter,  but   they  are  only 
one  and  the  same  being. 

IV.  ORIENTAL  PHILOSOPHY 

i.  Arabian  Philosophy  is  based  chiefly  on  Aristotle,  whose  works 
were  translated  into  Arabic  from  Syriac  versions.  Naturally 
such  translations  were  very  defective.  Arabian  philosophers  also 


566  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

borrow  doctrines  of  emanation  and  ecstasis  from  Neo-Platonism. 
In  the  discussions  which  were  raised  about  the  Koran  toward 
the  end  of  the  eighth  century,  the  Mutazilites  were  rationalists, 
the  Mutakallimun  defended  orthodoxy,  and  the  Sufis  gave  promi- 
nence to  mysticism.  Arabian  philosophy  proper  is  divided  into 
eastern  and  western. 

(a)  Main    oriental    Arabian    philosophers,     (i)  Alkendi    (died 
about  870)  wrote  on  logic,  physics,  metaphysics,  medicine,  magic, 
etc.     (2)  Alfarabi  (died  950),  at  the  school  of  Bagdad,  wrote 
commentaries  on  Aristotle's  logical  works.     In  metaphysics  he 
admitted    an    emanationistic     pantheism.      (3)  Avicenna    (Ibn 
Sina,  980-1036)    wrote  a  great  number  of  works  in  which  he 
abandons  many  of  the  Neo-Platonistic  interpretations  of  Aristotle, 
but  still  admits  a  theory  of  emanations  or  processions  from  God. 
The  last  emanation  is  the  "intellectus  agens,"  which  governs  our 
world.     Matter   is   eternal   and   increated.     (4)  Gazali    (Algazel, 
1058-1111)  opposed  the  philosophers  and  stood  for  the  Koran. 
He  was  one  of  the  Sufis  or  mystics. 

(b)  Occidental  Arabian  philosophers  lived  in  Spain.     The  most 
important  was  Averroes  (Ibn  Roshd,  1126-1198),  born  at  Cordova; 
died  at  Morocco.     He  wrote  many  commentaries  on  Aristotle's 
works,  and  also   original   works   on   philosophy,   medicine,   and 
Astronomy,     (i)    Primary   matter   is   eternal    and    contains    all 
forms  in  a  germ-like  fashion.     (2)  Human  reason  is  impersonal, 
one  and  identical  in  all  men.    Hence  there  is  no  personal  immor- 
tality. 

2.  Jewish  Philosophy  developed  chiefly  in  Spain  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Arabian  philosophy.  Amcebron  or  Avicebrol  (Ibn  Gebirol, 
1020-1070),  born  at  Malaga,  reproduces  many  tendencies  of  the 
Neo-Platonists.  God  is  one  and  unknowable.  All  things,  even 
spiritual,  are  composed  of  matter  and  form.  The  soul  must  unite 
itself  to  God  by  contemplation.  Moses  Maimonides  (1135-1204) 
tries  to  combine  the  teachings  of  Aristotle  with  Judaism.  On  many 
points  he  agrees  with  the  interpretation  of  Aristotle  by  Averroes. 
Matter  is  not  affirmed  to  be  eternal.  The  human  intellect  is  partly 
innate  (one  and  the  same  for  all)  and  partly  acquired  (personal 
and  individual). 


SECOND     MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD  567 

II.    SECOND  PERIOD 
I.  GENERAL 

i.  Influences. — The  thirteenth  century  is  the  period  of  per- 
fection of  scholastic  philosophy.  An  attempt  is  made  to  coordi- 
nate all  preceding  doctrines  in  a  complete  synthesis.  The  main 
influences  at  work  were  the  introduction  of  hitherto  unknown  phil- 
osophical writings,  especially  those  of  Aristotle;  the  foundation 
and  growth  of  universities,  and  the  institution  of  religious  orders. 

(a)  Before  this  time  only  the  logical  works  of  Aristotle  were 
known  to  the  schoolmen.     Now  his  other  philosophical  and  scien- 
tific works  were  translated  into  Latin,  sometimes  directly  from  the 
Greek,  more  generally  from  Arabic  translations.     The  translations 
from  the  Arabic  were    frequently  very  imperfect,  and,  together 
with  Arabian  commentaries,  were  causes  of  the  misrepresentation 
of  the  master's  doctrine  in  a  way  which  was  often  irreconcilable 
with    Catholic    dogma.     Hence  prohibitions  to  read   Aristotle's 
works  were  enacted  by  the  provincial  council  of  Paris  (1210)  and 
by  the  Pope's  legate  (1215).    This  prohibition,  however,  applied 
only  to  the  University  of  Paris.     Little  by  little,  when  Aristotle 
became  better  known  through  more  accurate  translations,  this  pro- 
hibition ceased  to  be  applied,  and  Aristotle  became  the  undisputed 
master  in  the  University. 

(b)  Universities  gave  to  philosophy  an  important  place  in  their 
teaching.     The  University  of  Paris  was  founded  early  in  the  thir- 
teenth century,  or  rather  grew  out  of  the  union  of  the  cathedral 
schools.     The  University  of  Oxford,  which  already  existed,  was 
definitely  organized  in  the  thirteenth  century,  and,  to  a  great 
extent,  modelled  after  that  of  Paris.    The  University  of  Cambridge 
was  founded  in  the  latter  half  of  the  thirteenth  century. 

(c)  It  is  also  at  this  time  that  the  Dominicans  and  Franciscans 
were  founded.    Their  teaching,  both  in  their  monasteries  and  in 
universities,  had  a  stimulating  influence  on  account  of  the  learn- 
ing of  the  men  who  gave  it,  and  of  the  controversies  which  arose 
between  seculars  and  regulars,  and  between  the  various  religious 
schools. 


568  HISTORY    OF     PHILOSOPHY 

2.  Division.  —  We  shall  consider  successively  (i)  the  philoso- 
ophy  of  the  earlier  part  of  the  thirteenth  century;  (2)  Thomistic 
philosophy;  (3)  Scotistic  philosophy;  (4)  some  other  more  or  less 
independent  schools  and  philosophers. 

II.  PHILOSOPHY  IN  THE  EARLIER  PART  or  THE  THIRTEENTH 

CENTURY 

In  general,  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth  century  is  a  period  of 
transition.  The  influence  of  Aristotle  is  already  very  important, 
but  far  from  exclusive.  Many  elements  are  borrowed  from  other 
sources,  especially  from  St.  Augustine,  (i)  William  of  Au- 
vergne  (died  1249),  professor  at  the  University  of  Paris,  and  later 
bishop  of  Paris,  attempts  to  reconcile  Aristotle  with  Plato  and 
St.  Augustine.  (2)  Among  the  Franciscans  must  be  mentioned 
Alexander  of  Hales  (died  1245)  and  St.  Bonaventure  (1221-1274). 
Alexander's  philosophy  is  essentially  Aristotelian,  although  it  still 
retains  some  traditional  Augustinian  elements.  St.  Bonaventure 
was  Alexander's  disciple.  In  his  metaphysics,  psychology,  theod- 
icy, etc.,  the  growing  influence  of  Aristotle  is  manifest.  He  also 
taught  a  form  of  mysticism  akin  to  that  of  the  Victorine  school. 
The  world  presents  to  the  mind  the  "vestiges"  of  God,  and  the 
soul  is  an  "image"  of  God.  The  knowledge  of  God's  vestiges 
and  image  must  lead  to  the  immediate  contemplation  of  God 
Himself. 

III.  THOMISTIC  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Albert  the   Great   (1193-1280),  a  Dominican,  professor  at 
Cologne  and  Paris,  was  St.  Thomas's  master,  and  began  the  great 
synthesis  completed  by  his  disciple.     He  contributed  to  spread 
the  influence  of  Aristotle.      Remarkable  as  a  theologian  and  phi- 
losopher, Albert  is  still  more  remarkable  as  a  scientist.     He  was 
familiar  with  all  the  sciences  of  his  time,  zoology,  botany,  phys- 
iology, medicine,   geography,   astronomy,  mineralogy,  and  even 
alchemy.    His  philosophy,  except  on  some  minor  points,  is  essen- 
tially the  same  as  that  of  St.  Thomas,  but  less  perfectly  elaborated. 

2.  Saint  Thomas  of   Aquino  or  Thomas  Aquinas,  called  the 
Angelic  Doctor  (1225-1274),  entered  the  Dominican  order  in  1243, 


SECOND     MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD  569 

was  the  disciple  of  Albert  the  Great  at  Cologne  and  Paris, 
began  his  public  teaching  at  Paris  about  1257,  and  later  taught 
at  Rome,  Bologna,  Perugia,  Naples,  and  other  places. 

(a)  Besides   a  number   of    commentaries  on  Holy   Scripture, 
Aristotle,   etc.,  he  wrote  "Opuscula,"   "Quodlibeta,"    "Quaesti- 
ones  disputatae,"  and  especially  "Summa  contra  gentiles"  and 
"Summa  theologica."    These  constitute  a  theological  and  phil- 
osophical encyclopaedia  in  which  Aristotelian  philosophy  and  Cath- 
olic dogma  are  harmonized.    Thomistic  philosophy  is  essentially 
Peripatetic,  but  on  many  points  Aristotle's  doctrine  is  modified. 
Reason  is  a  source  of  knowledge  distinct  from  revelation,  but 
allied  with  it,  and  St.  Thomas  always  distinguishes  natural  from 
supernatural  truth,  and  philosophy  from  theology. 

(b)  We  shall  mention  only  the  fundamental  points  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  St.  Thomas,     (i)  Material  substances  are  composed  of 
matter  and  form, potentiality  and  actuality.    (Cf.  pp.  426  ff.)    The 
world  was  created  by  God.     (2)  Man  is  also  composed  of  matter 
and  form  (cf .  pp.  480  ff) ,  but  the  form  or  soul  is  substantial  and 
spiritual,  hence  directly  created  by  God  and  immortal.     (3)  The 
soul  has  faculties,  some  of  which  it  exercises  through  the  organism, 
while  others  are  spiritual.    The  intellect  is  spiritual,  but  depends 
extrinsically  on  the  senses.    From  sensory  knowledge  we  arise  to 
intellectual  knowledge  by  the  abstractive  activity  of  the  intel- 
lectus  agens.     (Cf.  pp.  98  ff.)     Intellectual  or  universal  knowledge 
alone  constitutes  true  science.     Universals  exist  in  things  "funda- 
mentaliter,"  i.e.  in  their  concrete  essence,  but  in  the  mind  "for- 
maliter."     (Cf.  p.  398.)     (4)  The  existence  of  God  is  known  a 
posteriori  from  the  world,  as  also  whatever  may  be  known  concern- 
ing His  nature.    But  no  finite  mind  can  ever  have  a  comprehensive 
knowledge  of  God.     (Cf.  pp.  529  ff.)     (5)  The  ultimate  end  of  man 
is  perfect  happiness  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  possession  of  God, 
the  infinite  good.    The  moral  character  of  actions  is  to  be  derived 
from  their  relation  to  the  ultimate  end. 

3.  Thomists  and  Adversaries.  —  Some  of  St.  Thomas's  doc- 
trines were  opposed  very  strongly,  and  the  opposition  succeeded 
even  in  having  some  of  them  condemned  at  Paris  and  Oxford. 
But,  in  1278,  the  whole  Dominican  order  accepted  Thomism,  which 


570  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

thenceforth  gained  in  favor.  Among  the  main  opponents  of  St. 
Thomas  are  the  Dominican  Robert  Kilwardby  at  Oxford  and  the 
Franciscan  Richard  of  Middletown  at  Paris.  Among  his  main 
partisans  on  the  controverted  questions  are  Giles  of  Lessines,  and 
some  philosophers  who  were  eclectics,  but  kept  Thomism  as  a 
central  doctrine:  Godfrey  of  Fontaines,  Giles  of  Rome,  and  Henry 
of  Ghent. 

IV.  SCOTISTIC  PHILOSOPHY 

John  Duns  Scotus,  the  Doctor  Subtilis  (i  266 or  1 274-1308),  a  Fran- 
ciscan, taught  at  Oxford  (1294),  Paris  (1304),  and  Cologne  (1308), 
where  he  died.  His  philosophy  is  primarily  critical  and  negative, 
secondarily  constructive.  He  attacks  the  main  contemporary 
systems  of  St.  Bonaventure,  St.  Thomas,  Giles  of  Rome,  Henry 
of  Ghent,  and  others,  (i)  Philosophy  and  theology  not  only  are 
distinct,  but  may  be  opposed.  The  field  of  reason  is  narrowed 
more  than  in  St.  Thomas.  (2)  All  created  beings  are  composed 
of  matter  and  form.  Even  spiritual  substances  have  a  common 
and  homogeneous  substratum,  the  materia  primo-prima.  As  to 
the  substantial  form,  it  is  not  necessarily  one  in  the  same  being, 
but  there  may  be  together  several  subordinated  forms.  (3)  Scotus 
defends  a  moderate  realism.  However,  the  individual  as  such  is 
not  made  individual  by  its  matter,  as  St.  Thomas  asserted,  but  by 
a  special  reality  called  haecceitas  or  "thisness."  In  general,  under 
the  name  of  formalities,  Scotus  distinguishes  a  number  of  prin- 
ciples within  the  same  individual,  to  which  he  attributes  reality, 
although  their  distinction  seems  merely  logical.  (4)  Both  in  God 
and  in  man,  the  will  is  superior  to  the  intellect.  It  may  be  noted 
that,  notwithstanding  the  differences,  Scotus's  philosophy  agrees 
with  that  of  St.  Thomas  on  many  fundamental  points.  It  found 
many  exponents  and  defenders,  especially  among  Franciscans,  but 
Scotus's  influence  never  equalled  that  of  St.  Thomas,  who  remains 
the  greatest  of  all  scholastics. 

V.  OTHER  SCHOOLS  AND  PHILOSOPHERS 

i  Averroism.  —  The  commentaries  on  Aristotle  by  Averroes 
were  introduced  at  Paris  at  the  same  time  as  Aristotle's  works. 


THIRD     MEDIAEVAL    PERIOD  571 

Condemned  in  1210  and  1215,  Averroism  revived  especially  with 
Siger  of  Brabant  (died  at  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century),  and 
was  again  condemned  in  1270  and  1277.  At  this  period,  Averroism 
holds  that  the  active  intellect  is  impersonal  and  identical  in  all  men. 
Hence  there  is  no  personal  immortality.  It  also  denies  the  provi- 
dence of  God  and  asserts  a  mediate  creation,  God  having  first 
created  separate  intelligences  who,  in  turn,  created  material  sub- 
stances. Finally  it  divorces  reason  from  faith,  so  that  a  philo- 
sophical truth  may  be  a  falsehood  in  theology,  and  vice  versa. 

2.  Roger  Bacon    (about   1210-1294)    was    a    Franciscan    who 
taught  at  Oxford  and  Paris.     He  attaches  great  importance  to 
natural  sciences  and  uses  experimental  methods.     He  appeals  to 
observation  and  experience  against  authority  and  a  priori  deduc- 
tions.    His  learning  was  very  extensive  and  embraced  physics, 
mathematics,  geography,  astronomy,  alchemy,  and  linguistics.     In 
philosophy  he  borrows  from   Aristotle,  early   Franciscan  tradi- 
tions, and  Arabian  philosophers.     His  violent  polemics  against 
acknowledged  authorities  contributed  to  lessen  his  influence. 

3.  Raymond  Lully   (1235-1315)   was  also  a   Franciscan,   and 
opposed  Averroism.     He  held  that  reason  and  faith,  far  from  being 
opposed,  always  go  together.     Faith  is  essentially  rational,  and 
reason  can  demonstrate  all  revealed  truths.     Thus  the  difference 
between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural  is  suppressed.     His 
"Ars  Magna"   contains  a  kind  of   logical  mechanism  in  which 
various  letters  and  symbols  representing  ideas  are  combined  in 
different  ways  so  as  to  lead  to  formulas  and  conclusions  that  are 
supposed  to  correspond  to  reality. 

HI.    THIRD  PERIOD 

i.  General  Causes  of  Decline.  —  The  third  period  of  scholastic 
philosophy,  including  the  fourteenth  and  the  first  half  of  the 
fifteenth  century,  is  a  period  of  decline.  Several  causes  con- 
tributed to  this  decline.  As,  on  the  one  hand,  Albert  the 
Great  and  Roger  Bacon  had  failed  in  their  attempt  to 
foster  the  scientific  spirit  and  develop  experimental  methods; 
and  as,  on  the  other  hand,  the  work  of  harmonizing  philos- 


572  HISTORY    OF     PHILOSOPHY 

ophy  and  theology,  reason  and  faith,  had  been  perfected, 
philosophers  indulged  in  mere  verbal  questions,  abused  dialectics, 
and  discussed  idle  subtleties.  They  ceased  to  think  for  them- 
selves, and  limited  themselves  to  commenting  on  the  works  of  their 
predecessors.  Hence  frequently  arose  animated  discussions  on 
points  of  little  or  no  importance.  Moreover,  these  obscure  thoughts 
were  often  expressed  in  more  obscure  terminology.  All  this  con- 
tributed to  a  general  decline  of  studies,  and  the  high  level  which 
universities  had  attained  in  the  thirteenth  century  was  consider- 
ably lowered.  Two  main  movements  characterize  this  period,  the 
revival  of  nominalism  and  of  mysticism. 

2.  Terminism.  —  (a)  The   formalism   of   the   Scotistic   school 
multiplied  metaphysical  entities,  and  led  to  an  extreme  reaction  in 
which  everything  was  simplified  as  much  as  possible.    Thus  was 
revived  nominalism  which  had  generally  been  abandoned  in  the  pre- 
ceding century.     Durandus  of  St.  Pourqain  (died  about  1332)  and 
Peter  d'Auriol  (Aureolus,  died  1322)  are  the  precursors  of  Ockham 
(about  1280-1347),  who  taught  at  Paris  and  was  the  true  author 
of  the  revival  of  nominalism.    According  to  him,  only  individuals 
exist,  and  to  universal  notions  no  reality  whatever  corresponds  in 
nature.    Ideas  are  signs  or  terms  of  the  things  which  they  signify, 
but  intuitive  knowledge  alone  represents  things  that  have  any 
reality  outside   the  mind.    Abstract  concepts  have  no  objective 
value  whatsoever.     They  are  termini,  conceptions  of   the  mind, 
and  substitutes  for  a  number  of  individual  realities.    This  theory 
is  neither  Roscelin's  nominalism  nor  Abelard's  conceptualism,  but 
rather  terminism.    In  addition  to  this,  Ockham  manifests  sceptical 
tendencies,  and  professes  an  extreme  voluntarism. 

(b)  Ockham's  terminism  was  in  great  favor  during  the  fourteenth 
and  fifteenth  centuries.  Notwithstanding  many  prohibitions  by 
the  University  of  Paris,  it  became  predominant  at  Paris,  Vienna, 
Cologne,  and  Heidelberg.  The  most  prominent  followers  of  Ock- 
ham were  John  Buridan  (died  about  1358),  rector  of  the  University 
of  Paris,  Marsilius  of  Inghen  (died  1396),  rector  of  the  University 
of  Heidelberg,  and  Peter  d'Ailly  (1350-1425). 

3.  Mysticism.  —  The  abuse  of  dialectics  brought  about,  as  a 
reaction,  a  revival  of  mysticism  and  the  distrust  of  reason.    Among 


THIRD     MEDIEVAL    PERIOD  573 

those  who  professed  a  mysticism  consistent  with  Catholicism  are 
John  Ruysbrceck  (1293-1381),  Gerard  Groot  (1340-1384),  Thomas  a 
Kempis  (1380-1471),  Denys  the  Carthusian  (1402-1471),  and 
especially  John  Gerson  (1364-1429),  chancellor  of  the  University  of 
Paris,  whose  doctrine  has  many  points  in  common  with  that  of 
St.  Bonaventure.  Among  those  who  professed  a  mysticism  in- 
consistent with  Catholicism,  on  account  especially  of  a  leaning 
toward  pantheism,  are  Eckhart  (about  1260-1327),  who  holds  that 
God  is  the  very  existence  and  actuality  of  the  world,  but  tries  to 
defend  himself  from  accusations  of  pantheism;  Henry  Suso  (about 
1300-1366);  John  Tauter  (1290-1361). 


CHAPTER  III 

MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 

TRANSITION.    RENAISSANCE 

i.  General  Features.  —  The  philosophical  doctrines  that  suc- 
ceeded scholasticism  have  little  in  common  besides  an  opposition 
to  scholastic  philosophy.  They  develop  in  many  different  direc- 
tions, show  much  confusion  and  little  originality.  Some  tendencies, 
however,  manifest  themselves;  a  separation  of  philosophy  from 
dogmatic  teaching,  a  complete  independence  of  theology  and 
revelation,  an  alliance  of  philosophy  with  natural  sciences,  and  a 
return  to  antiquity. 

Among  the  causes  which  brought  about  this  break  with  the  past 
the  most  important  were  the  following: 

(a)  The  movement  known  as  humanism,  i.e.  the  study  of  Greek 
and  Latin  classics,  especially  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  per- 
fection of  the  form  which  was  contrasted  with  that  of  the  scholas- 
tics.   Naturally   this  artistic   renaissance  affected  philosophical 
thought,  for  it  is  not  possible  to  attend  to  the  form  without  feeling 
the  influence  of  the  ideas.    The  contact  of  Italy  and  the  western 
world  with  Greece  contributed  to  develop  this  tendency,  especially 
as  a  number  of  learned  Greeks  fled  to  Italy  when  Constantinople 
was  captured  (1453)  and  Europe  was  threatened  by  the  Turks. 
The  invention  of  the  art  of  printing  facilitated   the   spread  of 
literature. 

(b)  Religious  reformation,  which  implied  essentially  a  doing  away 
with  the  authority  of  the  Church,  and  an  advocating  of  the 
supremacy  of  individual  thought. 

(c)  The  progress  of  natural  sciences,  in  which  new  discoveries 
gave  rise  to  new  problems.     The  heliocentric  system  replaced  the 
geocentric   view    (Copernicus,    1473-1543;    Tycho-Brahe,    1546- 
1601;   Kepler,  1571-1631;   Galileo,  1564-1642).    The  laws  of  the 

574 


RENAISSANCE  575 

movements  of  heavenly  bodies  were  discovered.  Anatomy, 
physiology  (Vesalius,  1514-1564;  Servet,  1509-1553),  and  mathe- 
matics (Galileo,  Tartaglia)  made  a  rapid  advance.  America  was 
discovered,  etc.  All  these  opened  new  horizons,  suggested  new 
questions,  and  necessitated  the  use  of  new  methods. 

(d)  The  formation  of  nationalities  out  of  a  formerly  united  Chris- 
tian empire,  and  the  abolition  of  the  feudal  system.    Hence  ques- 
tions concerning  individual  and  national  rights  and  liberties  grew 
in  importance. 

(e)  The  failure  of  scholastic  philosophy,  which  had  weakened 
considerably  in  its  period  of  decline,  to  adapt  itself,  as  it  could 
and  should  have  done,  to  these  new  circumstances  and  needs.    Its 
dry  verbal  discussions  could  not  withstand  the  opposition  which 
raged  against  it.     Many  important  problems  had  been  raised,  and 
there  was  no  time  to  lose  in  idle  discussions. 

2.  Revival  of  Greek  Schools.  —  (a)   The  revival  of  Platonism, 
favored  by  the  beauty  of  form  and  diction  found  in  Plato's  writings, 
was  encouraged  especially  by  the  Platonic  Academy  of  Florence 
founded  by  Cosmo  de'  Medici  in  1460.     Plato,  frequently  with  a 
Neo-Platonic  interpretation,  was  preferred  to  Aristotle,  especially 
by  Gemistus  Pletho  (1355-1450),  a  Byzantine  scholar,  Cardinal 
Bessarion  (1403-1472),  and  Pico  delta  Mirandola  (1463-1494),  who 
combined  Neo-Platonism  with  the  Jewish  Cabala. 

(b)  Pomponatius  (1462-1524)  is  the  chief    Aristotelian  of  this 
period,  but  Aristotle's  doctrine  is  frequently  misinterpreted,  and 
becomes  again  the  subject  of  many  discussions. 

(c)  Stoicism   finds   a   great   number   of   advocates,   especially 
Justus  Lipsius  (i  547-1606) .   Epicureanism  in  its  essentials  is  revived 
by  Gassendi  (1592-1655). 

3.  Naturalism. — The   study   of   natural   sciences   was   based 
largely  on  observation.     But  at  this  early  stage  of  scientific  investi- 
gation, whenever  real  causes  were  not  at  hand,  occult  forces  were 
frequently  called  in  to  explain  facts.     Hence  a  tendency  to  magic 
and  astrology.     A  tendency  to  pantheism  was  favored  by  the 
admiration  of  the  order  of  nature,     (i)  Bernardino  Telesio  (1508- 
1588)  is  an  opponent  of  Aristotelian  philosophy,  and  devotes  his 
life  to  the  study  of  natural  sciences.    According  to  him.  the  uni- 


576  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

verse  results  from  the  combination  of  matter  with  two  immaterial 
forces,  heat  and  cold.  The  principle  of  life,  or  spiritus,  is  a  mani- 
festation of  heat.  (2)  Tommaso  Campanella  (1568-1639)  was 
influenced  chiefly  by  Telesio,  and  added  metaphysical  and  political 
doctrines  to  his  master's  teaching.  (3)  Paracelsus  (1493-1541),  a 
physician,  mingles  science  with  alchemy,  magic,  and  astrology. 
(4)  Nikolaus  of  Cusa  (1401-1464)  manifests  a  tendency  to  mysti- 
cism, and  his  doctrine,  although  it  avoids  pantheism,  contains  the 
germs  of  it.  (5)  Giordano  Bruno  (1548-1600)  teaches  that  the 
universe,  infinite  in  time  and  space,  is  but  an  unfolding  of  the 
being  of  God.  The  universe  is  one  living  organism,  vivified  by  an 
intelligence  or  anima  mundi.  There  is  no  freedom  and  no  personal 
immortality. 

4.  Mysticism.  —  The  private  interpretation  of  Scripture,  which 
is  a  fundamental  tenet  of  Protestantism,  cannot  fail  to  lead  differ- 
ent individuals  to  contradictory  beliefs,  which,  in  turn,  must  be 
harmonized  with  philosophical  ideas.    Hence  the  rise  of  Protestant 
philosophies    and    mysticism.     Luther    (1483-1546)    irreducibly 
opposes  reason,  as  a  function  of  the  flesh,  to  faith,  as  a  function  of 
the  spirit,  and  thus  professes  an  exaggerated  psychological  dualism. 
Zwingli  (1484-1531),  in  his  pantheistic  doctrine  of  the  immanence 
of  God  in  all  things,  combines  Neo-Platonic  and  Stoic  elements. 
Melanchthon  (1497-1560)   follows  chiefly  Aristotle.     The  mystics 
proper  are  Sebastian  Franck  (1499-1542)  and  Jakob  Boshme  (1575- 
1624).    The  latter  explains  the  existence  of  evil  by  assuming  that 

Hn  God  Himself  the  opposition  of  good  and  evil  is  essential  and 
necessary. 

5.  Political  Philosophy.  —  (i)    Niccolo  Machiavelli  (1469-1527), 
in  Italy,  professes  a  sort  of  political  utilitarianism.    The  ethical 
distinction  of  justice  and  injustice,  of  right  and  wrong,  is  not  valid. 
Whatever  means  are  useful  to  the  state  must  be  adopted.     Not 
only  Christian  ethics,  but  even  natural  law  is  worthless.     (2) 
Thomas  More  (1478-1535),  in  England,  besides  advocating  a  kind 
of  communistic  view  of  property,  professes  the  mutual  indepen- 
dence and  indifference  of  church  and  state.      (3)    Hugo  Grotius 
(de  Groot,  1583-1645),  in  the  Netherlands,  claims  that  human 
society  originated  from  a  social  contract  by  which  individuals 


FIRST    MODERN    PERIOD  577 

transferred  their  rights  to  the  state.     Natural  rights  are  those 
which  reason  discovers  to  be  essential  to  man. 

6.  Scholasticism.  —  Among  the  scholastic  philosophers  of  this 
period  are  the  commentators  of  St.  Thomas,  Ferrara  (1474-1528) 
and  Cajetan  (1468-1534);  the  Spanish  philosophers  Banez  (1528- 
1604)  and  John  of  St.   Thomas  (1589-1644),  both  Dominicans; 
the  Jesuits  Fonseca  (1528-1597)  and  Suarez  (1548-1617).    But, 
notwithstanding  their  efforts,  scholastic  philosophy  soon  lost  all 
prestige  and  succumbed  to  the  attacks  directed  against  it.    It 
failed  to  adapt  itself  to  new  needs,  to  keep  abreast  of  scientific 
progress,  to  modify  itself   according  to  new  discoveries.    Hence 
its  downfall.  ' 

7.  Scepticism.  —  The   confusion   of   ideas   and   contradictory 
systems  soon  brought  about  a  revival  of  scepticism  represented  by 
Montaigne  (1533-1592),  Charron  (1541-1603),  and  Sanchez  (1562- 
1632).    All  this  in  turn  opened  the  way  to  the  philosophical 
reforms  of  Bacon  and  Descartes. 

In  the  modern  period  of  philosophy,  the  work  of  construction 
begins  anew.  New  systems  appear,  and  original  syntheses  are 
completed.  The  break  with  the  past  and  with  dogmatic  authority 
becomes  more  and  more  accentuated;  problems  and  schools  are 
multiplied. 

We  shall  divide  the  history  of  modern  philosophy  into  two 
periods,  (i)  The  Pre-Kantian  period,  in  which  a  rational  current 
starts  from  Descartes,  and  an  empirical  current  from  Bacon.  (2) 
The  Kantian  and  Post-Kantian  period,  in  which  criticism,  i.e.  the 
problem  of  the  origin  and  value  of  knowledge,  becomes  central. 


I.    FIRST  PERIOD 

I.  BACON  AND  DESCARTES 

With  Bacon  and  Descartes  originate  two  distinct  movements 
which,  in  a  more  or  less  direct  manner,  influence  subsequent 
philosophy,  namely,  empiricism  and  rationalism,  the  supremacy 
of  experience  and  the  supremacy  of  reason. 

38 


578  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Francis     Bacon    (1561-1626),     baron    of    Verulam,    after 
occupying  several  high  political  positions,  was  condemned  for 
receiving  bribes,  and  deprived  of  his  office.    His  two  works,  "De 
dignitate  et  augmentis  scientiarum,"  and  "Novum  organon"  (the 
latter  incomplete),  were  the  first  two  parts  of  the  Instauratio  magna 
which  he  had  planned.    After  proposing  and  expounding  a  classi- 
fication of  sciences  based  on  a  tripartite  division  of  mental  faculties 
(memory,  imagination,  and  reason),  he  insists  on  the  necessity  of 
method,  and  opposes  his  Novum  organon  to  the  Organon,  or  logical 
works,  of  Aristotle. 

The  method  which  he  proposes  consists  essentially  of  the  fol- 
lowing points:  (i)  The  syllogistic  method  is  absolutely  worthless, 
and  experience  alone  is  a  sure  criterion  (cf.  p.  382);  respect  for 
antiquity  is  an  obstacle  to  progress.  (2)  The  sources  of  error,  or 
"idols,"  must  be  eliminated,  namely,  "idola  tribus,"  based  on 
human  nature  itself  and  common  to  all  men;  " idola  specus," 
arising  from  individual  tendencies;  "idola  fori,"  arising  from  the 
contact  with  other  men  through  language;  "idola  theatri,"  arising 
from  the  various  systems  of  philosophy  and  the  authority  which 
they  exercise.  (3)  The  constructive  work  is  based  on  scientific 
induction,  in  which  facts  are  classified  in  three  groups,  called 
tabulae  praesentiae,  absentiae,  graduum.  From  the  facts,  gradu- 
ally, and  always  with  great  caution,  the  passage  is  effected  through 
theories  and  probabilities  to  certitude  as  to  the  causes  of  the 
facts.  One  must  beware  of  prejudices,  and  all  judgments  must 
be  based  only  on  the  comparison  of  facts. — N.B.  Most  of  these 
rules  were  applied  before  Bacon  without  being  formulated;  Bacon 
was  the  first  clearly  to  state  the  inductive  methods. 

2.  Rene  Descartes  (Cartesius,  1596-1650)  travelled  extensively, 
and  entertained  relations  with  the  most  prominent  scientists  of 
his  time.     His  main  philosophical   works  are  the  "Discourse  on 
Method";    " Meditationes    de  prima  philosophia";    "Principia 
philosophiae." 

(a)  Method,  (i)  Descartes  begins  with  a  universal  methodic 
doubt  bearing  on  whatever  knowledge  he  had  acquired  previously, 
and  looks  for  a  truth  the  evidence  of  which  is  so  clear  that  doubt 
about  it  will  be  impossible.  (Cf.  pp.  243,  369  ff.)  (2)  He  finds 


FIRST     MODERN    PERIOD  579 

this  truth  in  the  intuition  of  his  own  thought,  and  consequently 
of  his  existence:  "Cogito,  ergo  sum."  As  this  idea  imposes  itself 
as  true  on  account  of  its  clearness,  he  infers  that,  in  general,  the 
clearness  of  an  idea  is  the  criterion  of  its  truth.  (Cf.  p.  405.) 
(3)  Finding  in  his  mind  the  idea  of  an  infinitely  perfect  being, 
Descartes  concludes  that  God  exists,  because  existence,  being  a 
perfection,  must  belong  to  the  Infinite,  and  also  because  this  idea 
itself  of  the  Infinite  can  come  only  from  God  Himself.  Moreover, 
the  idea  of  an  infinite  perfection  includes  that  of  infallible  verac- 
ity. Hence  God,  being  the  principle  of  all  things,  cannot  deceive 
man  who  invincibly  believes  in  the  reliability  of  his  faculties.  The 
perceptions  of  the  mind  are  therefore  truthful.  (4)  Descartes 
is  now  ready  for  his  constructive  work,  which  he  undertakes  with 
the  help  of  four  guiding  precepts:  Require  clearness  and  evidence; 
proceed  first  by  analysis;  then  by  synthesis;  always  proceed 
gradually  and  cautiously. 

(b)  Psychology,     (i)  From   his    starting-point:    "Cogito,    ergo 
sum,"  Descartes  infers  that  he  is  a  thinking  spiritual  substance, 
the  essence  of  which  is  thought.     (Cf.  p.  489.)     (2)  Ideas  are  of 
three  kinds,  innate  (especially  that  of  God),  acquired,  or  formed 
by  the  imagination.    The  first  two  classes  are  objective.     (Cf. 
pp.  100,  102  ff.)     (3)  The  organism  is  a  mere  automatic  machine 
which  the  soul,  located  in  the  pineal  gland,  moves,  and  from 
which  it  receives  external  impressions. 

(c)  Cosmology,     (i)  Matter   consists   essentially   in   extension, 
and  is  thus  opposed  to  thought  or  spirit.     (2)  Movement  is  always 
mechanical,  and  we  know  nothing  of  final  causes.    Its  first  source 
is  God,  who  in  creating  the  world  endowed  it  with  a  certain 
quantity  of  movement  which  remains  invariable. 

V 

II.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  BRITISH  EMPIRICISM 

i.  Thomas  Hobbes  (1588-1679),  a  friend  and  disciple  of  Bacon, 
advocates  Bacon's  empiricism.  Yet  his  philosophy  is  also  influ- 
enced by  Descartes,  with  whom  he  became  acquainted  at  Paris. 
His  main  works  are  "Leviathan  "  and  "Elementa  philosophiae." 
(i)  Sensation  is  the  only  source  of  knowledge;  hence  whatever 
exists  is  material,  and  universals  are  only  names.  As  a  coitee- 


580  HISTORY     OF    PHILOSOPHY 

quence,  science  and  philosophy  can  deal  only  with  matter.  (Cf. 
pp.  380  ff.)  (2)  Qualities  perceived  by  the  senses  have  no  reality 
outside  of  the  mind.  They  are  simply  mechanical  motions  in  things 
and  in  the  brain.  (3)  The  natural  condition  of  man  is  not  to  live 
in  society,  but  to  live  in  a  state  of  war  against  everybody  else. 
The  disadvantages  of  this  condition  brought  about  a  social  compact 
by  which  individuals  transferred  absolutely  all  their  rights  to  the 
authority  of  the  state.  This  authority  is  therefore  absolute  and 
unlimited.  Right  and  wrong  result  only  from  positive  laws. 
(Cf.  pp.  355  ff.) 

2.  John  Locke  (1632-1704)  in  the  four  books  of  his  main  work, 
"An  Essay  concerning    Human  Understanding,"    examines  the 
human  faculties  of  knowledge,     (i)  There  are  no  innate  ideas, 
since  there  are  no  ideas  that  are  present  in  the  minds  of  all  men. 
All  ideas  are  acquired  by  experience.     (2)  This  experience  is  two- 
fold:   sensation,  i.e.  the  mental   representation   of  the    external 
world,  and  reflection,  i.e.  the  consciousness  of  mental  activities. 
By  combining  simple  ideas  derived  from  these  two  sources,  the 
mind  forms  complex  ideas.     (Cf.  pp.  99,  103  ff.)     (3)  The  qual- 
ities which  are  attributed  to  bodies  are  either  primary,  like  exten- 
sion, figure,  motion,  etc.,  or  secondary,  like  color,  odor,  sound,  etc. 
Primary  qualities  exist  really  in  things;  secondary  qualities  exist 
only  in  the  mind.     (4)  We  do  not  know  directly  external  things, 
but  mental  representations  or  ideas.     (Cf.   pp.  369,  387.)     (5) 
Among  complex  ideas  is  found  that  of  substance.    Substances 
exist  (bodily,  spiritual,  and  divine),  but  their  nature  is  unknown 
and  unknowable.     (6)   Generality  and  universality  belong  only 
to  names.     (7)  Reason  alone  cannot  prove  the  spirituality  of  the 
soul. 

3.  George  Berkeley  (1685-1753),  bishop  of  Cloyne  in  Ireland, 
in  his  "New  Theory  of  Vision,"  "Principles  of  Knowledge,"  and 
"Dialogues  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,"  starts  from  Locke's 
assumption  that  we  know  directly  only  our  ideas,  and,  from  this, 
endeavors  to  refute  scepticism,  materialism,  and  atheism,     (i) 
Not  only  secondary,  but  also  primary,  qualities  are  mere  ideas.    For 
instance,  the  shape  (primary)  is  known  through  visual  sensations, 
and  is  no  more  objective  than  color,  which  is  perceived  through 


FIRST    MODERN    PERIOD  581 

the  same  sensations.  Extension,  far  from  being  the  essence  of 
matter,  as  Descartes  held,  is  not  objective  at  all.  (2)  All  ideas, 
even  abstract  and  universal,  are  derived  from  concrete  impressions 
which  are  products  of  the  mind  alone.  (3)  Matter  is  not  per- 
ceived directly  by  the  senses,  for  these  perceive  only  qualities; 
nor  is  its  existence  known  by  demonstration,  since,  on  the  one 
hand,  passive  matter  cannot  be  the  active  cause  of  sensations, 
and,  on  the  other,  ideas  cannot  result  from  an  inert  substance 
such  as  matter.  Matter  is  a  contradictory  notion  leading  to  scep- 
ticism. (4)  The  external  world,  therefore,  is  not  material.  The 
cause  of  its  order  and  harmony  is  God,  since  this  order  shows  that 
the  world  is  but  an  idea  of  God  manifesting  itself  to  the  human 
mind.  The  world  is  a  mental  representation  —  esse  est  percipi  — 
it  is  not  matter,  but  spirit.  (Cf.  pp.  387,  389  ff.) 

4.  David  Hume  (1711-1776),  especially  hi  his  "Treatise  on 
Human  Nature,"  and  his  "Enquiry    concerning  Human  Under- 
standing," carries  the  consequences  of  empiricism  to  their  extreme 
limits.     (Cf.  pp.  98,  113,  382.)     (i)  Nothing  exists  except  what 
is  given  in  experience,  and  as  experience  manifests  no  substances 
at  all,  it  follows  that  no  substance  exists.    Hume  denies  not  only 
the  existence  of  material  substances,  as  Berkeley  had  done,  but  of 
spiritual  as  well.    As  matter  is  but  a  collection  of  phenomena,  so 
the  mind  is  but  a  collection  of  mental  states.     (Cf.  pp.  460,  463 
ff.)     (2)  As  experience  does  not  manifest  any  causality,  but  only 
the  succession  of  phenomena,  the  idea  of  cause  is  not  objective, 
and  the  regular  sequence  of  cause  and  effect  is  not  one  of  ontolog- 
ical  dependence.      It  is   owing  to  habit    that  we  expect   this 
sequence.    Hume's  position  is  thus  phenomenalistic  and  sceptical. 
(Cf.  p.  454.) 

5.  Moralists.  —  As  a  reaction  against  Hobbes,  many  moral- 
ists admit  a  universal  moral  law,  natural  to  all  men,  and  altruistic 
as  well  as  egoistic.    Among  them  are  Ralph  Cudworth  (1617-1688) 
and  Richard  Cumberland  (1632-1718).    Others  base  morality  on  a 
special  innate  feeling  (cf.  pp.  309  ff.),  which  is  either  an  aesthetic 
sense  (Shaftesbury,  1671-1713),  conscience  (Joseph  Butler  1692- 
1752),  or  a  moral  sense  distinct  from  reason  (Francis  Hutcheson, 
1694-1747).    Others,  finally,  apply  empiricism  to  morals  (cf.  p. 


582  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

311)  and  are  led  to  utilitarianism  (Mandeville,  1670-1733;    A  dam 
Smith,  1723-1790). 

III.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIAN  RATIONALISM 

1.  Direct  Influences.  —  From    Descartes's    principles    Arnold 
Geulincx  (1625-1669)  and  Nicolas  M alebranche  (1638-1715)  deduce 
the  doctrines  of  occasionalism  and  ontologism,  which,  however, 
are  neither  so  clearly  expressed  nor  so  fully  evolved  in  the  former 
as  in  the  latter.    According  to  Malebranche,  (i)  God  alone  can 
be  a  cause;  hence  the  activity  of  creatures  is  only  apparent.    In 
the  various  changes  that  occur  there  is  only  a  coincidence  which 
is  due  to  God's  direct  intervention.    This  also  explains  the  union 
of  body  and  soul  (occasionalism;  cf.  p.  481.)     (2)  Since  finite 
beings  do  not  act,  our  ideas  cannot  be  caused  by  them.    They 
come  from  God,  in  whom  we  see  everything  (ontologism;  cf.  p. 

405). 

2.  More  Remote  Influences.  —  Spinoza  and  Leibniz  are  influ- 
enced by  Cartesianism,  but  introduce  many  new  elements  and 
develop  the  system  in  new  directions. 

(a)  The  main  works  of  Baruch  Spinoza^(i6$2-i6'jfj)  are  "Ethica 
more  geometrico  demonstrata,"   "De  intellectus  emendatione," 
"Tractatus  politicus."      In  them  is  revealed  the  influence  of  Car- 
tesianism, Neo-Platonism,  and  of  the  pantheism  of  Bruno  and 
Maimonides.     (i)  The  Cartesian  substantial  dualism,  and  oppo- 
sition of  extension  and  thought,  is  reduced  to  a  dualism  of  attri- 
butes of  one  and  the  same  substance,  namely,  God.     (2)  The 
divine  substance,  indetermined  and  unknowable  in  itself,  unfolds 
itself  through  attributes,  two  of  which  are  known  to  us,  viz., 
extension  and  thought.     (Cf.  pp.  521  ff.)     (3)  These  attributes  are 
manifested  through  a  number  of  modes,  which  are  the  finite  deter- 
minations of  the  divine  infinite  substance.     (4)  Everything  in  the 
physical  and  the  mental  world  takes  place  necessarily,  and  there 
is  no  room  at  any  stage  for  freedom. 

(b)  Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leibniz  (1646-1716)  is  an  eclectic  who  bor- 
rows from  Descartes,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  adds  many  personal 
ideas.     His  main  works  are  "Essais  de  theodicee,"  "La  monado- 
logie,"  "Nouveaux  essais  sur  Pentendement  humain"  (an  answer  to 


FIRST     MODERN    PERIOD  583 

Locke's  Essay),  (i)  Descartes  was  wrong  in  identifying  spiritual 
substances  with  thought,  and  material  substances  with  extension. 
There  are  in  the  soul  perceptions  which  are  almost  unconscious, 
and  which  cannot  be  called  thought  in  the  Cartesian  sense.  As 
to  extension,  it  is  the  principle  of  multiplicity  and  composition. 
But  composition  ultimately  supposes  simple  and  indivisible  units. 
Substance  means  essentially  a  principle  of  activity,  a  force. 
Thought  and  extension  are  modes  of  substances.  (2)  The  sub- 
stantial unit  is  the  monad,  immaterial,  eternal,  and  active.  Bodies 
are  aggregates  of  simple  monads,  while  souls  are  simple  monads. 
(3)  The  activity  of  the  monad  consists  essentially  in  representa- 
tion, i.e.  every  monad  is  like  a  mirror  reflecting  the  whole  universe 
more  or  less  perfectly  according  to  the  degree  of  its  perfec- 
tion. In  the  lowest  monads  this  representation  is  unconscious; 
in  the  highest  it  is  conscious,  and  the  degrees  of  clearness  vary 
with  the  perfection  of  every  monad.  God,  the  increated  monad, 
knows  everything  perfectly.  (4)  Monads  do  not  act  on  one  an- 
other; their  development  is  only  from  within,  every  monad  unfold- 
ing its  own  energies.  The  order  of  the  world  is  the  result  of  a 
divinely  preestablished  harmony,  (cf.  p.  481)  working  in  the  best 
possible  world,  since  God,  infinitely  perfect,  would  have  acted 
without  a  sufficient  reason  if  He  had  not  created  the  best  possible 
world.  (5)  Every  monad  is  different  from  every  other.  There 
is  a  gradual  transition  by  infinitesimal  differences  from  one  degree 
of  perfection  to  another.  (6)  There  are  no  innate  actual  ideas; 
yet,  in  a  certain  sense,  all  ideas  are  innate,  namely,  in  the  innate 
power  of  acquiring  them.  (Cf.  pp.  100  ff.) 

Christian  von  Wolff  (1679-1754)  expounded  and  systematized 
the  philosophy  of  Leibniz. 

3.  A  Reaction  against  Rationalism  was  due  largely  to  the  influ- 
ence of  British  empiricism,  and  contributed  to  the  changes 
which  took  place  at  this  time  in  French  political  and  religious 
conditions. 

(a)  Etienne  Bonnot  de  Condillac  (1715-1780)  follows  Locke  and 
teaches  a  psychological  sensationalism.  Instead  of  two  sources 
of  ideas  admitted  by  Locke  (sensation  and  reflection)  he  admits 
only  one.  External  sensation  is  the  primitive  mental  fact  which 


584  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

by  various  successive  modifications  gives  rise  to  the  most  complex 
mental  states.     (Cf.  pp.  98,  103  ff.) 

(b)  Materialistic  empiricism  is  represented  by  La  Mettrie  (1709- 
1751),  who  attacks  especially  the  existence  of  the  soul,  and  by  the 
Encyclopedists  (editors  of,  or  writers  in,  the  Encyclopedic),  namely, 
Diderot  (1713-1784),  d'Alembert  (1717-1783),  d' Holbach  (1723- 
1789),  Cabanis  (1757-1808).     (Cf.  p.  476.) 

(c)  These  views  opened  the  way  to  atheism,  or  at  least  deism, 
which  is  represented  especially  by  Voltaire  (1694-1778). 

(d)  Ethical  sensualism,  which  reduces  morality  to  egoistic  pleas- 
ure, has  for  its  main  advocate  the  materialist  Helvetius  (1715- 
1771). 

(e)  Political  philosophers  of  this  period  are  chiefly  Montesquieu 
(1689-1755)  and  Jean-Jacques  Rousseau  (1712-1778).    The  lat- 
ter refers  the  origin  of  society  to  a  social  contract.     (Cf .  pp.  3556.) 


II.    SECOND  PERIOD 

I.  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY 

i.  Kant.  —  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804),  born  at  Koenigsberg, 
was  successively  a  student  and  a  professor  in  the  university  of  his 
native  city.  In  the  first  period  of  his  philosophical  life,  he  studied 
and  taught  the  leading  ideas  of  Leibniz,  Wolff,  Newton,  and  later 
became  acquainted' with  the  writings  of  Locke  and  Hume.  Owing 
to  these  manifold  influences,  Kant's  own  doctrine  was  evolving 
gradually.  It  was  made  public  in  the  second  period  of  Kant's 
life,  by  the  publication  of  his  main  works:  "The  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason,"  (1781),  "The  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,"  (1788), 
"The  Critique  of  the  Faculty  of  Judgment"  (1790).  Here  we 
shall  deal  only  with  this  latter  period,  or  period  of  Kant's  critical 
philosophy,  in  which,  he  says,  he  was  aroused  from  his  dogmatic 
slumber  by  Hume's  scepticism. 

(a)  Critique  of  pure  reason.  Knowledge  consists  essentially 
in  judgment,  not  analytic,  since  in  analytic  judgments  the  predi- 
cate is  already  contained  in  the  subject,  and  therefore  such  judg- 
ments have  no  scientific  value;  nor  synthetic  a  posteriori,  since 


SECOND     MODERN    PERIOD  585 

such  judgments  refer  only  to  concrete  experience,  and  therefore 
cannot  give  the  universal  and  necessary  knowledge,  which  alone  is 
scientific.  It  consists  in  synthetic  a  priori  judgments,  in  which 
the  predicate  is  neither  contained  in  the  subject,  nor  affirmed  of 
the  subject  simply  on  the  ground  of  experience,  but  on  account 
of  the  very  structure  of  our  faculties,  hence  necessarily  and  uni- 
versally. (Cf.  pp.  loi,  106,  109,  395  ff.)  Kant  passes  now  to 
the  three  parts  of  his  work,  transcendental  aesthetic,  transcen- 
dental analytic,  and  transcendental  dialectic. 

(1)  Transcendental    (Esthetic    (i.e.    study    of    sense-knowledge). 
External  objects  always  appear  to  us  in  space,  and  internal  experi- 
ences always  in  time.     Space  and  time  are  a  priori  forms  of  our 
minds,  and    cannot   be   applied  to  things-in-themselves   (cf.  p. 
394).     Things  are  only  the  matter  of  knowledge,  unknowable 
in  themselves,  since,  in  order  to  be  known,  they  must  reach  the 
mind,  and  can  reach  it  only  through  its  a  priori  forms. 

(2)  Transcendental  analytic.    Sense-knowledge  is  elaborated  by 
the  understanding  which  perceives  manifold  relations  between 
various  sense-experiences,  and  thus  makes  them  scientific.    These 
relations  also  depend  on  a  priori  forms  or  categories,  twelve  hi 
number:  unity,  plurality,  totality   (referring  to  the  quantity  of 
judgments),  reality,  negation,  limitation  (referring  to  their  quality); 
subsistence  and  inherence,  causality  and  dependence,  reciprocity 
(referring   to  their   relations);    possibility,   existence,    necessity, 
and  their  opposites  (referring  to  their  modality).    Here   again 
the  conclusion  is  that  we  know  only  phenomena,  but  not  nou- 
mena,   i.e.   things-as-they-appear,   but  not  things-in-themselves. 
(Cf.  pp.  396  ff.) 

(3)  Transcendental  dialectic.     This  knowledge  in  turn  is  re- 
duced by  reason  to  three  ideas,  the  world,  the  soul,  and  God, 
which  are  also  a  priori  ideas.    To  take  them  for  realities  leads  to 
antinomies  or  contradictions. 

(b)  Critique  of  practical  reason.  The  critique  of  pure  reason  led 
Kant  to  assert  the  impossibility  of  knowing  the  noumena.  He 
turns  now  to  practice  and  action,  which  is  different  from,  and 
independent  of,  pure  reason,  (i)  The  moral  law  is  absolute, 
universal,  and  necessary.  It  is  expressed  in  conscience  by  the 


586  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

categorical  imperative  that  dictates  independently  of  any  condi- 
tion and  of  any  utilitarian  or  agreeable  motive.  (Cf.  pp.  320  ff.) 
(2)  The  existence  of  the  moral  law  postulates  freedom, since  "Thou 
must"  implies  "Thou  canst";  immortality,  since  virtue  requires 
an  adequate  sanction;  and  the  existence  of  a  personal  God  as 
perfect  holiness  and  justice.  (3)  Although  these  are  noumena  or 
things-in-themselves,  and  although  they  are  unknowable  for 
pure  reason,  they  are  nevertheless  certain,  because  without 
them  the  moral  law  is  impossible.  (Cf.  pp.  407  ff.) 

(c)  Critique  of  the  faculty  of  judgment.    This  faculty  is  inter- 
mediate between  pure  reason  and  practical  reason.    It  applies  to 
the  phenomena  of  pure  reason  some  a  priori  forms  of  practical 
reason,  special  to  free  agents,     (i)  Teleological  judgments  refer 
external  phenomena  to  a  purpose,  and  look  upon  them  as  adapted 
to  an  end.    They  serve  to  order  and  unify  experience.      (2)  Es- 
thetic judgments  refer  external  phenomena  to  our  own  subjective 
feelings  of  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime.    All  these  judgments 
depend  on  the  structure  of  the  human  mind. 

(d)  Influence  of  Kant;  immediate  disciples  and  opponents.    Of  all 
the  influences  exercised  on  philosophy  in  the  nineteenth  century 
that  of  Kant  is  certainly  the  greatest,  and  most  of  the  currents 
of  thought  that  subsequently  appeared  were  either  developments 
of  the  Kantian  theories  or  reactions  against  them.    Among  the 
immediate  disciples  of  Kant  are  Reinhold  (1755-1823),  and  the 
poet  Schiller  (1759-1805),  the  latter  upholding  especially  Kant's 
aesthetic  doctrines.     Among  his  opponents  are    Herder   (1744- 
1803),  and  Jacobi  (1743-1819). 

(e)  Kant  admitted  two  elements  in  knowledge,  one  material, 
the  thing-in-itself;  the  other  formal,  the  a  priori  form  or  category. 
But  how  can  the  phenomenon  come  from  the  noumenon?    How 
can  the  objective  and  the  subjective  be  reconciled?    This  dualism 
gave  rise  to  two  currents,  critical  idealism  reducing  even  the  thing- 
in-itself  to  a  mental  product,  and  critical  realism  reasserting  the 
existence  of  the  thing-in-itself. 

2.  Idealism.  — ..Three  names  especially  are  prominent,  Fichte, 
Schelling,  and  Hegel. 

(a)  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte  (1762-1814)  places  the  whole  reality 


SECOND     MODERN    PERIOD  587 

in  the  subject,  which  is  essentially  activity  and  consciousness, 
(i)  The  ego,  i.e.  the  universal  self-consciousness,  posits  itself, 
that  is,  knows  itself  as  existing  and  self-identical  (thesis).  (2)  By 
reflection  on  its  own  activity,  the  ego  posits  the  non-ego  within 
itself,  merely  as  an  object  of  mental  representation  (antithesis). 
(3)  The  ego  is  aware  that  it  is  limited  by  the  non-ego,  and  that 
the  non-ego  is  limited  by  the  ego  (synthesis).  In  this  whole 
process,  the  ego  is  the  only  reality,  since  the  non-ego  is  but  a 
modification  of  the  ego. 

(b)  Friedrich  Schelling  (1775-1854)  taught  at  Jena  with  Fichte. 
His  thought  varied  in  the  course  of  his  life,  and  he  seems  to  have 
defended  successively  no  less  than  five  different  systems.    The 
most  important  and  characteristic  of  these  is  the  philosophy  of 
identity,  in  which  the  subject  and  the  object  are  identified  in  the 
same  common  reality,  or  Absolute,  which  is  of  itself  indifferent  to 
both  the  objective  and  the  subjective  point  of  view,  and  evolves 
into  both. 

(c)  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel^  (1770-1831)  was  Schelling's 
disciple  at  Jena,  but  soon  abandoned  his  master's  doctrine  to 
develop  his  own  absolute  idealism.    The  object  is  not  derived 
from  the  ego,  as  Fichte  supposed,  but  from  the  absolute.    This 
absolute  is  not  indifferent,  as  Schelling  claimed,  it  is  thought  and 
idea,  since  the  rational  element  is  the  whole  reality  of  things. 
This  idea,  however,  is  not  necessarily,  but  only  accidentally, 
conscious.    In  its  abstract  state  it  is  the  object  of  logic;  in  its  exte- 
riorization,  the  object  of  the  philosophy  of  nature;  in  its  self-con- 
scious aspect,  the  object  of  the  philosophy  of  mind,  which  studies 
the  individual  manifestations  of  the  universal  spirit,  the  evolu- 
tion of  mankind  and  society  (objective  mind),  and  art,  religion, 
and  philosophy  (absolute  mind).     Everything  becomes,  and  the 
Idea  or  Spirit  unfolds  its  potencies  according  to  laws  that  are 
absolutely  necessary. 

Among  Hegel's  followers  some  belong  to  the  right  party  (Goe- 
schel,  Rosenkranz,  Erdmann),  and  admit  the  existence  of  a  per- 
sonal God  and  the  soul's  immortality;  others  belong  to  the  left 
(Strauss,  Feuerbach),  and  are  pantheists. 

3.   Realism  reasserts  the  existence  of  the  thing-in-itself.     (a) 


588  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

Herbart  (1776-1841),  professor  at  Gottingen,  teaches  the  exist- 
ence and  irreducible  manifoldness  of  things.  One  of  these  Real- 
ities (Realen)  is  the  individual  human  soul  whose  essential  function 
is  representation.  Things  external  are  unchangeable  and  iden- 
tical. It  is  the  mind  alone  that  establishes  between  them  the  many 
relations  which  we  perceive.  Prominent  among  the  Herbartians 
are  Drobish,  Steinthal,  and  Lazarus. 

(b)  Arthur  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860),  professor  at  Berlin, 
admits  a  priori  forms  of  knowledge,  namely,  space,  time,  and 
causality.  The  thing-in-itself  is  essentially  will,  which  is  one  and 
independent  of  a  priori  forms.  In  everything  the  fundamental 
reality  is  the  will-to-be,  or  the  will-to-live,  and  this  will  unfolds 
itself  through  existing  things.  In  addition  to  this,  Schopenhauer 
develops  a  pessimistic  philosophy.  One  of  his  most  important 
disciples  is  Von  Hartmann. 

4.  Materialism,  as  a  reaction  against  idealism,  was  defended 
by    Karl    Vogt   (1817-1895),  Jakob  Moleschott  (1822-1893),  and 
Ludwig    Buchner  (1824-1899),  while  Ernst  Backet  (born  1834) 
defends  an  evolutionary  monism.     (Cf.  pp.  476,  521.) 

5.  Lotze    (1817-1881)    and     Paulsen   are   Neo-Kantians,    and 
Trendelenburg    (1802-1872)    tends    to    Aristotelianism.     Baader, 
Froschammer,  Gunther,  Gorres,  who  flourished  in  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  were  Catholic  philosophers,  though  they  dif- 
fered on  many  important  points.     The  distinctly  neo-scholastic 
movement  is  represented  by   Kleutgen,  Stockl,   Tilmann  Pesch, 
etc.,  in  Germany. 

II.  SCOTTISH  PHILOSOPHY 

Like  Kantian  philosophy,  Scottish  philosophy  was  a  reaction 
against  Hume's  scepticism  and  Berkeley's  idealism.  Scottish 
philosophers  base  their  dogmatism  and  their  ethics  on  some  innate 
sense  or  instinct,  and  claim  that  we  know  external  things.  Thomas 
Reid  (1710-1796)  asserts  that  "common  sense"  is  the  basis  on 
which  philosophy  must  be  built,  and  common  sense  is  not  compat- 
ible with  scepticism  or  idealism.  Dugald  Stewart  (1753-1828) 
holds  essentially  the  same  view,  as  also  Thomas  Brown  (1778- 
1820)  and  James  Mackintosh  (1765-1832).  William  Hamilton 


SECOND     MODERN     PERIOD  589 

(1788-1856)  tries  to  combine  the  doctrines  of  Reid  with  those  of 
Kant.     (Cf.  pp.  405,  310.) 

III.  FRENCH  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Spiritualism    and    Eclecticism.  —  The    French    materialism 
of  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  followed  by  a 
spiritualistic  reaction.    The  distinction  of  reason  from  sense-knowl- 
edge, the  spirituality  of  the  soul,  the  existence  of  a  personal  God, 
and  the  spiritual  basis  of  morality  were  recognized.    The  main 
representatives  of  this  school  were  Maine  de  Biran  (1766-1824), 
who  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  will;  Royer-Collard  (1763- 
1845),  who  introduced  into  France  the  leading  principles  of  the 
Scottish  school;  Victor  Cousin  (1792-1867),  who  sought  to  combine 
the  mam  systems  of  philosophy  into  one  harmonious  synthesis, 
and  hence  gave  a  prominent  part  to  the  history  of  philosophy.    He 
was  thus  the  head  of  the  school  known  as  Eclecticism.    Among 
his  main  followers  were  Theodore  Jouffroy  (1796-1842),  Damiron 
(1794-1862),  Gamier  (1801-1864),  Paul  Janet  (1823-1899). 

2.  Traditionalism  was  a  Catholic  reaction  against  materialism 
and  rationalism.    It  minimized  the  value  of  personal  reason  and 
advocated  the  common  consent  of  mankind,  based  on  a  divine 
revelation,  as  a  safer  basis  of  certitude.    Joseph  de  Maistre  (1754- 
1821)   dealt  chiefly  with  political  and  religious  problems.     De 
Bonald  (1754-1840)  is  looked  upon  as  the  founder  of  the  tra- 
ditionalistic  school.     Besides  expounding  the  Catholic  doctrine 
of  society  in  opposition  to  the  principles  of  the  French  Rev- 
olution,  he    claimed    that    language    is    absolutely    prerequired 
for  thought,  and  as  a  consequence,  that  it  must  have  been  revealed 
by  God,  and  together  with  it,  the  truths  which  it  expresses.    Hence 
the  criterion  of  truth  is  tradition  based  on  primitive  revelation. 
Felicite  de  Lamennais  (1782-1854)  holds  that  the  criterion  of  truth 
is  universal  tradition  or  collective  reason.    Traditional  principles, 
sometimes  in  a  mitigated  form,  were  also  held  by  Bautain  (1796- 
1867),  Bonnetty  (1798-1879)  and  others  who  mingled  it  with  some 
tenets  of  ontologism,  that  is,  of  a  system  developed  chiefly  in  Italy, 
and  according  to  which  we  know  all  things  in  God.     (Cf.  pp.  105, 
126,  403.) 


5QO  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

3.  Positivism  is  but  a  slightly  modified  form  of  sensational- 
ism and  empiricism,  insisting  chiefly  on  the  epistemological  aspect 
of  knowledge.    Its  founder  is  Auguste  Comte  (1798-1857),  who,  in 
his  "Cours  de  philosophic  positive,"  claims  that  human  thought 
passed  through  three  successive  stages:  (i)  The  theological  stage, 
in  which  phenomena  are  explained  by  the  activities  of  divinities 
and  supernatural  agents.     (2)  The  metaphysical  stage,  in  which 
they  are  explained  by  abstract  principles,  such  as  essences,  causes, 
substances,  forms,  souls,  etc.     (3)  The  positive  stage,  in  which 
they  are  explained  by  their  concrete  antecedents  and  laws.    This 
is  the  only  valid  knowledge,  limiting  itself  to  facts  and  their  rela- 
tions.   Metaphysical,    religious,    and    moral   questions   are   idle 
when  they  try  to  transcend  facts.     Later  on,  Comte  founded 
a  positive  religion,  or  religion  of  humanity.    Among  the  main 
positivists  are  Littre  (1801-1881)  and  Taine  (1828-1893). 

4.  Various  Tendencies.  —  (i)  Social  questions  are  in  the  fore- 
ground to-day.    Among  the  precursors  of  modern  socialism  (cf. 
pp.  347  ff.)  may  be  mentioned  Saint-Simon  (1760-1825),  Charles 
Fourier   (1772-1837),   Pierre  Leroux   (1797-1871),   who  propose 
more  or  less  radical,   social,  and  industrial  reforms.     (2)  Neo- 
scholasticism  finds    many  representatives,   and    its   influence  is 
felt    even   where  it   does   not   predominate.      (3)    Neo-criticists 
(Renouvier,  Secretan,  etc.)  modify  Kant's  doctrine  in  a  dogmatic 
direction,  at  least  with  regard  to  certain  metaphysical  truths. 

IV.  ITALIAN  AND  SPANISH  PHILOSOPHY 

In  Italy,  Galuppi  (1770-1846)  professed  a  kind  of  criticism  which, 
on  many  points,  is  akin  to  that  of  Kant.  Rosmini  (1797-1855) 
teaches  that  the  intuition  of  the  ideal  and  universal  being  is  the 
form  of  thought.  Hence  it  does  not  come  from  experience,  but 
is  innate.  Although  Rosmini  rejects  ontologism  and  pantheism, 
his  system  seems  to  lead  to  these  consequences.  Ontologism  is 
the  doctrine  that  we  have  a  direct  primitive  intuition  of  God,  by 
means  of  which  all  other  things  are  known.  It  is  represented 
especially  by  Gioberti  (1801-1852).  Among  the  pioneers  of  neo- 
scholastkism  are  Liberatore  (1810-1892),  Cornoldi  (1822-1892), 
Sanseverino  (1811-1865). 


SECOND     MODERN    PERIOD  591 

In  Spain,  Balmes  (1810-1848)  and  Donoso  Cortes  (1809-1853) 
defend  spiritualistic  philosophy,  and  harmonize  philosophy  and 
religion. 

V.  ENGLISH  AND  AMERICAN  PHILOSOPHY 

1.  Associationism.  —  Among  associationists  are   David    Hart- 
ley (1705-1757)  and  Joseph  Priestly  (1733-1804),  whose  doctrine 
shows  a  marked  tendency  toward  materialism;  James  Mill  (1773- 
1836)  and  his  son  John  Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873);  Alexander  Bain 
(1818-1903).    All  reduce  even  the  highest  forms  of  knowledge 
to  associations  of  images.     (Cf.  pp.  96  ff.,  99,  112  ff.)    As  we 
can  know  nothing  which  is  not  given  in  experience,  associationism 
leads   to   empiricism  and  positivism.     (Cf.   p.    382.)     Moreover, 
whatever  transcends  experience  is  unknowable;    hence  agnosti- 
cism.   In  addition  to  their  theory  of  knowledge,  Stuart  Mill  and 
Bain  advocate  a  utilitarian  morality,  as  had  been  done  before  by 
Jeremy  Bentham  (1748-1832).     (Cf.  pp.  315  ff.) 

2.  Evolutionism.  —  The  theory  of  evolution  started  with  La- 
place (1749-1827)  for  the  inorganic  world  (nebular  hypothesis), 
and  Lamarck   (1744-1829)  for   the    organic  world.    Both  were 
French.    But  it  was  in  England  that  the  main  impetus  was  given 
to  transformism  (cf.  pp.  444  ff.)  by  Charles  Darwin  (1809-1882) 
and  his  followers,  Alfred  Russell  Wallace  (born  1822),  George  Ro- 
manes (1848-1894),    Thomas   Huxley  (1825-1895),  Saint  George 
Mivart  (1827-1900)  and  Herbert  Spencer  (1820-1903). 

Spencer,  in  his  "Synthetic  Philosophy,"  covers  a  far  wider 
ground,  (i)  Under  the  phenomena  lies  an  unknowable  reality, 
whose  modes  only  are  knowable  (agnosticism.  Cf.  pp.  376, 
513,  530.)  (2)  The  same  universal  force  manifests  itself  through- 
out all  phenomena.  Sensation  is  ultimately  a  nervous  shock, 
and  the  highest  knowledge  is  but  an  association  of  ideas  (asso- 
ciationism. Cf.  pp.  96,  99,  112.)  (3)  Not  only  are  physical 
and  mental  processes  results  of  a  universal  evolution,  but  to 
evolution  must  also  be  reduced  all  social  moral,  and  religious 
developments  (evolutionism). 

3.  Idealism  is   represented   by    Thomas   Carlyle    (1795-1881), 
John  Caird  (1820-1898),  Thomas  Green  (1836-1882). 


5Q2  HISTORY     OF     PHILOSOPHY 

4.  American  Philosophers.  —  Among  American  philosophers, 
exclusive  of  those  now  existing,  mention  must  be  made  of  Jona- 
than Edwards  (1703-1758);  Benjamin  Franklin  (1706-1790); 
James  McCosh  (1811-1894)  who  defended  a  theory  of  knowledge 
akin  to  that  of  Reid;  Noah  Porter  (1811-1892),  who  also  adheres 
to  many  tenets  of  the  Scottish  School;  Orestes  Brownson  (1803- 
1876),  who,  after  being  successively  a  member  of  several  Protes- 
tant denominations,  became  a  Catholic;  John  Fiske  (1842-1901), 
who  adheres  to  cosmic  evolutionism. 


CONCLUSION 

(a)  The  history  of  philosophy,  presenting,  as  it  does,  a  succes- 
sion of  so  many  systems,  frequently  completing  one  another,  fre- 
quently also  antagonistic  and  irreconcilable,  might  well  make  one 
doubt  whether  philosophical  truth  can  ever  be  reached.    Are  so 
many  efforts  fruitless?    Is  the  human  mind  condemned  forever 
to  seek  the  truth  without  ever  finding  it?    From  this  point  of  view 
it  is  true  that  the  constant  conflict  of  philosophical  schools  is  rather 
disheartening.    But  there  is  another  point  of  view.    Light  comes 
from  the  friction  of  two  stones.     So  also  in  philosophy,  the  conflict 
of  systems  tends  to  show  in  what  respect  they  may  be  defective  or 
exaggerated,  and  to  make  the  element  of  truth  which  they  con- 
tain more  secure.    Without  asserting  that  every  error  is  but  an 
incomplete  truth,  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  every  erroneous 
system  contains  a  great  many  truths. 

(b)  Notwithstanding,  or  rather  owing  to,  the  incessant  clash  of 
systems,  philosophy  progresses,  and,  slow  as  it  is,  its  advance  is 
nevertheless    real.    Throughout    the    ages,    the    same   problems 
come  back  incessantly,  and  the  attempts  to  solve  them  present 
the  same  divergences.    Any  actual  system  or  theory  can  be  traced 
back  to  past  systems  and  theories,  but  every  reappearance  of  a 
view  and  tendency  shows  a  development.    The  human  mind  does 
not  turn  around  like  a  squirrel  in  its  cage  to  come  back  to  exactly 
the  same  point.    Its  movement  is  rather  spiral-shaped,  always 
widening,  embracing  more  and  more,  and  yet  ever  turning  so  as 
to  face  again  the  same  problems. 

(c)  Will  philosophy  ever  be  one?    Will  philosophers  ever  agree 
at  least  on  a  group  of  essential  principles?    If  we  forecast  the 
future  by  what  we  know  of  the  past,  this  is  not  likely.    Too  many 
influences  are  at  work.    As  the  highest  science,  philosophy  receives 
contributions  from  too  many  sources,  and  these  respective  contri- 
butions affect  different  minds  in  too  many  different  ways  to  make 

39  593 


594  HISTORY    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

the  epoch  of  philosophical  agreement  one  whose  near  advent 
can  be  predicted.  Conflict  will  remain  as  a  proof  of  the  weakness 
of  the  human  mind,  but  also  as  an  element  of  progress.  It  con- 
tributes to  the  accuracy  of  expression,  and  to  the  revision  of  opinions 
which  were  not  sufficiently  examined  nor  subjected  to  a  thorough 
criticism. 

(d)  Hence  historical  contradictions,  while  showing  errors  of  the 
human  mind,  should  also  be  a  source  of  encouragement  toward  a 
sincere  and  honest  search  for  truth.  They  can  frequently  be 
traced  back  to  prejudices,  one-sided  views,  and  exclusive  atten- 
tion to  one  aspect  of  a  complex  problem.  To  recognize  the  source 
of  an  error  is  the  first  step  toward  correcting  it.  To  free  the  mind 
from  error,  to  proceed  farther  and  farther,  and  to  rise  higher  and 
higher,  must  be  the  aim  of  every  man.  The  unwearying  search 
for  truth  must  be  the  endeavor  of  every  human  intelligence,  with 
the  help  of  the  "true  light  which  enlighteneth  every  man  coming 
into  this  world." 


GENERAL  CONCLUSION 


The  problems  outlined  in  this  course  of  philosophy  are  so  nu- 
merous, so  complex,  and  so  varied  that  it  is  impossible  to  view 
them  at  one  glance.  Yet  it  is  interesting  to  retrace  the  general 
lines  of  this  vast  panorama.  The  observer  on  the  top  of  a  hill 
has  on  all  sides  a  wide  horizon  within  which  a  number  of  objects 
are  visible:  a  forest,  a  town,  a  road,  a  field,  a  meadow,  etc.  But 
only  the  main  outlines  are  seen,  and  in  a  general  way;  the  details 
cannot  be  perceived.  The  observer  may  go  down,  and  observe 
a  group  of  objects  more  in  detail,  e.g.  the  general  appearance  of  the 
forest  or  city,  by  moving  around  or  through  it.  Again,  one  tree 
may  be  selected  for  a  more  special  examination ;  then  each  part  of 
it,  till,  through  the  help  of  the  microscope  and  other  instruments, 
its  finest  details  are  known.  What  we  want  now  is  to  observe 
from  the  summit  of  the  hill,  so  as  to  glance  at  the  most  general 
outlines  of  the  philosophical  horizon,  including  the  physical 
universe,  man,  and  God. 

I.  THE    UNIVERSE 

i.  Unity  Amid  Diversity.  —  How  little  man  knows  about  the 
universe,  about  those  millions  of  worlds  in  which  our  earth  is  but 
an  atom!  To  look  at  the  stars  fills  the  mind  with  amazement, 
and  yet  we  see  nothing  of  their  details,  and  a  great  number  are 
altogether  invisible.  How  little  we  know  even  about  the  planet 
on  which  we  live!  We  see  only  its  surface.  Its  past  and  future 
are  hidden  from  us,  and  every  one  of  the  various  beings  that 
compose  it,  or  live  on  it,  includes  countless  mysteries. 

Yet  what  we  know  is  enough  to  manifest  at  the  same  time  a  most 
harmonious  variety  and  a  most  diversified  unity.  Variety  in 
the  inorganic  and  the  organic  world.  Unity  because  we  see  every- 
where harmonious  action  and  interaction,  and  gradual  transitions. 

595 


596  GENERAL     CONCLUSION 

Far  as  it  is  from  the  other  planets  and  from  the  sun,  the  earth  is 
in  close  relation  with  them  and  with  the  rest  of  creation.  Nothing 
in  the  world  is  isolated,  but  everywhere  all  things  are  related. 
On  the  earth  these  relations  are  seen  more  in  detail.  Things 
change  more  or  less  rapidly,  but  they  change  constantly.  In- 
organic matter  is  assimilated  by  organisms  to  return  again  to 
the  inorganic  world.  Everything  serves  a  purpose.  Everywhere 
activities  are  exchanged. 

2.  Laws  and  Causes.  —  All  changes  take  place  according  to 
fixed  laws  which  govern  their  occurrence.  These  laws  are  expres- 
sions of  the  mode  of  causality  of  various  beings.  What  is  a  cause? 
It  is  a  being  applying,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  its  energy  to 
the  production  of  some  result.  Here  again,  how  narrow  the 
point  of  view  of  man  who  is  obliged  to  place  certain  stops 
in  the  uninterrupted  flux  of  things.  Why  did  A  die?  Because 
B  shot  him,  we  say,  and  we  are  satisfied  with  the  answer.  Yet 
the  immediate  cause  of  death  was  the  internal  hemorrhage,  or 
some  other  similar  organic  result  due  to  the  presence  of  the  bul- 
let. The  pulling  of  the  trigger,  the  explosion  of  the  powder,  the 
impulse  given  to  the  bullet,  etc.,  are  so  many  intermediaries  be- 
tween the  murderer  and  death.  And  beyond  the  murderer,  in 
his  feelings  at  the  time  of  the  deed,  and  away  back  in  his  past,  in 
his  early  education,  in  the  dispositions  which  he  inherited,  etc., 
many  causes  have  contributed  to  the  present  result. 

The  same  is  true  of  every  occurrence.  We  are  obliged  to  look 
at  things  from  the  point  of  view  from  which  they  interest  us  most, 
and  according  to  the  limitations  of  our  knowledge  as  to  time  and 
space;  limitations  which  make  man  incapable  of  seeing  all 
influences,  of  tracing  back  the  series  of  causes  in  nature,  and  of 
following  all  their  results.  The  list  of  "whys,"  "wherefroms," 
"wheretos,"  even  of  the  smallest  events  is  inexhaustible,  and 
hence  our  necessity  of  stopping  without  ever  knowing  anything 
completely. 

Natural  laws  and  causes  are  utilized  by  man  for  his  own 
purposes.  Freedom  does  not  change  them,  but  simply  adapts 
them.  Art  always  supposes  and  is  based  on  nature,  without 
ever  modifying  its  intrinsic  energies  and  laws. 


THE     UNIVERSE,     MAN,     GOD  597 

II.  MAN 

1.  In  Himself.  —  Not  only  does  nature  present  many  mysteries 
to  man;  man  is  the  greatest  mystery  to  himself,  so  complex  in  struc- 
ture, so  manifold  in  activity,  that  the  study  of  self  is  a  never-end- 
ing task,  and  yet  the  condition  of  true  progress.     Physiological 
and  mental  functions,  lower  and  higher  faculties,  organic  and 
mental  complexity,  make  of  him  one  harmonious  whole,  different 
from  everything  else.     Faculties  of  knowledge,  feeling,  and  activity 
are  intimately  correlated,  all  originating  from  the  same  substan- 
tial unity  composed  of  matter  and  spirit.    Earthly  by  his  organ- 
ism, heavenly  by  his  soul,  man  is  obliged  to  cling  to  the  earth, 
and  yet  cannot  help  feeling  that  his  destiny  is  higher  and  nobler 
than  that  of  other  organisms. 

2.  In  the  Universe.  —  The  earth  is  small  when  compared  to  the 
rest  of  the  universe;  man  is  small  on  the  earth.    What  is  one  man 
among  the  countless  men  who  now  exist  or  who  have  existed  in 
the  past?    Yet  how  great  when  we  consider  his  faculties,  and  his 
spiritual  soul  which  is  a  spark  of  the  Eternal  Light.     Man,  it  is 
true,  is  the  plaything  of  nature,  powerless  in  the  face  of  its  tremen- 
dous energies.    And  yet  man  is  able,  in  many  things,  to  conquer 
and  subdue  natural  agencies,  and  make  them  serve  his  own  ends. 
Rising  above  space  and  tune,  his  intelligence  reaches  abstract  and 
universal  laws,  and  it  is  this  mode  of  knowledge  which  is  the  basis 
of  specifically  human  activities.     Similar  to  animals  in  his  physio- 
logical functions,  he  is  different  from  them  because  some  of  his 
activities  escape  the  determinism  of  matter.    Hence  man  alone  is 
capable  of  morality,  for  he  alone  can  know  the  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong  conduct,  and  he  alone  is  responsible  for  his  actions. 
And  all  these  activities  point  to  the  fact  that  this  life  on  earth  is 
not  complete,  but  calls  for  a  complement  hereafter.    It  is  chiefly 
this  hope  which  in  all  circumstances  gives  to  life  its  full  value,  and 
truly  makes  it  worth  living. 

III.  GOD 

i.   Supreme  Cause.  —  (a)  God  is  the  first  cause  of  nature  and 
of  its  laws,  distinct  from  it  and  transcending  it.     And  not  only 


598  GENERAL    CONCLUSION 

must  He  be  placed  at  the  beginning  of  the  world,  but  He  is  still 
governing  and  ruling  His  works  whose  activity  and  energy  sup- 
pose His,  and  are  derived  from  His.  Whatever  exists  in  the  uni- 
verse, whatever  is  real,  is  a  derived  reality,  and  this  derivation 
from  the  common  source  of  all  things  leads  man  to  some  knowledge 
of  God's  perfections,  however  imperfect  such  knowledge  must 
remain.  Yet  the  beauty  and  perfections  of  the  effect  must  evi- 
dently be  attributed  to  the  cause,  even  when  this  cause  is  so  far 
above  its  effects  that  these  present  only  dim  indications  of  its 
infinite  perfection. 

(b)  God  is  the  first  principle  of  truth.    Not  in  the  sense  that 
truth  depends  exclusively  on  God's  will,  as  Descartes  claimed, 
in  such  a  way  that  if  God  had  willed  it  otherwise,  two  and  two 
would  not  be  four;  but  in  the  sense  that  true  and  real  are  identical, 
and  that  God  being  the  principle  of  reality  is  also  the  principle  of 
truth.     God  could  not  make  two  plus  two  to  equal  five  because 
this  supposed  relation  expresses  nothing  real.    It  is  not  so,  and 
hence  cannot  be  derived  from  the  principle  of  reality.     God  knows 
Himself  first,  and  in  Himself,  the  various  realities  or  truths  that 
are  finite  realizations  of  the  divine  mind's  exemplars. 

(c)  It  is  also  God  who  is  the  first  principle  of  the  moral  law.    All 
essences,  including  man,  are  ultimately  based  on  the  divine  es- 
sence.   The  moral  law,  therefore,  which  governs  man  according 
to  his  rational  nature,  is  based  on  God,  the  author  of  nature,  and 
the  infinite  good  from  which  every  other  good  is  derived. 

(d)  Finally,  God  is  the  cause  of  the  social  order,  since  man 
naturally  lives  in  society,  and  society  requires  an  authority.     Yet 
no  man  has  of  himself  the  right  to  give  orders  to  his  fellowmen. 
For  a  man  to  obey  another  man  is  to  debase  himself.    But  "let 
every  soul  be  subject  to  higher  powers,  for  there  is  no  power  but 
from  God,  and  those  that  are  ordained  by  God"  (Rom.  xiii.  i). 
When  those  who  command  are  looked  upon  as  representatives  of 
God,  submission  to  them  becomes  honorable. 

2.  Ultimate  End.  —  In  creating,  God  could  propose  to  Him- 
self no  other  end  but  Himself.  "The  heavens  shew  forth  the 
glory  of  God."  Even  inanimate  creation  manifests  the  divine 
perfections,  but  man  is  the  spokesman  of  creation.  He  can  know 


THE     UNIVERSE,     MAN,     GOD  599 

his  maker,  and  must  entertain  toward  Him  the  feelings  of  rever- 
ence, praise,  thanksgiving,  etc.,  which  are  due  to  Him.  Reason 
shows  only  in  an  imperfect  way  the  final  relations  of  man  to  God, 
but  revelation  completes  the  data  of  reason;  the  supernatural  order 
is  added  to  the  natural,  and  perfects  it;  man  knows  his  higher 
destiny  and  is  given  the  means  to  reach  it.  Of  the  whole  universe 
in  general,  and  of  man  in  particular,  God  is  the  First  Cause  and 
the  Ultimate  End,  "  Alpha  and  Omega,  the  first  and  the  last,  the 
beginning  and  the  end"  (Apoc.  xxii.  13). 


APPENDIX 

IT  is  important  that  the  student's  mind  should  be  trained  to 
personal  thinking.  For  this  reason  the  following  thoughts  are 
suggested  as  topics  for  papers  and  discussions.  Many  of  them  are 
true;  others  are  false;  all  must  be  explained  and  interpreted.  A 
number  of  other  subjects  can  easily  be  found  in  connection  with 
the  different  lessons  of  the  text-book.  Some  of  those  that  are 
given  here  may  be  found  too  difficult,  but,  however  imperfect  at 
first  the  student's  attempt  to  treat  them  may  be,  they  will  oblige 
him  to  think  for  himself,  and  thereby  contribute  to  his  mental 
development. 

From  time  to  time  the  whole  class  may  be  given  the  same  sub- 
ject, thus  affording  an  opportunity  for  the  comparison  of  different 
viewpoints.  Generally  it  will  be  found  profitable  to  assign  the 
paper  to  one  student  —  perhaps  two  —  who  should  be  given  ample 
time  to  think  it  out  and  write  it.  He  should  then  read  it  in  class 
and,  under  the  professor's  direction,  the  other  students  should 
express  their  views  on  both  the  paper  and  the  subject  itself. 

Special  attention  should  be  given  to  clearness  of  thought  and 
expression,  logical  sequence  of  ideas,  careful  preparation  of  the 
plan,  etc. 

1.  Studium  philosophiae  non  est  ad  hoc  quod  sciatur  quid  homines 
senserint,  sed  qualiter  se  habeat  veritas  rerum.  —  ST.  THOMAS,  In  lib. 
I  de  Coelo,  lect.  XXII. 

2.  Nec  vero  probare  soleo  id  quod  de  Pythagoreis  accepimus:   quos 
ferunt,  si  quid  affirmarent  in  disputando,  cum  ex  eis  quaereretur  quare 
ita  esset,  respondere  solitos:  Ipse  dixit;  "ipse"  autem  erat  Pythagoras. 
—  CICERO,  De  nat.  deor.  I,  5. 

3.  Errare  malo  cum  Platone  quam  cum  istis  vera  sentire.  —  CICERO, 
Tusc.  Quaest.  I,  xvii,  39. 

Though  both  [Plato  and  truthl  are  dear  to  me,  it  is  my  duty  to  prefer 
truth.  —  ARISTOTLE,  Eth.  Nic.  I,  vi,  i. 

601 


602  APPENDIX 

4.  I  think  ...  I  can  make  it  plain  .  .  .  that  there  are  at  least  six  per- 
sonalities distinctly  to  be  recognized  as  taking  part  in  that  dialogue 
between  John  and  Thomas. 

1.  The  real  John;  known  only  to  his  Maker. 

2.  John's  ideal  John;   never  the  real  one,  and  often 


Three  Johns. 


Three  Thomases. 


very  unlike  him. 

Thomas's  ideal  John,  never  the  real  John,  nor 
John's  John,  but  often  very  unlike  either. 

1.  The  real  Thomas. 

2.  Thomas's  ideal  Thomas. 


3.  John's  ideal  Thomas. 
—  O.  W.  HOLMES,  The  Autocrat  of  the  Breakfast  Table,  III. 

5.  Noli  nimis  hi  sensu  tuo  confidere,  sed  velis  etiam  libenter  aliorum 
sensum  audire.  —  Imit.  Christi,  I,  ix,  2. 

6.  Qui  bene  seipsum  cognoscit  sibi  ipsi  vilescit.  —  Imit.  Christi,  I,  ii,  i. 

7.  Illud  yvwOt  <reavr6v  noli  putare  ad  arrogantiam  minuendam  solum 
esse  dictum,  verum  etiam  ut  bona  nostra  norimus.  —  CICERO,  Ad  Q, 
fratrem,  III,  6. 

8.  Ita  natura  comparatum  est  ut  altius  iniuriae  quam  merita  des- 
cendant, et  ilia  cito  defluant,  has  tenax  memoria  custodiat.  —  SENECA, 
De  benef.  I,  i. 

9.  Things  without  all  remedy 
Should  be  without  regard;  what's  done  is  done. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Macbeth,  III,  2. 
What's  gone,  and  what's  past  help, 
Should  be  past  grief. 

Id.  Winter's  Tale,  III,  2. 

10.  Pleasure  and  action  make  the  hours  seem  short.  —  SHAKESPEARE, 
Othello,  II,  3. 

11.  A  man  should  never  be  ashamed  to  own  he  has  been  in  the  wrong, 
which  is  but  saying  in  other  words  that  he  is  wiser  to-day  than  he  was 
yesterday.  —  SWIFT,  Thoughts  on  Various  Subjects. 

12.  Tell  (for  you  can)  what  is  it  to  be  wise? 
'Tis  but  to  know  how  little  can  be  known, 
To  see  all  others'  faults,  and  feel  our  own. 

POPE,  Essay  on  Man,  IV,  261. 

13.  Non    enim    tarn    auctoritatis    in    disputando,    quam    raticnis, 
momenta  quaerenda  sunt.    Quinetiam  obest  plerumque  iis  qui  discere 
volunt  auctoritas  eorum  qui  se  docere  profitentur.  —  CICERO,  De  nat. 
deor.  I,  5. 


SUBJECTS    FOR    PAPERS  603 

14.  (Hi  non  viderunt)  hoxninem  ad  duas  res,  ut  ait  Aristoteles,  ad 
intelligendum  et  ad  agendum  esse  natum.  —  CICERO,  De  fin.  II,  13. 

15.  I  find  the  great  thing  in  this  world  is  not  so  much  where  we  stand 
as  in  what  direction  we  are  moving.  —  HOLMES,  The  Autocrat  of  the 
Breakfast  Table,  IV. 

1 6.  Onerat   discentem   turba   [librorum],   non    instruit;    multoque 
satius  est  paucis  te  auctoribus  tradere  quam  errare  per  multos.  — 
SENECA,  De  tranquil,  an.  IX. 

Non  refert  quam  multos  [libros],  sed  quam  bonos,  habeas;  lectio  certa 
prodest,  varia  delectat.  —  Id.  Epist.  45. 

17.  Read  not  to  contradict  and  confute;  nor  to  believe  and  take  for 
granted;  nor  to  find  talk  and  discourse;  but  to  weigh  and  consider.  — 
BACON,  Essays,  Of  Studies. 

1 8.  A  man  may  have  a  great  mass  of  knowledge,  but  if  he  has  not 
worked  it  up  by  thinking  it  over  for  himself,  it  has  much  less  value  than 
a  far  smaller  amount  which  he  has  thoroughly  pondered.  —  SCHOPEN- 
HAUER, Essay  On  Thinking  for  One's  Self. 

19.  Homo  autem  (quod  rationis  est  particeps  per  quam  consequentia 
cernit,  causas  rerum  videt,  earumque  progressus  et  quasi  antecessiones 
non  ignorat,  similitudines  comparat,  et   rebus   praesentibus   adiungit 
atque  annectit  futuras)  facile  totius  vitae  cursum  videt,  ad  eamque 
degendam  praeparat  res  necessarias.  —  CICERO,  De  offic.  I,  4. 

20.  Scilicet  et  fluvius,  qui  non  est  maximus,  ei  est 
Qui  non  ante  aliquem  maiorem  vidit;  et  ingens 
Arbor,  homoque  videtur,  et  omnia  de  genere  omni, 
Maxima  quae  vidit  quisque,  haec  ingentia  fingit. 

LUCRETIUS,  De  rerum  nat.  VI,  674. 

21.  Neque  hoc    quidquam    est    turpius    quam    cognitioni    et    per- 
ceptioni  assensionem  approbationemque  praecurrere.  —  CICERO,  Acad. 

1,12. 

22.  The  heart  has  its  own  reasons  of  which  reason  has  no  knowledge. 
—  PASCAL,  Pensees,  P.  II,  art.  xvii,  62. 

23.  Causarum  ignoratio  in  re  nova  mirationemfacit;  eadem  ignoratio 
si  in  rebus  usitatis  est,  non  miramur.  —  CICERO,  De  divinat.  II,  22. 

24.  A  great  mistake:  for  a  man  to  think  himself  greater  than  he  is, 
and  to  value  himself  less  than  he  deserves.  —  GOETHE,  Maxims. 

25.  There  is  danger  in  showing  man  his  equality  with  animals  with- 
out showing  him  his  greatness.    There  is  danger  also  in  insisting  too 
much  on  his  greatness  without  showing  him  his  littleness.    There  is 
a  still  greater   danger  in  leaving  him  in  the  ignorance  of  both.    But 


604  APPENDIX 

there  is  a  great  advantage  in  showing  him  both.  —  PASCAL,  Penstes,  P.  I, 
art.  iv,  7. 

26.  Quid  importat  sollicitudo  de  futuris  contingentibus?  .  .  .  Vanum 
est;  et  inutile  de  futuris  conturbari  vel  gratulari  quae  forte  nunquam 
evenient.  —  Imit.  Christi,  III,  xxx,  2. 

27.  Past,  and  to  come,  seem  best;  things  present,  worst.  —  SHAKE- 
SPEARE, //  Henry  IV,  I,  3. 

28.  With  regard  to  the  estimation  of  a  man's  greatness,  mental 
nature  obeys  a  law  which  is  the  reverse  of  that  of  physical  nature.    The 
former  is  increased,  the  latter  decreased,  by  distance.  —  SCHOPENHAUER, 
Parerga  und  Paralipomena,  II. 

29.  Self-love  ...  is  not  so  vile  a  sin  as  self -neglecting. — SHAKESPEARE, 
Henry  V,  II,  4. 

30.  To  business  that  we  love  we  rise  betime, 
And  go  to  Jt  with  delight. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Anthony  and  Cleopatra,  IV,  4. 

31.  If  all  the  year  were  playing  holidays, 
To  sport  would  be  as  tedious  as  to  work. 

SHAKESPEARE,  I  Henry  IV,  I,  2. 

32.  Two  principles  in  human  nature  reign: 
Self-love  to  urge,  and  reason  to  restrain. 

POPE,  Essay  on  Man,  II,  54. 

33.  Communi  fit  vitio  naturae  ut  invisis,  latitantibus  atque  incognitis 
rebus  magis  confidamus,  vehementiusque   exterreamur.  —  CAESAR,  De 
bello  civ.  II,  4. 

34.  Plus  dolet  quam  necesse  est  qui  ante  dolet  quam  necesse  est.  — 
SENECA,  Epist.  95. 

35.  Suave,  man  magno  turbantibus  aequora  ventis, 
E  terra  magnum  alterius  spectare  laborem. 

Non  quia  vexari  quemquam  est  iucunda  voluptas, 
Sed  quibus  ipse  malis  careas  quia  cernere  suave  est. 

LUCRETIUS,  De  rerum  nat.  II,  i. 

36.  Hoc  modo  magnanimitas  est  circa  honores,  ut  videlicet  studeat 
ea  facere  quae  sunt  honore  digna,  non  tamen  sic  ut  pro  magno  aestimet 
humanum    honorem.  —  ST.  THOMAS,  Sum.    theol.    II-II,    Q.  129,  art. 
i,  ad  3. 

37.  Male  enim  respondent  coacta  ingenia;  reluctante  natura,  irritus 
labor  est.  —  SENECA,  De  tranquillit.  animi,  VI. 

38.  Maiora  cupimus  quo  maiora  venerunt .  .  .  ut  flammae  infinito 
acrior  vis  est  quo  ex  maiore  incendio  emicuit.    Aeque  ambitio  non 


SUBJECTS    FOR    PAPERS  605 

patitur  quemquam  in  ea  mensura  honorum  conquiescere  quae  quondam 
eius  fuit  impudens  votum.  .  . .  Ultra  se  cupiditas  porrigit,  et  felicitatem 
suam  non  intelligit,  quia  non  unde  venerit  respicit,  sed  quo  tendat.  — 
SENECA,  De  benef.  II,  27. 

39.  Endeavor  to  conquer  yourself  rather  than  fortune,  and  to  change 
your  desires  rather  than  the  order  of  the  world.  —  DESCARTES,  Discours 
de  la  methode,  P.  Ill,  3d  maxim. 

40.  Obstinacy  is  the  result  of  the  will  forcing  itself  into  the  place  of 
the  intellect.  —  SCHOPENHAUER,  Essays,  Psychological  Observations. 

41.  Men's  thoughts  are  much  according  to  their  inclination;   their 
discourse  and  speeches  according  to  their  learning  and  infused  opinions; 
but  their  deeds  are  after  as  they  have  been  accustomed.  —  BACON, 
Essays,  Of  Custom  and  Education. 

42.  Qui  blandiendo  dulce  nutrivit  malum 
Sero  recusat  ferre  quod  subiit  iugum. 

SENECA,  Hippolytus,  I,  134. 

43.  For  every  animal,  and  more  especially  for  man,  a  certain  con- 
formity and  proportion  between  the  will  and  the  intellect  is  necessary 
for  existing  or  making  any  progress  in  the  world.  —  SCHOPENHAUER, 
Essays,   Psychological   Observations. 

44.  Efficiendum  est  ut  appetitus  rationi  obediant,  eamque  neque 
praecurrant   nee   propter   pigritiam   aut   ignaviam   deserant,   sintque 
tranquilli    atque    omni   perturbatione   animi    careant.  —  CICERO,    De 
offic.  I,  29. 

45.  Yet  he  who  reigns  within  himself,  and  rules 
Passions,  desires  and  fears,  is  more  a  king. 

MILTON,  Paradise  Regained,  II,  466. 

46.  Resiste  in  principle  inclination!  tuae,  et  malam  dedisce  consue- 
tudinem,  ne  forte  paulatim  ad  maiorem  te  ducat  difficultatem.  —  Imit. 
Christi,  I,  xi,  5. 

47.  Ad  istud  diligenter  tendere  debes  .  .  .  ut  sis  dominus  actionum 
tuarum    et    rector,   non   servus   nee   emptitius.  —  Imit.  Christi,  III, 
xxxviii,  i. 

48.  Use  almost  can  change  the  stamp  of  nature, 
And  either  curb  the  devil  or  throw  him  out 
With  wondrous  potency. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Hamlet,  III,  4. 

49.  A  little  fire  is  quickly  trodden  out, 
Which,  being  suffered,  rivers  cannot  quench. 

SHAKESPEARE,  ///  Henry  VI,  IV,  8. 


606  APPENDIX 

50.  Certa     viriliter;      consuetude     consuetudine     vincitur.  —  Imit. 
Christi,  I,  xxi,  2. 

51.  "Tis  education  forms  the  common  mind; 
Just  as  the  twig  is  bent,  the  tree's  inclined. 

POPE,  Moral  Essays,  I,  149. 

52.  The  will  of  man  is  by  his   reason  sway'd.  —  SHAKESPEARE,  A 
Midsummer  Night's  Dream,  II,  3. 

53.  Naturam  expellas  furca,  tamen  usque  recurret, 
Et  mala  perrumpet  furtim  fastidia  victrix. 

HORACE,  Epist.  I,  x,  24. 

54.  He  that  complies  against  his  will 
Is  of  his  own  opinion  still. 

BUTLER,  Hudibras,  III,  3,  547. 

55.  Principiis  obsta;  sero  medicina  paratur 
Cum  mala  per  longas  convaluere  moras. 

OVID,  Rented.  Amor.  91. 

56.  Discipulus  est  prioris  posterior  dies.  —  PUBLIUS  SYRUS. 

57.  Viamque  insiste  domandi 
Dum  faciles  animi  iuvenum,  dum  mobilis  aetas. 

VERGIL,  Georg.  Ill,  164. 

58.  A  man's  nature  is  best  perceived  in  privateness,  for  there  is  no 
affectation;  in  passion,  for  that  putteth  a  man  out  of  his  precepts;  and 
in  a  new  case  or  experiment,  for  there  custom  leaveth  him.  —  BACON, 
Essays,  Of  Nature  in  Men. 

59.  Vita  hominum  altos  recessus  magnasque  latebras  habet.  —  PLINY 
THE  YOUNGER,  Epist.  Ill,  3. 

60.  No  man  can  justly  censure  or  condemn  another,  because  indeed 
no  man  truly  knows  another.  —  BROWNE,  Religio  Medici,  P.  II,  4. 

61.  Children    have    neither    past    nor    future;    but,    as    scarcely 
ever    happens    to  us,    they    enjoy     the     present.  —  LA    BRUYERE, 
Caracteres,  II. 

62.  Oportet  te  igitur  aliorum  graviora  ad  mentem  reducere  ut  levius 
feras  tua  minima.  —  Imit.  Christi,  III,  xix,  i. 

63.  They  say  best  men  are  moulded  out  of  faults.  —  SHAKESPEARE, 
Measure  for  Measure,  V,  i. 

64.  Some  are  born  great;   some  achieve  greatness,  and  some  have 
greatness  thrust  upon  them.  —  SHAKESPEARE,  Twelfth  Night,  II,  5. 

65.  Men  are  the  sport  of  circumstances,  when 
The  circumstances  seem  the  sport  of  men. 

BYRON,  Don  Juan,  Canto  V,  St.  17. 


SUBJECTS    FOR    PAPERS  607 

Man  is  not  the  creature  of  circumstances.    Circumstances  are  the 
creatures  of  men.  —  DISRAELI,  Vivian  Grey,  B.  VI,  ch.  7. 

66.  Ita  vita  est  hominum,  quasi  cum  ludas  tesseris; 
Si  illud,  quod  maxime  opus  est  iactu,  non  cadit, 
Illud,  quod  cecidit  forte,  id  arte  ut  corrigas. 

TERENCE,  Adelphi,  IV,  vii,  21. 

67.  The  fire  in  the  flint  shows  not  till  it  be  struck.  —  SHAKESPEARE, 
Timon  of  Athens,  I,  i. 

68.  Thoughts  are  but  dreams  till  their  effects  be  tried.  —  SHAKE- 
SPEARE, Lucrece,  St.  51. 

69.  The  moon  being  clouded  presently  is  missed, 
But  little  stars  may  hide  them  when  they  list. 

SHAKESPEARE,    Lucrece,  St.  144. 

70.  Indeed  man  is  a  being  wonderfully  vain,  complex  and  vacillating. 
It  is  difficult  to  find  in  him  a  basis  for  a  constant  and  uniform  judgment. 
—  MONTAIGNE,  Essais,  I,  i. 

71.  (Montaigne  recommends  travelling  in  order  that  we  may)  "rub 
and  polish  our  brains  against  the  brains  of  others."  —  MONTAIGNE, 
Essais,  I,  24. 

72.  Nimium  altercando  veritas  amittitur.  —  PUBLIUS  SYR  us. 

73.  'Tis  with  our  judgments  as  our  watches;  none 
Go  just  alike,  yet  each  believes  his  own. 

POPE,  Essay  on  Criticism,  9. 

74.  What's  in  a  name?    That  which  we  call  a  rose 
By  any  other  name  would  smell  as  sweet. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Romeo  and  Juliet,  II,  2. 

75.  Give  every  man  thine  ear,  but  few  thy  voice; 
Take  each  man's  censure,  but  reserve  thy  judgment. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Hamlet,  I,  3. 

76.  Veritatis  simplex  oratio  est.  —  SENECA,  Epist.  49. 

77.  It  is  not  enough  to  have  a  good  understanding;   the  main  thing 
is  to  apply  it  properly.  —  DESCARTES,  Discours  de  la  methode,  I. 

78.  Nescire  quaedam  magna  pars  scientiae.  —  PUBLIUS  SYR  us. 

79.  Videndum  est  non  modo  quid  quisque  loquatur,  sed  etiam  quid 
quisque  sentiat,  atque  etiam  qua  de  causa  quisque  sentiat.  —  CICERO, 
De  offic.  I,  41. 

80.  Idem    enim    vitii    habet    nimia    quod    nulla    divisio;     simile 
confuso  est    quidquid    usque    in    pulverem    sectum    est.  —  SENECA, 
Epist.  89. 

81.  One  must  know  how  to  doubt  where  necessary,  affirm  where 


608  APPENDIX 

necessary,  submit  where  necessary.    To  do  otherwise  is  to  misunder- 
stand the  role  of  reason.  —  PASCAL,  Pensees,  P.  II,  art.  vi,  i. 

82.  If  a  man  will  begin  with  certainties,  he  shall  end  in  doubts;  but 
if  he  will  be  content  to  begin  with  doubts,  he  shall  end  in  certainties.  — 
BACON,  Proficience  and  Advancement  of  Learning,  B.  I. 

83.  Where  men  of  judgment  creep  and  feel  their  way, 
The  positive  pronounce  without  dismay. 

COWPER,  Conversation,  145. 

84.  The  will  is  one  of  the  main  instruments  of  belief;  not  that  it  is 
the  source  of  belief,  but  that  things  appear  true  or  false  according  to  the 
point  of  view  from  which  they  are  seen.  —  PASCAL,  Pensees,  I,  vi,  13. 

85.  Veritati  aliquid  extremum  est;   error  immensus  est.  —  SENECA, 
Excerpta. 

86.  Quod  fere  libenter  homines  id  quod  volunt  credunt.  —  C.ESAR, 
De  bello  Gall.  Ill,  18. 

87.  Veritas  visu  et  mora,  falsa  festinatione  et  incertis  valescunt.  — 
TACITUS,  Annal.,  II,  39. 

88.  Words  are  wise  men's  counters;   they  do  but  reckon  by  them; 
but  they  are  the  money  of  fools.  —  HOBBES,  Leviathan,  I,  iv. 

89.  Nothing  is  so  easy  as  to  deceive  oneself,  for  a  man  readily  believes 
what  he  wishes,  but  this  belief  is  frequently  in  opposition  with  the  facts. 
—  DEMOSTHENES,  Olynth.  Ill,  19. 

90.  Be  calm  in  arguing;  for  fierceness  makes 
Error  a  fault,  and  truth  discourtesie. 

G.  HERBERT,  The  Temple,  The  Church  Porch. 

91.  Qualis  unusquisque  intus  est,  taliter  iudicat  exterius. — Imit. 
Christi,  II,  iv,  2. 

92.  The  fool  doth  think  he  is  wise,  but  the  wise  man  knows  himself 
to  be  a  fool.  —  SHAKESPEARE,  As  You  Like  It,  V,  i. 

93.  Sic  est  vulgus:  ex  veritate  pauca,  ex  opinione  multa  aestimat.  — 
CICERO,  Orat.  pro  Q.  Rose.  Com.  X. 

94.  Quid  maiore  fide  porro  quam  sensus  haberi 
Debet?  An  ab  sensu  falso  ratio  orta  valebit 
Dicere  eos  contra,  quae  tota  ab  sensibus  orta  est? 
Qui  nisi  sint  veri,  ratio  quoque  falsa  fit  omnis. 

LUCRETIUS,  De  rerum  nat.  IV,  483. 

95.  Ut  necesse  est  lancem  in  libra  ponderibus  impositis  deprimi,  sic 
animum  perspicuis  cedere.  —  CICERO,  Acad.  II,  12. 

96.  Non  enim  tarn  auctores  in  disputando  quam  rationis  momenta 
quaerenda  sunt.  —  CICERO,  De  natura  dear.  I,  5. 


SUBJECTS    FOR    PAPERS  609 

97.  Assiduitate    quotidiana    et    consuetudine    oculorum    assuescunt 
animi,  neque  admirantur,  neque  requirunt  rationes  earum  rerum  quas 
semper  vident;  proinde  quasi  novitas  nos  magis  quam  magnitude  rerum 
debeat  ad  exquirendas  causas  excitare.  —  CICERO,  De  nat.  deor.  II,  38. 

98.  Ipsa  consuetude  assentiendi  periculosa  esse  videtur  et  lubrica. 

—  CICERO,  Acad.  II,  21. 

99.  Duo  cum  idem  faciunt,  saepe  ut  possis  dicere: 
Hoc  licet  impune  facere  huic,  illi  non  licet; 

Non  quod  dissimilis  res  sit,  sed  quod  is  qui  facit. 

TERENCE,  Adelphi,  V,  iii,  37. 

100.  Nescimus  saepe  quid  possumus,  sed  tentatio  aperit  quid  sumus. 

—  Imit.  Christi,  I,  xiii,  5. 

101.  Mane  propone,  vespere  discute  mores  tuos. — Imit.  Christi, 
I,  xix,  4. 

102.  Saepe  malum  facilius  quam  bonum  de  alio  creditur  et  dicitur; 
ita  infirmi  sumus.  — Imit.  Christi,  I,  iv,  i. 

103.  Nam  qualitercumque  ordinavero  de  pace  mea,  non  potest  esse 
sine  bello  et  dolore  vita  mea.  — Imit.  Christi,  III,  xii,  i. 

104.  When  men  are  friends  there  is  no  need  of  justice,  but  when  they 
are  just,  they  still  need  friendship.  —  ARISTOTLE,  Eth.  Nic.  VIII,  i. 

105.  If  our  virtues 
Did  not  go  forth  of  us,  'twere  all  alike 
As  if  we  had  them  not. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Measure  for  Measure,  I,  i. 

106.  The  ruling  passion,  be  it  what  it  will, 
The  ruling  passion  conquers  reason  still. 

POPE,  Moral  Essays,  Ep.  Ill,  153. 

107.  There  is  some  soul  of  goodness  in  things  evil, 
Would  men  observingly  distil  it  out. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Henry  V,  IV,  i. 

108.  Reputation  is  an  idle  and  most  false  imposition;  oft  got  without 
merit,  and  lost  without  deserving.  —  SHAKESPEARE,  Othello,  II,  3. 

109.  To  thine  own  self  be  true; 
And  it  must  follow,  as  the  night  the  day, 
Thou  canst  not  then  be  false  to  any  man. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Hamlet,  I,  3. 

no.   Fine  art  is  that  in  which  the  hand,  the  head,  and  the  heart  go 
together.  —  RUSKIN,  The  Two  Paths,  lect.  2. 

in.  Omnis  ars  imitatio  est  naturae.  —  SENECA,  Epist.  65. 

Art  is  the  perfection  of  nature.  —  BROWNE,  Religio  Medici,  I,  16. 
40 


6lO  APPENDIX 

112.  Beggars  mounted  run  their  horse  to  death.  —  SHAKESPEARE, 
///  Henry  VI,  I,  4. 

113.  Were  man  but  constant,  he  were  perfect.  —  SHAKESPEARE,  The 
Two  Gentlemen  of  Verona,  V,  4. 

114.  Striving  to  better,  oft  we  mar  what's  well.  —  SHAKESPEARE, 
King  Lear,  I,  4. 

115.  Know  thou  this,  —  that  men 
Are  as  the  time  is. 

SHAKESPEARE,  King  Lear,  V,  3. 

116.  There  is  no  vice  so  simple  but  assumes 
Some  mark  of  virtue  on  his  outward  parts. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Merchant  of  Venice,  III,  2. 

117.  That  in  the  captain's  but  a  choleric  word 
Which  in  the  soldier  is  flat  blasphemy. 

SHAKESPEARE,  Measure  for  Measure,  II,  2. 

1 1 8.  Insani  sapiens  nomen  ferat,  aequus  iniqui 
Ultra  quam  satis  est  virtutem  si  petat  ipsam. 

HORACE,  Epist.  I,  vi,  15. 

NN^     119.   The  laws  of  conscience,  which  we  say  are  born  of  nature,  are 
born  of  custom.  —  MONTAIGNE,  Essais,  I,  22. 

1 20.  Est  modus  in  rebus;  sunt  certi  denique  fines 
Quos  ultra  citraque  nequit  consistere  rectum. 

HORACE,  Sat.  I,  i,  106. 

121.  Quot  homines  tot  sententiae;    suus  cuique  mos.  —  TERENCE, 
Phorm.  II,  iv,  14. 

122.  Gloria  nostra  est  testimonium  conscientiae  nostrae.  —  ST.  PAUL, 
1 1  Cor.  I,  12. 

123.  Mea  mihi  conscientia  pluris  est  quam  omnium  sermo.  —  CICERO, 
Ad  Attic.  XII,  28. 

124.  Lex  quaedam  regula  est  et  mensura  actuum.  .  .  .  Regula  autem 
et  mensura  humanorum  actuum  est  ratio.  —  ST.  THOMAS,  Sum.  theol. 
I-II,  Q.  90,  art.  i. 

125.  Omnino  si  quidquam  est  decorum,  nihil  est  profecto  magis  quam 
aequabilitas  universae  vitae  turn  singularium  actionum;   quam  conser- 
vare  non  possis  si  aliorum  naturam  imitans  omittas  tuam.  —  CICERO, 
De  offic.  I,  31. 

126.  Actio  recta  non  erit  nisi  recta  fuerit  voluntas;  ab  hac  enim  est 
actio.    Rursus  voluntas  non  erit  recta  nisi  habitus  animi  rectus  fuerit; 
ab  hoc  enim  est  voluntas.  —  SENECA,  Epist.  95. 

127.  Maximum  hoc  habemus  naturae  meritum  quod  virtus  in  omnium 


SUBJECTS     FOR    PAPERS  6ll 

animos  lumen  suum  permittit;  etiam  qui  non  sequuntur  illam  vident.  — 
SENECA,  De  benef.  IV,  17. 

128.  Aequam  memento  rebus  in  arduis 
Servare  mentem,  non  secus  in  bonis 

Ab  insolent!  temperatam 
Laetitia. 

HORACE,  Odes,  II,  3. 

129.  Ira  furor  brevis  est;  animum  rege,  qui,  nisi  paret, 
Imperat;  hunc  frenis,  hunc  tu  compesce  catena. 

HORACE,  Epist.  I,  ii,  62. 

130.  Non  est,  crede  mihi,  sapientis  dicere:  vivam. 
Sera  nimis  vita  est  crastina;  vive  hodie. 

MARTIAL,  Epigr.  I,  16. 

131.  Ut  quisque  est  vir  optimus,  ita  difficillime  esse  alios  improbos 
suspicatur.  —  CICERO,  Ad  Q.  fratrem,  I,  i,  4. 

132.  Felix  qui  potuit  rerum  cognoscere  causas.  —  VERGIL,  Georg.  II, 
490. 

133.  Prudens  interrogatio  quasi  dimidium  scientiae.  —  BACON,  De 
augmentis  scientiarum,  V,  116. 

134.  Tamdiu  discendum  est  quamdiu  nescias,  et,  si  proverbio  credi- 
mus,  quamdiu  vivas.  —  SENECA,  Epist.  76. 

135.  It  is  much  easier  to  detect  error  than  to  find  truth.    The  former 
lies  at  the  surface,  and  therefore  is  easily  got  at;  the  latter  lies  in  the 
depth,  and  to  search  for  it  is  not  every  man's  business.  —  GOETHE, 
Maxims. 

136.  Errors  like  straws  upon  the  surface  flow; 

He  who  would  search  for  pearls  must  dive  below. 

DRYDEN,  All  for  Love,  Prologue. 

137.  Nil  ideo  quoniam  natum  est  in  corpore  ut  uti 
Possemus;  sed  quod  natum  est,  id  procreat  usum. 

LUCRETIUS,  De  rerum  nat.  IV,  833. 

Nature  adapts  the  organ  to  the  function,  and  not  the  function  to  the 
organ.  —  ARISTOTLE,  De  part,  animal.  IV,  xii. 

138.  What  we  train  is  not  a  soul,  nor  a  body,  but  a  man;   the  two 
must  not  be  separated.  —  MONTAIGNE,  Essais,  I,  xxvi. 

139.  Ratio  et  oratio.  .  .  .  conciliat  inter  se  homines,  coniungitque 
naturali  quadam  societate.    Neque  ulla  re  longius  absumus  a  natura 
ferarum.  —  CICERO,  Definib.  I,  16. 

140.  Sufficit  ad  id  natura  quod  poscit.  —  SENECA,  Epist.  90. 

141.  Modus  quo  corporibus  adhaerent  spiritus  omnino  mirus  est, 


612  APPENDIX 

nee  comprehend!  ab  homine  potest,  et  hoc  ipse  homo  est.  -  ST  AUGUS 
TINE,  De  cimtate  Dei,  XXI,  10. 

142.  Ipsi  animi  magni  refert  quali  in  corpore  locati  sint;  multa  enim 

acuant  mentem>  muita  quae  °btundant- 


143-  Mutat  enim  mundi  naturam  totius  aetas, 
Ex  alioque  alius  status  excipere  omnia  debet; 
Nee  manet  ulla  sui  similis  res;  omnia  migrant; 
Omnia  commutat  natura,  et  vertere  cogit. 

LUCRETIUS,  De  rerum  nat.  V,  826 

144-  Intrandum  est  in  rerum  naturam,  et  penitus  quid  ea  postulet 
pervidendum.  —  CICERO,  De  finib.  V,  16. 

145.  Non  est  causa  efficiens,  sed  deficiens  mali,  quia  malum  non  est 
effectio,  sed  defectio.  —  ST.  AUGUSTINE,  De  cimtate  Dei,  XII  7 

146.  Omnia  profecto  cum  se  a  coelestibus  rebus  referet  ad  humanas 
excelsius  magnificentiusque  et  dicet  et  sentiet.  -  CICERO,  De  Oratore 
AAA1V,  119. 

of  Nature  h  *•  art  of 


I48'  'Tis  but  a  base  ignoble  mind 

That  mounts  no  higher  than  a  bird  can  soar. 

SHAKESPEARE,  //  Henry  VI,  II.  i 

149.  A  little  philosophy  inclineth  man's  mind  to  atheism;  but  depth 
in  philosophy  bringeth  men's  minds  about  to  religion:  For  while  the 
mind  of  man  looketh  upon  second  causes  scattered,  it  may  sometimes 
rest  in  them,  and  go  no  further;  but  when  it  beholdeth  the  chain  of 
them,  confederate  and  linked  together,  it  must  needs  fly  to  Providence 
and  Deity.  —  BACON,  Essays,  Atheism. 

I5°-  Thy  desire,  which  tends  to  know 

The  works  of  God,  thereby  to  glorify 
The  great  Work-Master,  leads  to  no  excess 
That  reaches  blame,  but  rather  merits  praise 
The  more  it  seems  excess. 

MILTON,  Paradise  Lost,  III,  694. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


ABELARD,  564. 

ABSOLUTE,  existence  of,  516  ff. 

idea  of,  132. 

ABSTRACTION,  nature  of,  93,  94  ff 
ACADEMY,  551,  553. 
ACCIDENT,  in  logic,  209,  211. 
ACTION,  17  ff.,  166  ff. 

automatic,  169,  172.  f. 

conscious  and  unconscious,  167. 

impulsive  and  instinctive,  171,  172.*. 

modes  of,  167  ff. 

moral  aspect  of,  281  ff. 

motives  of,  177. 

personal  and  impersonal,  167. 

random,  169,  172. 

reflex,  170,  172.  * 

rules  of,  303. 

volitional,  173.  *• 
ACTIVITY,  love  of,  147. 
Acrus,  516. 
ADELARD  of  Bath,  563. 
/ENESIDEMUS,  374,  556. 
/ESTHETIC  sentiment,  155,  270. 
/ESTHETICS,  265  ff. 
AFFECTIVE  life,  137  ff. 

importance  and  culture  of,  160  ft. 
AGNOSTICISM,  376. 

andknowablenessof  God,  5 13, 5295. 
D'AILLY,  Peter,  572. 
ALANTJS  of  Lille,  565. 
ALBERT  the  Great,  568. 
ALCUIN,  561. 
D'ALEMBERT,  584. 
ALEXANDER  of  Hales,  568. 
ALEXANDRIA,  school  of,  374,  557. 
ALFARABI,  566. 
ALKENDI,  566. 
AMAURY  of  Benes,  565. 
AMBROSE,  St.,  560. 
ANALOGY,  argument  from,  247. 

and  the  knowledge  of  God,  529  ff. 
ANALYSIS  and  synthesis,  117,  250. 

in  judgment,  no. 

in  psychology,  29  ff. 
ANALYTIC  judgments,  109,  395  ff. 
ANAXAGORA'S,  550. 


ANAXIMANDER,  549. 
ANAXIMENES,  549. 
ANDRONICUS  of  Rhodes,  556. 
ANGER,  148. 
ANSELM,  St.,  564. 
ANTHROPOMORPHISM,  529  ff. 
ANTIOCHUS  of  Ascalon,  553. 
ANTISTHENES,  551. 
APOLLONIUS  of  Rhodes,  555. 
APPETITE,  137. 
APPETITUS,  28,  138. 
APPROBATION,  love  of,  146. 
APRIORISM  and  origin   of   concepts, 

100,  105. 

ARABIAN  PHILOSOPHY,  565. 
ARCESILAUS,  374,  553,  556. 
ARISTIPPUS  of  Cyrene,  314,  551. 
ARISTOTLE,  553. 
ART,  275. 

classification  of  fine,  279. 

nature  and,  275,  276. 

science  and,  275,  278. 

works  of,  277  ff. 
ASSOCIATION  of  ideas,  34,  76,  115. 

ASSOCIATIONISM 

and  necessary  judgments,  113. 

and  origin  of  concepts,  99,  104. 

and  principle  of  induction,  253. 

and  the  moral  law,  297,  317,  318. 
ASSYRIA,  philosophy  of,  544. 
ATHEISM,  515. 
ATOMISM,  427,  428. 
ATTENTION,  31  ff. 
AUGUSTINE,  St.,  560. 
D'AURIOL,  Peter,  572. 
AUTHORITY,  417  ff. 

argument  from,  249. 

as  a  criterion  of  truth,  417  ff. 

civil,  357,  598. 

AVERROES,  566. 
AVICEBRON,  566. 
AVICENNA,  566. 


BAADER,  588. 

BABYLONIA,  philosophy  of,  544. 

BACON,  Francis,  578. 


6i6 


INDEX 


BACON,  Roger,  571. 
BADARAYANA,  546. 
BAIN,  99,  591. 
BALMES,  591. 
BANEZ,  577. 
BASIL,  St.,  560. 
BAUTAIN,  589. 
BEAUTY,  155,  270  ff. 

and  goodness,  268. 

and  truth,  267. 

realization  of,  277  ff. 

types  of,  273. 
BEING,  idea  of,  131. 
BELIEF,  120,  418. 
BENEVOLENCE  as  basis  of  morality, 

3". 

BENTHAM,  315,  591. 
BERKELEY,  580. 
BERNARD  of  Chartres,  563. 
BERNARD  of  Tours,  565. 
BESSARION,  575. 
BIRAN,  Maine  de,  589. 
BOZHME,  576. 
DE  BONALD,  101,  403,  589. 

BONAVENTURE,  St.,  568. 

BONNETTY,  589. 
BRAHMANISM,  545. 
BROWN,  588. 
BROWNSON,  592. 
BRUNO,  Giordano,  576. 
BUCHNER,  477,  588. 
BUDDHISM,  547. 
BURIDAN,  572. 
BUTLER,  581. 

CABANIS,  476,  584. 
CAIRO,  591. 
CAJETAN,  577. 
CALUMNY,  346. 
CAMPANELLA,  576. 
CANKARA,  546. 
CARLYLE,  591. 
CARNEADES,  374,  553,  556. 
CATEGORY,  in  logic,  211. 
CAUSE,  132. 

efficient,  454,  596. 

final,  455. 

first,  517,  597. 
CERTITUDE,  205,  366,  367,  372,  380. 

kinds  of,  367. 

of  facts  and  principles,  378,  381. 
CHARACTER,  203. 
CHARITY,  duties  of,  342. 
CHARRON,  577. 
CHILDREN,  duties  of,  354. 


CHINA,  philosophy  of,  547. 

CHRYSIPPUS,  555. 

CICERO,  556. 

CITIZENS,  rights  and  duties  of,  359. 

CLAIRVOYANCE,  199. 

CLEANTHES,  555. 

CLEMENT  of  Alexandria,  559. 

COMMON  SENSE  as  criterion  of  truth, 

405. 

COMPREHENSION  (see  INTENSION). 
COMTE,  590. 
CONATION,  28,  29,  166. 
CONCEPT,  93,  94  ff. 

and  image  compared,  96  ff. 

and  judgment,  108. 

genesis  of,  98  ff. 

objectivity  of,  398. 
CONDILLAC,  99,  583. 
CONDITIONAL 

argument,  230. 

proposition,  220. 
CONFUCIUS,  548. 
CONJUNCTIVE 

argument,  231. 

proposition,  220. 
CONNOTATION  (see  INTENSION). 
CONSCIENCE,  283,  299. 

as  the  rule  of  action,  300. 

education  of,  301. 
CONSCIOUSNESS,  23  ff. 

as  criterion  of  truth,  415. 
CONTINUITY  of  mental  processes,  36. 
CONTRACT,  social,  355. 
CONTRAPOSITION  of  propositions,  224. 
CONTROVERSY,  rules  of,  262. 
CONVERSION  of  propositions,  223. 

CORNOLDI,  590. 

CORTES,  Donoso,  591. 
COSMOLOGY,  423. 
COSMOS,  448. 
COUSIN,  589. 
CREATION,  535. 

of  human  soul,  493,  494. 

of  world,  534. 
CRITERION,  402. 

derivative,  414. 

ultimate,  403. 

CRITICISM  and  objectivity  of  knowl- 
edge, 388  ff. 
CUD  WORTH,  581. 
CUMBERLAND,  581. 
CURIOSITY,  153. 
CUVIER,  444. 
CYNICS,  551. 
CYRENAICS,  551. 


INDEX 


617 


DAMIRON,  589. 
DARWIN,  444,  591. 
DAVID  of  Dinant,  565. 
DEATH,  laws  and  signs  of,  498,  499. 
DEDUCTION,  116,  250,  254  ff. 
DEFINITION,  215  ff. 
DEISM,  535. 

DEMOCRITUS,  98,  476,  550. 
DEMONSTRATION,  244. 
DENOTATION  (see  EXTENSION). 
DENYS  the  Carthusian,  573. 
DESCARTES,  578. 

methodic  doubt  of,  243,  370. 

on  criterion  of  truth,  405. 

on  origin  of  ideas,  100. 

on  union  of  body  and  soul,  482,  484. 
DESIRE,  174. 
DETERMINISM,  and   freedom  of   the 

will,  177  ff. 
DETRACTION,  346. 
DIDEROT,  584. 
DIFFERENCE,  specific,  209. 
DIGNITY,  duties  concerning,  332,  345. 
DILEMMA,  232. 
DIOGENES  of  Sinope,  551. 
DION\SIUS,  Pseudo-,  560. 
DISCRETION,  347. 
DISCUSSION,  rules  of,  262. 
DISJUNCTIVE 

argument,  231. 

proposition,  220. 

DISPOSITION,  physiological  and  psy- 
chical, 72,  73,  84. 
DISTRACTION,  31. 
DIVISION,  217. 
DIVORCE,  353. 
DOGMATISM,  377  ff. 
DOUBT,  205,  366. 

methodical,  243,  370. 
DREAM,  195. 
DROBISCH,  588. 
DUEL,  345. 

DURANDUS  of  St.  Pourcain,  572. 
DUTY,  and  right,  328  ff. 

toward  God,  538. 

toward  men,  341. 

toward  self,  331. 
DYNAMISM,  427,  429. 

ECKHART,  573. 

EDWARDS,  592. 

EFFICIENT  CAUSALITY,  454,  596. 
EGYPT,  philosophy  of,  544. 
ELEATIC  school  of  philosophy,  549. 
EMOTION,  137,  144. 


altruistic,  148. 

self-regarding,  145. 
EMPEDOCLES,  98,  550. 
EMPIRICISM,  113,  297,  382. 
ENTHYMEME,  232. 
EPICHEIREMA,  232. 
EPICTETUS,  555. 
EPICURUS,  98,  314,  476,  555. 
EPISTEMOLOGY,  362. 

problems  and  method  of,  368,  369. 
ERDMANN,  587. 

ERIUGENA,  John  Scotus,  561,  563. 
ERROR,  205,  260. 

causes  of,  260,  413. 

remedies  of,  261. 
ESSENCE,  meaning  of,  96,  209. 
ETHICS,  281  ff. 
EUCLID  of  Megara,  551. 
EVIDENCE,  411. 

as  criterion  of  truth,  412. 

self-,  376,  378,  41 2. 
EVIL  and  divine  providence,  519,  536. 
EVOLUTION,  439,  440. 

of  inorganic  world,  441. 

of  man,  490,  492. 

of  organic  world,  441. 
EXAMPLE,  argument  from,  247. 
EXPERIENCE 

as  source  of  knowledge,  382. 

in  judgment,  in. 
EXPERIMENT,  251. 

in  psychology,  57  ff. 
EXTENSION,  and  intension,  95,  211. 

law  of,  96,  212. 

of  terms  in  propositions,  221. 

point  of  view  of,  in  syllogism,  233 
2.,  255. 

FACTS,  certitude  of,  249,  381,  418. 
FACULTIES,  27  ff.,  488. 
FALLACIES,  256  ff. 
FAMILY,  353. 
FEAR,  147. 
FEELING,  28,  29,  137. 

and  morality,  157,  161,  288,  309. 

and  will,  188. 

as  criterion  of  truth,  405. 

classification  of,  138. 

importance  and  culture  of,  160. 

of  pleasure  and  pain,  139. 
FERRARA,  577. 
FEUERBACH,  587. 
FICHTE,  586. 

FIGURES  of  syllogism,  227. 
FISKE,  592. 


6i8 


INDEX 


FONSECA,  577. 

FORM  and  matter,  428,  430,  438,  483. 
FOURIER,  590. 
FRANCK,  Sebastian,  576. 
FRANKLIN,  592. 
FREEDOM  of  will,  177  ff. 

condition  of  morality,  290. 
FROSCHAMMER,  494,  588. 

GALUPPI,  590. 
GARNIER,  589. 
GASSENDI,  427,  575. 
GAUTHIER  of  Mortagne,  563. 
GAZALI,  566. 
GEMISTUS  PLETHO,  575. 
GENERATIONISM,  494. 
GENUS,  meaning  of,  209. 
GERBERT,  562. 
GERSON,  573. 
GEULINCX,  582. 
GILBERT  de  la  Porre"e,  564. 
GILES  of  Lessines,  570. 
GILES  of  Rome,  570. 
GIOBERTI,  590. 
GNOSTICISM,  559. 
GOD,  51 1,  597. 

attributes  of,  525,  528. 

basis  of  moral  order,  324  ff.,  598. 

distinct  from  the  world,  521. 

duties  toward,  538. 

existence  of,  514  ff. 

first  cause,  517,  597. 

knowableness  of,  513,  529,  533. 

nature  of,  521. 

personal,  532. 

providence  of,  535. 

ultimate  end,  538,  598. 
GODFREY  of  Fontaines,  570. 
GCESCHEL,  587. 
GOODNESS,  and  beauty,  268. 
GORGIAS,  550. 

GORRES,  588.  ; 
GOTAMA,  547. 

GOVERNMENT,  forms  of,  357. 
GREEN,  591. 

GREGORY  Nazianzen,  560. 
GREGORY  of  Nyssa,  560. 
GROOT,  Gerard,  573. 
GROTIUS,  Hugo,  576. 

GtiNTHER,  588. 

HABIT,  34,  175. 
and  morality,  289. 
genesis  of,  175. 
importance  of,  176,  188. 


H^CKEL,  443,  588. 
HALLUCINATION,  89. 
HAMILTON,  588. 
HAPPINESS,  163. 

first  motor  of  the  will,  177. 
HARTLEY,  591. 
VON  HARTMANN,  588. 
HEARING,  sense  of,  51,  65. 
HEDONISM,  314. 
HEGEL,  587. 
HELVETIUS,  476,  584. 
HENRY  of  Ghent,  570. 
HERACLITUS,  549. 
HERBART,  588. 
HERDER,  586. 

HERMES  TRISMEGISTUS,  557. 
HISTORY  of  Philosophy,  542. 
HOBBES,  355,  579. 
D'HOLBACH,  476,  584. 
HONOR,  333. 

as  basis  of  morality,  312. 

due  to  others,  346. 
HUGH  of  St.  Victor,  565. 
HUME,  310,  463,  581. 
HUSBAND  and  wife,  duties  of,  354. 
HUTCHESON,  311,  581. 
HUXLEY,  591. 
HYLOMORPHISM,  428,  430. 
HYLOZOISM,  434. 
HYPNOTISM,  199. 

and  freedom  of  the  will,  182. 
HYPOTHESIS,  248. 
HYPOTHETICAL 

argument,  230. 

proposition,  220. 

IAMBLICUS,  558. 
IDEA,  72,  93. 

association  of,  34,  74,  76,  115. 

genesis  of  fundamental,  131. 

in  logic,  208. 

intension  and  extension  of,  95,  211. 

kinds  of,  212. 
IDEALISM,  387. 

and  knowledge  of  external  world, 

3Qi- 

and  knowledge  of  ideal  truths,  396. 

in  aesthetics,  276. 
IGNORANCE,  205,  366. 

and  morality,  287. 

sentiment  of,  153. 
ILLUSION,  89. 
IMAGE,  mental,  71  ff. 

and  concept  compared,  96  ff. 

as  motor,  75. 


INDEX 


619 


IMAGE,  —  continued. 

as  representative,  73. 

physiological  basis  of,  73. 

retention,  reproduction,  and  recog- 
nition of,  84. 
IMAGINATION,  33,  78. 

and  memory  compared,  83. 

importance  and  culture  of,  79. 

types  of,  82. 

IMMORTALITY  of  the  soul,  500  ff. 
IMPERATIVE,    categorical,    157,    294, 

320. 

INDIA,  philosophy  of,  545. 
INDUCTION,  116,  250,  251. 

fallacies  of,  260. 

methods  of,  252. 

principle  of,  253. 
INFERENCE,  115  ff. 

immediate,  224. 

mediate,  226. 
INFINITE,  idea  of,  132. 

God  is,  526,  531. 
INNATISM,   and  origin  of    concepts, 

loo,  105. 
INSANITY,  104. 
INTELLECT,  92. 

and  imagination,  80. 

and  senses,  102,  130,  474. 

and  will,  188. 

cultivation  of,  133  ff.,  333. 

in  man,  not  in  animals,  471  ff. 
INTELLECTUAL  sentiments,  153. 
INTELLIGENCE,  93. 
INTENSION,  and  extension,  95,  211. 

law  of,  96,  212. 

of  terms  in  propositions,  221. 

point   of    view    of,    in    syllogism, 

233,  255- 
INTERACTION  of  body  and  soul,  482, 

484,  489. 

INTEREST,  and  attention,  32. 
INTUITION   of   necessary   judgments, 

113,  412. 
IONIAN  school  of  philosophy,  548. 

ACOBI,  405,  586. 

AIMINI,  546. 
ANET,  589. 

OHN  of  St.  Thomas,  577. 
OHN  of  Salisbury,  565. 

OUFFROY,  589. 
UDGMENT,  IO7,  219. 

analysis  and  synthesis  in,  no. 
analytic  and  synthetic,   109,  395, 
396. 


and  concept  compared,  108. 

experience  and  reason  in,  in. 

genesis  of,  no,  117. 

kinds  of,  108,  219. 

rash,  326,  346. 
JUSTICE,  duties  of,  342. 
JUSTUS  LEPSIUS,  575. 

KANADA,  547. 
KANT,  584. 

on   analytic   and   synthetic   judg- 
ments, 396. 

on   knowledge   of  external   world, 

394- 

on  morality,  320. 

on  objectivity  of  knowledge,  388. 

on  origin  of  concepts,  101,  106. 
KAPILA,  546. 
KLEUTGEN,  588. 
KNOWLEDGE,  17,  28,  40,  385,  399. 

and  belief,  120. 

and  morality,  287. 

conditions  of,  386. 

development  of  intellectual,  133. 

faculties  of,  41,  42,  129. 

intellectual,  and  senses,  102. 

limits  of,  400. 

objectivity  of,  386. 

of  external  world,  389. 

of  ideal  truths,  395. 

qualities  of,  133. 

relativity  of,  399. 

scientific,  238. 

LAMARCK,  444,  591. 
LAMENNAIS,  101,  403,  589. 
LANGUAGE,  122,  124. 

acquisition  of,  125. 

and  thought,  126. 
LAO-TSZE,  547. 
LAPLACE,  441,  591. 
LAW,  292. 

civil,  283,  292,  294,  359. 

moral,  282,  285,  293  ff. 

of  thought,  235. 

physical,  285,  292,  452  ff.,  596. 
LAZARUS,  588. 

LEIBNIZ,  100,  427,  481,  484,  582. 
LEROUX,  590. 
LEUCIPPUS,  98,  476,  550. 

LlBERATORE,  590. 

LIFE,  432  ff. 

and  physical  energies,  436. 

duties  referring  to  one's  own,  337  ff. 

duties  referring  to,  of  others,  344. 


620 


INDEX 


LIFE,  —  continued. 

in  plants  and  animals,  435. 

nature  of,  436. 

origin  of,  442. 

origin  of  forms  of,  443. 
LITTRE,  590. 

LOCALIZATION,  cerebral,  192. 
LOCKE,  580. 

on  knowledge,  370,  387. 

on  origin  of  concepts,  99,  104. 
LOGIC,  206. 
LOTZE,  588. 
LOVE,  151,  343. 

of  activity,  147. 

of  approbation,  146. 

of  truth,  153. 
LUCRETIUS,  476,  555. 
LULLY,  Raymond,  571. 
LUTHER,  576. 

McCosH,  592. 
MACHIAVELLI,  576. 
MACKINTOSH,  588. 
MAIMONIDES,  566. 
DE  MAISTRE,  589. 
MALEBRANCHE,  101,  481,  484,  582. 
MAN,  489. 

antiquity  of,  496. 

greatness  and  smallness  of,  597. 

one  substance,  483. 

origin  of,  490  ff. 
MANDEVILLE,  582. 
MANICHEISM,  559. 
MANKIND, 

antiquity  of,  496. 

primitive  condition  of,  497. 

specific  unity  of,  495. 
MARCUS  AURELIUS,  555. 
MARRIAGE,  353. 
MARSILIUS  of  Inghen,  572. 
MATERIAL,  meaning  of,  469. 
MATERIALISM,  476,  523. 
MATTER,  and  form,  428,  430, 438, 483. 

constitution  of,  426  ff. 

idea  of,  132. 

properties  of,  425. 
MAXIMUS  of  Tyre,  557. 
MECHANISM,  427,  428,  455,  523. 
MELANCHTON,  576. 
MEMORY,  33,  83  ff. 

and  imagination  compared,  83. 

as  criterion  of  truth,  415. 

culture  of,  85. 

kinds  of,  34,  84. 
MENCIUS,  548. 


MENTAL,  22,  24. 

attitudes  regarding  truth,  205,  366. 

classification  of,  processes,  27  ff. 

general  laws  of,  processes,  35  ff. 
MERIT,  360. 
METAPHYSICS,  422. 
METHOD,  237. 
DE  LA  METTRTE,  476,  584. 
MIH-TSZE,  548. 
MILL,  James,  591. 

MILL,  John  Stuart,  99,  255,  316,  591. 
MIND,  13,  17,  19,  22,  24. 

and  organism,  190,  489. 

general  laws  of,  29,  35. 

human     and     animal     compared, 
471  ff. 

philosophy  of,  458. 

spiritual,  469,  471,  474. 

substantial,  21,  39,  460  ff. 
MIVART,  591. 
MOLESCHOTT,  477,  588. 
MONISM,  515,  522. 

forms  of,  522. 

psychophysical,  482,  485. 
MONTAIGNE,  577. 
MONTESQUIEU,  584. 
MOODS  of  syllogism,  228. 
MORAL,  284. 

law,  282,  285,  293  ff. 

sanction  of,  law,  326. 

sense,  310. 

sentiments,  157. 

standard,  303  ff. 
MORALITY,  281,  284, 

and  feelings,  288,  309  ff. 

and  habit,  289. 

and  knowledge,  287. 

and  pleasure,  313. 

and  utility,  313. 

and  will  and  freedom,  289,  290. 

based  on  human  nature  and  reason, 
307,  319,  323- 

based  ultimately  on  God,  323,  520, 
598. 

concrete  sentiment  of,  158. 

determinants  of  concrete,  302. 

existence  of,  295  ff. 

standard  of,  303  ff. 
MORE,  Thomas,  576. 
MOTIVES  of  action,  177,  178. 
MURDER,  344. 
MYSTICISM,  565. 

NATURE,  449,  452. 
and  art,  275,  276. 


INDEX 


621 


NATURE,  —  continued. 
human,  as  basis  of  morality,  307, 

3i9,  323- 
laws  of,  452. 
NIKOLAUS  of  Cusa,  576. 
NOMINALISM,  99,  104,  398. 

OBSERVATION  and  experiment,  251. 

OBVERSION  of  propositions,  223. 

OCCASIONALISM,  481,  484. 

OCKHAM,  572. 

ONTOLOGISM,  101,  105,  406,  590. 

OPINION,  205,  366 

OPPOSITION 

of  terms,  214. 

of  propositions,  222. 
ORGANISM  and  mind,  190,  480,  489. 

origin  of  human,  490. 
ORIGEN,  559. 
ORIGIN,  problem  of,  439. 

of  human  organism,  490. 

of  human  soul,  492. 
OWNERSHIP,  347. 

private,  348  ff. 

PAIN  (see  PLEASURE). 
PANTHEISM,  515,  521  ff. 
PARACELSUS,  576. 
PARALLELISM,    psychophysical,   482, 

485- 

PARENTS,  duties  of,  354. 
PARMENEDES,  549. 
PASSION,  137. 
PATANJALI,  547. 
PATRIOTISM,  152,  359. 
PAULSEN,  588. 
PERCEPTION,  44,  62. 

analysis  of,  62. 

auditory,  65. 

genesis  of,  64. 

of  external  world,  65,  67,  69  ff., 

3?9. 

of  time,  88. 

olfactory  and  gustatory,  64. 

tactual,  66. 

validity  of,  389  ff.,  414. 

visual,  67. 

PERIPATETIC  school  of  philosophy,  553. 
PERSIA,  philosophy  of,  545. 
PERSONALITY,  204,  509. 

double  or  multiple,  197,  465. 
PESCH,  588. 
PHENOMENALISM,    and     the    human 

mind,   460,   463. 
PHI£O  of  Larissa,  553,  556. 


PHILO  the  Jew,  557. 
PHILOSOPHY,  7  ff. 

division  of,  9. 

history  of,  542. 

method  of,  n. 

of  mind,  458. 

relation  of,  to  sciences,  3  ff.,  8. 
PHRENOLOGY,  192. 
Pico  della  Mirandola,  575. 
PLATO,  100,  387,  551. 
PLEASURE  amfcpain,  139. 

importance  of,  142. 

laws  of,  140. 
PLOTINUS,  558. 
PLUTARCH,  557. 
POLYSYLLOGISM,  232. 
POMPON ATIUS,  575. 
PORPHYRY,  210,  558. 
PORTER,  592. 
POSITIVISM,  590  (see  EMPIRICISM). 

POTENTIA,  516. 

PRACTICE,  as  criterion  of  truth,  407  ff. 
PRAGMATISM,  408,  410. 
PRAYER,  duty  of,  539. 
PREDICABLE,  209. 
PREDICAMENT,  211. 
PREESTABLISHED  HARMONY,  481,  484. 
PREJUDICES,  118,  135. 
PRIESTLEY,  591. 
PRINCIPLES,  knowledge  of,  133,  378, 

381,  396- 

PROBABILITY,  246,  366,  375. 
PROCLUS,  558. 
PROPERTY, 

duties  referring  to,  347. 

in  logic,  209. 
PROPOSITION,  219. 

contraposition  of,  224. 

conversion  of,  223. 

immediate  inference  of,  224. 

kinds  of,  219. 

ob version  of,  223. 

opposition  of,  222. 
PROTAGORAS,  550. 
PROVIDENCE  of  God,  535. 
PRUDENCE,  334. 
PSYCHOLOGY,  22,  25,  26. 

analysis  in,  29  ff. 

division  of,  27  ff. 

experimental,  56  ff. 
PYRRHO,  374,  556. 
PYTHAGORAS,  549. 

RACES  of  mankind,  495. 
RATIONALISM  and  certitude,  383. 


622 


INDEX 


REALISM,  388. 

and  knowledge  of  external  world, 

389- 

and  knowledge  of  ideal  truths,  395. 

in  aesthetics,  276. 
REASON, 

morality  based  on,  307,  319,  323. 

practical,  as  criterion  of  truth,  407. 

validity  of,  416. 
REASONING,  115,  116,  226. 

inductive  and  deductive,  116. 

uses  of,  121. 
REFLECTION,  471,  474. 

in  philosophy,  n,  12. 

in  psychology,  26. 
REED,  310,  405,  588. 
REINHOLD,  586. 
RELATIVITY  of  knowledge,  399. 
RELIGION,  538. 
RELIGIOUS  sentiments,  158. 
R£MI  of  Auxerre,  562,  563. 
RENOUVIER,  590. 
REPUTATION, 

of  others,  346. 

personal,  333. 

RESPONSIBILITY,  moral,  326. 
RHABANUS  MAURUS,  561. 
RICHARD  of  Middletown,  570. 
RICHARD  of  St.  Victor,  565. 
RIGHT  and  duty,  328  ff. 
ROBERT  KILWARDBY,  570. 
ROMANES,  591. 
ROSCELIN,  564. 
ROSENCRANZ,  587. 

ROSMINI,  101,  590. 

ROUSSEAU,  355,  584. 
ROYER-COLLARD,  589. 
RULE  of  human  actions,  303. 
RUYSBRCECK,  573. 

SAINT-SIMON,  590. 
SANCHEZ,  577. 

SANCTION  of  moral  law,  326. 
SANSEVERINO,  590. 
SCEPTICISM,  373. 
SCHELLING,  587. 
SCHILLER,  586. 
SCHOLASTIC  philosophy,  560. 
SCHOOLS  in  Middle  Ages,  561. 
SCHOPENHAUER,  588. 
SCIENCE,  238. 

and  art,  275,  278. 

classification  of,  240. 
SCOTUS,  Duns,  570. 
SECRETAN,  590. 


SECRETS,  obligation  to  keep,  347. 
SELF,  13  ff. 

-condemnation,  148. 

-consciousness,  130. 

-control,  185,  336. 

-defence,  344. 

duties  toward,  331. 

idea  of,  131.  ( 

-importance,  146. 

-knowledge,  26,  337. 

-love,  14,  331. 

-neglect,  340. 

obvious  characteristics  of,  19. 

relations  of,  to  external  world,  13, 

17- 

-respect,  331,  332. 
SENECA,  555,  556. 
SENSATION,  44  ff. 

auditory,  51. 

external,  45,  46  ff. 

internal,  45,  46. 

measurement  of,  56  ff . 

muscular,  50. 

of  smell  and  taste,  47. 

of  temperature,  50. 

of  touch,  49. 

perceptible  difference  of,  56,  59  ff . 

threshold  of,  57,  59. 

visual,  52. 

SENSATIONALISM,  99,  104. 
SENSES,  44,  45. 

and  intellect,  102,  130,  474. 

comparison  of  external,  55. 

education  of,  62,  64. 

number  of  external,  53. 

perception  of  (see  PERCEPTION). 

value  of  knowledge  of,  414. 
SENSISM,  98,  103. 
SENTIMENT,  137,  152. 

aesthetic,  155. 

intellectual,  153. 

moral,  157,  309. 

religious,  158. 
SERIES,    mind    as    a,    of    processes, 

463ff. 

SEXTUS  EMPIRICUS,  374,  556. 
SHAFTESBURY,  310,  581. 
SIGER  of  Brabant,  571. 
SIGN,  meaning  and  division  of,  122, 

123. 

of  mental  processes,  123. 
SIMPLICITY  of  the  mind,  469,  470. 
SIMPLICIUS,  558. 
SINCERITY,  334,  346. 
SLAVERY,  345. 


INDEX 


623  , 


SLEEP,  195. 

SMELL  and  taste,  47,  48,  64. 
SMITH,  Adam,  311,  582. 
SOCIAL  CONTRACT,  355. 
SOCIALISM,  348. 
SOCIETY,  nature  of,  352. 
SOCRATES,  551. 
SOLIDARITY, 

in  ethics,  319. 

of  mental  processes,  35. 
SOMNAMBULISM,  196. 
SOPHISTS,  373,  550. 
SORITES,  232. 
SOUL,  489. 

immortality  of,  500. 

one  in  man,  487. 

origin  of,  492. 

seat  of,  in  organism,  487. 

spiritual,  471. 

union  of,  with  body,  480. 
SPACE,  132,  449. 
SPECIES,  209. 

evolution  of  (see  TRANSFORMISM). 

unity  of  human,  495. 
SPEECH,  and  writing,  125. 
SPENCER,  591. 

on  criterion  of  truth,  406. 

on    knowableness    of    God,    513, 

530  ff. 

on  morality,  318. 

on  origin  of  concepts,  99. 
SPINOZA,  582.  ^ 
SPIRITISM,  201. 

SPIRITUALITY  of  the  soul,  469  ff. 
STATE,  354. 

functions  and  rights  of  the,  358. 

origin  of  the,  355. 
STATISTICS,  247. 
STEINTHAL,  588. 
STEWART,  Dugald,  588. 
STOCKL,  588. 
STOICS,  320,  555. 
STRAUSS,  587. 
SUAREZ,  577. 
SUBSTANCE,  131,  460,  524. 

man  is  one,  483. 

mind  is  a,  460. 

SUGGESTION,  mental,  198,  200. 
SUICIDE,  337. 
Suso,  Henry,  573. 
SYLLOGISM,  227. 

figures  and  moods  of,  227. 

hypothetical,  230. 

imperfect  forms  of,  232. 

principles  of,  233. 


quantitative,  234.  / 

rules  of,  228. 
SYMPATHY,  150,  151. 

as  basis  of  morality,  311. 
SYNTHESIS  and  analysis,  117,  250. 

in  judgment,  no. 

in  psychology,  30. 
SYNTHETIC  judgments,  109,  395  ff. 


TAINE,  99,  590. 
TASTE  and  smell,  47,  48,  64. 
TAULER,  573. 
TELEOLOGY,  455. 
and  existence  of  God,  519. 
and  immortality  of  soul,  503. 
TELEPATHY,  200 
TELESIO,  575. 
TEMPERAMENT,  191,  203. 
TEMPERANCE,  336. 
TEMPERATURE,  sense  of,  50. 
TERM,  211. 

intension  and  extension  of,  95,  211, 
221. 

kinds  of,  213. 

supposition  of,  211. 
THALES,  549. 
THEISM,  515,  521. 
THEMISTIUS,  558. 
THEODICY,  511. 
THEOPHRASTUS,  554. 
THIERRY  of  Chartres,  563. 
THOMAS  a  Kempis,  573. 
THOMAS,  St.,  Aquinas,  568. 
THOUGHT,  92. 

and  language,  126. 

primary  laws  of,  235. 
TIME,  132,  451. 

-perception,  88. 
TOUCH,  sense  of,  49,  66. 
TRADITION,  validity  of  oral,  419. 
TRADITIONALISM,  101,  105,  403,  589. 
TRADUCIANISM,  494. 
TRANSCENDENTALISM,  and  origin  of 

concepts,  101,  106. 
TRANSFORMISM,  443,  445. 

applied  to  man,  490  ff. 
TRENDELENBURG,  588. 
TRUTH,  364,  380. 

and  beauty,  267. 

knowledge  of  ideal,  395. 

love  of,  153. 

moral,  334,  346. 

personal  and  impersonal,  120. 
TRUTHFULNESS,  334,  346. 


624 


INDEX 


UNION,  480. 

of  body  and  soul,  481  ff, 
UNIVERSALS,  problem  of,  398,  562. 
UNIVERSE,  448,  595. 
UTILITARIANISM,  297,  298,  314,  316. 

VERACITY,  duty  of,  334,  346. 
VIRTUE,  326,  360. 
VISION,  52,  67. 
VOGT,  476,  588. 
VOLTAIRE,  584. 

WALLACE,  591. 
WALTER  of  Mortagne,  563. 
WIFE  and  husband,  duties  of,  354. 
WILL,  173  ff. 

and  desire,  174. 

and  feelings,  188. 

and  intellect,  188. 

and  morality,  289  ff. 


freedom  of,  177  ff. 

importance  and  culture  of,  185,  334. 
WILLIAM  of  Auvergne,  568. 
WILLIAM  of  Champeaux,  563. 
WILLIAM  of  Conches,  563. 
VON  WOLFF,  583. 
WORLD,  448. 

knowledge  of  external,  389. 

obvious  characteristics  of,  15  ff. 
WRITING,  and  speech,  125. 
WRITTEN  documents,  authority  of,42o. 

XENOPHANES,  549. 
YANG-CHU,  548. 

ZENO  of  Citium,  555. 
ZENO  of  Elea,  549. 
ZOROASTER,  545. 
ZWINGLI,  576. 


